

Siri-ously Leaky


Exploring Overlooked Attack Surfaces Across Apple's Ecosystem

Richard Hyunho Im (@richeeta)
DEF CON 33 • 45 min • Demo, Exploit


Friday at 14:30
LVCC • L1 • EHW3 • Track 4

Are your Hidden Photos really hidden?

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.5




Hidden Photo Leak Under the Hood



Can I peek at your Notes on Lock Screen?

CVE-2024-44235


✓ Fixed in iOS 18.1



Can I peek at your Pages files on Lock Screen?

CVE-2024-44235


✓ Fixed in iOS 18.1



Can I find out what naughty audiobook you last listened to on Lock Screen?


Related to CVE-2024-44235

X Not fixed




Can I access your ChatGPT data on Lock Screen?

Related to CVE-2024-44235
✓ Fixed by OpenAI in August 2024
ChatGPT for iOS/iPadOS update




CVE-2024-44235 Under the Hood




Are I peek at your locked private Safari tab?

Shortcuts Race Condition

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.3




Shortcuts → Safari Locked Tab Race Condition




Can I read your Note(s) from Lock Screen?

Speak Screen on Widget
X Not fixed




Speak Screen Reading Notes Under the Hood



Can I peek into your most recent ChatGPT convo on Lock Screen?

CVE-2025-24198
✓ Fixed in iOS 18.4




Can I peek into the last Safari tab you had open on Lock Screen?

CVE-2025-24198

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.4




CVE-2025-24198 Under the Hood



Can you trust emails in shared Contacts cards?

CVE-2025-24225

✓ Fixed in iOS 18.5



RFC 5322 Email Addressing Format

"Recipient Name" <username@domain.tld>

- Recipient Name: Often first name + last name; sometimes omitted altogether
 - Quotation marks sometimes omitted
 - <>: Enclose recipient's actual email address
 - Multiple recipients separated by commas

"Billy Joel" <bj@didntstartfire.us>, Harry Potter <hp@hogwarts.edu>, GRRM <george@stillwriting.wtf>

CVE-2025-24225: Discovery

1. On any iPhone running iOS 18.x (before 18.5) or iPad running iPadOS 17.x (before 17.7.7):

Open Contacts app → Tap + to create a new Contact.

2. Fill in the following fields:

First Name: Harry


Last Name: Potter

Email: `harry_potter_likes_long_email_address@hogwarts.edu`

3. Save the Contact.


4. Instead of displaying Harry's ridiculously long email address, iOS chooses to truncate it with ...

iOS thinks:
Nope, WAY too
long—not showing all
that crap!




Hmm...RFC 5322 + iOS Truncating Behavior

- Now recall RFC 5322:
Recipient Name <username@domain.tld>
- Now imagine Voldemort hijacks Harry's phone and decides to edit Harry's work email with a ton of whitespaces (represented here with the blue _):
**hp@ministryofmagic.co.uk <voldemort@slytherin.win
 >**



Then we get:



Now: Assume Unwitting Harry Shares His Contact Card

Nice Meeting You

To: hp@ministryofmagic.co.uk

Cc/Bcc, From: richeeta@icloud.com

Subject: Nice Meeting You

Hi Harry,

Thanks for teaching me how to use Expelliarmus to defend myself against Avada Kedavra! Who knew you could just shoot some LED beam to defeat the most dangerous wizard of all time?

Thanks,
Richard

Sent from iPhone

Can you see what might go wrong and why?

Hint:

"Recipient Name"
<username@domain.tld>

Nice Meeting You

To: hp@ministryofmagic.co.uk

"hp@ministryofmagic.co.uk"
<voldemort@slytherin.win>


Worse in Outlook!

If you select Outlook as your default email app (in Settings → Apps → Default Apps → Default Email App):

~~You can still reproduce issue CVE-2025-24225 right now!~~

~~Yes, Microsoft knows, but it's Microsoft. :(~~

Fixed in June 2025 😊



Oh my...even worse than Apple Mail??

At least in Mail, if you went to your Sent folder, you'd know you got duped.




Apple:
Hey, at least we aren't
gaslighting you!

But Outlook? The Sent folder still shows the spoofed email! To know you got duped, you'd have to look under the hood:



Microsoft:
Naw we good!
Nothing to see here!



