Inhuman Conditions

On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights

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Introduction

Globalization and the Inhuman

Whether *globalization* is defined in terms of a transnational market of production sites with an equally transnational labor market under the regime of flexible capitalist accumulation, the global spread of speculative finance capital and its plethora of sophisticated instruments, the rise of regional and supranational political formations, the accelerating mass migration of peoples, or the worldwide flows of culture, images, and data via the mass media and information technologies, the humanities appear to have very little to contribute to its study. The various component processes of globalization are empirical phenomena that are the proper objects of investigation for the social sciences. Even the study of images, data, and cultural flows and transfers, where humanistic modes of inquiry can be said to have some purchase, is arguably more efficiently conducted under the technical expertise of anthropology or mass communications and media studies.

In fact, however, the humanities are intimately connected to globalization in at least two ways. First, the intensive universality of the idea of humanity always already implies the extensiveness of globality as its concrete mode and sphere of actualization. Hence, Immanuel Kant, who distinguished humanity from animality in terms of the ability of the former to overcome the limitations of immediate existence and expand the circle of identification and belonging through sociability *(Geselligkeit)*, attributed to the humanities *(humaniora)* the power of cultivating our humanity by instilling in us "*the universal feeling of sympathy,* and the ability to engage universally in very intimate *communication.*"[1] Second, whether they are explicitly normative or merely descriptive, discourses about globalization almost always pre-comprehend a certain under-

standing of the human that is continuous with the canonical idea of humanity with which it shares cognate terms such as freedom and dignity. In arguments in praise of globalization as well as those about the need to regulate or curb its vicissitudes, human freedom (and whatever is inimical to it) is always at stake. In 1963, Frantz Fanon already pointed to the urgent need for humanity to reassert itself against the depredations of an unequal global capitalist system of accumulation in the postcolonial Cold War conjuncture:

> Now that the colonial countries have achieved their independence the world is faced with the bare facts that make the actual state of the liberated countries even more intolerable. The basic confrontation which seemed to be colonialism versus anticolonialism, indeed capitalism versus socialism, is already losing its importance. What matters today, the issue which blocks the horizon, is the need for a redistribution of wealth. Humanity will have to address this question, no matter how devastating the consequences may be.[2]

Identical sentiments have been expressed in the current post–Cold War conjuncture by Kofi Annan, who characterizes the inhumanity of globalization processes in terms of the alienation of humanity from itself:

> Workers may find their jobs made suddenly obsolete or uneconomic by imported technology or foreign competition. . . . Instead of widening our choices, globalization can seem to be forcing us all into the same shallow, consumerist culture—giving us all the same appetites but leaving us more unequal than ever before in our ability to satisfy them. That feeling accounts for much of the fear and anger we see in today's world. In many places, very destructive forces have been unleashed. We like to call them inhuman, but in reality they are all too human: They are one of the ways our human nature reacts when we feel ourselves threatened.[3]

This discourse of human self-alienation, which views globalization processes as human creations that require urgent sociopolitical collective regulation because they have escaped the grasp of their creators, is exemplary of most social-scientific accounts of globalization. The inhuman is here understood as a finite limit of man, a defective feature of human existence that is not *proper* to the true end of man but that we have thus far failed to control, for example, commodification, technology, totalitarian domination, and the like. We quite properly compare such

phenomena to animals or ghosts, associate them with death, and characterize them as subhuman precisely because they are improper to us but also reducible to us and must be overcome or transcended if we are to actualize the freedom that is our due.

This book is concerned with the ways in which such discourses of the human, which derive from the humanities, influence, irrigate, and underwrite our understandings of globalization. But more significantly, to the extent that the humanities do not take the humanity of the human being as a given but set as their basic task the inquiry into how humanity is constituted, this book also broaches the unsettling issue of whether the vicissitudes of globalization force us to question these axiomatic discourses of humanity, to radically rethink what it means to be human. In other words, if social-scientific solutions to the problems of globalization have always already pre-comprehended an idea of humanity as the bearer of dignity, freedom, sociability, culture, or political life, and therefore as an ideal project that needs to be actualized, the task and challenge of the humanities today in relation to globalization may be to question this pre-comprehension of the human and, somewhat perversely, even to give it up.

