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Deleuze's 'Immanent Historicism'

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> *More a physician than a patient, the writer makes a diagnosis, but what he diagnoses is the world; he follows the illness step by step, but it is the generic illness of man; he assesses the chances of health, but it is the possible birth of a new man.*
> Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*

It is not often noted, but *The Political Unconscious* by Fredric Jameson is explicitly presented as Deleuzian in spirit. It is, in effect, an experiment in immanent criticism, or what I would prefer to call 'immanent historicism', which like Deleuze and Guattari's first great collaboration, *The Anti-Oedipus*, is concerned, in Jameson's own words, 'to reassert the specificity of the political content of everyday life and of individual fantasy-experience and to reclaim it from that reduction to the merely subjective and to the status of psychological projection'.[1] That their respective projects could be the same or even similar scarcely seems possible given that they stand on opposite sides of that yawning chasm – namely, the Hegel and anti-Hegel divide – which in the decades since World War II has split philosophy in two. And yet, here is Jameson claiming a supposed enemy as a kindred spirit. This is surely the most provocative reading of Deleuze ever offered. Certainly, to my mind, it is the most interesting, and in what follows I will try to show how Jameson's insight can be used to enrich our understanding of Deleuze's work.

I aim to argue that Deleuze's 'clinical' method is in fact a modified form of historicism – where a theorist like Lukács, for instance, would speak of the history of forms, Deleuze speaks of permutations in the plane of composition, and while form and plane of composition are not exactly analogous they do serve a similar purpose in that both condition art. 'If there is progress in art it is because art can live only by creating new percepts and affects as so many detours, returns, dividing lines, changes of level and scale'.[2] By the same token, without linking the plane of composition to history in quite the same causal way that Lukács does with form (particularly in *The Theory of the Novel*), Deleuze does allow that it indicts history, and insofar as it does that, it seems to me it is useful and plausible to think of it as a new kind of historicism. That being said, it does need to be made clear that any resemblance between Lukács, say, and Deleuze is a matter of degree not kind. It is true that Deleuze does correlate stylistic shifts to world-historical events and circumstances as certain materialist

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(particularly Marxist) literary historians do, but his aim is not to chronicle the progress of literature itself.

Deleuze's view of things tends to be synchronic, not diachronic. When he speaks of the development of the line in easel painting, for instance, from its Gothic sources to its Bauhaus convulsions and modernist explosions in the hands of anti-line drip painters and pourers and true Dionysian originals like Jackson Pollock, he does so only to catalogue the increasing number and complexity of the constraints imposed on the production of the new by contemporary artists.[3] Effectively, each advance is also a reduction in the number of ways in which one could be original within a given field. Such restrictions, though, are viewed by Deleuze as opportunities for originality; they are simply so many more boundaries to be shifted or transgressed by whomsoever has the will and the taste for it. Interestingly enough, Jameson says something very similar: he defines postmodernism as a progressive increase in the number and strictness of artistic taboos (such as the one architects like Gehry seem to adhere to, that says a building can't look like what it is, a building, but must instead be a kind of stand-alone sculpture and look like a giant pair of binoculars, say). Likewise, he concludes that the true measure of creativity is to be found in the response the artist is able to make to this situation.[4] The point I want to make, though, is that Deleuze's conception of literature can still be usefully thought of as historicist, even if he doesn't conform to pre-existing models, because in his view literature has a special relation to history. And indeed insofar as this suggestion has the effect of estranging what we thought we meant by 'historicism' it serves the further, even more useful purpose, of renewing the very notion of historicism itself.

Deleuze's historicism is, to be sure, a historicism of an immanent rather than transcendental cast. He doesn't charge it with the task of absolutizing anything (sublating 'history' into History, in other words); but he does task it with deterritorializing such absolutes. That is to say, literature's function is precisely to open absolutes up to the chaotic pulsations of the Earth and the Cosmos so as to enable us to live 'history' (the everyday) the more intensely for not having to do so under the radar of History. The aim of all literature, Deleuze says, is to generate insights – via the elaboration of percepts and affects – into our everyday lives, that through being 'beyond' mere opinion are able to open us up to something new, something unlived and unknown.[5] Percepts and affects are intense, or abstract views of the world that have been resolutely purged of opinion; in this crystalline form they attain that revolutionary sensibility Deleuze referred to as becoming-minor.

