

Mathematical Logic for Mathematicians

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The Nature of Mathematical Logic

Mathematical logic originated as an attempt to codify and formalize the following:

1. The language of mathematics.
2. The basic assumptions of mathematics.
3. The permissible rules of proof.

One of the successful results of this program is the ability to study mathematical language and reasoning using mathematics itself. For example, we will eventually give a precise mathematical definition of a formal proof, and to avoid confusion with our current intuitive understanding of what a proof is, we will call these objects *deductions*. You should think of our eventual definition of a deduction as analogous to the precise mathematical definition of continuity, which replaces the fuzzy “a graph that can be drawn without lifting your pencil”. Once we have codified the notion in this way, we will have turned deductions into precise mathematical objects, allowing us to prove mathematical theorems about deductions using normal mathematical reasoning. For example, we will open up the possibility of proving that there is no deduction of certain mathematical statements.

Some newcomers to mathematical logic find the whole enterprise perplexing. For instance, if you come to the subject with the belief that the role of mathematical logic is to serve as a foundation to make mathematics more precise and secure, then the description above probably sounds rather circular, and this will almost certainly lead to a great deal of confusion. You may ask yourself:

Okay, we’ve just given a decent definition of a deduction. However, instead of proving things about deductions following this formal definition, we’re proving things about deductions using the usual informal proof style that I’ve grown accustomed to in other math courses. Why should I trust these informal proofs about deductions? How can we formally prove things (using deductions) about deductions? Isn’t that circular? Is that why we are only giving informal proofs? I thought that I would come away from this subject feeling better about the philosophical foundations of mathematics, but we have just added a new layer to mathematics, so we now have both informal proofs and deductions, which makes the whole thing even more dubious.

Other newcomers do not see a problem. After all, mathematics is the most reliable method we have to establish truth, and there was never any serious question as to its validity. Such a person might react to the above thoughts as follows:

We gave a mathematical definition of a deduction, so what's wrong with using mathematics to prove things about deductions? There's obviously a "real world" of true mathematics, and we are just working in that world to build a certain model of mathematical reasoning that is susceptible to mathematical analysis. It's quite cool, really, that we can subject mathematical proofs to a mathematical study by building this internal model. All of this philosophical speculation and worry about secure foundations is tiresome, and probably meaningless. Let's get on with the subject!

Should we be so dismissive of the first, philosophically inclined, student? The answer, of course, depends on your own philosophical views, but I will give my views as a mathematician specializing in logic with a definite interest in foundational questions. It is my firm belief that you should put all philosophical questions out of your mind during a first reading of the material (and perhaps forever, if you're so inclined), and come to the subject with a point of view that accepts an independent mathematical reality susceptible to the mathematical analysis you've grown accustomed to. In your mind, you should keep a careful distinction between normal "real" mathematical reasoning and the formal precise model of mathematical reasoning we are developing. Some people like to give this distinction a name by calling the normal mathematical realm we're working in the *metatheory*.

We will eventually give examples of formal theories, such as first-order set theory, which are able to support the entire enterprise of mathematics, including mathematical logic itself. Once we have developed set theory in this way, we will be able to give reasonable answers to the first student, and provide other respectable philosophical accounts of the nature of mathematics.

The ideas and techniques that were developed with philosophical goals in mind have now found application in other branches of mathematics and in computer science. The subject, like all mature areas of mathematics, has also developed its own very interesting internal questions which are often (for better or worse) divorced from its roots. Most of the subject developed after the 1930s is concerned with these internal and tangential questions, along with applications to other areas, and now foundational work is just one small (but still important) part of mathematical logic. Thus, if you have no interest in the more philosophical aspects of the subject, there remains an impressive, beautiful, and mathematically applicable theory which is worth your attention.

1.2 The Language of Mathematics

The first, and probably most important, issue we must address in order to provide a formal model of mathematics is how to deal with the language of mathematics. In this section, we sketch the basic ideas and motivation for the development of a language, but we will leave precise detailed definitions until later.

The first important point is that we should not use English (or any other natural language) because it is constantly changing, often ambiguous, and allows the construction of statements that are certainly not mathematical and/or arguably express very subjective sentiments. Once we've thrown out natural language, our only choice is to invent our own formal language. At first, the idea of developing a universal language seems quite daunting. How could we possibly write down one formal language that can simultaneously express the ideas in geometry, algebra, analysis, and every other field of mathematics, not to mention those we haven't developed yet? Our approach to this problem will be to avoid (consciously) doing it all at once.

Instead of starting from the bottom and trying to define primitive mathematical statements which can't be broken down further, let's first think about how to build new mathematical statements from old ones. The simplest way to do this is take already established mathematical statements and put them together using *and*, *or*, *not*, and *implies*. To keep a careful distinction between English and our language, we'll introduce symbols for each of these, and we'll call these symbols *connectives*.

1. \wedge will denote *and*.

2. \vee will denote *or*.
3. \neg will denote *not*.
4. \rightarrow will denote *implies*.

In order to ignore the nagging question of what constitutes a primitive statement, our first attempt will simply be to take an arbitrary set whose elements we think of as the primitive statements, and put them together in all possible ways using the connectives.