Unicode RTL Override (U+202E)

- Flip a filename's direction, fool the eye, and trick iOS.
- U+202E forces Right-to-Left rendering for the text that follows, reversing visible order while keeping the underlying byte order intact.
- Commonly used for Arabic & Hebrew.
- But also lets attackers can drop files such as:


<U+202E>fdp.uhcakip.mobileconfig → gifnocelibom.pikachu.pdf

The invisible RTLO makes the characters render RTL, so the user sees:
gifnocelibom.pikachu.pdf.

- The real extension remains .mobileconfig, but it looks like a harmless PDF.

Back to Apple! 😊

- Files app on iOS allows you to long-press then tap Rename to rename the file.
- Similar to CVE-2025-24225, you can insert extra whitespaces, but you can also add line breaks when renaming files!
- But not directly 🤦
- If you hit the Return key while renaming a file = iOS treats it as okay, you're done renaming this file instead of \n.
- But we can copy and paste when renaming. 😊



Back to Apple! 😊

- So we can not only do this:


```
<\U+202E>fdp.uhcakip.mobileconfig →  
gfnocelibom.pikachu.pdf
```

- We can also do:

```
<\U+202E>fdp.uhcakip  
<\n * 10>  
.mobileconfig → pikachu.pdf
```

No characters after line breaks are displayed in the Files app!

- The real extension remains .mobileconfig, but it looks like a harmless PDF AND doesn't even hint at a .mobileconfig.



Back to Apple! 😊

- Can also abuse in links to mislead/redirect calls and text messages.
- Copy and paste the payload into Notes and add a hyperlink:


tel:<U+202E>80055501231

- The user sees:

tel:3210-555-008-1


- But when the link is clicked, it will dial:

1 800 555 0123




Safari Punycode Confusion

- `/` (U+2044 FRACTION SLASH) is visually similar to `/` (U+002F) but IS NOT a path separator.
- Parsed as part of the domain name.
- **Example:**
`https://apple.com/compare.io?modelList=MacBook-Pro-14-M4x,MacBook-Pro`
→
`https://apple.xn--comcompare-496e.io`
- `/` prevents splitting the domain from the path & whole string before first true `/` is parsed as the domain
- Non-ASCII domain triggers punycode (IDNA) encoding
- Users *think* they're visiting `apple.com` but domain is actually `xn-comcompare-496e.io`
- Effective for phishing, spoofing Apple product pages, or session hijacking





Apple Intelligence



- Unveiled at WWDC in 2024.
- **Siri:** picks **on-device, PCC, or Ask ChatGPT**.
- **ChatGPT:** external LLM via Apple relay; opt-in.
- **Private Cloud Compute (PCC):** Apple cloud servers to process complex requests.
- `writingTools.compose`: rewrite the **selected text** (document-anchored).
- `GenerativeAssistant` (Siri) vs `writingTools.compose` (Writing Tools)
- When modes blur, **context confusion can leak** (prompts & cached PCC data) to **ChatGPT**

Apple Intelligence Leaking Cached PCC Data → ChatGPT



Confusing GenerativeAssistant Task
w/ WritingTools.Compose



Can anyone register for & access Apple SEED?

Broken access control


✓ Fixed July 2025



Can anyone install Apple's enterprise cert & **StoreFront**?

Broken access control

X Not yet fixed



Can I access your Apple support ticket?

Insecure direct object reference

X Rate limit added but core issue
remains unaddressed

Burp Suite Professional v2025.5.6 - 2025-07-13 - licensed to NA

Target: Proxy Intruder Repeater View Help

Target: Cluster bomb attack Start attack

Target: https://getsupport.apple.com Update Host header to match target

Positions: Add § Clear § Auto §

```
422getsupport.apple.com%2Factivity%22%20%22stitchPath%22%3A%5B%22no-referrer%22%2C%22appReload%22%20%22getsupport.apple.com%2F%22%20%22getsupport.apple.com%2Factivity%22%5D%7D%7D%2C%22expiry%22%3A1752449356995%7D;gs_id=eyJ6aXAiOiJERUYiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NbsInOiOjTVFiiLCJraWQiOiJ2MCJ9.eJwFwYnSgNAAA0BnMR2jno5lSQ1RGyVJdPk1zFC7yVGDDwV69_2-zx_inSLAd6BsasqERDQelx_FED779X3U-daPv-uk8WsAgn35eh5PmegxUUs4hapUagn0q8DfJiF1I50f6jg3piyHDLbn90Pknvan7zC1ZaZUyesM-aMnviix7k4f87wbGnjEl3sENKvBDwTnUY4twegZPKLBrgv3gc8pTB2B9Vq1NJDw1ruNgSVIAN4fu4XSGGzMHCsaxhNzk8Sn9dLE-act4_gSVANeZP9YGChsfRaxUbu3V259fZ4M2nM3RN9s0721_Nnj7FQ9wHFZHdbeXCinLKG4jELhJxaMAuv66PlkKiaRQkkHJplz1BDkCN6bj7nAsdl-60umP50_Ap9bnaqvhM4K2-Iy8b-h8PSml.I2n45BSWuY4p9RBeCudRnc24160CzanPY8bkCFLpMSA.d8bc969d
```

