

Advisor To Ukraine Army Chief Rice Says Has No Concerns Ukraine Would Violate Any Arms Agreement

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Body

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Ukraine's Armed Forces are solidly united with the desire to fight and destroy the Russian army, and they will not divert weapons delivered to them to some other place. Dan Rice, a U.S. combat veteran and Special Advisor to Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of **Ukraine**'s Armed Forces, said this in an interview with Ukrinform.

'In my experience with the Ukrainian Army over the past three months, we have found the Ukrainian military to be solidly united with the desire to fight and destroy the Russian army. I believe **Ukraine** is one of the greatest allies of the United States and have confidence that weapons delivered to the Ukrainian soldiers will not be diverted elsewhere and have no concerns that Ukrainian leadership would violate any agreement,' he said.

Rice added that Washington has trust in the Ukrainian people, their political and military leadership, and in the brave Ukrainian soldiers.

'And that is why I am constantly writing and speaking publicly within the United States, recommending getting the right number of weapons (more) to **Ukraine** immediately to drive the Russians out of **Ukraine** and help the 'First Army of **Peace**' win back its territory, people, culture and **peace**,' Rice said.

EU spokesperson Peter Stano earlier said that the European Union has no reason to doubt the Ukrainian government's obligations regarding the proper use and accounting of weapons that are delivered to **Ukraine** with the assistance of the EU to ensure its right to self-defense.

Earlier, a number of Western media outlets suggested that NATO and the EU were allegedly concerned about arms smuggling from **Ukraine**. Both organizations denied such allegations, which may be the result of the Kremlin's disinformation campaign against **Ukraine** and Western countries.

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Advisor To Ukraine Army Chief Rice Says Has No Concerns Ukraine Would Violate Any Arms Agreement

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Calls for a Diplomatic Settlement in Ukraine Are Misplaced

Newstex Blogs

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Body

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<https://www.thenation.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/destroyed-russian-tank-img.jpg>

Outside Kyiv, **Ukraine**, locals examine a destroyed Russian tank. (Dimitar Dilkoff / AFP via Getty Images)

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The war in **Ukraine** has lasted for more than five months. As the bloodletting and destruction continue, the West faces rising inflation, and many economists warn that recessions may be coming. With winter coming, Europe is panicking about gas supplies. And on the military front, there are fears that the war could spread or escalate[2], spiraling into a clash between the world's two nuclear superpowers.

For these and other reasons, the calls for a political settlement are understandable. The reality, however, is that there is not a shred of evidence that shows that Moscow and Kyiv are prepared to even start preliminary negotiations aimed at ending the war, let alone agree to a cease-fire. And believing that a larger deal involving the disposition of territories could be around the corner is just plain fantasy.

The Logic Underlying Calls for a Settlement

The calls for diplomatic settlement, which have been made on military and humanitarian grounds, differ in logic and substance.

Some[3] proponents of negotiations argue that **Ukraine** lacks the military muscle to oust Russia from its territory. They believe fighting on in hopes of achieving that goal will produce more carnage and destruction, increase **Ukraine's** economic burden, and make its postwar recovery, already a Herculean task, even harder. They understand that any deal that **Ukraine** strikes with Russia now will require surrendering some of the land the Russian army has occupied since the February 24 invasion, but insist that **Ukraine** will find itself in a far worse predicament if it does not make this difficult choice now. And they are skeptical that the advanced Western

Calls for a Diplomatic Settlement in Ukraine Are Misplaced

weaponry that flowing into **Ukraine**, in particular the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS[4]), will result in anything that can be categorized as a Russian defeat.