In the chapters that follow, I take up this challenge through engagements with two theoretical debates in which there has been a concerted attempt to give a softer, normative face to globalization by figuring it as an indispensable material condition for achieving humanity. These are the debates concerning the possible rise of new cosmopolitanisms in a world of movement, flux, and flow, and the establishment of international human rights regimes in a world no longer cleft by Cold War ideological scissions. Simply put, cosmopolitanism and human rights are the two primary ways of figuring the global as the human. Both phenomena are generally viewed as placing actual and normative limits on the efficacy of national culture and the sovereignty of the nation-state, which is seen as particularistic, oppressive, and even totalitarian. Yet the abiding question that insinuates itself into both these debates is whether or not the infrastructural and constitutive character of the contemporary international division of labor, with its stratification and polarization of the world into a prosperous postindustrial North (the United States, the European Union, and Japan), hyperdeveloping but authoritarian capitalist East Asia, industrializing India and Latin America, and low-growth Africa and the Arab and Islamic world, as well as the historical legacies

of colonialism and anti-imperialist struggle in the last three regions, indelibly compromises, circumscribes, and mars the face of global human solidarities and belongings staged by new cosmopolitanist and human rights discourses.[4]

The constitutive power of the international division of labor in these two fabrications of humanity ought to be understood through two related theoretical prisms: the problem of *technē* and the inhuman, and the power of transcendence that co-belongs with the human capacity for freedom. As a function and expression of global capitalism, the international division of labor can be understood as the composite product of technical, instrumental, or rational-purposive *(zweckrationale)* imperatives and actions. But although *technē* as a form of intentional or final causality requires human rational consciousness and therefore implies humanity's freedom from nature, it is also paradoxically inhuman. As the theorists of the Frankfurt School argued, *technē* can be inimical to the achievement of freedom because, taken to its extreme, a technical attitude toward other human beings reduces them to objects for instrumental use. Kant already described the "technical predisposition for manipulating things [*Handhabung der Sachen*]" as merely "a mechanical predisposition joined with consciousness," and characterized pragmatic action as "using other men skilfully for [one's] purposes."[5] Accordingly, the moral law categorically prohibits the instrumentalization or technologization of human beings—the use of another human as a means rather than as an end in itself—because all human beings are persons and not things by virtue of their ontological constitution as rational and free beings: "So act that you use humanity [*die Menschheit*], whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end [*Zweck*], never merely as a means [*Mittel*]."[6]

This proscription of instrumentality informs the fundamental axiom of human rights discourse, namely, that the human being, who is capable of rationality, is free and possesses dignity, and therefore is the bearer of inviolable rights. Although it is impossible to avoid instrumentality altogether, since human interaction mostly consists of pragmatic actions in which we routinely treat others as useful means in our pursuit of self-interest, human rights instruments constitute a quasi-juridical framework for regulating human relations so that people can act according to their self-interests and freedom of choice as long as their actions do not deprive others of the same freedom that they ought to have because of

their humanity. Hence, if the material aspects of concrete human life, for instance, the deployment of people as labor power, are viewed as a now globalized system of means and ends, then human rights regimes attempt to counteract and regulate this global field of instrumentality from a transcendent position. In a word, they seek to *humanize* the field of instrumentality.

The most glaring deficiency, however, in the protection and enforcement of human rights is their paradoxical link to the civil rights provisions of individual nation-states and, therefore, their natural dependence on citizenship within a sovereign state. As Hannah Arendt reminded us in *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* "civil rights—that is the varying rights of citizens in different countries—were supposed to embody and spell out in the form of tangible laws the eternal Rights of Man, which by themselves were supposed to be independent of citizenship and nationality."[7] For present purposes, we can gloss this dilemma as follows: although human rights are supposed to regulate and humanize the field of instrumentality, they are themselves dependent on the political *technē* of states for their enforcement and realization. This particular scene of the contamination of the human by *technē* has been historically understood in terms of the hampering and even vitiation of the universalistic vocation of Western democratic republicanism (with its internal link to human rights) by the particularism of membership in a people defined in terms of an artificially constructed homogeneous national culture that is mythically projected as natural. Under neoliberalism, the political culture of democratic republicanism is further undermined by another form of *technē:* the erosion of the social welfare state's powers of regulation by the purely economic imperatives and dictates of transnational capital. In this context, cosmopolitanism has an intrinsic affinity for human rights. As a form of collective consciousness that erodes national parochialism and facilitates the arduous process of establishing a platform for transnational political regulation, cosmopolitanism can help to release human rights from their historical bondage to the instrumentality of sovereign national states.

The normative ability of cosmopolitanism and human rights to regulate the global system of means and ends is moreover entwined with a normative concept of culture as the human power of transcendence. One needs only to note that the normative dimension of cosmpolitanism resides primarily in its being a form of will-formation *(Willensbildung)* to

fully grasp this leitmotif of culture (*Kultur* or *Bildung*) as *the human condition,* that is to say, culture as the condition that humanizes our existence by raising it beyond inhumanizing *technē*. Strictly speaking, culture itself is a form of *technē* because it involves the purposive shaping of objects. But as the self-recursive purposive shaping of subjects, it is also a form of individual and collective self-instrumentalization that lifts us beyond mere instrumentality, either because it points us toward moral ideals or because it is work that inspirits reality with norms, thereby actualizing these norms even as facticity itself becomes normative in the same process.

