Government Surveillance and Political Participation on the Internet

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Although more is probably known about the causes of political participation than any other political behavior, the research program suffers in that it generally assumes citizens operate within an unproblematic surveillance context. This article argues that the growing use of the Internet for political participation and the government's expanded electronic surveillance capacities make this assumption increasingly dubious. Drawing on Michel Foucault's insights concerning surveillance and resistance, this article develops empirical hypotheses related to surveillance and Internet political participation. Testing these hypotheses using data derived from a unique probability sample survey of U.S. Internet users, surveillance is shown to influence online political activity. Those who oppose the current administration, and who perceive the government monitors their Internet behavior, participate in politics online at the highest rates. Finally, the implications of these results are discussed.

Keywords: Internet; Michel Foucault; political participation; privacy; resistance; social control; surveillance

Political participation plays a well-understood role in various theories of democratic politics. Participation is said to promote system stability by legitimizing the current regime (e.g., Salisbury, 1975), facilitate the moral development of individuals (e.g., Mill, 1991; Pateman, 1970), and determine who governs and receives policy benefits (e.g., Key, 1949; Radcliff, 1994). Given the importance of political participation across a diverse range of democratic theories, a persistent question for empirical political scientists has been "why do people participate?" Broadly considered, the factors found to facilitate individual political participation commonly fall into four categories: socioeconomic (e.g., Milbrath, 1965), psychological (e.g., Miller & Shanks, 1996), civic resources (e.g., Verba & Nie, 1972), and mobilization (e.g., Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). Although scholars probably know more about the causes of political participation than any other political behavior, the research program suffers in that it generally assumes ordinary citizens operate within an unproblematic surveillance context.

Typically, when scholars do consider the impact of surveillance on political participation, they focus on narrowly defined targets such as Black Panther, communist, or Native American activists rather than on citizens in general (e.g., Churchill & Vander Wall, 1990; Cunningham, 2004; Donner, 1980; Rogin, 1987). Even those who do include ordinary individuals' privacy concerns as a determinant of political participation (completion of the U.S.

Census) argue explicitly that these concerns likely do not extend to other forms of political participation (Singer, Mathiowetz, & Couper, 1993; Couper, Singer, & Kulka, 1998).

Although the political participation literature's neglect of surveillance was perhaps reasonable a decade ago, three developing conditions render it questionable. First, the Internet has become a mainstream avenue for political participation in the United States. More than 60% of the U.S. adult population now connects to the Internet. Of those who do connect, two thirds engage in some type of online political activity (Center for Survey Research and Analysis [CSRA], 2003). This worldwide network of computers provides the technological infrastructure that makes the widespread surveillance of mass activity feasible for the first time in U.S. history (Nehf, 2003; Schwartz, 1999; Westin, 2003).[1]

Second, the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon provided justification for the passage of several new "antiterrorism" laws that expand the government's surveillance powers (for reviews, see Nelson, 2002; Pikowsky, 2002; Solove, 2004). Many of the key provisions of the central piece of antiterrorism legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), focus directly on electronic surveillance. Lower barriers now exist for the government to intercept electronic mail transmissions and monitor web surfing, all without necessarily informing the individual of this surveillance (Berkowitz, 2002; Nelson, 2002). Other initiatives have been proposed, but delayed, that would further expand the state's surveillance capacity (e.g., Operation Terrorism Information and Prevention System [TIPS], Total Information Awareness, PATRIOT Act II). Taken together, even these already passed provisions harness much of the surveillance potential latent in the technological design of the Internet. Of course, for the purposes of this article, these new surveillance capacities mean little if ordinary citizens escape from their gaze.

Finally, some suggest that whatever the terrorism prevention benefits of these surveillance techniques, one side effect will be the increased monitoring of ordinary citizens' Internet activity (Lyon, 2001). Moreover, because the government does not need to disclose the use of these techniques (Rotenberg, 2002; Solove, 2004), combined with the ambiguity regarding what exactly constitutes "domestic terrorism," the range of potential targets of these new techniques remains uncertain (Gould, 2002; Grant, 2003). Some suggest that in a "with us or against us" environment, where reminders are given "to all Americans that they need to watch what they say, watch what they do," those wishing to do the United States harm may be synonymous with those criticizing the government's policies (Fleischer, 2001, p. 11; see also Blanchard, 2002; Gould, 2002; Williams, 2003).

