SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

for

RIBBON TOKEN

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May 20, 2021

Document Properties

Client	Ribbon Finance
Title	Smart Contract Audit Report
Target	Ribbon Token
Version	1.0
Author	Xuxian Jiang
Auditors	Yiqun Chen, Xuxian Jiang
Reviewed by	Shuxiao Wang
Approved by	Xuxian Jiang
Classification	Public

Version Info

Version	Date	Author	Description
1.0	May 20, 2021	Xuxian Jiang	Final Release
1.0-rc	May 19, 2021	Xuxian Jiang	Release Candidate
0.1	May 16, 2021	Xuxian Jiang	First Draft

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1 Introduction

Given the opportunity to review the design document and related source code of the **Ribbon Token** smart contract, we outline in the report our systematic method to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistency between smart contract code and the documentation, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of the smart contract exhibits no ERC20 compliance issues or security concerns. This document outlines our audit results.

1.1 About Ribbon Token

The `RBN` token is the governance token for `Ribbon`. It is used to align incentives between depositors, managers and the DAO in the system. It will also secondarily be used as a liquidity mining incentive. Note that `RBN` will be distributed widely to users of `Ribbon Finance` with the `MerkleDistributor` contract. This audit covers the ERC20-compliance of the `RBN` token.

The basic information of Ribbon Token is as follows:

Table 1.1: Basic Information of Ribbon Token

Item	Description
Issuer	Ribbon Finance
Website	https://ribbon.finance/
Type	Ethereum ERC20 Token Contract
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Audit Completion Date	May 20, 2021

In the following, we show the Git repository and the commit hash value used in this audit:

- https://github.com/ribbon-finance/token.git (bb91af9)

And this is the commit ID after all fixes for the issues found in the audit have been checked in:

- https://github.com/ribbon-finance/token.git (423d0a8)

1.2 About PeckShield

PeckShield Inc. [6] is a leading blockchain security company with the goal of elevating the security, privacy, and usability of current blockchain ecosystem by offering top-notch, industry-leading services and products (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/peckshield), Twitter (http://twitter.com/peckshield), or Email (contact@peckshield.com).

1.3 Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [5]:

- Likelihood represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk;

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: *H*, *M* and *L*, i.e., *high*, *medium* and *low* respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, i.e., *Critical*, *High*, *Medium*, *Low* shown in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification

Impact \ Likelihood	*High*	*Medium*	*Low*
High	Critical	High	Medium
Medium	High	Medium	Low
Low	Medium	Low	Low

We perform the audit according to the following procedures:

- Basic Coding Bugs: We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.

- ERC20 Compliance Checks: We then manually check whether the implementation logic of the audited smart contract(s) follows the standard ERC20 specification and other best practices.
- Additional Recommendations: We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.

Table 1.3: The Full List of Check Items

Category	Check Item
Basic Coding Bugs	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	Money-Giving Bug
	Blackhole
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
	Revert DoS
	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead of Transfer
	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
	Approve / TransferFrom Race Condition
ERC20 Compliance Checks	Compliance Checks (Section 3)
Additional Recommendations	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
	Using Fixed Compiler Version
	Making Visibility Level Explicit
	Making Type Inference Explicit
	Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
	Following Other Best Practices

To evaluate the risk, we go through a list of check items and each would be labeled with a severity category. For one check item, if our tool does not identify any issue, the contract is considered safe regarding the check item. For any discovered issue, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.3.

1.4 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, we always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Last but not least, this security audit should not be used as investment advice.

2 | Findings

2.1 Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the Ribbon Token. During the first phase of our audit, we study the smart contract source code and run our in-house static code analyzer through the codebase. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by our tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place ERC20-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	# of Findings	
Critical	0	
High	0	
Medium	1	■
Low	1	■
Informational	0	
Total	2	

Moreover, we explicitly evaluate whether the given contracts follow the standard ERC20 specification and other known best practices, and validate its compatibility with other similar ERC20 tokens and current DeFi protocols. The detailed ERC20 compliance checks are reported in Section 3. After that, we examine a few identified issues of varying severities that need to be brought up and paid more attention to. (The findings are categorized in the above table.) Additional information can be found in the next subsection, and the detailed discussions are in Section 4.

2.2 Key Findings

Overall, no ERC20 compliance issue was found, and our detailed checklist can be found in Section 3. Also, there is no critical or high severity issue, although the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table 2.1), including 1 medium-severity vulnerability, and 1 low-severity vulnerability

Table 2.1: Key Ribbon Token Audit Findings

ID	Severity	Title	Category	Status
PVE-001	Low	Accommodation of Non-ERC20-Compliant Airdrop Token	Business Logic	Fixed
PVE-002	Medium	Trust Issue of Admin Keys	Security Features	Mitigated

Besides recommending specific countermeasures to mitigate these issues, we also emphasize that it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms need to kick in at the very moment when the contracts are being deployed in mainnet. Please refer to Section 3 for our detailed compliance checks and Section 4 for elaboration of reported issues.