Others[5] make the case for a diplomatic solution on humanitarian grounds alone. They point, for example, to the 12 million[6] Ukrainians who have become either refugees[7] or are internally displaced (including two-thirds of the country's children) and to the destruction of **Ukraine**'s schools[8], hospitals and health clinics[9], homes and apartment buildings[10], and infrastructure[11]. They also call attention to the wider ill effects attributable to the war. These include skyrocketing global food prices that threaten to increase hunger and malnutrition[12] in places where people are already impoverished, the potential of a debt crisis[13] in poor and middle-income countries as Western central banks raise interest rates to curb inflation, and the hardships created by surging in energy prices. The recent decline in global food prices doesn't reassure them, especially as experts warn[14] that prices would surge again. Costs are still 23 percent higher[15] than a year ago, and the July 22 agreement brokered by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and UN Secretary General António Guterres to allow grain exports from **Ukraine** and Russia is subject to uncertainties. Related Articles

Of course, these are sound reasons to urge an end to the war. Yet whatever outsiders may think about the military outlook, or the magnitude of the suffering created by continued fighting, neither warring party believes that it is losing—or will lose. Both Russia and **Ukraine** believe they will ultimately prevail, and neither worries about a drawn-out conflict, confident that time favors their side.

The View from Moscow

Let's start with Russia's perspective. The Russian army now occupies all of Luhansk province and is gearing up to conquer the part of neighboring Donetsk still under **Ukraine**'s control. Beyond that, Russia has captured Kherson province, much of Zaporozhzhia, and part of the Black Sea coast, giving them a land corridor that connects the Donbas to Crimea. Putin seems to believe that Russia, thanks to its numerical superiority in soldiers and firepower (especially artillery, which it has used to destroy towns), will occupy all of Donbas—the region that made up of Donetsk and Luhansk—and that it can then gain additional territories elsewhere in **Ukraine**—perhaps the rest of Zaporozhzhia, which would turn **Ukraine** into a landlocked country.

Current Issue

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Neither Western economic sanctions nor large Russian losses in troops and weaponry seems to have shaken Putin's confidence. As he sees it, Russia has already all but partitioned **Ukraine**, and he boasts[16] that his army hasn't even begun to fight in full force. Some experts have predicted[17] that public protests in Russia, a collapse of its political system, or even the Russian Federation itself could end the war, but none of these is remotely likely. There have been demonstrations, some of them substantial[18], but nothing on a scale or with a frequency that would threaten the Russian state. And the political order Putin built remains intact despite the strain produced by Western sanctions and the war and assertions that the Russian economy is 'imploding[19]' are eye-catching but far-fetched formulations that confuse distress with disaster. There is as, Adam Smith observed in 1777, 'a great deal of ruin in a nation.'

Still, if Russia has gained large portions of Ukrainian land and has much more of everything that makes for military power than **Ukraine**—GDP, troops, weaponry, armament factories—why are **Ukraine**'s leaders[20] and a majority of Ukrainians[21] so confident that their army will eventually push out Russia?

How Things Look from Kyiv

President Volodymyr Zelensky and other top Ukrainian leaders also believe they will eventually win. They point to Russia's unsustainable losses in troops[22] and equipment[23], the increasing difficulty[24] it is having replenishing its ranks, the economic pain Western sanctions have inflicted, and the sophisticated weaponry **Ukraine** has received from the West, especially the United States. **Ukraine**'s recent destruction[25] of many Russian ammunition dumps and command stations, using the US-supplied HIMARS, and its recent push into Russian-occupied Kherson province have only strengthened Kyiv's optimism.

The Zelensky government seems confident that the high morale among Ukrainians will hold up because they understand theirs is a fight for national survival and are therefore willing to sacrifice[26]—unlike the Russian

Calls for a Diplomatic Settlement in Ukraine Are Misplaced

troops[27] pressed into service. In a June poll[28] conducted by the University of Chicago, 89 percent of Ukrainians opposed conceding territory to Russia in exchange for an end to the war. Sixty-six percent said that it was 'extremely likely' or 'very likely' that their army would force Russia to retreat to the pre-February 24 lines. And more than half believed that Russia would even be expelled from Crimea and the parts of Donbas it occupied in 2014.

Yes, the war has forced Ukraine to seek \$5 billion a month in foreign assistance just to cover its budget deficit and destroyed so much of Ukraine's economic assets that the estimated bill for rebuilding the country is at least \$750 billion[29]. But just as military casualties haven't persuaded Ukraine to seek a settlement, neither have the economic costs of the war. Ukrainians are suffering on multiple fronts but are unwilling to bargain with Russia. Those urging a settlement on humanitarian grounds seem not to understand Ukrainian thinking.

