BAGONG PILIPINAS

PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD

2024

WEST PHILIPPINE SEA

Annual Report

WEST PHILIPPINE SEA TRANSPARENCY GROUP

2024 WEST PHILIPPINE SEA Annual Report

Executive Summary

In 2024, the Philippine government strengthened its administrative authority in the West Philippine Sea through increased deployments of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). Regular maritime patrol (MARPAT) operations were carried out in Bajo de Masinloc (BdM) and the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), supported by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) to enhance maritime domain awareness. The PCG achieved a milestone with BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV-9701) setting a record 152-day deployment in Escoda (Sabina) Shoal.

Despite China's continued illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive (ICAD) actions, including area denial tactics by the China Coast Guard (CCG), the Philippine government has maintained a resolute stance in asserting its maritime rights. This determination has garnered public support, translating into increased congressional funding to sustain and expand PCG operations in the West Philippine Sea. The inter-agency collaboration, particularly with BFAR, has also intensified, ensuring Filipino fishermen receive logistical support and encouraging them to continue operating in these waters.

In parallel with its operational efforts, the Philippine government has prioritized transparency and public engagement to solidify domestic and international backing. The West Philippine Sea Transparency Group (WPSTG) played a pivotal role in disseminating accurate information on maritime rights through initiatives such as the *Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea*, the publication of the comic book *Ang Mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun*, the nationwide fun run, *Takbo Para sa West Philippine Sea*, and campus caravans, among others. These efforts have reinforced the country's legal and diplomatic positions while fostering a broader understanding of the West Philippine Sea situation.

Looking ahead, the Philippines is set to adopt a more proactive stance in the West Philippine Sea and the broader South China Sea region by integrating security, diplomatic, economic, political, and environmental strategies to safeguard national interests.

PART I. Bajo de Masinloc

Int. Scarborough Shoal



FIGURE 1.1. Philippine map indicating the location of Bajo de Masinloc, boxed in red

FIGURE 1.2. Filipino fisherfolk participating in a ceremonial flag-laying activity at a *payao* in the West Philippine Sea (December 2024)

FIGURE 1.3. A Filipino Service Boat mooring beside BRP TERESA MAGBANUA to receive logistical support (December 2024)

"In CY2024 the PCG has conducted a total of 22 deployments in the West Philippine Sea near Bajo de Masinloc, including three (3) joint missions with the BFAR."

OVERVIEW

The year 2024 presents a significant milestone in the Philippine government's projection of administrative authority in the West Philippine Sea near Bajo de Masinloc (BdM). The PCG increased both the frequency and duration of its presence in BdM through consecutive and uninterrupted deployment of PCG maritime assets to conduct MARPAT operations in the area. These efforts were further bolstered by occasional Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) flights manned by the Coast Guard Aviation Force (CGAF) and by BFAR, alongside joint MARPAT and humanitarian missions.

The Philippine government's intensified efforts to assert its lawful presence and administrative authority in the area through the efforts of the PCG, among other concerned agencies, prompted China, primarily through the China Coast Guard (CCG), to recalibrate its area denial strategies by preventing Philippine vessels access from farther distances around BdM.

CHINA

China has evidently recalibrated its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy in BdM and its vicinity waters, departing from its previously documented vessel deployment patterns in 2023. While routine deployments continued during the first quarter of 2024, irregularities emerged in the second quarter. This is particularly seen in the shift in the types of vessels stationed inside the shoal—from CCG vessels to "civilian", likely affiliated with the Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM).

In 2023, pairs of 40 to 45-meter *Shutu-WAG class* CCG vessels (e.g. CCG-3063 and 3064; 3065 and 3066) were regularly dispatched inside the shoal. However, beginning in April 2024, these were replaced by pairs of CMM vessels (CMMVs) bearing the pinyin YUE ZHAN YU, following similar deployment patterns. The CMMVs involved included those with the bow numbers 08032, 08033, 08036, 08044, 08045, and 08048.

Figure 1.4.
Threat Level Assessment of Incidents at Bajo de Masinloc

less aggressive

Radio Challenges

BRP BAGACAY (PCG)
(14 to 17 May 2024)

BRP SINDANGAN (PCG)
(26 June to 01 July 2024)

BRP GABRIELA SILANG (PCG)
(11 to 17 August)

BRP GABRIELA SILANG (PCG)
(30 August to 02 September)
(07 to 15 September)

Shadowing

BRP SULUAN (PCG)
(16 to 23 August)

BRP SULUAN (PCG)
(25 August to 01 September)

(HELICOPTER)
BRP SULUAN (PCG)
(04 to 11 October)

Dangerous Maneuvers

BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (PCG)
(01 to 09 February)

BRP DATU SANDAY (BFAR)
(21 to 24 February)



Dangerous Maneuvers

BRP SINDANGAN (PCG)
(14 to 19 June)

BRP DATU TAMBLOT (BFAR)
(14 to 17 February)

BRP MALAPASCUA (PCG)
(30 June to 08 July 2024)

BRP MALAPASCUA (PCG)
(14 to 21 June 2024)

Blocking

BRP CABRA (PCG)
(11 to 18 October)

Use of Water Cannons

BRP DATU CABAYLO (BFAR)
BRP DATU SANDAY (BFAR)
(07 to 09 October)

Ramming/Collision

BRP CABRA (PCG)
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (PCG)
BRP DATU SANDAY (BFAR)
BRP DATU PAGBUAYA (BFAR)
(02 to 05 December)

Ramming/Collision

BRP MALABRIGO (PCG)
(06 to 08 March)

BRP BAGACAY (PCG)
BRP DATU BANKAW (BFAR)
(30 April to 01 May)

more aggressive

Int. Scarborough Shoal

***Figures 1.5. and 1.6**. CMMVs YUE ZHAN YU 08032 (top, left) and 08036 (bottom, left) pictured inside the shoal (December 2024).*

***Figure 1.7.** (right) BRP TERESA MAGBANUA distributing logistical support to Filipino fisherfolk in the WPS off Zambales, with BRP CABRA providing security escort (December 2024).*

By the third quarter, Chinese deployment patterns became more consistent. The number of CCG vessels patrolling the waters around the shoal increased from two to three, with a fourth vessel occasionally joining, particularly when Philippine presence heightened in the area. Typically, CCG vessels would spend five to six weeks in the area before rotating (Annex 1.2).

With the onset of the fishing season, the PCG recorded an increase in Chinese vessels, especially CMMVs, starting in February (Figure 1.8). On May, the number of monitored Chinese vessels reached an unprecedented high of 66, a direct response to the ATIN ITO! civilian mission in the waters near BdM held on 15 May.

Although the numbers went down after May, compared to 2023, the monthly average of Chinese vessels in the area rose from 23 to 37 in 2024. This growth reflects not only the expanded presence and active participation of CMMVs and CCG vessels, but also the heightened deployment of PLA-N ships, which recorded the highest count at 11 ships in December. In addition to China's intensified activities, the higher figures also demonstrate improved monitoring capabilities on the part of the Philippines.

The CCG's response to the presence of PCG and BFAR vessels grew increasingly aggressive during the first and second quarters (Figure 1.4). This culminated in April 2024 when BRP DATU BANKAW (MMOV-3004) was subjected to water cannon attacks and collided with a CCG vessel three times. The highest single-day monitoring of Chinese vessels around the shoal occurred in mid-May 2024, coinciding with the civilian resupply mission carried out by the ATIN ITO! Coalition.

Although CCG actions simmered down beginning in June 2024, marked mostly by shadowing, radio challenges, and dangerous maneuvers, China maintained efforts to prevent Philippine state vessels and Filipino Fishing Boats (FFBs) from operating within the immediate vicinity waters of the shoal. CCG vessels initiated dangerous maneuvers as Philippine state vessels approached within the 30.0 nautical mile-mark of the shoal. Nevertheless, in early December 2024, BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV-9701)

managed to come as close as 10 nautical miles of BdM.

After refraining from using water cannons against Philippine state vessels, the CCG resumed their use against BFAR vessels in October and December 2024. During the December incident, CCG-3302 collided with BFAR vessel BRP DATU PAGBUAYA (MMOV-3003).

Moreover, from the third quarter onwards, CCG vessels noticeably expanded their area of patrol, with PCG vessels reporting radio challenges issued around 80 nautical miles of BdM. People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) ships were observed actively monitoring Philippine vessels as well.

Using satellite imagery, the PCG also identified at least 32 days when Chinese entities installed a floating barrier at the southeast entrance of the BdM, spanning approximately 303.0 to 495.0 meters in length (Annex 1.1). The actual number of days may be higher considering gaps in satellite coverage or cloud cover obscuring the shoal. While it remains inconclusive whether these floating barrier deployments exceeded 2023 levels due to limited data from that period, physical monitoring suggests fewer instances of barrier installations during 2023. Moreover, in response to the symbolic laying of buoys by a civilian group in the West Philippine Sea off Zambales in mid-May 2024, Chinese entities installed two rows of barriers at the shoal's southeast entrance.

Regarding the harassment of Filipino fisherfolk aboard FFBs, incidents peaked in May 2024, with 13 reports, followed by 11 in November 2024. These incidents mainly involved the use of aluminum-hulled boats to approach, document, and follow FFBs. Additionally, CCG personnel used megaphones, hand gestures, and sirens or horns to intimidate and drive away fisherfolk engaged in lawful fishing operations near BdM or at their respective Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs), locally known as *payao*. The most notable



Figure 1.8.
Bajo de Masinloc Vessel Monitoring for CY2024.

incident occurred in January 2024, when nine Filipino fisherfolk were harassed, chased, and forced by CCG personnel into surrendering edible star shells (*taktakun*) they harvested from an exposed portion of the reef in the southern part of BdM.

PHILIPPINE EFFORTS

Pursuant with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s directive to maintain a Philippine presence in the West Philippine Sea, the PCG achieved a record deployment of 22 vessels conducting MARPAT missions in the waters near BdM in 2024. Three of these missions were carried out jointly with BFAR. Additionally, BFAR independently deployed six vessels throughout the year, with PCG personnel onboard. These maritime efforts were further supported by the occasional dispatch of PCG and BFAR aircraft for MDA flights.

As part of OPLAN *Kalasag sa Kanlurang Karagatan* (KKK), since June 2024, the PCG's MARPAT operations have remained mostly uninterrupted, maintained by the regular rotation and relieving of PCG vessels. However, operations faced disruptions from September to November 2024 owing to inclement weather.

Throughout 2024, PCG and BFAR vessels provided logistical support to FFBs in seven missions within the area. Three of these missions were conducted solely by the PCG, delivering fuel, food, water, and medical supplies to fisherfolk operating near the shoal. This support aimed to extend the duration of fisherfolk activities by reducing the need for frequent resupply trips ashore. In addition, PCG vessels on MARPAT mission actively heeded distress calls from FFBs by immediately carrying out Search and Rescue (SAR) and salvage operations upon receiving incident reports. Additionally, PCG vessels also provided towing assistance to FFBs experiencing engine trouble. The PCG also

Figure 1.9.
BRP CABRA towed FFB MARTINA and its service boat to Limay Port, Bataan on 21 December.

provided security assistance during the WPS Atin Ito! Coalition activities in mid-May 2024.

FFBs recorded a monthly average of 61 boats in the first quarter of 2024. Subsequently, no FFBs were observed operating in the immediate vicinity of the shoal, as the fishing season waned and more fisherfolk opted to fish at their respective *payaos*. During the second and third quarters, the monthly averages of boats near their *payaos* were logged at 35 and 32 boats, respectively.

However, the number surged again in October, with 74, and December 2024, with 86. This increase aligned with several humanitarian missions: one conducted by BFAR from 07 to 09 October 2024, a joint BFAR and PCG operation from 04 to 09 December, and a mission led solely by the PCG from 18 to 19 December. For the entire year, there were 297 days wherein at least one FFB was in the vicinity waters of the shoal.

Aside from PCG and BFAR deployments, in May 2024, the PCG released previously unpublished documentation detailing China's exploitative activities in BdM to the public. These activities include the scouring of the shoal's seabed, the harvesting of giant clams, and the collection of

sea turtles, to show the threats to the environmental integrity of the area.

ANALYSIS

Relevant agencies, such as the PCG and BFAR, were emboldened to bolster their presence in the vicinity of BdM through more frequent and extended patrols during the first and second quarters of 2024. This increased activity followed the successful Philippine deployments in 2023 and was further sustained by public support for the administration's policies, actions, and programs on the West Philippine Sea and the transparency initiative. This exposed China's ICAD actions in the area to both local and international audiences. In response to this, as well as PCG and BFAR patrols, especially in the first half of the year, China adjusted its previous routine by expanding the patrol areas of the CCG to include regions within the Philippine EEZ that it claims under its unilateral "dashed line" map.

Building on the success of smaller 30-meter BFAR vessels, which had previously approached the southeast entrance of the shoal, China replaced the *Shutu-WAG*-class vessels stationed inside BdM with similarly sized YUE ZHAN YU vessels, suspected to be CMMVs. This shift to CMMVs rather than CCG vessels creates more space for China to deny its involvement by claiming that civilian fishing vessels are conducting lawful operations. However, the 2016 Arbitral Award provides that only traditional fishing methods are allowed inside the shoal, as BdM was identified as a traditional fishing ground. Moreover, data shows that China has regularly installed floating barriers at the entrance of BdM in response to the presence and operations of Philippine state vessels near the shoal.

After the substantial build-up of Chinese vessels around the shoal in May, which seemed to be a disproportionate and threatening reaction to civilian activities in the West Philippine Sea, the CCG scaled back its ICAD activities against Philippine vessels in the third quarter. During this period, Philippine vessels were mostly subjected to radio challenges and occasional dangerous maneuvers. However, ICAD actions heightened again in October, coinciding with the humanitarian mission conducted by BFAR. Such response may possibly be an effort to intimidate Philippine authorities and prevent a successful approach near the southeast entrance of the shoal, similar to the one carried out by three BFAR vessels in the December 2023 mission.

The high concentration of vessels in May and the issuance of CCG Regulation No. 3, titled *Provisions on Administrative Enforcement Procedures for Coast Guard Agencies 2024*, in June 2024 discouraged local fisherfolk from venturing around the immediate vicinity of the shoal. Instead, they opted to operate at and around their respective FADs, located about 10 nautical miles from BdM. CCG Regulation No. 3, authorized the CCG to detain vessels or individuals caught trespassing within China's unlawfully claimed sea areas for up to 60 days.

