

Precise Concolic Unit Testing of C Programs using Extended Units and Symbolic Alarm Filtering

Yunho Kim

School of Computing, KAIST
Daejeon, South Korea
yunho.kim03@gmail.com

Yunja Choi

School of Computer Science and
Engineering, Kyungpook Natl. Univ.
Daegu, South Korea
yuchoi76@knu.ac.kr

Moonzoo Kim

School of Computing, KAIST
Daejeon, South Korea
moonzoo@cs.kaist.ac.kr

ABSTRACT

Automated unit testing reduces manual effort to write unit test drivers/stubs and generate unit test inputs. However, automatically generated unit test drivers/stubs raise false alarms because they often over-approximate real contexts of a target function f and allow infeasible executions of f . To solve this problem, we have developed a concolic unit testing technique CONBRIO. To provide realistic context to f , it constructs an *extended unit* of f that consists of f and *closely relevant* functions to f . Also, CONBRIO filters out a false alarm by checking feasibility of a corresponding symbolic execution path with regard to f 's *symbolic calling contexts* obtained by combining symbolic execution paths of f 's closely related predecessor functions.

In the experiments on the crash bugs of 15 real-world C programs, CONBRIO shows both high bug detection ability (i.e. 91.0% of the target bugs detected) and high precision (i.e. a true to false alarm ratio is 1:4.5). Also, CONBRIO detects 14 new bugs in 9 target C programs studied in papers on crash bug detection techniques.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Software and its engineering** → **Software testing and debugging**;

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1 INTRODUCTION

Although unit testing is effective to detect SW bugs, field engineers have burden of manually generating test drivers/stubs and test inputs for each target unit. To reduce manual effort to generate test inputs, automated test generation has been applied (e.g., concolic testing have been applied to detect bugs in open source programs [2–4, 27, 31, 39] and industrial projects [6, 17, 23, 24, 33, 45] at

system-level). Also, to reduce manual effort to generate unit test drivers/stubs, automated unit testing has been applied to open source programs [10, 14, 37] and large industrial SW [28].

A main drawback of the automated unit testing is a large number of *false alarms* raised by *infeasible unit executions* (i.e. unit executions that are infeasible at system-level). Infeasible unit executions occur generated due to inaccurate unit test drivers/stubs that over-approximate real contexts of a target unit (Sect. 2.4). This false alarm problem is a serious obstacle to apply automated unit testing in practice since field engineers would not like to spend time to manually filter out many false alarms.

To overcome this limitation, we have developed an automated unit testing framework CONBRIO (CONcolic unit testing with sym-Bolic alaRm fltering using symbolic calling cOntexts) which operates in the following two stages:

1. To provide realistic context to a target function f , CONBRIO constructs an *extended unit* of f that consists of f and *closely relevant* functions to f which can filter out infeasible unit executions caused by symbolic stubs. The relevance of a function g to f is measured by the degree of dependency of f on g (Sect.3.2). Then, CONBRIO performs concolic execution of an extended unit of f .
2. To filter out false alarms by checking feasibility of a corresponding symbolic unit execution of f , CONBRIO generates *symbolic calling context* of f by combining symbolic paths of *closely relevant* predecessor functions of f in a static call graph.

As a result, CONBRIO detects bugs effectively and precisely because it enforces various and realistic executions of f through concolic execution of f with f 's realistic contexts (i.e., with the functions closely relevant to f) and accurately filters out false alarms using f 's symbolic calling contexts.

Note that it is important to construct an extended unit and symbolic calling context of f to contain *only* functions *closely relevant* to f since including more functions will enlarge symbolic search space and degrade unit testing effectiveness and efficiency. For example, at one extreme end, an extended unit may contain all successor functions of f and fail to detect bugs due to too large symbolic search space to explore. Also, symbolic calling context of f may contain symbolic execution paths of all predecessor functions of f up to main and fail to detect bugs.¹

We have applied CONBRIO to 15 real-world C programs in SIR [11] and SPEC2006 [41] benchmarks and CONBRIO shows both

¹ Generated symbolic calling context may *not* represent all feasible calling context of f due to the limitation of symbolic execution. Thus, a symbolic calling context becomes more difficult to satisfy by adding symbolic execution paths of more predecessor functions of f (i.e., via logical \wedge . See Sect. 3.5).

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high bug detection ability (i.e., 91.0% of all target bugs detected) and high precision (i.e., a true to false alarm ratio is 1:4.5) which is more precise than the latest concolic unit testing techniques for C programs (e.g., 1:5.7 by UC-KLEE [37]). Also, CONBRIO detects 14 *new* bugs in the latest versions of the nine target C programs studied in other papers on crash bug detection techniques.

The contributions of this paper are as follows:

- CONBRIO achieves both high bug detection ability (91.0% of the target bugs detected) and high precision (false alarm ratio is 1:4.5) based on the two core ideas: 1) building and utilizing contexts of a target function explicitly based on relevance of functions measured by a function dependency metric, 2) a new alarm filtering strategy that constructs symbolic calling contexts compositionally and utilizes them to check feasibility of a violating unit execution.
- The extensive empirical evaluation on both bug detection ability and precision of CONBRIO and the other concolic unit testing techniques on the 15 real-world C programs supports researchers and practitioners to learn the pros and cons of the related techniques (Sect. 4–5).
- By applying CONBRIO, we have detected and reported 14 new crash bugs in the latest versions of the 9 target programs that were studied in other papers on crash bug detection techniques (Sect. 5.5).
- We have made the real-world crash bug data of the C benchmark programs publicly available, which were collected and organized after examining the bug reports of the last 12–24 years (<http://swtv.kaist.ac.kr/tools/conbrio>), so that researchers can use them for various testing research purposes (Sect. 4.2.1).

The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the background of automated concolic unit testing. Section 3 describes the detail of CONBRIO. Section 4 explains the experiment setup to evaluate CONBRIO compared to other techniques. Section 5 reports the experiment results. Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes the paper with future work.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Preliminary

Unit testing uses *drivers* and *stubs* (or mock objects) to test a target function in isolation (i.e., without the rest of a target program). Suppose that a target function under test f takes n arguments a_1, \dots, a_n and accesses m global variables v_1, \dots, v_m , and directly calls l other functions g_1, \dots, g_l . To enforce diverse test executions of f , a tester develops various unit test drivers drv_i^f each of which generates argument values a_1^i, \dots, a_n^i , global variable values v_1^i, \dots, v_m^i and finally invokes f with these input values. Also, a tester builds stub functions $s_{g_1}^i, \dots, s_{g_l}^i$ to replace g_1, \dots, g_l . Also, test drivers/stubs should satisfy constraints on the interface between f and the rest of a target program to avoid infeasible unit test executions of f .

