Historical Events and Spaces of Hate: Hate Crimes against Arabs and Muslims in Post-9/11 America

Ilir Disha, *University at Albany, SUNY*

James C. Cavendish, *University of South Florida*

Ryan D. King, *University at Albany, SUNY*

This research investigates variation in hate crime offending against Arabs and Muslims across U.S. counties in the months before and after September 11, 2001. Four questions are of particular interest. First, what were the determinants of anti-Arab and Muslim hate crimes prior to 9/11? Second, in what social contexts were Arabs and Muslims at greatest risk of victimization? Third, to what extent did hate crimes against these groups increase after the terrorist attacks? And last, did the predictors of hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims change appreciably after 9/11? Findings show that hate crimes targeting Arabs and Muslims increased dramatically in the months following 9/11, although the structural determinants and geographic concentration of these crimes remained largely consistent after the attacks. Negative binomial regression results further suggest that counties with larger concentrations of Arabs and Muslims have higher incidents of such hate crimes, which likely reflects the availability of targets for this type of offending. At the same time, the likelihood of victimization for a given Arab or Muslim person is lowest in counties where the percent Arab or percent Muslim is highest, in line with a power-differential perspective on discrimination and intergroup violence. The findings imply that terrorist attacks may indeed incite retaliation and set off a wave of hate crime offending, but the location of these crimes is likely to remain consistent after a galvanizing event. Keywords: Arab, hate crime, Muslim, September 11, threat.

Over the last three decades, an increasing number of politicians, interest groups, and social movement organizations in the United States have defined "hate crimes" as a social problem of national concern. Amid this growing concern, and in response to mounting pressure from civil rights activists, numerous states have adopted hate crimes legislation. The federal government also responded to these voices by passing laws requesting that law enforcement agencies collect data on hate crimes (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998; Grattet and Jenness 2001; Jenness and Broad 1997; Jenness and Grattet 2001). Together, these events have made the United States a world leader in the implementation of laws intended to track and combat bias-motivated crimes, which the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 defines as "offenses against a person or property motivated by bias toward race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, disability, or sexual orientation" (FBI 2005a).

Despite these state and national efforts to combat hate crimes in the 1990s, available data indicate that the incidence of hate crime offending has not significantly diminished over the last 20 years, and hate crimes against Arab and Muslim Americans increased dramatically in the months and years following September 11, 2001. To illustrate the magnitude of the increase in anti-Muslim hate crime offending, the FBI (2002) reported a 1,600 percent increase

in such hate crimes between 2000 and 2001—from 28 hate incidents in 2000 to 481 in 2001. According to New York City police, there were 117 reports of hate crimes against Muslims in that city alone between September 11, 2001 and March 2002 (Evans 2005). Furthermore, although the FBI lacks comparable data on trends in anti-*Arab* crimes because of the lack of an "Arab" category, the states of California, Colorado, and Illinois (Gerstenfeld 2004), along with a variety of Arab advocacy groups, report a dramatic rise in anti-*Arab* hate crimes over the same period.

Although the numbers of such anti-Muslim and anti-Arab hate crimes have declined since 2001, several years later the numbers of anti-Muslim hate crimes remained five times what they were in 2000 (FBI 2005b). Moreover, the recent controversies over the building of an Islamic mosque near "ground zero" and the threats of burning copies of the Koran on the anniversary of 9/11 suggest that stereotypes portraying Arabs and Muslims as perpetrators of terrorism have not dissipated nearly a decade after 9/11. In some circumstances, such stereotypes continue to inspire hate-motivated violence, as evidenced by the recent violent assault on a Bangladeshi taxi driver who stated to a passenger that he was Muslim (Hays 2010).

This reported increase in hate crime incidents against Arab and Muslim Americans (what we refer to as "Arab/Muslim" throughout the text)[1] in the aftermath of 9/11 calls for a thorough, systematic investigation. Did hate crimes against other major social groups (e.g., black, Hispanic, Asian) change in the months and years surrounding 9/11, and if so, how? If anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes increased, were the increases proportionately similar across various sociodemographic contexts? Or did "hot spots" for anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes change after 9/11? And in what places were individual Arabs and Muslims at highest risk of victimization? We shed light on these questions by investigating hate crimes perpetrated against Arabs/Muslims before and after September 11th. We first use incident-level data to investigate whether the increase in crimes against Arabs/Muslims after September 11th paralleled trends in hate crimes against other groups. Then, aggregating these data to the county level, we examine the county-level demographic, economic, and sociopolitical determinants of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes in the months preceding and just after the 9/11 attacks. Importantly, we differentiate between two types of questions. On the one hand, we are interested in the conditions that produce higher *counts* of anti-Arab or anti-Muslim hate crimes. That is, where are these types of crimes most prevalent? On the other hand, we are equally interested in the *rate* of this type of hate crime. Focusing on the rate as opposed to the count answers a related but distinct question: where were individual Arabs and Muslim most vulnerable to attack? As we explain below, answering these questions requires different model specifications and yields different results.

We see the above research questions as important and timely for several reasons. For one, existing studies of racially and ethnically motivated hate crime offending focus almost exclusively on crimes against blacks, Latinos, or Asians (e.g., Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Lyons 2007; Torres 1999). To the best of our knowledge, no studies of hate-motivated behavior have investigated the conditions under which crimes against small minority groups such as Arab and Muslim Americans occur.

Second, our focus on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes speaks directly to theories of intergroup crime and violence. Prior research often explains temporal and spatial variation in intergroup crime with reference to theories emphasizing minority group threat (Jacobs and Wood 1999; Liska 1992). From this perspective, a large or growing minority group is perceived as a threat to many majority group members, and a backlash ensues that often results in prejudicial acts committed against minorities (Blalock 1967). Although this perspective has received ample support in the study of prejudicial attitudes (Quillian 1995, 1996; Taylor

---

1. Referring to "anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes" is admittedly somewhat imprecise. After all, anti-Muslim hate crimes are distinct from anti-Arab hate crimes given that not all Arabs are Muslims, and vice versa. We nonetheless use this term for consistency and convenience throughout the text. We also elaborate on the use of the term when providing the rationale for the measure of our dependent variable (see below).

1998) and homicide (Jacobs and Wood 1999), it has received far less support in prior work on hate crime offending (Lyons 2007). An alternative hypothesis explored in the present work emphasizes power differences between groups (Levine and Campbell 1972). The key notion here is that majority group members are emboldened when the minority group is proportionately small. To state it rather colloquially, potential offenders see safety in numbers and have no reason to fear reprisal when and where the minority group constitutes only a percentage or two of the population. This perspective on hate crime offending offers different predictions from the more traditional group (or racial) threat theories, and we see our empirical case as useful for adjudicating between these theoretical camps.

Finally, to our knowledge, no studies have investigated whether, or to what extent, the effects of demographic composition and economic conditions are exacerbated following a landmark event, such as the politically charged attacks of September 11th. Research has explored how historical events affect attitudinal change (Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Hyman and Sheatsley 1964; Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005), yet studies investigating how social conditions affect hate motivated behavior against small minority groups in the wake of historical events are largely absent from the literature. The present work, in part, speaks to this issue as well.

Perspectives on Hate Crime Offending

The study of intergroup conflict, and offending motivated by prejudice in particular, is often understood as being driven by three types of factors: demographics, economic conditions, and the distribution of political power (King 2009). Much of this research, to variable degrees, draws on the foundational theoretical work of Hubert Blalock (1967) on intergroup relations, which indeed emphasized the importance of these three factors. However, extant theory and empirical studies since Blalock's seminal work have yielded competing predictions and results. As Donald P. Green, Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Janelle S. Wong (1998) note in their widely cited work on racially motivated hate crime, "These literatures . . . offer conflicting hypotheses about the conditions under which racially motivated violence [is] likely to arise" (p. 373).

We see reasons to expect that demographics, economic conditions, and politically charged events will explain some of the variation in hate crimes perpetrated against Arabs and Muslims. Yet, the precise nature of these relationships is not straightforward and extant theory pushes us in multiple directions. As such, we briefly review some relevant theoretical work to put our research questions in context before moving to the analyses.

Racial and Ethnic Demographics

The literature on prejudice and discrimination identifies *minority group size* as an important determinant of intergroup conflict and prejudice, yet precisely how and why group size matters remains debatable. Moreover, group size may affect behavior (e.g., criminal offenses) and attitudes (e.g., racial prejudice) differently, since the former places greater emphasis on factors such as opportunity, risk of retaliation, and risk of law enforcement sanction. We see three notable ways in which minority group size is likely to influence hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims. First, group size may simply indicate opportunity. At a general level, places with higher proportions of minorities may have more intergroup crime simply because there are more targets available. As David Jacobs and Katherine Wood (1999) find in their work on interracial homicide, white killings of blacks increase with the proportion of the population that is black, likely because of the probability of interracial interaction. In our case, we would expect the number of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes to increase with the proportion of Arabs or Muslims in a county, although an opportunity-based perspective would predict no association with the *rate* of offending. That is, the minority group percentage matters insofar as it is correlated with the number of available targets. Once the number of Arabs/Muslims (targets) is used as a

denominator in the variable measuring hate crime offenses (effectively making the dependent variable into a rate of hate crime offenses per number of available targets), the percent Arab/ Muslim would presumably be of little meaning from a pure opportunity perspective.

