



## introduction

### sean gaston

Born in 1952, Bernard Stiegler teaches philosophy at the Université de Compiègne, where in 1992 he founded the research unit Connaissances, Organisations et Systèmes Techniques (COSTECH). He was the director of the Institut National de l'Audiovisuel (INA) from 1996 to 1999 and is currently the director of the Institut de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique (IRCAM). Asked at a conference in April 2003 how he became a philosopher, Stiegler revealed that he became one while serving a five-year prison sentence (1978–83) for a series of bank robberies. In a short autobiographical work, *Passer à l'acte* (2003), he describes how, encouraged by the late Gérard Granel, he spent most of these years intensively reading philosophy. Granel also suggested that he write to Derrida. After leaving prison, Stiegler studied with Derrida, received his doctorate from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, and began teaching at the Collège International de Philosophie.

Stiegler is preoccupied with the questions of technics and time. He is in the midst of writing a remarkable project that has an almost Proustian scale: three volumes of *La Technique et le temps* have so far been published: *I La Faute d'Épiméthée* (1994); *II La Désorientation* (1996); *III Le Temps du cinéma et la question du mal-être* (2001), and two more are promised (*IV Symboles et diabolos ou la guerre des esprits*; *V Le Défaut qu'il faut*). Stiegler has also published *Échographies de la télévision* (1996), a "live" recording of an interview with Derrida. Stiegler concludes *Échographies* with an essay on Barthes' analysis of the "this-has-been"

bernard stiegler

translated by sean gaston

## TECHNICS OF DECISION an interview

["ça-a-été"] in photography in relation to new digital technology. A short work, *Aimer, s'aimer, nous aimer*, dealing with the question of self-esteem and the recent case of Richard Durn (who in 2002 shot and killed several people in Nanterre), is due out later this year.

For Stiegler, the technical is more than the tool, more than the machine: it involves the *invention* of the human. Life is always already reliant on technics. Technics make the transmission of the past and the anticipation of the future possible. Without technics there can be no memory, no heritage, no adoption, no invention. Technics give us time. Underlying Stiegler's re-examination of technics is an original fault, default, or lack of origin (*le défaut*

*d'origine*) that makes technics and prostheses necessary. Like Derrida's notion of the supplement of the origin (an always necessary addition – to give the illusion of a full plenitude or self-sufficiency – that displaces, replaces and re-marks a fundamental lack, void or abyss), an original fault or default suggests that there can be no “origin” no “beginning,” no “inside” without exteriorisation and differentiation, without the artifice of technics. From the start, a “default” – and the reliance on technics – is always necessary: *un défaut qu'il faut*. In “Derrida and Technology” (2002), Stiegler situates Derrida's thought “within the context of an unprecedented development in technology” and argues that deconstruction is first and foremost a “thinking of technics.”<sup>1</sup>

In *La Technique et le temps I*, Stiegler attempts to extricate the technical from its traditional determination in such metaphysical oppositions as dynamic/mechanic, human/technical, subject/object, nature/culture, inside/outside, etc. Through readings of André Leroi-Gourhan, Gilbert Simondon and Heidegger, Stiegler identifies the history of technics as “the evolution of the living by other means than life.”<sup>2</sup> Stiegler sees in Heidegger's analysis of the clock a repetition of the traditional attitude towards calculation and measurement as the attempt to “program the unprogrammable.” In contrast to Heidegger's ambivalent view of technics, Stiegler argues that it is the “pro-grammatic” that registers the already-there in the “form of the *not-yet*,” “a past that is not mine (that I have not lived, but without which my past is nothing).” *Dasein* is “pros-thetic,” “pro-posing and projecting itself outside of itself, in front of itself”: technics as temporalisation.<sup>3</sup>

*La Technique et le temps II* is dominated by the question of memory and industrialisation. There can be no memory without an initial forgetting, an original default. Memory requires prosthetic supplements. Turning to Bergson, Husserl and Barthes, Stiegler traces the creation and transformation of memory through the technics of writing and the development of industrial temporal objects (photography, recorded music, radio, cinema, television).<sup>4</sup> The advent of recorded sounds and images reveals that an

*identical* repetition must – like the original forgetting or default that produces memory – be received each time as a modification, as a difference. These industrial temporal objects register the flux of time as an already-there that produces a not-yet. Stiegler argues that memory as technics challenges the Husserlian opposition of primary retention (perception) and secondary retention (imagination). Consciousness is indicative of a *distinction* between perception and imagination that cannot be reduced to an *opposition*. Living reality does not exhaust consciousness, which is haunted by fictions and phantasms of the passing of time, of our own passing.<sup>5</sup>

In *La Technique et le temps III* Stiegler develops the intricate relationship between consciousness and new industrial temporal objects by raising “the question of Kant” and turning to the politics of hyperindustrialisation, mass media, global telecommunications and the Internet. Through a reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Stiegler argues that consciousness has “an essentially cinematographic structure,” employing prosthetic processes of selection, montage, contraction and projection. Like cinema, consciousness relies on the constant adoption of an unlived past and the projection of an unlived future. Stiegler discerns in the difficulties that arise from the Kantian opposition of perception to imagination and of the image to the schemata the need for an inherently cinematographic “‘a priori’ prosthetic synthesis.” For Stiegler, it is because consciousness *is* cinema (adoption and projection) that Hollywood and “THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE” has had – and is having – such a dramatic effect on consciousness and belief.<sup>6</sup> The hegemony of Hollywood, only compounded by the simultaneous watching of live events by hundreds of millions of people and the domination of the Internet, threatens a mass manipulation and mass synchronisation of individual (diachronic) consciousness. Industrial control and globalisation have created a new opposition between the synchronic and the diachronic, and provoked a crisis of social decomposition, entropy and spiritual disorientation that demands an urgent and radical critique.

## notes

1 Stiegler, "Derrida and Technology" 238–39. For differing accounts of Stiegler's reading of Derrida, see Geoffrey Bennington, "Emergencies," *Oxford Literary Review* 18 (1996) 175–216, and John Lechte, "The Who and the What of Writing in the Electronic Age," *Oxford Literary Review* 21 (1999): 135–60.

2 Stiegler, *Technics and Time I* 135.

3 Stiegler, *Technics and Time I* 225–26, 232–34, 270.

4 With their constant references to past volumes and promise of future volumes to come, the books that make up *La Technique et le temps* themselves have the performative quality of "temporal objects" that register the flux of time.

