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THE EUROPEAN CHINA-RECEPTIONS FROM LEIBNIZ TO KANT
Translation by MARTIN SCHÖNFELD

1. China as "Reference Text" for Early Modern Europe

Europe as a historical entity is the result of multiple influences. Geographical, cultural, religious, and mythological factors have contributed to its profile, as has the engagement with non-European societies and creeds. Prior to the political unifications of the continent after World War II, Europe represented a specific religious and cultural image. This image involved cultural and sociopolitical traditions originating in antiquity.[1]

Social and ethnic groups on the European continent have always interacted in multilevel cultural relations.[2] Neighbors defined the identity of any society and for the profile of any epoch. The interaction with foreigners provoked contemplation, challenges, and endeavors, all of which served as vital engines driving the historical evolution toward ever more complex societies. This process lasted into the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when social processes were increasingly the affair of nation-states that channeled them into their own ethnic images of land and history.[3]

The construction of societies and spaces, in their national, ethnic, or cultural definitions, was mirrored in the religious and ideological identities of Europe during the early modern period.[4] In sociopolitical terms, Europe was (and is) the result of cultural information transfers. Cultural relations are constitutive of its identity, and in this sense, Europe is simultaneously diverse yet uniform. As F. Tenbruch (1992, 23) notes, "cultural encounters are accordingly the factual field and the real engine of all history." In this light, social development would never have happened were it not for the encounter with other cultures.

At least since the Enlightenment, historiography recognizes the relevance of cultural encounters. Voltaire, in *Essai sur les moeurs*, explicated the conception of Europe as unity-cum-diversity.[5] Cultural

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efforts created its civil societies, which, in turn, generated its modernizing vision in the Kantian dream of a peaceful global village.[6] To the extent that this idea is now reality, we can describe Europe's cultures as hybrids.[7] Materially and culturally, the continent grew together via diplomacy, politics, and ideas, and with the help of international media events.

Information exchanges with overseas informed the cultural interplays in Europe in early modernity. Its modern makeup is arguably more shaped by encounters with the outside world than by those within. This trend toward the outside emerged in the seventeenth century. Voltaire remarked on Europe,

> It is the space of a large republic covering several states, some of which are monarchies, while others are aristocratic or ruled by the people. All of them form a network, share a common religion, and have the same legal and political principles, unknown to others.[8]

In early modernity, this large and shared republic faced new challenges. Crucial were the Reformation and the reports from China since the late sixteenth century. The Reformation destroyed the universality of Church doctrine. Leibniz observed the end of Roman universality, which intellectuals hoped to revitalize in secular form as a *République des Lettres*:

> As I see it, there existed before the schism of the last century the idea of a common state of Christianity with the pope as leader in religious matters and the emperor in secular matters.[9]

China's discovery challenged the cultural and political identity of European intellectuals. China was the first civilization found by Westerners that could be neither ignored nor destroyed. Nor could it be integrated in Europe's cultural identity. The influx of information from China had to be absorbed by fields of study as diverse as philosophy, theology, or historiography.

Up to the Enlightenment, the integration of knowledge occurred on the basis of normative texts of reference—the Bible; theological literature; and the classic canon from Aristotle to Tacitus. Reading these texts, helped by exegesis and commentary, guided the interpretation of the world. But reports from China resisted integration by such textual tools, since they offered neither reason nor report of this distant land. But in the Enlightenment, as a result of seeking emancipation from tradition, China became a normative model in its own right. For Europeans, China served as a tool for interpreting the religious customs, the political system, and the social order on their own continent.

2. The Literature on China 1600–1799, and the Rites Controversy

Conceptualizing foreigners, or the construction of one's identity in the face of alterity, requires reference texts. Such texts were missionary reports of the *Societas Jesu* in Asia.[10] They grounded the discussions; typically, debates turned on the issue of China's significance for Europe. The information supplied by the Jesuit reports determined the content of this discourse, which, in turn, shaped later literatures and provoked pursuits of more specific data. As a result, discussions of natural religion, and emerging French critiques on Christianity, jointly created a demand for translations of Confucian texts. The discourse supplied itself with just the knowledge it wanted, and the publication history of Western texts on China reflects this development.

