

# Solving Large Extensive-Form Games Quicker Richard Gibson

Joint work with:

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






#### What is this talk about?

We are interesting in "solving" large sequential decision making problems with imperfect information.



- Best known algorithm: CFR (Counterfactual Regret Minimization).
- Monte Carlo sampling variants of CFR have been shown to reduce computation time in many games.
  - · Still takes many days of off-line computation.

This talk asks the question:

Can we solve games **faster**?

#### Outline of Talk

- Extensive-form Games
  - Examples
  - Terminology
  - Solution concepts
- Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)
  - Base algorithm for solving extensive-form games
  - Older variants
- New, Faster CFR Variants
  - Probing
  - Public Chance Sampling
  - Average Strategy Sampling
- Conclusions and Future Work

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#### Texas Hold'em Poker









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




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


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


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








- · Play continues until one player has no dice left and loses.
- · Winner gets +1 utility, loser gets -1 utility.




Points: 0



Points: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Points: 0






Points: 5

Win +5 points

1 2 3 4 5

Points: 5




Tie 0 points

5 Points: 6 2 3 4

Points: 5

Points: 9



Win +3 points
2
3

Points: 5

Tie 0 points

Points: 9

3

Points: 6

Win +1 point



Points: 9

Points: 6


- · The player with the most points at the end of the game wins.
- · The winner receives +1 utility, loser receives -1 utility.

Points: 9


Winner!

# Other Examples of Extensive Games


- Airport security
- Football
- Driving a car
- Etc. etc.




Nodes are histories (game states)




Edges are actions




Histories belong to player 1, player 2, or chance (assume 2-players)




Chance's action probabilities are known and fixed




Terminal histories have associated utilities (assume zero-sum)




Players' histories are partitioned into information sets



Strategy profile  $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  maps information sets to probability distributions over actions.



 $(\sigma)$  is the expected utility for player i if both players play according to  $\sigma$ .



#### Solution Concepts

• A best response to a player 1 strategy  $\sigma_1$  is an opponent strategy that maximizes player 2's expected utility:

$$\underset{\sigma_{2}'}{\operatorname{argmax}} \ u_{2}(\ \sigma_{1},\ \sigma_{2}'\ )$$

• The best response value,  $brv_2(\sigma_1)$ , against  $\sigma_1$  is that expected utility:

$$brv_2(\sigma_1) = \max_{\sigma_2'} u_2(\sigma_1, \sigma_2')$$

The exploitability of σ, e(σ) measures how much σ loses to a
worst case opponent when players alternate positions:

$$e(\sigma) = \frac{(brv_1(\sigma_2) + brv_2(\sigma_1))}{2}$$

#### Solution Concepts

 A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile σ with zero exploitability:

$$e(\sigma) = 0 \longrightarrow \sigma$$
 is Nash

 An ε-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile σ that is exploitable for at most ε:


$$e(\sigma) \le \varepsilon \longrightarrow \sigma \text{ is } \varepsilon\text{-Nash}$$

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
## "Vanilla" CFR Walk-through

CFR is an iterative algorithm that computes an ε-Nash equilibrium




#### "Vanilla" CFR Walk-through


Initialize strategy profile to uniform random





#### "Vanilla" CFR Walk-through


Each iteration, we perform a depth-first tree walk
































































































































































































#### Vanilla CFR Summary


- Vanilla CFR traverses the entire game tree each iteration.
- As the number of iterations approaches infinity, the average of the strategy profiles produced converges to a Nash equilibrium.
- However, each iteration can be very expensive in really large games (think billions of information sets).















































At each chance node, traverse only one action per iteration


[Zinkevich et al., NIPS 2007]








At each chance node, traverse only one action per iteration [Zinkevich *et al.*, NIPS 2007]















At each chance node, traverse only one action per iteration
[Zinkevich et al., NIPS 2007]





At each chance node, traverse only one action per iteration
[Zinkevich et al., NIPS 2007]

























At each chance node, traverse only one action per iteration [Zinkevich et al., NIPS 2007]








































































