



## Technological Forms of Life

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What are 'technological forms of life'? What would forms of life look like in an age of technology? The question of forms of life is of course very closely tied up with the question more generally of culture. In a very important sense forms of life, ways of life are cultures. To pose the question of what is culture in terms of forms of life and then in terms of contemporary, technological forms of life should help us make some pivotal analytic distinctions in asking the question what is culture. Very different notions of culture are presupposed in Wittgenstein's shift from what was closer to a logical positivism in the *Tractatus* to what is often called the 'ordinary language philosophy' in the *Philosophical Investigations*. This 'ordinary language' was as distinct from philosophy of pure, apodictic, indeed positivistic language of the *Tractatus*. Indeed in the *Tractatus* culture is presumed very much on the model of representation. Whereas the idea of forms of life in the *Investigations* views culture, not as representation but as practice.

I think it is important to address what is meant by forms of life before we move on to technological forms of life. Let me try first to build up a notion of forms of life then drawing not particularly on Wittgenstein, although as consistent with the thrust of what he was saying. And focusing quite literally on 'forms', on the one hand, and in particular on 'life', on the other. To speak of forms of life, indeed to speak of culture as forms of life, is to break with earlier notions of culture as representation, as reflection. This we already see in Wittgenstein's transition. It is to break with positivism for phenomenology, to break with judgement for experience, to break with epistemology for ontology, to break with a certain type of cognition for living.

### *From Representation to forms of Life: The Critique of Epistemology*

Forms of life presume the integration in an important sense of forms on the one hand and life on the other. They also presume the emergence and centrality of 'life'. They presume the thematisation of life. And life was not always on the agenda. Prior to life was the predominance of - alright let's for the moment call it an episteme - of *reflection*, of representation, of classification. Foucault in *Les mots et les choses* (in the words and the things) says we move from a principle in the classical episteme (17th & 18th centuries of classification to what he calls the new 'empiricities' of the modern (19th and 20th c.) Thus the shift from natural history, based on classification to a biology, to life sciences which featured no longer classification but 'vie', with Cuvier. Here along with life, the organism assumes centrality. Foucault finds similar moves from the classification of the general grammar to the organismic assumptions of nation and life of historical linguistics or philology and also with the move from the analysis of wealth towards Ricardian political economy. In each case this is shift from the principle of classification to one of life and organism. To an organismic heuristic from a heuristic of representation. That Foucault calls the modern organismic episteme 'empiricities' is also significant. Classifier was based on an agreement of words in one realm with things in the other. It was a two world assumption. The words on the one hand classified the things on the other. Whether one speaks in terms of

classifying, representing or reflecting as in a mirror, the things, its still the same epistemic regime of culture. But in the subsequent break with classification the words have become empiricities, on the same sensate, empirical level as the things. Thought has entered the living thing, the organism. Thought no longer represents bits of life that it abstracts from it. Thought becomes one with life. This is empiricism and anti-positivism. In any event forms of life are very importantly organismic There weren't always forms of life.

I don't like the word episteme because it presumes that there always is epistemology. It presumes what Foucault called classification. World-view, Weltanschauung, is perhaps a bit better because it grows out of the presumption that intuition (Anschauung) is predominant. The earlier epistemology or reflection, representation, classification work from the opposition of intellect or intellection on the side of Foucault's words, and intuition in the world of the things. With the rise of 'life', Lebensphilosophie, ordinary language rather than conceptual language, the words are among the things, and intuition (Anschauung) is no longer separate from intellection. Today we might say neither episteme nor Weltanschauung, but perhaps configuration, reconfiguration or platform. Best perhaps is to think of all three of these terms, or phases in terms of cultural regimes. Three ways predominantly in which we conceive of what culture is. Not only ways we conceive of what culture is, but that are horizon for how we think and act. From representation to forms of life to technology. From episteme to (Welt)anschauung to configuration. Please accept what follows as a sociological meditation, a sort of sociological speculation on the idea of technological forms of life.