A second argument emphasizes the real or perceived threats posed by a minority group. Blalock (1967), for instance, asserted that dominant groups in society would seek to maintain their powerful positions and would resort to discrimination and perhaps even violence to obviate threats from minority groups. Blalock (1967) emphasized the importance of proportionate minority group size as a source of both political and economic threat. Large or growing minority groups, according to Blalock (1967), may become politically viable and compete for political power, which elicits a reaction from the majority or "dominant" group. Likewise, minority groups represent a source of cheap and expendable labor that can compete with majority group members, at least under certain labor market conditions. Although not all contemporary work supports this premise, the general tenets of the group threat perspective have received considerable support in the study of prejudice (Dixon 2006; Quillian 1995; Semyonov et al. 2004; Taylor 1998), punishment (Jacobs and Kleban 2003), and most relevant to our case, racially motivated violence (Corzine, Creech, and Corzine, 1983; Reed, 1972; Tolnay, Deane, and Beck 1996). It follows from this perspective that the percent Arab/ Muslim would be positively associated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, measured either as a count of such hate crimes or as a rate per Arab/Muslim population. The key notion is that the larger proportion of Arabs/Muslims would be perceived as threatening by segments of the majority group, and a backlash would ensue.

We stress one additional and important detail relevant to group threat theory and its applicability to our substantive case. Blalock emphasized the importance of minority group size for both political and economic forms of threat, although we see neither as likely to accrue either before or after 9/11. The largest concentration of Arabs is about 3 percent of a county's population (the percent Muslim is only slightly higher), hardly on par with the concentrations of other minority groups, such as blacks and Hispanics, and thus concerns about competition and power are unlikely to materialize. Rather, we suggest that in the eyes of many non-Arabs a relatively large concentration of Arabs or Muslims may trigger fears of terrorism or mass violence. Although the actual association between Arab ethnicity and terrorism may be dubious, the *perceived* association rests on a strong empirical foundation. For instance, Gallup polls not only indicate that almost a quarter of Americans thought it was likely that *their community* would experience an act of terrorism in November of 2001 (Gallup 2009), they also singled out Arabs as particularly suspicious. Forty-nine percent of Americans supported a requirement that Arabs (including Arab U.S. citizens) carry a special form of identification with them, and 58 percent favored a requirement that Arabs have a special and more intensive screening process at airports (Gallup 2009). We see the terrorism threat associated with Arabs as akin to the exaggerated threat of street crime associated with African Americans (Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002; Quillian and Pager 2001).

Finally, a power-differential perspective would predict precisely the opposite of that posited by traditional group threat theory. This line of theorizing suggests that majority group members are emboldened to act on their prejudices when they anticipate little or no reprisal from local law enforcement and a low likelihood of retribution from the minority group. In their work on ethnocentrism, Robert Levine and Donald Campbell (1972) express this sentiment when stating that "the fear of retaliation for hostility against powerful groups may make the level of inhibition against aggression greater than the level of evocation so that *outgroups with the power to retaliate will be least likely to be aggressed against . . .*" (pp. 216–17). In other words, Levine and Campbell's idea aligns with the adage that "there is safety in numbers." Minority group members are at a lower risk of victimization in areas where they constitute a higher proportion of the population because dominant group members may fear the consequences of their acts. Violence can beget retaliatory violence, or perhaps bring about the force of the law. Returning to our case of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, the power-differential thesis suggests

that hate crimes may indeed occur with some frequency in places with a large raw number of Arabs and Muslims. Yet, the *rate* of hate crime offending against this minority group is expected to be smaller where the proportion of Arabs and Muslims in a county is higher.

Economic Conditions

Prior research, often growing out of the group threat tradition, also emphasizes the potential importance of economic conditions in the study of prejudice and hate crime. In Blalock's (1967:147–50) classic formulation, economic threat was primarily understood as a consequence of minority group size. More recent theorizing (Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995, 1996), however, suggests that economic conditions affect levels of competition between groups and contribute to elevated levels of perceived threat *independently* of minority group size. As Lincoln Quillian (1996) states, "The idea is that the dominant group perceives their own group to be more threatened by minority presence when economic circumstances are worse" (p. 821).

 These more recent explanations of economic threat usually follow one of two pathways. The first, frequently referred to as the "frustration-aggression hypothesis," argues that intergroup hostility is higher at times and places that experience difficult economic conditions. This path emphasizes resource competition (Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995; Tolnay and Beck 1993) among groups. Competition for scarce resources in certain occupational niches can bring majority and minority groups in contact with each other in the economic domain, and this interaction becomes more hostile during times when economic conditions are poor because some factions of the majority group vent their frustration by acting aggressively against minority group members. The classic expression of this hypothesis is found in Carl Hovland and Robert Sears's (1940) analysis of the economy and black lynchings in the American South over nearly 50 years. They show that lynchings increased during periods of economic turmoil, which they viewed as consistent with frustration-aggression (see also Hepworth and West 1988). Marshall Medoff (1999) recently found similar support for the frustration-aggression hypothesis as an explanation for contemporary hate crimes by showing that hate crime rates and market wages are inversely correlated.

Still, not all empirical work has supported the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Green, Glaser, and Rich 1998; Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Lyons 2007). To this end, an alternative perspective takes issue with the notion that hate crimes are more frequent in locations characterized by disadvantageous economic conditions. For instance, Christopher Lyons's (2007) research on racially motivated crimes in Chicago communities found that anti-black hate crimes are more common in *affluent* white communities which "appear . . . organized *in favor* of anti-black crimes" (p. 847). These wealthy and ostensibly socially organized communities are likely to have higher levels of trust, cohesion, and informal means of social control among community members. In such communities, "outsiders" may be at higher risk of attack.

In short, there are reasons to suspect that hate crimes against Arabs/Muslims may be higher in affluent areas, although the causal mechanisms may have more to do with confounding factors such as social cohesion and informal control than absolute wealth (Lyons 2007). We are mindful of both lines of argument and test whether measures of economic conditions have a negative or a positive effect on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes.

The Political Context and Triggering Events

Other recent work on intergroup crime gives greater weight to the political environment (Green et al. 1998; King and Brustein 2006; McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003). For example, Donald P. Green, Jack Glaser, and Andrew Rich (1998) reanalyzed Hovland and Sears's (1940) data on lynchings in the South and found not only that the correlation between economic turmoil and lynching was less robust than earlier studies had indicated, but also that the correlation was strongest at times and places in which political, business, or labor leaders

had tried to persuade their communities that blacks were the cause of their economic problems. Ryan D. King and William Brustein (2006) similarly point towards the specific political situation of Jews during a particular historic period, such as pre-World War II Germany. Their study found that the "association of [Jews] with the leadership of the political left," rather than Jewish population size or economic conditions, was a principal determinant of anti-Semitic violence (King and Brustein 2006:867). Hence, research during the past decade indicates that political change and political discourse can directly and indirectly influence intergroup violence (see Koopmans and Olzak 2004).

In a similar vein, a related line of work points to the role of specific events that can trigger intergroup violence or otherwise influence prejudice. In contrast to more traditional racial threat models that posit a "gradual, unbroken trend" (Quillian 1996:825; see also Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Hyman and Sheatsley 1964) of attitude change unaffected by the particular historical events of the period, another model suggests that historical events have the ability to influence attitude change. This is demonstrated in recent research by Maykel Verkuyten and Katarzyna Zaremba (2005) on the evaluations of various groups in the Netherlands toward ethnic majority-(Dutch) and minority-groups (including two Islamic outgroups, Turks and Moroccans) before, during, and after the rise of a new populist rightist movement in 2002. The authors report that during the height of the movement, Dutch respondents evaluated the Islamic outgroups more negatively than any other ethnic minority groups. They conclude that "it is important to study ethnic relations across time, in relation to political circumstances" (Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005:375).

In line with this body of work, we consider the events of September 11th to be an historical event that transformed Arabs and Muslims into convenient targets for acts of "vicarious retribution," defined as an act that "occurs when a member of a group commits an act of aggression toward members of an outgroup for an assault or provocation that had no *personal* consequences for him or her, but did harm a fellow ingroup member" (Lickel et al. 2006:372). This implies that retaliatory actions by dominant group members are amplified in response to a (construed) threatening event. Brian Lickel and associates (2006) argue that if the event is construed in a way that elicits high ingroup identification and negative outgroup dispositions, then aggressive behavior in the form of vicarious retribution is an expected outcome directed against the "provoking group." September 11th was clearly a politically charged, transformative event for U.S. society in general, including American Arabs and Muslims. Given that the fateful event was orchestrated by individuals of Arab descent, it brought to the forefront of public scrutiny members of Arab and Muslim origins. Before 9/11, and despite experiences of discrimination (Akram and Johnson 2002), their plight was overshadowed by the concerns of other minority groups. After 9/11, Arabs and Muslims were largely depicted as a unified, coherent, and threatening group consisting of "foreigners," "extremists," and "terrorists" (Gerstenfeld 2004; Merskin 2004; Volpp 2002). We argue that such a negative depiction of Arabs and Muslims, coupled with high "ingroup identification—group pride, group member empathy, and normative pressure" (Lickel et al. 2006:375), makes the post-9/11 environment highly conducive to acts of aggressive retaliation against individuals who appeared to display characteristics of an Arab ancestry or Islamic faith. We thus expect a sizeable increase in hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the months after 9/11 relative to the preceding months.

