## Hands-On Threat Modeling Workshop Labs


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#### Who am I?



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#### **Robert Hurlbut**

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# Threat Modeling Lab 1: Review case study Draw a Data Flow Diagram (DFD)

#### Objectives

Reinforce what you just learned

Build a complete threat model with optional diagram for a fictitious system

Work in independent groups

Even with a defined process, people come up with different threat models

The models converge over time but is not likely to happen right away

#### Rare Books R Us

Fictitious mail-order bookseller specializing in rare and old book titles

Launching web-site: Rare Books R Us

## Security is important but need help in determining where it is needed

Variety of data stores (Oracle, SQL Server, mySQL)

The company is also looking to move most of the data and operations to the cloud

#### Rare Books R Us

#### **Business Goals:**

- Provide online inventory of rare and old books
- Make searching and buying easy
- Security is important, but not sure how / where to apply it

#### **Technical Goals:**

 System written with React front end, Java backend interacting with several DB inventories and systems

#### Rare Books R Us

#### **Data Stores:**

Customers

Orders

Invoices

#### **Users:**

Customers (external)

Warehouse (internal)

#### **Processes:**

Receive Order Collect Payments Ship Books

#### **Data Flows:**


Orders
Billing information
Order details / shipping details
Etc.

## Data Flow Diagram (DFD)

#### **DFD Elements**



The external entity shape is used to represent any entity outside the application that interacts with the application via an entry point




Represents a task that handles data within the application. The task may process the data or perform an action based on the



Used to present a collection of subprocesses. The multiple process can be broken down into its subprocesses in another DFD.

Data Store

Represents locations where data is stored



Data Flow

Represents data movement within the application. The direction of the data movement is represented by the arrow.



Represent the change of privilege levels as the data flows through the application.

#### Model the system

To model the system:

Receive and review all artifacts


Review the interview notes made by your colleagues

Create a component diagram
OK to "flag" assets, controls, etc.

Only draw a component / DFD diagram now!!

Duration: 20 minutes (includes 10 min. to review)

#### RareBooksRUs DFD



## Threat Modeling Lab 2: Identify threats

## Identify threats - STRIDE

#### STRIDE

Threat	Description	Breaks  Authentication	
<b>S</b> poofing	Pretending to be somebody else		
<b>T</b> ampering	Modifying data that should not be modifiable	Integrity	
Repudiation	Claiming someone didn't do something	Non-Repudiation	
Information Disclosure	Exposing information	Confidentiality	
<b>D</b> enial of Service	Preventing a system from providing service	Availability	
Elevation of Privilege	Doing things that one isn't supposed to do	Authorization	

#### Identity threats - Games

#### OWASP Cornucopia

#### Suits:

Data validation and encoding

Authentication

Session Management


Authorization

Cryptography

Cornucopia

13 cards per suit, 2 Jokers

Play a round, highest value wins



#### Identity threats - Games

Elevation of Privilege (EoP)

The EoP game focuses on the following threats (STRIDE):

Spoofing

Tampering

Repudiation

Information Disclosure

Denial of Service

Elevation of Privilege



#### **Identify threats**

Base your work on **ONLY** the provided system model diagram!


Add threat possibilities to the model: Using STRIDE or other methods

Duration: 20 minutes (includes 10 min. to review)


### **Threat Table**

Threat	STRIDE	Mitigation / Risk	Review / Action Items

#### MS Threat Modeling Tool – RareBooksRUs DFD



#### MS Threat Modeling Tool – RareBooksRUs DFD – w/ AWS



## Threat Modeling Lab 3: Determine mitigations

#### Determine mitigations

Base your work on **ONLY** the provided system model diagram!

Add mitigations to the model: Security controls

Duration: 20 minutes (includes 10 min. to review)


#### Review

Let's review the threat models:

How different was each group's interpretation of the system?

What areas were identified where you need to get additional information?

#### MS Threat Modeling Tool – RareBooksRUs DFD



#### MS Threat Modeling Tool – RareBooksRUs DFD – w/ AWS