The enforcement of CCG Regulation No. 3, combined with ongoing acts of intimidation—such as the use of megaphones, horns, sirens, radio challenges, and dangerous maneuvers—directly infringes upon the lawful rights of Filipino fisherfolk to operate around BdM and within the Philippine EEZ. These actions have adversely affected the productivity of fisherfolk, as disruptions to their operations result in reduced yields and profits.

As such, the sustained presence of Philippine government vessels in the area, along with regular humanitarian missions led by concerned agencies, is critical in encouraging local fisherfolk to operate in the West Philippine Sea on a regular basis. These missions provide logistical support that facilitates extended fishing operations with less need to resupply. Furthermore, the presence of these vessels offers a sense of security and ensures a prompt response during emergencies.

PART I. Bajo de Masinloc

Int. Scarborough Shoal

Annex 1.1. Floating Barriers at the Southeast Entrance of BdM



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Annex 1.1 Floating Barriers at the Southeast Entrance of BdM



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

07 1424H Dec 2024 (PH time)

09 0937H DEC 2024 (PH time)

10 1200H DEC 2024 (PH time)

PART I. Bajo de Masinloc

Int. Scarborough Shoal

Vessel Name	Dec 28-Jan 3	Jan 4-Jan 10	Jan 11-Jan 17	Jan 18-Jan 24	Jan 25-Jan 31	Feb 1-Feb 7	Feb 8-Feb 14	Feb 15-Feb 21	Feb 22-Feb 28	Feb 29-Mar 6	Mar 7-Mar 13	Mar 14-Mar 20	Mar 21-Mar 27	Mar 28-Apr 3	Apr 4-Apr 10	Apr 11-Apr 17	Apr 18-Apr 24	Apr 25-May 1	May 2-May 8	May 9-May 15	May 16-May 22	May 23-May 29	May 30-Jun 5	Jun 6-Jun 12	Jun 13-Jun 19	Jun 20-Jun 26	Jun 27-Jul 3	Jul 4-Jul 10	Jul 11-Jul 17	Jul 18-Jul 24	Jul 25-Jul 31	Aug 1-Aug 7	Aug 8-Aug 14	Aug 15-Aug 21	Aug 22-Aug 28	Aug 29-Sep 4	Sep 5-Sep 11	Sep 12-Sep 18	Sep 19-Sep 25	Sep 26-Oct 2	Oct 3-Oct 9	Oct 10-Oct 16	Oct 17-Oct 23	Oct 24-Oct 30	Oct 31-Nov 6	Nov 7-Nov 13	Nov 14-Nov 20	Nov 21-Nov 27	Nov 28-Dec 4	Dec 5-Dec 11	Dec 12-Dec 18	Dec 19-Dec 25	Dec 26-Jan 1	Total Days Monitored (2024)
CCGVs																																																						
CCG-3303	3	7	7	7	5	1																		1						3	7	7	7	7	7	2																		71
CCG-3063	2	2				5	7	7	7	3																																												33
CCG-3064	2	1				1	7	6	7	3																																												27
CCG-3104		5	7	7	4				5	7	6	5	3																		1	1	1	4	2									1	5	5	4	5	4	4	4	1		91
CCG-3066		3	7	7	7	1					7	7	7	7	6																																							59
CCG-3065		3	7	7	7						7	7	7	7	6																																							58
CCG-3302		**3**			**5**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**2**				**4**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**6**	**2**					**2**	**7**	**7**	**5**	**5**									**1**	**2**	**7**	**6**	**7**	**7**							**3**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**151**
CCG-3105					3	6	6	7	3			4	6							1					1		2	4	3	2											2													50
CCG-3502									5	7	7	7	3						5	3	7	7	7	7	7																3	7	7	7	6	3								105
CCG-21558												4	6					4	5	6	1																																	26
CCG-3106													4	7	7	7	5			3	2	5	4		3	1									2	5	4	6	5	4								2	5	6	2	4	93
CCG-3305																	4	4		4															3	7	7	7	7	4							5	7	7	2	5	5	78
CCG-5305																			2	4	7	7	5																														25
CCG-5303																			1							2			1																			3	6	2		1	16
CCG-21550																				3	2	2												5	4																		16
CCG-5901																						1				1																										1	3
CCG-4302																											3	7	7	7	7	1																						32
CCG-3301																										6	7	7	7	4	6	1									3	7	7	4	6	6	7	7	5				90
CCG-3304																																5	3	2	4										7	7	7	7	7	7			56
CCG-3103																																								4	7	7	7	2	3								30
CFVs/CMMVs																																																						
YU 00103	3	7	7	3										3																																							23
QIONG SANSHA YU 00312	3	3	7	3																1	5																																22
YU 00005	3	3	7	3																																																	16
QIONG SANSHA YU 00117		6	6	3														2	1	6	7	7	7																														45
YUE ZHAN YU 08036		1	4	4	1	3					1									4	1	1	2	1		3	3	3	1			1	5	2	2	2	1		4	1	2		2		2			2	1	2	3	1		66
QIONG SANSHA YU 00009		4	1																																						5	6	2	6	1	7	7	5					44
QIONG SANSHA YU 00107		3		3	3	7	7	7	7	7	2							1																																			47
QIONG SANSHA YU 00309				3	3	7	7	7	7	6	3																														5	6	2	5	1	7	7	5					81
QIONG SANSHA YU 00006				3	2	7	7	7	7	7	3																																										43
QIONG SANSHA YU 00307				3	2	7	7	7	7	7	2																																											42
YANG PO 0189								3	7	2	1	6	7	7	6	7	4			4	1	1	3	1																														60
SHENNAN 3168								2	7	2	1	6	7	7	6	6	4			4	1	2	5	1	1	4	5	4																											75
SHENNAN 3128								2	7	2	1	6	7	7	6	7	4			4	1		1																															55
QIONG QIONG HAI YU 66168									7	7	1	3			2	6	4	2																							3							1	1	2	1	2	42
SHENNAN 3138									4	1	1	6	7	7	6	6	4			4			3	1																														50
QIONG SANSHA YU 00121											5	7	6	7	7	7	2			1	5																																	47
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QIONG SANSHA YU 00122											3	7	6	7	7	7	2			1	5										3	7	7	7	7	5																	81
QIONG SANSHA YU 00318											3	7	6	7	6	7	3				1																											3	7	1		6	57
QIONG SANSHA YU 00304														5	7	7	4	1		1	2																											3	7	1		7	45
QIONG SANSHA YU 00105														5	7	7	4	1		1	5																																	30
YUE ZHAN YU 08031														3	6	7	1			4	1	2	1	1		3																													29
YUE ZHAN YU 08033														3	6	6	1			4	1	2	3	1		4	5	3	2	2			5	1	2			1	3	1	2	1	3		3									65
YUE ZHAN YU 08032														2	6	7	1			4	1		2	1		3																						2	3	4	5	2	2	45
YUE ZHAN YU 08044														2	6	6	1			4	1			1		1									2	1																	1	26
QIONG SANSHA YU 00218															7	6	1	2	5	7	7	4																																39
QIONG SANSHA YU 00206															7	6		3	6	6	7	7									3	7	7	5	7	5																		76
QIONG SANSHA YU 00224															7	5																									5	6	2	6	1	7	7	5					51
QIONG SANSHA YU 00204																1															3	7	7	7	7	5																		37
QIONG SANSHA YU 00116																			4	6	7	7	7																															31
QIONG SANSHA YU 00310																			3	6	7	7	7																															30
QIONG SANSHA YU 00118																			3	5	7	7	7																															29
QIONG SANSHA YU 00209																				1	5																3	6	4	7	7	4												37
QIONG SANSHA YU 00219																				1	5																3	6	4	7	7	4												37
QIONG SANSHA YU 00221																				1	5																2	6	3	7	7	4												35
QIONG SANSHA YU 00113																				1	2																3	6	3	7	7	4												33
QIONG SANSHA YU 00111																				1	2			1	5	1		4	6	3	5	3																						31
QIONG SANSHA YU 00112																				**1**	**2**			**1**	**7**	**7**	**2**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**5**		**7**	**3**	**2**	**4**					**5**	**6**	**2**	**6**	**1**	**7**	**7**	**5**				**108**
QIONG SANSHA YU 00315																				1	2			1	7	7	2	7	7	7	7	5																						53
QIONG SANSHA YU 00109																				1	2			1	7	7	2	7	7	7	7	5																						53
QIONG SANSHA YU 00110																								1	7	7	2	7	7	7	7	5																						50
QIONG SANSHA YU 00306																								1	7	7	2	7	7	7	7	5																						50
QIONG SANSHA YU 00120																																3	7	7	7	7	5																	36
QIONG SANSHA YU 00402																																3	7	7	7	7	5																	36
QIONG SANSHA YU 00205																																3	7	7	7	7	5																	36
QIONG SANSHA YU 00216																																						3	6	4	7	7	4											31
QIONG SANSHA YU 00114																																						3	6	3	7	7	4											30
QIONG SANSHA YU 00222																																										5	6	2	7	1	7	7	3				38

Annex 1.2. *Heatmap for Select Chinese Vessels in BdM, 2024.*

Note: *Cells are numbered (colored) from 1 (light yellow) to 7 (red), indicating the frequency with which the vessel was observed for the week in review.*

Figure 1.10.
BRP CABRA (MRRV-4409) conducting a Maritime Patrol in the West Philippine Sea near BdM in December 2024, with CCGV 3106 in the background.

Figure 1.11.
Filipino Fisherfolk conduct a ceremonial flag-laying activity at 40.3NM west of Silanguin Island, San Antonio, Zambales on 19 December 2024

PART II. Kalayaan Island Group

Int. Spratly Islands



FIGURE 2.1. Philippine map indicating the location of Kalayaan Island Group, boxed in red.

FIGURE 2.2. Three (3) 44-meter MRRVs joined BRP TERESA MAGBANUA at Escoda Shoal, following successful resupply missions at PCG KIG sub-stations

FIGURE 2.3. The Commandant, PCG welcomes home the crew of BRP TERESA MAGABNUA following their challenging Maritime Patrol at Escoda Shoal.

CY 2024 witnessed the longest deployment of a PCG vessel at sea, with BRP TERESA MAGBANUA having been stationed in Escoda (Sabina) Shoal for a total of 152 days.

OVERVIEW

The PCG has maintained a consistent and assertive presence, with over 67 deployments covering a vast area since the beginning of 2024. Notably, the year witnessed the longest continuous deployment of a PCG vessel at sea, as BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV-9701) remained stationed in Escoda Shoal for 152 days. Despite facing numerous attacks, the PCG has remained steadfast in its operations, even as China intensified its efforts to uphold its unlawful territorial claims within the Philippine's jurisdictional waters.

Support for Filipino Fishermen have also strengthened through the increase and expansion of MARPAT operations. The increased frequency of these patrols from 2023 has facilitated numerous supply distribution activities, made possible with the assistance of BFAR. This inter-agency collaboration has evolved from its initial framework into a more comprehensive initiative, aimed not only at sustaining Philippine state operations but also at bolstering the confidence of Filipino fisherfolk to continue venturing in the KIG.

The Philippines is poised to assume a more proactive stance in influencing the dynamics in the West Philippine Sea and the South China Sea region throughout 2025. This proactive approach is expected to involve a range of strategies and initiatives designed to enhance the Philippines' influence, reflecting a commitment to both national interests and regional stability.

CHINA

China's assertive actions have reached new heights in 2024, characterized by unprecedented levels of obstruction against Philippine vessels, particularly in Ayungin Shoal and Escoda Shoal (Figure 2.4). What were previously manageable challenges have escalated into full-scale blockades, involving dangerous tactics such as ramming, firing of water cannons, boarding, and direct threats to the lives of

Figure 2.4.
Threat Level Assessment of Incidents at Kalayaan Island Group

Shadowing

ESCODA SHOAL
UP-MSI, PCG Marine Scientific Research Mission
(JUNE 2024)

ESCODA SHOAL
USE OF ANTI-DRONE GUNS
(JUNE 2024)

Dangerous Maneuvers

BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (PCG)
(01 to 09 February)

BRP DATU SANDAY (BFAR)
(21 to 24 February)



Ramming/Collision

ESCODA SHOAL
BRP BAGACAY (PCG) and BRP CAPE ENGAÑO
(19 AUGUST 2024)

ESCODA SHOAL
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (PCG)
(31 AUGUST 2024)

AYUNGIN SHOAL
Rotation and Resupply Mission *(JUNE 2024)*

less aggressive

Radio Challenges

ESCODA SHOAL &
AYUNGIN SHOAL

BRP CABRA & BRP SINDANGAN (PCG)
UM 1
(FEBRUARY 2024)

Shadowing

AYUNGIN SHOAL
BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (PCG)
(SEPTEMBER 2024)

AYUNGIN SHOAL
BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (PCG)
(NOVEMBER 2024)

Dangerous Maneuvers

QUIRINO ATOLL
BRP DATU TAMBLOT (BFAR)
(JUNE 2024)

Blocking

ROZUL REEF
FAD Laying Mission
(APRIL2024)

Water Cannon

AYUNGIN SHOAL
Rotation and Resupply Mission
(MARCH 2024)



Risking of Civilians' Safety

PAG-ASA ISLAND
UP-MSI Marine Scientific Research Mission

Ramming/Collision

AYUNGIN SHOAL
Rotation and Resupply Mission
(MARCH 2024)



ESCODA SHOAL
BRP DATU SANDAY(BFAR)
(25 AUGUST 2024)



more aggressive

Figure 2.5. *Filipino Fishing Boats with BFAR BRP DATU BAGACAY (MMOV-3004) in Escoda Shoal*

Figure 2.6 *(right, top). Distribution of food packs and essential supplies to FFBs in Katimugan Bank*

Figure 2.7. *(right, bottom). CCGV 5901, dubbed "the monster", was deployed in response to BRP TERESA MAGBANUA's presence in Escoda Shoal*

Philippine personnel. These aggressive actions have necessitated urgent diplomatic interventions.