Others go further, plainly arguing that the recent history of government surveillance suggests that these electronic surveillance tools, at least in part, were designed to monitor and stifle legitimate political dissent (Shehadeh, 2002; Troyer, 2003). They noted that most of the individuals with a Hoover-era Counter Intelligence Program (Cointelpro) file had no connection to foreign subversives or any history of violence but were monitored simply because of their political beliefs or affiliation (e.g., Donner, 1980; Solove, 2004). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also used surveillance as an end in itself to interfere with political expression "A secret political file serves up a banquet of fears. Do they have a 'file' on me? What could they possibly have found out about my past? Is there any derogatory information in my record?" (Donner, 1980, p. 172). To be sure, how closely current government electronic surveillance practices correspond to the Cointelpro era remains open to debate. Whatever the validity of these claims, many now believe that the government uses these surveillance powers to monitor ordinary citizens' Internet activity.

Despite the growing use of the Internet for political activity, the government's expanded electronic surveillance capacities, and the belief by many that the government monitors ordi-

nary citizens, empirical studies do not incorporate surveillance into political participation models. This article seeks to integrate this compelling factor by using Michel Foucault's well-developed insights on surveillance to generate empirical hypotheses involving Internet political participation.[2] Using Foucault has distinct advantages. Not only does Foucault place surveillance at the center of his theory of disciplinary society but also his imagery offers a framework for understanding how the architectural characteristics of the Internet likely affect individuals' reaction to surveillance.[3]

SURVEILLANCE, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND RESISTANCE

In perhaps his best-known work, *Surveiller et Punir* (Discipline and Punish), Foucault (1979) used Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon as a fundamental metaphor for his conception of modern society that seeks to produce normal, useful, and docile individuals out of deviants[4] who depart as much from society's norms as its laws. Surveillance lies at the heart of techniques of normalization in modern society. To condition individuals requires "a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal . . . which, even today, are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him" (Foucault, 1979, p. 199).

The specific mechanisms of surveillance's power are best expressed through the architectural characteristics of the Panopticon. The circular prison, with its central observation tower, uses light and blinds to completely monitor inmates while eliminating the visibility of the guards. The inmates, unsure of the direction of the guards' gaze, imagine the guards view their actions at all times and act as if they are watched so as to avoid punishment. Because the watchers remain hidden from the prisoners, the Panopticon requires few real guards. Although actual punishment is unlikely because of the small number of real guards, inmates internalize the prison's rules by imagining the ersatz surveillance and gradually condition themselves through the repetition of normal behavior. To keep this facade of constant surveillance also requires the isolation of inmates. "The isolation of the convicts guarantees that it is possible to exercise over them, with maximum intensity, a power that will not be overthrown by any other influence; solitude is the primary condition of total submission" (Foucault, 1979, p. 237).

Given a perfect panoptic surveillance system, where individuals are categorized (as deviant), blinded (from the watcher), and isolated (from each other), we generally would expect deviants to condition themselves into normal, or at least docile, individuals. Yet Foucault only used the idealized Panopticon as a metaphor for modern disciplinary techniques. Surveillance never conditions individuals absolutely (for a discussion, see Digeser, 1992).

Resistance to the conditioning effects of surveillance is not only possible but is inadvertently encouraged by the very process of conditioning (Dumm, 1996; Foucault, 1982; Pickett, 1996). For Foucault (1978, 1979), individuals only accept surveillance's normalizing influence to the degree that it remains hidden. And it cannot be hidden completely. Because the Panopticon's surveillance techniques only condition when the inmates conjure the image of a watchful guard, this necessary aspect of control also dialectically produces the possibility of resistance (Digeser, 1992; Gordon, 2002). When surveillance is recognized, resistance can occur by specifically rejecting these normalizing forces (the micropolitics of resistance). Because resistance is localized, the forces it works against, in part, shape it. For example, Orwell reminded us that simply writing in a personal journal can become an act of resistance; Winston Smith's realization that Big Brother wants to control his very thoughts prompts his journal entries, shaping the form of his resistance (Grant, 2003).