Well into the eighteenth century, Jesuit reports were Europe's main source of knowledge on China in Europe.[11] Leibniz praised the accomplishments of Jesuits such as Ricci, Schall, and Verbiest with great enthusiasm.[12] Available bibliographic records of the missionary literature reveal trendlines of the literary productivity on China.[13] These records usually omit travelogues, philosophical treatises, and writings in the wide field of chinoiserie. Despite these omissions, trends of this production of literature are apparent that defined the ways of engaging with China.

In the half-century from 1600 to 1649, China literature emerged in moderate numbers, between 32 and 47 titles per decade.[14] Later, the publication output increased—75 titles in the 1650s; 95 titles in the 1660s; and 99 titles in the 1670s. The numbers continued to rise from the years 1680 to 1700: 155 titles in the 1680s, followed by 175 titles in the 1690s. In 1700–09, literary productivity peaked—599 works on China came out in one decade. The output decreased to 324 titles in 1710–19 and continued to decline until bottoming out with 76 titles published in 1760–69. The causes of the waning productivity were the collapse of the Jesuit China mission (1724), the fact that Chinese things were falling out of fashion, and the prohibition of the Jesuits in various countries starting in 1759. After this nadir, the output of China literature slowly rose again until reaching 158 titles in the decade 1790–99.

Travelogues multiplied after the Jesuit text production collapsed, but the addition of the former did not make up for the loss of the latter. In the travelogues printed in the later decades of the eighteenth century, negative assessments of China were ubiquitous. While sinophile interpretations, theologically or spiritually motivated, had prevailed in the early Enlightenment, sinophobe viewpoints, motivated by colonialist desires, were popular in the late Enlightenment. This

latter perspective was imbued with contempt. The reason for this contempt was simple—only the idea of Europe's "higher civilization" would justify growing colonial interests and acquisitions.

But already in the early Enlightenment, the impact of the Jesuit literature was waning, and the lessened importance of these texts was not just caused by the prohibitions of the order. Prior to the prohibitions, the Rites Controversy had increasingly discredited the Jesuit authority in the Roman Catholic Church and thereby undermined the legitimacy of the Jesuit China mission. In addition, the wholesale rejection of Jesuit views by Protestants and German *Aufklärer* had negative effects on the perceived credibility of their reports. Lorenz of Mosheim, the leading historian of the Protestant clergy of the day, argued that the recent events of the Church in China just went to show how weak and dissolute papal authority had become.[15]

In what follows, I will chart the trends in Europe's reception of China by classifying them in typological structures. The start of this reception formed a sinophilia in missionary theology. The Western self-image derived from the belief in its own powerful civilization, which entailed the obligation to bring the true faith to barbarians, as well as to speed them along their own cultural progress. For the mission, this meant that spiritual blessings went hand in hand with material benefits for the barbarians.[16] With Europe's encounter of China, however, the Great Commission confronted for the first time a culture, so the Jesuits said, that did not need much in terms of civilization; that happened to believe in the right religious tenets about God; and that had only suffered a few pagan confusions in its later development. This sinophile stance in theology is tied to Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), the Jesuit who paved the way for the China mission in early modernity.[17]

Ricci made a twofold accommodation in his missionary project. As an individual, he fully adapted to China's culture; as a theologian, he built a bridge to China's faith.[18] A contemporary praised his efforts at a personal accommodation to his Chinese hosts with the words,

> Matteo Ricio, Italian, so similar in all things to the Chinese, that he is like one of them, in the beauty of his mien, in his tender graces, and in his gentle mildness; in all the virtues held in high esteem by this culture.[19]

