

Jan-16 Lecture

Objectives

- Super quick intra-domain routing summary
- Super quick switching question
- Super quick Internet architecture
- Router architectures
- More extensive inter-domain routing summary
- Inter-domain routing attacks
- Tie to monitoring research

Reading Summary

- Notes from when I taught cs176a—pretty similar to what is in Kurose & Ross (and we'll review today)
- J. Aweya, "IP Router Architectures: An Overview," *International Journal of Communication Systems*, vol. 14, num. 5, June 2001.
- YouTube AS hijacking article and video
 - Mostly just used as an example with a decent animation
- Washington Post article
 - Short article about security concerns
- IBM article
 - Also short with some background—useful to re-see the basics of BGP
- Lots of details about peering
 - I'll go over some of it, but not all of it and likely not today

Routing Summary

- From a router perspective
 - Need to maintain a forwarding table and a routing table
- Forwarding table
 - Need the simplest, fastest, most efficient way of taking a packet with a given destination and determining an outgoing interface
- Routing table (or database)
 - Collect as much information as available and choose among the different options

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 - Collect as much information as available and choose among the different options
- Different protocols offer different amounts/types of information
 - They have different properties with respect to overhead, convergence, security, etc.
 - As a result, different protocols are used in different ways in different parts of the network
 - For example: different protocols in mobile networks

Couldn't You Just Use Switches?

- Switches are simpler, faster, and cheaper
 - Switches don't do routing, they do switching (duh)
- Recall: they act on L2 headers (e.g., Ethernet switch)
- Switches already:
 - monitor which destinations are attached to which ports
 - use buffering to avoid collisions as much as possible
- So, what's the problem?

Cascade of Switches

- Problem: broadcast traffic gets sent everywhere
- Problem: switches can be connected together and connected back to each other to form loops
 - Protocols to solve this (and other) problems
- Solutions
 - Use Virtual LANs (VLANs) to control traffic flow
 - Avoid loops and use designated port to point “upstream”
 - Run a “spanning tree” algorithm: goal is to identify ultimate upstream connection and build tree, thereby avoiding loops

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- ...but now switches aren't so **simple/cheap** anymore
- Ultimately, it becomes a question of what is needed
 - Features, CPU, backplane, line cards/connects

Intra-Domain Routing Summary

- Intra-domain routing protocols collect various **amounts** of information from various **locations**
 - From neighbors or from routers throughout the network
- Border routers advertise non-AS routes (inbound)
 - Could just be a default route
 - Or could be sets of prefixes if default routing not applicable
- Outbound routes/prefixes are usually pretty stable
- Routers run different shortest-path algorithms based on the kinds of information available
- Result is a forwarding table
- Repeat...


A Quick Peek at ISP Connections

- Direct peering
 - Connect ISP A's router to ISP B's router
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 - Connection is likely (these days) through direct fiber (or satellite or whatever)
- Peering at a Network Access Point (NAP)
 - Special purpose location that allows ISPs to (co-)locate a router in their network with routers from other ISPs









Router Architecture

- So I decided last minute to throw in some stuff about router architectures
- See: J. Aweya, "IP Router Architectures: An Overview," International Journal of Communication Systems, vol. 14, num. 5, June 2001.







OC12=622 Mbps
OC48=2.4 Gbps
OC192=10 Gbps



Basic Router Architecture



a). Basic architecture.



b). Routing components.

Figure 1. Generic architecture of a router.

Use of a Common Bus




Figure 2. Traditional bus-based router architecture.

Use of a Route Cache






Figure 3. Reducing the number of bus copies using a route cache in the network interface.

Switching and Routing Together



a). Functional diagram [34][35][36].



b). Generic architecture.

Figure 6. A generic switch-based distributed router architecture.

Fast Path v. Slow Path




Figure 7. Example IEEE 802 protocol entities in an IP router [Adapted from 34].

More Examples of Slow Path Functions

Typical Router Slow Path Functions	
Packet-by-Packet Operations	Background Tasks
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Fragmentation and reassembly- Source routing option- Route recording option- Timestamp option- ICMP message generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Routing protocols (RIP, OSPF, BGP, etc.)- Network management (SNMP)- Router configuration (BOOTP, DHCP, etc.)

Figure 8. IP router slow-path functions.

Slow/Fast Path Functions in the Architecture




Figure 9. An example functional partitioning in the distributed router architecture.

Even More Functionality Added




Figure 10. A high level functional diagram of a distributed router architecture.