If the earlier representational regime of Kant separated 'forms' on the one hand and 'life' on the other: Forms as the condition of possibility of intellection, on the one hand, and life as intuition and the things themselves on the other. This was the dualism of representation. The first steps towards the new regime of forms of life were in dialectics. Dialectics and forms of life of course are already a critique of the Enlightenment, a critique of the philosophy of reflection. The philosophy of reflection from Descartes through Locke, Kant and onwards presumes the centrality of self-consciousness. At issue for thought is not the things in the world we relate to, but thought itself. The object of philosophy is not the things but the way consciousness relates to those things (whether this consciousness is empirical or transcendental) In dialectics consciousness must somehow ground itself in what is exterior to consciousness, in some sort of alterity - whether this alterity is nature, or the (other) servant in the dialectic of master and servant (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft - lordship and serfdom) or more importantly for our purposes what Hegel called Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit is normally translated as ethical life. This is an early twentieth century mistranslation from the newer lebensphilosophisch assumptions. This is already a precursor of forms of life. Sittlichkeit came up of course in what Marx rightly saw as the beginnings of Hegel's materialist critique of Kant's (and also Descartes) transcendental idealism. Kantian abstract morality (Moralität) of the categorical imperative Hegel noted made no sense. He meant literally had no Sinn. The categorical imperative could not be applied to concrete situations, but had no meaning attached to it (anthropologists will be well aware) unless it was grounded in a sociality that was exterior to consciousness, that was exterior to the self-conscious subject of the Enlightenment's and idealism's philosophy of reflection. It needed to be grounded in the customary (Sitte means custom, usage, habit). To make sense, to have a sense for people in everyday life, for members of communities of any sort of practice, the ideal and abstract imperative needed a material ground. The reflected needed a ground in the materiality of the tacit, of the unreflected.

So, in the dialectical critique of reflection (of representation) consciousness began to reflect outside of itself onto the alterity, the materiality of forms of life. To reflect outside of itself is something new. It is in a sense the birth of ontology. If the master sees the servant for the point of view only of the master's self-consciousness, then he sees the servant epistemologically, as what Hegel called a

'for-itself' (für sich), i.e. as only an appearance, as positivistically as the natural sciences and mathematics might see event, an object or a subject (positivism) But if self-consciousness reflects outside of itself and thus doesn't just cognise the servant but *recognises* (which is also a sort of re-cognising, the second time by reflecting directly into the other) the servant (the other) then he grasps the other as an 'in-itself (an-sich)'. That is he grasps the other ontologically. For a properly materialist dialectics, class-consciousness proceeds not from class in itself to class for itself, but from class for itself to class in itself (Klasse-an-sich). The working class first understands capitalism epistemologically, re. Smith and Ricardo, exchange value and abstract labour power. For Marx the critique of ideology is the critique of epistemology. Then of course the proletariat proceeds to move beyond epistemology to come to grips with the ontological structures of class and capitalist society. This breaks with scientism (though it preserves epistemology as a moment) to come to terms with the ontological structures.

Kant could not break out of the philosophy of reflection, out of the cycle of self-consciousness. The scientific knowledge of appearances was all that was possible. Knowing could only be epistemological. One could never know things-themselves. One could never know things an sich but only things für sich. Intuition could deal with the an-sichness of things. intuition was in the world with the things. But this was not intellect, this was not knowledge. The intellect could know things für-sich. For his part, Hegel's move out of this vicious circle of self-consciousness, into the materiality of the things there is the chance to grasp them an sich. Indeed there is the chance in dialectics not only to grasp the things an sich, but also to grasp the other and forms of social life an-sich. The point is intuition could know things as everyday man does, i.e. from the natural attitude. Whereas the intellect for its part, through reflection could only know appearances. It would take 'intellectual intuition' to know things an-sich. To know social life an-sich. This idea of intellectual intuition was already implicit in Kant's 'original unity of apperception', an 'hypothesis' that presupposed the unity of intellect and intuition as hypothetically prior to their separation. That is the separation presumed an hypothetical previous unity. The idea of intellectual intuition also peaks through in the *Critique of Judgement*, in which nature and the object become not just instruments but finalities, becomes an-sichs. The subjective idealism and objective idealism of the Romantics Fichte and Schelling took this as their starting point as did dialectics. Only dialectics takes it further by proceeding temporally, in both idealist and materialist dialectics, through moments. Always a movement out into the particular and then into the totality.