5 See also Stiegler, *Le Temps du cinéma* 36–49.

6 See Stiegler, *Le Temps du cinéma* 35, 217, 130.

## technics of decision: an interview<sup>1</sup>

bernard stiegler

*Peter Hallward: At the beginning of the first volume of La Technique et le temps you say that philosophy has repressed the question of technics [la technique]. Why did this happen? Is it mainly a result of the association of tekhnē with sophistry, i.e. with the corrupt manipulation of knowledge? Or does this repression stem from the orientation of philosophy, after the poem of Parmenides, towards the being of being – an orientation that leads it down the path of the eternal, of that which neither changes nor evolves?*

Bernard Stiegler: I think that it is both and that they cannot be separated. In *La Technique et le temps I*, I first address this problem with respect to the question of sophistry, but I finish the work by returning to the Heideggerian question of being, since Heidegger both asks and fails to ask the question of technics. The question of this repression of technics is linked to the fact that, strictly speaking, philosophy, in other words the thought of Plato (what I call philosophy in the strict sense is metaphysics, defined first of all as a post-tragic discourse, and thus one that denies mortality), constituted itself in opposition to sophistry defined as the technical use of the *logos*. This is how I respond to your question in the first volume.

At the same time, however, I think the problem goes deeper than this. *Before Plato*, what is at stake in Parmenides' question of Being (which to my mind still belongs to the tragic epoch)? It would take too long to explain what I mean by tragic here – let's say it refers to the pre-Socratic epoch, an epoch where the immortality of the soul is not yet recognised as a principle. This is what I call tragic: Greek thought that does not yet reason from within a framework that presumes the immortality of the soul, but on the contrary, that takes as its essential starting point mortality and the fact that mortality is ineluctable, that there is no horizon beyond

death. This certainly does not mean that the dead do not return: spirits do indeed return (and the whole problematic, for example, of Antigone rests on this), but that does not mean that they are immortal. What is involved is quite different. They are ghosts [*revenances*]. And they are ghosts that transmit an inheritance – the inheritance comes from a "spirit" [*esprit*] that crosses generations along with the spirits (in the plural) that bear and convey it.

We need to ask then: where does Parmenides come from, the *spirit* of Parmenides, that is, the *question of being*? Parmenides' thought inscribes itself in the same vein as that opened by Thales, by Solon and by the Seven Sages – people who are at once thinkers, poets and politicians, founders of cities, as one says, and even founders of the idea of the city. Thales had written the laws of his city, had been a geometer, had set out the first discourse on *phusis*. My thesis is that all these problems, which arise with Thales, fundamentally proceed from the appearance of a *techno-logy*, in this case a technique of writing. A technique appears, that of linear writing, that radically transforms the way all spirits transmit and are transmitted from generation to generation, and the way spirit transmits itself from generation to generation through them – but this time as a unified spirit, precisely through the unification of language enabled by literalisation. It is this mnemotechnics that makes possible the writing of laws, the founding of cities, the construction of geometric reasoning (Thales embodies the origin of geometry), the practice of philosophy. It involves a massive transformation of the social group that raises a thousand questions. It overturns, for example, the relation to tradition, to spirits, and, more precisely, the articulation between the city and religion, the relation between the profane and the sacred, the place of the clans inside the city-states or territories [*demes*], and so on. It raises, in short, questions that are not entirely foreign to what we are experiencing today, on a global scale, with respect to contemporary forms of technology (however novel our current situation might otherwise be).

The sophists, denounced by philosophy as mere technicians of the *logos*, are a by-product

of this situation. From the seventh century BCE the city appears and straightaway transforms itself, because it is essentially a process of transformation. The city is always in transformation, but I believe that its initial period of foundation/transformation, between the seventh and fifth centuries, has specific characteristics that remain unclear to this day, in particular as regards their consequences for the genesis of philosophy itself. This initial period of foundation/transformation, during which everything changes completely, is very rapid – it lasts about 150 years. These years are witness to a process which in a short time gives birth to sophistry – the arrival of the *grammatists*, the masters of letters, of writing, who are the predecessors of the sophists. The sophists then go on systematically to develop a technique of language that quickly acquires a critical dimension, in so far as this technique of developed language will in turn engender a moral crisis.

*P.H.: It's not an essentially oral technique, a technique of speaking well?*

*B.S.:* Certainly not. And this is precisely what Plato denounces: they always manage to speak well, he says, but they learn everything by heart, by means of this techno-logical “hypomnesis” that is logography, the preliminary writing out of speeches. It is because writing exists that the sophists can learn the apparently “oral” technique of language that is rhetorical construction. And this knowledge is not reducible to the arts of the story teller, it is of an entirely other nature, even if Plato also denounces, elsewhere, those who make up stories and fables – even if it is quite clear that Plato, when he mocks the rhapsode in *Ion*, makes a direct connection between the poets (who as you know will be condemned in the *Republic* as mere imitators and tellers of tales) and the sophists. He will conclude that essentially the same thing is at stake in both cases, in both the *tekhnē* of the poet, or of the rhapsode, and the *tekhnē* of the sophist. They work along the same lines in the same vein, the same grain of falsehoods. Sophists, poets, are only liars, *that is to say, technicians*.

So to conclude my answer to your question, I would say that the question of technics, considered in this way and as the object of repression, is a question that emerges *with* and *by* its denunciation by Plato. But it is a question that emerges also and above all as a *denial*, and in this sense therefore as a *kind of forgetting*. It's a paradoxical situation, since what Plato denounces in technics is precisely its power of forgetting. The canonical text here is *Phaedrus*.

But, at the same time, the question of technics that I'm trying to explore appears well *before* Plato, and appears first of all as the *question of transformation and becoming* [*devenir*] (raised by the economic crisis associated with the development of navigation, money, and thousands of other new technics that appear at that time) in the Greek cities. This is how I see it. And it is not simply a question of technics, but also and above all of *mnemotechnics*, that is to say of technics of the future, in its capacity profoundly to transform the conditions of being together, the terms of the law, the rules of life, etc.