What Matters Are the Assessments in Russia and Ukraine

Could Ukraine's Western supporters, especially some European governments, start pressing it to cut a deal with Russia, given that the war is creating economic and political serious problems for them? US inflation is now the highest in 40 years[30], and the eurozone is experiencing record inflation[31]. The IMF has downgraded[32] its growth forecasts and indeed warned recently[33] that the world 'may be soon be teetering on the edge of global recession.' Russia has reduced natural gas flows to Europe—it now supplies only a third[34] of what it did in 2021—and this could lead already high prices[35] to spike. Perhaps then, France, Germany, and Italy[36] might renew their calls for negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. Perhaps Ukraine fatigue will take hold in the United States[37]. So far, however, Western unity has held: Ukraine hasn't faced pressure to resolve the war diplomatically. In fact, the public narrative of American and Europe leaders has it that the goals of the fighting and the terms of any peace deal are Ukraine's alone to determine and that, regardless of what they are, the West will stand behind them. There have been occasional signs of dissonance—from French President Emmanuel Macron[38], for instance—but nothing amounting to a breaking of ranks.

Currently, the assessments of outsiders don't matter, even if their pessimistic forecasts could prove accurate. All that matters now is Russian and Ukrainian leaders' undiminished confidence that they will be victorious. So long as at least one side does not change its upbeat view, there can be no negotiation toward a political settlement, which will necessarily require difficult compromises by both of them.

Ukraine isn't prepared to sign a deal that hands any of its territory to Russia. But Russia would insist that any peace agreement include precisely such provisions. Barring Russia's total defeat, Putin won't sign an agreement that doesn't yield substantial territorial gains and a political arrangement that guarantees that Ukraine will be a neutral country rather than a member of NATO—terms that are sufficient for him to tout at home as proof that Russia won the war. Ukraine's minimum condition[39] for a just cease-fire, according to Zelensky, is a return to the status quo ante bellum. Given its current military position, Russia will not forfeit all that it has gained at great cost. The upshot is that this war will continue until at least one side concludes that fighting will prove fruitless, perhaps even disastrous. Neither is anywhere near that point, and it could take many months, maybe even longer, for one or both to get there. Meanwhile, the carnage will continue, economic pain will increase in the West and beyond, and the risk of a direct confrontation between the West and Russia will continue to lurk in the background.

[1]: <https://www.thenation.com/issue> [2]: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/coming-storm-insights-ukraine-about-escalation-modern-war> [3]: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-07-08/ukraines-implausible-theories-victory> [4]: <https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/ms-himars-m142/> [5]: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/dicarlo-meaningful-sustained-political-process-needed-peaceful-settlement-ukraine> [6]: <https://www.iom.int/news/returns-increase-ukraine-62-million-people-remain-internally-displaced> [7]: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine> [8]: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/13/world/europe/ukraine-schools-war.html> [9]: <https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2022/the-vulnerability-of-health-care-in-conflict-ukraine-and-beyond> [10]: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-struggles-house-thousands-displaced-people-rcna28895> [11]: <https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/ukraine-war-100-billion-infrastructure-damage-and-counting> [12]: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/food-security-update> [13]: <https://www.dw.com/en/debt-crisis-looms-for-developing-countries-amid-perfect-storm/a-62246014> [14]: <https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/26/investing/premarket-stocks-trading/index.html> [15]: <https://tradingeconomics.com/world/food-price-index> [16]: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/08/putin->

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UKRAINE - IS THE TIDE TURNING AGAINST PUTIN, AGAIN?

States News Service

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The following information was released by the U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC):

Analysis and Commentary, By Timothy Ash

Bluebay Asset Manager

London, UK

LONDON.....I thought it worth updating my thoughts on Ukraine, and particularly where this war is going as the duration and ultimate damage done by the conflict will be key to understanding the longer term economic story in Ukraine - the rebuild demands.