Finally, existing research has rarely investigated whether or how galvanizing landmark events such as 9/11 affect the socioeconomic determinants of prejudice or intergroup conflict. We see three scenarios as plausible for the present case of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. First, landmark historical events like the 9/11 attacks may weaken the association between minority group size and hate crimes. The event could fuel broad hostility towards Arabs and Muslims, and thus the motivation to offend would extend more broadly after the event than before. To wit, the event would alter the spatial distribution of hate crime offending so that hate crimes against Arabs/Muslims are more evenly distributed across county contexts. Alternatively, we might expect no change after 9/11; that is, the event may simply be obsolete

with respect to hate crime offending. From this perspective, demographic conditions simply trump the importance of potentially galvanizing events. Levels of hate crime offending and their spatial distribution would remain consistent before and after the attack. A third possibility is that hate crimes increase by proportionately equal amounts in all counties, and thus the 9/11 attacks would alter the frequency or rate of hate crime offending but not necessarily the spatial patterning of such crimes. We adjudicate between these three alternatives in the present research.

Acknowledging the Social Constructionist Approach

We have discussed how minority group size, economic conditions, and historical events contribute to hate crime offending, particularly as they pertain to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. However, we are aware that reports of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, like other forms of hate crime, can be a combination of actual incidents and institutional reporting practices. One of the most comprehensive studies to examine the role of such political and institutional practices on hate crimes is Rory McVeigh, Michael R. Welch, and Thoroddur Bjarnason's (2003) study of county-level variation in hate crimes reported to the FBI in the year 2000 (see also McVeigh, Neblett, and Shafiq 2006). McVeigh and associates (2003) acknowledge that "hate crimes are rooted in an objective reality" (p. 848). However, they also suggest that hate crime reporting is a reflection of "different incentives to call acts of bias to the attention of local authorities, as well as different incentives that influence law enforcement agencies to report hate crimes" (McVeigh et al. 2003:846). In their work, hate crimes are more likely to be reported in counties with a legislative mandate for data collection, in counties with resourceful civil rights organizations, and in counties with more political party competition. They also show that the effect of civil rights organizations is highly dependent on the "availability of resources, a favorable political context, and objective features of local communities that lend credibility to civil rights framing" (McVeigh et al. 2003:862). It is thus prudent to account for the constructionist approach when assessing the determinants of hate crime offending, and hence to the extent possible, with available data. We control for sociopolitical factors (e.g., legislative mandates for hate crime data collection; the presence of Arab Advocacy organizations; political party voting preferences) that are likely to affect the *reporting* of bias-motivated crimes.

Research Methods

Data and Variables of Interest

The data for our analyses come from a variety of sources: the FBI's *Uniform Crime Reports* for 2001–2002 (U.S. Department of Justice 2002b, 2003) supply data on hate crime incidents; the U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2002) provides us with population demographics of U.S. counties; the Glenmary Research Center (Jones et al. 2002), an independent private organization that collects and disseminates data on religious bodies and adherents, provides county-level estimates of Muslim population size; the Web sites of a variety of Arab advocacy organizations supply information on the locations of their chapters in 2001 (ADC 2002; CAIR 2002: MPAC 2002); and data obtained from Polidata (2001) provide county-level measures of election outcomes in 1996 and 2000.

Incident-Level Hate Crime Data. The FBI provides incident-level data on hate crimes in which each case represents a single incident report. Practically no single reported incident of hate crime is classified as having more than one bias motivation (only 12 incidents between 2001 and 2002), enabling us to construct variables measuring the frequency of each type of bias motivation. Of the 17,180 single-bias incidents reported over the 2001–2002 period,

46.6 percent were motivated by racial bias, 18.9 percent by religious bias, 18.6 percent by ethnic bias, 15.4 percent by sexual orientation bias, and .5 percent were motivated by bias against the disabled. In comparison to the distribution of hate crime incidents reported in the year 2000 (as reported by McVeigh et al. 2003), the data show an increase in the proportion of incidents motivated by religious and ethnic bias (from 18.3 percent in 2000 to 18.9 percent in 2001–2002 and from 11.3 percent in 2000 to 18.6 percent in 2001–2002, respectively) but a decrease in the percentage of incidents motivated by racial bias (from 53.8 percent in 2000 to 46.6 percent in 2001–2002). We examine whether this change is partly attributable to September 11, 2001.

The County-Level Data. Because of our interest in exploring how the characteristics of local contexts also contribute to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime incidents after September 11, we drew the incident-level data from the period between January 1, 2001 and May 31, 2002 (a period of equal duration before and after September 11, 2001) and aggregated these data to the county level. Since our dependent variable combines anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hate crimes (see below), we develop two separate county-level data sets. The first data set consists of 2,343 counties that have a nonzero Arab population. We are interested in examining the effect of Arab population size on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, and thus we limited the sample to those counties with a nonzero Arab population. The population of Arab descent is defined as people who report "Arab" as their first or second ancestry (definition is based on the U.S. Census 2000 SF3 files).[2] A second sample consists of 422 cases. The latter included only counties with a nonzero Muslim population based on county-level estimates from the Glenmary Research Center (Jones et al. 2002).

The Dependent Variable. In most of our analyses, the dependent variable is the *combined* number of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hate crimes. It must be noted that the FBI's *Uniform Crime Reports* do not have a separate "Arab" category, but we argue, partly via the process of elimination, that the FBI's measure of crimes against people of "other ethnicity" is largely, if not entirely, capturing anti-Arab hate crimes. In other words, because virtually all other types of hate crime have their own specific categories, and because each crime incident is assigned a single bias motivation, hate crimes committed against Arabs have the highest probability of being assigned to the "other ethnicity" category. In fact, Arabs are the only major ethnic group with no representation under existing hate crime classifications.

Assuming that anti-Arab hate crimes constitute a significant proportion of hate crimes against "other" ethnicities, an argument we further validate shortly, our justification for combining the anti-other and anti-Muslim categories rests on a few arguments. First, in the eyes of many Americans, Arabs and Muslims have become equated, especially during the period under consideration. The following paragraph illustrates this point.

> Arab Americans and Muslims have been "raced" as "terrorists:" foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening. Although Arabs trace their roots to the Middle East and claim many different religious backgrounds, and Muslims come from all over the world, these distinctions are blurred and negative images about either Arabs or Muslims are attributed to both. As Ibrahim Hooper of the Council on American-Islamic relations notes, "the common stereotypes are that we're all Arabs, we're all violent, and we're all conducting a holy war" (Saito 2001, as quoted in Akram and Johnson 2002:296).

Second, there is some face validity to our assumption about the "other ethnicity" category as consisting largely of anti-Arab hate crimes. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show that trends for

---

2. Our reliance on the combined Arab ancestry reports (versus those reporting only first Arab ancestry) stems from the fact that hate crime reports in the aftermath of 9/11 were directed not only to those with a "certain" Arab background but also to those with a "mistaken" Arab identity. This suggests that we would want to include in our models all individuals who would report complete and partial Arab ancestry.

what we call "anti-Arab" hate crimes (labeled "other ethnicity" in the *Uniform Crime Reports*) closely parallel the trend lines for bona fide anti-Muslim hate crimes. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the number of hate crimes by subcategory over a ten-year period, from 1995 through 2005. As expected, hate crimes against Muslims peaked in 2001, when there were 481 reported incidents, as did crimes against people of "other ethnicity," when there were 1,502 reported incidents in this category. No other type of motivation displayed a comparable temporal pattern. Figures 2 and 3 report patterns in hate crime incidents motivated by different categories of religious bias and ethnic bias, respectively. As these figures illustrate, there are very dramatic spikes in religious bias crimes against Muslims and ethnic bias crimes against the "other ethnicity" (interpreted Arab) immediately following 9/11. That the two lines so closely resemble each other increases our confidence that anti-Arab hate crimes constitute a significant portion (albeit perhaps not all) of hate crimes against those of the "other ethnicity." To make these figures intelligible, alongside the anti-Muslim and anti-"other ethnicity" trend lines, we have reported only the trend lines for the most frequently occurring hate crimes motivated by religion and race—anti-Jewish and anti-black hate crimes, respectively.

Third, because some readers may continue to question this rationale for collapsing the "other ethnicity" category and the "Muslim" category, all of our analyses have been replicated using only the "anti-Muslim" category, and then using only the "anti-other ethnicity" category, as separate dependent variables. Results of these analyses, although not reported here, are virtually identical to those presented below and are available from the authors upon request.

Appendix A provides an overview of the dependent variable. It reports the total number of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab hate crimes before and after September 11th for counties with the greatest increase in the overall number of anti-other (hereafter referred to as anti-Arab) and anti-Muslim hate crimes following September 11th, 2001.


Figure 1 • *Distribution of Hate Crimes by Select Subcategories, 1995–2005*

Figure 2 • *Reported Hate Crimes Due to Religious Bias, Jan 1, 2001–May 31, 2002*


Figure 3 • *Reported Hate Crimes Due to Racial/Ethnic Bias, Jan 1, 2001–May 31, 2002*

Focal Predictor Variables. The 2000 U.S. Census contains data on a variety of demographic characteristics, which allow us to test theories of intergroup violence. (See Appendix B for descriptive statistics on all the variables of interest). We include variables that measure the percentage of the population that is non-Hispanic white, the percentage of a county's population that is of Arab ancestry, and per capita income as an indicator of economic conditions. The indicator of non-Hispanic white population size is important because research by Green and associates (1998) showed that hate crimes against minorities were highest in the predominantly white neighborhoods of New York City, a finding consistent with the power-differential approach.