Hegelian Sittlichkeit was not forms of life. Sittlichkeit is also not translatable as I said as 'ethical *life*'. It is translated in German-English dictionaries as morality. But it is morality grounded in custom. Most important of the dialectical movement of consciousness had little to do with life. It had to do with Reason. Reason as the transcendental unity of apperception prior to its breakdown into intellect on the one hand and intuition on the other. And the movement of reason, the movement of reflection is from the understanding to intellectual intuition. This is the movement of consciousness, the movement of Reason. Yet such intellectual intuition, the knowing of things and others and nature and forms of sociality an-sich are also at the basis of the notion of *culture*. Of the notion of *Kultur* and distinct from *Zivilisation*. Zivilisation is the knowledge of the things für-sich, it is the process of rationalisation. It is all that is contested by Kultur. This is however Kultur as Reason that has taken the form of Counter-Enlightenment. It is Kultur as Reason. But when reason finds its ground in custom, in Sittlichkeit the idea of culture is already there. Though not forms of life per se. The an-sich, the in-itself is the integration of the forms on the one hand and life on the other. This is what we mean by Kultur. But the notion of life is not yet there.

### *Forms of life: Phenomenology*

Fully developed forms of life are phenomenological. Now phenomenology works off a different principle. It works not through reflection, but through what Husserl called *Abbau*, through dismantling, literally 'unbuilding'. What is dismantled or unbuilt, de-built? De-building undoes the dialectic so to speak and takes it back to scratch. Abbauen, Destruktion, Deconstruction. (Gasché 1986) The dialectic builds through moments. It has to do with Bildung. With Bauen. Phenomenology proceeds by Abbauen. Phenomenology presumes life. And hence forms of life. But let us get there. With phenomenology there is intentionality, there is an 'attitude', the subject is in the world with the things. The dialectician does not have an 'attitude'. The man without attitude. He has an attitude no more than the Cartesian cogito. The dialectician reaches the an-sich, reached the unity of intellect and intuition through, reaches the grasping of nature and sociality as a finality (i.e. not an instrumentality) through the movement of Reason. He surely does not reach it through the taking on of an attitude. Or of intentionality. The supreme being too operates through intellectual intuition. God surely is not with either attitude or intentionality. He thus can sit in judgement. Only those without attitude can sit in judgement. With phenomenology and the full development of forms of life, judgement needs to go. Judgement works slowly and from above. Phenomenology works in quick time and from below. The cogito works through doubt. The dialectician works through greater transcendence, towards the absolute idea. Ever higher, it goes ever lower. The recognition of the other in master and slave, works first through the fur-sich of epistemology and then raises to a higher level with the an-sich of Reason. This does not come through the master having an attitude or intentionality towards the serf. But through transcending the mere fur-sich, merely positivistic knowledge of the servant. The same is true in *The Philosophy of Right*. Sittlichkeit is not a step into an attitude, into intentionality, into the world with all the customs and the hoi polloi. No Sittlichkeit comes when you transcend morality. When you transcend what Kant saw as already higher than the understanding, the intellect. This is reached through the unity of the subject-object, in the original unity of apperception. In a move towards absolute reason. In this sense the *Critique of Judgement* does not come in between but transcends the second Critique. And in transcending bridges. In any event all of this comes from having less and less of an attitude, less and less intentionality. You grasp the ground of objects and subjects as finalities not through getting down with them but through Bauen ever bauen and bilden towards Absolute Reason.