For example, suppose we start with the set $P = \{A, B, C\}$. We think of A, B, and C as our primitive statements, and we may or may not care what they might express. We now want to put together the elements of P using the connectives, perhaps repeatedly. However, this naive idea quickly leads to a problem. Should the “meaning” of $A \wedge B \vee C$ be “A holds, and either B holds or C holds”, corresponding to $A \wedge (B \vee C)$, or should it be “Either both A and B holds, or C holds”, corresponding to $(A \wedge B) \vee C$? We need some way to avoid this ambiguity. Probably the most natural way to achieve this is to insert parentheses to make it clear how to group terms (we will eventually see other natural ways to overcome this issue). We now describe the collection of *formulas* of our language, denoted by $Form_P$. First, we put every element of P in $Form_P$, and then we generate other formulas using the following rules:

1. If φ and ψ are in $Form_P$, then $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ is in $Form_P$.
2. If φ and ψ are in $Form_P$, then $(\varphi \vee \psi)$ is in $Form_P$.
3. If φ is in $Form_P$, then $(\neg\varphi)$ is in $Form_P$.
4. If φ and ψ are in $Form_P$, then $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ is in $Form_P$.

Thus, the following is an element of $Form_P$:

$$((\neg(B \vee ((\neg A) \rightarrow C))) \vee A).$$

This simple setup, called *propositional logic*, is a drastic simplification of the language of mathematics, but there are already many interesting questions and theorems that arise from a careful study. We’ll spend some time on it in Chapter 3.

Of course, mathematical language is much more rich and varied than what we can get using propositional logic. One important way to make more complicated and interesting mathematical statements is to make use of the quantifiers *for all* and *there exists*, which we’ll denote using the symbols \forall and \exists , respectively. In order to do so, we will need *variables* to act as something to quantify over. We’ll denote variables by letters like x , y , z , etc. Once we’ve come this far, however, we’ll have to refine our naive notion of primitive statements above because it’s unclear how to interpret a statement like $\forall x B$ without knowledge of the role of x “inside” B .

Let’s think a little about our primitive statements. As we mentioned above, it seems daunting to come up with primitive statements for all areas of mathematics at once, so let’s think of the areas in isolation. For instance, take group theory. A group is a set G equipped with a binary operation \cdot (that is, \cdot takes in two elements $x, y \in G$ and produces a new element of G denoted by $x \cdot y$) and an element e satisfying the following:

1. Associativity: For all $x, y, z \in G$, we have $(x \cdot y) \cdot z = x \cdot (y \cdot z)$.
2. Identity: For all $x \in G$, we have $x \cdot e = x = e \cdot x$.
3. Inverses: For all $x \in G$, there exists $y \in G$ such that $x \cdot y = e = y \cdot x$.

Although it is customary, and certainly easier on the eyes, to put \cdot between two elements of the group, let's instead use the standard function notation in order to make the mathematical notation uniform across different areas. In this setting, a group is a set G equipped with a function $f: G \times G \rightarrow G$ and an element e satisfying the following:

1. For all $x, y, z \in G$, we have $f(f(x, y), z) = f(x, f(y, z))$.
2. For all $x \in G$, we have $f(x, e) = x = f(e, x)$.
3. For all $x \in G$, there exists $y \in G$ such that $f(x, y) = e = f(y, x)$.

In order to allow our language to make statement about groups, we introduce a *function symbol* f to represent the group operation, and a *constant symbol* e to represent the group identity. Now the group operation is supposed to take in two elements of the group, so if x and y are variables, then we should allow the formation of $f(x, y)$, which should denote an element of the group (once we've assigned elements of the group to x and y). Also, we should allow the constant symbol to be used in this way, allowing us to form things like $f(x, e)$. Once we've formed these, we should be allowed to use them like variables in more complicated expressions, such as $f(f(x, e), y)$. Each of these expressions formed by putting together, perhaps repeatedly, variables and the constant symbol e using the function symbol f is called a *term*. Intuitively, a term will name a certain element of the group once we've assigned elements to the variables.

With a way to name group elements in hand, we're now in position to say what our primitive statements are. The most basic thing that we can say about two group elements is whether or not they are equal, so we introduce a new *equality symbol*, which we will denote by the customary $=$. Given two terms t_1 and t_2 , we call the expression $(t_1 = t_2)$ an *atomic formula*. These are our primitive statements.

With atomic formulas in hand, we can use the old connectives and the new quantifiers to make new statements. This puts us in a position to define *formulas*. First off, all atomic formulas are formulas. Given formulas we already know, we can put them together using the connectives above. Also, if φ is a formula and x is a variable then each of the following is a formula:

1. $\forall x \varphi$.
2. $\exists x \varphi$.

Perhaps without realizing it, we've described a reasonably powerful language capable of making many nontrivial statements. For instance, we can write formulas in this language which express the axioms for a group:

1. $\forall x \forall y \forall z (f(f(x, y), z) = f(x, f(y, z)))$.
2. $\forall x ((f(x, e) = x) \wedge (f(e, x) = x))$.
3. $\forall x \exists y ((f(x, y) = e) \wedge (f(y, x) = e))$.