At each chance or opponent node, traverse only one action per iteration





EV = 0.5(+1) + 0.5(0) / probability of sampling c








































































































































































### Sampling Variants

- Chance Sampling, External Sampling, and Outcome Sampling all fall under a general Monte Carlo CFR (MCCFR) framework.
- In general, one can choose any scheme for sampling actions (can be domain specific).
- All actions not sampled are always assumed to contribute zero value.
- Iterations required: Vanilla < Chance ≤ External < Outcome</li>
- Time per iteration: Vanilla > Chance > External > Outcome


# Chance vs. External vs. Outcome Sampling

#### 2-round No-limit Hold'em, 30 chip stacks



- Card abstraction applied to reduce chance branching factor to 5 at each chance node

#### Goofspiel with 6 cards




[Lanctot et al., NIPS 2009]

#### **Outline**

- Extensive-form Games
  - Examples
  - Terminology
  - Solution concepts
- Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)
  - Base algorithm for solving extensive-form games
  - Older variants
- New, Faster CFR Variants
  - Probing
  - Public Chance Sampling
  - Average Strategy Sampling
- Conclusions and Future Work

## Sampling in General


**Example: Outcome Sampling** 



EV = 0.5(0) + 0.5(-2) / probability of sampling b

## Sampling in General

**Example: Outcome Sampling** 




- EV is a sampled value and is an unbiased (equal in expectation) estimate of the true value at this node [Lanctot *et al.*, NIPS 2009].
- · However, EV is a noisy estimate of the true value (variance).
- · Can prove that estimates with lower variance gives better bound on number of iterations required to converge to a given solution quality [G et al., AAAI 2012].

EV = 0.5(0) + 0.5(-2) / probability of sampling b

## Sampling in General


**Example: Outcome Sampling** 




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- · However, EV is a noisy estimate of the true value (variance).
- · Can prove that estimates with lower variance gives better bound on number of iterations required to converge to a given solution quality [G et al., AAAI 2012].
- Can we **quickly** produce unbiased estimates of EV with lower variance?

EV = 0.5(0) + 0.5(-2) / probability of sampling b


**Example: Outcome Sampling** 






**Example: Outcome Sampling** 

-2




**Example: Outcome Sampling** 




**Example: Outcome Sampling** 

QK 0.5 c. 0.5 0.5 b 0.5 0.5 -2 +1 -2




**Example: Outcome Sampling** 



$$EV = 0.5(-2) + 0.5(-2)$$

- Probing can be added to any Monte Carlo sampling algorithm.
  - Time per iteration: MCCFR < MCCFR + Probing (barely)</li>
  - Iterations required: MCCFR > MCCFR + Probing
- Probing algorithms live outside of the Monte Carlo family of algorithms (but still provably converge).
- Probing is more expensive than simply assigning zero value, but no updates are performed during probe traversal (cheaper than regular traversal).
- All of our probing experiments use domain-specific sampling schemes.


Goofspiel with 6 cards



[G et al., AAAI 2012]

MCCFR = Always sample the highest and lowest cards remaining, sample all other actions with probability 0.5.


Bluff with 2 dice each



[G et al., AAAI 2012]

MCCFR = Always sample 1-5, 2-5, 1-6, 2-6, and for each die-face x rolled, n-x for all valid n. All other actions sampled with probability 0.5.


Limit Texas Hold'em with card abstraction (10s)



[G et al., AAAI 2012]

MCCFR = Always sample fold and raise, sample call with probability 0.5.

#### Goofspiel with 7 cards





[G et al., AAAI 2012]


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
- Limitation: Probing does not help when combined with Chance Sampling or External Sampling.
  - These are the best sampling algorithms for Bluff and many poker games.
  - Adding probing to our poker-specific MCCFR algorithm is still slower than Chance Sampling and External Sampling.