*P.H.:* *Let's try to isolate the domain of temporality, since the question of memory of the past obviously arises well before the invention of writing. Are you saying that temporality as such is linked in an original way to technics, such that we distinguish it in principle from the experience of the living? Or is there “before” this a temporality of the living as living, a temporality of life considered without reference to technics?*

*B.S.:* As far as I am concerned, one can speak of at least three kinds of temporality. There is physical temporality, in other words, what we call entropy, the degradation of matter, the expansion of the universe – personally, I never call this temporality, I call this *becoming* [*le devenir*]. Then there is the temporality of the living, which as you know is a negentropic temporality, that is to say a temporality that fights against disorder and which already involves a *différance* with an “a,” as Jacques Derrida defines it, that is to say a structure that attempts to differ from and to defer [*différer*] entropy, that fights against entropy. This is life. And there is a third tempo-

reality, the one that people generally call human temporality. But I don't like to call it human, because I think that it is an anthropocentric determination. I call it *technics*. It is a temporality within which a living being, in particular the one that we call man, is constituted in relation to the temporality of a technics which is itself a technical development or becoming, which is the main dimension of becoming for human beings. The technical object only exists within a technical system that develops with the living in a situation that both extends and breaks with the living, in so far as mortals, from the beginning – and this is what is related in the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus, in Plato's *Protagoras* 320d ff. – are not predestined to be what they are. Mortals are *prosthetic*, that is to say they are endowed with artefacts and are capable of altering the artefacts which they adopt. In this sense, they are not doomed to a predestination, they “have to be” what they are, they are destined to *decision*, that is, to time understood in this sense, which is not that of life. The myth tells us about the singularity of this time, which calls upon *dikē* [justice] and *aidō* [modesty, respect].<sup>2</sup>

Let me recall this myth very briefly. One day Zeus says to Prometheus: the time is come to bring into this world the non-immortals, those who are not immortal. Zeus gives him qualities, *dunameis*, powers and clay: he gives him forms and matter and the responsibility to distribute the qualities. But Prometheus leaves it to his twin brother to act in his place. Epimetheus hands out all the qualities, but forgets to keep one for that mortal being we call man: there remains enough matter “to bring him into the world,” but there are no more qualities. On account of this *lack of quality* [*à défaut de qualité*], Prometheus is obliged to go and steal the technics that permit the invention and fabrication of artefacts, that enable the adoption of all qualities. Prometheus steals fire from the home of Hephaestus, the lame blacksmith god.

In this sense, the mortal is a being by default, a being marked by its own original flaw or lack, that is to say afflicted with an original handicap<sup>3</sup> – one received from a god who is himself handicapped – and for which he has need

of prostheses to supplement this original flaw, or more exactly to defer (and differ from) it [*le différer*]. For this flaw cannot be *made good*, the lack can never be *filled*; the problem that then arises is that mortals cannot agree on how to use this impotent power of the artefact. The artefact brings disorder (*eris, polemos*). Consequently, mortals fight each other and destroy themselves. They are put in charge of their own fate, but nothing tells them what this fate is, because the lack [*défaut*] of origin is also a lack of purpose or end. It is in this way that technics *constitutes* the *problem of decision* – and this problem, and its experience, is what I call time (in the third sense of the word), that is a time that is neither the becoming of the universe, nor the negentropy that fights against the becoming-entropic of the universe, i.e. life. This third meaning requires a decision, it calls for a capacity to make a difference, a capacity imposed by the lack of origin, by our original default. The feeling for such a difference, which arises from this “*différance*,” is what Hermes, sent by Zeus, then brings to mortals as a double feeling of *dikē* and *aidō*.

*P.H.: From this perspective, is Heidegger your main philosophical adversary, despite the care with which you read his work, in so far as he wants to think this moment of indetermination (this opening up of a space of imminent decision, the prelude to any possible resolution, etc.) at an essential distance from the question of technics?*

B.S.: For me, Heidegger is not an adversary. In any case, I do not have philosophical adversaries. It is *in* Heidegger that I have investigated everything that I'm telling you about, and obviously, it is also against him. There is a saying, *un mot d'esprit*, that you may know. The actor and film director Sacha Guitry said “I am against women, right up against them [*je suis contre les femmes, tout contre*].” “I am against them,” because I am not a woman and I am “right up against them,” because I love what I am not and the very fact that I am not that. As far as I'm concerned, one can only have a dialogue with a philosopher in so far as one is “against this philosopher, right up against him”: you are very close to him, but to

be *close* to him, you must not be him. Ok. This is what I mean about Heidegger and the same applies to my relation with Plato, even with Derrida.

Now, to answer your question, it is true that in *The Fault of Epimetheus*, my dialectical interlocutor, in the old (Greek) sense of the word, the interlocutor that I speak against or contra-dict, is indeed Heidegger. Heidegger is my interlocutor because in the twentieth century he is the one (though there is also Simondon) who has done the most to advance the thought of temporality that I have just spoken about, the third temporality. And at the same time he thought this temporality both along with technics and against technics in a very traditional Platonic sense. After Marx, the greatest thinker of technics is Heidegger, but in a way – and this is particularly apt – *by default* [*par défaut*]. But I am, of course, speaking to you about something that is a *negative* for Heidegger. The way I read Heidegger is obviously not the way that Heidegger would read himself. In effect, I consider – and it is a possibility that Heidegger himself opens when he discusses Kant – that the way Heidegger reads Heidegger is not the best way to read Heidegger.

In *Being and Time* (but I am also thinking, for example, of *Identity and Difference*) Heidegger suggests that the temporality of what he calls *Dasein* is originally technical, when he says that to be a temporal being in the sense of *having to be* [*d'avoir à être*], i.e. in the sense of *existing*, is to be in a world. He describes this world as constituting what he calls the structure of reference [*renvoi*].<sup>4</sup> And he explains what this structure of reference is by analysing the latch of a door.<sup>5</sup> He shows that the door refers to something else which refers to something different and that this forms a horizon of *significance* – but in doing this he describes what in the history of technics is called a technical system. He shows that the material world, the world of useful objects, of tools, utensils, equipment, supports a structure of finality – within which develops what he calls *Besorgen*, concern [*préoccupation*], which, as he conceives it, is fundamentally a relation to death. For this relation to death to be able to exist this whole structure must be there.

Heidegger is the first thinker after Marx to insist so forcefully – certainly from a completely different perspective – that existence is constituted by an original technicity. This, incidentally, is what Hubert Dreyfus has both understood so well and so badly (I say badly because in a rather poor text published in French in the *Cahier de l'Herne* devoted to Heidegger, he reproaches Heidegger for having “technicised being” – in other words he *denounces* what is properly *revolutionary* in Heidegger's work).<sup>6</sup>

The difference or disagreement [*différend*] that I have with Heidegger concerns what he says about the temporality that he calls original, authentic, proper, *eigentlich*. This is the temporality of the relation to death, of being-toward-death, and I fully ascribe to such an analysis. But he adds that in *Besorgen*, in concern, I am always already concealing my relation to death, hiding it, and that is why technics, which is the horizon of the temporality of concern, reduces the indeterminacy of time to a calculation and therefore to a determination. As a result, technics regains the same status that it had in Plato, namely the status of that which obscures the true relation to *aletheia*, to *Eigentlichkeit*. And there is an enormous contradiction here – because there is at the same time a great difference between Heidegger and Plato. The origin of *Dasein*, of time, is what Heidegger calls worldhood [*mondanéité*], which is also a lack of origin or original flaw, that is to say a *facticity* [*facticité*]. Worldhood is fundamentally and necessarily the structure of reference, and the structure of reference is what he calls the world of tools, of technics, of concern. Heidegger says that this structure of reference conditions the constitution of worldhood, but at the same time he says that authentic temporality is the temporality of being for death that frees itself from concern. In other words, he attempts to make good the original fault – which is itself *the worst of faults*, and the basis of a formidable *political* adventure.<sup>7</sup>