We can also write a formula saying that the group is abelian:

$$\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x)),$$

along with a formula expressing that the center of the group is nontrivial:

$$\exists x (\neg(x = e) \wedge \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))).$$

Perhaps unfortunately, we can also write syntactically correct formulas which express things nobody would ever utter, such as:

$$\forall x \exists y \exists x (\neg(e = e)).$$

What if you want to consider an area other than group theory? Commutative ring theory doesn't pose much of a problem, so long as we're allowed to alter the number of function symbols and constant symbols. We can simply have two function symbols \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{m} which take two arguments (\mathbf{a} to represent addition and \mathbf{m} to represent multiplication) and two constant symbols $\mathbf{0}$ and $\mathbf{1}$ ($\mathbf{0}$ to represent the additive identity and $\mathbf{1}$ to represent the multiplicative identity). Writing the axioms for commutative rings in this language is fairly straightforward.

To take something fairly different, what about the theory of partially ordered sets? Recall that a partially ordered set is a set P equipped with a subset \leq of $P \times P$, where we write $x \leq y$ to mean that (x, y) is an element of this subset, satisfying the following:

1. Reflexive: For all $x \in P$, we have $x \leq x$.
2. Antisymmetric: If $x, y \in P$ are such that $x \leq y$ and $y \leq x$, then $x = y$.
3. Transitive: If $x, y, z \in P$ are such that $x \leq y$ and $y \leq z$, then $x \leq z$.

Analogous to the syntax we used when handling the group operation, we will use notation which puts the ordering in front of the two arguments. Doing so may seem odd at this point, given that we are putting equality in the middle, but we will see that such a convention provides a unifying notation for other similar objects. We thus introduce a *relation symbol* \mathbf{R} (intuitively representing \leq), and we keep the equality symbol $=$, but we no longer have a need for constant symbols or function symbols.

In this setting (without constant or function symbols), the only terms that we have (i.e. the only names for elements of the partially ordered set) are the variables. However, our atomic formulas are more interesting because now there are two basic things we can say about elements of the partial ordering: whether they are equal and whether they are related by the ordering. Thus, our atomic formulas are things of the form $t_1 = t_2$ and $\mathbf{R}(t_1, t_2)$ where t_1 and t_2 are terms. From these atomic formulas, we build up all our formulas as above.

We can now write formulas expressing the axioms of partial orderings:

1. $\forall x \mathbf{R}(x, x)$.
2. $\forall x \forall y ((\mathbf{R}(x, y) \wedge \mathbf{R}(y, x)) \rightarrow (x = y))$.
3. $\forall x \forall y \forall z ((\mathbf{R}(x, y) \wedge \mathbf{R}(y, z)) \rightarrow \mathbf{R}(x, z))$.

We can also write a formula saying that the partial ordering is a linear ordering:

$$\forall x \forall y (\mathbf{R}(x, y) \vee \mathbf{R}(y, x)),$$

along with a formula expressing that there exists a maximal element:

$$\exists x \forall y (\mathbf{R}(x, y) \rightarrow (x = y)).$$

The general idea is that by leaving flexibility in the types and number of constant symbols, relation symbols, and function symbols, we'll be able to handle many areas of mathematics. We call this setup *first-order logic*. An analysis of first-order logic will consume the vast majority of our time.

Now we don't claim that first-order logic allows us to express everything in mathematics, nor do we claim that each of the setups above allow us to express everything of importance in that particular field. For example, take the group theory setting. We can express that every nonidentity element has order two with the formula

$$\forall x (\mathbf{f}(x, x) = \mathbf{e}),$$

but it seems difficult to say that every element of the group has finite order. The natural guess is

$$\forall x \exists n (x^n = \mathbf{e}),$$

but this poses a problem for two reasons. The first is that our variables are supposed to quantify over elements of the group in question, not the natural numbers. The second is that we put no construction in our language to allow us to write something like x^n . For each fixed n , we can express it (for example, for $n = 3$, we can write $f(f(x, x), x)$ and for $n = 4$, we can write $f(f(f(x, x), x), x)$), but it's not clear how to write it in a general way without allowing quantification over the natural numbers.

For another example, consider trying to express that a group is simple (i.e. has no nontrivial normal subgroups). The natural instinct is to quantify over all subsets H of the group G , and say that if it so happens that H is a normal subgroup, then H is either trivial or everything. However, we have no way to quantify over subsets. It's certainly possible to allow such constructions, and this gives *second-order logic*. We can even go further and allow quantifications over sets of subsets (for example, one way of expressing that a ring is Noetherian is to say that every nonempty set of ideals has a maximal element), which gives *third-order logic*, etc.

Newcomers to the field often find it strange that we focus primarily on first-order logic. There are many reasons to give special attention to first-order logic that we will develop throughout our study, but for now you should think of it as providing a simple example of a language which is capable of expressing many important aspects of various branches of mathematics. In fact, we'll eventually understand that the limitations of first-order logic are precisely what allow us to prove powerful theorems about it. Moreover, these powerful theorems allow us to deduce interesting mathematical consequences.

1.3 Syntax and Semantics

In the above discussion, we introduced symbols to denote certain concepts (such as using \wedge in place of “and”, \forall in place of “for all”, and a function symbol f in place of the group operation f). Building and maintaining a careful distinction between formal symbols and how to interpret them is a fundamental aspect of mathematical logic.

The basic structure of the formal statements that we write down using the symbols, connectives, and quantifiers is known as the *syntax* of the logic that we're developing. Syntax corresponds to the grammar of the language in question with no thought given to meaning. Imagine an English instructor who cared nothing for the content of your writing, but only cared that it was grammatically correct. That is exactly what the syntax of a logic is all about. Syntax is combinatorial in nature and is based on simple rules that provide admissible ways to manipulate symbols devoid of any knowledge of their intended meaning.