To get intentionality, to get attitude, which is what you get in phenomenology, what you get in fully developed forms of life - not just Kultur, but forms of *life* is not to bau but to abbau. the operative term is 'life'. Once life replaces reflection, things change. To abbau is for life to replace reflection. The move from Bauen to abbauen is from reflection to life. The shift to intentionality is the shift towards life. Consequently no forms of life without intentionality. It is here with intentionality that culture becomes forms of life. Time. What happens to time with the emergence of 'life'? In representation, the intellect is universal it is atemporal. Dialectics give us the 'moments', from fur-sich to an-sich. Phenomenology gives you a series of infinitely small, rapid and immediate now-heres. It is a move from a time of consciousness as reflection to lived time. Enlightenment and Kantian judgement presumes the long lastingness of laws. In dialectics, Hegel's phenomenology means erheben. Hegel's phenomenology of Bewusstsein is also die Phanomenologie des Geistes. Husserl's means abbauen and is the phenomenology of Bewusstsein without Geist. In Newtonian time the universal subject is outside of time, the particulars relate to one another in the temporality of cause and effect. Dialectics take a step out of the Newtonian temporality of the philosophy of representation and thus grounds the subject and reason in the meaningful ground of time as history, and thus the subject is in time. Temporality for the subject of experiential (not dialectical) phenomenology becomes a rapid fire stream of nows,

a stream of consciousness, a stream of unconsciousness, flows. *Erlebnisflüsse* as Husserl says. Looking forward to the technological forms of life, these flows of consciousness get exteriorised (McLuhan) as the logic of flows of the information order. The interior stream of consciousness and unconsciousness are exteriorised as flows of images, of libido. Technological time is disruptive of the time both of reflection and narrative time of *Lebensphilosophie*, but also of dreams. (Deleuze-Bergson). The streams of consciousness (Husserl, Bergson, Joyce, James) are exteriorised as flows in the temporality of cinema, and more so of television and the net. This is the shift in temporality from forms of life to technology. There is an exteriorisation of the flows of *Erlebnisse*, of the flows of Husserl's famous *innere Zeitbewusstsein* (internal time-consciousness), an immediacy with the collapse of the transcendental consciousness and indeed the unconscious into the immanence of the actor-networks of the information order. A displacement of temporality onto the flows. Representational culture is a culture of judgement. The temporalisation of consciousness in forms of life, in lived culture, cancels judgement. The technological culture flattens consciousness, and exteriorises its stream. Meaning is now on the outside. The subject comes to process information and emit communications. Is experience possible at all in the technological culture, in technological forms of life?

What happens is very much a question of Foucault's man and his doubles. Or more so theatre and its doubles. Where theatre (Artaud) should not be the double of life and hence kill off life, but should be an extension of life itself, like a police raid on a brothel. Likewise, thought (philosophy) should not somehow double life in reflection but join life with an attitude. With an intentionality. Only then does *Sittlichkeit* become forms of life or *Lebenswelt*. Culture should not as a representation be life's double, but should be life. With dialectics you have different types of transcendence, different degrees of transcendence. Of mediation. With phenomenology you have different types and degrees of immediation, of attitude. You know things through attitudes. Attitudes comprise neither reflection, nor doubt, but the suspension of reflection, the bracketing of doubt. To know through an attitude is to know through the bracketing of doubt. But Husserl wanted apodictic knowledge, the knowledge of things-themselves. He thus bracketed the various bracketings: the result was not doubt but the transcendental reduction. The intuition of essences. From the point of view of intuition. (Levinas) Not from intellectual intuition. No you took the whole of the separate sphere of the intelligible and *abgebaut* it. And you are in the world with things. With attitude. Living with things. Operating out of intuition, not the intellect, not reason. Intuition does not doubt. It trusts. To be in the world with, to have an attitude towards is to intuit. You need a special kind of intuition to intuit essences. A transcendental sort of intuition, that brackets the various sorts of empirical intuitions. Dialectical consciousness reflects; phenomenological consciousness experiences.

Through life as intuition, but transcendental intuition you get authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*). You get the life affirmation not of *Das Man*, but of the Overman.

### *Difference*

Forms of life are based ultimately in assumptions of 'difference'. There are problems with the forms of life in life world phenomenology to contemporaries like Derrida. First phenomenology in many ways reverts back to the old philosophy of consciousness. It is too much about the structure of consciousness. Similarly *Dasein* thematises itself in *Being and Time* which is again about the ontological structures of a bring-there or a there-being (that displaces consciousness) for whom Being more or less unconceals itself in the thing. Thus working from within phenomenology, broadly speaking, Derrida follows the logic of phenomenological *Abbau*, and keeps *bauen ab*, keeps destructing. And each deconstruction leads to a primordial difference. First consciousness is *abgebaut* for the difference between

self and self, and then ontological difference for again the more primordial difference. Derrida argues famously of course that it is difference that is originary, primordial. Difference is the third space that separates the self from its thematised self in Husserl's self-consciousness. The self must be seen as opposite to in contrast to the self in order for the self to thematise it. So no self-identity without alterity. What counts is neither the self as subject or the self as object, but the distinction between the two, the interval between the two. This interval, this boundary is difference. Difference is prior to any split of the self into two, prior to the separation of Being and beings.