What I have attempted to show against Heidegger – and in this case it is *truly against*, my reasoning proceeds alongside his, right up against his – concerns this *structure of inheritance* that he describes, starting from the analysis of the world as the world of objects, which

forms, at the heart of the system of referring, what he calls the already-there of historicity, of *Geschichtlichkeit*. I inherit the world (the world of objects) precisely as a *history*. As *Dasein*, I am someone whose past has *always already gone ahead* of me. This is what section 6 of *Being and Time* says. As you know, he says that the past does not follow *Dasein*, but on the contrary it “always already goes ahead of it.” This means that I am an heir, that fundamentally my past is not *my* past: it is the past of a culture that I inherit, the past of those spirits I mentioned a moment ago, the past of the dead. I am always already haunted by the dead, through the objects that they leave to me, mostly anonymously. This is what I found most interesting in Heidegger, but it is also the most dangerous aspect of his thought because, politically, it leads to the romantico-national-socialism that has made so many people detest Heidegger, with good reason, unfortunately. Or at least with good reason on this point which, of course, has many other regrettable consequences for other aspects of Heidegger’s thought – but many of those who detest him on account of this also wrongly believe that they are entitled not to read him, and so their hatred turns good reason into bad. Now, I believe that this terrifying political outcome is made possible *precisely* because Heidegger does not raise the question *here* of the actual conditions of this inheritance, inasmuch as they are already inscribed in its original technicity. It is on this point, in sections 76, 77, 80 and 81 of *Being and Time*, that Heidegger is faced with a dilemma, hesitates, and comes down on the wrong side of the question.

Before developing this point further, I’d like to go back to the analyses of *The Fault of Epimetheus* – which might first seem anthropological, if not biological, but this is obviously not my position. I’m not interested in what we call “man” but in *temporality*, temporality that, as a form of life, has to decide what it is to become (and it so happens that this form of life is still called man today). Even when man is finished, when he belongs to the past, this form of life may well continue on, becoming ever more complex – and perhaps man is *already* finished. But if there is something profoundly *necessary* in man it is

precisely his fundamental anxiety, in so far as this *opens up possibilities* – and in the end, perhaps this is what accounts for the fact that the question of his possible end always remains, from the beginning and throughout the course of his life, an open question. If I do not in fact wish for the disappearance of man, it is because I do not wish for the disappearance of this opening of possibilities that results from this always open experience of the possible end. I certainly don’t want to be turned into a homeostatic machine, let’s put it that way (and this also is certainly a possibility). But I am already and have always been constituted by my relation to the *mēkhanē* and, through it, to all possible machines. It was around four million years ago, according to the dating of Leroi-Gourhan (since reduced to 2.8 million years ago), that a new form of life appeared, one supported by prostheses. In a certain way, this is what the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus describes. This living being that we call man and that this myth more soberly designates as *mortal* (that is to say: the being who anticipates his own end and his *difference* from the *immortals*, from whom he receives, albeit by theft, his power, his fire, that is to say *tekhnē* and all its possibilities, and who therefore endures, in the ordeal of non-predestination that results from this, the experience of a difference marking his origin, which is thus essentially the difference between the sacred and the profane) is a being that, to survive, requires non-living organs. These non-living organs – eye-glasses, houses, clothes, sharpened flints, etc., absolutely everything that Heidegger describes as constituting the system of reference and significance: worldhood – make up a set of entities that I characterise as inorganic (artificial) yet organised (articulated).

Now, by manufacturing these artefacts – for example, in order to cut meat, to cut down trees, to work materials, to fight – this new form of life creates a new basis for memory. Every living sexual being is constituted by two kinds of memory which, since August Weismann, have been called germinal and somatic – the genetic memory of the species preserved in DNA, and the somatic, individual memory preserved in an organism’s nervous system. Now, with what



Leroi-Gourhan calls the process of exteriorisation there appeared around three million years ago a third form of memory: *technical* memory that enables the transmission of the individual experience of people from generation to generation, something inconceivable in animality. This experience of individuals inherited by other individuals is what I call *the world*, the world inasmuch as it is always *inhabited by spirits*.

*P.H.: You think temporality along with its technical conditions – temporality understood as the opening in which one decides something, where one creates the unpredictable, the new. Is this the main source of your criticism of Heidegger? That although he recognises that such an open space depends on these conditions, despite everything he confines it to the really decisive moments of anguish, resolution, etc. This tendency is even stronger in Sartre: the decision takes place in the emptiness of pure consciousness, in the absence of any prosthesis. But doesn't a viable theory of decision need to find some way of thinking such an experience of evacuation or emptiness, this moment devoid of all determination – and so in a sense devoid of any subject, in the usual meaning of the term? And which then (as Badiou likes to suggest) might not even have a place "in" temporality as such, since a genuine decision configures a new experience of time in its wake.*

*B.S.:* As for your first question: it is this and many other things that constitute my disagreement with Heidegger – but *in* Heidegger. The first thing that I dispute in Heidegger is the opposition between the determinate and indeterminate that he establishes and assumes as self-evident. He says that concern, *Besorgen*, always seeks to *determine* the indeterminate, i.e. to determine the indetermination that constitutes my ignorance of the time and manner of my death, whereas in fact the when and the how of death are structurally indeterminable. According to Heidegger, what makes me absolutely unique is that I am caught up in an original relation to my own death, that I do not know when or how it will occur. And this ignorance, which is a non-knowledge, is structural: the knowledge of death

is from the start the knowledge of an ignorance. Using my own vocabulary, I would say that here one experiences, from the beginning and at an elemental level, the feeling of a lack of origin or original default [*défaut d'origine*], along with its inverse, the default or *lack of an end* [*défaut de la fin*]. Being in absolute ignorance of the how and the when of my death, I am plunged into an absolute indetermination, which means that I cannot give responsibility for my own life to another because this other does not know the end any more than I do. (By "end" I mean both the limit or conclusion, and the meaning or direction, and thus the content, of my life, which is only determined after the fact and too late, once my death has occurred and I am no longer there to live, and which will always have remained indeterminate for me: my end is an event that will only "happen" to me in my absence, by default.)