The manner in which we are permitted (or forced) to interpret the symbols, connectives, and quantifiers is known as the *semantics* of the the given logic. In a logic, there are often some symbols that we are forced to interpret in specific rigid way. For instance, in the above examples, we interpret the symbol \wedge to mean *and*. In the propositional logic setting, this doesn't settle how to interpret a formula because we haven't said how to interpret the elements of P . We have some flexibility here, but once we assert that we should interpret certain elements of P as true and the others as false, our formulas express statements that are either true or false.

The first-order logic setting is more complicated. Since we have quantifiers, the first thing that must be done in order to interpret a formula is to fix a set X which will act as the set of objects over which the quantifiers will range. Once this is done, we can interpret each function symbol f taking k arguments as an actual function $f: X^k \rightarrow X$, each relation R symbol taking k arguments as a subset of X^k , and each constant symbol c as an element of X . Once we've fixed what we're talking about by provided such interpretations, we can view them as expressing something meaningful. For example, if we've fixed a group G and interpreted f as the group operation and e as the identity, then the formula

$$\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$$

is either true or false, according to whether G is abelian or not.

Always keep the distinction between syntax and semantics clear in your mind. Many basic theorems of the subject involve the interplay between syntax and semantics. For example, suppose that Γ is a set of formulas and that φ be a formula. We will eventually define what it means to say that Γ *implies* the formula φ . In the logics that we discuss, we will have two fundamental, but seemingly distinct, approaches. One way of saying that the formulas in Γ imply φ is semantic: whenever we provide an interpretation which makes all of the formulas of Γ true, it happens that φ is also true. For instance, if we're working in propositional logic and we have $\Gamma = \{((A \wedge B) \vee C)\}$ and $\varphi = (A \vee C)$, then Γ implies φ in this sense because whenever we assign true/false values to A , B , and C in a way that makes the formulas in Γ true, it happens that φ will also be true. Another approach that we'll develop is syntactic. We'll define deductions which are "formal proofs" built from certain permissible syntactic manipulations, and Γ will imply φ in this sense if there is a witnessing deduction. The Soundness Theorem and the Completeness Theorem for first-order logic (and propositional logic) say that the semantic version and syntactic version are the same. This result amazingly allows one to mimic mathematical reasoning with purely syntactic manipulations.

1.4 The Point of It All

One important aspect, often mistaken as the only aspect, of mathematical logic is that it allows us to study mathematical reasoning. A prime example of this is given by the last sentence of the previous section. The Completeness Theorem says that we can capture the idea of one mathematical statement following from other mathematical statements with nothing more than syntactic rules on symbols. This is certainly computationally, philosophically, and foundationally interesting, but it's much more than that. A simple consequence of this result is the Compactness Theorem, which says something very deep about mathematical reasoning, and also has many interesting applications in mathematics.

Although we've developed the above logics with modest goals of handling certain fields of mathematics, it's a wonderful and surprising fact that we can embed (nearly) all of mathematics in an elegant and natural first-order system: first-order set theory. This opens the door to the possibility of proving that certain mathematical statements are independent of our usual axioms. In other words, there exist formulas φ such that there is no deduction (from the usual axioms) of φ , and also no deduction of $(\neg\varphi)$. Furthermore, the field of set theory has blossomed into an intricate field with its own deep and interesting questions.

Other very interesting and fundamental subjects arise when we ignore the foundational aspects and deductions altogether, and simply look at what we've accomplished by establishing a precise language to describe an area of mathematics. With a language in hand, we now have a way to say that certain objects are *definable* in that language. For instance, take the language of commutative rings mentioned above. If we fix a particular commutative ring, then the formula

$$\exists y(m(x, y) = 1)$$

has a free variable x and "defines" the set of units in the ring. With this point of view, we've opened up the possibility of proving lower bounds on the complexity of any definition of a certain object, or even of proving that no such definition exists in the given language.

Another, closely related, way to take our definitions of precise languages and run with it is the subject of *model theory*. In group theory, we state some axioms and work from there in order to study all possible realizations of the axioms, i.e. all possible groups. However, as we saw above, the group axioms arise in one possible language with one possible set of axioms. Instead, we can study all possible languages and all possible sets of axioms and see what we can prove in general and how the realizations compare to each other. In this sense, model theory is a kind of abstract algebra.

Finally, although it's probably far from clear how it fits in at this point, *computability theory* is intimately related to the above subjects. To see the first glimmer of a connection, notice that computer programming languages are also formal languages with a precise grammar and a clear distinction between syntax and semantics. However, the connection runs much more deeply, as we will see in time.

1.5 Terminology, Notation, and Countable Sets

Definition 1.5.1. We let $\mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ and we let $\mathbb{N}^+ = \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$.

Definition 1.5.2. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we let $[n] = \{m \in \mathbb{N} : m < n\}$, so $[n] = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$.

We will often find a need to work with finite sequences, so we establish notation here.

Definition 1.5.3. Let X be a set. Given $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we call a function $\sigma: [n] \rightarrow X$ a finite sequence from X of length n . We denote the set of all finite sequences from X of length n by X^n . We use λ to denote the unique sequence of length 0, so $X^0 = \{\lambda\}$. Finally, given a finite sequence σ from X , we use the notation $|\sigma|$ to mean the length of σ .