On the theological side of accommodation, Ricci tried to create a synthesis of Christianity and Confucianism. Joined by other missionaries, such as Alvaro Semedo (1586–1658), Gabriel de Magalhães (1610–77), and Martino Martini (1614–61), he regarded Confucianism as the ethical complement of Christianity.[20] This view involved the assumption that earliest forms of Confucianism had innate knowledge of a monotheist God. Jesuits hoped to reconstruct the putative

original faith on the basis of the old Chinese classics. They also assumed that Confucianism had been corrupted over its history by polytheist, pantheist, and atheist ideas, supposedly through Taoism and Neo-Confucianism, which made Confucianism deviate from its "true path." Ricci placed Confucius on the same level as Plato and Aristotle, the two great pagan teachers of the West whose views were recognized in the Christian tradition.[21] Even Kant later called Confucius "the Chinese Socrates."[22] For Ricci, the Chinese had made the fewest theological errors of all heathens; they already worship a supreme being as a "heavenly Emperor" (*tian*); and Confucius had felt a premonition of Christ.[23] Thus, assuming Confucius to have known and taught "real" theological truths, Ricci could defend China's veneration of its great ancestor from the charge of idolatry and explain it as the honoring of a teacher, whose testimony would allow missionaries to steer the natives to the true faith. In this way, Ricci proposed a Christian accommodation to China: Ancestral rites could be justified as a grateful memorial service, and ancestor worship could thus be respected as a fair custom.[24]

Ricci's defense of China was the spark that ignited the subsequent Rites Controversy. Three questions, it seems, can be identified as triggers of this crucial European quarrel on China. The first trigger was the question of the legitimacy of spiritual rites, which Roman Catholic priests encountered at their Malabar mission at the southwest Indian coast. Next was the question of the legitimacy of Chinese rites, encountered at the later and more distant Macao and Beijing missions. A final trigger was the problem of how to translate "God" into Chinese, or, conversely, the problem of the Chinese denotations of God. These three questions—on Malabar rites, Chinese rites, and Mandarin terms for "God"—turned into weapons in the hands of secular thinkers and Protestant preachers of the Enlightenment. They raised them in the context of the issue of figurism (*a system of integrating China and Bible; see note, M.S.*) and used these questions to attack the validity of the Roman Catholic faith.[25]

The sheer fact that Catholics were even willing to discuss pagan rites strengthened Lutherans in their belief that Catholics indulged in idolatry. Rome's termination of the figurism debate did not help; this event (1710) was only used by Protestants to renew their polemics against Roman Catholicism. A growing rejection of Jesuit sinophilia came to dominate the eighteenth-century culture of the Enlightenment. Increasing numbers of Protestant and Papist observers agreed that the conflict of sinophile Jesuits with sinophobe Dominicans over the Rites was the Jesuits' fault—provoked by the mission of the Jesuits in China. This view confirmed a Lutheran prejudice, as a contemporary theological voice illustrates:

> The cause [for starting this Rites Controversy] was the excessive tolerance of the Jesuits. The Chinese have great respect for their philosopher Confucius and for their late ancestors, a respect shown annually at certain dates with sacrifices and specific rites. The Jesuits pretended that such displays of respect are merely civil honors for said persons and hence held such displays admissible, just for the sake of gaining more.[26]

Ricci's method of accommodating the Chinese acquired its explosive historic potential in its further evolution to figurism. Figurism was the work of French Jesuits, especially Joseph-Henri de Prémare (1666–1736), Joachim Bouvet (1656–1730), Alexis de Gollet (1664–1741), and Jean-François Foucquet (1665–1741). They tried to convince Chinese scholars that the Chinese classics contain the seed of Christian dogma. The priests argued that the classics reveal anticipations of Christ's Revelation in allegoric and symbolic form. This theological view was based on the assumption that even heathens and Jews can possess knowledge of "the truth," through native natural religion. Clearly, such custody of truth could not represent literal knowledge, but it could involve genuine information as a *figura* or allusion to Christ, in symbolic, allegoric, or archetypical ways. Paul Beurrier argued (1663) that the Chinese are one of the tribes who share the Revelation. In the Rites Controversy, Louis Le Comte advanced (1696) that the Chinese once had knowledge of the true God and that their religious worship could serve as a role model for Christians. However, it needs to be noted that the figurists always remained a fringe minority in Roman Catholicism.[27] The more the Rites Controversy heated up, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the more China scholars lost their former sympathies for the Jesuits.[28]