> The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from perceptions, the affect from affections, the sensation from opinion – in view, one hopes, of that still-missing people.[6]

According to Deleuze, authors able to produce such literature deserve 'the Nietzschean name "physicians of civilisation"'.[7] A constant throughout Deleuze's work, the notion of the author-physician derives (in the main) from the early, more strictly Nietzschean period in his work, when he liked to speak of art in terms of 'dramatization'. 'Dramatization' is the name Deleuze gave, finally, and only after a

careful bracketing of all the Christian and dialectical pathos tainting the word 'drama', to Nietzsche's method. This method, Deleuze says, is derived from the quintessential Nietzschean question 'which one wills?' 'Any given concept, feeling or belief will be treated as symptoms of a will that wills something. What does *the one that* says this, that thinks or feels that, will?'[8] In the Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche, the will is able only to will qualities, not quantities; it does not hunger after objects or ends, but certain strains of intensity that enrich its power to act (the Spinozism Deleuze habitually attributes to Nietzsche is nowhere more evident). One such quality the will strives for above all others is that most modernist of modern qualities, 'newness'.

While it is true Deleuze resists calling this process of striving for newness utopian, I would argue it is not only the best word for it, it is also reactionary to shy away from it. Deleuze's reluctance to use the term is problematic, I think, because it isn't clear that it doesn't signal a fear of it. 'Utopia' Deleuze says, 'is not a good concept because even when opposed to History it is still subject to it and lodged within it as an ideal motivation.'[9] My feeling, though, is that Deleuze's reluctance to endorse the concept of utopia can only be understood in terms of the context of the times in which he wrote, and should not be taken to imply a wholesale rejection of utopian thinking. Elliott argues, rightly I think, that fear of utopia usually springs from conservative, or disillusioned sources: for instance, the tragic failings of Russian and Chinese styles of communism have tainted the very word utopia in such a way as to turn the notion of the future into some kind of a codeword for tyranny (George Orwell's 'negative utopia', *1984*, is of course the archetype of this perversion).[10] While I would defend Deleuze against a charge of conservatism, I do think it is fair to say that at a certain point he became quite disillusioned with so-called 'actually existing socialism' and by association all visions of 'new societies'.[11] A sign of this, I believe, is Deleuze's unqualified hatred of Hegel – what Jameson says of Althusser holds true for Deleuze: any time we hear him execrating Hegel, it should be understood that he really means Stalin.[12]

Now, insofar as utopia is defined as a quiescent concept, as it often is, Deleuze is rightly hesitant about using such a passive term. For him, literature is anything but in the business of edulcoration. As such, Deleuze would certainly not agree with Elliott that utopia – if that indeed is literature's true calling – is supposed to eradicate pain by lowering the intensity of our engagement with history.[13] Obviously enough, he would argue the very opposite of this. But inasmuch as utopia condemns the present state of things for the sake of a better future, his claim that literature indicts the present from the perspective of the future and in so doing summons forth 'a people yet to come', can validly and usefully be called utopian. It would, at the very least, serve the valuable purpose of demystifying that chillingly apt phrase of Kafka's, perhaps even letting it become an analytic concept instead of a mere description. There is, it seems to me, much to be gained by thinking of 'the people yet to come' as a code-phrase for allegory (yet another term to be found languishing under the general heading 'taboo' in Deleuze's private *Dictionnaire des idées reçues*), because it functions precisely to encourage us to read the inhuman bleakness of authors like Kafka and Beckett as an astringent ironization of hope.