The percent of a county's population having an Arab ancestry—the focal independent variable—was computed by using the total number of individuals reporting an Arab ancestry, dividing it by the total county population, and multiplying by 100. We also included a measure of Muslim population—obtained from Jones and colleagues (2002)—similar to the above computations of Arab ancestry. Moreover, we include a quadratic term for percent Arab (percent Arab squared) and percent Muslim (percent Muslim squared) because classic minority group threat theory (Blalock 1967) raises the possibility of curvilinear effects in the study of prejudice.

In addition to racial-ethnic composition variables, we also include an indicator of economic conditions. Following Quillian's (1995, 1996) research on prejudice and group threat, we use a county's per capita income as a measure of affluence.

Control Variables. We control for a variety of sociodemographic factors known or suspected to influence the incidence of hate crimes. Among these variables are total population size (in logarithmic form), which is likely to display a positive relationship with the number of hate crimes; percentage of the population aged 15 to 24, because younger age groups commit a disproportionate share of serious crimes (Moffitt 2006; Rosenfeld 2002) and hate crimes (Levin and McDevitt 1993); and percentage of the population that is urban, because urban counties are likely to have more crimes of all types.

In addition to demographic composition, we control for the county rate of serious criminal offenses (expressed as an index of crimes per 100 residents in a county) and police force size using *Uniform Crime Report* (U.S. Department of Justice 2002a, 2002c) data. The crime rate includes the total number of reports of murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft in each county. It is used in our analyses because the number of hate crimes is, in part, a reflection of general patterns of crime within a county. McVeigh and colleagues (2003) argue that the effect of the crime rate on hate crime reporting is likely "to be curvilinear (inverted-U), as an extremely high volume of general offenses within a community could force local authorities to give less priority to the enforcement of hate crime legislation" (p. 855). For this reason, we add a quadratic term (crime rate squared) to the model. A measure of police force size per 100,000 is also included. It is tenable that counties with a smaller police force would have fewer personnel to monitor and report hate crimes. Hence, we see this as an important control variable.

Furthermore, we include a variety of political context measures that are thought to affect hate crime reporting practices. The number of Arab advocacy organizations in each county is included because these organizations are known to encourage their constituents and pressure public officials to report hate crimes. In our search for Arab advocacy organizations, we relied on two selection criteria. First, advocacy organizations had to have a national, rather than a local reach. Second, they must have been established before 2000. Usually, the organizations that have a national scope and have had time to establish themselves draw more adherents and are more influential in political and public media settings. To verify this, we visited the Web sites of a number of Arab advocacy organizations and selected three of them; the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (the largest, established in 1980), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (established in 1994), and the Muslim Public Affairs Council

(established in 1988; see Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). We found evidence that these organizations do, in fact, actively encourage victims of hate crimes to report these incidents to law enforcement agents. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC 2002), for instance, encourages all victims to "call your local Police Department and file an official police report." The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC 2002), to take another example, lists on its Web site a number of reasons why victims should report incidents of hatred.

To construct a measure of the presence of Arab advocacy organizations we gathered information from the Web sites of these three national organizations that report having local chapters across the United States: ADC, CAIR, and MPAC. Because it is believed that advocacy organizations could exert influence in their own county or in other counties in their state, and because their efforts are likely strengthened by working in unison with other Arab advocacy chapters within their state, we calculated an Arab advocacy variable that represents the total number of advocacy organizations in the state plus the number of advocacy organizations in the county. This variable, ranging from 0 to 6, has a mean of 1.90; 834 (or 35.6 percent) of all counties do not have a chapter in their state or county, and 226 (9.3 percent) have as many as six chapters within their state or county.

We also include a measure of whether the county is located in a state with a statutory mandate for law enforcement agencies to report hate crime incidents to the state attorney general. We obtained this information from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL 2001). Our rationale for including this measure rests on our belief that counties located in states with legislative mandates to collect data are more likely to have normalized the process of reporting (King 2007).

Other factors influencing hate crime reporting, following McVeigh and colleagues (2003), are the county's political party preference and the degree of political competitiveness. McVeigh and colleagues (2003) suggest that "political incentives" propel local authorities to respond to civil rights issues, such as hate crime (p. 853). We suspect that Democratic, rather than Republican, counties would be more favorable to hate crime reporting given their particular concern with civil rights issues. Following this rationale, we measure Democratic voting as the percent of votes cast for Democratic candidate Al Gore in the 2000 election, thinking that Democratic strongholds are more favorable to hate crime reporting.

Similarly, hate crime reporting would be taken more seriously in a politically competitive environment. To that end, we calculate political competitiveness by taking the mean of the absolute difference between the percentage of votes cast for the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates in the 1996 and 2000 elections, and multiplying this value by −1 so the higher scores represent greater competition.[3]

Analytic Strategy

Using the incident-level data, we first explore whether the trend in hate crime offending against Arabs/Muslims was altered by the events of September 11, 2001. We also assess whether there are any noticeable fluctuations on other categories of hate crimes that surfaced during the 2001–2002 period. Then, using the county-level data, we utilize negative binomial regression to assess whether county-level characteristics are associated with the number of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes reported before and after 9/11. With respect to the county-level analyses, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is problematic because the distribution

3. Because political mediation theory, as described by McVeigh and colleagues (2003), suggests that the influence of Arab advocacy organizations on hate crime reporting is contingent on the presence of these "political incentives" for public officials to respond to their demands, we also created variables to measure the interactions between Arab advocacy organizations and three key variables: whether the county is located in a state with a legislative mandate, the percent of the county's population that voted Democratic in the 2000 presidential election, and the degree of political competition. Since interactions were not significant and did not alter the results, they are not included in our models but are available upon request.

of our outcome, the count of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, is heavily skewed with many counties reporting no such hate crimes. As such, we do not work with a normal distribution and the heteroskedasticity present in the data clearly violates OLS assumptions. A Poisson-based estimator can provide nonbiased estimates for positively skewed event counts (Osgood 2000), although the presence of overdispersion renders the Poisson model problematic. We thus employ a negative binomial model, which is based on the Poisson distribution but provides more efficient estimates in the presence of over dispersion.

As mentioned above, we are equally interested in characteristics of counties that influence the overall *count* of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes and factors that affect the *rate* (per Arab population). Again, the former tells us if these crimes are saturated in particular types of counties, while the latter tells us about the relative risk for the average Arab or Muslim in a county. These are distinct but equally important issues. Accordingly, some of our negative binomial models include the respective Arab and Muslim populations (logged) as offsets to account for the population at risk, which essentially restores the rate distribution of the data in a Poisson-based model.[4]

Results

Incident-Level Findings

One of our objectives is to explore whether the events of 9/11 had any observable impact on patterns of hate crime incidents against various categories of people, particularly Arabs and Muslims. Although our primary interest is the 2001–2002 period, we begin by examining some general trends in hate crime offending. Figures 1 through 3, which were discussed earlier, clearly indicate that crimes motivated by hatred against most groups remained flat or slightly declined in the years (Figure 1) or months (Figures 2 and 3) before and after 9/11. The only notable exceptions are crimes manifesting hatred against Arabs and Muslims, which increased dramatically in the wake of 9/11. Comparing different categories of hate crime for the first 8½ months of 2001 (i.e., from January 1–September 10) to the 8½ months following September 11th (i.e., from September 11, 2001–May 31, 2002) further illustrates this point. The total number of hate crimes attributed to both anti-Muslim and anti-Arab bias (we have not collapsed the categories of our dependent variable in these descriptive statistics) increased from 26 and 260, respectively, in the pre-September 11th period to 517 and 1,502 hate crimes in the post-September 11th period. Corresponding with these increases are decreases in the number of hate crimes motivated by bias against blacks, whites, Asians, and Latinos. Anti-Jewish hate crime was the only other category showing a slight increase after September 11th (from 720 to 740). In fact, the historically most common form of bias motivation (i.e., motivation against blacks) dropped by a total of 361; from 2,159 offenses in the first 8½ months of 2001 to 1,798 offenses in the 8½ months after September 11th. The 9/11 attacks thus clearly mattered for hate crime offending against Arabs and Muslims, although an unresolved question is whether the location and determinants of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes significantly changed after 9/11.

County-Level Findings

Hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims clearly increased following the 9/11 attacks, but was the increase more pronounced in some places than others? To answer this question, we employ negative binomial regression models to assess which county-level characteristics are

---

4. The respective (logged) Arab and Muslim populations are included as offsets in all models in Tables 3, 4, and 5. With this specification, the logged population coefficient is a constant with a fixed value of one, and hence these coefficients are not depicted in the tables.