Consequently, for the context considered in this article, to understand the form that resistance may take one must focus on the specific type of conditioning encouraged by the surveillance system. Government Internet surveillance works to create docility among those most opposed to the regime by creating anxiety about whether dissenting online political activity may make them more of a focus of observation, perhaps by the government opening a file on them (Digeser, 1992; Foucualt, 1979). Accordingly, resistance to the docility encouraged by government Internet surveillance would take the form of political activity. This notion of political participation as resistance against the forces of docility coincides with the conceptualization of "postmodern participation" developed explicitly by Jessica Kulynych (1997):

> A concept of performative resistance sees tactics and strategies that resist not only the global strategies of economic domination, but also the construction of apathetic, quiescent citizens. When power is such that it can create quiescence, the definition of political participation must include those forms of political action that disrupt and counter quiescence. (p. 338)

Moreover, while Kulynych's notion of political participation moves beyond conventional conceptualizations to include a number of "ordinary activities," she also recognized that depending on the context, "conventional political activities may also take on the character of resistance" (p. 341). Clearly, in an environment where surveillance works to create docile individuals of political dissidents, resistance may take the form of conventional political activity.

APPLYING THE INTERNET

While disciplinary power alone implies the possibility of resistance, as discussed, the structure of the surveillance environment can serve to facilitate or stifle resistance. Actual surveillance systems never fully re-create the idealized Panopticon. In view of this, Gary Marx (2003) observed "control systems are not usually as effective and efficient as their advocates claim and they often have a variety of unintended consequences" (p. 371; see also, Marx, 1988). If a surveillance system allows the watched to view the watcher, then power becomes exposed even further, increasing the likelihood of resistance. Surveillance systems also seldom achieve complete isolation. While the isolation of deviant influences tends to produce docility and the acceptance of conditioning, horizontal communication breeds resistance. Alternative conceptions of acceptable behavior, communicated across individuals, expose the synthetic norms encouraged by the disciplinary surveillance.

The Internet surveillance techniques at the disposal of the federal government conform to some aspects of the panoptic model. Certainly, these techniques create uncertainty regarding whether the government monitors individuals' (especially those critical of the regime) Internet activity. Yet many argue that the structure of the Internet provides a poor fit for an effective disciplinary Panopticon. Whereas a crucial component of effective disciplinary surveillance requires the few to watch the many while preventing the many from watching the few, modern information technologies also reverse these relations (Boyne, 2000; Green, 1999; Lim, 2002; Staples, 1997). Internet users can watch their watcher.[5] Refining the notion of a Synopticon, Boyne (2000) suggested "the machinery of surveillance is now always potentially in the service of the crowd as much as the executive" (p. 301).

For surveillance to discipline individuals also requires the lack of horizontal communication between individuals. Yet the decentralized information and communication network enhances one-to-one (e.g., e-mail, instant messaging), many-to-many (e.g., chat rooms, web

pages), and one-to-many (e.g., listservs, blogs) forms of communication. Describing this nonconforming feature of the technological environment Munro (2000) suggested that "the network promotes lateral communication and 'informates' those who are under surveillance" (p. 690). By allowing the watched to view the watcher and communicate horizontally with others that may offer subversive perspectives, the Internet conforms poorly to the idealized Panopticon. Therefore, Internet surveillance should perform poorly as an instrument of social control.

HYPOTHESES

Taken as a whole, Foucault and his followers offered a useful framework for considering the impact of perceived government surveillance on political activity. First, the framework identifies political deviants as the primary targets of government surveillance. Second, the perspective offers two possible reactions to this surveillance, docility or political resistance. Third, by focusing on the structure of the surveillance environment, the framework is particularly helpful identifying the conditions under which these two potential reactions most likely occur. Docility occurs most often when the surveillance system isolates individuals from each other and blinds individuals from surveillance and those conducting the surveillance. Political resistance occurs most often when individuals are aware of surveillance, can watch their watcher, and can communicate horizontally with others. Therefore, given the Internet's structure, I expect that, for those who disagree with dominant political opinion, perceptions that the government monitors citizens' Internet activity should result in higher levels of Internet political activity. In addition, because they are not the focus of government surveillance, the political activity levels of citizens who agree with dominant opinion should not be affected by perceived surveillance. The remainder of the article tests these hypotheses and discusses the implications of the results.