The crucial point is this: that which modernists praised as new, is itself symptomatic of some deeper process of willing. The question is: what is the nature of the relation between symptom and cause? Newness in Nietzsche means the transmutation and transvaluation of existing forces. The achievement of the new punctuates but in no way arrests the ongoing struggle against inertia, or what Nietzsche called the reactive forces (opinion, in literature). Literary history is a continuous assertion of this point. Every author faces the same problem: the form of their expression ages more rapidly and more deleteriously than the form of content. A poetic innovation, for instance, becomes a technique to be copied the very instant it is deployed, but worse still, it blends into the amorphous morass of opinion in the very moment of its recognition. This, as Barthes has explained, is what is tragic (in the Nietzschean sense) in modern literature's pursuit of the new: 'mechanical habits are developed in the very place where freedom existed, a network of set forms hem in more and more the pristine freshness of discourse, a mode of writing appears afresh in lieu of an indefinite language.'[14] The tragic is to be found on two levels: both the writer's situation and the writing itself are determined by its paradoxes. On the one hand, the writer cannot fail to perceive a 'tragic disparity' between what they write and what they see; while, on the other hand, if they do manage to close this gap by even the minutest margin through some technical innovation or other they are prohibited from reusing it by virtue of its very success, for to do so would be to risk transforming it into a ritual.[15]

> Therefore, unless they renounced Literature, the solution of this problematic of writing does not depend on the writer. Every writer born opens within himself [sic] the trial of literature, but if he condemns it, he always grants it a reprieve which literature turns to use in order to reconquer him. However hard he tries to create a free language, it comes back to him fabricated, for luxury is never innocent: and it is this stale language, closed by the immense pressure of all the men who do not speak it, which he must continue to use. Writing is therefore a blind alley, and it is because society itself is a blind alley.[16]

In Barthes's work, then, we see all the essential constituents of Deleuze's clinical conception of literature pushed to the brink of becoming a dialectical analysis. If we were to rewrite this in Deleuze's terminology, we should say that literature begins with the creation of one's own impossibilities, 'because without a set of impossibilities, you won't have the line of flight, the exit that is creation, the power of falsity that is truth.'[17] This is as near to dialectics as Deleuze ever gets: impossibilities, but not contradictions. So the question must be how does he avert the apparently inevitable dialectical step? How does he prevent the line of flight from being re-read as either a higher unity or a labour of the negative and yet still find the means of progressing beyond the impasse he creates? For Deleuze, it is the notion of the tragic itself that permits him – after Nietzsche – to avoid dialectics, because the tragic is the very opposite of the dialectic: whereas the latter wants to justify life, the tragic wants only to affirm it. 'Dialectics in general are not a tragic vision of the world but, on the contrary, the death of tragedy, the replacement of the tragic vision by a theoretical conception (with Socrates) or a Christian conception (with Hegel).'[18] That is to say, dialectics resolves its impossibilities by parleying with some kind of higher authority,

but the tragic does so by embracing its contradictions and treating them as constitutive not symptoms of an irredeemable lack.

The tragic, then, might more usefully be seen as a repolarizing of the notion of the symptom itself because now instead of indicating a lack of health, one finds in it the lineaments of a new way of conceiving health. For instance, Deleuze says of Zola's alcoholics and murderers that their atavistic impulses express 'the kind of life that a body invents in order to turn to its own advantage what the environment gives, even if it has to destroy other bodies.'[19] With the change in valency of symptoms, so 'health' too is made to evolve in a new direction. It becomes the new code word for denoting not merely the relation between the subject and their circumstances (or what we might also call the objective world), but their response to it. For Deleuze, the writer's health, as exhibited by their work, is a kind of biological barometer measuring the pressures and possibilities of 'a historically determined life'.[20] One can read off a work the rise and fall of such determining tensions as economic security, existential stability, and so on, almost as if it had so many dials and gauges, by concentrating on its formal mechanisms. This means instead of treating the often sensational content of Zola's novels as an attempt to capture, evoke or otherwise represent the real and rating it against some imaginary scale of pure mimesis, it should rather be thought in expressive terms as being that figuration which the conditions of the times demanded, but ultimately could not be delivered.