Table 1 • *Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab Population* **before** *and* **after** *September 11, 2001*

Categories	Independent Variables	Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11		Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Population, urbanicity, crime, and law enforcement control variables	Population in 2000 (in 1,000s, logged)	1.34*** (.17)	1.30*** (.17)	1.27*** (.09)	1.25*** (.09)
	Percent urban	.01 (.01)	.00 (.11)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.00)
	Percent ages 15–24	.10** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.07*** (.01)	.06*** (.02)
	Crime rate in 2000	.34 (.22)	.33 (.22)	.32** (.10)	.31** (.10)
	(Crime rate)² in 2000	−.02 (.02)	−.02 (.02)	−.02* (.01)	−.02* (.01)
	Police size (per 100,000)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)
Political context and political processes control variables	Legislative mandate for HC data collection	.50* (.24)	.50* (.24)	.69*** (.12)	.69*** (.12)
	Arab advocacy organizations	−.02 (.06)	−.02 (.06)	.04 (.03)	.03 (.03)
	Percent voting Democrat	.02 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
	Party competitiveness	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)
Focal independent variables	Percent white in 2000	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01** (.01)	.01* (.00)
	Percent Arab in 2000	.49 (.32)	1.53 (.86)	.54** (.20)	1.14* (.49)
	Per capita income (in $1,000s)	.10*** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.06*** (.02)	.05** (.02)
	Percent Arab squared in 2000	—	−.49 (.36)	—	−.31 (.22)
Log-likelihood		−345.48	−344.661	−1083.11	−1082.24
Pseudo *R²*		.3746	.3760	.3413	.3418
N = 2,343					

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients for the intercepts are not reported. Data for these analyses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11, 2001.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

associated with the number of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime offenses before and after 9/11. We present the findings in Tables 1 through 4, with each table having an identical organization. Models 1 and 2 in each table present findings for the 8½ months prior to 9/11, while Models 3 and 4 present findings for the 8½ months after 9/11. We also point out that all models in Tables 1 and 2 do *not* include the logged Arab or Muslim population size as an offset, whereas all models in Tables 3 and 4 use the respective logged population sizes as offsets, thereby converting our outcome variable into a rate.

Table 1 shows the results without minority population offsets for counties with a nonzero Arab population. In all models, we are primarily interested in examining whether *percent* Arab is associated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, net of our control variables. Looking at Model 1, we first note that several control variables are associated with the outcome

variable prior to 9/11. The number of hate crimes is significantly associated with population size ($b = 1.34$), proportion of the population 15 to 24 years old ($b = .10$), and the presence of a state data collection statute ($b = .50$). Of the focal variables, per capita income ($b = .10$) is positively correlated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes before 9/11, suggesting that they occur more frequently in relatively affluent counties. This finding runs against the predictions of the frustration-aggression hypothesis but is generally consistent with Lyons's (2007) work on hate crimes against blacks. However, we find no association between percent Arab and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes prior to 9/11, which lends little support for any of the theories discussed above that emphasize demographic influences. This pattern of findings remains unchanged in Model 2, which adds the quadratic term (percent Arab squared). The quadratic term is not statistically significant.

Turning to Models 3 and 4 (post 9/11), we observe three changes. First, the crime rate and its squared term reach statistical significance and the functional form is consistent with McVeigh and associates' (2003) findings. Second, the percent non-Hispanic white population (referred to as percent white hereafter; $b = .01$) is positive and significant, indicating that post-9/11 anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes are more prevalent where the white population is proportionately larger. Third, we find that percent Arab ($b = .54$) is significantly associated with hate crimes, indicating that anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes after 9/11 are more frequent in counties with larger proportions of individuals with Arab ancestry. The squared term in Model 4 is again nonsignificant while Z-tests of differences in coefficients for the respective models in the pre- and post-9/11 period reveal no statistically significant differences.[5]

Table 2 presents essentially the same models as those reported in Table 1, but here we focus on the Muslim population instead of the Arab population. These results can be dealt with rather concisely. First, although the N is substantially smaller in this analysis ($N = 422$), the pattern of findings for the control variables remains remarkably similar to Table 1. Second, the coefficients for percent Muslim are quite consistent with those for percent Arab, and on this note it is worth emphasizing that the two variables are not simply proxies for one another (Pearson correlation = .44). The coefficient is positive but nonsignificant prior to 9/11, but significant and positive after 9/11 ($b = .23$; see Model 3 of Table 2). Third, although there is some shift in the magnitude of the latter coefficient after 9/11, the before-after difference is not statistically significant (again based on a Z-test for differences in coefficients). Fourth, there is some evidence of nonlinearity in Model 4 of Table 2. The significant quadratic term indicates that the strength of the slope dissipates at higher values of percent Muslim, perhaps indicating a saturation level at which point further increases in the proportion of Muslims have less of an effect on anti-Arab or anti-Muslim hate crimes. More specifically, the apex of the curvilinear function is approximately 6 percent. Only three counties in our sample have Muslim populations in excess of 5 percent, and hence we are probably not picking up a change in direction with the quadratic term. Rather, we think it indicates a decreasing slope in which the change from 1 to 2 percent Muslim yields a larger increase in hate crimes than a change from 4 to 5 percent.

Before proceeding to Tables 3 and 4, we briefly take stock of a few findings. Earlier we posed the question: "Where do anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes occur most frequently?" Before 9/11, the chief determinants were overall population size, age structure, and wealth. Yet, it appears that 9/11 served as a catalyst for hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims (Figures 2 and 3), and in the wake of 9/11 it seems that religious, ethnic, and racial demographics help us explain with considerably less error where such hate crimes occurred. After 9/11, places with higher proportionate numbers of Arabs and Muslims experienced more hate crimes of this nature. We also note that hate crimes with these motivations occurred with greater frequency

---

5. The test of difference that we utilized is explained by Kleinbaum (1988). It is a Z-test of difference: $Z = (b_1 - b_2) / \sqrt{(s_1^2 + s_2^2)}$ where b_1 and b_2 refer to the unstandardized regression coefficients for pre- and post-9/11, respectively, whereas $s_1^2(b_1)$ and $s_2^2(b_2)$ refer to the variance of coefficients in pre- and post-9/11 models, respectively.

Table 2 • *Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Muslim Population* **before** *and* **after** *September 11, 2001*

Categories	Independent Variables	Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11		Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Population, urbanicity, crime, and law enforcement control variables	Population in 2000 (in 1,000s, logged)	1.38*** (.21)	1.30*** (.21)	1.16*** (.11)	1.14*** (.11)
	Percent urban	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03* (.01)	.02* (.01)
	Percent ages 15–24	.12** (.04)	.11** (.04)	.06** (.02)	.06** (.02)
	Crime rate in 2000	.48 (.28)	.53 (.29)	.48** (.14)	.47** (.14)
	(Crime rate)² in 2000	−.04 (.03)	−.05 (.03)	−.04** (.01)	−.04** (.01)
	Police size (per 100,000)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.01 (.00)
Political context and political processes control variables	Legislative mandate for HC data collection	.32 (.26)	.34 (.26)	.78*** (.15)	.80*** (.15)
	Arab advocacy organizations	−.05 (.07)	−.04 (.07)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)
	Percent voting Democrat	.01 (.01)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
	Party competitiveness	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.00 (.01)	−.01 (.01)
Focal independent variables	Percent white in 2000	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.02** (.01)	.02** (.01)
	Percent Muslim in 2000	.12 (.17)	.84 (.52)	.23* (.10)	.57* (.26)
	Per capita income (in $1,000s)	.10** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.04* (.02)	.03 (.02)
	Percent Muslim squared in 2000	—	−.19 (.16)	—	−.05** (.02)
Log-likelihood		−246.118	−244.406	−690.289	−686.907
Pseudo R^2		.2534	.2586	.2137	.2176
N = 422					

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients for the intercepts are not reported. Data for these analyses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11, 2001.

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

where the white population was proportionately larger. Importantly, the differences in coefficients before and after 9/11 are not statistically significant. In fact, the magnitudes of the coefficients for percent Arab and percent Muslim change very little, but the standard errors are noticeably smaller after 9/11. We thus see no evidence of significant changes in the location of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, but more likely an escalation of hate crimes in counties that have above average Arab and Muslim populations and had some hate crime activity of this nature prior to 9/11. In addition, we point out that the findings from Tables 1 and 2 could support group threat theory or a simple target opportunity model. To further assess whether minority group threat is applicable in this context, we next turn to a set of models that takes into account the raw number of Arabs (Table 3) and Muslims (Table 4), respectively. In these models, the respective number of Arabs or Muslims (in logged form) is used as an offset in

Table 3 • *Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab Population* **before** *and* **after** *September 11, 2001 (Arab Population Size as an Offset)*

Categories	Independent Variables	Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11		Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Population, urbanicity, crime, and law enforcement control variables	Population in 2000 (in 1,000s, logged)	.23 (.17)	.24 (.17)	.14 (.09)	.16* (.09)
	Percent urban	−.00 (.01)	−.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)
	Percent ages 15–24	.08* (.03)	.08** (.03)	.04** (.02)	.05** (.02)
	Crime rate in 2000	.32 (.22)	.32 (.22)	.30** (.10)	.31** (.10)
	(Crime rate)² in 2000	−.02 (.02)	−.02 (.02)	−.02 (.01)	−.02* (.01)
	Police size (per 100,000)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)
Political context and political processes control variables	Legislative mandate for HC data collection	.47 (.24)	.46 (.24)	.67*** (.13)	.65*** (.12)
	Arab advocacy organizations	−.03 (.06)	−.03 (.06)	.02 (.03)	.03 (.03)
	Percent voting Democrat	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01* (.01)
	Party competitiveness	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Focal independent variables	Percent white in 2000	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.00)	.01* (.00)
	Percent Arab in 2000	−.81** (.29)	−1.49 (.87)	−.97*** (.17)	−2.47*** (.52)
	Per capita income (in $1,000s)	.07** (.03)	.08** (.03)	.03* (.01)	.05** (.02)
	Percent Arab squared in 2000	—	.31 (.38)	—	.75** (.26)
Log-likelihood		−344.267	−343.934	−1086.23	−1081.26
Pseudo R²		.0424	.0433	.0415	.0458
N = 2,343					

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients for the intercepts are not reported. Data for these analyses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11, 2001.