I have already pointed to this idea of culture in Kant's celebration of the humanities. But this understanding of culture as the means by which humanity achieves itself through the overcoming of its finitude and, therefore, as the medium of expression and the performative self-actualization of the human spirit also informs the Hegelian idea of *Geist* and Marx's account of social intercourse *(Verkehr)* and socialized labor as the substrate for the epigenesis of humanity. The same power of transcending finite limitations underwrites Horkheimer and Adorno's sharp opposition between instrumental reason and critical reason. Instrumental or technical reason, which is the essence of scientific knowledge and material progress, is synonymous with power. "What human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings. Nothing else counts."[8] This lower form of reason needs to be overcome and transcended through a higher, self-recursive form of reason: "If enlightenment does not assimilate reflection on this regressive moment, it seals its own fate. By leaving consideration of the destructive side of progress to its enemies, thought in its headlong rush into pragmatism is forfeiting *its sublating* [*aufhebenden*] *character, and therefore its relation to truth.*"[9] Accordingly, "the critique of enlightenment. . . is intended to prepare a positive concept of enlightenment *which liberates it from its entanglement* in blind domination."[10] Jürgen Habermas's distinctions between technical and communicative action and between "lifeworld" and "system" are part of this genealogy.[11] What lies at the heart of this human capacity for overcoming or regulating finite or material limitations is essentially the power to remake the world and ourselves through meaningful, mediational forms such as symbols and images. In Ernst Cassirer's words: "Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man's progressive self-liberation. Language,

art, religion, science, are various phases of this process. In all of them man discovers and proves a new power—the power to build up a world of his own, an 'ideal' world."[12]

This understanding of culture tacitly informed discourses of economic progress and national-social development espoused by the social welfare states of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, but especially by postcolonial states of the ci-devant Third World. In both cases, *Bildung* was recoded as the cultivation of the well-being of the national body conceived in analogy with an individual person striving to maximize its capacities, and the *Bildung* of the nation-state was regarded as the condition for the cultivational relation between the state and its individual citizens, whether this was understood as the protection of individual civil and political freedoms or the respect for socioeconomic rights. Of course, this sort of cultivation often modulated into social control through official bourgeois nationalist ideology. But with the inability of the postcolonial state to fulfill its promises of freedom in an unequal neocolonial global economy, and the gradual decline of the Northern social welfare state under neoliberalism, this concept of culture was increasingly refigured in the more extensive shapes of cosmopolitanism and human rights. This is the conjuncture where we currently find ourselves.

The constitutive power of the international division of labor over cosmopolitanism and human rights discourses, however, problematizes the human capacity for transcending instrumentality in at least two ways. First, the fact that these humanizing forms of solidarity are themselves enabled by and inextricably imbricated within instrumental relations points to the irreducible crafting of the human capacity for freedom by *technē*. Indeed, these technologies are not just economic. They are multifarious and operate at every level. They stretch from global political negotiations, diplomatic relations, and even military deployment in the name of global security to policies and technologies of global competition and economic development, as well as those techniques for the management and enhancement of populations and the disciplining of individual bodies as human capital which are indispensable to capitalist development—what Michel Foucault has called bio-power.[13] Second, the power of remaking the world into a higher spiritualized nature through normative ideals and images also opens up the possibility of the coagulation of purportedly mutable social norms and cultural forms into

a second nature that is lived and incarnated in every pore of our corporeal lives and that stubbornly persists even after radical critique has exposed them as contingent nonnatural processes. Second natures of this kind can be either constraining and oppressive or enabling. I have called the postcolonial nationalisms induced by uneven globalization cases of "given culture." The crucial point is that this aporetic oscillation between culture *qua* human formation and nature, which does not always serve the ends of the human spirit, points to something profoundly inhuman in the constitution of the human being. Analyzing this oscillation in the Foucauldian terms of the tug-of-war between subjection and the ethical practice of freedom, the interplay between technologies of power and technologies of the self in the constitution of subjects in a given historical situation, is a valuable exercise.[14] But it does not exactly address the more difficult question of the radical susceptibility of human life, and perhaps even life itself, to the constitutive play of *technē*.

Moreover, the constitution of human freedom by *technē* also points to the need for an alternative account of change that does not issue in the first instance from the human power of transcendence. Rightful or legitimate political transformation has conventionally been regarded as a change in the *form* of the ordering of collective political life. Such alteration is understood as an effect of the freedom that stems from the human capacity for self-activity and the transcendence of finite limitations through our various rational faculties. The problem, however, is that neither human rights nor cosmopolitan solidarities can escape from being entangled within the field of instrumentality. They are pulled back into and find themselves mired within the imperatives and techniques of globalization at many different levels. And yet these phenomena also have a normative dimension that cannot simply be reduced to the ideological reflection of the global system. I have suggested that normative change should be thought in terms of the *inscription* of universal norms within a global field of forces, their repeated generation from an infinite textile back into which they are repeatedly woven.