The concept "figurism" suggests a uniformity of thought among its exponents that was not a literal historical fact; it just indicated a generally shared trend.[29] Bouvet was most interested in the Chinese classics; Foucquet focused more on China's historical records; de Gollet studied China's recorded chronology in light of Kabalistic ideas; and the missionary editors of the Confucian classics, as in *Confucius Sinarum philosophus* (1687), tried to purge Confucius of his putative contamination by the Neo-Confucianism of the Song era. Figurism ended in Roman Catholicism with the papal edicts *Ex quo singulari* (1742) and *Omnium sollicitudinem* (1744) by Benedict XIV, who decreed the prohibition of Chinese and Indian rites.[30]

The development from Ricci's accommodation to the syncretism of the figurists was possible because of two social and cultural factors in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries—the enthusiasm for China and the Christian image of history. The enthusiasm for China

served partly as a political utopia and partly as a critique on European absolutism—a critique that had been brought about by the euphoric Jesuit descriptions of China in the first place. On the other hand, the standard Christian image of history was deeply shaken by the Jesuit study of China's ancient records [*which lack a Deluge*—M.S.].[31] And yet, the Christian image of history remained an indispensable condition for the figuristic interpretations of Confucianism.

The sinophile enthusiasm of the pioneers of the Enlightenment peaked in the early eighteenth century, simultaneous with the flowering of figurism.[32] At that time, China served as a canvas for a social and political utopia, as the ideal of absolutist enlightened states, and thus as the yardstick on which actual European states-of-affairs had to be measured.

3. China and the World of the Enlightenment

By 1650, numerous publications on Chinese culture and society had already appeared in Europe, which were inspired and informed by the sinophile missionary theology abroad. These texts entered the Enlightenment discourse on the religious, political, and social affairs at home. After the trauma of savagery and cruelty in the confessional period [*Thirty Years War*—M.S.], Europeans imagined China as a world infinitely better than their own. Led by this image, Johannes Althusius laconically concluded that Eastern peoples have more humanity.[33] This view was still grounded in the Christian philosophy of history, in which the total history of humankind is seen as a process of decay since its earliest beginnings. The new idea of progress, coming from England and France, gradually pushed this philosophy of history aside. The older association, of the enthusiasm for China and the motif of decay, is echoed by Leibniz:

> Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we are into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of natural religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology. And so I believe that if someone expert, not in the beauty of goddesses but in the excellence of peoples, were selected as judges, the Golden Apple would be awarded to the Chinese, unless we should win by virtue of one great but superhuman being, namely, the divine gift of the Christian religion.[34]

The earliest stage of coming to terms with China produced specific judgments that grew into the standard of subsequent decades. They accounted for the cultural grandeur of China. But in the anticlerical discourse of the eighteenth century, their significance became explo-

sive. Already in 1667, Athanasius Kircher wrote in his description of China that the Chinese admittedly know far less than the Europeans do in the "speculative disciplines" (i.e., in the fields outside the theological fold), such as geometry, optics, mathematics, music, and natural science. But since the Chinese focus on ethics and politics, their empire has exemplary stability and political order; accordingly, China's policies spawned sophisticated agriculture and extensive continental trade.[35] This thesis—that compared with Europe, China had developed a more advanced ethics while lagging behind in scientific technological progress—was a determining factor in the assessment and reception of this distant land.