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

the equation, thereby allowing us to treat the dependent variable as a rate per Arab or Muslim population in a county. This set of models enables us to answer a slightly different question: In what counties are individual Arabs and Muslims most vulnerable?

We first note that the effects of our control variables remain largely consistent in Table 3 (likewise for the models in Table 4). Of greatest interest in Table 3 is the dramatic change in the percent Arab coefficient, which is negative and significant in all models in which the Arab population is used as an offset. These results indicate that the *rate* of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime offending is inversely correlated with percent Arab (Models 1 and 3). This implies that individuals of Arab descent are at a lower risk of victimization in counties where they constitute a larger proportion of the population. We interpret this set of coefficients as largely in line with a power-differential hypothesis, where proportionately large numbers of Arabs

Table 4 • *Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab Population* **before** *and* **after** *September 11, 2001 (Muslim Population Size as an Offset)*

Categories	Independent Variables	Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11		Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Population, urbanicity, crime, and law enforcement control variables	Population in 2000 (in 1,000s, logged)	.19 (.21)	.20 (.21)	.00 (.12)	.00 (.12)
	Percent urban	.31 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03** (.01)	.03** (.01)
	Percent ages 15–24	.10* (.04)	.10* (.04)	.05* (.02)	.05* (.02)
	Crime rate in 2000	.61* (.29)	.59* (.29)	.58*** (.15)	.60*** (.15)
	(Crime rate)² in 2000	−.05 (.03)	−.05 (.03)	−.05** (.02)	−.05** (.02)
	Police size (per 100,000)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.01* (.00)	−.01* (.00)
Political context and political processes control variables	Legislative mandate for HC data collection	.36 (.27)	.34 (.27)	.94*** (.16)	.90*** (.16)
	Arab advocacy organizations	−.02 (.07)	−.03 (.07)	.10* (.04)	.09* (.04)
	Percent voting Democrat	.01 (.02)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
	Party competitiveness	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.00 (.01)
Focal independent variables	Percent white in 2000	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.02*** (.01)	.02** (.01)
	Percent Muslim in 2000	−.84*** (.22)	−1.03*** (.30)	−.59*** (.10)	−1.09*** (.17)
	Per capita income (in $1,000s)	.09** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.02 (.02)	.03 (.02)
	Percent Muslim squared in 2000	—	.05 (.05)	—	.08** (.03)
Log-likelihood		−247.020	−246.676	−715.872	−708.893
Pseudo R²		.0969	.0982	.0853	.0942
N = 422					

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients for the intercepts are not reported. Data for these analyses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11, 2001.

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

probably instill a sense of potential retaliation if attacked. In addition, in Model 4 we observe that percent Arab squared (b = .75) is statistically significant. We are again cautious when interpreting this finding. The positive squared term indicates a weakening slope, but it does not signify a reversal of direction (i.e., we see no true tipping point). The base of the curve would be just under the 2 percent Arab mark, and only four counties exist in which Arabs constitute more than 2 percent of the population. To wit, we again interpret the significant squared term as indicating a weakening effect in counties with higher concentrations of Arabs.

In Table 4, we replace percent Arab with percent Muslim and use the logged number of Muslims as an offset in the negative binomial models. These results are very consistent with the results of Table 3; when employing the offset, we see an inverse association between percent Muslim and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. In general, it appears that the rate of

Table 5 • *Negative Binomial Estimates of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime Incidents in U.S. Counties with Nonzero Arab or Nonzero Muslim Population* **before** *and* **after** *September 11, 2001 (with Respective Population Sizes as Offsets)*

Independent Variables	Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes before September 11		Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes after September 11	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Percent white in 2000	.02 (.01)	.02* (.01)	.02*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)
Percent Arab in 2000	.32 (.93)	—	.81 (.57)	—
Percent Muslim in 2000	—	.48 (.40)	—	.21 (.24)
Percent Arab*percent white	−.02 (.01)	—	−.03*** (.01)	—
Percent Muslim*percent white		−.03** (.01)	—	−.02*** (.004)

N = 2,343 in Models 1 and 3
N = 422 in Models 2 and 4

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Only the interaction terms and their component variables are shown in the table, although all models control for all variables included in previous tables (except for the quadratic terms for percent Muslim and percent Arab). Data for these analyses are restricted to the 8½ months before and 8½ months after September 11th, 2001. All models include population offsets (logged number of Arabs in Models 1 and 3; logged number of Muslims in Models 2 and 4).

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes is lower in counties with larger proportions of Muslims, suggesting that the average Muslim is at a higher risk of victimization when and where few other Muslims reside.

Before moving to a more general discussion of our findings in relation to prior work, we close this section by highlighting two findings that we see as important. First, and similar to the findings from models without the population offset (Tables 1 and 2), the changes in predictor variables before and after 9/11 are not statistically significant in Tables 3 and 4. Overall, the rate of hate crime activity may change after 9/11, but the determinants remain largely consistent across the two periods. Second, we can claim even stronger support for the power-differential hypothesis if we were to find that small Arab or Muslim populations in counties with very large majority group populations (i.e., whites in the United States) were especially likely to experience anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. The latter assertion implies an interaction between minority group size and percent white in the models with population offsets, and we show these results in Table 5. The control variables were practically unchanged from earlier models, and thus Table 5 includes only the interactions and their component variables (although all other variables are statistically controlled; see note below Table 5). Three of the four models, including both post-9/11 models, show significant interaction coefficients in the predicted direction, which lends additional support for the power-differential hypothesis. One way of interpreting the interaction coefficients is to assess the difference in slopes for percent white at low (e.g., .01) and high (e.g., 1 percent) values of percent Arab and Muslim. Looking at the post-9/11 models (Models 3 and 4), we see that the effect of percent white is .02 when the percent Arab is .01 percent (.02 − .03*.01) but changes to −.01 when the percent Arab increases to 1 percent (.02 − .03*1; see Model 3). A similar pattern emerges for the Muslim population. Increases in the percent white yield more anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes when the percent Muslim is .01 percent (.03 − .02*.01 = .03), yet the percent white coefficient weakens as the percent Muslim increases to 1 percent (.03 − .02*1 = .01). In short, a small

minority appears most at risk when the majority group is sizeable, and this is a particularly robust finding after 9/11.[6]

Discussion and Conclusion

At a very general level, this article had a twofold purpose: first, to understand the "spaces of hate"—*where* anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes occur more frequently—and second, to understand the "times of hate"—*when* and *how* anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes change given the historical events of September 11th. Taken together, the results support three primary conclusions.

First, while the majority of racially and ethnically motivated hate crimes (i.e., anti-black, anti-Asian, anti-Hispanic) declined after 9/11, the number of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes increased sharply. This finding is consistent with reports from the FBI and from Arab advocacy organizations suggesting that 9/11 created a climate in which many Americans felt united against a "new enemy" and in which acts of hatred against Arabs and Muslims became "normalized" behaviors (Perry 2001, 2002; Wang 2002). This finding is also in line with the conclusions of numerous researchers who argue that historical events can serve as triggers that shape and enable the social construction of binary oppositions, such as "American citizen" versus "foreign alien" (Alexander 1992; Petonito 2000; Volpp 2002), increase levels of interethnic hostility and prejudice (Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005), and fuel intergroup violence through acts of vicarious retribution (Gerstenfeld 2002, 2004; Green et al. 1998; Lickel et al. 2006). Yet, this landmark event has no effect on the predictors of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes; the determinants of hate crime remain largely unchanged as indicated by the relatively similar coefficients across the two periods. In other words, the timing of hate crime offending may change, but its place remains rather constant. This implies that the conditions for anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes did not simply culminate immediately after September 11th. Rather, the conditions have been in place, probably as early as Arabs and Muslims began migrating to the United States (Akram and Johnson 2001), and hence some counties were ripe for vengeance in the aftermath of the 9/11 events.

Second, Tables 1 and 2 revealed that hate crime offending, at least against Arabs and Muslims after 9/11, is partly a function of target opportunity. Places with proportionately larger Arab and Muslim populations had higher numbers of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes. This finding, although intuitive, is important in that it tells us where to expect more of such hate crimes should another terrorist attack attributed to Arabs or Muslims transpire.

However, as a third concluding point, we find little support for the traditional group threat account of prejudice and intergroup violence. Once the Arab or Muslim populations were taken into account as offsets, the results indicated that Arabs and Muslims were at higher risk of victimization after 9/11 in counties where their proportions were extremely small, and Table 5 indicated that this was particularly the case when the majority group (whites) represented a very large proportion of the population. In such contexts, the small minority group is visible, has little protection, and is thus highly vulnerable. We see this finding as aligning with a power-differential hypothesis. As Levine and Campbell (1972) might have argued, large proportions of minorities may not be an indication of threat but of power to mobilize and retaliate against discrimination and hostility. We would add that this is especially the case for very small minority groups. As indicated by the squared terms in Model 4 of Tables 3 and 4, there is evidence of a decreasingly powerful slope as the minority population increases.