Derrida's keep moving to the border of forms of life with alterity. Hence temporal Difference in terms of deferring meaning inside FoL. Hence the difference between FoL and it outside, spatial difference. Hence the alterity underneath, as it were, forms of life, ontological difference. In forms of life there is temporal difference. In forms of life you stand in a different attitude, with an altered intentionality to an utterance than I do then there is a temporal difference between uttering and interpreting. For the difference of deferring in time. there is semiotic difference , between the materiality of the signifier and the ideality, the intelligibility of the signified.

### *Technological Forms of Life*

Technological forms of life follows this logic of abbauen, of deconstruction even further. Technological forms of life deconstruct, dismantle difference itself, into a generalised indifference. Technological forms of life flattens all four modes of pre-existing difference and indeed difference into a generalised indifference. Temporal difference of present, past and future, of the deferral of meaning, becomes collapsed into a present, into a speed of the signal in which nothing is deferred and past and future are telescoped compressed temporally into the now. Spatial difference between same and other, between culture and nature, freedom and necessity is compressed, not just with the movements of globalization, into indifference. Forms of life which was once synonymous just with culture now become also natural forms of life, capable of being generated artificially.

Differentiation becomes compression in the technological culture all differences are compressed. Semiotic difference was based on the sign as semiotic unit. Now the semiotic unit is the unit of information, the communication. The sign is one side intelligible, the other side material. Information is compressed into one side only, into one space only. And this side is easily definable is either material or intelligible. Its relationship to any referent is problematic. Then unit of information s also arguably the referent. Or the referent too is compressed into the unit of information. Its sense comes neither from predication, - phrases of subject and predicate of universal and particular - But is a much more immediate sense, like Sinn, like the tactility of the five senses. It is in some way tactile. Forms of life were based on a logic of sense. On experience and meaning. On one subject making sense of what another subject uttered. In regard to horizons. Technological forms of life are based less on meaning, less on sense than on *sensation*. They are based semiotically on the transfer of information which is the transfer of a signal, an impulse, a 'pulsion'. There is an element of desire in this. But not desire as intersubjectivity, of mother and self, but on desire as flow. The production side also becomes flow in the technological culture as what counts is again less intersubjectivity than communications and their movements. Communications flow in a sense that meanings do not. The technological culture is a culture of flows. Meaning in the representational culture was monologic, it had to do with consciousness's relation to itself. Meaning in culture as forms of life is dialogic. Natural language presumes always utterance makers and utterance takers. Producers and consumers, authors and readers, producers and audiences. Even if there is temporal deferral. Meaning in the technological culture is attached to flows. It is neither monologic nor dialogic, but networked and transient.

Meaning in forms of life were somehow importantly organic. Communications are cybernetic. They often happen machine dependent. We speak of the mass media of communications, of telecommunications equipment. In forms of life narrative meaning is organic. They may *pass* from generation to generation in forms of life. They don't flow. To pass to be handed over, handed down. This has to do with forms of life. Flows slip through the hands. They have none of the substance of a handed down culture. Is experience impossible in the technological culture? To select, process, and transmit flows, of sensation, money and different forms of information is not to experience. Experience is based on the flow, the dream, the movement of consciousness. If this is exteriorised then what happens to experience. At best it loses all depth.