METHODS

I estimated an ordered probit model of the online participation scale using perceived government Internet surveillance and support for the war in Iraq and an interaction term of these two variables. A statistically significant interaction term would suggest that support for the Iraq War moderates the effect of government Internet surveillance. The model also includes controls for political interest, mobilization, civic resources, Internet resources, and demographics.[6] After estimating the model, I calculated the change in the probability of participating in three or more political acts[7] caused by moving from a variable's minimum to maximum value while keeping all other variables set to their mean (or zero category for dichotomous variables). This technique allows for effective comparisons of magnitude across explanatory variables. Finally, to protect against spurious findings resulting from measurement, specification, and estimation, I reran the analysis using several alternate models.

Data

As part of a larger project, the Center for Survey Research Analysis (CSRA) at the University of Connecticut generated a probabilistic telephone sample of U.S. Internet users commencing in April 2003. The timing of the interviews, begun after U.S. military forces took control of Tikrit and the Pentagon declared an end to the major fighting, allows for evaluations of online political behavior during the diplomatic phase and offensive period of the Iraq War.

Measurement

One of the dramatic findings from studies of the FBI's Cointelpro period was that most of the content in the FBI's files pertained to nonviolent, conventional, political activity (Donner, 1980).[8] Given this past focus on conventional political activity, I sought to measure similar Internet activity over the past 12 months with affirmative answers to the following questions: Have you used the Internet to contact an elected representative, government official, or candidate for office to express your opinion about a local, national, or international issue (19.0% of Internet users)? Have you contributed money to a political party, candidate, organization, or some other political cause over the Internet (3.2%)? Have you signed an Internet petition about a local, national, or international issue (13.7%)? Have you used the Internet to look for information about a local, national, or international issue (34.1%)? Have you used the Internet to try to persuade another person about your view on a local, national, or international issue (12.7%)? This sample of Internet political acts is summed to produce a scale of overall online political participation (alpha = .67).

To test the hypotheses, two key explanatory variables need measurement—perceived government Internet surveillance and support for the war in Iraq. Government Internet surveillance is measured by assessing whether respondents strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following statement: "The government monitors citizens' electronic mail and web surfing." Nearly 52% of Internet users agree or strongly agree with this statement. Support for the war in Iraq is measured by answers to the following question: "Would you say that you oppose or support the war in Iraq (probe strongly or somewhat)? " This indicator of support or opposition to the war in Iraq most directly identifies political deviants. Blanchard (2002), outlining the administration's expectations of citizens during an international crisis, suggested that responsible citizens do not dissent; and most do not, 71% of the sample indicated support for the war in Iraq. Moreover, because the new electronic surveillance capacities of the federal government focus on terrorism, and the war in Iraq was packaged as part of the war on terrorism, I expect that those unsupportive of the war effort would become sensitive to this potential gaze.

I also sought to measure the customary explanatory factors theorized to influence political participation in general (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) and medium specific explanations of Internet political activity (Krueger, 2002). I measured respondent's level of interest in politics using an 11-point Likert-type scale anchored by 0 (*a total lack of interest*) and 10 (*a great deal of interest*). I used the respondents' number of hours reported free from work, home, and school responsibilities to measure respondents' free time. To measure civic skills, I created a scale giving one point for every activity engaged in the past 12 months as part of their job, church, or other organization. The activities include writing a letter, taking part in making a group decision at a meeting, planning or chairing a meeting, and giving a presentation or speech (alpha = .78).

The effective use of the Internet requires technical sophistication. Online skills should help an individual overcome the technical hurdles associated with navigating the Internet just as civic skills help individuals act in a complex social and political world (e.g., Krueger, 2002). To create the online skills scale, I summed four items: designed a web page, sent an attachment via e-mail, posted a file to the Internet, and downloaded a program from the Internet (alpha = .75). I also included an Internet-specific physical resource. A broadband connection may enhance the likelihood of engaging in a variety of online activities (e.g., Grubesic & Murray, 2002). To measure this physical resource, I created a broadband dummy variable.