4 Content-Length: 67

5 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux"

6 Accept-Language: en-US, en;q=0.9

7 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not/A;Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="138"

8 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: 70

9 X-Apple-Auth-Token:

```
eyJ6aXAiOiJERUYiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NbsInOiOjTVFiiLCJraWQiOiJ2MCJ9.eJwFwYnSgNAAA0BnMR2jno5lSQ1RGyVJdPk1zFC7yVGDDwV69_2-zx_inSLAd6BsasqERDQelx_FED779X3U-daPv-uk8WsAgn35eh5PmegxUUs4hapUagn0q8DfJiF1I50f6jg3piyHDLbn90Pknvan7zC1ZaZUyesM-aMnviix7k4f87wbGnjEl3sENKvBDwTnUY4twegZPKLBrgv3gc8pTB2B9Vq1NJDw1ruNgSVIAN4fu4XSGGzMHCsaxhNzk8Sn9dLE-act4_gSVANeZP9YGChsfRaxUbu3V259fZ4M2nM3RN9s0721_Nnj7FQ9wHFZHdbeXCinLKG4jELhJxaMAuv66PlkKiaRQkkHJplz1BDkCN6bj7nAsdl-60umP50_Ap9bnaqvhM4K2-Iy8b-h8PSml.I2n45BSWuY4p9RBeCudRnc24160CzanPY8bkCFLpMSA.d8bc969d
```

10 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/138.0.0.0 Safari/537.36

11 Accept: application/json

12 X-Apple-Cguid: 32bfd76-3c2-5340-20cc-757b1155d585

13 Content-Type: application/json

14 Origin: https://getsupport.apple.com

15 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

16 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors

17 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty

18 Referer: https://getsupport.apple.com

19 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

20 Priority: u=1, i

21 Connection: keep-alive

22

23 {"caseOrRepairId": "61026428180795", "lastName": "SING", "serialNumber": ""}

Resource pool

Specify the resource pool in which the attack will be run. Resource pools are used to manage the usage of system resources across multiple tasks.

Use existing resource pool

ected	Resource pool	Concurrent requests	Request delay	Random delay
<input type="checkbox"/>	Default resource pool	10		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Custom resource pool 1	4	1337	

Create new resource pool

Name: Custom resource pool 2

Maximum concurrent requests: 4

Delay between requests: 1337 milliseconds

Fixed

With random variations

Increase delay in increments of 0 milliseconds

Automatic throttling

429

503

Other CSV format (e.g. 504,505)

Event log (7) All issues

Memory: 188.5MB

Takeaways

- **High-trust components** deserve **scrutiny**.
- **Face ID ≠ foolproof** if trust boundaries aren't enforced.
- **Intents & daemon handoffs** often **under-audited**.
- Unicode + whitespace = **massively under-explored attack surface!**
- **Security ≠ not just permissions but context**.
- **Logic bugs lurk in “normal” behavior!**
- **Authentication ≠ Authorization**
- **New/beta features = ripe** for testing.

Thank You!



Apple Product Security

DEF CON staff & goons

Mimi Ahn

Nibin Philip

Hillary Song

Aaron Jae Ho Lee

Joe Kleve

Colin Monk

Gabriela Loya

Scott Eide

Jack Fei

Jacob Schoellkopf

Mathew Nguyen

Alexander Choi

Clare Yan

Denis Smajlović

Phil Scott

My puppy Peanut ☺

Richard Hyunho Im (@richeeta)

✉ richardim.com | routezero.security

✉ richeeta AT proton dot me

<https://github.com/richeeta/DEFCON33-Siriously-Leaky> (will upload soon!)

**Stay in
Touch?**