2.2 Concolic Unit Test Driver/Stub Generation

For each target function f , a concolic unit testing technique automatically generates *symbolic* stubs and a *symbolic* unit test driver. Symbolic stubs simply return symbolic values (without updating

global variables and output parameters for simplicity) and a symbolic driver invokes f after assigning symbolic values to the input variables of f according to their types as follows:²

- *primitive types*: primitive variables are directly assigned with primitive symbolic values of the corresponding types.
- *array types*: each array element is assigned with a symbolic variable according to the type of the array element (for a large array, only the first n elements are assigned with symbolic values where n is given by a user).
- *pointer types*: for a pointer variable ptr pointing to a variable of a type T , a driver allocates memory whose size is equal to the size of T and assigns the address of the allocated memory to ptr (i.e., $ptr = \text{malloc}(\text{sizeof}(T))$). Then, a driver assigns $*ptr$ with a symbolic value of type T . If a size of T is not known (e.g., `FILE` in standard C library), `NULL` is assigned to ptr . If there exists a pointer variable $ptr2$ pointing to a symbolic variable of the same type T , a driver assigns $ptr2$ to ptr .
- *structure types*: a unit test driver specifies all fields of struct variable s as symbolic variables recursively (i.e., if s contains struct variable t , a unit test driver specifies the fields of t as symbolic too).

A limitation of this approach is that the drivers and stubs often over-approximate the real environment of f and allow *infeasible unit executions* (i.e., executions of f which are *not* feasible at system-level) that may raise *false alarms*.

2.3 Insertion of Assertions Targeting Crash Bugs

Concolic unit testing techniques aim to detect crashes/run-time failures such as null-pointer dereference (NPD), array index out-of-bounds (OOB), and divide-by-zero (DBZ) as well as violations of user-given assertions. They often focus on crashes because user-given assertions are usually not available in real-world programs.

Concolic unit testing techniques insert `assert(exp)` into f where exp specifies a condition to avoid crashes (e.g., $denominator \neq 0$ to avoid DBZ). Because of `assert(exp)` in f , concolic testing tries to generate a test input with which f makes exp false and increases a chance to detect crash bugs.

2.4 Example of False Alarm

Figure 1 shows a target program with a target function f under test (lines 10–16). `main` calls `a1` if the first parameter x of `main` is greater than 0 or calls `a2`, otherwise (line 3). `a1` and `a2` call `b` at line 5 and line 6, respectively, and `b` calls f at line 7. f takes an integer parameter x and calls $g(x)$ (line 12) (a sanity check function for accessing array through an index x) and $h(x)$ (line 15). A concolic unit testing technique generates a unit test driver `driver_f` and symbolic stubs `stub_g` and `stub_h` for f . Also, it modifies f to call `stub_g` and `stub_h` instead of g and h respectively (see the comments at line 12 and line 15) and inserts an OOB assertion at line 13.

Figure 2 shows a unit test driver and stubs for f . `driver_f` invokes f with a symbolic argument `arg1` (lines 2–3) where `int arg1 = SYM_int()` sets `arg1` as a symbolic integer value (line 2). `stub_g`

²This subsection is excerpted from [28].

```

01:// x and y are inputs of a target program
02:int main(int x,int y){
03:  return (x>0) ? a1(x,y) : a2(y);}
04:
05:int a1(int x, int y){if(y>0) return b(x); else return 0;}
06:int a2(int x){if(x>0) return b(x);}
07:int b(int x){if(x>0) return f(x);else return 0;}
08:
09:// Target function under test
10:int f(int x){
11:  int array[5] = {1,3,5,7,9}, result;
12:  if (g(x) != 0){ //=> if (stub_g(x) != 0) {
13:    // => assert(0<=x && x<5);
14:    result = array[x];
15:  }else result=h(x);//=> else result=stub_h(x);
16:  return result;}
17:
18:int g(int x){ return (x<5)? 1:0;}
19:
20:int h(int x){ return x + 2;}

```

Figure 1: Target program with a target function f

```

01: int driver_f(){
02:   int arg1 = SYM_int();
03:   f(arg1);}
04:
05: int stub_g(int x){
06:   int ret = SYM_int();
07:   return ret;}
08:
09: int stub_h(int x){
10:   int ret = SYM_int();
11:   return ret;}

```

Figure 2: Generated unit test driver and stubs for f

and `stub_h` return symbolic integer values as `g` and `h` return integer values (lines 5–7 and lines 9–11 respectively). Concolic execution of `driver_f` violates the OOB assertion at line 13 of `f` if a unit test execution satisfies the following two conditions:

- a symbolic argument `arg1` to `f` (line 3 of `driver_f`) is larger than or equal to the size of array (e.g. `arg1` is 5)
- `stub_g` returns a non-zero value (e.g. 1)

However, an alarm raised in such unit test execution is a *false alarm* because such unit test execution of `f` is *infeasible* with the real target program where `g` is invoked (`g` returns 0 if `arg1` \geq 5 (line 18 of Figure 1) unlike `stub_g`). In other words, a concolic unit testing technique can raise a false alarm if it generates unit test drivers/stubs different from real environment of `f` which consist of `main`, `a1`, `a2`, `b`, `g`, and `h`.

3 CONBRIO TECHNIQUE

Figure 3 shows the overall process of CONBRIO as follows:

1. CONBRIO receives source code of a target program, a list of target functions to test, and system test cases of the target program as inputs. CONBRIO obtains function call profiles from the system test executions (Section 3.1).

2. It checks function relevance by calculating *dependency* of a target function f on other function g using *conditional probability* $p(g|f)$ based on the observed function call profiles (Section 3.2). With a given dependency threshold τ , we consider f has a *high dependency* on g if $p(g|f) \geq \tau$.
3. Based on the calculated dependency of f on other functions,
 - It constructs an *extended unit* of f that contains f , f 's successor functions in a static function call graph on which f has high dependency, and symbolic stubs.
 - It identifies *calling contexts* of f each of which is a maximal call path $a^1 \rightarrow a^2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow f$ in a static function call graph such that f has high dependency on all a^i 's. We use $ctx(f, k)$ to indicate k th calling context of f .
 Section 3.3 describes more detail.
4. CONBRIO applies concolic testing to an extended unit of f to explore diverse and realistic target unit test executions. During concolic execution, it builds a symbolic path formula σ_{fv_i} that represents executions violating a given assertion v_i in f (Section 3.4).
5. It filters out an alarm raised at v_i by checking the feasibility of σ_{fv_i} with regard to f 's *calling contexts* (see Step 3). For this purpose, CONBRIO constructs f 's *symbolic calling context formulas* $\Sigma_{ctx(f,k)}$ and uses a SMT solver to check satisfiability of σ_{fv_i} (see Step 4) conjuncted with $\Sigma_{ctx(f,k)}$ (Section 3.5). If the result is UNSAT for all calling contexts (i.e., there exists *no* feasible execution in any calling context of f to make σ_{fv_i} feasible), a target alarm is considered as false and ignored. Otherwise (i.e., the result is SAT with at least one calling context), a corresponding alarm is reported as a violation of v_i in f .