TABLE 1
Models of Online Political Participation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age	−.010** (.004)	−.015** (.006)	−.009* (.004)	−.009** (.004)	−.011** (.005)
Gender (male)	−.077 (.112)	.035 (.150)	−.079 (.115)	−.053 (.113)	−.296** (.143)
Race (White)	.538*** (.164)	.626*** (.206)	.483*** (.164)	.542*** (.162)	.297 (.227)
Education	.325*** (.067)	.323*** (.089)	.337*** (.068)	.323*** (.068)	.182** (.088)
Income	.033 (.050)	.042 (.065)	.029 (.052)	.029 (.050)	−.009 (.058)
Mobilization	.596*** (.152)	1.037*** (.290)	.555*** (.160)	.587*** (.155)	.563*** (.214)
Political interest	.190*** (.029)	.173*** (.033)	.190*** (.030)	.204*** (.031)	.229*** (.077)
Free time	.028 (.017)	.016 (.023)	.030* (.017)	.031* (.017)	.005 (.037)
Civic skills	.066* (.036)	.078 (.051)	.068* (.037)	.059 (.037)	.143 (.116)
Internet skills	.266*** (.048)	.255*** (.065)	.277*** (.050)	.274*** (.047)	.296*** (.099)
Broadband	.226* (.116)	.191 (.151)	.201 (.123)	.234** (.119)	.216 (.140)
Surveillance	.278** (.116)	.244* (.143)	.815*** (.309)	.208* (.111)	1.021*** (.387)
War support	.125 (.104)	.172 (.129)	.072 (.189)	.107 (.100)	.921*** (.355)
Surveillance × War	−.069*** (.027)	−.075** (.035)	−.258*** (.093)	−.055** (.026)	−.302*** (.097)
Trust Internet				.044 (.045)	
Trust government				−.051 (.078)	
Ideology				−.084 (.057)	
Pseudo R^2	.350	.292	.347	.357	n/a
χ^2	199.84***	121.08***	189.13***	221.70***	n/a
N	580	580	580	572	573

NOTE: Model 1: Baseline ordered probit; Model 2: Dichotomous dependent variable; Model 3: Dichotomous interaction variables; Model 4: Inclusion of "third" variables; Model 5: Instrumental variable model.
*$p < .10$, two-tailed test. **$p < .05$, two-tailed test. ***$p < .01$, two-tailed test.

Finally, I used a two-step procedure to measure mobilization. Individuals initially responded to the question "Did anyone from a political party, campaign, or political organization contact you over the Internet about a local, national, or international issue?" Those answering affirmatively received a follow-up question: "Prior to being contacted, did you ever provide the political party, candidate for public office, or political interest group your e-mail address"? Those contacted without providing their contacting information are scored 1 while all others are scored 0.

RESULTS

Table 1, column 1 displays the results from the ordered probit model of online political activity. The pattern of coefficients conforms to past studies of political participation. Political interest, resources, mobilization, and socioeconomic factors all significantly predict the likelihood of online political activity. Even age's negative coefficient, suggesting that younger individuals are more likely to act politically online, parallels previous online participation models (e.g., Krueger, 2002). It is crucial to note, to test the hypotheses, the interaction term needs examination. The statistically significant interaction term (War Support × Surveillance) suggests that individuals' level of support for the war moderates perceived surveillance's impact on the probability of participating in politics via the Internet.

Figure 1 graphically represents the pattern of moderation. For those who strongly opposed the war, I calculated the predicted probabilities of engaging in high levels of online political activity by the level of imagined government surveillance. Of those who strongly

Figure 1:   War Support's Moderating Effect on Surveillance

opposed the war, those who most agreed that the government monitors citizens' Internet activity possess the highest likelihood of engaging in online political activity. Everything else equal, those who strongly opposed the war and strongly felt the government does not monitor citizens' online activity possess a 4.7% chance of engaging in three or more online political acts whereas those who strongly opposed the war and strongly felt the government monitors citizens' Internet activity possess a 19.4% chance. For those who strongly supported the war, I also calculated the predicted probabilities of engaging in high levels of online political activity by the level of imagined government surveillance. Everything else equal, those who strongly supported the war and strongly felt that the government does not monitor citizens possess a 7.1% chance of engaging in three or more online acts. Those strong war supporters who strongly felt that the government monitors citizens engage in high levels of online political activity at marginally lower rates (4.5% likelihood).[9] Taken together these results tend to confirm the hypotheses regarding the impact of surveillance on individual online political activity.