This thesis also affected European debates on natural law. Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) praised the Chinese for recruiting their elite not on the basis of feudal origin but on grounds of their actual merits, and underscored their high ethos and faith in self-worth [*alien to the European dogma of original sin*—M.S.]. Pufendorf concluded that natural law must be anchored in reason, and that it would not make sense to ground natural law just on some arbitrary social arrangements.[36]

In the early Enlightenment, the question of the natural law was vital for the reception of China. China's example seemed to be a case for the universality of the natural-law idea. Thus, a certain type of sinophile law theory combined with a certain type of sinophile political theory to measure Europe's system of states on China's ethical and political yardstick.

Apparently, China had just what late eighteenth-century scholars were missing in Europe: A strong central government that acted in line with rational criteria. It is thus no coincidence that the second edition of Leibniz's *Novissima Sinica* (1699) depicts an engraving of Emperor Kangxi. In Europe, China represented a rational state and the ideal of enlightened absolutism.[37]

The culture of the Enlightenment rated both the Chinese state and China's moral and religious achievements as exemplary role models. The popular reception of this assessment resulted in a political and ethical sinophilia. Leibniz, for example, looked at the human world as the spectrum defined by two poles of civilization, Europe and China; characteristic of the poles is their striving for organizing ever more rational ways of life. It appears Leibniz thought that joining the revealed religion of Europe to the ethics of China would allow for higher forms of knowledge. Europe (so Leibniz) had the superior Christian faith and logical philosophy, while China had the superior civil organization and practical philosophy. China's assets had successfully produced a social peace and a well-organized social hierarchy. Leibniz's verdict weighed all the more, since the terrors of the

Thirty Years War were still fresh memories in the minds of the German people.[38]

Christian Wolff idealized China's natural religion in his famous speech on the practical philosophy of the Chinese.[39] He argued that China's sophisticated practical philosophy, and its application to the makeup of the state, allowed the realization of Plato's ideal philosopher kings. The Chinese, so Wolff, attained virtues just by natural revelation—and the fact that they had to do without a Christian revelation made their achievement all the more impressive. At the same time, their virtue is not a rigid concept, but Chinese engage in a continuous effort of self-improvement.

The sinophile Enlightenment reached its climax in Voltaire's *Essai sur les moeurs* (1759). Voltaire transformed China into a political utopia and the ideal state of an enlightened absolutism; he held up the mirror of China to provoke self-critical reflection among European monarchs. But even this great French thinker bought into the claim that Chinese science was stagnating at the level of the European Middle Ages out of respect for their ancestors.[40] His additional and positive remarks on China were informed by Church critique; in a sense, this was the frame of reference [*Referenzfolie*] for Voltaire's assessment of China. Criticisms of the Christian churches entered the political sinophilia of the constitutional thought in the age of absolutism—"Leur religion était simple, sage, auguste, libre de toute superstition et de toute barbarie," as Voltaire pointed out.[41] Historically, and judged by their texts, the Chinese have been a rational culture since they first learned to write.[42] China's advantage, so Voltaire, is its freedom of a priesthood interfering with legal matters.[43] In this way, he interpreted China's spirituality as the deistic ideal of any religion:

> Jamais la religion des empereurs et des tribunaux ne fut déshonoré par des impostures, jamais troublée par les querelles du sacerdoce et de l'émpire, jamais chargée d'innovations absurdes, qui se combatent les unes les autres avec des arguments aussi absurdes, qui se combattent les unes les autres avec des arguments aussi absurdes qu'elles, et dont la dont la démence a mis à la fin le poignard aux mains des fanatiques, conduits par des factieux. C'est par là surtout que les Chinois l'emportent les nations de l'univers.[44]

Voltaire argued that Confucius just taught the wisdom of the ancient emperors.[45] Thus, Confucius merely recommended living virtuously and refrained from advocating any particular religious doctrine. The background of such readings was the demand of the Enlightenment for tolerance, whose realization, for Voltaire, was China.[46] Its emperors never appealed to the tenet of a hell, used in Europe for the goal of civil domination. Instead, they limited them-

selves to civil admonitions to their subjects, to worship the cosmos, and to heed the rules of fairness. In China, the law of the day needed to be feared more than any future day of judgment.