We can understand the peculiar dynamism at work here by borrowing from Saussure's account of linguistic change. The perverse uniqueness of language as a social institution, Saussure argued, stems from the fact that it is not the product of a consensual contract by a limited number of individuals but the result of entirely arbitrary conventions that are constantly affirmed through time by the haphazard participation of every

1

The Cosmopolitical—Today

> The entire world can now observe the actions of any person. And people can observe the actions of the entire world.
>
> Pramoedya Ananta Toer, *This Earth of Mankind*

We live in an era when nationalism seems to be out of favor in academia. The catchwords of the moment are *globalization, transnationalism,* even *postnationalism.* Many argue that the accelerated pace of economic globalization—the intensification of international trade, fiscal and technology transfers, and labor migration, and the consolidation of a genuinely global mode of production through foreign direct investment and subcontracting—in advanced post-Fordist or late capitalism, the transnationalization of military command structures through NATO, and the rise of global hybrid cultures from modern mass migration, consumerism, and mass communications since the 1980s have combined to create an interdependent world in which the nation-state faces imminent obsolescence as a viable economic unit, a politically sovereign territory, and a bounded cultural sphere. Even official U.S. nationalism feels the need to put on nonnational costume now and then, either as the champion of world trade liberalization or as the protector of international human rights.

Indeed, the unprecedented growth of academic research on nationalism in recent years predominantly takes the tone of an officiation at a wake foretold. Scholars of both liberal and leftist persuasions in the humanities and the social sciences have tried to hasten the demise of nationalism by pointing to its pathological nature. Nationalism has been linked to the right-wing racist ideologies of the Axis powers of the Second World War, the rise of new right-wing movements and xenophobia

in Western Europe, and genocidal wars in Eastern Europe. Third World statist ideologies justifying the oppression of religious and ethnic minorities and, more recently, Islamic patriarchal fundamentalism and oppressive identity politics in the postcolonial South have also been described as nationalist. It is argued that these nationalist discourses give the lie to the promise of freedom made by national liberation movements during decolonization. The subfield of postcolonial studies emerges from this general disenchantment with nationalism, more specifically exemplified by the argument of the subaltern studies scholars of India that nationalism is an ideological humanism engendered from colonialist discourse.[1]

The New Cosmopolitanism

In this intellectual climate where nationalism is rejected as a particularistic mode of collective consciousness or a privative ethnic identity that disguises itself as a universalism and the political institution of the nation-state is viewed as undesirable and outmoded, cosmopolitanism has emerged as a political alternative. Of course, there were earlier articulations of cosmopolitanism in the history of philosophy which celebrated it as an ideal political project or a practical consciousness that could overcome nationalist particularism and offer a better embodiment of genuine universalism. What is distinctively new about the revival of cosmopolitanism that began in the 1990s is the attempt to ground the normative critique of nationalism in analyses of contemporary globalization and its effects. Hence, studies of various global phenomena such as transcultural encounters, mass migration and population transfers between East and West, First and Third Worlds, North and South, the rise of global cities as central sites for the management of global financial and business networks, the formation of transnational advocacy networks, and the proliferation of transnational human rights instruments have been used to corroborate the general argument that globalizing processes, both past and present, objectively embody different forms of normative, non-ethnocentric cosmopolitanism because they rearticulate, radically transform, and even explode the boundaries of regional and national consciousness and local ethnic identities.[2] In comparison with older philosophical approaches, cosmopolitanism is regarded no longer as merely an ideal project based on universal reason but as a variety of actually existing practical stances. It is suggested that

whatever its shortcomings, contemporary transnationalism furnishes the material conditions for new radical cosmopolitanisms from below that can regulate the excesses of capitalist economic globalization. These new cosmopolitanisms are therefore the human face of globalization.

Although the remilitarization of Northern imperialism and the proliferation of "anti-globalization" movements exemplified by the protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the early years of the twenty-first century have posed serious challenges to the new cosmopolitan visions of the 1990s, the issues raised by the new cosmopolitanism are not reducible to or exhausted by its origins in the post–Cold War pro-globalization discourse of the end of the twentieth century.[3] "Anti-globalization" movements are in fact not against globalization per se but against the neoliberal regime of globalization. Indeed, one possible response to the remilitarization of the world is a renewed project of cosmopolitan democracy that will lead to the establishment of an international criminal court and genuinely multilateral institutions for the enforcement of public international laws governing crimes against humanity, including the unjustified "war against terrorism" waged by the United States. It is therefore productive to assess some of the claims of the new cosmopolitanism.

New theories of cosmopolitanism can be reduced to three related propositions, two of which are empirical and one normative. First, it is suggested that cultural and political solidarity and political agency should not be automatically restricted to the sovereign nation-state as a unified spatiotemporal container because globalization has undermined many of the key functions from which the nation-state derives its legitimacy.[4] Second, a stronger positive link is posited between globalization and cosmopolitanism. It is argued that the various material networks of globalization have formed a world that is interconnected enough to generate political institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have a global reach in their regulatory functions as well as global forms of mass-based political consciousness or popular feelings of belonging to a shared world. Third, building on the conventional critique of nationalist particularism, it is argued that the new cosmopolitan consciousness is normatively superior to nationalism. Even if cosmopolitanism is no longer grounded in universal reason, it is a more expansive form of solidarity that is attuned to democratic principles and human interests without the restriction of territorial borders. In some cases it is

also suggested that the new cosmopolitan consciousness is in a relation of mutual feedback with emerging global institutions, taking root and finding sustenance from these institutions and influencing their functioning in turn.