To comprehend the relative importance of surveillance for online political participation requires comparison to other predictors of online participation. Table 2 displays the changes in the probability of participating in three or more political acts caused by moving from each statistically significant variable's minimum to maximum value. Considering only the control variables, political interest (.213 change), Internet skills (.198 change), and mobilization (.108 change) rank as the three most powerful predictors of online activity. Five variables exert less impact (≤ .100 change), while three other variables' coefficients cannot be differentiated confidently from zero. These results suggest that for political deviants the magni-

TABLE 2
Change in Predicted Probabilities of Engaging in Three or More Online Political Acts

	Minimum to Maximum
Political interest	.213
Internet skills	.198
Surveillance[a]	.147
Mobilization	.108
Education	.100
Age	−.073
Race	.055
Broadband	.036
Civic skills	.032

NOTE: a. Change in probability for those who strongly oppose war. For all those who oppose war, the change in probability equals .117.

tude of the relationship between surveillance and online political participation (.147 change) compares favorably to the most powerful predictors of online participation.[10]

Although these results seem clear, I also considered several potential criticisms. To rule out the possibility that the results rely on the skewed nature of the dependent variable, I created a dichotomous dependent variable with 1 representing at least one online political activity and 0 representing no activity. The second column of Table 1 displays the results from this alternate model. The two key additive terms and the interaction term retain the same signs and significance indicating that the distribution of the online participation scale does not appreciably prejudice the estimates. Multiplying two five-category additive terms also can create a skewed distribution that may unfairly leverage the results. Therefore, I truncated the two key independent variables into dummy variables with 1 indicating support for the war and agreement that the government monitors citizens' Internet activity, respectively. The third column of Table 1 displays the results of an additional model using these new dummy variables. Again the results do not change in terms of substance or significance.

I also considered the classic third variable problem as a potential threat to this analysis. Some might argue that the interaction term simply represents some other variable that is missing from the model that also independently covaries with the dependent variable. Although the baseline model does include most of the major previously demonstrated explanations of participation, and the threats posed by excluded variables never can be removed fully from multivariate models, three such third variables seem particularly compelling in this context. First, the interaction term may simply capture some underlying dimension of trust in the Internet. Second, the interaction term may simply capture an underlying dimension of trust in the government. And finally, the interaction term may simply represent those most ideologically opposed to the current regime.[11] If these third variables are responsible for the results, then presumably the magnitude and significance of the interaction term would disappear if I included more direct indicators of these three concepts in the model. To test this supposition I respecified the model including an indicator of trust in Internet users, trust in government, and an ideology measure.[12] The fourth column of Table 1 reports the results from this model. None of the new variables' coefficients can be distinguished from zero. It is more important to note, the interaction term remains significant, of the correct sign, and of the same general magnitude.

Finally, these results may confuse cause with effect. Just as participating in politics may increase political interest or civic skills, participation also could increase perceptions of sur-

veillance among those opposed to the regime's policies. To account for this potential endogeneity, and purge any reciprocal effects from the estimates, I used an instrumental variable model. In the first stage models, estimates for each potentially endogenous variable (free time, civic skills, internet skills, political interest, surveillance, war support, and Surveillance × War) are obtained using instruments that are correlated with the endogenous variables but not with the second stage model's error. The fifth column of Table 1 reports the second stage estimates.[13] Again, the results do not differ markedly in terms of substance or significance.

DISCUSSION

Although political participation scholars typically assume an unproblematic surveillance context for ordinary citizens, the results from this analysis suggest that this assumption may be unwarranted in the contemporary technological and political environment. More than 50% of U.S. Internet users feel the government monitors ordinary citizens' Internet activity. It is more important to note, the results from this analysis suggest that the surveillance context influences online political participation; in addition, the magnitude of this influence compares favorably to other long-standing explanatory factors. To be sure, this evidence does little to diminish the importance of classic predictors of participation such as mobilization, resources, psychological engagement, and socioeconomic factors. Even so, if the determination of the relative importance of explanatory factors is the primary goal of the empirical study of political participation, then these initial analyses make clear that the surveillance context deserves serious consideration.