First point here is that it's clearly difficult to predict anything in a conflict. And we have seen the ebb and flow of this war with first Moscow's apparent blitzkrieg and most peoples assumption it would be all over in days with a Russian victory, but then the Ukrainian victory in the battle of Kyiv, then Russia refocusing on Donbas and victories in Severdonetsk and Lychachyansk, and in recent weeks what seems to be the momentum turning again through the provision of new Western military supplies (HIMARS) to Ukraine, with Russian momentum in Donbas stalled and the focus now turning to a looming battle for Kherson with Ukraine expected to go on the offensive.

Second, we know here that much depends on Putin ultimately, and the war will end when Putin decides to stop offensive actions - he might need to be beaten on the battlefield first though. And therein six months in, surely Putin must now be questioning whether he really can win this war? If that is the case, maybe he will push for a nearer term peace deal.

And therein I think what is now clear is that Russia does not have unlimited capacity to prolong this conflict unless that is Putin is prepared to put the Russian economy on to full scale, total war settings - think WW2 style general mobilisation and back to state planning of the economy.

I guess you could refer back to Iraq under Saddam and say, look he waged the Iran war for close to a decade. But back then Saddam was being financed and armed by the Gulf and the US. Russia currently has limited external sources of money or arms - albeit higher oil prices are helping.

But it is with arms and troops that Putin has the problem. By most accounts Russia has lost a huge amount of kit and troops in this conflict - likely half its combat capability. The kit is difficult to replace quickly. Russia is running out

UKRAINE - IS THE TIDE TURNING AGAINST PUTIN, AGAIN?

of supplies of high precision missiles, and they are difficult to manufacture given Western technology export bans to Russia. And China has not been willing to help Russia herein - albeit that could change with the idiotic Pelosi visit.

And on resupply, the HIMARS systems are now having a devastating effect - wreaking havoc on Russian supply chains which were already vulnerable. If Russia cannot get sufficient kit to the front line it cannot conduct war, simple as that.

And then there is the issue of troops and morale. Ukraine has said it can get 1 million troops in the field, and given its home advantage and now Western training (10k every 3 months being trained in the U.K.), manpower is not an issue for Ukraine. But it is for Russia. Russian casualties are likely tens of thousands already - some suggest KIA and MIA might be as many as 100,000, half the number of troops that initially started this campaign.

And unless Putin begins a general mobilisation, Russia just cannot get that many troops quickly into the field - actually also pointless if it cannot arm them anyway given resupply problems. Indeed we are seeing Russian forces having to be moved from different fronts, first from the north to Donbas, now to the South.

Meanwhile, for political reasons Putin seems reluctant to go to a general mobilisation - he seems happy to use troops drawn from poorer southern, largely Muslim, regions but not risk casualties from Western Russia, from Moscow and St Pete, et al. He is therefore obviously nervous about the domestic political setting in Russia itself.

Bottom line here is that Ukraine can mobilise close to 1 million men, and women, who are motivated to fight for their land. Putin is already close to depleting Russian regular forces and do Russians really want to fight for someone else's land unless they really are totally brainwashed, or desperate (in the form of prisoners being freed to fight in Ukraine).

So it feels here as though Russia is reaching the peak of its capability to launch major offensive actions in Ukraine. It feels like Russia has got to the peak of its reach in Ukraine, so taking Crimea, much of Donbas and big chunks of Kherson and Zaporizhiya. And it feels to me now that the Kremlin agenda will be trying to consolidate these gains on the ground via some kind of diplomatic route.

Perhaps here we could see the recently reached grain deal as a start of that process - the deal made no sense from a Russian perspective, unless it was eyeing some bigger peace deal. Also note Schroeder's recent visit to Moscow and claims Russia wants a peace deal. We can debate whether Ukraine and Ukrainians are in any way inclined to accept anything of which Schroeder appeared to suggest.

From the Ukrainian side, they are only going to get stronger with more Western kit and financing arriving, and no shortage of motivated soldiers - surely Moscow realises now that time is not on its side. The longer it fights this war, the stronger Ukraine and the more impact that Western sanctions will have on its military capability. And remember on this latter front that for Putin the war in Ukraine is just part of the broader war with the West.