The deeper representative task of the novel is not then to try to find a more purely mimetic language, but to create the means of folding its own tragic flaws into itself and render artistic its own fatal incapacities at the levels of vision and expression. For Deleuze, this is the function of the plane of composition: it creates the artistic ground needed to tell a particular kind of story, and it does so by posing and solving the problems for representation that a particular historical situation entails. In Zola this challenge is met via something Deleuze likes to call 'the crack' (a term he borrows from F. Scott Fitzgerald). Here I must emphasize that the crack is not the ground itself, it is rather the device needed to produce a ground. While it is true that it is the crack which gives naturalism its distinctive character, it should not thereby be thematized, which is to say, treated as some kind of touchstone or hermeneutic key, because by itself it explains nothing. Its function, as we will see, is not only more complicated than that, it cannot be explained in isolation from 'originary worlds and real milieux'. One must be wary of being carried away by Deleuze's own enthusiastic rhetoric; he will go so far as to describe naturalism as a veritable launching of the theme of the crack, but in my view this is a false trail.

We can get a better fix on Deleuze's claim by contrasting it with that which it constantly risks falling into, and must sedulously avoid becoming, namely a *thematization* of the crack (to use Paul DeMan's term). In effect, what Deleuze claims for Zola's delineation of this theme is precisely some kind of a hermeneutic raising-up of an indeterminate quality that might otherwise have passed unnoticed in the confusion of the naturalistic content. As Jameson explains, thematization refers to the 'moment in which an element, a component, of a text is promoted to the status of official theme, at which point it becomes a candidate for that even higher honour, the work's ''meaning''.'[21] But, as he clarifies, such thematization is not necessarily a

function of the theme itself and could indeed be read as a degradation of it, or else the product of an internal flaw in either its execution or imagining. While Deleuze does speak of the crack as being a theme, it seems clear that he would not wish it to be thought of in these terms. The fall into thematization is, however, an ever present risk, one that is especially hard to contend with because it can be triggered both by the author and the reader.

On the one hand, not all authors are always able to work through their own wish-fulfilments fully enough to attain that purity of image Deleuze associates with the impersonal – the crack, as an instance of what Deleuze describes as pure form, that is, form utterly relieved of content, is an example par excellence of this impersonal mode. The crack is neither indeterminate nor determinate, but the determinable, which means it is neither a precondition nor a product, but that which cuts across and at the same time joins these things. It is in this respect the alter-image of Deleuze's third synthesis of time (a connection which is confirmed by Deleuze's correlation of the third synthesis with the death instinct).[22] On the other hand, there is the problem of the defences of the readers themselves, which it must be said Deleuze does not really trouble himself with overly much. The fact is, though, readers cannot always be prevented from defending themselves against excoriating visions of the world by fetishizing critical motifs. And what's more, the work of psychoanalytic critics like Norman Holland would suggest that it is precisely the management of these defences that accounts for the pleasure people take in reading, and, accordingly, is in fact built into the literary works themselves.[23] Deleuze would no doubt see such built-in defences as faults, or impurities. As such, he says the greatest difficulty faced by naturalistic authors is how to keep the crack 'alive' once it is set in place.[24]

The crack, Deleuze says, is the death instinct, and the death instinct is the third synthesis of time.[25] Obviously enough, we will not come any closer to understanding the crack and with it naturalism until we reckon more fully into the picture the missing first two syntheses of time. The first thing that needs to be noted about syntheses one and two is that they are passive, whereas the third is active, but only in relation to the others. Therefore, it does not give rise to a truly tripartite structure. Rather, it corresponds to the baroque vision of the two-storeyed monad.[26] Although it is only explicitly spelled out in his book on Leibniz, the model it presupposes effectively defines Deleuze's entire hermeneutics. This is evidenced by its insistence (to use a Deleuzian term[27]) in every book Deleuze wrote. Sooner or later, everything boils down to a steep slope joining two distinct, but inseparable levels, which one must simultaneously ascend and descend. For me, the sublime image of this is the one Deleuze borrows from Melville, that of the theme of two books – one written in ink and the other written in blood and anguish.[28] But the same logic is at work in Deleuze's manipulation of a host of other two-tiered models, from sense and nonsense, irony and humour, virtual and actual, right through to concept and plane. Undoubtedly, the most critical of all of the two-tiered models Deleuze has recourse to is Spinoza's distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas.[29]

