of the social relations themselves"; and second, since not all statistical configurations of social relations are created equal, different configurations offer "different practical possibilities for intervention and administration," and as such, "the worth of census data [and quantitative research more generally] is related to the projects in whose service they are enlisted."

In this chapter I explore a different configuration of Indigenous sociality in light of the important considerations that Curtis (2001) details. One increasingly important element of contemporary Canadian Indigenous sociality that sits largely outside the ability of current statistical configurations to document is the emerging urban Indigenous communities that have emerged as engines of cultural Indigenous power in both Australia and Canada. While official quantitative data analysts have begun to explore these social relations, they do so by cross tabulating existing census classifications with geographical residence. The chapter's third and final part will explain the problems with attempting to "pour new wine into old bottles," and how we might go about creating a new set of analytical lenses better suited for dealing with the Indigenous sociality of these novel and distinctive communities.

Example 1: Tribal Affiliations as Ethnic Ancestry

I have written elsewhere about the ways in which Statistics Canada measures ethnic ancestry and the problems this presents for enumerating changes between Aboriginal categories—what Statistics Canada officials refer to as "ethnic drift" or "ethnic mobility" (Andersen 2013b). As explained in various parts of this book, current census categories are employed not because they measure Indigenous "identity" better or more accurately than other alternative categories might, but because they better measure the *kinds* of knowledge required as evidence for deficit-based policy interventions. But, as this chapter outlines, there is nothing acontextually superior about such categories and, indeed, the positioning of these as measuring "identity" to the exclusion of other, equally contextual measures naturalizes particular ways of understanding Indigenous peoples, our communities, and the issues within them.

Back to the issue of ethnic ancestry. We explained in Chapter 1 how notions of "ethnic ancestry" have been embedded into development-based discourses. Here, I want to describe a different way to enumerate Indigenous identity—through tribal identity. I am not suggesting that tribal identity and "ethnic" identity are identical (to do so is to efface the realities of Indigenous sovereignty that separate them). Nonetheless, thinking in terms of official identification, tribal identities offer a particular *kind* of collective identification, despite the fact that contemporary policy makers seem to hold little interest in these forms of affiliation.

In the previous chapter, Walter explored the ways in which changing the ontological landscape within which we understand Indigeneity—from

the conventional mapping of Australia to one focused more specifically on Indigenous national boundaries—changes the ways in which we understand and enumerate it. The same is true, though in a different way, in Canada. As it stands, Statistics Canada officially enumerates Aboriginality according to two major questions, with several additional sub-questions depending on the answers provided to the first two. To provide some contextualization, we will detail some of the history behind why the current categories exist as they do and their relationship to Canada's colonial history.

Canada's Constitution recognizes three distinct Aboriginal peoples—First Nations (formerly termed "Indians"); Inuit (formerly termed "Eskimos"); and Métis (formerly termed "Half-breeds" and "Metis"), but these are administrative distinctions that relate to the Canadian government's attempts to govern the diversity of Indigenous peoples in Canada, rather than reflecting "real" or exhaustive accountings of Indigenous identities. For example, the term 'First Nations' encapsulates dozens of distinctive tribal societies that, while sharing broad cosmological similarities, nonetheless exhibit massive differences in their internal and external governance of language, lifestyle, land tenure, and gender relations, to name but a few of many sectors of social life. To provide one of many examples: Canada's "Indigenous population" possesses more than fifty languages from a dozen different language groups.

Despite this distinctiveness and diversity, British, and later Canadian, governing rationalities and policy was never intended to reflect this diversity. Instead, the major category through which they understood Indigenous peoples and attempted to produce governing policy was that of "Indian," and before that, "friend and foe" (Tobias 1991), based in pre-confederate social and political dynamics of imperialism (Day 2000; Dickason 1992; Tobias 1991). Early relations were largely based in European sovereignty-based concerns with marking and claiming territory (see Hogeveen 1999).