Definition 1.5.4. Let X be a set. We let $X^* = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} X^n$, i.e. X^* is the set of all finite sequences from X .

We denote finite sequences by simply listing the elements in order. For instance, if $X = \{a, b\}$, the sequence $aababbba$ is an element of X^* . Sometimes for clarity, we'll insert commas and instead write a, a, b, a, b, b, b, a .

Definition 1.5.5. If $\sigma, \tau \in X^*$, we denote the concatenation of σ and τ by $\sigma\tau$ or $\sigma * \tau$.

Definition 1.5.6. If $\sigma, \tau \in X^*$, we say that σ is an initial segment of τ , and write $\sigma \preceq \tau$, if $\sigma = \tau \upharpoonright [n]$ for some n . We say that σ is a proper initial segment of τ , and write $\sigma \prec \tau$ if $\sigma \preceq \tau$ and $\sigma \neq \tau$.

Definition 1.5.7. Given a set A , we let $\mathcal{P}(A)$ be the set of all subsets of A , and we call $\mathcal{P}(A)$ the power set of A .

For example, we have $\mathcal{P}(\{1, 2\}) = \{\emptyset, \{1\}, \{2\}, \{1, 2\}\}$ and $\mathcal{P}(\emptyset) = \{\emptyset\}$. A simple combinatorial argument shows that if $|A| = n$, then $|\mathcal{P}(A)| = 2^n$.

Definition 1.5.8. Let A be a set.

- We say that A is countably infinite if there exists a bijection $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow A$.
- We say that A is countable if it is either finite or countably infinite.

Proposition 1.5.9. Let A be a nonempty set. The following are equivalent:

1. A is countable.
2. There exists a surjection $g: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow A$.
3. There exists an injection $h: A \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$.

Proposition 1.5.10. We have the following:

1. If A and B are both countable, then $A \times B$ is countable.
2. If A_0, A_1, A_2, \dots are all countable, then $\bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} A_n$ is countable.

Corollary 1.5.11. If A is countable, then A^* is countable.

Theorem 1.5.12. The sets \mathbb{Z} and \mathbb{Q} are countably infinite, but \mathbb{R} and $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})$ are not countable.

Chapter 2

Induction and Recursion

Proofs by induction and definitions by recursion are fundamental tools when working with the natural numbers. However, there are many other places where variants of these ideas apply. In fact, more delicate and exotic proofs by induction and definitions by recursion are two central tools in mathematical logic. We'll eventually see *transfinite* versions of these ideas that provide ways to continue into strange new infinite realms, and these techniques are essential in both set theory and model theory. In this section, we develop the more modest tools of induction and recursion along structures which are generated by one-step processes, like the natural numbers. Occasionally, these types of induction and recursion are called “structural”.

2.1 Induction and Recursion on \mathbb{N}

We begin by compiling the basic facts about induction and recursion on the natural numbers. We do not seek to “prove” that inductive arguments or recursive definitions on \mathbb{N} are valid methods because they are “obvious” from the normal mathematical perspective which we are adopting. Besides, in order to do so, we would first have to fix a context in which we are defining \mathbb{N} . Eventually, we will indeed carry out such a construction in the context of axiomatic set theory, but that is not our current goal. Although the intuitive content of the results in this section are probably very familiar, our goal here is simply to carefully codify these facts in more precise ways to ease the transition to more complicated types of induction and recursion.

Definition 2.1.1. We define $S: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ by letting $S(n) = n + 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

We choose the letter S here because it is the first letter of *successor*. Induction is often stated in the following form: “If 0 has a certain property, and we know that $S(n)$ has the given property whenever n has the property, then we can conclude that every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ has the given property”. We state this idea more formally using sets (and thus avoiding explicit mention of “properties”) because we can always form the set $X = \{n \in \mathbb{N} : n \text{ has the given property}\}$.

Theorem 2.1.2 (Induction on \mathbb{N} - Step Form). Suppose that $X \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is such that $0 \in X$ and $S(n) \in X$ whenever $n \in X$. We then have $X = \mathbb{N}$.

Definitions by recursion are often described informally as follows: “When defining $f(S(n))$, we are allowed to refer to the value of $f(n)$ in addition to referring to n ”. For instance, let $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be the factorial function $f(n) = n!$. One typically sees f defined by the following recursive definition:

$$\begin{aligned} f(0) &= 1. \\ f(S(n)) &= S(n) \cdot f(n) \quad \text{for all } n \in \mathbb{N}. \end{aligned}$$

In order to be able to generalize recursion to other situations, we aim to formalize this idea a little more abstractly and rigorously. In particular, we would prefer to avoid the direct self-reference in the *definition* of f .

Suppose then that X is a set and we're trying to define a function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow X$ recursively. What do we need? We certainly want to know $f(0)$, and we want to have a “method” telling us how to define $f(S(n))$ from knowledge of n and the value of $f(n)$. If we want to avoid the self-referential appeal to f when invoking the value of $f(n)$, we need a method telling us what to do next regardless of the actual particular value of $f(n)$. That is, we need a method that tells us what to do on any possible value, not just the one the ends up happening to be $f(n)$. Formally, this “method” can be given by a function $g: \mathbb{N} \times X \rightarrow X$, which tells us what to do at the next step. Intuitively, this function acts as an iterator. That is, it says if the the last thing we were working on was input n and it so happened that we set $f(n)$ to equal $x \in X$, then we should define $f(S(n))$ to be the value $g(n, x)$.