But when I *flee* from my own life, I tend to determine this indetermination in reference to what Heidegger calls the "they," *das Man*: I tend to give myself over to others and to abandon my indetermination to them, by adopting gregarious forms of behaviour – along with all the conventional and stereotypical ways of behaving in the face of the indeterminate, of fleeing from the anguish that also always constitutes this indetermination. This is the refusal to assume what Heidegger calls isolation, solitude, loneliness, and it is also the Sartrean moment. Heidegger *opposes* this – this solitary determination – to indetermination.

Now, and here I am coming to your second question, I believe that this opposition is extremely superficial, *because what makes indetermination possible is precisely determination*. The principle of individuation, which is the concretisation of indetermination, can operate all the more vigorously – as happens, for example, with the proliferation of individual interpretations of a text – the more the literal and public establishment of such a text, the most unequivocal determination possible of its identity, enables each of its readers (all of whom will thus have read the same text in the same form, written in an absolutely identical way) to read it differently, in relation to his or her own indetermination.

Each reader then acts as the carrier and “opener” of a still greater indetermination of readers (that the text affects in so far as it intensifies their singularity). In each case, every individual indetermination opens up in and through the general indeterminacy of meaning, an indeterminacy which all the more effectively guarantees and exhibits the determination of significations (it is essential to distinguish, here, between signification, which is determinate, and meaning, which is indeterminate). I am sure everyone has noticed that if you read the same text three times in your life, three different readings happen each time: faced by the determined identity of the text (the web of significations), we have an especially acute experience of our indetermination, which is also to say of our temporality. It is only starting from this moment that we truly experience the ordeal of indetermination. That is in fact why during the age of alphabetic writing the figure of the citizen appears who is above all a singular individual [*une singularité*], the affirmation of singularity in the collective. On the basis of the identical text on which is written the common law, each citizen has the experience of the *strangeness* of this identity which, each time that it is brought into play, produces a difference. What Heidegger neglects in the relation between determinate and indeterminate is the question of the difference *in* repetition. And this opposition of determination to indetermination that we find in Heidegger is a typically metaphysical opposition.

Your question, however, concerns decision, and there is decision, strictly speaking, when there is *epoché*. I use the word *epoché* in several senses at once – in the sense of the Stoics, in the sense of Husserl and even in the sense of Heidegger. With the Stoics, *epoché* is decision as the interruption of a flow, an arrest or halt that issues a judgment – and in French *arrêt* remains a word for legal judgment. In Husserl, it is a method: the phenomenological method whereby our experience of the world (the thesis that there is a world) is suspended, i.e. whereby we suspend our ordinary preoccupation with particular objects so as to reflect instead on the pure operations of consciousness. In Heidegger, it punctuates the history of being, being is essentially

history, and this history is the history of the epochs of being as a succession of suspensions. In this respect, there is a big problem in Heidegger. Heidegger had written *Being and Time* – and a whole series of works that are always, directly or not, readings of Kant, in particular *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, but also the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. However, in 1927, Heidegger had not managed to finish *Being and Time*: he had published it unfinished, announcing a second part which would never actually appear. Now, what finally did appear, in 1935, was the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. And this is a complete change of discourse, in which it is no longer essentially a question of *Dasein* – and, above all, there is no longer any question of an existential analytic.

From that point on, Heidegger devotes himself instead to a history of being. In other words, he is torn between two paths that are antagonistic in some respects, but whose critical synthesis seems possible in principle. On the one hand, he tries to think the existential analytic of the individual: he fails. On the other hand, he attempts to think the history of Western being, that is to say the history of the *globality* of the history of the West – which leaves us wondering what happened to the endeavour of the existential analytic, which seems in some ways to have disappeared before its status has been clarified. What is extremely problematic in all this is that the years between 1927 and 1935 are marked, of course, by the National Socialist episode. So there are a lot of reasons to investigate that which brings together or on the contrary distances these two paths. In my opinion, the essential factors (which serve to explain the hesitations and the sort of secret rift which, after all, separates 1935 from 1927) are already at issue in sections 73 to 77 of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger tries to return to the question of original temporality through the analysis of what he calls “antiquities,” where he speaks of *Weltgeschichtlichkeit*. This world-historicity stems from the objective and material traces that I receive from the world, and the question is whether these must be taken into account in the

constitution of original temporality. If, for example, I go to a museum, I can see and study antiquities: does this *constitute*, as something inherited, as something already-there, my original temporality? I believe that Heidegger really hesitates here, that he *truly* asks himself this question. But he eventually decides no, it doesn't.

Now, and here I am finally getting back to your question, this "decision" is an enormous problem – it is even a catastrophe, which will lead him to *oppose* the "they," on the one hand, and the "I" on the other. It implies that a decision is produced absolutely outside of any collectivity, a decision which is essentially solitary, one made in the solitude of being-towards-death. To this I would object, first of all, that it makes absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable the *problem* of immortality, which is nevertheless a constituent aspect of metaphysics – one of the great limits of Heidegger's existential analytic is the way it relies, unconditionally, an a priori thanatology which implies that once I am dead, *nothing* more can happen. Now this is not true: *my whole life is dedicated to or overdetermined by that which comes after-my-death*, which is also to say by the births to come. It's only in this way, at least, that my life can be liveable. Everything that precedes my death is only of little interest, when all is said and done, compared with that which will survive it – or rather, it is only of any real interest in terms of that which will survive it. Fundamentally, today, in this epoch that is at present ours, the one in which we are trying to live, and which is a-theological, totally profane if not totally profaned, there is something that persists above and beyond any becoming-profane, which ensures that no one says nor above all thinks: "After me, the flood [*Après moi, le déluge*]." Certainly, corporate capitalism says this, that is to say *signifies this as a process*. But no one, and not even a capitalist (*as a person*), no one on the planet says or would dare say to himself: "Right, let's take full advantage of things, let's exploit our resources as much as we can, and in fifty years there will be nothing left – but we couldn't care less about this, since in any case we will not be here anymore." No one dares say this because

*we cannot not think that after us there is and there will be something else*. This is why we always already live in the after-me, in the after-us, always and fundamentally – even if the *they* tends, on the contrary, to live in the denial of such a destiny, in denial of the fact that *it is precisely this: destiny*. This is why we write books: everything that we *do*, we do essentially according to this above-and-beyond. And it is here that Heidegger is greatly mistaken, because he imagines that concern is exclusively dedicated to the struggle against death. Whereas to my mind what he calls concern, *Besorgen*, and what I (after Marx) would also simply call labour or work, is also, beyond the mere activity that survival requires, the will to *be*, that is to say to exist, to be in the sense of ex-isting, and therefore, of *marking, leaving a trace*.