China has also expanded its deployment of various maritime assets, including CCG vessels, PLA-N ships and aircraft, CMMVs, and Chinese Research and Surveillance Vessels (CRSVs). In 2024, the PCG recorded around 1,800 Chinese vessels operating within the entire KIG, up from last year's record of about 1,500. The monthly average rose from 336 Chinese vessels to 362 in 2024. Data also shows significant difference between the figures in the two years (Figure 2.8). China-flagged fishing vessels and maritime militia vessels accounted for approximately 90 percent of the total, with large concentrations observed around Panganiban Reef, Pag-asa Island, Pagkakaisa Bank, Zamora Reef, Ayungin Shoal, and Escoda Shoal (Figure 2.9).

The month of September logged the highest concentration, with more than 500 CMMVs present. This surge coincided with the withdrawal of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA from Escoda Shoal and the joint maritime exercise involving the navies of the Philippines, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

Regarding PLA-N activities, the PCG monitored more than 65 PLA-N ships, with roughly 60 ships physically observed by the PCG in the KIG.

The count of CCG vessels also grew, with 48 unique vessels identified in 2024, up from 33 in 2023. The monthly average rose from 10 to 12, with a peak of 29 recorded in September, mirroring the rise in CMMV presence. Based on records from automatic identification system (AIS), physical monitoring, satellite images from the Philippine Space Agency, and other sources, the PCG observed that CCG vessels carried out near-daily patrols around key features in the KIG.

In the area of Pag-asa Island, the PCG tracked 11 vessels in 2024, a rise from the seven monitored in the previous year. Patrols remained consistent with 2023, with vessels operating for six to seven weeks before rotated out. The PCG recorded a cumulative total of 349 patrol days in the area, suggesting a near-constant presence of at least one CCG vessel. A CCG vessel was likely deployed daily, however, some vessels may have

been undetected due to poor visibility during adverse weather conditions.

In Ayungin Shoal, 27 CCG vessels patrolled the area, higher than the 14 recorded the past year. As in 2023, at least one to two CCG vessels patrolled the area per day. This number increased further during Philippine Navy rotation and resupply (RORE) missions for BRP SIERRA MADRE as well as during the PCG's RORE missions for BRP TERESA MAGBANUA, which has been stationed in Escoda Shoal since April. Escoda Shoal has also been accommodating one to two vessels almost daily, likely due to the presence of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA and the possibility of another deployment in the shoal.

The CCG's area operations have become more expansive and aggressive, as demonstrated by the physical harassment and attacks against Philippine personnel.

On 17 June, Philippine Navy assets were subjected to severe harassment, forcing the abrupt prompt termination of the scheduled RORE mission in Ayungin Shoal. In response to government directives, the PCG conducted an emergency medical evacuation for injured personnel—one of whom lost a finger—and rescued stranded assets that had been violently attacked with knives and axes in the vicinity of Ayungin Shoal. Despite the PCG's clear humanitarian role, BRP CABRA (MRRV-4409) and BRP BAGACAY's (MRRV-4410) approach towards Ayungin Shoal encountered close quarter maneuvers and radio challenges from Chinese forces. China deployed a Type 726 Yuyi-class Hovercraft and at least three Type 22 Houbei-class Missile Boats to tail the PCG vessels, delaying the rescue mission by several hours. This incident marked the most aggressive encounter in the West Philippine Sea since the 2012 BdM stand-off.

Historically, from 2021 to the first half of 2023, the number of Chinese vessels surrounding Ayungin Shoal remained under 20. However, by the end of 2023, this figure surged to around 90. Although there was a temporary decrease in early 2024, the number rose again to about 70 in June, coinciding with heightened incidents of violence and intimidation.

This escalation prompted diplomatic negotiations aimed at de-escalating tensions. Following these discussions, both parties agreed on conditions to maintain the PN's presence in Ayungin Shoal. China shifted from overtly



Figure 2.8.
Graph comparing the number of monitored Chinese vessels in CY2023 and CY2024

Int. Spratly Islands



Figure 2.9.

Number of Monitored Chinese Maritime Militia vessels in the KIG.

Note: *KIG Line indicates the total number of unique vessels in KIG. CMMVs have visited multiple features during the month.*

aggressive operations to more subtle but equally coercive tactics to enforce its territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea. However, tensions were redirected to Escoda Shoal, especially in mid-August 2024 when China lodged a diplomatic protest against the presence of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA and other PCG vessels in the shoal (Figure 2.9).

During this time, CCG vessels enforced dangerous maneuvers, rammed, and fired water cannons, against PCG and BFAR vessels that were resupply BRP TERESA MAGBANUA, resulting in damages. The PCG vessel then attempted a small-scale maritime patrol within the area, which raised an alarm and triggered an immediate and hostile response from the CCG and CMMVs. They subjected the BRP TERESA MAGBANUA to various forms of harassment, including radio challenges, dangerous maneuvers, and ultimately, ramming. The ramming, which targeted the vessel's port side, suggests a deliberate attempt to inflict substantial damage, particularly to the PCG vessel's engine. This necessitated the vessel's immediate removal from the shoal to prevent sinking or a potential explosion. This incident formed part of a broader strategy to block resupply missions and restrict provisions to PCG personnel onboard, attempting to starve them off.

Majority of these severe incidents occurred during the second quarter of 2024, aligning with the implementation of revised CCG rules stipulated by CCG Regulation No. 3, granting expanded flexibility and authority to respond aggressively to foreign entities within what China considers its jurisdictional waters.

Pursuant to the Coast Guard Law of the People's Republic of China, this order is applicable to "sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China" (Article 3) and directed towards "major maritime rights protection" (Article 15). Furthermore, Article 17 outlines the legal basis for the exercise of detention powers as defined in CCG Order No. 3, while Article 22 provides the legal basis for the use of force by coast guard vessels for acts that infringe on China's national sovereignty or jurisdiction. Beyond its legal provisions, this order has

provided the CCG with the psychological assurance to enforce China's law with the necessary level of violence they deem proper.

VIETNAM

In 2024, Vietnamese state vessels consistently maintained their positions near Vietnam-occupied features, while Vietnamese Fishing Vessels (VFVs) carried out fishing activities across the Kalayaan Island Group (Figure 2.10). The PCG recorded over 1,700 Vietnam-flagged vessels operating within the KIG, marking a significant decrease from the 2,700 vessels logged in 2023. VFVs accounted for approximately 68 percent of these vessels.

The decline in Vietnamese vessel activity can be attributed to several factors, possibly including escalating tensions between the Philippines and China, as well as Vietnam's own maritime confrontations with China. In October, Vietnam reported severe physical harassment of its fishermen by Chinese state entities near the Paracel Islands, with alarming incidents involving fractured limbs and serious injuries sustained by civilian fisherfolk.

Despite the overall reduction in vessel activity, VFVs remain predominantly concentrated near Philippine-occupied features, as reported by PCG sub-stations in Likas, Patag, and Lawak Island. This pattern suggests a persistent preference for fishing near Philippine-controlled areas rather than those occupied by China within the KIG. While the PCG continues its efforts to deter such illegal activities, these vessels continue operating unlawfully within Philippine waters.

However, notable progress has been made in bilateral cooperation between Vietnam and the Philippines since January 2024, focusing on enhancing joint efforts to combat illegal fishing. Although VFVs continue to violate maritime regulations, the strengthened partnership between the two countries provides a promising framework for addressing this issue more effectively in the future.

In parallel with fishing activities, the PCG has also monitored the presence of Vietnamese dredgers, barges, and cargo vessels in Mascardo Reef, Hizon Reef, and Hilagang Peligro Reef. This indicates Vietnam's continued reclamation activities in the region.



Figure 2.10.
Number of Monitored Vietnam vessels in the KIG.
Note: *KIG Line indicates the total number of unique vessels in KIG. Some VVs have visited multiple features during the month.*



Figure 2.11. *Escoda Shoal deployments, March-September 2024*

PHILIPPINE EFFORTS

BRP TERESA MAGBANUA in Escoda Shoal

The PCG's flagship initiative for 2024 was the deployment of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA to Escoda Shoal, marking the longest PCG patrol to date. Over the course of 152 days, from April to September, the PCG vessel successfully maintained a consistent Philippine-state presence in the area and carried out various operations, including underwater surveys, maritime surveillance, and support for local fisherfolk operating in the area. BRP TERESA MAGBANUA also observed the deployment and activities of the Chinese vessels in the area (Figure 2.11)

From 16 April to 05 May, the PCG observed a steady presence of CMMVs in Escoda Shoal, with an average of 20 vessels per day. The PCG also noted the militarization of the area, with multiple sightings of PLA-N ships and aerial assets to surveil the movements of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA. At this time, the PCG's directive was to verify China's alleged reclamation activities and conduct targeted surveys, including sand collection and underwater documentation.

In direct response, from 07 to 19 May, China deployed China Maritime Surveillance Vessel (CMS) HAI CE 3301, accompanied by two support vessels, YUE XIA YU ZHI 20030 and YUE XIA YU ZHI 20027. These vessels carried out ten survey expeditions across different sections of Escoda Shoal, utilizing their service boats for diving and collecting water and coral samples. Throughout the duration of these surveys, the PCG documented service boats transporting sand, coral fragments, and crates of ocean water, as well as the use of measurement tools and diving equipment.

On 03 June, anticipating potential propaganda based on Chinese activities, the PCG deployed BRP CABRA (MRRV-4409) to transport scientists from the University of the Philippines Diliman College of Science, alongside media representatives, to the shoal. Their mission entailed providing security and assistance during the diving and sample collection activities. Throughout the two-day survey, the CCG attempted to impede the survey team's activities, deploying Rigid-hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) and rubber boats in support of the CCG's monitoring. The CCG also used loudspeakers to disrupt the mission, while the PLA-N conducted amphibious operation drills to further deter the survey.

Figure 2.12.
CCGV 3305 water cannons BRP DATU BAGACAY as it attempts to enter Escoda Shoal for the resupply of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA

China's desperation to eventually drive BRP TERESA MAGABNUA away from Escoda Shoal became increasingly evident as July progressed into August. This development was anomalous and followed the arrival of CCG-5901, the largest CCG vessel, on 03 July. While initially refraining from engaging, CCG-5901 began deploying RHIBs for patrols during the last week of July.

By 04 August, additional FFBs and BFAR vessels arrived in the area. This was followed by a pattern of patrols from CCG-5901, and later, two other CCG vessels after CCG-5901 departed on 06 August. These patrols grew more aggressive, culminating in the blockade of Escoda Shoal, which hindered the PCG's resupply missions.

Two attempts to resupply BRP TERESA MAGBANUA on 19 and 26 August were thwarted by the CCG. The latter operation, launched in the early morning of 26 August, employed a daytime approach to outmaneuver China's tactic of exploiting low visibility and ensuring media coverage in the event of a ramming incident. While the CCG's approach was less confrontational, the blockade of Escoda Shoal persisted, and radio transmissions from China threatened action against the PCG vessels should they continue in their approach. Negotiations initiated via radio failed, as China's deliberate tactics appeared aimed at forcing the Philippines to withdraw the BRP TERESA MAGBANUA. Ultimately, the PCG resorted to airborne operations to resupply the vessel.

The BRP TERESA MAGBANUA mission reached its conclusion after an incident on 31 August, when a series of ramming attempts damaged the vessel's engine. This incident mirrored the aggressive actions previously taken against PN RHIBs in June. With three ramming attempts, the PCG sustained structural damage and was



Figure 2.13. Number of Monitored vessels in the KIG.

compelled to withdraw the vessel from Escoda Shoal on 14 September, once the weather conditions had improved and safe conditions for departure were ensured.

Support to Filipino Fishermen

The number of FFBs in the KIG grew from around 350 in 2023 to a record of 460 boats in 2024, with the highest figure logged in November (Figure 2.12). This surge is largely the result of the strengthened collaboration between the PCG and BFAR, aimed at improving fishing conditions within the region and enhancing the confidence of Filipino fisherfolk in the protection provided by Philippine state vessels during routine patrols in the KIG.

Reminiscent of the buoy laying operations in 2023, the PCG deployed BRP CABRA to provide security assistance to 25 FFBs during a Fish Aggregating Device (FAD) laying operation on 04 April in Rozul (Iroquois) Reef. With the support and participation of BFAR vessel BRP LAPU-LAPU (MMOV 5001), the operation successfully deployed 10 FADs.

Following the FAD laying operations, joint patrols with BFAR have shown improvement and consistency, as 13 individual and joint patrols were executed throughout the year. In addition to these patrols, the PCG and BFAR improved relations through supply runs and gift-giving activities to FFBs at sea. These gestures of support from the Philippine government were intended to foster greater enthusiasm among Filipino fisherfolk to utilize the country's resources in the KIG. This collaborative effort between the PCG and BFAR is especially focused on areas such as Rozul Reef, Recto Bank, and Pagkakaisa (Union) Bank—regions that serve as key sheltering zones for FFBs—emphasizing the dedication of both agencies to protecting the country's marine resources for the benefit of Filipino fisherfolk.

ANALYSIS

China's 2024 operations solidified a greater level of threat, especially in response to the Philippines' increasing assertiveness in the West Philippine Sea. The intent behind China's actions has become unequivocally clear through strategic adjustments following the June resupply mission, a pattern further reinforced by subsequent developments following the BRP TERESA MAGBANUA incident. In the coming year, China will not only persist in but likely intensify its shadowing activities to ensure no discernible lapse in control, similar to the challenges they faced with the PCG in Escoda Shoal. The increased operational pressure in Escoda Shoal serves as a precursor to future actions within the Philippine EEZ, where China is expected to continue its behavior to undermine Philippine authority.

Operationally, the growing aggression of the CCG, in connection or as a result of strengthened internal laws supporting such an approach, suggests a higher possibility of similar confrontations during missions outside the established agreement in Ayungin Shoal. The settlement reached during the PN resupply mission does not extend to adjacent features, granting the Philippines greater flexibility to operate, particularly in light of the current stalemate surrounding BRP SIERRA MADRE. However, it remains essential to recognize that China cannot be relied upon to consistently uphold agreements established between the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs and the People's Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as domestic factors and shifting public opinion in China heavily influence its foreign policy.

China's primary concern is not necessarily adherence to international agreements but rather maintaining control over its narrative. This is reflected in its manipulative messaging

directed at the Philippine contingent during resupply missions, despite these operations being conducted under mutual agreements. As such, the AFP and the PCG should remain vigilant in not falling into this thinking and continuously find ways to formulate alternative approaches or radio responses to guarantee that resupply operations are not dependent or shown as dependent on the dictates of China.