And we are now entering an arms race, with NATO set to go +2% of GDP spending on defence, and Russia simply cannot match that. Just do the maths, Western states now reigned against Russia have a combined GDP of what \$40 trillion, 2% of that is \$2 trillion, which is more than Russia's entire GDP.

Putin needs now to replace half his military destroyed in Ukraine, and spend even more than pre-war just to maintain some kind of military parity with NATO. The longer he continues the war in Ukraine, the longer sanctions and the less able he will be to maintain any kind of military parity with the West - at least in conventional weapons, as nukes are a separate story.

Winning in Ukraine is important to Putin but would he want to jeopardise Russia's broader security vis a vis the West by eroding its conventional military capability so much that it will struggle to counter possible NATO threats (not that I see them). And if Putin is going to try and maintain any kind of military parity with the West, surely this puts Russia back into a guns versus butter (or I-phones) scenario.

UKRAINE - IS THE TIDE TURNING AGAINST PUTIN, AGAIN?

For Russia to keep pace with likely \$2 trillion Western defence spending it will have to divert resources from consumption to defence, and this will raise fears about political stability. Russians will inevitably get much poorer, and will they still prize the capture of Donbas when they are struggling to maintain living standards? I doubt it - as the star of Crimea has waned in Russia, post 2014.

So I think Putin has no other option here but to try and push some kind of peace deal, the sooner the better from his perspective. I think this winter. And what we are likely to see is the last big battle over the next month or so in Kherson, the gas crisis in Europe play out in the next few months, and at its peak, perhaps October-November, the Kremlin comes up with some peace plan.

At that point Ukraine will be under huge pressure from Europe to accept Moscows - opinion in Ukraine is set against a deal (polls show 90% against now giving territorial concessions to Russia as the price of peace), but let's see how that might change with the battle for Kherson. If the Ukrainians fail to recapture much territory, the mood in Kyiv might change. But I would expect Europe to try and bribe Ukraine big time to accept some kind of deal - ultimately a big reconstruction package would be good for Ukraine's growth/recovery story.

Not sure here though that the US, and its UK and Eastern European backers would be quite as enthusiastic as the appeasers in Germany and France. They are likely to be of the view that a real peace in Ukraine, and the security of Europe, can only be brought with a defeat for Putin, and the Ukrainians (backed by Western money and arms) are the best chance of achieving that. I don't think Washington or London will be pushing Ukraine to agree a deal at any price. They will encourage Ukraine to negotiate hard, and hopefully from a position of new strength on the battlefield.

If Ukraine fails to accept peace, then I think we are in for a long grinding war, but at a much lower intensity - think back to Donbas 15-22, where the scale of the conflict is reduced significantly, we see various rounds of attempted peace talks which don't go very far. But in this scenario, Ukraine can still get back on with reconstruction.

Lots of money is still pumped in, and we see real GDP rebound from the low. Russia will remain weighed down by sanctions and hence in decline - whatever endgame in Ukraine, the arms race between the West and Russia will continue and hence the West has little real reason to relax sanctions.

The alternative is I guess that Putin is just hell bent on Ukraine's destruction, and likely with it that of Russia - perhaps the line on Ukraine could be if I can't have it, I will ensure trust you won't want it. He continues the attacks and as per the Iran- Iraq war both countries are grinded into the ground. But as with that conflict I don't see a win for either side. Neither has the capacity to win this war. That just seems like fact now - actually the more likely longer term winner would be Ukraine as I noted it has the troops and will get more Western kit and finance.

Now on the gas crisis, I think Putin plays that to full effect this winter, to get old Europe in a place where they are desperate to deal, and force Ukraine to deal.

Why this winter?

Because I think this is Putin's last chance to play this card. The longer he leaves it the more Russia will have been cut out of Europe's supply chains. And it will inevitably be cut out of supply chains for sure over the longer term as it has proven to be an unreliable supplier. So his card is now, this winter, not next year. If he is to play this card it is now. And the Kremlin will think they need to play it to bring this war to an end.

Just as an aside here on the energy crisis in Europe. Putin will play the gas card for sure, but he does have to be a bit careful. If he forces Europe, and the world, into recession as seems likely now he collapses global demand for energy and with it energy prices. He will then face the double whammy of lower export volumes and prices, so it will be ironic if only with peace comes the collapse of the Russian economy - guess you might say there it gives him an incentive to try and maintain tensions.