Pretty Close to Modern Functionality




Figure 11. Forwarding database consisting of several cross-linked tables.

Hierarchical Routing

- Now, we've talked about (1) the basics of switching and routing, (2) what routers are, (3) how they connect to each other, (4) how networks connect to each other, now...

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- Now, we've talked about (1) the basics of switching and routing, (2) what routers are, (3) how they connect to each other, (4) how networks connect to each other, now...
- Problem: Internet is too big to just have a single domain and a single routing protocol
 - If there were just a flat topology, every router would have to hear from every other router in order to populate its routing table and build a forwarding table

Hierarchical Routing

- Ways of dealing with the massive scale of the Internet
 - Default routing: networks (and hosts) on the edges of the Internet don't need full routing tables, they just need a route into the core

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 - Address aggregation: when packets are far from their destinations, they only need to know the general direction to go (still, as specified by a next hop)
 - By aggregating addresses, the number of entries in the routing and forwarding tables can be greatly reduced.
 - Border/Gateway routers: like default routing, a border router can act as a proxy for everything that isn't local (e.g., all traffic *not* for 128.111/16 goes to the border router)
 - The benefit of border/gateway routers also works in the reverse direction: the rest of the Internet does not need to know about routing within networks at the edges—core routers just get one prefix for a stub network (like UCSB).

Hierarchical Routing

- Routing grows much more complicated the further away from the edges
- Examples
 - When (transit) domains have multiple egress points
 - When a domain has multiple equal provider connections
 - When money is involved
- Most difficult for transit providers
 - E.g., CENIC

Hierarchical Routing

- Border/Gateway routers serve another purpose as well
 - Provide a place to wall off an administrative domain from the rest of the Internet
 - Border routers provide a “demarcation point” (or border) between what is considered “inside” the network and what is considered “outside”
 - A place to implement “routing policy”

Hierarchical Routing Analogy

- One of the more significant challenges in running a border router is dealing with the different routing protocols that communicate with the border router
- Analogy: an information station at a “T” intersection
 - It receives updates on traffic conditions from all of the different roads
 - Yet travelers arrive and want to know how to get to a particular destination
 - And lots of different languages are being spoken
 - The information station translates everything and stores it away, probably processing everything it hears to come up with a best road to take to get to each of the different destinations.
 - Ultimately, the advice is either “take Road X” or “take Road Y”

Routing Protocols

- At the end of the day, how information about possible paths and the conditions on each are defined as part of the routing protocol
- The most commonly used protocols are much simpler than you might imagine
 - 99% of the time, there isn't a lot going on
 - The routing *algorithms* are very simple: most don't consider path conditions, the metric is simply hop count
- **From CS theory:** because the scale is so large, small increments in complexity and state require significant resources as the network grows larger


Border Gateway Protocol

- THE inter-domain routing protocol
 - Designed to provide scale
 - Designed to provide security
 - Designed to provide policy mechanisms
- High level BGP routing steps are about the same as for an intra-domain routing protocol:
 - Receive routing updates from neighbors
 - Propagate that information to other neighbors
 - Compute best routes for a particular prefix
- The issues are:
 - What information is exchanged
 - How the route is determined
 - What exactly is determined

BGP Terminology

- Stub networks: a single border connection
- Multi-Connected: no third-party network reachability
- Transit: inter-connected ASes & provide traffic through the AS (not sourced or destined within the AS)
- External BGP (eBGP): receiving routes from routers outside the AS
- Internal BGP (iBGP): receiving external routes from within the AS
 - Structured as a mesh

BGP Terminology




BGP Route Information

- Origin: AS that originated that update
- AS-Path: set of ASes to reach the destination prefix
- Next-Hop: IP address of the router that begins the AS-Path
- Multi-Exit Description (MED): tie-breaker to determine what entry/exit point in an AS should be
- Local Pref: Used in iBGP to determine best exit point (if multiple exit)
- Communities: set of BGP speakers that are trusted

BGP Policy Information

- Two examples where received routes are often not put into the routing table:
 1. Multi-homed network that does not want to act as a transit network
 2. Transit networks that do not want to do the majority of the work for its neighbors/peers/competitors



- Not putting routes into the routing table is the best policy enforcement mechanism
 - Preferring one route over another to avoid a particular destination is not guaranteed to work
 - Remember! Forwarding is always hop-by-hop