In the broader context of the South China Sea, the Philippines has played a pivotal role in shaping the discourse, especially as China endeavors to match the efforts made towards marine environmental protection during the past year. Initiatives undertaken by the PCG, BFAR, and the University of the Philippines from late 2023 to early 2024 have impacted the region, provoking responses from China, including sponsored investigations and publications. These actions underscore China's continued emphasis on dominating the narrative. This need for control is especially evident during operations where the PLA-N parades hospital ships and missile crafts, painting a contradictory image to the Philippines, yet one that is transparently intended for controlled propaganda.

Considering the above, it is essential for the Philippines to exercise heightened vigilance and continue to strengthen the participation of its fisherfolk. As frontline workers, Filipino fisherfolk serve as the primary witnesses to China's aggressive actions and militarization of the area rightfully under Philippine jurisdiction. They constitute the most compelling evidence and vital allies for the government in countering the ongoing propaganda campaign. While the PCG and BFAR, with their sustained presence and humanitarian missions, have initiated efforts in 2024 to fortify this vision, 2025 should see a significant bolstering of support for the overall operations of fisherfolk, ultimately aiming to alleviate the cumulative struggles they face before and after each venture at sea.

PART II. Kalayaan Island Group

Int. Spratly Islands

Area	Vessel Name	Dec 28-Jan 3	Jan 4-Jan 10	Jan 11-Jan 17	Jan 18-Jan 24	Jan 25-Jan 31	Feb 1-Feb 7	Feb 8-Feb 14	Feb 15-Feb 21	Feb 22-Feb 28	Feb 29-Mar 6	Mar 7-Mar 13	Mar 14-Mar 20	Mar 21-Mar 27	Mar 28-Apr 3	Apr 4-Apr 10	Apr 11-Apr 17	Apr 18-Apr 24	Apr 25-May 1	May 2-May 8	May 9-May 15	May 16-May 22	May 23-May 29	May 30-Jun 5	Jun 6-Jun 12	Jun 13-Jun 19	Jun 20-Jun 26	Jun 27-Jul 3	Jul 4-Jul 10	Jul 11-Jul 17	Jul 18-Jul 24	Jul 25-Jul 31	Aug 1-Aug 7	Aug 8-Aug 14	Aug 15-Aug 21	Aug 22-Aug 28	Aug 29-Sep 4	Sep 5-Sep 11	Sep 12-Sep 18	Sep 19-Sep 25	Sep 26-Oct 2	Oct 3-Oct 9	Oct 10-Oct 16	Oct 17-Oct 23	Oct 24-Oct 30	Oct 31-Nov 6	Nov 7-Nov 13	Nov 14-Nov 20	Nov 21-Nov 27	Nov 28-Dec 4	Dec 5-Dec 11	Dec 12-Dec 18	Dec 19-Dec 25	Dec 26-Jan 1	Total Days Monitored (2024)
Pag-asa Island	CCG-5201	3	7	7	5	3	7	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	4	5	7	7	7	7	5	7	6	7	7	7	5	7	7	1	3	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	1	7	69
	CCG-5202					3																					2																																78
	CCG-5204								2	7	7	7	7	7	4	7	7	7	7	7	5	7	6	7	7	7	2	7	7	3	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	82
	CCG-5101																																																											**85**
	CCG-3301																			1																																							3
	CCG-3303																		1			1																																					1
	CCG-5901																									1																																	1
	CCG-5203																																																											1
	CCG-5108																																							1																				1
	CCG-5103																																					6	7	5																6	7			43
	CCG-4301																																													1														1
	Total days with at least one CCGV																																																											**349**
Ayungin Shoal	CCG-5204	3	4								1																																																	8
	CCG-5205	1	7																																																									42
	CCG-21551	1	1				3																																																					67
	CCG-21555	1									1			1																																														72
	CCG-21556	1									1			1																																															47
	CCG-5203		2						4						4	5	7	7	7	7	2							4	7	6	7	7	7	3																											**120**
	CCG-3305								1	1	1																																																	4
	CCG-5201								1	6	6	6	7	6	3						4	7	5	7	7	7	2																																	75
	CCG-4202																			3																																								11
	CCG-21549																																								2	3	1	2																51
	CCG-21558																																					4	1	4	5	5		3	5									7					27
	CCG-4108																																											1										2					20
	CCG-21559																																												3	6											3		16
	Total days with at least one CCGV																																																											**340**
Escoda Shoal	CCG-5203						1																															1																							44
	CCG-4202																1																																											5
	CCG-21555																	2							1	1																																		15
	CCG-21556																	1							1	2	2																																	7
	CCG-3303																					7	7	4	7	7	2																																	38
	CCG-21551																						2	1																																				13
	CCG-5201																										1																																	3
	CCG-4103																							2																																				33
	CCG-5901																							4	6	6	7																																	39
	CCG-5303																											1	7	7	7	7	3																												23
	CCG-5202																																	4																											32
	CCG-4303																																	3	2	7	6	6	3	1	2	6	2	3	1														27
	CCG-3104																																			3	2	3	1	2	6																				15
	CCG-5205																																			2	2	4	7	3	1																				**47**
	CCG-4108																																								1	6	4	2	4															17
	CCG-21558																																										2	2	4	1														13
	CCG-4301																																										1	1	1															3
	CCG-21549																																										1	1	1															4
	CCG-3033																																										1																	1
	CCG-4203																																									1																	1
	CCG-4104																																											1															1
	CCG-5302																																												1														1
	CCG-5305																																													3	7	7	1	1	3	2					25
	CCG-21559																																																1	4	3	1						10
	CCG-5402																																																	4								4
	CCG-4302																																																			2	3					5
	CCG-5403																																																			2						2
	CCG-5204																																																						1			1
	Total days with at least one CCGV																																																											**238**

Annex 2.1. *Heatmap for CCGVs in Select Features in KIG, 2024*

Note: *Cells are numbered (colored) from 1 (light yellow) to 7 (red), indicating the frequency with which the vessel was observed for the week in review.*

PART III. Luzon Strait/Batanes

Aside from monitoring BdM and the KIG, the PCG also focused on vessels operating in the Luzon Strait and Batanes area due to the country's proximity to Taiwan and the evolving dynamics in the region. To enhance maritime domain awareness and response readiness, the PCG inaugurated a new coast guard station in Itbayat, Batanes in May 2024.

Tracking data showed that bulk carriers, tankers, and cargo and container ships frequently traverse the northern waters of the Philippines. These vessels primarily use the Luzon Strait, navigating to and from the South China Sea and the western Pacific Ocean. Many of these vessels are registered under the flags of convenience, particularly from Panama, Liberia, and Marshall Islands.

For China-flagged vessels, around 10 CCG or law enforcement vessels were detected patrolling the area in 2024. Moreover, research and survey vessels were also monitored, indicating continuous maritime activities. As vessel tracking in the area has only been recently established, it is not yet possible to conclusively determine whether there has been a heightened presence. However, these activities are possibly linked to ongoing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, which may be influencing maritime operations in nearby waters, including the Luzon Strait.



FIGURE 3.1. Philippine map indicating the location of the Luzon Strait, boxed in red.



Figure 3.2. *Number of Monitored vessels along the Luzon Strait.*

PART IV. Regional and Local Developments

The regional and local development desk continues to collate and review key issues concerning security, diplomatic, and political affairs, both domestically and internationally. In 2024, its analysis primarily examined three main topics: China's continuous aggression in the region; the Philippines' efforts to assert its maritime rights and entitlements; and significant developments involving Southeast Asian neighbors. These topics contributed to creating a comprehensive and holistic understanding of regional dynamics, facilitating informed policy decisions and strategic courses of action.

A. China's continuous aggression in the region





Figure 4.1 *(left) Joint Sword Drills from 2022 to 2024 (Source: CNA).*

Figure 4.2. *(right) Chinese Incursions in Taiwan for 2024 (Source: Damien Symon on "X").*

THE ONGOING CHINA-TAIWAN TENSION

The extent of China's aggression in the region is evident through its actions against Taiwan, employing a combination of both hard and soft power strategies. This approach is buttressed by the so-called "One China Policy" and its hastened efforts toward the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.

In 2024, Taiwan's Ministry of Defense recorded 5,111 People's Liberation Army (PLA) air incursions, with 3,075 breaching the median line into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Additionally, China deployed 114 PLA balloons[1] and consistently patrolled Taiwan's waters using PLA-Navy and China Coast Guard vessels. These operations were further reinforced by occasional ballistic missile launches.[2]

China also conducted two Joint Sword military drills, 2024A[3] and 2024B,[4] which symbolize judicial and military punishments that Taiwanese separatist movements would suffer if they attempted to halt the reunification. These drills were viewed as responses to perceived "provocations", including the election and inauguration of Taiwan President Lai Ching-te, his pro-independence statements and acts, and visits of high-ranking officials from the United States.

To further justify its aggressive behavior, China issued Order No. 3[5], granting the CCG the power to seize foreign vessels and detain foreign individuals. It also applied to the High Seas Boarding and Inspection (HSBI) as an Authority of the Inspection Vessels, enabling it to board and inspect foreign-flagged fishing vessels on the high seas.[6] These actions denote China's attempt to evade scrutiny under the guise of internationally sanctioned inspections.

China's soft power tactics also support these measures, particularly in President Xi Jinping's public addresses, where he repeatedly underscores reunification and criticizes opposition forces.[7] This is consistent with the release of various promotional videos that exploits psychological warfare against Taiwan, showcasing China's current military capabilities and simulating possible invasion scenarios. The Chinese government even went as far as requiring other states to express their support for reunification as a prerequisite for diplomatic engagements with President Xi or Premier Li Qiang.[8]

OTHER EXPANSIONIST ACTIVITIES OF CHINA

Aside from its Taiwan affairs, China has been involved in improving its influence in other parts of the Pacific, particularly in contested waters. Its increasing aggression towards Japan highlights its aim to reinforce its claim towards the Senkaku Islands. A case in point is the monitored presence of a Chinese Shupang-class hydrographic survey vessel near Kagoshima Prefecture.[9] Furthermore, reports revealed the plan of Chinese maritime university, Dalian Maritime University, to establish a Ryukyu research center in Okinawa, in line with China's history in the area.[10]

China is also converting Triton Island, a feature located approximately 250 kilometers from the coast of Vietnam, into a strategic intelligence base in the South China Sea.[11] Moreover, Chinese police engaged with Kiribati local police on matters of community policing and martial arts training, specifically Kung Fu, while also working with the IT department in developing Kiribati's crime database.[12] In another development, Cambodia is set to receive two PLA-N Type 056A missile corvettes from China, as part of the ongoing enhancement of the Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville province in the Gulf of Thailand.[13] These actions show how China is not only fixated in asserting its claim in the South China Sea, but is concerned as well with widening its sphere of influence over the vast Indo-Pacific region. This trend highlights China's maritime expansionist tendencies, which should be kept in check by like-minded States.

Figure 4.3 *(left) Ream Naval Base in Cambodia (Source: New York Times).*

Figure 4.4. *(right) Presence of two (2) PLA-N vessels in Ream Naval Base (Source: New York Times).*

B. Philippine efforts to promote regional cooperation

Figure 4.5 *President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. during the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (Source: Rappler).*

When President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. attended the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, he bared the hallmark of his foreign policy: the Philippines will not yield any part of its territory and maritime zones.[14] He reiterated this stance during his meeting with ASEAN leaders at the ASEAN Summit in Laos. A diplomat even revealed how the Philippine president called out Chinese Premier Li in a closed-door meeting, expressing his disappointment in the overall situation in the South China Sea, as well as the harassment and intimidation experienced by Filipinos in the region.[15]

This pronouncement was further crystallized by the passage of two important pieces of legislation, the Republic Act 12064 or the "Philippine Maritime Zones Act" and Republic Act 12056 or the "Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act". These laws emphasize the Philippines' maritime and archipelagic identity, empowering both government agents and ordinary citizens to carry out maritime operations and fishing activities in the West Philippine Sea, while ensuring every Filipino is aware and informed of their maritime rights and entitlements.[16]

> *"The life-giving waters of the West Philippine Sea flow in the blood of every Filipino. We cannot allow anyone to detach it from the totality of the maritime domain that renders our nation whole."*
>
> ***
>
> *President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. (Shangri-La Dialogue 2024)*

The Philippine government acknowledges, however, that these efforts alone are insufficient. There remains a need to build a reputable and respectable defense posture, as reflected by various cooperation and strategic partnerships forged with like-minded states.

This year, the United States remains to be one of the active allies of the Philippines, particularly in the country's maritime affairs. Former US President Joe Biden stressed that the US defense commitment to the Philippines is "ironclad," and that any attack against a Philippine aircraft, vessel, or armed force would trigger the mutual defense treaty (MDT).[17] This strong relations is expected to subsist even with the transition to President Donald Trump's administration, considering the longstanding MDT, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).[18] Additionally, there are multimillion cooperation deals in place, like the recent acquisition of the US Typhon missile system for the protection of Philippine maritime interest.[19]

The Philippines' relationship with Japan also took a positive trajectory upon the signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), a pact similar to the US' VFA. This agreement aims to deepen security and defense cooperation between the two countries while enhancing interoperability through the conduct of joint exercises.[20] Japan has been open to providing assistance through the Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Security Assistance (OSA), which includes loans for the acquisition of additional five 97-meter vessels for the Philippine Coast Guard[21] and equipment to improve the maritime domain awareness capabilities of the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Air Force.[22]



South Korea has likewise elevated its bilateral ties with the Philippines to a strategic partnership, as formalized during the state visit of President Yoon Suk-yeol in 2024.[23] This includes the signing of a memorandum of understanding between their respective coast guards and South Korea's involvement in the ongoing AFP modernization program. Meanwhile, France has forwarded its intent to finish the drafting of a VFA with the Philippines, which is geared towards a stronger defense partnership between the two.[24]

***Figure 4.6**. MOU Signing between President Marcos and President Yoon Suk Yeol together with Commissioner General of the Korean Coast Guard and the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard (Source: Hong Kong Free Press).*

***Figure 4.7.** (left) Visit of Prime Minister Kishida in Manila Port (Source: The Strait Times).*

***Figure 4.8.** (right) French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu and Secretary Gilberto Teodoro during the signing of letter of intent in Manila to boost bilateral defense cooperation (Source: Rappler).*

***Figure 4.9.** (bottom) President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and then US President Joe Biden Meeting at the White House last 13 April 2024 (Source: U.S. Embassy Manila).*

C. Significant Developments in Southeast Asia

The Chinese policies of Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia are generally more genial and accommodating compared to the Philippines, characterized by their toned-down assertiveness towards regional tensions. However, despite such conciliatory approach, these countries are met with aggression from China. This highlights how China's behavior remains consistent, regardless of the strength of relations with a country. It also runs contrary to the claim of pro-China propagandists that only the Philippines experiences Chinese aggression. In this context, ASEAN's role as a collective voice is central in addressing this behavior by forwarding the rule of law and a rules-based order.