It is because he opposes concern and "resoluteness" that Heidegger objects to the original articulation of the "I" and of the "we." I am devoting a large part of my current work to the study of this original articulation of the I and the we, and to the historical forms through which its transformation proceeds. Simondon, in his *L'Individuation physique et collective*, tries to avoid opposing the I and the we. The I *in* the we is what it means to be we as singularity – which is also to say, as the exception. The I can only be an exception. I can only be as an exception in the sense that I exempt myself from the we. I am not the we, and yet I am nothing outside the we: I am a figure of the we, a projection of the we that is always in some sense in excess of this we. This is what I call an instance or *occurring* of the we. I have found some similar ideas in Badiou, in his little book on ethics.<sup>8</sup>

All of this relates to what Simondon calls individuation, and to what a moment ago I called *epoché*, suspension, inasmuch as this is a process of inadequation. *I* individuate, *I* individuate myself [*je m'individue*]: I am always already and continuously in the midst of individuating. I am structurally incomplete (this is also what Heidegger says) and I seek to individuate myself, i.e. to collect and to complete myself, but at the same time I also try to defer [*différer*] my completion since my completion is my death, the end of individuation. To use

Derrida's terms, I am caught up in *différance*, if you like.

Now this structure only affects me to the extent that it *also* affects the group to which I belong. The process of individuation does not only proceed at the level of individual minds, a social entity is also a process of individuation at the level of a *group*. And a group can only individuate itself if it is composed of individuals who are themselves individuating in and against the group, at one and the same time in excess of the group and as its highest expression, who mark the process that is set in motion by the inadequation of the individual to the group and vice versa. The I and the we are inadequate to themselves (incomplete, evolving) precisely in so far as they are both inadequate to but also inseparable from each other. They are in a state of co-individuation, and I only individuate myself to the degree that I participate in this way in the individuation of the group, no less than in my own individuation. This signifies that my individuation can only be as effective as is my socialisation. But the latter can take a lot of time: belonging constitutes itself here as difference, that is to say as *différance* – as time. And there is co-individuation in so far as the I shares with the we a pre-individual milieu [*milieu*]: I is an heir (the we is always older than the I). Which brings us back again to the already-there of Heidegger. With this difference, perhaps – that the we of which I speak here is also always already younger than the I.

*P.H.:* Could Heidegger agree with you here, up to a point, since the “they” is not static but something that changes and evolves over time?

*B.S.:* No, because the “they [*das Man*]” for Heidegger is precisely the collapse of individuation. This is the whole problem, and it's a result of the fact that Heidegger confuses or at least does not distinguish the we and the they. I believe that the lack of such a distinction is also the reason why he abandons the historicity of *Dasein* when he undertakes, from 1935, the interpretation of the history of being, a history that he will attempt to rethink precisely as the individuation of being. At this point it is indeed

*being* that individuates itself as such, as far as Heidegger is concerned. But the problem is that he doesn't really maintain a relation with the existential analytic. He goes back and forth: sometimes he comes down on the side of the “we” (which is not at all the same thing as the “they”) as historical being; at other times he comes down on the side of the “I” as solitary *Dasein* – even if, undoubtedly, *Dasein*, as the heir of an already-there, always tends towards a we. But the problem is to figure out how the two join together – and this is what Heidegger fails to do. That is why there is no politics in Heidegger, because politics is precisely this: to join the “I” and the “we.” Isn't this what *Antigone* tells us?

Now, all of this proceeds through inadequation, and inadequation proceeds through technics. Because human beings, or existential beings, or beings who deal with decision – the decision of their temporality – are continuously called into question by the development of technics which overtake them. Technics simultaneously give them access to the already-there (i.e. join the I to the we) and form what I call the retentional mechanism of their pre-individual background. When I say that technics overtake mortals, I am relying on Marx as well as on Leroi-Gourhan and Gille, and also on Simondon:<sup>9</sup> people form technical objects but these objects, because they themselves form a dynamic system, go on to overtake their makers. Objects form a *system* because no technical object is ever thinkable in isolation – for example, in the tape recorder that you're using to record this interview there is a cassette, which is of no use without the tape recorder, which itself is of no use without the microphone, and so on: technics is essentially a system of references [*renvois*], just like the system of the world that Heidegger analyses in *Being and Time*. And such systems are *dynamic*, meaning that they are always marked by particular tendencies. It is Leroi-Gourhan who develops the concept of technical tendency, and he owes the notion to Bergson. There are also concepts of tendency, or of force, in Freud and in Nietzsche. And a tendency only exists along with a counter-tendency – such as, for example, pleasure and reality in Freud. The human, or what we call human, is essentially a

negotiation between tendencies. What matters is to understand how these tendencies combine, to describe the conditions of such combinations, to describe how they make the *connectivity* of a social fabric possible. To understand and to describe this connectivity is to struggle against the always imminent possibility of a decomposition of tendencies, against an archi-tendency, if I might put it this way, towards decomposition.

A human society is always based on a technical system – what Marx calls a system of production. A society puts this technical system to work, but at some point it no longer provides the expected results – for example because it has enabled a social transformation in relation to which it “disadjusts” itself. This disadjustment then induces a dynamic exogenous to the system, one that may in turn come up against a dynamic endogenous to the system itself. For example, the steam engine enables the production of better steel which enables the production of more effective machines and this constitutes a positive retroactive loop, which progresses until the machine reaches an optimal performance and then declines. And in the end this changes the technical system. The result of these dynamics is a process of technical evolution that regularly leads to a transformation of the very laws of the system and so produces a boomerang effect, such that the system itself then impacts upon society as excess, disadjustment, inadequation, etc. Or again: mnemotechnics, in so far as it gives me access to the already-there, for example in the literal form of a text, thereby opens me, on the basis of this literality, to the meaning of the text [*l’esprit de la lettre*] which is essentially indeterminate precisely to the extent that confirmation of the literal text ensures the permanence of textual significations (according to the logic that we looked at a moment ago). Technics (as mnemotechnics) here constitutes my indeterminacy, that is to say my inadequacy to myself, precisely as determination. And the point is that everything related to a problem of decision proceeds through a structure of this kind, as dynamic coupling.