With all this setup, we now state the theorem which says that no matter what value we want to assign to $f(0)$, and no matter what iterating function $g: \mathbb{N} \times X \rightarrow X$ we have, there exists a unique function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow X$ obeying the rules.

Theorem 2.1.3 (Recursion on \mathbb{N} - Step Form). *Let X be a set, let $y \in X$, and let $g: \mathbb{N} \times X \rightarrow X$. There exists a unique function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow X$ with the following two properties:*

1. $f(0) = y$.
2. $f(S(n)) = g(n, f(n))$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

In the case of the factorial function, we have $X = \mathbb{N}$, $y = 1$, and $g: \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ defined by $g(n, x) = S(n) \cdot x$. Theorem 2.1.3 implies that there is a unique function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that:

1. $f(0) = y = 1$.
2. $f(S(n)) = g(n, f(n)) = S(n) \cdot f(n)$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

Notice how we moved any mention of self-reference out of the definition of g , and pushed all of the weight onto the theorem that asserts the existence and uniqueness of a function that behaves properly, i.e. that satisfies both the initial condition and the appropriate recursive equation.

There is another version of induction on \mathbb{N} , sometimes called “strong induction”, which appeals to the ordering of the natural numbers rather than the stepping of the successor function.

Theorem 2.1.4 (Induction on \mathbb{N} - Order Form). *Suppose that $X \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is such that $n \in X$ whenever $m \in X$ for all $m \in \mathbb{N}$ with $m < n$. We then have $X = \mathbb{N}$.*

Notice that there is no need to deal with a separate base case of $n = 0$, because this is handled vacuously because there is no $m \in \mathbb{N}$ with $m < 0$. In other words, if we successfully prove that statement “ $n \in X$ whenever $m \in X$ for all $m \in \mathbb{N}$ with $m < n$ ” using no additional assumptions about n , then this statement is true when $n = 0$, from which we can conclude that $0 \in X$ because the “whenever” clause is trivially true for $n = 0$. Of course, there is no harm in proving a separate base case if you are so inclined.

What about recursions that appeal to more than just the previous value? For example, consider the Fibonacci sequence $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ defined by $f(0) = 0$, $f(1) = 1$, and $f(n) = f(n-1) + f(n-2)$ whenever $n \geq 2$. We could certainly alter our previous version of recursion to codify the ability to look back two positions, but it is short-sighted and limiting to force ourselves to only go back a fixed finite number of positions. For example, what if we wanted to define a function f , so that if $n \geq 2$ is even, then we use $f(n/2)$ when defining $f(n)$? To handle every such possibility, we want to express the ability to use *all* smaller values. Thus, instead of having a function $g: \mathbb{N} \times X \rightarrow X$, where the second input codes the previous value of f , we now want to package many values together. The idea is to code all of the previous values into one finite sequence. So when defining $f(4)$, we should have access to the sequence $(f(0), f(1), f(2), f(3))$. Since we

defined sequences of length n as functions with domain $[n]$, we are really saying that we should have access to $f \upharpoonright [4]$ when defining $f(4)$. However, to get around this self-reference, we should define our function g that will take as input an *arbitrary* finite sequence of elements of X , and tell us what to do next, assuming that this sequence is the correct code of the first n values of f . Recall that given a set X , we use X^* to denote the set of all finite sequences of elements of X .

Theorem 2.1.5 (Recursion on \mathbb{N} - Order Form). *Let X be a set and let $g: X^* \rightarrow X$. There exists a unique function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow X$ such that*

$$f(n) = g(f \upharpoonright [n])$$

for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

Notice that, in contrast to the situation in Theorem 2.1.3, we do not need to include a separate argument to g that gives the current position n . The reason for this is that we can always obtain n by simply taking the length of the sequence $f \upharpoonright [n]$.

With this setup, here is how we can handle the Fibonacci numbers. Let $X = \mathbb{N}$, and defined $g: \mathbb{N}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ by letting

$$g(\sigma) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } |\sigma| = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } |\sigma| = 1 \\ \sigma(n-2) + \sigma(n-1) & \text{if } |\sigma| = n \text{ with } n \geq 2. \end{cases}$$

Theorem 2.1.5 implies that there is a unique function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ with $f(n) = g(f \upharpoonright [n])$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. We then have the following:

- $f(0) = g(f \upharpoonright [0]) = g(\lambda) = 0$, where we recall that λ is the empty sequence.
- $f(1) = g(f \upharpoonright [1]) = g(0) = 1$, where the argument 0 to g is the sequence of length 1 whose only element is 0.
- For all $n \geq 2$, we have $f(n) = g(f \upharpoonright [n]) = f(n-2) + f(n-1)$.

2.2 Generation

There are many situations throughout mathematics where we want to look at what a certain subset “generates”. For instance, we might have a subset of a group (vector space, ring, etc.), and we want to consider the subgroup (subspace, ideal, etc.) that the given subset generates. Another example is that we have a subset of the vertices of a graph, and we want to consider the set of all vertices in the graph that are reachable from the ones in the given subset. In Chapter 1, we talked about generating all formulas from primitive formulas using certain connectives. This situation will arise so frequently in what follows that it’s a good idea to unify them all in a common framework.