VIETNAM

Vietnam's approach on the South China Sea issue is defined as a balance of "cooperation and struggle" or vừa hợp tác, vừa đấu tranh, with the aim of asserting its rights over maritime features while maintaining political and economic relations with China.[25] This approach has been reinforced in 2024, in line with the developments in Vietnam affairs.

The "struggle" aspect of Vietnam's policy was demonstrated when it made a notable submission for an extended continental shelf before the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in July.[26] This move, in turn, broadens Vietnam's rights over the natural resources found in the extended shelf. Vietnam also initiated the construction of an airstrip in Mascardo (Barque Canada) Reef[27] and continued to improve other features, challenging China's unilateral claims over the whole South China Sea.

Tensions heightened in September with an incident in Paracel Islands, where 40 Chinese authorities in camouflage uniforms boarded a Vietnamese fishing boat. Each armed with metal rods, they beat the Vietnamese crew on board and confiscated fishing equipment and devices.[28] Vietnam "resolutely opposes" China's behavior, stating that the Chinese authorities violated Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and contravened international law and the UNCLOS, and is against China's handling of disputes at sea.[29]

In October, Vietnamese President To Lam met with French President Emmanuel Macron to forge a strategic partnership between their countries.[30] Both leaders emphasized their opposition to all forms of threats or use of force in violation of international law and expressed support for efforts "to reach an effective and substantial Code of Conduct in the East Sea." Additionally, Indonesian Coast Guard ship KN PULAU DANA 323 made an inaugural docking at PTSC Port in Vung Tua City, Ba Ria-Vung Tau Province for a four-day courtesy visit in Vietnam.[31] These developments show how Vietnam attempts to oppose and resist China's actions that threaten its rights in the South China Sea.

Nevertheless, Vietnam continues to maintain the "cooperation" aspect with China. The countries jointly declared seeking a fundamental and sustainable solution in the South China Sea dispute through friendly consultation.[32] Moreover, Vietnam remains China's largest trading partner in the Southeast Asia region.[33] By October, Vietnam and China signed ten agreements in several areas of cooperation, improving bilateral trade by 21 percent for the first three quarters of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023.[34]

INDONESIA

Indonesia maintains a policy of non-alignment, even with the growing tensions between the United States and China in the region.[35] This approach is seen by spectators and experts to continue under the leadership of President Prabowo Subianto, as shown by Indonesia's

engagements with China, the United States, and even Russia throughout 2024.

This non-alignment policy, however, is challenged by developments that transpired for the year. In October, CCG-5402 intruded into the North Natuna Sea to impede the Arwana 3D seismic survey and data processing activities carried out by an Indonesian company.[36] This action triggered a response from Indonesian Coast Guard, with the deployment of KN PULAU DANA 323 vessel, accompanied by Indonesian Navy patrol ships.

The momentum gained from Indonesia's dismissal of Chinese authority in its waters took a turn when the "2024 Orruda" occurred during the early part of November.[37] The "2024 Orruda" is a joint military exercise between Indonesia and Russia, a known regional aggressor and ally of China. Indonesia and China also issued a joint statement in line with a USD 10 billion-worth of comprehensive strategic partnership,[38] particularly the conduct of joint development in "areas of overlapping claims" through the establishment of an Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee.[39] The international community reacted critically, thereby urging President Subianto to clarify Indonesia's position during his visit to the United States, where he met President Joe Biden and CIA Chief William Burns.[40] He reiterated that he would "always safeguard" Indonesia's sovereignty, and that partnering with other states is better than conflict.

MALAYSIA

Among Southeast Asian nations, Malaysia is often viewed as having the closest ties with China—a relationship that Chinese Premier Li described as "a fine example of relations between countries in the region."[41] This statement is buttressed by both countries' agreement to forge high-level strategic mutual trust and exchanges, deepening of development initiatives through the Belt and Road Cooperation Plan, promotion of people-to-people exchanges, and enhancing multilateral coordination in line with Malaysia's ASEAN chairmanship in 2025.[42] Malaysia's stance towards the South China Sea issue is also defined by its rejection of any "external assistance" in resolving the issue.[43]

This relation, however, still involved certain "irritants" that could spark disagreements over vision and policy. A case in point is the presence of CCG-5103 in Terumbu Sahap, South Luconia, last April, with the aim of asserting China's unilateral right over the South China Sea.[44] In August, a published report in August bared a two-page document from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Malaysian Embassy, where China expressed its "serious concern" and "strong dissatisfaction" on Malaysia's oil and gas exploration in Nankang Ansha and Beikang Nansha.[45] In response, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim emphasized that Malaysia would not stop its explorations within its waters.[46]

PART V. WEST PHILIPPINE SEA TRANSPARENCY GROUP

The West Philippine Sea Transparency Group (WPSTG) remains steadfast in its mission to deliver truthful, accurate, and accessible information that reinforces the Philippines' maritime rights and entitlements in the West Philippine Sea. This effort aligns with the Philippine government's broader transparency initiatives. Over the past year, the WPSTG has intensified its efforts by engaging various sectors through initiatives such as the inaugural *Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea*, the publication of the comic book *Ang Mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun*, and the nationwide fun run, *Takbo Para sa West Philippine Sea*. These programs complement university caravans, local and international media engagements, and participation in relevant forums, ensuring cohesive, efficient, and impactful information dissemination. Collectively, these efforts aim to enhance the visibility and credibility of the Philippine government, particularly the PCG, in matters concerning the West Philippine Sea.

MANILA DIALOGUE ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

In collaboration with the Pacific Forum, the WPSTG successfully convened the inaugural *Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea* from 06 to 08 November 2024, at the Grand Hyatt Manila in Taguig City. This event brought together key government officials, policy experts, thought leaders, and academics from Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. Participants discussed debated issues surrounding the South China Sea, all geared towards reaching a consensus for dispute resolution, while promoting adherence to international law and a rules-based order.

Figure 5.1. COMMO JAY TRISTAN TARRIELA, PCG, *pictured with ASEC. Jonathan Malaya, National Security Council (NSC) speaking during the inaugural session of the Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea.*

Figure 5.2. *(left) US Ambassador H.E. MaryKay Carlson talking a selfie with guests seated at the VIP table during the opening dinner of the Dialogue.*

Figure 5.3. *(right) The Commandant, PCG, ADM RONNIE GIL L. GAVAN, delivering his remarks during the Coast Guard's Panel portion of the Dialogue.*

Figure 5.4. *(left) House Speaker Hon. Ferdinand Martin Romualdez delivering his remarks during the opening dinner of the Dialogue.*

Figure 5.5. *(right) The Executive Secretary Hon. Lucas Bersamin arriving with The Commandant, PCG at the venue for the opening dinner of the Dialogue.*

Figure 5.6. *(left) Dialogue participants await their turn to speak and ask questions during a Panel discussion.*

Figure 5.7. *(right) the Canadian, Australian, US, and German Ambassadors to the Philippines pose for a photo opportunity with panel moderators during the Dialogue.*

ANG MGA KWENTO NI TEACHER JUN COMIC BOOK

Under the guidance of the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS), the WPSTG initiated the publication of *Ang Mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun*, a comic book that offers Filipinos accurate and verified information about the West Philippine Sea, as well as the Philippines' maritime rights and entitlements, which are explained and illustrated in a manner more accessible and easily understood by every Filipino. To date, over 12,000 copies have been printed and distributed in both English and Filipino language. This initiative is done as part of this Office's commitment to counter and deter the disinformation and misinformation ploy against Philippine efforts in the West Philippine Sea, as well as to carry out the intergenerational mandate of keeping Filipinos aware and knowledgeable of critical national issues.

Figure 5.8. *Cover of the comic book "Ang mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun".*

Figures 5.9. and 5.10. *Secretary for Education Hon. Juan Edgardo (Sonny) Angara graced the official book-launch of "Ang mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun" at the National Library of the Philippines in January 2025*

Figure 5.11. *School principals receive copies of "Ang mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun" for distribution*

Figure 5.12. *The Commandant, PCG poses with invited VIPs.*

TAKBO PARA SA WEST PHILIPPINE SEA ADVOCACY RUN

The WPSTG, in collaboration with Runrio Inc., organized the advocacy run *Takbo Para Sa West Philippine Sea* (Takbo), aimed not only at raising awareness and asserting the maritime rights and entitlements of the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea, but also to encourage more public-private partnerships on matters of national interest. For 2024, the advocacy run was held in four cities: Metro Manila, Cebu City, Cagayan de Oro City, and Baguio City, attracting more than 11,000 participants nationwide. The Takbo also involved setting up interactive booths showcasing historical facts and current geopolitical issues, as well as installations depicting the beauty and significance of the West Philippine Sea. Each participant received loot bags containing, among others, a copy of the comic book, *Ang Mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun*, which complements the overarching goal of the advocacy run.

Figure 5.13. *Collage of photos taken during the 1st Leg of the "Takbo Para Sa West Philippine Sea: Campaign in Metro Manila, such as the opening ceremony, zumba sessions , starting gun, and participants including Hon. Senator Francis "Tol" Tolentino, ASEC. Jonathan Malaya, NSC as well as PCG Units.*

Figures 5.14 to 5.19 (from left to right and top to bottom). *COMMO TARRIELA, PCG in action, delivering lectures which shed light on the West Philippine Sea during Campus Caravans, as well as speaking engagements with other government agencies such as the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) (5.18)*

SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS, FOREIGN AND LOCAL MEDIA ENGAGEMENTS, AND UNIVERSITY CARAVANS

The WPSTG, through COMMO JAY TRISTAN TARRIELA PCG, conducted approximately 223 speaking engagements in both local and international forums, alongside interviews with media organizations. This is simultaneous with the conduct of 12 campus caravans in partnership with the National Security Council (NSC). These engagements are done to ensure cohesive messaging, for an effective and efficient information dissemination regarding the West Philippine Sea dispute and keep the public abreast of government initiatives. Furthermore, they serve to build networks and garner support from the media, academe, civil society leaders, and decisionmakers, ensuring sustained and widespread advocacy for Philippine maritime rights.

Figure 5.19. *COMMO TARRIELA, PCG with COMMO NELSON JAY T.TIMBANG, PCG, Deputy Chief of Coast Guard Staff for Intelligence, CG-2, ASEC. Jonathan Malaya, NSC, and other speakers during the KONGRESO NG MANGINGISDA held last September 2024.*

Figure 5.20. *(left) COMMO TARRIELA, PCG with ASEC. Jonathan Malaya, during a Press Briefing on West Philippine Sea developments at the West Philippine Sea Transparency Office.*

Figure 5.21. *(right) COMMO TARRIELA, PCG with vloggers after delivering a lecture on the importance of factual and correct narratives against fake news.*

Figure 5.22. *(left) COMMO TARRIELA, PCG delivering a lecture on the importance of the West Philippine Sea and factual narratives to personnel of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA).*

Figure 5.23 *(right) COMMO TARRIELA, PCG speaking during an event hosted by Stratbase ADR Institute in April 2024.*

INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL SUPPORT

The Philippines' transparency initiative in the West Philippine Sea has garnered international support, bringing attention to China's ICAD activities in the region. Several countries have voiced their criticisms of China's actions, with the United States, Japan, Australia, and several European nations expressing solidarity with the Philippines. Notably, the United States reaffirmed its ironclad commitment to the Philippines in line with the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty that extends to the two countries' armed forces, public vessels, aircrafts, and coast guard. In response to the increased international backing, the Philippines has expanded defense cooperation, leading to joint military exercises and enhanced security assistance. This cooperation has also facilitated support to the modernization of the PCG, enabling it to better fulfill its mandates.

Domestically, the Philippine government's actions in the West Philippine Sea are largely supported by the Filipino public. According to a survey conducted by the Social Weather Station in June, 60 percent of Filipinos think the government is doing enough to assert the country's rights in the region. These actions include joint patrols and military exercises with allied nations and partners. In a separate survey conducted by OCTA Research, results showed that 76 percent of the respondents chose China as the biggest threat to the Philippines. These findings demonstrate that while Filipinos back government's actions in the West Philippine Sea, there is also a growing concern over China's behavior, reinforcing the need for continued vigilance and diplomatic efforts to protect the Philippines' maritime interests.

Annex 3.0.

Summary of Incidents in the West Philippine Sea (CY2024)

DATE/LOCATION	VESSELS INVOLVED	DETAILS OF INCIDENTS
DATE: 06 January **LOCATION:** Bajo de Masinloc	**PHILIPPINES:** Filipino Fishing Boat **CHINA:** 1. CCG-3303	**INCIDENTS:** **a. Driving-away** **b. Use of Horns/Sirens** **DETAILS:** CCG personnel aboard a rubber boat used hand gestures and sirens to drive away a Filipino Fishing Boat and its service boat and were later also shadowed by CCG-3303 and another speedboat.
DATE: 08 January **LOCATION:** Bajo de Masinloc	**PHILIPPINES:** Filipino Fishing Boat **CHINA:** 1. CCG rubber-boat	**INCIDENTS:** **a. Driving-away** **b. Use of Horns/Sirens** **DETAILS:** A Filipino Fishing Boat and one of its service boats, were driven away from the southeast entrance of BdM by CCG personnel using hand gestures and a siren and were later shadowed by a CCG rubber boat.
DATE: 12 January **LOCATION:** Bajo de Masinloc	**PHILIPPINES:** Filipino Fishing Boat **CHINA:** 1. CCG rubber-boat 3104	**INCIDENTS:** **a. Driving-away** **b. Use of Horns/Sirens** **DETAILS:** A Filipino Fishing Boat harassed and forced by CCG personnel to surrender the edible star-shells (local: "Taktakun") and fish they harvested from an exposed reef on the southern part of BdM.