3.1 Obtaining Function Call Profile from System Test Executions

CONBRIO executes a target program with given system test cases and obtains function call profiles. For example, suppose that a target program in Fig. 1 has three system test cases to `main(x, y)`: $(-1, 1)$, $(1, 1)$, and $(5, 1)$. Then, the function call profiles are obtained as follows: $\{main \rightarrow a2, a2 \rightarrow b, b \rightarrow f, f \rightarrow g\}$ with $(-1, 1)$, $\{main \rightarrow a1, a1 \rightarrow b, b \rightarrow f, f \rightarrow g\}$ with $(1, 1)$, and $\{main \rightarrow a1, a1 \rightarrow b, b \rightarrow f, f \rightarrow g, f \rightarrow h\}$ with $(5, 1)$.

3.2 Computing Dependency of a Target Function on Other Functions

Suppose that a program has a target function f and other function g and it has n_f system test executions that invokes f . Based on function call profiles, we compute *dependency* of f on g as $p(g|f)$. Given a static call graph $G(V, E)$ (see Def. 1) and system test executions, we compute $p(g|f)$ as follows:

- Case 1: for g which is a *predecessor* of f in $G(V, E)$, $p(g|f)$ is calculated as $\frac{n_1}{n_f}$ where n_1 is a number of system executions where g calls f directly or transitively.
- Case 2: for g which is a *successor* of f in $G(V, E)$, $p(g|f)$ is calculated as $\frac{n_2}{n_f}$ where n_2 is a number of system executions where f calls g directly or transitively.
- Case 3: for g which is a *successor* and *predecessor* of f in $G(V, E)$ (i.e., there exists a recursive call cycle between f and g), $p(g|f)$




Figure 3: Overall process of CONBRIO

is calculated as $\frac{n_3}{n_f}$ where n_3 is a number of system executions where f calls g or g calls f directly or transitively.

For example, Step 1 of Fig. 3 shows three test cases $(-1,1)$, $(1,1)$, and $(5,1)$ and their corresponding function call profiles for the program in Fig. 1. Based on the profiles, we calculated dependency of f on other functions as follows:

- $p(\text{main}|f) = 1.00 (= \frac{n_1}{n_f} = \frac{3}{3})$
- $p(a1|f) = 0.66 (= \frac{n_1}{n_f} = \frac{2}{3})$
- $p(a2|f) = 0.33 (= \frac{n_1}{n_f} = \frac{1}{3})$
- $p(b|f) = 1.00 (= \frac{n_1}{n_f} = \frac{3}{3})$
- $p(g|f) = 1.00 (= \frac{n_2}{n_f} = \frac{3}{3})$
- $p(h|f) = 0.33 (= \frac{n_2}{n_f} = \frac{1}{3})$

3.3 Constructing Extended Unit and Calling Contexts

Given a static call graph $G(V, E)$ of a target program (Def.1), a target function f 's dependency on other functions (i.e., $p(g|f)$), and a dependency threshold τ , CONBRIO constructs an *extended unit*

of f that consists of f and f 's closely relevant successor functions and calling contexts of f .

DEFINITION 1. A *static call graph* $G(V, E)$ is a directed graph where V is a set of nodes representing functions in a program and E is a relation $V \times V$. Each edge $(a, b) \in E$ indicates that a directly calls b . We call a node p as a *predecessor* of f if there exists a path from p to f . We call a node s as a *successor* of f if there exists a path from f to s .

For example, Step 3 of Fig. 3 shows how CONBRIO constructs an extended unit of f and a calling context of f for a program in Fig. 1. Given a static call graph whose nodes are labelled with dependency of f , CONBRIO constructs an extended unit of f that contains f and g since f has high dependency on g , but not h (i.e., $p(g|f) \geq \tau$ but $p(h|f) < \tau$ where $\tau = 0.7$). Finally, driver_f invokes an extended unit of f with symbolic inputs. Note that CONBRIO does *not* raise a false alarm in this example unlike concolic unit testing in Sect. 2.4 because an extended unit provides realistic environment to f by using g which is closely relevant to f . Also, CONBRIO builds a calling context of f as $b \rightarrow f$ since f has high dependency on b , but not $a1$ nor $a2$ (i.e., $p(b|f) \geq \tau$ but $p(a1|f), p(a2|f) < \tau$).

3.3.1 Constructing Extended Unit. For each target function f , CONBRIO constructs an extended unit that contains f and f 's successor functions g such that f has high dependency on all function nodes in a call path from f to g in a static function call graph (i.e. for all nodes n_i between f and g , $p(n_i|f) \geq \tau$). A unit test driver sets all arguments and all global variables accessed by the extended unit of f as symbolic inputs as described in Sect. 2 and invokes f .

For example, Fig. 4 shows a static call graph whose nodes are labeled with dependency of a target function f . Fig. 4 shows that an extended unit of f (marked with black dashed line at the bottom) consists of f , $n12$, $n13$, and $n14$ functions on which f has high dependency (i.e. $p(n12|f)$, $p(n13|f)$, $p(n14|f) \geq \tau = 0.7$).

In addition, as a false alarm reduction heuristic, CONBRIO adds $\text{SYM_assume}(expr)$ ³ at the beginning of f 's extended unit where $expr$ represents possible value ranges of symbolic input variables (which are obtained by applying a static value range analyzer [36] to an entire target program code). If an input value is not in the estimated range, a current test execution immediately terminates without raising any alarms and CONBRIO continues to a next test execution. As another heuristic, CONBRIO constructs an extended unit to keep consistency between a pointer input variable to dynamically allocated memory and its size variable by figuring out such relation between input variables based on the variable names.