Forms of life were phenomenological, they deconstructed the dualism of subject and object, intellection and intuition. Yet resulting in the new dualisms of ontology, transcendence, difference. Technological forms of life result in a new phenomenology. Result in carrying out the implications of phenomenology to their most radical extreme. This new phenomenology *baus ab* (dismantles) consciousness. Consciousness makes meaning through thematising it. The new phenomenology erases consciousness and meaning remains tacit, undetermined. The new phenomenology collapses ontology. In this sense it is radically empiricist. Everybody and everything with an attitude. No one with a transcendental attitude. Phenomenological forms of life were ultimately humanist. In technological forms of life, things judge too, information machines measure and judge. They and the people select, process, control the information and emit communications. The old phenomenology had the material on the one hand and the intelligible, what consciousness did in the reduction on the other. [Even in transcendental *intersubjectivity*, there is the material and the intelligible on the other - i.e. ethics. Only in this case the side of intellect is unintelligible and enunciated only as the command of the other. In technological and radically empirical, empiricist (while anti-positivist) phenomenology the material and the intelligible are *welded together*. This is what Harold Garfinkel means by reflexivity is a light years from Hegel's reflexivity, and much more radically in the world than Husserl's reflective attitude. The natural attitude and the reflexive attitude are welded in Garfinkel's notion of communications. There is the most incredible compression and foreshortening of reflexivity. Hegel's reflection was Reason and its transcendental movements which took a detour through the material in order to reunite as the absolute subject-object. The new reflexivity is a tying, a welding of the intelligible, onto the material, for Garfinkel a concrete action. Each action is reflexively tied to its own account-giving to members. This is an unthematized, tacit account giving. So different than the old intelligible as reason. It is the dialectical movement of the absolute subject-object as the intelligible now compressed down to the minutiae of the tacit unit of communication. Say a gesture. This is technological phenomenology. Without a transcendental, without consciousness, the byte of communication replacing Reason as the intelligible.

Forms of life are somehow organic. For Durkheim, they were organic. For Foucault, the principle of classification (reflection) of natural history, is replaced by the principle of life of the newer 19th c. biology (Cuvier), in which the concept, or words do to speak entered the organism. In a 'physiology' very reminiscent of the 'physiology' of morals, Nietzsche's attempt to break with all transcendentals. There is an organicist model here: the normal, the pathological. Forms of life are organic and can be more or less systemic. Their technological successors: the actor-network can also be more or less systemic. Technological forms of life are somehow instead cybernetic. They are self reproducing systems, who take in information, select it from the environment, command and control it, 'steer it' (Steuer), And then work through communications. Of the members of the technological systems with one another. Their systems the man-machine interface. The system of man *and* his extensions. Where the man-machine interface becomes the technological system, the subject-object unit of the tech culture. Its, not exchanging so much as flowing, semiotic unit is the information-

communication.

### *Property*

In forms of life, the material is proprietary. Forms of life themselves or culture is not proprietary. Hence we have the laws of material property. Property is a collection of means, means of survival, means of production, means of reproduction of economies, families and generations. Culture and life itself does not come under the principle of property, but stands transcendent to it, as the *an-sich* is transcendent to the *fur-sich*, and indeed the *for-itself* is always means, always utilities. In forms of life, life is the content. As form and content they are intellectual intuition, the concrete universal. Kant said form without content is empty, content without form is blind. You need forms *and* life to have culture. Forms of life are finalities, ends. When the forms separate out from the content, from the life and Kant's forms were means, instruments, they too can accumulate, like capital, in a sort of standing reserve. As empty, as means, they are indeed frames, contentless utilities. But what happens when forms of life become technological? On the one hand, it is not only the material, but now the cultural itself that accumulates. That become proprietary. It is the intelligible that accumulates. Accumulations of the intelligible come under the laws of intellectual property.

Culture, i.e. forms of life, previously the antithesis of property becomes proprietary. Surely with copyright. This is especially important today with the 'platform'. Platforms are conditions of possibility of technological forms of life. They are constitutive rather than regulative. Thus operating systems are constitutive without which there can be no regulative rules. Platforms are particularly central forms of intellectual property. They are gatekeepers -that bar and enable participation in tech FOL. Platforms may or may not be proprietary. US cell phone platforms are; European DSN is not. Platforms tend to become standards because they enable more universal interchange. Standards can be proprietary - Windows, or not - Unix, DSN. The same is true in biotechnology -cf. the famous patenting and trade marking of the oncomouse. That is literally proprietary life itself. (Strathern, Haraway) Journals: must have to participate in TFOL in libraries. As necessary platforms. Controlled by a handful of publishers. As necessary platforms, a *de facto* standard, that dominates libraries' purchase. No accumulation of the intelligible possible - in the production of scholarly, peer refereed articles (esp. science, technology, business journals) without this platform, without this *de facto* standard. cf. future struggles with interment publishing between the proprietary and the non-proprietary. Of course the same with digital set top boxes.