CCG rubber-boat 3104 headed to their location and warned the group using sirens. CCG personnel disembarked from their rubber boat and swam towards the location of the Filipino fisherfolk, which prompted them to proceed to their service boats to load pails containing their harvested shells. This also forced the fisherfolk to swim towards the direction of their mother-boat while being chased by CCG personnel.

DATE:
01 to 03 February

LOCATION:
Escoda Shoal
Ayungin Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA
BRP SINDANGAN
UM1

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 500
2. CCG-5203
3. CCG-5205
4. CMMV 00118

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:
The PCG vessels were shadowed and subjected to radio challenges. CCG RHIBs also attempted to tail Philippine Navy's Indigenous Boat UM1 upon entering the shoal.

DATE:
07 February

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Two (2) Filipino service boats

CHINA:
1. CCG-3063

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away

DETAILS:
On 07 February 2024, while Filipino fisherfolk aboard two service boats were net fishing near the southeast entrance of BdM or approximately 500 meters from their mother boat, a CCG rubber boat approached and circled them.

DATE:
01 to 09 February

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Placement of Floating Barrier
d. Dangerous Maneuvers
e. Blocking

CHINA:
1. CCG-3063
2. CCG-3064
3. CCG-3105
4. CCG-3302
5. CMMV 00006
6. CMMV 00107
7. CMMV 00307
8. CMMV 00309

DETAILS:
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV 9701) was persistently shadowed by and had several exchanges of radio challenges with CCG-3105, while also issuing radio challenges toward CCG-3302 as well as CMMVs QIONG SANSHA YU 00006 and 00107. CCG vessels 3105 and 3302 conducted dangerous maneuvers toward the PCG vessel on 08 February.

DATE:
14 to 17 February

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP DATU TAMBLOT

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 527
2. CCG-3063
3. CCG-3064
4. CCG-3105
5. CCG-3302
6. CMMV 00006
7. CMMV 00107
8. CMMV 00307
9. CMMV 00309

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Placement of Floating Barrier
d. Dangerous Maneuvers
e. Blocking

DETAILS:
BRP DATU TAMBLOT (MMOV 3005) received approximately 25 and 10 radio challenges from the CCG on 15 and 16 February, respectively, most of which originated from CCG-3105, with some from CCG-3302. BRP DATU TAMBLOT was subjected to dangerous maneuvers and blocking by CCG vessels 3105 and 3302, as well as CMMV QIONG SANSHA YU 00307, and following by PLA-N 527.

DATE:
21 to 24 February

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP DATU SANDAY

CHINA:
1. CCG-3063
2. CCG-3064
3. CCG-3105
4. CCG-3302
5. CMMV 00006
6. CMMV 00107
7. CMMV 00278
8. CMMV 00307
9. CMMV 00309
10. CMMV 0189
11. CMMV 01599
12. CMMV 03003
13. CMMV 09809
14. CMMV 3128
15. CMMV 3138
16. CMMV 3168
17. CMMV 66168
18. CMMV 83168

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Placement of Floating Barrier
d. Deployment of RHIBs
e. Dangerous Maneuvers
f. Blocking

DETAILS:
On 21 February, PLA-N 105 began shadowing BRP DATU SANDAY (MMOV 3002), while approximately 91.0NM southeast of BdM and issued a radio challenge. As the PCG inched towards the northwestern part of the shoal, CCG-3105 heightened its response by approaching the BFAR vessel approximately 100 meters from its bow. CCG-3105 and CMMVs 00309 and 00107 then corralled BRP DATU SANDAY around 1.2NM south of BdM.

Later, as BRP DATU SANDAY moved closer to the shoal 0.7 NM southwest, CMMV SHENNAN 3168 blocked the BFAR vessel at 50 meters. BRP DATU SANDAY had a total of 28 radio challenge exchanges with CCG-3105.

DATE:
04 to 06 March

LOCATION:
Escoda Shoal
Ayungin Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA
BRP SINDANGAN
UM4

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 164
2. PLA-N 530
3. CCG-3305
4. CCG-5201
5. CCG-21551
6. CCG-21555
7. CCG-21556

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Use of Water Cannons
e. Collision/Ramming

The PCG encountered multiple CCG vessels and CMMVs persistently shadowing, blocking, and documenting the Philippine vessels' movements. China's aggression intensified as the Philippine unit approached Ayungin Shoal, resulting in a collision with BRP SINDANGAN (MRRV 4407) and the use of water cannons against UM4, resulting in four minor injuries.

DATE:
06 to 08 March

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP MALABRIGO

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 155
2. PLA-N 175
3. PLA-N 500
4. CCG-3066
5. CCG-3104
6. CCG-3501
7. CCG-3502
8. CCG-4106
9. CMMV 00006
10. CMMV 00007
11. CMMV 00107
12. CMMV 00121
13. CMMV 00122
14. CMMV 00307
15. CMMV 00309
16. CMMV 00317
17. CMMV 0189
18. CMMV 01599
19. CMMV 08036
20. CMMV 3128
21. CMMV 3138
22. CMMV 3168
23. CMMV 20488
24. CMMV 91086
25. CMMV 61199

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
The PCG deployed BRP MALABRIGO (MRRV 4402) from 06 to 08 March 2024, to carry out a MARPAT in the area. Throughout the mission, BRP MALABRIGO encountered unusual electronic malfunctions.

BRP MALABRIGO was also subjected to CCG radio challenges, shadowing, and dangerous maneuvers, specifically from CCG vessels 3104 and 3502, resulting in a collision between BRP MALABRIGO and CCG-3104 on 07 March.



DATE:
21 to 23 March

LOCATION:
Pag-asa Island Cays

PHILIPPINES:
BRP DATU SANDAY
BRP DATU PAGBUAYA

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 500
2. CCG-5204
3. Changhe Z-8J
4. Aircraft Tail No. 57

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:
China actively monitored and disrupted the Pag-asa Island cay surveys by issuing radio challenges, shadowing Philippine scientists and government personnel, sounding sirens, and conducting dangerous maneuvers.

Moreover, the PCG observed the consecutive use of a Changhe Z-8J Aircraft with tail number 57. Upon its deployment on 23 March, this aircraft was extensively used as a deterrent, flying as low as 20 meters above Pag-asa Cay 3 while scientists, divers, and fisherfolk conducted activities.

Strong rotor downwash generated by the aircraft caused debris to scatter, leading to injuries and nearly causing a diver to drown.

DATE:
22 to 24 March

LOCATION:
Escoda Shoal
Ayungin Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA
BRP SINDANGAN
UM4

CHINA:
1. Unidentified Houbei-Class PLA-N
2. PLA-N 175
3. PLA-N 500
4. PLA-N 530
5. PLA-N 570
6. PLA-N 648
7. CCG-4103
8. CCG-5201
9. CCG-21551
10. CCG-21555
11. CCG-21556

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Use of Water Cannons
e. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
CCG and CMMVs persistently separated the PCG from UM4. They prevented the convoy's approach towards BRP SIERRA MADRE by issuing radio challenges, blocking, and corralling, and conducting dangerous maneuvers.

When UM4 approached approximately 6NM from Ayungin Shoal, it was subjected to continuous water cannon operations from CCG vessels 5201 and 21551, resulting in its eventual halt. The PCG responded immediately to assess the situation and provide medical assistance by outmaneuvering the CCG vessels and CMMVs.

However, only BRP CABRA successfully shook off the blockings. CCG-4103 collided with BRP SINDANGAN from behind when they PCG vessel was attempting to break free.

DATE:
30 April to 01 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP BAGACAY
BRP DATU BANKAW

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 162
2. CCG-3104
3. CCG-3305
4. CCG-5303
5. CCG-21558
6. CMMV 00116
7. CMMV 00117
8. CMMV 00118
9. CMMV 00218

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Placement of Floating Barrier
d. Dangerous Maneuvers
e. Use of Water Cannons
f. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
The CCG, with the assistance of CMMVs, subjected the Philippine vessels to aggressive, dangerous, and unlawful actions. The CCG vessels utilized high-pressure water, directly hitting the contingent more than 14 times, resulting in significant damage.

BRP DATU BANKAW (MMOV-3004) also collided with a CCG vessel at least three times. Moreover, Chinese entities deployed a floating barrier to block the southeast entrance of the shoal from 30 April to 01 May.

DATE:
13 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3305
2. CCG aluminum-hulled boat

INCIDENTS:
a. Driving-away
b. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was moored at the southwestern part of BdM, CCG-3305 approached an FFB while sounding its horn. CCG-3305 then deployed an aluminum-hulled boat with six (6) CCG personnel onboard, which approached and circled the FFB while sounding its siren. CCG personnel drove away the FFB using a megaphone and hand signals while taking photo and video documentation.

DATE:
13 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3305
2. CCG aluminum-hulled boat

INCIDENTS:
a. Driving-away
b. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
A CCG aluminum-hulled boat deployed by CCG-3305 headed toward the location of a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) and roamed around the FFB twice, while taking photo and video documentation. After, the CCG crew onboard the CCG aluminum-hulled boat warned the FFB using a megaphone and through hand signals.

DATE:
14 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3502
2. CCG aluminum-hulled boat

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was moored at its *payao* located 8.76NM from the southeast entrance of BdM, CCG-3502, located around 20.0 meters from the FFB, blew its horn three times and launched one aluminum-hulled boat boarded by seven CCG personnel wearing navy blue coveralls and life jackets.

The aluminum-hulled boat, approached and roamed around the location of the FFB. After drifting at the portside of the FFB, one CCG personnel asked *"What are you doing here? Can you speak English?"* Other CCG crew took photos and drove the fisherfolk away using hand signals, prompting the FFB C to leave the area and head east. CCG-3502 and the aluminum-hulled boat followed the FFB until it reached 8.0 NM from its previous location.

DATE:
14 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-5305
2. CCG aluminum-hulled boat 5305-2

INCIDENTS:
a. Driving-away

DETAILS:
While a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was anchored at the southwestern part of the shoal, CCG-5305 launched an aluminum-hulled boat with body number 5305-2 and three personnel onboard wearing navy blue coveralls and orange lifejackets.

The boat approached the team and roamed around the FFB around 13 times. CCG personnel onboard aluminum-hulled boat 5305-2 then used a megaphone to warn the FFB, stating, to wit:

"Filipino people China has sovereignty over Huangyan island and its [surrounding] water, your behavior is being unreasonable, leave immediately".

DATE:
14 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3106
2. CCG aluminum-hulled boat

INCIDENTS:
a. Driving-away

DETAILS:
While an Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was fishing around the southwestern part of the shoal using a small service boat, CCG-3106 launched an aluminum-hulled boat with six CCG personnel onboard to approach the FFB. CCG personnel warned the FFB away, stating that its activities were illegal, while also using hand signals.

DATE:
14 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3305

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Use of Horns/Sirens
c. Pointing of Searchlights

DETAILS:
While heading southeast 8.0NM from the southeastern part of BdM, A Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) observed CCG-3305 shadowing at around 30.0 meters from her portside while blowing its horn around 20 times and pointed a searchlight toward their location.

A drone also flew over the location of the FFB. CCG-3305 ceased following FFB upon reaching 17.0 NM from its previous location.

DATE:
15 to 16 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP BAGACAY

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 175
2. PLA-N 886
3. CCG-3105
4. CCG-3106
5. CCG-3305
6. CCG-3502
7. CCG-4108
8. CCG-4109
9. CCG-4203
10. CCG-5302
11. CCG-5305
12. CCG-21549
13. CCG-21550
14. CCG-21558
39 CMMVs

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Placement of Floating Barrier
d. Dangerous Maneuvers
e. Use of Water Cannons
f. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
The largest number of China-flagged vessels recorded in the vicinity of BdM at 66 vessels was recorded on 15 May 2024, coinciding with the commencement of the Second Civilian Resupply Mission of the ATIN ITO! Coalition.

In support of the activity, the PCG deployed BRP BAGACAY (MRRV-4410) to provide security escort, while BRP BORACAY (FPB-2401) and BRP PANGLAO (FPB-2402) were dispatched to augment the convoy on 16 May.

BRP BAGACAY received radio challenges from CCG-4109 and 4203 and was followed by these CCG vessels, along with CCG-4108 and PLA-N 668. CCG-4203 also crossed from the port to starboard quarter side of BRP BAGACAY at 1800 yards.

Two rows of floating barriers, joined together in the middle to form an "H" formation, was observed at the southeast entrance along with one CCG aluminum-hulled boat.

DATE:
15 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3305
2. CCG aluminum-hulled boat

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Driving-away
d. Use of Horns/Sirens
e. Pointing of Searchlights

DETAILS:
On 15 May, while a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was moored at its *payao* located roughly 13.30NM from the southern part of BdM, CCG-3305, located around 100 meters from the location of the FFB, sounded its siren, which prompted the FFB to turn on its Channel-16 radio. CCG-3305 then radio challenged FFB, stating that the FFB does not have permission from the Chinese government to fish in the area.

CCG-3305 then launched an aluminum-hulled boat, with four CCG personnel onboard. The boat approached the FFB while sounding its siren. One CCG crew uttered via megaphone that the fishing activities conducted by the FFB are illegal, while other crew members used hand signals to drive the FFB away. The FFB unanchored an hour after the arrival of the fisherfolk and headed southeast. CCG-3305 and the aluminum-hulled vessel then followed the FFB for an hour.

DATE:
16 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21550

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
On 16 May, while 20.0 NM south of BdM, CCG-21550 approached and circled a Filipino Fishing Boat 30.0 meters away.

DATE:
19 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3106
2. CCG-21550

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Dangerous Maneuvers
c. Blocking

DETAILS:
While a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was underway 9.0NM from the southeastern part of BdM, CCG vessels 3106 and 21550 conducted dangerous maneuvers around 10.0 meters to block the FFB, prompting the FFB to change course and head east.

DATE:
20 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21543

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Blocking
e. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While underway heading north from its *payao* located 20.0 NM west of BdM, CCG-21543 approached and blocked a Filipino Fishing Boat. around 10.0 meters. The CCG sounded its horn, while the four CCG personnel drove away the Filipino fisherfolk using hand gestures and flags.

DATE:
22 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21550

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away

DETAILS:
At around 22 May, while 7.0 NM from the southeastern part of BdM navigating to its private *payao* approximately 20.0NM from the western part of BdM, a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was approached and later followed by CCG-21550 around 200.0 meters until reaching 30.0NM from the southern part of the shoal. Seven CCG personnel reportedly signaled the FFB to leave the area.