Definition 2.2.1. *Let A be a set and let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. A function $h: A^k \rightarrow A$ is called a k -ary function on A . The number k is called the arity of the function h . A 1-ary function is sometimes called unary and a 2-ary function is sometimes called binary.*

Definition 2.2.2. *Suppose that A is a set, $B \subseteq A$, and \mathcal{H} is a collection of functions such that each $h \in \mathcal{H}$ is a k -ary function on A for some $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. We call (A, B, \mathcal{H}) a simple generating system. In such a situation, for each $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we denote the set of k -ary functions in \mathcal{H} by \mathcal{H}_k .*

For example, let A be a group and let $B \subseteq A$ be some subset that contains the identity of A . Suppose that we want to think about the subgroup of A that B generates. The operations in question here are the group operation and inversion, so we let $\mathcal{H} = \{h_1, h_2\}$, whose elements are defined as follows:

1. $h_1: A^2 \rightarrow A$ is given by $h_1(x, y) = x \cdot y$ for all $x, y \in A$.
2. $h_2: A \rightarrow A$ is given by $h_2(x) = x^{-1}$ for all $x \in A$.

Taken together, we then have that (A, B, \mathcal{H}) is a simple generating system.

For another example, let V be a vector space over \mathbb{R} and let $B \subseteq V$ be some subset that contains the zero vector. Suppose that we want to think about the subspace of V that B generates. The operations in question consist of vector addition and scalar multiplication, so we let $\mathcal{H} = \{g\} \cup \{h_r : r \in \mathbb{R}\}$ whose elements are defined as follows:

1. $g: V^2 \rightarrow V$ is given by $g(v, w) = v + w$ for all $v, w \in V$.
2. For each $r \in \mathbb{R}$, $h_r: V \rightarrow V$ is given by $h_r(v) = r \cdot v$ for all $v \in V$.

Taken together, we then have that (V, B, \mathcal{H}) is a simple generating system. Notice that \mathcal{H} has uncountably many functions (one for each $r \in \mathbb{R}$) in this example.

There are some situations where the natural functions to put into \mathcal{H} are not total, or are “multi-valued”. For instance, in the first example below, we’ll talk about the subfield generated by a certain subset of a field, and we’ll want to include multiplicative inverses for all nonzero elements. When putting a corresponding function in \mathcal{H} , there is no obvious way to define it on 0.

Definition 2.2.3. Let A be a set and let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. A function $h: A^k \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(A)$ is called a set-valued k -ary function on A . We call k the arity of h . A 1-ary set-valued function is sometimes called unary and a 2-ary set-valued function is sometimes called binary.

Definition 2.2.4. Suppose that A is a set, $B \subseteq A$, and \mathcal{H} is a collection of functions such that each $h \in \mathcal{H}$ is a set-valued k -ary function on A for some $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. We call (A, B, \mathcal{H}) a generating system. In such a situation, for each $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we denote the set of multi-valued k -ary functions in \mathcal{H} by \mathcal{H}_k .

For example, let K be a field and let $B \subseteq K$ be some subset that contains both 0 and 1. We want the subfield of K that B generates. The operations in question here are addition, multiplication, and both additive and multiplicative inverses. We thus let $\mathcal{H} = \{h_1, h_2, h_3, h_4\}$, whose elements are defined as follows:

1. $h_1: K^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(K)$ is given by $h_1(a, b) = \{a + b\}$ for all $a, b \in K$.
2. $h_2: K^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(K)$ is given by $h_2(a, b) = \{a \cdot b\}$ for all $a, b \in K$.
3. $h_3: K \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(K)$ is given by $h_3(a) = \{-a\}$ for all $a \in K$.
4. $h_4: K \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(K)$ is given by

$$h_4(a) = \begin{cases} \{a^{-1}\} & \text{if } a \neq 0 \\ \emptyset & \text{if } a = 0. \end{cases}$$

Taken together, we have that (K, B, \mathcal{H}) is a generating system.

For an example where we want to output multiple values, think about generating the vertices reachable from a given subset of vertices in a directed graph. Since a vertex can have many arrows coming out of it, we may want to throw in several vertices once we reach one. Suppose then that G is a directed graph with vertex set V and edge set E , and let $B \subseteq V$. We think of the edges as coded by ordered pairs, so $E \subseteq V^2$. We want to consider the subset of V reachable from B using edges from E . Thus, we want to say that if we’ve generated $v \in V$, and $w \in V$ is linked to v via some edge, then we should generate w . We thus let $\mathcal{H} = \{h\}$ where $h: V \rightarrow V$ is defined as follows:

$$h(v) = \{u \in V : (v, u) \in E\}.$$

Taken together, we have that (V, B, \mathcal{H}) is a generating system.

Notice that if we have a simple generating system (A, B, \mathcal{H}) , then we can associate to it the generating system (A, B, \mathcal{H}') where $\mathcal{H}' = \{h' : h \in \mathcal{H}\}$ where if $h : A^k \rightarrow A$ is an element of \mathcal{H}_k , then $h' : A^k \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(A)$ is defined by letting $h'(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) = \{h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)\}$.