3.3.2 Constructing Calling Contexts. In a static call graph $G(V, E)$ labelled with dependency of f , we define a *calling context* of f as a maximal call path from a predecessor node of f to f as follows.

DEFINITION 2. An i th *calling context* of $f \in V$ (saying $ctx(f, i)$) is a maximal call path $a^1 \rightarrow a^2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow f$ in a static call graph $G(V, E)$ satisfying the following conditions:

- a^1 is a predecessor of f
- for all a^j in $ctx(f, i)$, $p(a^j|f) \geq \tau$
- there exists no other calling context of f that contains $ctx(f, i)$ as its sub path (i.e., $ctx(f, i)$ is maximal).

CONBRIO generates a calling context by traversing a static call graph from f in a reverse direction until it reaches a node labelled with low dependency of f . For example, Fig. 4 shows two calling contexts of f : $ctx(f, 1)$ and $ctx(f, 2)$. $ctx(f, 1)$ is a call path from $n5$ to f (see the blue dotted line in the left part) where $p(n5|f) = p(n8|f) = 0.8 > \tau = 0.7$ and $p(n1|f) = 0.5$, $p(n2|f) = 0.6$. Thus, $ctx(f, 1) = n5 \rightarrow n8 \rightarrow f$. Similarly, $ctx(f, 2) = n3 \rightarrow n6 \rightarrow n9 \rightarrow f$.

3.4 Concolic Testing to Generate Violating Symbolic Path Formulas

CONBRIO applies concolic testing to an extended unit to explore diverse and realistic executions of f . During concolic execution, it obtains a set of symbolic execution path formulas SE_f and records a symbolic path formula $\sigma_{f(v_i, j)}$ that violates an assertion v_i in f (j is an index to a symbolic path formula violating v_i since there can be multiple such symbolic path formulas). We use $\sigma_{f v_i}$ to denote $\bigvee_j \sigma_{f(v_i, j)}$.

³ $\text{SYM_assume}(expr)$ is a macro of $\text{if}(!expr) \text{exit}(0);$.




Figure 4: Static call graph showing an extended unit and two calling contexts of f ($ctx(f, 1)$ and $ctx(f, 2)$) with $\tau = 0.7$

To focus on f , CONBRIO modifies DFS search strategies by using a priority queue for branch conditions of f and a normal queue for those of the other functions in an extended unit of f (e.g., g in Fig. 1). CONBRIO explores various behaviors of f first by negating branch conditions in a priority queue first (branch conditions in a normal queue are negated when the priority queue is empty).

3.5 Alarm Filtering by Checking Satisfiability of f 's Violating Symbolic Path Formula $\sigma_{f v_i}$ with f 's Symbolic Calling Context Formula

To filter out false alarms raised at v_i in f , CONBRIO checks the feasibility of $\sigma_{f v_i}$ with regard to f 's calling contexts (see Sect. 3.3.2). For this purpose, CONBRIO constructs $\Pi_{ctx(f, k)}$ which is a k th symbolic calling context of f and checks satisfiability of $\sigma_{f v_i} \wedge \Pi_{ctx(f, k)}$ using a SMT solver. $\Pi_{ctx(f, k)}$ is constructed as follows (see Fig. 5):

- For each function a^j in a calling context of f (i.e. $ctx(f, k)$), CONBRIO obtains SE_{a^j} which is a set of symbolic execution path formulas of a^j . Note that this task is the same task in Step 4 (Sect. 3.4). If a^j was already tested as a target function and SE_{a^j} was generated in Step 4, this alarm filtering step (Step 5) reuses SE_{a^j} .
- CONBRIO obtains a slice of SE_{a^j} with regard to a^{j+1} (saying $\text{Slice}(SE_{a^j}, a^{j+1})$) as follows:

$\text{Slice}(SE_{a^j}, a^{j+1}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\sigma' | \sigma' \text{ is a prefix of } \sigma \in SE_{a^j} \text{ such that } \sigma \text{ contains invocation of } a^{j+1} \text{ and } \sigma' \text{ does not contain a suffix of } \sigma \text{ after the invocation}\}.$

For example, for $ctx(f, 1)$ in Fig. 4, Fig. 5 shows that $\text{Slice}(SE_{n5}, n8)$ has two symbolic path formulas that call $n8$: $\sigma_{n5(n8, 1)}$ and $\sigma_{n5(n8, 2)}$ (shown as thick blue arrows) where $\sigma_{x(y, z)}$ is z th symbolic path formula of a function x that terminates immediately after calling a function y . $\text{Slice}(SE_{n8}, f)$ also has two symbolic path formulas that call f : $\sigma_{n8(f, 1)}$ and $\sigma_{n8(f, 2)}$.




Figure 5: Violating symbolic path formula σ_{fv_i} and a symbolic calling context of f (i.e., $\Pi_{ctx(f,1)}$) with $ctx(f,1)$ in Fig. 4

- CONBRIO obtains symbolic calling context formula of f with $ctx(f,k)$ (i.e., $\Pi_{ctx(f,k)}$) by combining sets of sliced symbolic execution path formulas of a^1 (i.e., $Slice(SE_{a^1}, a^2)$), a^2 (i.e., $Slice(SE_{a^2}, a^3)$), ... of $ctx(f,k)$ until reaching f using logical conjunction. Thus, $\Pi_{ctx(f,k)}$ with $ctx(f,k) = a^1 \rightarrow a^2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow f$ is defined as follows:

$$\Pi_{ctx(f,k)} \stackrel{def}{=} \bigwedge_{a^j \in (ctx(f,k) - \{f\})} (\bigvee_{\sigma_l \in Slice(SE_{a^j}, a^{j+1})} \sigma_l)$$

For example, Fig. 5 shows $\Pi_{ctx(f,1)}$ with $ctx(f,1) = n5 \rightarrow n8 \rightarrow f$ in Fig. 4 as follows (see thick blue arrows representing $\sigma_{n5(n8,1)}$, $\sigma_{n5(n8,2)}$, $\sigma_{n8(f,1)}$ and $\sigma_{n8(f,2)}$):

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{ctx(f,1)} &= \Pi_{n5 \rightarrow n8 \rightarrow f} = \\ &(\sigma_{n5(n8,1)} \vee \sigma_{n5(n8,2)}) \wedge (\sigma_{n8(f,1)} \vee \sigma_{n8(f,2)}) \end{aligned}$$

Finally, CONBRIO applies a SMT solver to $\sigma_{fv_i} \wedge \Pi_{ctx(f,k)}$ for every symbolic calling context of f . If a result is UNSAT for all calling contexts (i.e., there exists no feasible execution in any calling contexts of f to make σ_{fv_i} feasible), a target alarm is considered as false and ignored. Otherwise (i.e., a result is SAT with at least one calling context), a corresponding alarm is reported as a violation of v_i in f .