In every case, though, it must be stressed, the crucial point of interest is the steep slope itself (also known as the 'differenciator' or 'dark precursor'[30]) which joins the two levels, not the levels themselves. But before we can come to that we need to

know more about the respective levels themselves. Now, the first level, or synthesis, which Deleuze stipulates is the foundation of time, is habit; while the second level, or synthesis, which Deleuze stipulates is the ground of time, is memory. 'The foundation concerns the soil: it shows how something is established upon this soil, how it occupies and possesses it; whereas the ground comes rather from the sky, it goes from the summit to the foundations, and measures the possessor and the soil against one another according to a title of ownership.'[31] At stake here is a whole new conception of time and space, one that on Deleuze's own say-so can be thought of as a completion of Kant's famous Copernican revolution. This can be rewritten in literary terms as follows: Habit refers to the selection of data, or semantics, while memory refers to its organization into a sequence, or syntax. By itself this is insufficient to create literature, to give the writing the strength it needs to 'stand up'. Something else is needed – a bolt of lightning – to galvanize the disparate components into a vigorous whole: the crack.

The third synthesis of time, or the crack, is precisely this bolt of lightning. Deleuze's explanation of it is couched in epic narrative terms. The first synthesis of time, he says, is felt as a time in which an imagined act is 'too big' for the individual in question (Hamlet and Oedipus are of course the ubiquitous examples). This moment refers to that eternal (and usually painful) 'before' which necessarily precedes all action. The second synthesis, meanwhile, refers to the present of the action itself, which 'is thus the present of metamorphosis, a becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the self, and the projection of an ideal self in the image of the act (this is marked by Hamlet's sea voyage and by the outcome of Oedipus's inquiry: the hero becomes ''capable'' of the act)'.[32] The third synthesis, then, refers to the moment in which the future finally appears; it 'signifies that the event and the act possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become equal to is the unequal in itself'.[33] Hamlet is annihilated in body and spirit by the very fact that he finds the inner resources equal to the task of killing his uncle, which is to say, equal to the impersonal exactions of vengeance itself.[34] His actions become meaningful only at this point.

In his account of *film noir*, Deleuze rewrites the three syntheses of time as *situation* (in a western for instance, this would refer both to the imminent threat posed to civilization by a band of marauding cattle thieves or Indians with which every western inevitably begins and the hero's fundamental unwillingness or constitutional incapacity to get involved – here the eponymous hero of *Shane* is the archetype), *action* (that is, whatever it will take to remedy the situation, which is at once the carrying out of an act and the becoming-equal to that act), and lastly, the *changed situation* (the moment in which it is realized that the hero had somehow become inhuman and could no longer be tolerated by the society which demanded action of him).[35] The changed situation, or crack, shouldn't be confused with what on a more traditional understanding of drama might be called the third act: it is, rather, the force of dramatization itself. Shane's heroism only becomes patent when it is realized how fully he has condemned himself to an aimless purgatory at the exact moment when it at last looked liked he might have found himself a proper home.

The drama resides not in his exploits as a gunfighter, but in his inability to avert the fate he knows awaits all who would carry a gun. It is this tragic element of fate that corresponds to the crack.

However, even this risks being too privative a definition because it correlates the crack with what is after all a fairly primitive means of constructing a drama, pathos. And indeed, for Deleuze, the crack is not simply a plot device, it refers rather more extensively to any practical means an author may choose to deploy in order to purge their text of pathos and opinion (the all too pathetic last scene of *Shane* stands as something of a monitory example of just how inadequate mere plotting can be to this task). It is therefore better understood in terms of what Jameson refers to as 'skill' in his account of style. If the crack is thought in these terms, as 'skill', what seemed like a localized generic trait, something peculiar only to naturalism, is then suddenly revealed as historicist. And this, it seems to me, is the nature of the shift in Deleuze's work from talking about the crack, or the third synthesis of time, to the plane of composition.