The emancipatory potential of these new cosmopolitanisms turns on the nature of their relation to capitalist globalization. In this chapter I address some of the new cosmopolitanist arguments from the softer social sciences that have been influential in the humanities. The next two chapters deal with theories of cosmopolitanism from philosophy and cultural studies.

Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism as Vehicles of Freedom in the History of Ideas

The normative critique of the nation-state as a particularistic straitjacket that limits the circle of political belonging and action is based on a restrictive understanding of the nation as a cultural formation that serves the modern territorial state's bureaucratic and administrative imperatives to stabilize the intense mobility and transformation that characterize modern societies. Hence, a static and primordialist self-understanding is imputed to the nation, which is invariably linked to the state instead of the people. It is then suggested that the primordial unity of the nation, which has become a fundamental methodological assumption of social-scientific research, is in fact an ideological mystification. The apparent solidity of the national container easily decomposes into a multiplicity of transnational processes that traverse national space and undermine its fabric, thereby pointing to the emergence of cosmopolitan forms of political solidarity and action. Essentially, the normative deficiency of the nation-form is seen to derive from its mystificatory character and its connection to the particularistic imperatives of the territorial state. In contradistinction, cosmopolitanism breaks down these particularistic barriers and envisions borderless modes of belonging.

But is nationalism in fact reducible to an ideological appendage of the territorial state? Is the space-time of the nation necessarily static and primordial, and is nationalism always a particularistic form of consciousness that is antithetical to cosmopolitanism? Benedict Anderson, for example, has argued that the nation originates in global pilgrimages from the Creole Americas to the European metropole, and that unlike ethnic-

ity, nationalism operates according to the universalistic logic of an unbounded seriality.[5] Indeed, from an intellectual-historical perspective, the understanding of cosmopolitanism as an erosion of the particularistic barriers of the national imagination, as something that comes after and seeks to transcend an anterior mass-based nationalism, turns out to be an anachronistic projection. The relation between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is more supple and complex, and the putative thematic opposition between these terms has always been unstable.

As a central concept of the eighteenth-century French *philosophes,* cosmopolitanism is derived from *kosmopolitēs,* a composite of the Greek words for "world" and "citizen," by way of the *esprit cosmopolite* of Renaissance humanism.[6] It primarily designates an intellectual ethic, a universal humanism that transcends regional particularism. It is important to note that contrary to conventional understandings, the cosmopolitan spirit is not one of rootlessness. What is imagined is a universal circle of belonging that embraces the whole of humanity, as a result of the transcendence of the particularistic and blindly given ties of kinship and country. Hence, the cosmopolitan embodies the universality of philosophical reason itself, namely, its power of transcending the particular and contingent. The regional particularism opposed by cosmopolitanism may be defined territorially, culturally, linguistically, or even racially, but it is not defined *nationally* as we now understand the term, because in a Europe made up of absolutist dynastic states, the popular national state did not yet exist. Nor, indeed, had the doctrine of nationalism been fully articulated. Cosmopolitanism thus precedes the popular nation-state in history and nationalism in the history of ideas.

French Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, however, is merely an intellectual ethos or perspective espoused by a select clerisy. Its philosophers could not envision feasible political structures for the regular and widespread institutionalization of mass-based cosmopolitan feeling. Rousseau lamented that in relations between different societies, the Law of Nature, or natural pity, the original root of social virtues such as clemency and humanity, has lost "almost all the force it had in the relations between one man and another, [and] lives on only in the few great Cosmopolitan Souls [*grandes âmes cosmopolites*] who cross the imaginary boundaries that separate Peoples and, following the example of the sovereign being that created them, embrace the whole of Mankind in their benevolence."[7] The true inaugurator of modern cosmopolitanism is Im-

manuel Kant, whose vision of institutional cosmopolitanism involves a shift from a merely voluntary ethical community of intellectuals to a world political community grounded in right. Kant articulated four different modalities of cosmopolitanism that have become the main topoi of contemporary discussions of the concept in normative international relations theory (including accounts of global civil society and the international public sphere), liberal political economy, and theories of globalization. These modalities, which are part of a systemic whole, are: a world federation as the legal-political institutional basis for cosmopolitanism as a form of right; the historical basis of cosmopolitanism in world trade; the idea of a global public sphere; and the importance of cosmopolitan culture in instilling a sense of belonging to humanity.