The specific nature of the relationship between governmental Internet surveillance and online political participation has implications for the ongoing debate about whether the Internet and associated technologies will become a means of social control or citizen empowerment (e.g., Lim, 2002; Lowi, 1975; Staples, 1997). Although individuals do perceive that the government uses the Internet to monitor citizens, this gaze does not attenuate politically unorthodox individuals' participation on the medium. Instead, it seems that the structure of the Internet promotes resistance, at least within the context considered in this analysis. Those most out of step with dominant opinion, who also feel that the government monitors citizens' Internet activity, participate in politics online at the highest rates. The Internet appears to be an unwieldy instrument of social control.

These results underscore the utility of the Foucauldian imagery for understanding individual political behavior and parallels research from other disciplines such as sociology, health, education, and labor studies that routinely use this theoretical lens to comprehend individual behavior (e.g., Button, Mason, & Sharrock, 2003; Gastaldo & Holmes, 1999; May, 1999; Troman, 1997). Yet to date no empirical studies of political participation rely on these insights. Of course, the results from this one analysis should not be overgeneralized. Future efforts to assess the impact of surveillance on individual political behavior should consider if and how perceived surveillance influences behavior in other contexts. Do individuals react to surveillance similarly outside of a war setting? To what extent do individuals actively resist surveillance by employing avoidance tactics such as using code words within or encrypting electronic mail messages? In addition, do individuals perceive the government monitors ordinary citizens' offline activities, and if so, do these perceptions influence offline behavior similarly?

Finally, those involved in the policy debate about government surveillance generally, and about whether to allow the major provisions of PATRIOT Act to expire after 2005 specifically, may find these results instructive. The debate often centers on whether these surveil-

lance capacities adversely affect citizens. Defenders of these surveillance capacities often downplay their relevance for ordinary citizens by claiming the infrequent use of these surveillance powers (e.g., Eggen, 2003). The results from this article suggest that simply counting the number of times the government uses these techniques should not constitute the only way to consider the law's impact on ordinary citizens; the potential use of these surveillance techniques influences individual behavior. It is ironic to note, whatever the public safety benefits of government surveillance, it actually may work against the interests of its strongest supporters by politically energizing their opposition.

NOTES

1. Although Westin is not concerned only with state Internet surveillance, Lyon (2001) reminded us that particularly after September 11, 2001, the state also can exploit the surveillance capacity of various commercial networks and databases when needed (e.g., the surveillance assemblage).

2. A potential criticism of the use of Foucault in this context needs consideration. Some may suggest that using Foucault to develop empirical hypotheses runs counter to his "poststructuralist" imagery. Yet it is not the methods of science as a way of knowing that bothers Foucault, but instead the privileged position of science that excludes nonscientific ways of knowing and claims neutrality. Methods and theories (even science or Marxism) can be used, as a toolkit, if they are useful in a particular context (Foucault, 1980). Foucault does not

esteem the virtues of direct cognition and base their [his] practice upon an immediate experience that escapes encapsulation in knowledge. It is not that which we are concerned. We are concerned, rather, with the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of science, but to the effects of the centralizing powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse. (p. 84)

3. The liberal tradition offers a competing framework for understanding the influence of surveillance on political participation. Liberal theorists, from John Stuart Mill (1991), to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis (1890), to Alan Westin (1967) all noted the lack of privacy's chilling effect on free expression. Using this framework, Paul Schwartz (1999) directly argued that, in the absence of electronic privacy, "Americans will hesitate to engage in cyberspace activities—including those that are most likely to promote democratic self rule" (p. 1650).