Now, to explain a little more fully what I mean by suggesting that 'skill' can be thought of as a galvanizing force (or synthesis) injecting life into an otherwise inert folding of a singular syntax and a determinate set of content, let me briefly sketch out Jameson's argument as he enumerates it near to the end of *Marxism and Form*.[36] He argues that it is a mistake to think authors deal essentially in themes, that their works are simply disquisitions – albeit of 'another' type – on such great concerns as love, honour and death. Even an author like Hemingway, famous as much for the books he wrote as the animals he killed and the wounds he sustained, his life experiences being the indispensable support of his art, cannot be apprehended in this way, he argues, because in reality his 'deepest subject is simply the writing of a certain type of sentence, the practice of a determinate style.'[37] It is the sheer process of writing itself that stands out as the essential event, whether it proves adequate to the task it sets itself. Thus, on Jameson's view, Hemingway's style is like an announcement of his ability, a showing of his skill at a certain craft, and it is this that attracts our empathy, not the actual content of his stories. This skill is not exercised in a vacuum, however, it is conditioned by the times in which an author writes – Hemingway's emphasis on the authenticity of experience, for instance, is only meaningful in an era that fears it has somehow lost its grip on the real.

The problems writers confront are all a product of history itself; their writing, as such, is their means of dealing with the environment they have no choice but to inhabit. It is their means of counter-actualizing it.[38] As Deleuze says of Zola's instinct driven characters, their 'instincts designate the conditions of life and survival in general – the conditions of the conservation of a kind of life determined in a historical social milieu (here, the Second Empire). This is why Zola's bourgeois can easily name their vices, their lack of generosity and their ignominies as virtues; conversely, this is why the poor are often reduced to ''instincts'' like alcoholism, which express the historical conditions of their lives and their only way of putting up with a historically determined life'.[39] But the sheer hubbub of the instincts let loose is not enough to produce naturalism. For this one needs to introduce a tragic mechanism,

such as 'the crack', to bring about the proper amount of degradation. The instincts by themselves could always be brought under control by the reality principle, or its equivalent molarizing force, but are powerless to help themselves in the presence of a crack.[40]

> Naturalism in literature is essentially Zola: he had the idea of making real milieux run in parallel with originary worlds. In each of his books, he describes a precise milieu, but he also *exhausts* it, and restores it to the originary world; it is from this higher source that the force of realist description derives.[41]

The real world, as it were, is converted into the medium needed to present another world, which isn't fictional exactly, but more a pointed abstraction of the real. Crucially, though, neither one can be separated from the other, nor do they ever take on a distinct form.[42] The originary world only makes sense insofar as it is situated, as rigorously as possible, in a geographical and historical milieu which serves as its medium and whose violence and cruelty it ultimately reveals. But, by the same token, the real milieu 'only presents itself as real in its immanence in the originary world'. This means it, too, is a species of contrivance: 'it has the status of a "derived" milieu, which receives a temporality as destiny from the originary world'.[43] Neither the originary world, nor the real milieu, has existence independent of the other, and in this respect each is as 'fictional' as the other. Obviously enough, it is the juxtaposition of the two worlds that produces the celebrated diagnostic effect of naturalism. But just what are real milieux and originary worlds? 'Take a house, a country or region. These are the real milieux of geographical and social actualisation. But it looks as if, in whole or in part, they communicate from within with originary worlds'. The originary worlds, for their part, can be thought of as worlds which have been emptied of all subjective and characterological content, worlds which in effect are prior even to the differentiation of animals and humans.[44] They are diagrams, but not of the blueprint variety. Rather they are the types of life-maps ethologists contrive to produce – that is, maps of behaviour reduced to its patterns of action.

> For example, the Tick, attracted by the light, hoists itself up to the tip of a branch; it is sensitive to the smell of mammals, and lets itself fall when one passes beneath the branch; it digs into its skin, at the least hairy place it can find. Just three affects; the rest of the time the tick sleeps, sometimes for years on end, indifferent to all that goes on in the immense forest.[45]

The life of the tick is bounded by just two limits, an optimal one, the feast, and a pessimal one, the fast it endures, and taken together with its three affects this is enough to draw its diagram. When Deleuze says one of the achievements of the modern novel is to 'rediscover, below the level of active syntheses, the domain of passive syntheses which constitute us',[46] he means that it has found a means of drawing this type of diagram. It is a diagram of life as it is lived in modernity. Modernity would then be the real milieu that at once sustains this diagram like agar and that which this diagram hollows out and thereby condemns. The diagram itself, meanwhile, is like a terrible secret that everybody knows but no one dares mention:

it is that stark alienation of life all ideologies labour long and hard to paper over. It isn't the figure of Oedipus, however, but Empedocles, who dramatizes this situation. 'The originary world is therefore both radical beginning and absolute end; and finally it links the one to the other, it puts the one into the other, according to a law which is that of *the steepest slope*. It is thus a world of a very special kind of violence (in certain respects, it is the radical evil); but it has the merit of causing an originary image of time to rise, with the beginning, the end, and the slope, all the cruelty of Chronos.'[47] A writer, on Deleuze's view, is thus part ethologist (discoverer of the inhuman, or the cruel) and part anthropologist (recorder of the human, or the juridical). The art of writing consists in utilizing anthropological material to stage ethological material in a way that causes the reader to oscillate between the two worlds. This very oscillation, which as I've stressed above can be found as much in the reader as the work itself, is the crack.

In the place of a conclusion, let me briefly return to my opening comparison of Deleuze's plane of composition and Lukács's notion of form. The plane of composition is the crack raised to a higher power and purged of its strictly local content; but precisely because of the nature of what it must exclude in order to attain this 'purity' it remains peculiar to the times in which it is produced. The plane of composition, in other words, is historicist in precisely the same way that Lukács' form is historicist. The 'skill' of writing consists in figuring out how the plane of composition *must be* composed given the conditions of the age; this is, in effect, the writer's essential problem, and the 'drama' of their work is directly proportional to the quality of the solution arrived at. Looked at in this way, it is not difficult to see why Jameson should find Deleuze's work so inspiring: it is clear now that the essential Deleuzian category is Necessity, rather than say 'desire', or what Jameson himself calls History (that which 'hurts').[48]

Notes

[1] F. Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (London: Routledge, 1981), p.22.
[2] G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), p.193.
[3] G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p.575n38.
[4] F. Jameson, *The Seeds of Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.xv.
[5] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, p.174.
[6] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, p.176.
[7] G. Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p.125.
[8] G. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. H. Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983), p.78.
[9] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, p.110.
[10] 'Whereas for Bellamy or William Morris present society was the evil to be transcended, and the image of the desirable life was projected into the future, in the negative utopia it is the life of the future, created in response to man's [sic] longing for happiness on earth, that is evil'. Robert C. Elliott, *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p.89.
[11] Deleuze himself fends off the charge of conservatism in his letter to Michel Cressole. See G. Deleuze, *Negotiations*, trans. M. Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.10–12.
[12] Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*, p.27n12.
[13] Elliott, *The Shape of Utopia*, p.127.
[14] R. Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, trans. A. Lavers and C. Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), p.78.
[15] Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, p.86.
[16] Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, pp.86–87.
[17] G. Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p.133.

[18] Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.18.
[19] G. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. M. Lester and C. Stivale (London: Athlone Press, 1990), p.322.
[20] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p.322.
[21] F. Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1991), p.91.
[22] G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.86.
[23] See N. Holland, *The Dynamics of Literary Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
[24] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, pp.136–137.
[25] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.315n10.
[26] See G. Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp.100–120.
[27] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.82.
[28] G. Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. D. W. Smith and M. A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), p.72.
[29] For a more detailed account of this argument see I. Buchanan, *Deleuzism: A Metacommentary* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2000), pp.31–34.
[30] See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp.119–126.
[31] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.79.
[32] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.89.
[33] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp.89–90.
[34] 'As Klossowski says, it is the secret coherence which establishes itself only by excluding my own coherence, my own identity, the identity of the self, the world and God. It allows only the plebeian to return, the man without a name. It draws into its circle the dead god and the dissolved self' (Deleuze, 1994, pp.90–91).
[35] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, pp.178–179.
[36] See F. Jameson, *Marxism and Form* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp.407–412. For a more extensive treatment of this argument, see Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, pp.53–54.
[37] Jameson, *Marxism and Form*, p.409.
[38] See Buchanan, *Deleuzism*, pp.77–87.
[39] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p.322.
[40] Jameson uses Deleuze's notion of 'molar' in this way in *Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp.7–8.
[41] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.124.
[42] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.124.
[43] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.125.
[44] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.123.
[45] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.257.
[46] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.79.
[47] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p.124.
[48] Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*, p.102.

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