It is worth noting at this point that somewhat of a paradox is at play when predicting hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims, particularly in the immediate post-9/11 period. Places with

---

6. In the models shown in Table 5, the respective main effects of percent white indicate the coefficient magnitudes and significance levels when percent Arab and Muslim are set to 0. We tested to see if the slopes for percent white were statistically significant at the .01 percent and 1 percent level of percent Arab and Muslim using a technique recommended by Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990). The slopes were statistically significant ($p < .05$) in three of the four cases.

more Arabs may indeed have more anti-Arab hate crime, but each individual Arab is at lower risk. A brief example might usefully illustrate how this plays out. Consider, for instance, a county with a high Arab population (Wayne County, Michigan) and another with a slightly above average Arab population (Hennepin County, Minnesota). The former county is home to more than 56,000 Arabs (about 2.7 percent of the population) and experienced 27 anti-Arab hate crimes after 9/11. This equates to a rate of about 48 offenses per 100,000 Arabs. Hennepin County, by contrast, had fewer overall post-9/11 anti-Arab hate crimes (21), but also a comparatively small Arab population (4,832). The rate per 100,000 Arabs in the latter county is approximately 434, or about 9 times higher than Wayne County. This simple comparison is in many respects a microcosm of our overall findings, and it stresses the importance of matching the question (how many versus relative risk) with the method (e.g., with or without a population offset).

In addition to the population findings, we also call attention to the results for economic conditions. Measured either as a count or as a rate, most of our models indicate that anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes happen with more regularity in affluent counties. We suspect that hate crimes (in our case, anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes) occur more frequently in affluent counties because they entail more informal social control and respond more forcefully to threatening outsiders (Lyons 2007). While a disadvantageous economic condition has been reported as a useful mechanism for explaining crime in general (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001) or anti-white hate crimes in particular (Lyons 2007), this is not the case for anti-Arab/Muslim hate-motivated behavior.

We close with a few comments about the limitations of our study and some suggestions for future research. First, we are acutely aware of the limitations of our dependent variable. Collapsing the categories of anti-other (ostensibly anti-Arab) and anti-Muslim hate crimes, while logical and we think empirically defensible (e.g., Figures 2 and 3), our assumptions may still leave readers with questions. In some sense, our investigation has attempted to uncover something that does not exist in the *Uniform Crime Reports*—hate crimes against Arabs. By saying this, we do not imply that hate crimes against Arabs have not occurred. Rather, we wish to simply suggest that a critical dimension of the process that makes these crimes real—namely, classifying these crimes as a distinct hate crime category—has been absent. This makes the job of both researchers and policy makers all the more difficult. Neither can fully capture hate crimes against Arabs if such offenses are not categorized as a social problem that warrants accurate recording. Rather than abandoning our attempt to investigate this phenomenon, we decided to proceed while acknowledging the limitations we faced in using these data. Perhaps future research will be aided by the adoption of an "anti-Arab" hate crime category, which would be a useful alternative to the current practice of simply clustering them as crimes against "others." Second, we also acknowledge that some theoretical ideas on hate crime offending could not be tested here, namely the defended neighborhoods theory that has received ample support in prior work. We were only able to aggregate our data to the county level, and hence such theories that emphasize *community*-level demographic changes could not be adequately assessed in the present research.

Still, we think the conclusions from this work can be useful in guiding future research. Future studies should investigate the effect of historical events both on the outcome variable as well as on the predictors of that variable. An historical event and similar processes of vicarious retribution may influence the study of intergroup violence in other contexts. For example, the highpoint of violence against Jews prior to WWII occurred in the aftermath of the assassination of a German diplomat at the hands of a young Jewish man (the infamous *Kristallnacht* pogrom). Susan Olzak (1990) similarly observed a spike in lynching after elections when Populist movements challenged the status quo in the Jim Crow South. To that end, such events must not necessarily constitute acts of violence on par with the 9/11 attacks or a political assassination. For instance, we would suspect an increase in hate crimes against immigrants, and particularly Mexican immigrants, during acrimonious political debates about amnesty and violence at the border. More closely related to this research, we would expect

more hate crimes against members of the Arab and Muslim community in the short period following the media coverage of beheadings that took place in Middle Eastern countries like Iraq and Afghanistan or the construction of an Islamic mosque near "ground zero." Overall, we think the study of triggering events and the distribution of hate-motivated behavior is a rich and theoretically informative area for future research.

Appendix A • *Counties with Greatest Increases in Overall Number of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crimes: Comparing the 8½ Months prior to September 11th to the 8½ Months after September 11th*

Rank	County	State	# of Crimes Committed 1/1/01–9/10/01			# of Crimes Committed 9/11/01–5/31/02			Increase
			Anti-Muslim	Anti-"Other"	Total Before	Anti-Muslim	Anti-"Other"	Total After	(Total After – Total Before)
1	Los Angeles	CA	3	35	38	26	133	159	121
2	Maricopa	AZ	0	1	1	15	64	79	78
3	San Francisco	CA	1	6	7	13	49	62	55
4	San Diego	CA	1	2	3	8	48	56	53
5	Cuyahoga	OH	0	1	1	4	46	50	49
6	Cook	IL	0	2	2	7	42	49	47
7	Suffolk	MA	0	6	6	11	41	52	46
8	Harris	TX	0	1	1	5	34	39	38
9	Suffolk	NY	0	9	9	0	44	44	35
10	Santa Clara	CA	0	5	5	4	30	34	29
10	Camden	NJ	0	2	2	11	20	31	29
11	Alameda	CA	0	1	1	1	25	26	25
11	Orange	CA	0	2	2	3	24	27	25
11	Wayne	MI	0	2	2	7	20	27	25
12	Franklin	OH	2	2	4	26	2	28	24
13	Bexar	TX	0	0	0	5	17	22	22
14	King	WA	0	5	5	10	16	26	21
15	Pima	AZ	0	1	1	6	15	21	20
15	Hennepin	MN	1	0	1	13	8	21	20
16	Sacramento	CA	0	3	3	4	18	22	19
16	Middlesex	MA	0	1	1	5	15	20	19
16	Hudson	NJ	1	0	1	6	14	20	19
17	Pinellas	FL	0	1	1	0	17	17	16
17	Dallas	TX	0	1	1	5	12	17	16
18	Bergen	NJ	2	2	4	6	13	19	15
19	Contra Costa	CA	0	1	1	1	14	15	14
19	Hillsborough	FL	0	1	1	1	14	15	14
19	Multnomah	OR	0	1	1	0	15	15	14
20	Riverside	CA	0	1	1	4	10	14	13
20	Essex	NJ	1	0	1	4	10	14	13
21	New Haven	CT	0	1	1	4	9	13	12
21	Clark	NV	1	1	2	2	12	14	12
21	Passaic	NJ	0	0	0	6	6	12	12
22	Fresno	CA	0	1	1	2	10	12	11
22	Middlesex	NJ	0	4	4	6	9	15	11
22	Monmouth	NJ	0	2	2	4	9	13	11
23	Miami-Dade	FL	0	0	0	0	10	10	10
National Mean (3,113 Counties)			.01	.08	.07	.17	.48	.56	.56
National Minimum			0	0	0	0	0	0	−3
National Maximum			3	35	38	26	133	159	121

Appendix B • *Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Interest*

	2,343 Counties with Nonzero Arab Population		422 Counties with Nonzero Muslim Population	
	Mean	*Standard Deviation*	*Mean*	*Standard Deviation*
Pre-9/11 anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes	.10	.89	.47	2.04
Post-9/11 anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes	.74	4.76	3.74	10.69
Natural logarithm of county population (in 1,000s)	3.73	1.30	5.41	1.19
Percent urban	46.83	30.09	80.60	18.92
Percent population 15–24 years old	13.78	3.60	15.93	5.13
Crime rate (per 100)	2.78	1.81	4.24	2.08
Crime rate (per 100) squared	11.00	13.58	22.27	20.52
Police size (per 100,000)	269.13	238.71	326.74	303.34
State legislative mandate to collect data (0 = no; 1 = yes)	.52	.50	.57	.50
Arab advocacy organizations	1.90	2.00	2.57	2.16
Percent voting Democrat	41.01	11.00	47.97	11.64
Party competitiveness	21.55	15.69	18.34	14.91
Percent non-Hispanic white population	81.52	17.88	71.25	18.82
Percent Arab population	.19	.22	—	—
Percent Muslim population	—	—	.64	.90
Per capita income (in 1,000s)	18.14	4.08	20.96	4.98

References

Akram, Susan M. and Kevin R. Johnson. 2002. "Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims." *NYU Annual Survey of American Law* 58(3):295–356.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1992. "Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification: On the Polarizing Discourse of Civil Society." Pp. 289–300 in *Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality*, edited by Michele LaMont and Marcel Fournier. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). 2002. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Web Site. Retrieved August 6, 2006 (www.adc.org).

Anti-Defamation League (ADL). 2001. "Anti-Demfamtion League State Hate Crime Statuary Provisions." Retrieved August 6, 2006 (www.adl.org/99hatecrime/state_hate_crime_laws.pdf).

Bakalian, Anny P. and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. 2009. *Backlash 9/11: Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans Respond*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations.* New York: Jon Wiley and Sons.

Corzine, Jay, James C. Creech, and Lin Huff-Corzine. 1983. "Black Concentration and Lynchings in the South: Testing Blalock's Power-Threat Hypothesis." *Social Forces* 61(3):774–96.

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). 2002. Council on American-Islamic Relations Web site. Retrieved August 6, 2006 (www.cair-net.org).

Dixon, Jeffrey C. 2006. "The Ties that Bind and Those that Don't: Toward Reconciling Group Threat and Contact Theories of Prejudice." *Social Forces* 84(4):2179–2204.

Eitle, David, Stewart J. D'Alessio, and Lisa Stolzenberg. 2002. "Racial Threat and Social Control: A Test of the Political, Economic, and Threat of Black Crime Hypotheses." *Social Forces* 81:557–76.