So summarising, my base case is a European energy crisis, brought on by Putin desperate now to get a Ukraine peace deal before year end. Big risk here is that Zelensky might not be able to sell that domestically - polls show

UKRAINE - IS THE TIDE TURNING AGAINST PUTIN, AGAIN?

90% want the war to continue until all territory is regained - but lots of Western cash will be deployed to entice Ukraine to the table. But Ukraine will get big Western financing flows anyway, given the need now to build Ukraine as a defensive buffer state against Russia. And in the Schroeder peace offer, there is no way NATO would now accept a demilitarised Ukraine.

The good news for Ukraine in an early end to the war is that the economy is likely to bounce back quickly, as a result of the low base effect, the innovation shown in the war, and the huge Western financing likely to flow into Ukraine - we can debate the West's willingness to write big checks for reconstruction but surely NATO now has a huge incentive to build the Ukrainian military into a supreme fighting force and buffer against Russia. And I use the State of Israel analogy here - like Israel, Ukraine fought this war as it had to to actually survive.

It will need to successfully rebuild its economy for the same reasons, to be economically powerful enough to be able to counter likely future Russian aggression. Important also to remember that whereas on February 24 we were debating whether Ukraine would exist, but we know now that despite Putin trying his best, a Ukraine with a significant part of its pre-Feb 24 land area, and access to ports, will exist. This is still a huge country, with a large, skilled population, which is absolutely viable as a state. It has fought and proven its right to exist.

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Ukraine : USAID announces additional \$1.8m for WHO to support the continuity of healthcare in Ukraine

Mena Report

August 4, 2022 Thursday

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Body

As Ukraine continues to face the most acute humanitarian crisis in the WHO European Region in decades, the Ukrainian Ministry of Health (MoH) is striving to meet basic health service delivery, surveillance, and pharmaceutical needs.

The health system, already overwhelmed by two years of COVID-19 prior to the war, needs direct support to maintain essential, lifesaving functions and services.

Today, USAID Deputy Administrator Isobel Coleman met with Dr. Hans Kluge, the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Director for Europe. They discussed the United States and the WHO's coordinated response to support Ukraine and the country's health system recovery and announced that USAID is providing an additional \$1.8 million in funding to WHO to strengthen infectious disease surveillance and reporting in Ukraine, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable, including people with special needs, those living in remote areas and internally displaced people (IDP). With this additional support, USAID has now provided \$15.5 million to WHO, for critical health support, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February.

For almost six months now, Ukraine's health system has been facing numerous and serious challenges due to the ongoing conflict. We are beginning to see a rise in COVID-19 cases, with a corresponding rise in hospitalizations and deaths, driven by the BA.5 sub-lineage of Omicron which has quickly spread through Europe since early June, said Dr Hans Kluge, WHO Regional Director for Europe.

On top of that, the war has affected routine immunization activities for highly infectious and potentially life-threatening diseases like measles, polio and diphtheria. A cholera outbreak remains a real and serious risk. And the rapid and unexpected spread of monkeypox in the European Region could further challenge the Ukrainian health system, when the virus reaches Ukraine. The only way to get a handle on these health threats is to have robust and agile surveillance systems that are able to function amid the current conflict and well beyond," continued Dr Kluge.

Working closely with the Ukrainian MoH, the overarching objectives will be to:

Improve laboratory diagnostic capacities to detect and report communicable diseases in a timely way.

Enhance existing surveillance systems through event-based surveillance (EBS) in selected priority regions with a high number of IDPs.

Ukraine : USAID announces additional \$1.8m for WHO to support the continuity of healthcare in Ukraine

Strengthen health information systems, ensuring regular data flow and better monitoring of service availability.

On behalf of WHO, I thank USAID for this generous and timely donation to help protect the health and well-being of the Ukrainian people. Health must be a central pillar of the humanitarian response, but also a key component of Ukraines recovery. Investing in health now will pay dividends later, when peace finally comes, Dr Kluge concluded.

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