### *Linearity*

Forms of life are continuous, they are linear. For much settler cultures from the start are somehow not just organic but linear, they extend, they work through explosion. [FOOTNOTE: Nomadic cultures are to the contrary discontinuous. Nomads are not like herds. They are in movement. They strike. They are like the 'stranger'. But they may travel in packs. They are coyotes. They attack the flanks of the herd, the system. they destroy the organism. Hence the fascination of Nietzsche and Deleuze with nomads. They do not have forms of life. Or horizons. They also work through signals.] There is a sort of linear expansion. Churches are linear, sects are mosaic. Over roads. Empires expand over 'roads'. National communities as forms of life, as imagined forms of life. They grow through linear expansion as 'peasants become Frenchmen'. Tech forms of life for their part are discontinuous. The organism is somehow continuous. It does not exist in fragments. TFOL is splintered, exploded into fragments. The organism has ruptured and the organs subsumed into the flows in circulations. The body is no longer an organism, It is empty, a body without organs that joins into the global



flows of weapons, drugs, immigrants, orphans children. What was interior exteriorises. Consciousness into flows, organisms into flows of organs. Unconscious desire (as lack) into flows of libido. All of the inner entities of forms of life exteriorise. they exteriorise and compress. Exteriorise and compress. Indeed all the inner content of forms life, all of life exteriorises and compresses.

Networks are discontinuous. They are comprised not of 'roads' of 'ports'. Like mobile teleports. Like networked airports. The European Union is continuous. must work within extra-national forms of life. Needs a 'figure', a symbolic. Networks need neither a figures nor a symbolic. They deal in communications, not in the imaginary, in flows. Flows have little imagination. Colonialism was continuous, Post colonial power is discontinuous. It works through networks. Post colonial power needs no ideology. it works indeed through the performative, not the pedagogic. The pedagogic has to do with forms of life. The immediacy of the speech act, the communication is performative. Not the linear story telling or discourse of the pedagogic. This immediacy is technological, Is based on flows and networks. Post-colonial power is non-linear power.

### *Death*

Forms of life are about life. About life in opposition to reflection. But life should be seen here not just in contrast to reflection, but also in contrast to death. It is death as other, on the outside that constitutes forms of life on the inside. This is for the collective, where theodicy as suffering, the interpretation of suffering and especially death constitute a sort of symbolic on the inside. In terms of the deepest meanings. Or for the individual death in the individual narrative. When we live a certain finitude in the face of our mortality, then we live authentically, eigentlich. TFOL do not work off the opposition of life and death. They are not forms of life on the inside with death on the outside. Culture as the same is no longer constituted in contraposition to death as the other. TFOL are forms of life-and-death. There is no outside now. With universal compression to semiotic bytes, lines, networks and interfaces there is very little of substance to make up the same. There is not a life-world but a life and death world, not of a Lebensphilosophie but a TodundLebensphilosophie. It is a culture not of life but of life-and-death. Not life and death in the sense that every moment matters, or that every moment is significant. But precisely because these moments do not matter. Because death is no longer important enough - no longer sufficiently mourned - to constitute anything. Death is just another element of the network, just another unit of information.

### *Critique*

Forms of life open up the possibility of critique. Indeed critique began most significantly with Hegel's critique of the philosophy of reflection. Critique is system taken to task by life world, beings by being. Critique needs continuity, needs to be of the linear. When power is no longer linear, we cannot so easily find critique. Critique needs space, and time both which are in short supply in the technological culture. Critique must be from the information. With the supplement. Power. Intellect property, exclusion more important than exploitation. Power is elusive in technological forms of life, which, it is becoming clear perhaps may no longer be forms of life at all.