Evans, Martin C. 2005. "London Terror; Local Muslims Decry Attacks." *Newsday*, July 8, p. W23. Retrieved August 10, 2005 (www.newsday.com/news/london-terror-1.612363).

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 2002. *Hate Crime Statistics—2001*. Retrieved November 12, 2007 (www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2001/hatecrime01.pdf/view?searchterm=hate%20crime%202001).

———. 2005a. *Hate Crimes*. Retrieved November 12, 2007 (www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/hate_crimes/hate_crimes).

———. 2005b. *Hate Crime Statistics 2005*. Retrieved November 12, 2007 (www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2005/table1.htm).

Firebaugh, Glenn and Kenneth E. Davis. 1988. "Trends in Anti-Black Prejudice, 1972–1984: Region and Cohort Effects." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(2):251–72.

Gallup. 2009. *Terrorism in the United States*. Retrieved December 5, 2009 (www.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-States.aspx#2).

Gerstenfeld, Phyllis B. 2002. "A Time to Hate: Situational Antecedents of Intergroup Bias." *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 2(1):61–67.

———. 2004. *Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls and Controversies.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Grattet, Ryken and Valerie Jenness. 2001. "The Birth and Maturation of Hate Crime Policy in the United States." *American Behavioral Scientist* 45(4):668–96.

Grattet, Ryken, Valerie Jenness, and Theodore R. Curry. 1998. "The Homogenization and Differentiation of Hate Crime Law in the United States, 1978 to 1995: Innovation and Diffusion in the Criminalization of Bigotry." *American Sociological Review* 1998(63):286–307.

Green, Donald P., Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Janelle S. Wong. 1998. "Defended Neighborhoods, Integration and Racially Motivated Crime." *American Journal of Sociology* 104(2):372–403.

Green, Donald P., Jack Glaser, and Andrew Rich. 1998. "From Lynching to Gay Bashing: The Elusive Connection between Economic Conditions and Hate Crimes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75(1):82–92.

Hays, Tom. 2010. "Slashed Muslim Taxi Driver to Visit NYC Mayor." *ABC News*, August 26. Retrieved August 27, 2010 (http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=11479468).

Hepworth, Joseph T. and Stephen G. West. 1988. "Lynchings and the Economy: A Time-Series Reanalysis of Hovland and Sears (1940)." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 55(2):239–47.

Hovland, Carl I. and Robert R. Sears. 1940. "Minor Studies in Aggression: VI. Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices." *Journal of Psychology* 9:301–10.

Hyman, Herbert H. and Paul B. Sheatsley. 1964. "Attitudes towards Desegregation." *Scientific American* 211:16–23.

Jaccard, James, Robert Turrisi, and Choi K. Wan. 1990. *Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Jacobs, David and Katherine Wood. 1999. "Interracial Conflict and Interracial Homicide: Do Political and Economic Rivalries Explain White Killings of Blacks or Black Killings of Whites?" *American Journal of Sociology* 105(1):157–90.

Jacobs, David and Richard Kleban. 2003. "Political Institutions, Minorities, and Punishment: A Pooled Cross-National Analysis of Imprisonment Rates." *Social Forces* 82(2):725–55.

Jenness, Valerie and Kendal Broad. 1997. *Hate Crimes: New Social Movements and the Politics of Violence.* New York: Walter De Gruyter.

Jenness, Valerie and Ryken Grattet. 2001. *Making Hate a Crime: From Social Movements to Law Enforcement.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Jones, Dale E., Sherri Doty, Clifford Grammich, James E. Horsch, Richard Houseal, Mac Lynn, John P. Marcum, Kenneth M. Sanchagrin, and Richard H. Taylor. 2002. *Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States, 2000*. Nashville, TN: Glenmary Research Center.

King, Ryan D. 2007. "The Context of Minority Group Threat: Race, Institutions, and Complying With Hate Crime Law." *Law and Society Review* 41(1):189–224.

———. 2009. "Hate Crimes: Perspectives on Offending and the Law." Pp. 525–49 in *Handbook on Crime and Deviance*, edited by Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, and Gina Penly Hall. New York: Springer.

King, Ryan D. and William Brustein. 2006. "Political Threat Model of Intergroup Violence: Jews in Pre-World War II Germany." *Criminology* 44(4):867–91.

Kleinbaum, David G. 1988. *Applied Regression Analysis and Other Multivariate Methods*. Boston, MA: PWS-Kent Publishing CO.

Koopmans, Ruud and Susan Olzak. 2004. "Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right-Wing Violence in Germany." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(1):198–230.

Levin, Jack and Jack McDevitt. 1993. *Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide of Bigotry and Bloodshed*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.

Levine, Robert A. and Donald. T. Campbell. 1972. *Ethnocentrism.* New York: Wiley.

Lickel, Brian, Norman Miller, Douglas M. Stenstrom, Thomas F. Denson, and Toni Schmader. 2006. "Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in Intergroup Aggression." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10(4):372–90.

Liska, Allen E. 1992. *Social Threat and Social Control*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Lyons, Christopher J. 2007. "Community (Dis)Organization and Racially Motivated Crime." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(3):815–63.

McVeigh, Rory, Carl Neblett, and Sarah Shafiq. 2006. "Explaining Social Movement Outcomes: Multiorganizational Fields and Hate Crime Reporting." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11(1):23–49.

McVeigh, Rory, Michael R. Welch, and Thoroddur Bjarnason. 2003. "Hate Crime Reporting as a Successful Social Movement Outcome." *American Sociological Review* 68(6):843–67.

Medoff, Marshall H. 1999. "Allocation of Time and Behavior: A Theoretical and Positive Analysis of Hate and Hate Crimes." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 58(4):959–73.

Merskin, Debra. 2004. "The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush." *Mass Communication & Society* 7(2):157–75.

Moffitt, Terrie E. 2006. "A Review of Research on the Taxonomy of Life-Course Persistent versus Adolescence-Limited Antisocial Behavior." Pp. 277–311 in *Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory, Volume 15*, edited by Francis T. Cullen, John Paul Wright, and Kristie R. Blevins. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Morenoff, Jeffrey D., Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2001. "Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence." *Criminology* 39(3):517–59.

Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC). 2002. Muslim Public Affairs Council Web Site. Retrieved August 6, 2006 (www.mpac.org).

Olzak, Susan. 1990. "The Political Context of Competition: Lynching and Urban Racial Violence, 1882–1914." *Social Forces* 69(2):395–421.

———. 1992. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Osgood, Wayne D. 2000. "Poisson-Based Regression Analysis of Aggregate Crime Rates." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 16(1):21–43.

Perry, Barbara. 2001. *In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes*. New York: Routledge.

———. 2002. "Defending the Color Line: Racially and Ethnically Motivated Hate Crime." *American Behavioral Scientist* 46(1):72–92.

Petonito, Gina. 2000. "Racial Discourse and Enemy Construction: Justifying the Internment 'Solution' to the 'Japanese Problem' during World War II." Pp. 19–40 in *Social Conflicts and Collective Identities*, edited by Patrick G. Coy and Lynne M. Woehrle. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Polidata. 2001. "'Presidential Returns for Counties and County Equivalents' for the General Elections, 1996 and 2000, As Collected from State Election Authorities." Corinth, VT: Polidata.

Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 60(4):586–611.

———. 1996. "Group Threat and Regional Change in Attitudes toward African-Americans." *The American Journal of Sociology* 102(3):816–60.

Quillian, Lincoln and Devah Pager. 2001. "Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime." *American Journal of Sociology* 107(3):717–67.

Reed, John Shelton. 1972. "Percent Black and Lynching: A Test of Blalock's Theory." *Social Forces* 50(3):356–60.

Rosenfeld, Richard. 2002. "Crime Decline in Context." *Contexts: Understanding People in Their Social Worlds* 1(1):25–34.

Semyonov, Moshe, Rebecca Raijman, Anat Yom Tov, and Peter Schmidt. 2004. "Population Size, Perceived Threat, and Exclusion: A Multiple-Indicators Analysis of Attitudes toward Foreigners in Germany." *Social Science Research* 33(4):681–701.

Taylor, Marylee C. 1998. "How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count." *American Sociological Review* 63(4):512–35.

Tolnay, Stewart E. and E. M. Beck. 1993. *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882–1930*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Tolnay, Stewart E., Glenn Deane, and E. M. Beck. 1996. "Vicarious Violence: Spatial Effects on Southern Lynchings, 1890–1919." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(3):788–815.

Torres, Sam. 1999. "Hate Crimes against African-Americans: The Extent of the Problem." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 15(1):48–63.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2002. *Technical Documentation: Census 2000 Summary File 3.* Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau.

U.S. Department of Justice. 2002a. *Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [United States]: County-Level Detailed Arrest and Offense Data, 2000.* Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political Research.

———. 2002b. *Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [United States]: Hate Crime Data, 2001 [Record-Type Files].* Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political Research.

———. 2002c. *Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [United States]: Police Employees (LEOKA) Data, 2000.* Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political Research.

———. 2003. *Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data [United States]: Hate Crime Data, 2002 [Record-Type Files].* Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political Research.

Verkuyten, Maykel and Katarzyna Zaremba. 2005. "Interethnic Relations in a Changing Political Context." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 68(4):375–86.

Volpp, Leti. 2002. "The Citizen and the Terrorist." *UCLA Law Review* 49:1575–1600.

Wang, Lu-in. 2002. "Hate Crime and Everyday Discrimination: Influences of and on the Social Context." *Rutgers Race and Law Review* 4:1–31.