DATE:
25 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21550

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While moored to its *payao* 12.0 NM from the southern part of BdM, CCG-21550 approach a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) at 200.0 meters and sounded its siren. Three CCG crew came out, one of which warned the fisherfolk to *"go home!"* while driving them away using hand signals.

This prompted the FFB to unmoor and head south. CCG-21550 followed the FFB until it reached around 5.0 NM from its previous location.

DATE:
26 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3106

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Blocking
d. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While navigating 13.0 NM from the southeastern part of BdM underway to its *payao*, a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was blocked by CCG-3106 at around 100 meters.

The CCG also sounded its horn five times, prompting the FFB to change course and navigate toward its other *payao* located 18.0 NM from the southeastern part of BdM. CCG-3106 also used its megaphone to drive away the FFB.

DATE:
03 to 05 June

LOCATION:
Escoda Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA
BRP CABRA

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 987
2. PLA-N 997
3. HOVERCRAFT 3330
4. HOVERCRAFT 3349
5. CCG-3303
6. CCG-4103
7. CCG-21555
8. CCG-21556
9. Changhe Z-8JH TN 57
10. Changhe Z-18 TN 18

INCIDENTS:
a. Shadowing
b. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
The CCG consistently deployed Rigid-hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) and Rubber Boats (RBs) to augment the CCG's shadowing operations against the survey team.

Additionally, in a renewed strategy, China vessels has utilized their horns, and the PLA-N conducted amphibious operation drills as further deterrent to the survey.

DATE:
14 to 19 June

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP SINDANGAN

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 552
2. CCG-3105
3. CCG-3106
4. CCG-3502

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:
Over the course of its MARPAT operations deployment, BRP SINDANGAN (MRRV 4407) was followed by PLA-N 552, as well as CCG vessels 3105, 3106, and 3502. The PCG vessel also had multiple radio exchanges with CCG vessels 3105, 3106, and 3502.

On 15 June, CCG-3105 conducted dangerous maneuvers against BRP SINDANGAN, at times prompting BRP SINDANGAN to stop its engine to avoid a collision. The closest approach by CCG-3105 to BRP SINDANGAN was two yards, while 21.07 NM southeast of BdM.

DATE:
14 to 21 June

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP MALAPASCUA

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 552
2. CCG-3105
3. CCG-3106
4. CCG-3502

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
d. Dangerous Maneuvers
e. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
Over the course of its deployment, BRP MALAPASCUA (MRRV 4403) was followed by CCG vessels 3105, 3106, and 3502, as well as PLA-N ship 552.

BRP MALAPASCUA had multiple radio exchanges with CCG vessels 3106 and 3502.

On 16 June, CCG-3106 blew its horn and conducted a dangerous maneuver by crossing the starboard bow to dead ahead of BRP MALAPASCUA, while 22.8NM east-southeast of BdM.

DATE:
15 June

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21543

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
CCG-21543 approached a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB), which was operating at its *payao* located approximately 15.0NM north of BdM. CCG-21543 reportedly sounded its siren and warned the Filipino fisherfolk in Chinese using a megaphone and hand gestures, prompting the FFB to leave the area.

DATE:
16 June

LOCATION:
Escoda Shoal
Ayungin Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA
BRP BAGACAY
Two Patrol Coast Crafts (PCC)
Two Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB)
M/V Lapu-Lapu

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 31
2 .PLAN 167
3. PLAN 175
4. PLA-N 542
5. PLAN 646
6. Type 726 Yuyi-class Hovercraft
7. PLAN Hospital Ship
8. CCG-3301
9. CCG-4103
10. CCG-5201
11. CCG-21551

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Placement of Floating Barrier
d. Dangerous Maneuvers
e. Use of Water Cannons
f. Collision/Ramming
g. Boarding

DETAILS:
The PCG was relegated to logistical support roles, including transporting personnel, fuel supply for PN assets, and rescue operations. The two deployed PCG vessels, BRP BAGACAY (MRRV 4410) and BRP CABRA (MRRV 4409), participated in the rescue operations. BRP BAGACAY focused on salvaging the two PCCs and two PN RHIBs, while BRP CABRA prioritized the evacuation of injured personnel from BRP SIERRA MADRE.

Despite the humanitarian nature of these rescues, the PCG vessels were still subjected to dangerous maneuvers, radio challenges, and consistent harassment through imposing deployments of Chinese missile boats, helicopters, and other military vessels.

12. CCG-Speedboat 3010
13. CCG-Speedboat 5003
14. CCG-Speedboat 21556-1
15. CCG-21551 Patrol Boat
Three (3) HOUBEI-Class Vessels

DATE:
17 June

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21543
2. CCG-21550

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
CCG vessels 21543 and 21550 chased a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) on while around 11.0NM southeast of BdM. CCG vessels 21543 and 21550 allegedly approached around five meters from the astern part of the FFB while sounding their sirens, leading the FFB to vacate the area.

DATE:
26 June to 01 July

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP SINDANGAN

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 574
2. CCG-3105
3. CCG-3302
4. CCG-5303

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:
During its MARPAT, BRP SINDANGAN (MRRV 4407) was intermittently followed by PLA-N ship 574, as well as CCG vessels 3105, 3302, and 5303, and had multiple radio exchanges with CCG vessels 3105 and 3302.

DATE:
30 June to 08 July

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP MALAPASCUA

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 574
2. CCG-3105
3. CCG-3301
4. CCG-3302
5. CCG-4302
6. CCG-21543
7. CMMV 00109
8. CMMV 00112
9. CMMV 00315
10. PLA-N Helicopter 65

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:
Over the course of its deployment, BRP MALAPASCUA (MRRV 4403) was followed by PLA-N ship 574, as well as CCG vessels 3105, 3302, and 4302. BRP MALAPASCUA had multiple radio exchanges with CCG-3105, and the CCG conducted dangerous maneuvers against the PCG vessels, approaching as close as 10 yards from its port-quarter side.

DATE:
12 to 20 July

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP MELCHORA AQUINO

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 105
2. PLA-N 574
3. CCG-3105
4. CCG-4302

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Pointing of Searchlights

DETAILS:
On 12 July, BRP SINDANGAN (MRRV 4407) transferred its MARPAT duties to BRP MELCHORA AQUINO (MRRV 9702). The PCG vessel engaged in several radio exchanges with CCG vessels 3105 and 4302, while also issuing radio challenges to PLA-N ships 105 and 574.

On 17 July, while BRP MELCHORA AQUINO was around 26.24NM southeast of BdM, CCG-4302 vessel turned on a light located on its fantail alley while approximately 533 yards from the port beam of the PCG vessel. BRP MELCHORA AQUINO responded by turning on its searchlight and pointing it toward CCG-4302, prompting the latter to do the same. This exchange lasted for about 15 minutes. CCG-4302 ceased following the PCG vessel on 19 July.

DATE:
28 July

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 569

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
On 28 July 2024, PLA-N 569 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat 100.0 meters from its portside, while navigating approximately 18.0NM southeast of BdM en route to its *payao*.

DATE:
29 July

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3104

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
On 29 July, while around 11.0 NM from the southeastern part of BdM heading to its *payao* located at 23.0NM west of the shoal, CCG-3104 blew its horn and followed a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) approximately 100.0 meters from its starboard side. This prompted the FFB to change course. CCG-3104 ceased following the FFB upon reaching 20.0NM of BdM.

DATE:
29 July

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3104

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
CCG-3104 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat 100.0 meters while navigating roughly 11.0NM southeast of BdM, en route to its *payao* located 23.0NM west of the shoal. CCG-3104 also reportedly blew its horn.

DATE:
01 August

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3104

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While 7.0 NM east of BdM, CCG-3104 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat at 200.0 meters while sounding its siren. CCG-3104 ceased upon reaching 12NM northwest of the shoal.

DATE:
01 August

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
CCG-(UBN)

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While fishing around 11.0NM north of BdM, an unidentified CCG-navigated towards the location of a Filipino Fishing Boat, prompting it to leave the area.

DATE:
02 August

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3104

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While around 10.0NM southwest of BdM, CCG-3104 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) approximately 15 meters from its outrigger. The CCG-blew its horn twice and continuously sounded its siren. CCG-3104 ceased following the FFB upon reaching about 12.0NM of the shoal.

DATE:
04 August

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21550
2. CMMV 00204

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
While around 12.0NM southwest of BdM, CCG-21550 came close and followed a Filipino Fishing Boat at roughly 100 meters. CMMV 00204 also approached and roamed around the location of the FFB.

DATE:
11 August

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP GABRIELA SILANG

CHINA:
1. CCG-3304

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:
BRP GABRIELA SILANG (OPV 8301) had at least five (5) radio exchanges with CCG-3304.

DATE:
16 August

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21550

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
CCG-21550 approached a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) at its *payao* 10.0 NM southeast of the shoal, sounded its siren, and circled the FFB five (5) times.

CCG-21550 then approached the fantail of the FFB, coming as close as 10 meters, while five CCG personnel were observed taking photo and video documentation and reportedly warning the Filipino fisherfolk, stating:

"This is China property, Leave immediately."

CCG-21550 ceased following the FFB when it reached 4.0NM from its previous location.

DATE:
20 August

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-4109

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
Around 12NM north of BdM, CCG-4109 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB), sounded its siren, and warned the FFB, to wit:

"This is China property, Leave immediately".

At around 7.0 NM of BdM, an unidentified CCG vessel reportedly followed the FFB while sounding its siren.

DATE:
18 to 22 August

LOCATION:
Kalayaan Island Group

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CAPE ENGANO
BRP BAGACAY

CHINA:
1. CCG-3104
2. CCG-4103
3. CCG-21551

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Use of Water Cannons
e. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
On 18 August, the PCG dispatched BRP BAGACAY (MRRV-4410) and BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (MRRV-4411) to resupply PCG sub-stations in the KIG, including BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV-9701), which has been in Escoda Shoal since 16 April.

During the mission towards Escoda Shoal on 19 August, CCGVs exhibited aggressive conduct, such as dangerous maneuvers, ramming, and/or firing of water cannons.

BRP BAGACAY sustained damage to its auxiliary room on the port side near the port auxiliary engine, with a hole measuring 2.5 feet in length and three feet in width.

On the PCG vessel's starboard quarter, damages were thirteen stanchion posts and a one-foot dent. In total, the PCG recorded three ramming instances against BRP BAGACAY by CCG-21551.

Meanwhile, the damage inflicted on BRP CAPE ENGAÑO by CCG-3104 included a hole with a diameter of 1.10 meters located on the starboard quarter, as well as damage to the engine exhaust on the starboard quarter, with a diameter of 40 centimeters.

DATE:
23 August

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-4109

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
Around 11.0 NM east of the shoal, CCG-4109 approached and circled a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB), maintaining 100.0 meters from its starboard side.

The CCG vessel sounded its siren and warned the FFB at least five times using a megaphone, stating: *"This is property of China."*

DATE:
25 August

LOCATION:
Kalayaan Island Group

PHILIPPINES:
BRP DATU SANDAY

CHINA:
PLA-N 626

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Use of Water Cannons
e. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
From 24 to 25 August 2024, BFAR deployed BRP DATU SANDAY (MMOV 4402) to carry out a humanitarian mission, resupplying Filipino fisherfolk with diesel, food, and medical supplies in the KIG, including Escoda Shoal.

Despite two attempts to enter the shoal, BRP DATU SANDAY failed to access Escoda Shoal due to continuous tailing and encirclement by PLA-N 626 and multiple CCG vessels.

The CCG vessels engaged in dangerous maneuvers, blasted their horns, rammed, and deployed water cannons against the BFAR vessel, eventually causing engine failure and forcing an early termination of the operation.

DATE:
26 August

LOCATION:
Kalayaan Island Group

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA
BRP CAPE ENGAÑO

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 105
2. PLA-N 626
3. CCG-3104
4. CCG-4103
5. CCG-5202
6. CCG-5205
7. CCG-21551
8. CCG-21555

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
Following the unsuccessful resupply mission to BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV 9701) on 19 August, owing to China's aggressive actions, the PCG redeployed BRP CABRA (MRRV 4409) and BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (MRRV 4411) for another resupply attempt on 26 August.

This operation, initiated in the early morning, employed a daytime approach, aiming to outmaneuver China's tactic of exploiting low visibility and ensuring media coverage in the event of any potential ramming incidents that could result in structural damages to the PCG vessels.

During this operation, the CCG adopted a less aggressive posture compared to the 19 August incident, although it maintained its blockade of Escoda Shoal. Radio transmissions from China continued to threaten action against the PCG vessels if they persisted in their approach.

An attempt was made to initiate negotiations via radio, however, this effort proved futile, as China's deliberate tactics were aimed at compelling the Philippines to withdraw the BRP TERESA MAGBANUA.

DATE:
31 August

LOCATION:
Kalayaan Island Group

PHILIPPINES:
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 175
2. PLA-N 185
3. CCG-4303
4. CCG-3104
5. CCG-5205
6. CMMV 00017
7. CMMV 00218
8. NAN HAI JIU 116

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
On 31 August 2024, the BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV 9701), stationed in Escoda Shoal for 137 days since 16 April, was instructed to carry out a small-scale maritime patrol within the shoal.

This movement raised an alarm and triggered an immediate response from the CCG and CMMMVs.

They subjected the PCG vessel to various forms of harassment, including radio challenges, dangerous maneuvers, and, eventually, ramming.



The ramming, aimed at the vessel's port side, suggests a deliberate attempt to inflict significant damage, particularly to the engine, potentially necessitating a removal from the shoal.

DATE:
11 September

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21613

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Dangerous Maneuvers
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
CCG-21613 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) within 50.0 meters starboard side while sounding its siren on 11 September, while approximately 13.0NM southeast of BdM.

CCG-21613 subjected the FFB to dangerous maneuvers on 12 September.

DATE:
12 September

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CMMV 00113
2. CMMV 00219

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Pointing of Searchlights

DETAILS:
CMMVs QIONG SANSHA YU 00219 and QIONG SANSHA YU 00113 approached a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) on 12 September, almost bumping the stern part of the FFB. This prompted the FFB to leave the area, around 40.0 NM west-southwest of BdM. QIONG SANSHA YU 00219 reportedly pointed a searchlight at the Filipino fisherfolk while continuing to follow the FFB, along with QIONG SANSHA YU 00113.