*P.H.: Automobiles are invented and developed, they impact on the organisation of towns; this*

stiegler

*then forces change in the organisation of work, of social life, and so on ...*

B.S.: For example. But one can also understand this more radically and more “constitutively.” Let’s say, for example, that one night I write the sentence: “it is dark.” I then reread this sentence twelve hours later and I say to myself: hang on, it’s not dark, it’s light. I have entered into the dialectic. What is to be done here? Why does Hegel attempt to introduce “sense certainty” into the dialectic through this thematic of writing? It’s certainly not a coincidence. That which makes consciousness be self-consciousness (i.e. consciousness that is conscious of contradiction with itself) is the fact that consciousness is capable of externalising itself. This is why Hegel is the first thinker of exteriority, the great thinker of exteriority. And it’s upon this principle that Marx founds the whole of his reinvestment of the dialectic, as in *The German Ideology*. He takes up Hegel’s problematic of exteriorisation from the materialist point of view – but the great invention in this is exteriorisation. I write “it is dark” and when I read it twelve hours later it is light. There is therefore a contradiction between times, the time of the consciousness when I wrote this and the time of the consciousness when I read it. But as for me, I have the same consciousness: my consciousness is therefore put in crisis. It is *always* in the play of exteriority that decisions are made. Questions which call for decisions arise only like this: they always go through exteriority, they are induced and led, more or less palpably, by exteriorisation. For example, Cézanne’s decision: to see the mountain is to show it. Seeing is therefore painting: I do not see without painting. Cézanne says to us, but this painting is a decision as to how I “see.” The visible is not what informs the eye, but what the eye uses to *make* or do something. Now, this action is in the final analysis an inscription, an exteriorisation which constitutes the interior, which means that interiority does not precede exteriority or vice versa. It is above all because he has formulated this question like no one else before him that Derrida is very important.

Furthermore, this question of decision is always that of knowing how *I* join myself to the

group. I am only who I am in so far as I am in relation to a group. How is it that I am called Stiegler, when I live in France? This means that I have at least one Germanic grandparent. I am an heir, but in quite a complex way: I speak French, I consider myself French, while both my grandfathers have German names (Trautmann and Stiegler). And yet I say that I am French, heir of the *sans-culottes*, of the French Revolution, of the language of French literature, of Descartes, Proust, Mallarmé, Queneau, Char and Blanchot. I cannot escape this. Later, it may be that I'll want to escape this, to declare that the national domain does not interest me, does not concern me. But can I then avoid being taken into the structure of another group, if only by default [*par défaut*]? I might, for example, join up with a more tribal group, perhaps a sort of network, or else something more nomadic, perhaps through the Internet, if not by the much older and more common path of an international journal – when I speak of Heidegger, for instance, you know who this is, we can communicate because we are part of the same group, in the end: the group of readers of philosophy. In this sense we are talking about the same things. Now, what constitutes these groups, each time, these groups which in each case are the theatre of every possible decision, is still and always exteriority.

*P.H.: Ok – even if our capacity to communicate has an effectively transcendental or quasi-transcendental status (as Habermas, Chomsky and Pinker might say, each in their own way), this capacity can only actualise itself within a group of more or less specific interlocutors. Your perspective accords very well, it seems to me, with the dynamic coordination of the I and the we described by Deleuze, which proceeds through the ceaseless invention of assemblages and machines that increase our collective power. But does that which opens us up to sharing (linguistic sharing, in this case) itself depend on a preliminary belonging? And, on the other hand, even if I am not an “I” before I communicate with others, isn't it necessary to distinguish the I of communication (the I with the you, the I which is part of a we) from the I of a genuine*

*decision? Does decisive action restrict itself to the differentiation of an I amongst a we? Everyday communication clearly discourages any decision: why then must the decision depend, in general, on a sort of communication? Isn't the act of decision indifferent to these particular conditions of possibility, at least?*

B.S.: I think that what you call the transcendental in Chomsky is not at all transcendental, in fact – on the contrary, it's just a form of scientific naturalism. I don't believe that language is a competence shared by humanity and registered in biological equipment: I believe that language is first an *incompetence*, the sense of a flaw or lack [*défait*], a default of language and of pronunciation that marks the diversity of idioms – and this is what Babel means. That human beings have the neurological possibility of speaking a language is an obvious fact, a platitude, but I do not believe that it consists of “rules,” and, above all, if they have not learnt it culturally they will never learn it. Moreover, I believe that this neurological competence is the same as that used to coordinate acts of manufacturing, of technical production: it is the competence of exteriorisation, which, as Leroi-Gourhan recognised well before Chomsky, clearly requires a level of suitable cortical and subcortical organisation. Now, this competence is nothing other than the mark of a lack or default of quality. A language is an *echo* of this lack or default, and this echo is essentially learnt and received from preceding generations, that is to say from the preceding “we.” At the same time, I absolutely do not believe that there are universal rules of language. I have always found this fanciful, and what's more, very ethnocentric. It is at once ethnocentric and metaphysical. As Sylvain Aurox has shown, with its project of general grammar the West has enslaved the evolution of exotic idioms, imposing on them a grammatical model which has either obliterated or profoundly altered them.<sup>10</sup> Through its religious missions, which have completed the grammatisation of all vernaculars, the West has truly waged a spiritual war – one that I examine in the book that I am now writing, *Symboles et diabolos, ou la guerre des esprits*.

I don't believe that there is an original generative syntax from which I could beget all the linguistic formulae of the entire world. This cognitivist point of view misses the heart of the problem, which is that "language" is always already diachronic, which means that it is always already idiomatic. In other words, there is no "language": it does not exist, because only *languages* exist, including the various ways of speaking "the" French language. If I wanted to describe "the" French language, I'd take a tape recorder like the one you're using now and I'd record and sample lots of people who speak French. I'd go to Marseilles, to Lille, to Paris, to Strasbourg, to Ajaccio, to Brussels, to Canada, to the West Indies, to the Ivory Coast, to Mali, etc. And by doing so I would record as many different French languages. Of course, they understand each other, they understand each other up to the point where they stop understanding each other – and *therefore* they have something to say. For this is precisely the problem of speech: if they understood each other completely they would have absolutely no need to talk. We talk because we do not understand each other, but at the same time we only talk when we understand each other, a little, that is to say because we *believe* in the possibility of understanding each other. But this is an endless possibility on which, when we talk, we *wager* that what we say will make sense, that it will be significant, that it will not be insignificant.

The question here concerns idiom, and I will return to it through the question of the exception, which is also the question of invention. And this is my way of returning to your own question:

1. I do not believe that the I can in any way precede the we; on the contrary, it is the already-there of a we that makes the individuation of the I possible.

2. Nor do I believe that it is a matter here of communication, strictly speaking: the relation of the I to the we is not so much a communication as a signification [*signifiance*], i.e. a non-insignificance – or if you prefer, an idiomatic invention.

For signification does not depend on communication, any more than does idiomatic inven-

tion. "Communication" assumes that I already know what I want to say before saying it. This does happen sometimes, of course. But in idiomatic invention, in signification – of which poetry is the form par excellence – what I want to say is constituted *by* the way in which I say it, and this is then no longer simply a matter of communication.