In the Indigenous territories that eventually came to be claimed by Canada, these concerns first assumed the guise of England and the Hudson's Bay Company, through the former granting the Royal Charter of 1670 to the latter, and the relations of domination and subservience particular to the fur trade relations that followed in its wake. Concomitant with this rationality of accumulation, Indigenous territories were also variously claimed (often without their knowledge) in a larger game of imperial power between England and France, and later the United States. Following the Seven Years War in the mid eighteenth century and the subsequent creation of treaties and agreements of friendship and collaboration, imperial claims to Indigenous territories began to stabilize. Despite this early if grudging equality, Aboriginal settlements and nations in "Canadian" territory came increasingly under the ambit of British imperial control.

Early relations between Aboriginal nations and various imperial powers were characterized by an uneasy equality, likely fueled by mutual trade concerns. While this uneasy and often fragile equality shaped the protective stance of initial attempts at formal policy through which the British government attempted to ward off the growing intrusion of non-Indigenous settlers (exemplified in the precepts of the *Royal Proclamation of 1763*), governing rationalities from the non-Indigenous side remained powerfully anchored in the rule of difference alluded to in the Introduction (Chatterjee 1993) as the central marker of global colonial rule. By the end of the inter-empire rivalries with France and the United States at the dawn of the nineteenth century, Aboriginal communities suddenly found themselves targeted as "impediments to progress" and in need of "civilization," rather than as the "valued allies" of their earlier relationships. Initial official attempts to "civilize" targeted Indigenous individuals' moral capacity through their "souls" in the form of religious instruction and (in some cases) physical removal from the corrupting influences of white society. By the era of Canadian confederation in 1867, however, these interventions had turned into more deliberate and calculated attempts at assimilation.

During and following the treaty era (roughly the period between 1870 and 1920), Aboriginal communities—most extremely status Indian communities (described in Chapter 1)—came under increasing surveillance from Canadian government authorities, including the then-termed Department of Indian Affairs, the North West Mounted Police (a national policing agency formed in the 1870s), and the church. Interventionist techniques began to include the rationing of food, the imposition of a pass system controlling movement on- and off-reserve for those designated as "Indians," the outlawing of ceremonies (though these interventions were uneven in their application), the imposition of Christianity, an expectation to take up farming, and the large-scaled creation of "residential schools" (for general overviews, see Dickason 1992; Miller 1989; Ray 2008). Such measures were widely viewed by contemporaneous authorities as a midway point in the eventual assimilation of the "Indian problem" and the disappearance of Indians.

Importantly, the rationalities undergirding this intervention were shot through with Victorian racializing and patriarchal mentalities, particularly (though not only) for those classified as "Indians." Indeed, legislation such as the 1876 *Indian Act* and the racism and patriarchy woven into its rules and regulations not only served as the basis for intervention into "Indian" communities, it shaped the very boundaries of the communities themselves. Once adopted as common practices of administrative policy, these policies enacted horrendous impacts on the kin relations of Indigenous women in particular, as well as their children.

Nonetheless, the term 'Indian' became—and remains—the mainstay through which the complexity of Indigenous society was rendered visible to

Canada's government, and a bulk of its knowledge about Indigenous peoples has keyed off this one term. Particularly, through the Department of Indian Affairs, Canada's "Indian policy" enacted horrendous policies on tens of thousands of Aboriginal people in hundreds of Aboriginal communities across the country. Given the Department of Indian Affairs's detailed colonial knowledge about Native communities, it is little wonder that the history of census-taking and the categories of its enumeration have been so deeply rooted in the colonial rationalities animating Indian Affairs administration. This included both biological understandings of race (and racial "mixedness") and an associated patriarchy through which "Indian" was defined legislatively and through which the Department of Indian Affairs excluded (formerly) status Indian women and their families upon their marriage to non-status men (see Eberts 2010; Palmater 2011).