4. It is important to note, political deviants rank as one of the first group of abnormal individuals monitored by the state (Foucault, 1979, p. 215). Less well known is that Foucault (1988) cited the imprisonment of Tunisian political dissidents as one of two major impetuses for his writing *Discipline and Punish.*

5. Stephen Green (1999) discussed the use of new information technologies to watch the state:

The profound decentralization of new-gathering, its informality at point of production and the global audiences that can be assessed, all dramatically reshape notions of power and protest. The video—and television—camera have proved dynamic as a catalyst for social change—used in televising state violence in Eastern Europe, in capturing human rights offences on film or to immortalize brutality against animals, these "electronic eyes" offer a new perspective on the discourse of surveillance and power. Relations are reversed and the public becomes the informed audience, while authority suffers the inspecting gaze . . . [and this] information (the product of others' surveillance) is available *en masse* online. (pp. 38-39)

6. These demographic variables include age, gender, race, education, and income. I measured age with an interval level variable, gender with a dummy variable (male = 1), race with a dummy variable (White = 1), education with a 4-point variable ranging from *less than high school* to *college graduate*, and income with a 5-point variable (US$25,000 increments).

7. I chose three or more online political acts to represent a "high" level of activity because only 18.2% of Internet users engage in three or more online acts.

8. Donner (1980) explained how the FBI made a credible threat of domestic subversion from ordinary political activity, "[t]he sheer accumulation of items -a signature on a peace petition, presence at a demonstration, receipt of left-wing literature, a speech at a conference on police brutality- each innocuous in itself, invites the inference that the subject is subversive" (p. 171).

9. Because the margins of error overlap for the strongly agree the government monitors predicted probability and the strongly disagree predicted probability, surveillance does not exert a significant impact on the likelihood of political activity for strong war supporters.

10. As Kulynych (1997) noted, all conventional political activity cannot be considered resistance. This article does not argue that all online political activity, even by those opposed to the regime, should be conceived as resistance. Instead, in this nonlinear model that predicts the likelihood of participation, for those strongly opposed to the regime the amount of political activity considered resistance is best expressed as the increase in the probability of participating in online politics caused by surveillance (.147 change).

11. Without running the new model, a descriptive analysis of the data led me to doubt the ideology explanation. While 54.4% of those who opposed the war feel that the government monitors citizens' Internet activity, 50.0% of those who supported the war also feel the government monitors citizens' activity. This wide distribution indicates that feelings about government monitoring do not simply reside among those opposed to the Bush administration.

12. Agreement with the following statement measures Internet trust: "Generally speaking, most people on the Internet can be trusted." Government trust was measured with the following question: "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right?" Ideology was measured using the following question, "In politics today, do you consider yourself a liberal, moderate, or conservative [probe would that be strong or not so strong]?"

13. I also ran a two-stage ordered probit model that produces similar results. However, because few statistical packages include diagnostics for two-stage probit models, and others have used two-stage least squares to estimate political participation scales (Verba et al., 1995), I report the two-stage OLS model.

Instrumental variable models require reasonably robust first-stage estimates. However, no accepted standard seems to exist regarding the level of robustness; two recent articles using an instrumental variable approach report a wide range of first stage R-squares —from .05 to .47 (Lau & Pomper, 2002; Vavreck, Spiliotes, & Fowler, 2002). The first-stage models fall safely within this range (.12 to .37). Within the first-stage models, the excluded instruments should contribute a large percentage to the model's R^2 (Bartels 1991). Again, no standard percentage contribution to the R^2 exists, though the same recent articles report percentages between 14% and 45%. In this article's model, the percentage contributions from the excluded instruments range from 48% to 84% suggesting that the excluded instruments strongly predict the endogenous variables relative to the other independent variables.

I also assessed the validity of the instruments using a Sargan exogeneity test. This tests the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage participation model. The Sargan statistic failed to achieve even a liberal level of statistical significance ($p = .69$); therefore the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. This suggests that the chosen instruments are exogenous and can be confidently excluded from the second-stage model. The instruments are as follows: marital status, region, home ownership, parental status, adults in residence, population density, employment status, years in the community, foreign travel, club involvement, church involvement, recreational involvement, 2000 election turnout, high school governance, high school newspaper, parental political discussion, high school computer course, high school typing course, officer in high school club, violent crime victim, television viewership, programmed a VCR, years using the Internet, use Internet from work, use Internet from home, and family members who use the Internet.

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