Voltaire popularized the deistic message and the humanitarianism of the religious criticism in *L'Orphelin de Chine*. This poetic tragedy was first staged in Paris on August 20, 1755.[47] The text was based on a fourteenth-century Chinese musical play, which Voltaire encountered in the translation made by the figurist Jesuit Prémare.

In the same vein, Frederick the Great contrasted the intolerant and ruthless morality of the Roman Catholic Church with China's rational attitude toward religion. His *report of Phihihu* (1760) is a fictitious letter of a Chinese ambassador in Europe to the emperor of China.[48] The ambassador, a pagan relying on natural religion, is the inverse mirror of the Church relying on divine revelation. The ambassador's critique on Christendom turns on the contradiction of the religious creeds of the European rulers and their actual lifestyle. Like Wolff and Voltaire, Frederick claimed the superiority of China's practical philosophy.

While Voltaire represented the anticlerical articulation of sinophilia, Pierre Poivre represented the sociopolitical strand of sinophile views. His *Travels of a Philosopher* (1768) depicts China as a state based on a common-sense freedom and as a role model for all royal houses in Europe.[49] For Poivre, reason sits next to the throne of the world's mightiest emperor. The emperor does not order; he teaches. He brings happiness to his subjects and lives like a brother among them. This fictitious travelogue evokes Plato's philosopher king. Poivre distilled the essence of the enlightened government of the Chinese emperor in a beautiful turn of phrase: The emperor is worshipped by his grateful people like a god because he is behaving like a human.

For Montesquieu, however, the church critique was irrelevant, and he did not idealize the absolutist state. His *De l'esprit des lois* (1748) was the antithesis to Voltaire's *Essai sur les moeurs*. Montesquieu was indifferent to anticlerical positions and partial to political liberalism, and this combination allowed him to shed light on China from a distanced and critical perspective. He articulated a political critique on China that was hugely influential in the European assessment of China during the second half of the eighteenth century, and that guided German philosophers such as Herder and Hegel.[50] China was for Montesquieu a case in point for his constitutional thought: Absolutism reveals a spectrum from *grandeur* to *decadence*, and all absolutist order leads to despotism.

The importance of the Jesuit China-literature for European sinophilia is illustrated by Montesquieu's attacks. Against Jesuits

who enthusiastically embrace Chinese despotism, Montesquieu polemically dismisses Jesuit sinophilia as "cette exercice continuel de la volonté d'un seul, par lequel ils sont gouvernées eux-même."[51]

Montesquieu derived China's alleged despotism from its agrarian, economic, and demographic conditions. High population density requires incessant labors to produce the requisite amounts of food. This task demands the full attention of the government. The rulers ensure that anyone can work without worrying about being cheated out of rewards. Thus, China's government is more of a "domestic" than a "civil" sort, and this peculiarity is the reason for the precepts and rules then debated in Europe. Despotism is the inevitable result of enforcing the authority of such laws. China is a despotic state whose ultimate principle is fear. Customs and rites must not be altered; any alteration would immediately trigger a revolution. This is why the customs of China display such apparent indestructibility.

For Montesquieu, the basic intellectual mistake in the Chinese model is the legal rule of customs (*moeurs*) and rites (*manières*). In reality, customs govern the actions of human beings, while laws govern the actions of citizens. Furthermore, customs relate to the inner human activity, whereas rites concern the outward conduct of people.[52] Religion, customs, rites, and laws are distinct concepts, but they are conflated in the Chinese moral law and its prescriptions of rites. Rites, however, are just simple empirical rules that concern more the senses than understanding. Thus, Chinese ethics cannot be compared with European ethics. As a result, Montesquieu rejects the ethical sinophilia articulated by Leibniz and Wolff.