From its 1871 inception in the census, the category "Indian" was, of course, derived from Department of Indian Affairs legislation. Likewise, through most of the twentieth century, census enumerator instructions for collecting Aboriginal "ethnic ancestry" information required ascertaining the patrilineage of "Indian" respondents (that is, ascertaining whether the respondent's father was "Indian") rather than, for example, tribal affiliation. Not uncoincidentally, this fit squarely into policy requirements of the *Indian Act*. From the standpoint of longer standing ethnic ancestry like that found in tribal affiliation and broader kinship dynamics, however, such classifications wreaked havoc (see Lawrence 2004; Simpson 2008). Despite the numerous changes to the official meaning and boundaries of legal "Indianness" the category itself has displayed a remarkable endurance. Buoyed by a now-massive infrastructure geared toward the integration of "Indians" into the mainstream Canadian body politic, the term's legitimacy enfolded its census visage to sit at the largely unquestioned center of Canada's colonial/administrative "Aboriginal policy."

Despite their widespread use and longstanding legitimacy, however, the current census categories are not the only logical categories that could be used to produce knowledge about the Aboriginal population in Canada. Arguably, equally (if not more so) contextual indicators of identity can theoretically be derived from existing ethnic ancestry data produced in the existing "long-form" National Household Survey. For example, question 17 of the current National Household Survey asks, "What were the ethnic or cultural origins of this person's ancestors?" with the caveat that the term "ancestor" refers to someone more distant than a grandparent (Statistics Canada 2011: 10). Among the twenty-eight options listed as examples of ancestral ethnic cultures, the form includes "Cree, Mi'kmaq, Salish, Métis, Inuit" as Aboriginal examples.

Two problems prevent any data analysis and (thus) knowledge production using a tribal context. First, Statistics Canada does not publicly release data pertaining to tribal affiliation. As such, even if tribal policy makers (or any policy

makers, for that matter) wished to apply for grants using publicly available, tribally specific data, they couldn't. A second sub-question of the Aboriginal identity question allows respondents to fill in their "First Nation" and so might serve as a (imperfect) proxy, not everyone fills these out and not all First Nations are included. But even in this case, the aspiring statistician would likely have to contact Statistics Canada directly (or, given current privacy legislation, become employed with them) in order to get access to this information. Likewise, while Aboriginal "first language" could also be used as a proxy for tribal affiliation, we run into the same problems in terms of how the census question is posed (in terms of language competency[2]).

In addition to the problem of not releasing the data publicly, it is unlikely that even if it were available, policy makers—Aboriginal or non- —would find it useful. This is because in Canada the current categories of analysis are so powerfully entrenched in the Aboriginal policy field (for reasons explained in Chapter 1) that any data produced in a tribal context would be of little value to the kinds of grants applied for and auditing requirements levied by various funding organizations. This is particularly problematic in an urban context where much of the funding supporting Indigenous social services organizations in Canadian cities is short term/year-to-year funding with onerous grant-writing requirements and, more often than not, "status free" requirements, meaning that the service organization must admit Aboriginal clientele regardless of their legal categorization (see Andersen and Strachan 2012).

And yet. Given the internal diversity of Indigenous societies and given the broad span of colonial projects across such a geographically expansive landscape, we should not be surprised that Indigenous peoples encountered, endured, and reacted to colonial projects differently, for a wide variety of reasons relating to location, governing structures, and the eras within which colonial authorities attempted to colonize them. Likewise, the same diversity could reasonably be expected of the kinds of social conditions they find themselves and their communities in today. There are a number of reasons, then, to think that tribally specific data might be useful in ways that the current data categories are not.

Another level at which we can think about this is to recall Curtis's (2001: 35) observation about the worth of census data: different configurations offer "different practical possibilities for intervention and administration" and, as such, "the worth of census data [and quantitative research more generally] is related to the projects in whose service they are enlisted." In Canada, the Assembly of First Nations is the national organization that purports to speak on behalf of the vast bulk of all First Nations in Canada. Part of the organization's problem, however, has always been that of dealing with the diversity of First Nations within it. One way tribally specific data might be useful would be in the context of making tribally specific claims within the organization itself.