3.6 Implementation

We have implemented CONBRIO in 5,000 lines of C++ code using Clang/LLVM-3.4 [29]. CONBRIO uses CROWN [1] for concolic testing and LLVM-based static variable range analyzer [36] to compute the possible ranges of variables. CROWN (Concolic testing for Real-world softWare aNalysis) is a lightweight easy-to-customize concolic testing tool for real-world C programs (available at <http://github.com/swtv-kaist/CROWN>). It supports complex C features such as bitwise operators, floating point arithmetic, bit-fields and so on. CROWN has been successfully applied to various industrial projects.

Table 1: Target programs and bugs for RQ1 to RQ4

Target programs and versions	Lines	# of func.	# of sys. test cases	Branch cov. (%)	Func. cov. (%)	# of target bugs
Bash-2.0	32714	1214	1100	46.2	89.0	6
Flex-2.4.3	7471	147	567	45.7	93.9	2
Grep-2.0	5956	132	809	50.3	94.7	5
Gzip-1.0.7	3054	82	214	55.8	87.8	2
Make-3.75	28715	555	1043	64.5	87.9	3
Sed-1.17	4085	73	360	47.3	87.7	2
Vim-5.0	66209	1749	975	35.8	91.0	6
Perl-5.8.7	79873	2240	1201	52.3	95.0	6
Bzip2-1.0.3	4737	114	6	67.4	93.9	2
Gcc-3.2	342561	5553	9	43.7	96.2	15
Gobmk-3.3.14	154583	2682	1354	65.2	92.0	5
Hmmer-2.0.42	35992	539	4	75.6	94.1	3
Sjeng-11.2	10146	144	3	77.9	91.7	2
Libquantum-0.2.4	2255	101	3	68.5	93.1	3
H264ref-9.3	51578	590	6	63.6	88.0	5
Sum	829929	15915	7654	N/A	N/A	67
Average	55328.6	1061.0	510.3	57.3	91.7	4.5

4 EXPERIMENT SETUP

We have designed five research questions to evaluate bug detection ability and precision of CONBRIO and compare CONBRIO with other concolic unit testing techniques on 15 real-world C programs. Note that it is important to evaluate bug detection ability and precision together because of a trade-off between them (i.e., a technique may improve bug detection ability at the cost of precision or vice versa). Also, we applied CONBRIO to the latest versions of the nine C programs studied in other papers on crash bug detection techniques.

4.1 Research Questions

RQ1. Bug Detection Ability: How many crash bugs among the target crash bugs does CONBRIO detect, compared to the other concolic unit testing techniques?

RQ2. Bug Detection Precision: How much is a false alarm ratio of CONBRIO, compared to the other techniques?

RQ3. Effectiveness of the Symbolic Alarm Filtering: How much does the alarm filtering strategy using symbolic calling contexts affect a number of target bugs detected and a false alarm ratio?

RQ4. Effect of the Function Selection Strategy on Bug Detection Ability and Precision: How much does the function selection strategy based on the function relevance metric affect a number of target bugs detected and a false alarm ratio, compared to a strategy based on static call graph distance?

RQ5. Effectiveness of Detecting New Crash Bugs: How many new crash bugs does CONBRIO detect?

4.2 Target Bugs and Programs

We target crash bugs described in Section 2.3 by inserting corresponding crash assertions in target programs because crash bugs are serious problems and CONBRIO can automatically insert such

Table 2: Target programs for RQ5

Target programs and versions	Lines	# of func.	# of sys. test cases	Branch cov. (%)	Func. cov. (%)
abcm2ps-8.13.9	36595	499	12	74.0	93.0
autotrace-0.31.1	18495	343	5	69.3	84.8
bib2xml-5.11	77216	1032	24	73.2	93.0
catdvi-0.14	12693	187	7	53.0	81.8
eog-3.14.1	43463	605	42	73.3	81.0
gif2png-2.5.11	4058	76	2	60.1	81.6
jpegtran-1.3.1	51828	817	33	72.0	84.9
mp3gain-1.5.2	5786	100	3	53.7	86.0
xpdf-3.03	22309	381	13	54.9	81.9
Sum	272443	4040	141	N/A	N/A
Average	30271.4	448.9	15.7	64.8	85.3

assertions without user-given test oracles, which are rarely available in target programs. We use two benchmarks: *known crash bug benchmark* for RQ1 to RQ4 and *unknown crash bug benchmark* for RQ5 (available at <http://swtv.kaist.ac.kr/tools/conbrio>).

4.2.1 Known Crash Bug Benchmark. The known crash bug benchmark consists of all C programs in SIR [11] (except Siemens programs and space which do not have available bug-fix histories) and SPEC2006 integer benchmarks (except mcf-1.2 which has only one system test case). We target the crash bugs of the benchmark programs that satisfy the following conditions:

- crash bugs that exist in a target program version and have been confirmed by original developers through bug-fix commits since the release of a target program version (e.g., Dec 1996 for bash-2.0) until April 2017
- crash bugs that can be detected by unit testing (i.e., both buggy statement(s) reported in a bug-fix commit and violated assertion(s) are located in a same target function)

Table 1 describes 15 target programs including their sizes (in LoC including comments and empty lines), a number of functions to test, a number of system test cases used, branch coverage and function coverage achieved by the system test cases, and a number of the target crash bugs. For all target programs, we used all system test cases provided in the benchmarks. Each target program has two to 15 target crash bugs (4.5 on average). Note that no system test case detects a target bug.

For example, we have reviewed 28 bug-fix commits reported since the release of vim-5.0 on Feb 1998 until April 2017. 11 among them report crash bugs existing in vim-5.0. Among the 11 crash bugs, unit testing can detect six of them, which we target for vim-5.0 (see the eighth row of the table).

4.2.2 Unknown Crash Bug Benchmark. The unknown crash bug benchmark programs were selected from the literature on crash bug detection techniques. This is because SIR and SPEC benchmark programs do not satisfy the following criteria: we selected target programs whose sizes are 1,000 to 100,000 LoC and which have more than three crash bug fixes in the last three years (i.e. between April 2014 to April 2017). We excluded very large programs due to huge manual effort required to check validity of alarms. We also

excluded programs with three or less crash bug fixes in the last three years because such programs may not have a crash bug.