3 | ERC20 Compliance Checks

The ERC20 specification defines a list of API functions (and relevant events) that each token contract is expected to implement (and emit). The failure to meet these requirements means the token contract cannot be considered to be ERC20-compliant. Naturally, as the first step of our audit, we examine the list of API functions defined by the ERC20 specification and validate whether there exist any inconsistency or incompatibility in the implementation or the inherent business logic of the audited contract(s).

Table 3.1: Basic `View-Only` Functions Defined in The ERC20 Specification

Item	Description	Status
name()	Is declared as a public view function	✓
	Returns a string, for example "Tether USD"	✓
symbol()	Is declared as a public view function	✓
	Returns the symbol by which the token contract should be known, for example "USDT". It is usually 3 or 4 characters in length	✓
decimals()	Is declared as a public view function	✓
	Returns decimals, which refers to how divisible a token can be, from 0 (not at all divisible) to 18 (pretty much continuous) and even higher if required	✓
totalSupply()	Is declared as a public view function	✓
	Returns the number of total supplied tokens, including the total minted tokens (minus the total burned tokens) ever since the deployment	✓
balanceOf()	Is declared as a public view function	✓
	Anyone can query any address' balance, as all data on the blockchain is public	✓
allowance()	Is declared as a public view function	✓
	Returns the amount which the spender is still allowed to withdraw from the owner	✓

Our analysis shows that there is no ERC20 inconsistency or incompatibility issue found in the audited Ribbon Token. In the surrounding two tables, we outline the respective list of basic `view-only` functions (Table 3.1) and key `state-changing` functions (Table 3.2) according to the widely-

Table 3.2: Key `State-Changing` Functions Defined in The ERC20 Specification

Item	Description	Status
transfer()	Is declared as a public function	✓
	Returns a boolean value which accurately reflects the token transfer status	✓
	Reverts if the caller does not have enough tokens to spend	✓
	Allows zero amount transfers	✓
	Emits Transfer() event when tokens are transferred successfully (include 0 amount transfers)	✓
	Reverts while transferring to zero address	✓
transferFrom()	Is declared as a public function	✓
	Returns a boolean value which accurately reflects the token transfer status	✓
	Reverts if the spender does not have enough token allowances to spend	✓
	Updates the spender's token allowances when tokens are transferred successfully	✓
	Reverts if the from address does not have enough tokens to spend	✓
	Allows zero amount transfers	✓
	Emits Transfer() event when tokens are transferred successfully (include 0 amount transfers)	✓
	Reverts while transferring from zero address	✓
	Reverts while transferring to zero address	✓
approve()	Is declared as a public function	✓
	Returns a boolean value which accurately reflects the token approval status	✓
	Emits Approval() event when tokens are approved successfully	✓
	Reverts while approving to zero address	✓
Transfer() event	Is emitted when tokens are transferred, including zero value transfers	✓
	Is emitted with the from address set to $address(0x0)$ when new tokens are generated	✓
Approval() event	Is emitted on any successful call to approve()	✓

adopted ERC20 specification. In addition, we perform a further examination on certain features that are permitted by the ERC20 specification or even further extended in follow-up refinements and enhancements (e.g., ERC777/ERC2222), but not required for implementation. These features are generally helpful, but may also impact or bring certain incompatibility with current DeFi protocols. Therefore, we consider it is important to highlight them as well. This list is shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Additional `Opt-in` Features Examined in Our Audit

Feature	Description	Opt-in
Deflationary	Part of the tokens are burned or transferred as fee while on transfer()/transferFrom() calls	—
Rebasing	The balanceOf() function returns a re-based balance instead of the actual stored amount of tokens owned by the specific address	—
Pausable	The token contract allows the owner or privileged users to pause the token transfers and other operations	✓
Blacklistable	The token contract allows the owner or privileged users to blacklist a specific address such that token transfers and other operations related to that address are prohibited	—
Mintable	The token contract allows the owner or privileged users to mint tokens to a specific address	✓
Burnable	The token contract allows the owner or privileged users to burn tokens of a specific address	—

4 Detailed Results

4.1 Accommodation of Non-ERC20-Compliant Airdrop Tokens

- ID: PVE-001
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low
- Target: `MerkleDistributor`
- Category: Business Logic [4]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-841 [2]

Description

Though there is a standardized ERC-20 specification, many token contracts may not strictly follow the specification or have additional functionalities beyond the specification. In the following, we examine the `transfer()` routine and related idiosyncrasies from current widely-used token contracts.