Montesquieu's claims of China's despotism and of the deceitful nature of its inhabitants can be identified as the primary causes of the devaluation of China during the late Enlightenment. The now emerging liberal theories of state precluded the positive appraisal of China as the utopia of an enlightened absolutism. August Ludwig Schlözer, for instance, subsequently called China the dumbest empire of the world.[53] French writers such as Turgot and Baron Grimm attacked the rigidity of Chinese culture.[54] The portrayal of China as a tyrannical state impeding civil progress was the standard image in the late Enlightenment. In 1790, for instance, a historian at Marburg, Konrad Michael Curtius, claimed that China was trapped in despotic horror and cultural stagnation.[55]

In addition, racist arguments were infusing the emerging political critique on China since mid-century. The image of despotism, cultural stagnation, and moral inferiority of China was completed by early theories of race. A telling example of the racist turn is the issue of Chinese skin color: As W. Demel has shown, color was not a topic in

Western reflections on China until mid-century; afterwards, Chinese were turning yellow.[56]

In 1749, Buffon was the first to assert a causal link between darkness of skin and cultural backwardness. David Hume claimed that different races possess different gifts and characters:

> I am apt to suspect the [N]egroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the [w]hites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white.[57]

In the late Enlightenment, history was increasingly interpreted in biological terms. An important condition for this radically new assessment of China was the changing basis of knowledge about China. Jesuit reports remained the main source of information well into the eighteenth century, but the prohibition of the order closed this source off. English and French travel reports began to fill this gap, for instance from the English mission under Lord Macartney, who spent six weeks in China in the winter 1793–94.[58] The end of Jesuit reports resulted in a comparative scarcity of news from the distant land—and now the views on China changed. Its reappraisal in the late Enlightenment occurred in a time of impoverished information flow. The China accounts in the second half of the eighteenth century were emphatic rebuttals of the alleged idealization by Jesuit missionaries. Whereas the Jesuits had focused on clarifying the cultural and religious rank of China, subsequent travelogues, for instance the 1804 publication by John Barrow, Royal Navy secretary, tried to determine its economic and military status.[59]

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Endnotes

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19. Cited from W. Franke, *China und das Abendland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 33.
20. David E. Mungello, *Curious Land. Jesuit Accomodation and the Origins of Sinology* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1985), 18.
21. Mungello, *Curious Land*, 58.
22. Helmuth von Glasenapp, *Kant und die Religionen des Ostens* (Kitzingen: Holzner, 1954), 89.
23. Claudia von Collani, *Die Figuristen in der Chinamission* (Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1981), 1–2.
24. Compare the entry "Chinesische Religionen" in Göran Malmqvist, *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (Berlin: de Gruyter 1981), 7:760–82.
25. [Translator's note] "Figurism" is the name of a unique theological system of interpreting the Chinese classics; it proposes the identity of the *Yi-Jing* with the *Book of Enoch*, and the identity of Emperor Fuxi (2952 BCE) with the prophet Enoch of the Old Testament. Figurist assertions were advanced by Joachim Bouvet, S.J. (1656–1730), at Beijing; he also suggested (1701) to Leibniz that the hexagrams of the *Yi-Jing* involve binary arithmetic (presented by Leibniz at Paris 1704). A student of Bouvet

and later defender of figurism was J. H. M. de Prémare, S.J. (1666–1736), who wrote on Chinese syntax, translated classics, and studied the ontological aspect of Chinese semantics. In theology, figurism is the claim that Chinese spirituality is not only compatible with Christian dogmatics but also *constitutive* of the latter. The Church turned against figurism in 1742.