To obtain new crash bug benchmark programs, we surveyed papers on crash bug detection techniques published in major SE (ICSE, FSE, ASE, ISSTA), PL (PLDI, POPL, SPLASH), and security conferences (IEEE S&P, ACM CCS, USENIX Security) in the last three years and obtained the nine relevant papers [3, 8, 18, 30, 37, 38, 46–48]. Then, we applied the above criteria to the latest versions of the target programs studied in these papers and obtained the nine target programs in Table 2. Again, for all target programs, we used all system test cases provided in the target program versions and no system test case violated the crash assertions.

4.3 Concolic Unit Testing Techniques to Compare

We have compared CONBRIO with the following concolic unit testing techniques:

- *Symbolic unit testing (SUT)*: It generates a symbolic unit testing driver with symbolic arguments to a target function f and symbolic global variables without any constraints on the symbolic values, as described in Sect. 2.2. Also, SUT uses symbolic stubs to replace all functions called by f .
- *Static call-graph distance techniques*: It constructs an extended unit to include all successor functions of f within a certain distance bound from f in a static function call graph. Also, a calling context of f contains predecessor functions of f within a certain distance bound from f . We use distance bounds 3, 6 and 9. SUT corresponds to a static call-graph distance technique with a distance bound 0.

SUT uses DFS as a concolic search strategy. Call-graph distance techniques and CONBRIO use the modified DFS (Sect. 3.4).⁴ These unit testing techniques have been implemented in 1,000 lines of C++ code using CROWN [1].

4.4 Measurement

We consider that a target bug is detected if a unit test execution that violates an assertion covers one of the buggy statements in a target unit. To identify the buggy statements, we have manually analyzed all crash bug-fix commits of all subsequent releases of the target program versions in SIR and SPEC2006 benchmarks. We consider that a statement s of a target program is a buggy statement if s corresponds to the changed/fixed statements in a crash bug-fix commit.

We analyze alarms reported by the alarm filtering strategy (Sect. 3.5). For true alarms, we count a number of violated assert statements which satisfy the following conditions:

- There exists a unit test execution σ_{fv} that covers a buggy statement and violates an assert statement in a target function f .
- We can confirm that σ_{fv} is feasible at system level by manually creating a system-level test that includes σ_{fv} and violates the assert statement (we compared execution traces of σ_{fv} and a corresponding system test using gdb).

⁴ We report the experiment using only DFS and modified DFS since the experiments using other search strategies such as random negation and CFG heuristic show only negligible difference.

We consider all other alarms as false ones.

4.5 Testbed Setting

For SUT, call-graph distance techniques, and CONBRIO, we set the timeout of concolic testing (Step 4 in Fig. 3) as 180 seconds per a target function.⁵ After test generation terminates, call-graph distance techniques and CONBRIO performs the false alarm filtering task (Step 5 in Fig. 3). We set a function dependency threshold τ as 0.7.

Since the experiment scale is large (i.e., targeting 15,915 functions for the known crash bugs and 4,040 functions for the unknown crash bugs), the experiments were performed on 100 machines each of which is equipped with Intel quad-core i5 4670K and 8GB ram, running Ubuntu 14.04.2 64 bit version. We run four concolic unit test runs on a machine in parallel.

4.6 Threats to Validity

A threat to external validity is the representativeness of our target programs. But we expect that this threat is limited since the target programs are widely used real-world ones and tested by many other researchers. Another threat to external validity is the possible bias of the system tests we used to obtain dependency between functions. We tried to reduce this threat by utilizing all available system test cases in the benchmarks.

A threat to internal validity is possible faults in the implementation of the concolic unit testing techniques we studied. To address this threat, we extensively tested our implementation. A threat to construct validity is the use of the crash bugs that were fixed by the bug-fix commits reported so far (i.e., the target programs may have unknown/unreported crash bugs which we do not count). We target crash bugs confirmed by the developers through the bug-fix commits because it would require too much effort to manually validate numerous alarms without confirmed reports in this large scale experiment. However, this threat seems limited because all target programs are well-maintained so that these programs may not have many new bugs.

5 EXPERIMENT RESULT

For all comparison in the experiments in this section, we applied Wilcoxon test with a significance level 0.05 to show the statistical significance. All comparison results in this section are statistically significant unless mentioned otherwise. The experiment data are available at <http://swtv.kaist.ac.kr/tools/conbrio>.

5.1 Experiment Data

5.1.1 Data on Extended Units and Calling Contexts. For the 15 known crash bug benchmark programs, each extended unit constructed by CONBRIO contains 6.2 functions on average. CONBRIO generated 3.0 calling contexts per target function where each calling context has 6.6 functions on average. Call-graph distance techniques with bound 3, 6, and 9 generate an extended unit that contains 5.8, 13.8, and 22.5 functions on average, respectively. Also, they

⁵We selected timeout as 180 seconds because exploratory study with timeout 60, 180, 300, and 600 seconds suggested that timeout beyond 180 seconds had negligible effect on the overall experiment results of CONBRIO and the other techniques.

Table 3: Numbers of the target bugs detected by the concolic unit testing techniques

Target program	# of target bugs	Bound of static call graph distance tech.				CONBRIO
		0(SUT)	3	6	9	
Bash-2.0	6	5	3	3	3	5
Flex-2.4.3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Grep-2.0	5	3	4	2	2	4
Gzip-1.0.7	2	2	1	1	1	2
Make-3.75	3	3	3	2	2	3
Sed-1.1.7	2	2	2	2	2	2
Vim-5.0	6	5	4	2	2	5
Perl-5.8.7	6	6	5	4	3	6
Bzip2-1.0.3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Gcc-3.2	15	14	12	9	8	14
Gobmk-3.3.14	5	4	3	3	3	5
Hmmer-2.0.42	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sjeng-11.2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Libquantum-0.2.4	3	3	2	2	2	3
H264ref-9.3	5	5	4	3	3	4
Sum	67	61	51	41	39	61

generate 5.9, 11.1, and 24.3 calling contexts per target function on average, respectively.

5.1.2 Data on Unit Tests Generated and Alarm Filtering. For the 15 known crash bug benchmark programs, CONBRIO spent 1.8 hours to generate 7,979,781 unit tests for 15,915 target functions and 2.3 hours for the symbolic alarm filtering using Z3 on 100 quad-core machines. Z3 reports that a symbolic calling context formula with a violating symbolic unit execution consists of 1.5 million clauses on 0.1 million Boolean variables on average and its maximum memory usage is around 7.6 GB. Call-graph distance techniques with a distance bound 0, 3, 6, and 9 spent the almost same 1.8 hours for unit test generation (i.e., most target functions reach the timeout) and 0, 2.6, 3.9, and 6.3 hours for the symbolic alarm filtering, respectively.