What Kant calls "a universal *cosmopolitan existence*" is nothing less than the regulative idea of "a perfect civil union of mankind."[8] This global federation of all existing states is also more ambitiously described as "a universal federal state [*allgemeiner Völkerstaat*]."[9] Its constitution is "one in accord with the *right of citizens of the world* [*Weltbürgerrecht*], insofar as individuals and states, standing in the relation of externally affecting one another, are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind [*eines allgemeinen Menschenstaats*] *(ius cosmopoliticum)*."[10] Although it would not possess the coercive means of enforcement available to a world state, it would nevertheless be a legitimately institutionalized world community, able to make rightful claims on its constituent states regarding their treatment of individuals and other states. Individual states would retain their sovereignty but would be held accountable by a universal citizenry—humanity—on issues such as disarmament and imperialist expansion. Kant's world federation would therefore fall somewhere between the political community of the state in its lawful relations with other states and a world state.[11]

In Kant's view, world trade provided the historical basis of cosmopolitan unity. As the spirit of commerce spreads throughout the world, states find that it is in their self-interest to enter into this world federation to prevent war and violence, which deplete their financial power *(Geldmacht)*.[12] Moreover, the unity brought about by trade and other forms of encounter between countries creates something like a global public sphere that will safeguard cosmopolitan right by protesting any violations of it in the same manner that a critical national public sphere safeguards the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the territorial state: "Since the

(narrower or wider) community of the peoples [*Völkern*] of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right in *one* place of the earth is felt in *all,* the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing right; it is, instead, a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of a state and the right of nations necessary for the sake of any public rights of human beings [*öffentlichen Menschenrechte*]."[13] In addition, forms of culture also instill a deeper subjective sense of cosmopolitan solidarity or the feeling of belonging to humanity by encouraging universal social communication and sympathy. The fine arts and the sciences play a crucial role in developing our humanity *(Menschheit)* because they involve "a universally communicable pleasure."[14] The humanities *(humaniora)* cultivate our mental powers by instilling in us "the universal feeling of sympathy, and the ability to engage universally in very intimate communication [*das Vermögen, sich innigst und allgemein mitteilen, zu können*]. When these two qualities are combined, they constitute the sociability [*Geselligkeit*] that befits humanity and distinguishes it from the limitation of animals."[15]

Kant's cosmopolitanism signifies a turning point where moral politics or political morality needs to be formulated beyond the *polis* or state-form, the point at which "the political" becomes, by moral necessity, "cosmopolitical." For present purposes, what is striking is that Kant's cosmopolitanism is not identical to "internationalism," and its antonym is not "nationalism" but "statism." The historical timing of Kant's vision indicates that it is formulated prior to the spread of nationalism in Europe. Written in 1795, *Toward Perpetual Peace* clearly precedes what Lord Acton disparagingly names the age of "the modern theory of nationality"—the period between 1825 and 1831, when nationality, in search of statehood, emerges for the first time as the primary basis of revolution.[16] This era of the nationality principle saw the rise of Greek, Belgian, and Polish nationalist movements, first aroused by the Napoleonic invasion, and now rebelling against their Ottoman, Dutch, and Russian governments for the primary reason that these were foreign regimes. Kant's idea of the cosmopolitical is formulated too early to take into account the role of nationalism in the transition between the age of absolutism and the age of liberalism. It is more a philosophical republicanism and federalism designed to reform the absolutist dynastic state than a theory opposing the modern theory of nationality.[17] Indeed, because Kant writes at a time when the phenomenon and concept of "the

nation" is still at an embryonic stage, he points out that the right of peoples or nations *(Völkerrecht)* is a misnomer since it actually refers to the lawful relation of states to one another, *ius publicum civitatum*.[18]

The original antagonist of Kant's cosmopolitanism is therefore absolutist statism. Its appropriate historical context is not the age of nationalism but the interstate system of anarchy established by the Treaty of Westphalia after the breakup of the vast religious political communities of the medieval period. This interstate system, which arguably prevails through the early twenty-first century, is anarchic in at least two senses.[19] First, because the states within the system are not subject to an overarching universal sovereign authority, they are sovereign actors who claim absolute authority over the territories they govern. Second, much like corporations in a market, these states relate to one another and to individuals according to utilitarian principles of self-help and self-interest, without any cohering normative principles or moral purposes to regulate their actions. Kant's vision of cosmopolitical right asserted in the name of a common humanity attempts to provide an ideal institutional framework for regulating the anarchic behavior of states. It is not anti- or postnationalist. A prenationalist attempt to reform absolutist statism, it is not in the least an ideal of detachment opposed to national attachment. It is instead a form of right based on existing attachments that bind us into a collectivity larger than the state. This collectivity also includes states because international commerce is a form of sociability that brings states and individuals into relation, connecting all of us into a larger whole.