DATE:
22 to 24 September

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP SULUAN

CHINA:
1. PLA-N ship (UBN)
2. CCG-3106
3. CCG-3302

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Blocking

DETAILS:
PCG vessel BRP SULUAN (MRRV 4406) has been issued a radio challenge by an unidentified PLA-N vessel, as well as CCG vessels 3106 and 3302, on 22 September.

On 24 September, around 40.3NM east of BdM, CCG-3106 subjected BRP SULUAN to at least four blocking maneuvers by crossing from the starboard side to the port side bow of the PCG vessel at 0.1 to 0.2NM.

The PCG vessel was able to approach around 28.7 NM east of the shoal on 25 September.

DATE:
25 to 26 September

LOCATION:
Ayungin Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CAPE ENGAÑO

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 6261
2. CCG-4103
3. CCG-4203
4. CCG-5103
5. CCG-5203
6. CMMV 00106
7. CMMV 00316
8. HAIYANG DIZHI 12 HAO

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
On 25 September 2024, the PCG directed BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (MRRV-4411) to assist in the RORE mission of the Philippine Navy in Ayungin Shoal.

As per the concept of operations provided by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Western Command (WESCOM), BRP CAPE ENGAÑO was assigned to escort M/V LAPU-LAPU.

The PCG vessel was instructed to rendezvous with M/V LAPU-LAPU and PN ship BRP LANDISLAO DIWA before proceeding to Ayungin Shoal with M/V LAPU-LAPU.

Like the last PN RORE mission under the new arrangement with China, the transit proceeded unimpeded, free from obstructions or blocking attempts. China deployed four (4) CCG vessels and one PLA-N ship, likely to document and potentially respond to any deviations from the intended activity.

DATE:
27 September to 02 October

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA

CHINA:
1. CCG-3302
2. CCG-3306

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:
BRP CABRA (MRRV 4409) received radio challenges from CCG vessels 3306 and 3302 on 28 and 30 September.

DATE:
28 September

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CMMV 00113

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Attempt to Retrieve Payao Blinker Lights

DETAILS:
On or about 28 September, four (4) service boats deployed by a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) ventured around their *payao* approximately 12.0NM east of BdM. CMMV QIONG SANSHA YU 00113 approached, followed, and attempted to drive away a FFB while also attempting to retrieve blinker lights attached to the fisherfolks' *payaos*. The CMMV reportedly hit the *payao* and almost bumped one of the service boats. The CMMV followed the service boats until the evening but safely reached their mother boat, located around 18.0NM east of BdM around 2300H.

DATE:
04 to 11 October

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP SULUAN

CHINA:
1. CCG-3103
2. CCG-3302

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
PCG vessel BRP SULUAN (MRRV 4406) took over MARPAT duties from BRP CABRA (MRRV-4409). The PCG vessel was followed intermittently by CCG vessels 3302 and 3103 and was radio-challenged by CCG-3302 six times on 05 October. CCG-3103 blew its horn while following the vessel on 09 October. BRP SULUAN was able to approach around 32.34NM east-northeast of BdM.

DATE:
07 to 09 October

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP DATU CABAYLO
BRP DATU SANDAY

CHINA:
1. CCG-3301
2. CCG-3502
3. CCG-21543

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Use of Horns/Sirens
d. Use of Blinker Lights
e. Dangerous Maneuvers
f. Use of Water Cannons

DETAILS:
On 07 October, BRP DATU CABAYLO (MMOV-3301) and BRP DATU SANDAY (MMOV-3302) departed from Orion, Bataan, to provide logistical support for Filipino fisherfolk operating near BdM. CCG vessels 3301, 3502, and 21543 followed and monitored the BFAR vessels, occasionally turning on their blinkers and sounding their horns/sirens. The BFAR vessels were also subjected to radio challenges and dangerous maneuvers.

On 08 October, CCG-3502 conducted dangerous maneuvers against BRP DATU CABAYLO with its water cannon pointed towards the water.

CCG-3301 followed the same BFAR vessel and pointed its water cannon at its astern part. The BFAR vessels provided provisions to at least 28 FFBs before altering their course and heading toward Pag-asa Island on 09 October.

DATE:
11 October

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3301

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
While about 30.0NM southwest of BM, CCG-3301 began tailing a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB), which was heading toward the location of the FFB 10.0NM south of BM. Upon arriving, CCG-3301 followed the FFB closely and blew its horn twice.

DATE:
11 to 18 October

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA

CHINA:
1. CCG-3103

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Blocking

DETAILS:
From 11 to 18 October, PCG vessel BRP CABRA (MRRV 4409) conducted a MARPAT near the vicinity waters of BdM where it was shadowed, radio challenged and blocked by CCG-3103 on 14 October 2024.

DATE:
13 October

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-21543

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
On 13 October, while approximately 11.0NM southeast of BdM, CCG-21543 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) closely while sounding its siren.

CCG personnel also warned the FFB away using verbal queues, prompting the FFB to leave the area.

DATE:
31 October

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3503
2. CCG-21543

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
On 31 October, while heading to its *payao* roughly 25.81NM east of BdM, a Filipino Fishing Boat was followed by CCG vessels 21543 and 3503, at 30 meters, while sounding their horns or sirens, until reaching around 30.0NM northeast of BdM.

DATE:
02 to 04 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3301
2. CCG-3304

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
From 02 to 04 November, a Filipino Fishing Boat reported that it had been followed by CCG-3301 and 3304 at 15.0 to 20.0 meters in separate instances.

DATE:
03 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3104

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While underway around 25.70NM northeast of BdM, CCG-3104 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat 50 meters portside and sounded its horn or siren three times.

The CCG vessel ceased shadowing upon reaching 30.0 NM from their previous location.

DATE:
04 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3104

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens
c. Pointing of Searchlights

DETAILS:
While a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was moored at its *payao* approximately 19.0NM east of BdM, CCG-3104 pointed its searchlight and sounded its horn from 10.0 meters away, prompting the FFB to vacate the area.

CCG-3104 ceased following the FFB upon reaching 10.0NM from their previous location.

DATE:
13 to 14 November

LOCATION:
Ayungin Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CAPE ENGAÑO

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 167
2. PLA-N 500
3. CCG-5205
5. CCG-5305
6. CCG-21558
7. CCG-21549
8. CMMV 00301

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
On 13 November, the PCG directed BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (MRRV-4411) to assist in the RORE mission of the PN in Ayungin Shoal.

As per the concept of operations provided by the AFP WESCOM, BRP CAPE ENGAÑO was tasked with escorting M/V LAPU-LAPU, rendezvousing with the vessel in Sikatuna Shoal Shoal.

From there, BRP CAPE ENGAÑO was to continue the mission, heading towards Ayungin Shoal with M/V LAPU-LAPU, replicating last September's operations.

The PCG recorded around nine Chinese vessels that responded to the mission, two of which were projecting AIS signals of Vietnamese vessels but were identified by BRP SIERRA MADRE personnel as CMMVs.

DATE:
12 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3301

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While 21.0NM southeast of BdM, a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was approached by CCG-3301, at 300 meters, while sounding its horn and siren. CCG personnel verbally warned the Filipino fisherfolk, to wit:

"...This is the [People's] Republic of China, please leave immediately to avoid collision at the sea."

CCG-3301 then followed the FFB, ceasing upon reaching 30.0NM southeast of the shoal.

DATE:
13 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3301
2. CMMV (UBN)

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was heading towards its *payao* around 24.0NM northeast of BdM, CCG-3301 and an unidentified CMMV shadowed the FFB at 1.0NM.

CCG-3301 reportedly sounded its horn and siren, while CCG personnel issued a verbal warning.

China entities stopped following the FFB upon reaching 27.0NM northeast of the shoal.

DATE:
15 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3304

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) was moored at its *payao* roughly 31.0 NM northeast of BdM, CCG-3304, 20.0 meters away, sounded its horn, prompting the FFB's service boat to halt its activities. CCG-3304 reportedly followed the service boat until it returned to its mother boat.

DATE:
16 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3304
Two (2) CMMVs (UBN)

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While moored 21.0NM west of BdM, CCG-3304 roamed around the location of a Filipino Fishing Boat (FFB) three times at 30.0 meters, while sounding its horn and siren.

Two unidentified CMMVs also approached the FFB's location, prompting it to leave the area. The CMMVs shadowed the FFB until reaching around 30.0NM west of the shoal.

DATE:
19 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3301

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While fishing 20.0 NM southeast of BdM, CCG-3301 approached a Filipino Fishing Boat at 5.0 meters, while sounding its horn and siren, prompting it to leave the area.

DATE:
20 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3301

INCIDENT:
a. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
CCG-3104, at 500.0 meters away, sounded its horn and siren upon the arrival of a Filipino Fishing Boat at approximately 30.0NM west of BdM.

DATE:
24 November

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
Filipino Fishing Boat

CHINA:
1. CCG-3301

INCIDENT:
a. Use of Horns/Sirens
b. Driving-away

DETAILS:
While around 22.0NM southwest of the shoal, a Filipino Fishing Boat was driven away by CCG-3301 using its horn and siren to force the boat to vacate the area.

DATE:
02 December

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA

CHINA:
1. CCG-3304

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Driving-away
c. Use of Horns/Sirens

DETAILS:
While 27.0NM southwest of BdM, CCG-3305 followed a Filipino Fishing Boat, blowing its horn and sounding its siren three times.

DATE:
02 to 04 December

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA
BRP DATU SANDAY
BRP DATU PAGBUAYA

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 500
2. CCG-3104
3. CCG-3302
4. CCG-3304

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Dangerous Maneuvers
d. Blocking
d. Use of Water Cannons
e. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
On 04 December, the BFAR vessels BRP DATU SANDAY (MMOV 3002) and BRP DATU PAGBUAYA (MRRV 3003) provided logistical support to around 40 Filipino fisherfolk in the area, while PCG vessels BRP CABRA (MRRV 4409) and BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV 9701) escorted them and conducted maritime patrols.

While around 15.2NM south of BdM, CCG-3302 conducted dangerous maneuvers while firing its water cannon at BRP DATU PAGBUAYA, resulting in a collision, while PLA-N 500 blocked and subjected BRP TERESA MAGBANUA to radio challenges.

BRP CABRA was also followed by CCG-3304 and was subjected to blocking and dangerous maneuvers by CCG-3104; while BRP DATU SANDAY was subjected to blocking and dangerous maneuvers by CCG-3304.
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

DATE:
04 December

LOCATION:
Ayungin Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP MELCHORA AQUINO
BRP CAPE ENGAÑO
BRP DATU ROMAPANET
BRP DATU BANKAW

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 167
2. PLA-N 572
3. CCG-5402
4. CCG-5203
5. CCG-5205
6. CCG-5305
7. CCG-21549
8. CCG-21558
9. CCG-21559

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Collision/Ramming

DETAILS:
On or about 04 December 2024, PCG vessels BRP MELCHORA AQUINO (MRRV 9701) and BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (MRRV 4411), along with BFAR vessels BRP DATU ROMAPANET (MMOV 3007) and BRP DATU BANKAW (MMOV 3004), were tasked to assist a group of FFBs reportedly heading towards Escoda Shoal.

The FFBs, which first tried to enter the shoal during the early morning of 04 December, reported that three Rigid-hull Inflatable Boats, two High-Speed Response Boats (HSRB), and two speed boats from Chinese state vessels blocked and harassed them through sounding their sirens.

PCG and BFAR's efforts to reach the FFBs, which were positioned approximately 22NM from the shoal, were persistently blocked or shadowed by CCG vessels 5402, 5205, 5203, 5305, 21558, 21559, 21549, as well as PLA-N ships 167 and 572. Three Rigid-hull Inflatable Boats, two High-Speed Response Boats (HSRB), and two speed boats from Chinese State Vessels.

Additionally, CCG-21549 side-swiped BRP DATU BANKAW as it tried to outmaneuver the CCGV, and later, CCG-21559 intentionally rammed BRP DATU ROMAPANET, leading to damage to its vessel structure. With the aggressive reception hampering the FFB's transit, they rerouted their fishing operations towards Southern Bank.

DATE:
05 to 08 December

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 500
2. PLA-N 571
3. PLA-N 669
4. PLA-N 885
5. CCG-3104
6. CCG-3106
7. CCG-5303

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
PCG vessel BRP CABRA (MRRV 4409) conducted a routine MARPAT around the vicinity waters of BdM. From 05 December, BRP CABRA was intermittently shadowed by CCG vessels 3104, 3106, and 5303, as well as PLA-N ships 500, 571, 669, and 885.

DATE:
10 to 15 December

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA

CHINA:
1. CCG-3106
2. CCG-5303

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
PCG vessel BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV 9701) conducted a routine MARPAT around the vicinity waters of BdM from 10 to 15 December, during which it was intermittently shadowed by CCG vessels 3106 and 5303.

DATE:
11 to 13 December

LOCATION:
Ayungin Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP MALAPASCUA

CHINA:
1. PLA-N 167
2. PLA-N 599
3. PLA-N 538
4. CCG-5305
5. CCG-5205
6. CCG-21558

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:
On 10 December 2024, the PCG directed BRP MALAPASCUA (MRRV 4403) to assist in the RORE Mission of the PN in Ayungin Shoal. As per the concept of operations provided by the AFP WESCOM, BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (MRRV 4411) was tasked with escorting M/V LAPU-LAPU, rendezvousing with the vessel in Sikatuna Shoal.

DATE:
15 to 18 December

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA

CHINA:
1. CCG-3106
2. CCG-5303

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing
b. Radio Challenges
c. Blocking

DETAILS:
PCG vessel BRP CABRA (MRRV 4409) conducted a routine MARPAT around the vicinity waters of BdM from 15 to 18 December, during which it was intermittently shadowed by CCG vessels 3106 and 5303.

BRP CABRA issued radio challenges against CCG-3106 twice, with the CCG vessel responding one time. CCG-3106 also blocked BRP CABRA approximately 160.0 yards dead ahead while around 29.0 NM northeast of BdM.

DATE:
24 to 25 December

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP TERESA MAGBANUA

CHINA:
1. CCG-5303

INCIDENT:
a. Shadowing

DETAILS:
PCG vessel BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV 9701) conducted a routine MARPAT around the vicinity waters of BdM and off the coasts of the provinces of Zambales and Bataan from 24 to 26 December, during which it was shadowed by CCG-5303.

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