CONBRIO covered 69.8% to 88.0% of the branches of a target program (82.5% on average) with the unit tests and the given system test cases (i.e., the unit tests increase the branch coverage 25.2%p more on average (= 82.5% - 57.3% where 57.3% is the average branch coverage achieved by the system test cases (see the last row of Table 1)).

5.2 RQ1: Bug Detection Ability

Table 3 describes a number of the target bugs detected by the concolic unit testing techniques and shows that CONBRIO has high bug detection ability. CONBRIO and static call-graph distance technique with bound zero (i.e., SUT) achieve the highest bug detection ability (i.e., 91.0% (=61/67)) (but SUT achieves this at the cost of many false alarms (see Sect. 5.3)). Note that the given system tests do not detect any of the target bugs. In addition, we applied concolic testing at system level using distributed concolic testing tool SCORE [25] with the same amount of total time on 100 machines but found that no target bug was detected.

Table 4: Numbers of false alarms and ratios of false alarms per true alarm of the concolic unit testing techniques

Target programs	Static call-graph distance techniques								CONBRIO	
	0 (SUT)		3		6		9			
	# of F/T		# of F/T		# of F/T		# of F/T		# of F/T	
	false alarm	ratio	false alarm	ratio	false alarm	ratio	false alarm	ratio	false alarm	ratio
Bash-2.0	484	96.8	137	45.7	69	23.0	54	18.0	18	3.6
Flex-2.4.3	142	71.0	25	25.0	12	12.0	12	12.0	6	6.0
Grep-2.0	120	40.0	34	8.5	18	9.0	18	9.0	13	3.3
Gzip-1.0.7	33	16.5	7	7.0	3	3.0	3	3.0	5	2.5
Make-3.75	664	221.3	106	35.3	59	29.5	46	23.0	9	3.0
Sed-1.17	31	15.5	9	4.5	4	2.0	4	2.0	5	2.5
Vim-5.0	906	181.2	207	51.8	123	61.5	72	36.0	25	5.0
Perl-5.8.7	392	65.3	187	37.4	64	16.0	44	14.7	57	9.5
Bzip2-1.0.3	34	17.0	12	6.0	7	3.5	7	3.5	10	5.0
Gcc-3.2	2026	144.7	503	41.9	195	21.7	147	18.4	79	5.6
Gobmk-3.3.14	791	197.8	133	44.3	62	20.7	45	15.0	39	7.8
Hmmmer-2.0.42	162	54.0	48	16.0	22	7.3	22	7.3	12	4.0
Sjeng-11.2	108	54.0	13	6.5	7	3.5	7	3.5	8	4.0
Libquantum-0.2.4	55	18.3	9	4.5	4	2.0	4	2.0	5	1.7
H264ref-9.3	232	46.4	34	8.5	15	5.0	15	5.0	17	4.3
Average	412.0	82.7	97.6	22.9	44.3	14.6	33.3	11.5	20.5	4.5

As a distance bound of the call-graph distance techniques increases to 3, 6, and 9, the number of detected bugs severely decreases to 51, 41, and 39, respectively because larger symbolic search space should be explored within the timeout.

Among the undetected six target bugs (=67-61), three target bugs in bash, grep, and gcc were missed because concolic execution did not cover corresponding buggy statements within the timeout, two bugs in flex and h264ref were missed because of the alarm filtering strategy, and one in vim was missed because a unit execution covered the corresponding buggy statement and an assert statement but did not violate the assert statement.

5.3 RQ2: Bug Detection Precision

Table 4 describes a number of false alarms and a ratio of false alarms per true alarm of the techniques and shows that CONBRIO achieves high bug detection precision. Among the techniques, CONBRIO raises the lowest number of false alarms (i.e., 20.5 false alarms per target program on average) and the lowest false alarms per true alarms ratio (i.e., 4.5 false alarms per true alarm on average).⁶

The static call-graph distance technique with distance 0 (i.e. SUT) suffers the largest number of false alarms (412.0 false alarms per target program on average). CONBRIO raises only 5.0% (=20.5/412.0), 21.0%, and 46.4% and 61.6% of the false alarms raised by the static call-graph distance techniques with distance bounds 0, 3, 6, and 9 on average, respectively (see the last row of the table).

5.4 RQ3. Effectiveness of the Symbolic Alarm Filtering

The comparison of the experiment results of CONBRIO and CONBRIO without the alarm filtering strategy using symbolic calling context formulas (Sect. 3.5) demonstrates that the alarm filtering strategy improves bug detection precision significantly. In other words, CONBRIO without the alarm filtering strategy detects two

⁶The static alarm reduction heuristics of CONBRIO decrease the number of false alarms (23.5 to 20.5 on average) and the number of false alarms per true alarm (5.2 to 4.5 on average) without decreasing the bug detection ability (i.e. CONBRIO without the static alarm reduction heuristics detects the same 61 bugs and raises 23.5 false alarms per target program on average).

more target bugs (i.e., 63 bugs) in all target programs but with five times higher false alarm ratio (i.e., 20.3 false alarms per true alarm on average). Although the symbolic alarm filtering spent more time (2.3 hours) than the unit test generation (1.8 hours), this strategy is worthwhile to apply to improve bug detection precision. Detailed experiment data is available at <http://swtv.kaist.ac.kr/tools/conbrio>.

5.5 RQ4. Effect of the Function Selection Strategy on Bug Detection Ability and Precision

The comparison on the experiment results of CONBRIO and the call-graph distance techniques confirms that the idea of including only *closely relevant* functions to a target function based on the proposed dependency metric in extended units and calling contexts is effective.

For example, CONBRIO and the call-graph distance technique with bound 3 generate an extended unit of a similar size (i.e., 6.2 vs. 5.8 functions on average) and the amount of generated calling contexts are also comparable (3.0 calling contexts each of which has 6.6 functions vs. 5.9 calling contexts each of which has 2.8 functions on average) (see Sect. 5.1.1). The time taken to generate unit test executions is almost same 1.8 hours and the time taken to apply the alarm filtering strategy is also similar (2.3 vs 2.6 hours).

However, CONBRIO achieves much higher bug detection ability and precision than the call-graph distance technique with bound 3 (i.e., 91.0% vs 76.1% (=51/67) for bug detection ability and 4.5 vs. 22.9 false alarms per true alarm on average). With larger distance bounds 6 and 9, a number of the detected bugs drops to 41 and 39 and the false alarm ratio decreases to 14.6 and 11.5 respectively, which is still three to two times less precise than CONBRIO.