Kant, however, could not possibly predict that capitalism, or more specifically print capitalism, to use Benedict Anderson's felicitous phrase, was also the material condition of possibility of a different type of collective glue with similar humanizing aims. I am, of course, speaking of nationalism, which, like cosmopolitanism, also sought to provide rightful regulation for the behavior of absolutist states toward their individual subjects. In the initial moment of its historical emergence, nationalism is a *popular* movement distinct from the state it seeks to transform in its own image. Thus, before the nation finds its state, before the tightening of the hyphen between nation and state that official nationalism consummates, the ideals of cosmopolitanism and European nationalism in its early stirrings are almost indistinguishable. As late as 1861, Giuseppe Mazzini would emphasize that the nation was the only historically effective threshold to humanity:

> Your first Duties . . . are . . . to Humanity. You are *men* before you are *citizens* or *fathers*. . . . But what can *each* of you, with his isolated powers, *do* for the moral improvement, for the progress of Humanity? . . . The *individual* is too weak and Humanity is too vast. . . . But God gave you this means when he gave you a country, when, like a wise overseer of labour, who distributes the different parts of work according to the capacity of workmen, he divided Humanity into distinct groups upon the face of our globe, and thus planted the seeds of nations. . . . Without Country you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights, no admission as brothers into the fellowship of Peoples. You are the bastards of Humanity. . . . Do not beguile yourselves with the hope of emancipation from unjust social conditions if you do not first conquer a Country for yourselves. . . . Do not be led away by the idea of improving your material conditions without first solving the national question. . . . In labouring according to the true principles for our Country we are labouring for Humanity; our Country is the fulcrum of the lever which we have to wield for the common good. If we give up this fulcrum we run the risk of becoming useless to our Country and to Humanity. Before *associating* ourselves with the Nations which compose Humanity we must exist as a Nation.[20]

Indeed, even when cosmopolitanism is diluted in its usage to designate a universally normative concept of culture identified with the culture of a certain ethno-linguistic people such as in Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808), it is still compatible with nationalism because the national culture in question is not yet bonded to the territorial state and can be accorded world-historical importance without being imperialistic. The crucial point here is that prior to its annexation of the territorial state, nationalism is not antithetical to cosmopolitanism. In his classic study *Cosmopolitanism and the National State,* the German social historian Friedrich Meinecke argued that in its initial phase, German spiritual or ethical national feeling was also cosmopolitan in nature and that cosmopolitanism was superseded by nationalism only with the birth of a genuinely national state.[21] This unbounded and cosmopolitical extensiveness of pre-statized nationalism may further indicate that nationalism is not reducible to ethnicity and that nationalist politics is not necessarily a form of particularistic identity politics.

In the history of ideas, the notorious tensions between nationalism and cosmopolitanism become more apparent from Marx onwards. Whereas cosmopolitanism in idealist philosophy had designated a normative horizon of world history, for Marx, cosmopolitanism is realized

as exploitation on a world scale through international commerce and the establishment of a global mode of production:

> The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a *cosmopolitan* character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. . . . In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in spiritual [*geistigen*] production. The spiritual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness [*Beschränktheit*] become more and more impossible, and from numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.[22]

This passage documents the two crucial developments that occur between the cosmopolitanisms of Kant and Marx. For Marx, cosmopolitanism is no longer just a normative horizon or a matter of right growing out of international commerce. It is an existing and necessary condition resulting from the development of forces of production on a global scale. But more important, in the intervening years between *Toward Perpetual Peace* and the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848), a significant sense of national belonging had obviously developed. Nationality was not even an issue in Kant's vision of the cosmopolitical. It is therefore a little startling to see Marx characterizing the nation and its appendages—national economy, industry, and culture—in naturalistic and primordial terms only fifty-three years later. Indeed, by then the nation is sufficiently annexed to the territorial state (which has in turn naturalized its boundaries through official nationalism) for it to be characterized as a particularity to be opposed and eroded by (capitalist and proletarian) cosmopolitanism. For Marx, nationality belonged to an initial phase of capitalist production, the natural or immediate stage of the appearance of the capitalist form of capital. Even though this natural/national phase of capitalism was antiquated and in the process of being sublated *(aufgehoben)* into the higher and truer phase of cosmopolitan capitalism, it still existed, and its passing had to be hastened by ideology critique. The nation may have a weak compensatory dimension insofar as it provides the appearance of a natural collective-psychological or af-

fective barrier against the dehumanizing, atomizing effects of capital. But it is a false natural community, an ideological construction: the appeal to nationality in Listian exhortations to protect the national economy and industry mystifies the class interests of less developed bourgeois states.[23]