BGP Policy Information

- Another input that affects which routing paths are used is based on economics
 - This decision is usually made by a network operator
 - Use MED (multi-exit descriptor) attribute or LocalPref (used in iBGP to identify preferred exit point)
- Most common current billing model is “95/5”: 95% percentile of traffic, sampled at 5 minute intervals
 - <https://www.semaphore.com/95th-percentile-bandwidth-metering-explained-and-analyzed/>
- Past billing models
 - Based on access capacity (Ex: buy a T1 or OC3)
 - Average usage: skewed higher based on bursty nature of Internet traffic
- Multi-homed networks or transit providers monitor usage and adjust preferences accordingly

Bandwidth Pricing

Internet Transit Pricing (1998-2015)

Source: <http://DrPeering.net>

Year	Internet Transit Price	% decline
1998	\$1,200.00 per Mbps	
1999	\$800.00 per Mbps	33%
2000	\$675.00 per Mbps	16%
2001	\$400.00 per Mbps	41%
2002	\$200.00 per Mbps	50%
2003	\$120.00 per Mbps	40%
2004	\$90.00 per Mbps	25%
2005	\$75.00 per Mbps	17%
2006	\$50.00 per Mbps	33%
2007	\$25.00 per Mbps	50%
2008	\$12.00 per Mbps	52%
2009	\$9.00 per Mbps	25%
2010	\$5.00 per Mbps	44%
2011	\$3.25 per Mbps	35%
2012	\$2.34 per Mbps	28%
2013	\$1.57 per Mbps	33%
2014	\$0.94 per Mbps	40%
2015	\$0.63 per Mbps	33%

BGP Protocol Details

- Uses TCP, Port 179
- Open: used to exchange configuration and parameters for the session
- Update: distribute routing information including add, update, withdraw
- KeepAlive: sent at 1/3 of the “hold time” to keep the TCP session alive
 - Usually 90s or 120s
- Notification: Error detected, terminate TCP session
- Route Refresh: complete re-transmission of routing information

BGP Attacks and Weaknesses

- Interject a session reset (DoS attack)
 - Through TCP or BGP
- Malicious advertisements
 - Create route flaps: send updates frequently
 - Inject black holes: send updates for routes that don't exist
- Human mistakes
 - Allow unusual routes to be advertised (misconfiguration)
 - Allow unusual routes to be accepted (too much trust)

YouTube Hickjacking by Pakistan Telecom, 2008

- **Before, during and after Sunday, 24 February 2008:** AS36561 (YouTube) announces 208.65.152.0/22
- **Sunday, 24 February 2008, 18:47 (UTC):** AS17557 (Pakistan Telecom) starts announcing 208.65.153.0/24.
- **Sunday, 24 February 2008, 20:07 (UTC):** AS36561 (YouTube) starts announcing 208.65.153.0/24.
- **Sunday, 24 February 2008, 20:18 (UTC):** AS36561 (YouTube) starts announcing 208.65.153.128/25 and 208.65.153.0/25.
- **Sunday, 24 February 2008, 21:01 (UTC):** AS3491 (PCCW Global) withdraws all prefixes originated by AS17557 (Pakistan Telecom), thus stopping the hijack of 208.65.153.0/24.

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzLPKuAOe50#t=62>

Washington Post Article

- “In 2010 a Chinese ISP momentarily hijacked the Internet. Due to a misconfiguration, **some traffic that should have gone to Dell, CNN, Starbucks and Apple was sent to China instead.** The incident lasted for only a few minutes and the responsible party claimed it was an accident. But it highlights a dangerous security weakness in one of the Internet's fundamental protocols.”
- “Research released this week has revealed two more cases in which misconfigurations re-routed traffic far from their intended destination. For example, in one of the attacks, **traffic traveling from Mexico to the United States took a circuitous and illogical route to Belarus.**”

Washington Post Article

- “According to Renesys, on July 31, 2013, [Opin Kerfi] it began announcing **origination routes for 597 IP networks**, despite the fact that it **normally only originates three IP networks** and has no downstream autonomous system customers. The faulty routes appear to have exclusively come through one of Opin Kerfi's ISPs, Síminn.”
- “Renesys believes this kind of attack is a serious threat to Internet security, but may have a very limited shelf life. **"This is not a very subtle attack -- you can't carry it out without publishing your false routes all over the planet,"** said Cowie. ‘If everyone would take care to watch how their networks are being advertised around the world it would disappear overnight.’”

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<http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~almeroth/classes/W19.176B/papers/ibm-17.pdf>

Reading Summary for Next Time

- Paxson paper
 - 1997: defines route stability metrics
- Global Internet paper
 - 2010: revisited some of the same metrics
- Will probably then talk about peering...