5.6 RQ5. Effectiveness of Detecting New Crash Bugs

CONBRIO detects 14 new crash bugs in the seven target programs. CONBRIO detects five new crash bugs in autotrace, two bugs in each of abcm2ps, gif2png, and mp3gain, one bug in each of bib2xml, eog, and jpegtran, and no bug in catdvi and xpdf.⁷

Note that we confirmed the 14 new crash bugs by manually creating system-level test cases that crash a target program due to the bugs detected by CONBRIO. CONBRIO raises 71 false alarms over the all target programs and its true to false alarm ratio for each program ranges from 1:3.0 to 1:6.0 (1:4.3 on average except catdvi and xpdf). We have reported these 14 new crash bugs to the original developers and been waiting the responses from them (detailed example and explanation of the newly detected bugs are available at <http://swtv.kaist.ac.kr/tools/conbrio>).

6 RELATED WORK

6.1 Concolic Unit Testing Techniques

There exist concolic unit testing techniques (e.g., [7, 35, 40, 43]) which require a user to build symbolic unit test drivers and stubs.

⁷ CONBRIO generated 3.3 calling contexts per target function each of which has 4.3 functions on average. It spent 11.2 minutes to generate 725,584 unit tests for 4,040 target functions and 20.7 minutes to apply the symbolic alarm filtering on 100 machines and covered 80.9% of the branches on average.

DART [16] generates symbolic unit test drivers (but not symbolic stubs) like SUT (Sect. 2.2) and test inputs for C programs. CONBOL [28] generates symbolic unit test drivers/stubs and test inputs targeting large-scale embedded C programs. DART and CONBOL generate symbolic unit test drivers without utilizing contexts of a target function f and may suffer many false alarms.⁸

Chakrabarti and Godefroid [9] developed a unit testing technique which statically partitions a static call graph using topological information and tests each partition as a unit through symbolic execution. This technique may suffer many false alarms because the obtained partitions may not represent groups of relevant functions due to insufficient information to generate partitions (i.e., using only topological information of a static call graph without semantic or dynamic information). Their tool is not publicly available and the paper does not report bug detection ability nor precision [9]. Tomb. et al [44] reported that interprocedural program analysis with deeper call depth bound raise fewer false alarms. However, they did not report how to set a proper call depth bound.

Recently, UC-KLEE [37] directly starts symbolic execution from a target function using lazy initialization [22]. Through the manual analysis of the thousands of alarms, the authors of UC-KLEE detected 67 new bugs in BIND, openssl, Linux kernel and its true to false alarm ratio is 1:5.7 on average. We could not directly compare CONBRIIO with UC-KLEE because UC-KLEE is not publicly available and BIND, openssl, and Linux kernel (million lines of code) are too large to manually analyze alarms.

6.2 Random Method Sequences Generation Techniques for Object-Oriented Programs

Randoop [32] invokes a random sequence of public methods including constructors of a target method's class. MSeqGen [42] mines code bases to extract relevant method sequences of a target class under test and extends such method sequences with symbolic execution for high coverage. EvoSuite [13, 14] tests Java methods using search-based strategies with symbolic execution. TestFul [5] combines genetic algorithm and a local search to improve the speed of Java unit test generation. Garg et al. [15] improves Randoop by generating input test cases of the generated method sequence using concolic testing for C++ programs. These techniques may also suffer false alarms due to infeasible test inputs/method sequences generated. For example, Gross et al. [19] reported that Randoop raised 181 alarms without detecting any bug (i.e., all alarms were false ones) on five Java programs although the authors of Randoop reported that Randoop's true to false alarm ratio is 1:0.67 on 8 Java libraries and 6 .NET libraries on average [32]. Fraser et al. [14] reported that the statistically estimated true to false alarm ratios range from 1:0.6 to 1:4.2 in their experiments on randomly selected 100 projects hosted on sourceforge.net. Garg et al. [15] does not report detected bugs or false alarm ratios but branch coverage obtained using the proposed technique on eight programs (except gnuchess on which the authors reported nine new bugs and that a true to false alarm ratio was 1:1.0). In spite of the lack of explicit context information (e.g., class/object information) in C programs, CONBRIIO detects bugs precisely in C programs (i.e., a true to false alarm ratio is 1:4.5

on average) while keeping high bug detection ability (i.e., 91.0% of the target bug detected on average).

The aforementioned papers report only bug detection precision (RQ2), not bug detection ability (RQ1), which makes fair comparison between these techniques and CONBRIIO difficult. This is because these techniques may improve a true to false alarm ratio at the cost of missing bugs. Because of such trade-off between precision and recall of bug detection, we studied and reported both bug detection ability and precision.

6.3 Automated Unit Testing Techniques based on System Tests

Elbaum et al. [12] proposed a technique to generate unit tests from system tests; the technique captures program states before and after an invocation of a target function f to generate unit test inputs and oracles for f . OCAT [21] captures object instances during system executions and generates unit tests using Randoop with the captured object and the mutated object instances as seed objects. GenUtest [34] automatically generates unit tests and mock objects using captured method sequences during system testing. A limitation of these techniques is that the executions of the generated unit tests just replay the same behaviors [12, 34] (or similar behaviors [21]) of a target unit in already performed system testing (i.e., they are applicable to only regression testing of evolving software, not to a single version of software). Also, the aforementioned papers do not report bug detection ability nor precision.

7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We have presented an automated concolic unit testing technique CONBRIIO which generates extended units to closely mimic the real contexts of a target function f and filters out false alarms using symbolic calling context formulas of f using relevant functions to f . Through the experiments, CONBRIIO demonstrates both high bug detection ability (91.0% of all target bugs detected) and high bug detection precision (a true to false alarm ratio is 1:4.5). Furthermore, CONBRIIO detects 14 new crash bugs in the latest versions of the nine target C programs studied in other papers on crash bug detection techniques.

As future work, to improve the precision of automated unit testing further, we plan to refine the function dependency metric by analyzing more semantic characteristic of target program executions. Also, we will improve bug detection ability further by applying an invasive software testing technique [26] which increases test coverage by utilizing diverse executions of mutated versions of a target program. In addition, we will utilize generated test cases to improve precision of mutation-based fault localization [20].

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⁸ DART [16] bypasses the false alarm issue by targeting public API functions of libraries which should work with all possible inputs.

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