Marx's anti- and postnationalist cosmopolitanism is thus different from Kant's prenationalist cosmopolitanism. Kant missed the potential of popular nationalism as an emancipatory force against statism because he could not predict that the material interconnectedness brought about by capitalism would engender the bounded political community of the nation. Marx summarily dismissed nationalism although he witnessed its rise. Identifying the nation too hastily with the bourgeois state, Marx reduced the nation to an ideological instrument of the state and saw nationalism as a tendentious invocation of anachronistic quasi-feudal forms of belonging in modernity. The antagonistic relation between socialist cosmopolitanism and nationalism is premised on a collapsing of the nation into the state. Marx's cosmopolitanism presupposes a historical scenario in which the masses are able to recognize the nation as a tool of oppression because the hyphen between nation and bourgeois state has been rendered so tight that it has completely disappeared. The aphorism "the working men have no country" refers to the inevitable inability of bourgeois nations to command the loyalty of their proletariat in global exploitation and pauperization. Indeed, Marx was more concerned about abolishing the state apparatus than its epiphenomenon, the nation-form. Since he believed that nationality was already becoming obsolete, its dismantling would not require much effort, and the proletariat should direct their efforts at seizing state power instead: "The supremacy of the proletariat will cause [national differences] . . . to vanish still faster. . . . In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end."[24]

Marx's teleological argument about socialist cosmopolitanism is often dismissed for ignoring the continuing disparity between the working classes of different countries, a fact illustrated by the breakup of the Second International. But the more important reason why Marx missed the tenacity of nationalism so badly is that he deduced the ideological nature of nationality too hastily from the economic and cultural nationalism of European states and so foreclosed its popular dimension and its potential as an ally of Marxist cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, the fa-

ther of historical materialism works with an entirely ahistorical premise. He takes it for granted that the hyphen welding the nation to the state is immutable. Capitalism is certainly the progenitor of the European territorial national state. But in different historical situations, the global interconnectedness brought about by capitalism can also mutate to loosen the bourgeois state's stranglehold over the nation so that the state can undergo a popular renationalization. Marx seems to make a similar point in his unelaborated concept of the proletarian nation that occupies the interregnum between the bourgeois nation-state and the proletarian world community: "Since the proletariat . . . must constitute itself as the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word."[25]

The most notable revaluation of the national question in socialism so far has occurred in response to anticolonialist struggles.[26] Using national liberation movements in Asia as his example, Lenin argued in 1914 for a strategic alliance between the proletarian struggle and the right of nations to political self-determination based on the principle that the former would be served by supporting the bourgeoisie of an oppressed nation to the extent that it fights against imperialism:

> *If* the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fights against the oppressing one, we are always, in every case, and more resolutely than anyone else, *in favour.* . . . But if the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stands for *its own* bourgeois nationalism, we are opposed. We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressing nation, but we do not condone the strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed nation. . . . The bourgeois nationalism of *every* oppressed nation has a general democratic content which is directed *against* oppression, and it is this content that we support *unconditionally,* while strictly distinguishing it from the tendency towards national exceptionalism.[27]

Lenin's argument widens the small foothold opened by Marx's tentative acknowledgment that as a form of collective solidarity that shelters the worker against capital's atomizing effects, nationality has a compensatory dimension. Decolonizing nationalisms flourish in this opening, seizing this precarious foothold and filling Lenin's abstract notion of nationality with positive cultural content.

In the colonial situation, global capitalism has enslaved African and Asian territories either by establishing colonial administrative states (co-

lonial India, Africa, or Malaya) or by indirectly colonizing traditional dynastic states through extraterritorial demands (China, Siam, Ethiopia). At the same time, it leads to the birth of nations with interests that diverge from those of existing colonial or colonized states. No longer just an ideological tool of the state, the decolonizing nation can now serve as an agent of socialist cosmopolitanism to the extent that it attempts to save the state from the clutches of cosmopolitan capital. By bringing to the fore again the similar aims of cosmopolitanism and nationalism that Marx obscured, and by distinguishing these progressive goals from those of an imperializing cosmopolitanism, decolonizing nationalism destabilizes Marx's rigid antithesis between the two terms.[28] Thus, in words that seem to adapt Mazzini's position to decolonizing Asia, Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, argues that nationalism is the necessary basis of genuine cosmopolitanism:

> [Western colonial powers] are now advocating cosmopolitanism to inflame us, declaring that, as the civilization of the world advances and as mankind's vision enlarges, nationalism becomes too narrow, unsuited to the present age, and hence, that we should espouse cosmopolitanism. In recent years some of China's youths, devotees of the new culture, have been opposing nationalism, led astray by this doctrine. But it is not a doctrine which wronged races should talk about. We . . . must first recover our position of national freedom and equality before we are fit to discuss cosmopolitanism. . . . We must understand that cosmopolitanism grows out of nationalism; if we want to extend cosmopolitanism we must first establish strongly our own nationalism. If nationalism cannot become strong, cosmopolitanism certainly cannot prosper.[29]

But it is not only progressive nationalism that can ally itself with genuine cosmopolitanism. Reactionary (bourgeois) nationalism can also be the accomplice of capitalist cosmopolitanism. Thus, Frantz Fanon suggests that the retrograde national consciousness of underdeveloped countries is the result of "the apathy of the national bourgeoisie, its mediocrity, and its deeply cosmopolitan mentality."[30] Similarly, in the Second World War, Japanese imperial nationalism actively modulated into a violent military cosmopolitanism: the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere that stretched from Southeast Asia through Korea and China to conquered Russian territory.