Having said that, I am not speaking here in the name of the transcendental (any more than I am taking refuge in the empirical): my reasoning is "a-transcendental," in the sense in which Bataille spoke "a-theologically." Bataille owes the a-theological form of thought to a theological history of thought: he comes after theology, but in the sense that he comes *from* theology. The after of theology is completely overdetermined by theology. In a sense you could describe me as an a-transcendental philosopher: I consider that everything that precedes me in philosophy proceeds from what we call the transcendental, but at the same time I believe that I belong to an era that challenges the difference between what is transcendental and what is empirical, an era that says that this difference is not relevant. And I think that this is because, technics being at once empirical and constitutive, we can no longer be satisfied with the old distinction between transcendental and empirical. We are confronted, in other words, by a new question about difference: how to *invent difference*, that is to say to *make* a difference, beyond the difference between the empirical and the transcendental that is ruined by the constitutive dimension of technics? But at the same time, *all* the questions that interest us have been *given* to us by the transcendental tradition, and once the constitutive dimension of technics has been taken on board, all these questions remain intact. It is necessary to re-examine them just as the transcendental manner of questioning bequeaths them to us, but by inventing another way of answering them, which is not at all empiricist or naturalistic.


I can only speak a language if the language that I speak is absolutely unique in the world. This is why you came to speak to me, to interview me: because you think that what I have to say can only be said by me. There are some

people who no longer speak at all in their own name: these are people who live in poverty, people who are manipulated and alienated by the media. They are the outcome of the last stage of the war of spirits [*guerre des esprits*] (which is also a war of minds, and the whole question concerns the way we understand this link between spirit and mind), which not only reduces the idiomatic diversity of exotic speech to nil but also tends to destroy the diachronicity of consciousness itself, through the imposition of statements and ways of speaking produced by marketing and the information and communication industries. This stage of the war of spirits is that of the industrial production of symbols, which leads to their inversion into what I call *diaboles* (because their expressions are insignificant): what's at stake here is an *ecology of the mind* [*écologie de l'esprit*]. The ruin of the mind causes the annihilation of the I and the we in the they.

In order for someone to signify, two apparently contradictory things must happen. On the one hand, speakers make use of the rules that they share with others: if you understand me, it's because you understand French grammar. But all of these rules are implemented in the service of an *irregular* construction. And it's an *absolute* irregularity – for example, *the French language does not exist*. The French language does not exist, but each time we speak, we try to invent it: this is what I call the structure of invention. In other words, *the French language, which does not exist, consists*. This insistent consistency is what ties the I to the we.

In order that I can speak to you, we must be able to synchronise with each other, to share the rules that we have in common. This sharing makes up what Saussure calls a synchronic period of language. But inside this synchrony there is a diachrony: each speaker is radically diachronic, and here again we encounter the problem of time. The speaker can only speak in a time which is absolutely his own, but he speaks *for* synchrony, that is to say for the “we”: to register the speaker in the “we.” In other words, it is not necessary to oppose the exceptional to the banal, or diachrony to synchrony. Diachrony and synchrony must continuously work together

in order for signification to take place. Today, in the age of the information and communication industry, that is to say the age of the industrial production of symbols that have as their essential purpose *the synchronisation of consciousnesses by nullifying their diachrony* (by adapting them to mass markets, by subjecting them to standardised models of behaviour), synchrony and diachrony oppose each other and fall apart, decompose. This *decomposition of the symbolic* is literally *diabolical*: it generates disconnection, that is to say, the *decomposition of the social* itself.



### notes

1 This interview was conducted in Paris on 28 June 2002. I have used Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of *Being and Time* as my guide in rendering Stiegler's Heideggerian terms into English (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962)). I would like to thank Viviane de Charrière for her invaluable help and wise advice. [Translator's note.]

2 Cf. Stiegler, *Technics and Time* I 200–01.

3 The French reads: “*En ce sens, le mortel est un être par défaut, un être marqué d'un défaut d'origine, c'est à dire plongé dans un handicap d'origine ...*” *Etre par défaut* connotes the phrase *condamner par défaut* (to condemn someone in their absence), as well as the usual meanings of *défaut*: absence, lack, failure, fault, flaw, defect, and so on. There is no longer any one English word that conveys these various connotations, but since Stiegler uses the term *défaut* as an effectively technical term it seems important to translate it literally, at least much of the time. Here and elsewhere *défaut d'origine* could be more naturally translated either as “original flaw” or as “lack of an origin,” but in order to preserve the effect of Stiegler's usage we will occasionally translate it as “original default.” In such cases the reader should remember the (now archaic) connotations of failure, want, and absence in dated expressions like “for default of” or “in default of,” as well as the more familiar implication of phrases like “to win by default.” As in other deconstructive contexts, one effect of the phrase is to blur the difference between an



original and a pre-original condition. Collins and Beardsworth, confronted with the same problem, generally translate *défaut* as “de-fault” (see Stiegler, *Technics and Time I* 280, n. 12). Jennifer Bajorek translates *défaut d’origine* as “original lack or lack of origin” (Stiegler, *Echographies* 173, n. 10). [Editor’s note.]

4 Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, sect. 17. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Heidegger’s *Verweisung, verweisen* (and its cognates *anweisen* and *zuweisen*) as “the phenomenon of reference or assignment” (*Being and Time* 107). [Translator’s note.]

5 Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time* 96.

6 Hubert Dreyfus, “De la technè à la technique: le statut ambigu de l’ustensilité dans *Être et temps*” in *Cahier de l’Herne: Martin Heidegger*, ed. Michel Haar (Paris: L’Herne, 1983) 285–303.

7 The French reads: “Autrement dit il tente de combler le défaut d’origine – comble du défaut, comme on dit en français, qui est aussi une redoutable aventure politique.” [Translator’s note].

8 Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001).

9 See, in particular, André Leroi-Gourhan, *Évolution et techniques*, 2 vols. (Paris: Albin Michel, 1943–45); Leroi-Gourhan, *Prehistoric Man* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957); Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech* (Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1993); Bertrand Gille, *History of Techniques* (New York: Gordon, 1986); Gilbert Simondon, *L’Individuation psychique et collective* (Paris: Aubier, 1989); Simondon, *Du mode d’existence des objets techniques* (Paris: Aubier, 2001).

10 Cf. Sylvain Auroux, *La Révolution technologique de la grammatisation: introduction à l’histoire des sciences du langage* (Liège: Mardaga, 1994); Auroux (ed.), *Le Développement de la grammaire occidentale: histoire des idées linguistiques*, vol. 2. (Liège: Mardaga, 1989); Auroux, *La Raison, le langage et les normes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998).

## works by stiegler

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