## 1-Round Limit Hold'em















Utility(JsJc) = +2












```
Utility(JsJc) = +2( probability opponent reaches with 2s3c )
+2( probability opponent reaches with 2s4c )
+ ... -2( probability opponent reaches with AhAd )
= O(n) computation
```


#### Self-Public Chance Sampling Experiments




- Self-Public Chance Sampling requires fewer iterations than Chance Sampling (lower variance estimates).
- Iterations of Self-Public Chance Sampling are too expensive (O(n)) operations at terminal nodes).







[Johanson et al., AAMAS 2012] - Walk player 1 [2s3c, 2s4c, ..., AhAd] [2s3c, 2s4c, ..., AhAd] C b b Naïve approach: Utility(2s3c) = O(n) computation Utility(2s4c) = O(n) computation  $O(n^2)$  computation Utility(AhAd) = O(n) computation



1. p = probability opponent reaches with any hand = <math>O(n) computation


[Johanson et al., AAMAS 2012] - Walk player 1 [2s3c, 2s4c, ..., AhAd] [2s3c, 2s4c, ..., AhAd] C b Better approach:

- 1. p = probability opponent reaches with any hand = O(n) computation
- 2. w = 0 (probability opponent reaches and player 1 has better hand)

- Walk player 1

[Johanson et al., AAMAS 2012]

[2s3c, 2s4c, ..., AhAd] [2s3c, 2s4c, ..., AhAd]



- Better approach:
- 1. p = probability opponent reaches with any hand = O(n) computation
- 2. w = 0 (probability opponent reaches and player 1 has better hand)
- 3. for hand in [2s3c, 2s3h, ..., AhAd] (ordered worst to best) do Utility( hand ) = +2w 2(p w) w += probability opponent reaches with hand


end for

[Johanson et al., IJCAI 2011]

O(*n*) computation

## Public Chance Sampling Experiments






- Public Chance Sampling iterations are equally as expensive as Self-Public Chance Sampling iterations.
- At terminal nodes, Public Chance Sampling does  $O(n^2)$  work in O(n) time, and thus requires fewer iterations than Self-Public Chance Sampling.

## Public Chance Sampling Experiments


#### Bluff with 2 dice each



-  $O(n^2)$  to O(n) trick can also be applied to Bluff.


- Works well in games where players have many possible private states (large n).
- Limitation: Does not combine well with actions sampling.
  - Action sampling is very useful in no-limit poker games...

2 round No-limit Hold'em with 30 chip stacks




- Card abstraction applied to reduce chance branching factor to 5
- Question: Can we beat External Sampling?


## No-limit Poker




# Vanilla / Public Chance / Chance / External Sampling



## Outcome Sampling



## Average Strategy Sampling




P[ sample action a ] ≈ P[ average strategy plays a ]

## Average Strategy Sampling

- At the end of the day, the strategy that we will actually use is the average strategy.
- Average Strategy Sampling samples more often towards those information sets that our average strategy reaches, and so more often updates action probabilities at the information sets we reach in practice.
- Theoretical arguments suggest that this is a good thing to do.
- For chance and opponent nodes, we follow external sampling rules.
- Iterations required: Chance ≤ External < Average Strategy < Outcome</li>
- Time per iteration: Chance > External > Average Strategy > Outcome


#### Average Strategy Sampling Experiments

2 round No-limit Hold'em with 36 chip stacks



- Card abstraction applied to reduce chance branching factor to 5

#### Average Strategy Sampling Experiments



- Card abstraction applied to reduce chance branching factor to 5
- Each algorithm run for approximately 3.16 trillion nodes visited

#### Conclusions

- We have developed new, fast sampling variants of Counterfactual Regret Minimization for solving large, 2-player zero-sum extensive-form games.
  - Probing: Reduce variance of estimates by sampling a terminal node for non-sampled actions.
  - Public Chance Sampling: Reduce variance of estimates and achieve  $O(n^2)$  work in O(n) time by consider all possible private states for both players.
  - Average Strategy Sampling: Produce fast iterations by sampling a subset of actions of the actions for the current player according to the player's average strategy.
- Future work: Are these sampling variants fast enough so that we can apply a modification of CFR on-line to exploit the opponent's tendencies?