In particular, we use the popular token, i.e., `ZRX`, as our example. We show the related code snippet below. On its entry of `transfer()`, there is a check, i.e., `if (balances[msg.sender] >= _value && balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to])`. If the check fails, it returns `false`. However, the transaction still proceeds successfully without being reverted. This is not compliant with the ERC20 standard and may cause issues if not handled properly. Specifically, the ERC20 standard specifies the following: *"Transfers _value amount of tokens to address _to, and MUST fire the Transfer event. The function SHOULD throw if the message caller's account balance does not have enough tokens to spend."*

```
64    function transfer(address _to, uint _value) returns (bool) {
65        //Default assumes totalSupply can't be over max (2^256 - 1).
66        if (balances[msg.sender] >= _value && balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to]) {
67            balances[msg.sender] -= _value;
68            balances[_to] += _value;
69            Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
70            return true;
71        } else { return false; }
72    }
73
74    function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint _value) returns (bool) {
```

```
75          if (balances[_from] >= _value && allowed[_from][msg.sender] >= _value &&
                balances[_to] + _value >= balances[_to]) {
76              balances[_to] += _value;
77              balances[_from] -= _value;
78              allowed[_from][msg.sender] -= _value;
79              Transfer(_from, _to, _value);
80              return true;
81          } else { return false; }
82      }
```

Listing 4.1: ZRX.sol

Because of that, a normal call to `transfer()` is suggested to use the safe version, i.e., `safeTransfer()`, In essence, it is a wrapper around ERC20 operations that may either throw on failure or return false without reverts. Moreover, the safe version also supports tokens that return no value (and instead revert or throw on failure). Note that non-reverting calls are assumed to be successful. Similarly, there is a safe version of `transferFrom()` as well, i.e., `safeTransferFrom()`.

In the following, we show the `claim()` routine in the `MerkleDistributor` contract. If the `USDT` token is supported as the claimable `token`, the unsafe version of `IERC20(token).transfer(account, amount)` (line 75) may revert as there is no return value in the `USDT` token contract's `transfer()` implementation (but the `IERC20` interface expects a return value)!

```
57      function claim(
58          uint256 index,
59          address account,
60          uint256 amount,
61          bytes32[] calldata merkleProof
62      ) external override {
63          require(!isClaimed(index), "MerkleDistributor: Drop already claimed.");
64
65          // Verify the merkle proof.
66          bytes32 node = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(index, account, amount));
67          require(
68              MerkleProof.verify(merkleProof, merkleRoot, node),
69              "MerkleDistributor: Invalid proof."
70          );
71
72          // Mark it claimed and send the token.
73          _setClaimed(index);
74          require(
75              IERC20(token).transfer(account, amount),
76              "MerkleDistributor: Transfer failed."
77          );
78
79          emit Claimed(index, account, amount);
80      }
```

Listing 4.2: MerkleDistributor :: claim()

Recommendation Accommodate the above-mentioned idiosyncrasy with safe-version implementation of ERC20-related `transfer()`, `transferFrom()`, and `approve()`.

Status The issue has been addressed by the following commit: `078cfa6`.

4.2 Trust Issue of Admin Keys

- ID: PVE-002
- Severity: Medium
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium
- Target: `RibbonToken`
- Category: Security Features [3]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-287 [1]

Description

In the `RBN` token contract, there is a privileged `admin` account (assigned with the `ADMIN_ROLE`) that plays a critical role in governing and regulating the token-related operations (e.g., assigning other roles). In the following, we show representative privileged operations in the `RBN` token contract.

```
62      /// @dev Mints tokens to a recipient.
63      ///
64      /// This function reverts if the caller does not have the minter role.
65      function mint(address _recipient, uint256 _amount) external onlyMinter {
66          _mint(_recipient, _amount);
67      }
68
69      /// @dev Toggles transfer allowed flag.
70      ///
71      /// This function reverts if the caller does not have the admin role.
72      function setTransfersAllowed(bool _transfersAllowed) external onlyAdmin {
73          transfersAllowed = _transfersAllowed;
74          emit TransfersAllowed(transfersAllowed);
75      }
```

Listing 4.3: Example Privileged Operations in `RBN`

We emphasize that the privilege assignment is necessary and consistent with the token design. However, it is worrisome if the `admin` is not governed by a `DAO`-like structure. The discussion with the team has confirmed that this privileged account will be managed by a multi-sig account. Moreover, once the governance has voted for the token to be transferable, the `admin` role will be relinquished.

We point out that a compromised `admin` account would allow the attacker to mint unrestricted funds, which directly undermines the assumption of the `RBN` token contract.

Recommendation Promptly transfer the privileged account to the intended `DAO`-like governance contract. All changed to privileged operations may need to be mediated with necessary timelocks.

Eventually, activate the normal on-chain community-based governance life-cycle and ensure the intended trustless nature and high-quality distributed governance.

Status This issue has been confirmed and partially mitigated with a multi-sig account to regulate the `admin` privileges.

5 Conclusion

In this security audit, we have examined the Ribbon Token design and implementation. During our audit, we first checked all respects related to the compatibility of the ERC20 specification and other known ERC20 pitfalls/vulnerabilities. We then proceeded to examine other areas such as coding practices and business logics. Overall, although no critical or high level vulnerabilities were discovered, we identified two issues that were promptly confirmed and addressed by the team. In the meantime, as disclaimed in Section 1.4, we appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions about our findings, procedures, audit scope, etc.

References

[1] MITRE. CWE-287: Improper Authentication. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html.

[2] MITRE. CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/841.html.

[3] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - Security Features. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/254.html.

[4] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Business Logic Errors. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/840.html.

[5] OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology.

[6] PeckShield. PeckShield Inc. https://www.peckshield.com.