26. Cited after Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexikon* (1743; reprint Graz, 1993), 37:1618; see the entry "Sinesische Mission," 1615–24.
27. Mungello, *Curious Land*, 20.
28. Mungello, *Confucianism*, 111.
29. Lackner, *Jesuit Figurism*, 133.
30. Wolfgang Reinhardt, "Gelenkter Kulturwandel im siebzehnten Jahrhundert: Akkulturation in den Jesuitenmissionen als universalhistorisches Problem," *Historische Zeitschrift* 223 (1976): 529–90, esp. 533.
31. Paul Hazard, *Die Krise des europäischen Geistes / La Crise de la Conscience Européenne 1680–1715*, trans. Harriet Wegener (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1939), 70.
32. Günther Lottes, "China in European Political Thought, 1750–1850", in ed. Thomas H.C. Lee, *China and Europe. Images and Influences in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991), 65–98, 70.
33. Johannes Althusius, *Politica methodice digesta atque exemplis sacris et profanis illustrata*, 3rd ed. (Herborn: Corvinus, 1614), cap. xxiii, 447.
34. Leibniz, *Novissima Sinica*, 51.
35. Cited after Walter Demel, "Europäisches Überlegenheitsgefühl und die Entdeckung Chinas: ein Beitrag zur Frage der Rückwirkungen der europäischen Expansion auf Europa," in *Kolumbus' Erben: Europäische Expansion und überseeische Ethnien im Ersten Kolonialzeitalter, 1415–1815*, ed. Thomas Beck, Annerose Menninger, and Thomas Schleich (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), 99–143, cf. esp. 105.
36. Samuel Pufendorf, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium*, 2 vols., ed. Frank Böhling (Berlin: Akademieverlag, 1998), 1:448.
37. Walter Demel, "China in the Political Thought of Western and Central Europe, 1570–1750," in *China and Europe: Images and Influences in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Thomas H. C. Lee (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991), 45–64, esp. 55.
38. Leibniz, *Novissima Sinica*, 45–46.
39. Christian Wolff, *Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica: Rede über die praktische Philosophie der Chinesen*, trans. and ed. M. Albrecht (Hamburg: Meiners, 1985); see also Donald Lach, "The Sinophilism of Christian Wolff (1679–1754)," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 14 (1953): 561–74.
40. Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations, vols. 1–4, in *Oeuvres de Voltaire avec préfaces, avertissements, notes, etc.*, ed. M. Beuchot, vols. 15–18 (Paris: Lefèbre, 1829), 15:87.
41. *Essai sur les moeurs*, vol. 1, in *Oeuvres* 15:88.
42. Ibid., 15:86.
43. Ibid., 15:86.
44. Ibid., 15:88.
45. Ibid., 15:88–89.
46. Ibid., 15:90–91.
47. Voltaire, *L'Orphelin de la Chine: tragèdie en cinqu actes*, in *Oeuvres de Voltaire avec préfaces, avertissements, notes, etc.*, ed. M. Beuchot (Paris: Levèbre, 1830), sec. VI *théatre* 5:399–481.
48. Friedrich der Grosse, *Bericht des Phihihu, Sendboten des Kaisers von China in Europa*, in *Deutsche Denker über China*, ed. Adrian Hsia (Frankfurt a. M.: Insel, 1985), 73–74.
49. Pierre Poivre, *Reisen eines Philosophen* (*1768*), trans. and ed. Jürgen Osterhammel (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1997), 214–15.
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52. Ibid., I xix 16, 1:579–80.
53. August Ludwig Schlözer, *Vorstellung der Universal-Historie*, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1775), 122.
54. Demel, "Europäisches," 128–29.
55. Konrad Michael Curtius, *Grundriss der Universalgeschichte* (Marburg: Neue Akademische Buchhandlung, 1790), 229.
56. Walter Demel, "Wie die Chinesen gelb wurden. Ein Beitrag zur Frühgeschichte der Rassentheorien," *Historische Zeitschrift* 255 (1992): 625–66.
57. Cited after Demel, "Wie die Chinesen gelb wurden," 652.
58. Aeneas Anderson, *Erzählung der Reise und Gesandtschaft des Lord Macartney nach China und von da zurück nach England in den Jahren 1792 bis 1793* (Erlangen: Walther, 1795).
59. Jürgen Osterhammel, *China und die Weltgesellschaft. Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in unsere Zeit* (München: Beck, 1989), 27.