Given a generating system (A, B, \mathcal{H}) , we want to define the set of elements of A generated from B using the functions in \mathcal{H} . There are many natural ways to do this. We discuss three approaches: the first approach is “from above”, and the second and third are “from below”. Each of these descriptions can be slightly simplified for simple generating systems, but it’s not much harder to handle the more general case. Throughout, we will use the following three examples:

1. The first example is the simple generating system where $A = \mathbb{N}$, $B = \{7\}$, and $\mathcal{H} = \{h\}$ where $h : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is the function $h(x) = 2x$.
2. The second example is the simple generating system given by the following group. Let $A = S_4$, $B = \{id, (1\ 2), (2\ 3), (3\ 4)\}$, and $\mathcal{H} = \{h_1, h_2\}$ where h_1 is the binary group operation and h_2 is the unary inverse function. Here the group operation is function composition, which happens from right to left. Thus, for example, we have $h_1((1\ 2), (2\ 3)) = (1\ 2)(2\ 3) = (1\ 2\ 3)$.
3. The third example is the generating system given by the following directed graph: We have vertex set $A = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, 8\}$, edge set

$$E = \{(1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 7), (2, 8), (3, 1), (4, 4), (5, 7), (6, 1), (6, 2), (6, 5), (8, 3)\},$$

In this case, let $B = \{3\}$ and $\mathcal{H} = \{h\}$ where $h : A \rightarrow A$ is described above for directed graphs. For example, we have $h(1) = \{1, 2, 7\}$, $h(2) = \{8\}$, and $h(7) = \emptyset$.

2.2.1 From Above

Our first approach is a “top-down” one. Given a generating system (A, B, \mathcal{H}) , we want to apply the elements of \mathcal{H} to tuples from B , perhaps repeatedly, until we form a kind of *closure*. Instead of thinking about the iteration, think about the final product. As mentioned, we want a set that is *closed* under the functions in \mathcal{H} . This idea leads to the following definition.

Definition 2.2.5. Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system, and let $J \subseteq A$. We say that J is *inductive* if it has the following two properties:

1. $B \subseteq J$.
2. If $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in J$, then $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \subseteq J$.

Notice that if we working with a simple generating system directly (i.e. not coded as set-valued functions), then we should replace $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \subseteq J$ by $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in J$.

Given a generating system (A, B, \mathcal{H}) , we certainly have a trivial example of an inductive set, since we can just take A itself. Of course, we don’t want just any old inductive set. Intuitively, we want the *smallest* one. Let’s take a look at our three examples above in this context.

1. For the first example of a simple generating system given above (where $A = \mathbb{R}$, $B = \{7\}$, and $\mathcal{H} = \{h\}$ where $h : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is the function $h(x) = 2x$). In this situation, each of the sets \mathbb{R} , \mathbb{Z} , \mathbb{N} , and $\{n \in \mathbb{N} : n \text{ is a multiple of } 7\}$ is inductive, but none of them seem to be what we want.
2. For the group theory example, we certainly have that S_4 is an inductive set, but it’s not obvious if there are any others.

3. In the directed graph example, each of the sets $\{1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8\}$, $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8\}$, and $\{1, 2, 3, 7, 8\}$ is inductive, and it looks reasonable the last one is the one we are after.

In general, if we want to talk about the *smallest* inductive subset of A , we need to prove that such an object exists. Here is where the “from above” idea comes into play. Rather than constructing a smallest inductive set directly (which might be difficult), we instead just intersect them all.

Proposition 2.2.6. *Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. There exists a unique inductive set I such that $I \subseteq J$ for every inductive set J .*

Proof. We first prove existence. Let I be the intersection of all inductive sets, i.e.

$$I = \{a \in A : a \in J \text{ for every inductive set } J\}.$$

Directly from the definition, we know that if J is inductive, then $I \subseteq J$. Thus, we need only show that the set I is inductive.

- Let $b \in B$ be arbitrary. We have that $b \in J$ for every inductive set J (by definition of inductive), so $b \in I$. Therefore, $B \subseteq I$.
- Suppose that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in I$ are arbitrary. Given any inductive set J , we have $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in J$ (since $I \subseteq J$), hence $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in J$ because J is inductive. Therefore, $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in J$ for every inductive set J , and hence $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in I$ by definition of I .

Putting these together, we conclude that I is inductive.

To see uniqueness, suppose that both I_1 and I_2 are inductive sets such that $I_1 \subseteq J$ and $I_2 \subseteq J$ for every inductive set J . In particular, we then must have both $I_1 \subseteq I_2$ and $I_2 \subseteq I_1$, so $I_1 = I_2$. \square

Definition 2.2.7. *Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. We denote the unique set of the previous proposition by $I(A, B, \mathcal{H})$, or simply by I when the context is clear.*

2.2.2 From Below: Building by Levels

The second idea is to make a system of levels, at each new level adding elements of A which are reachable from elements already accumulated by applying an element of \mathcal{H} . In other words, we start with the elements of B , then apply functions from \mathcal{H} to elements of B to generate (potentially) new elements. From here, we may need to apply functions from \mathcal{H} again to these newly found elements to generate even more elements, etc. Notice that we still want to keep old elements around in this process, because if $h \in \mathcal{H}$ is binary, we have $b \in B$, and we generated a new a in the first round, then we will need to include $h(b, a)$ in the next round. In other words, we should keep a running tab on the elements and repeatedly apply the elements of \mathcal{H} to *all* combinations generated so far in order to continue climbing up the ladder. Here is the formal definition:

Definition 2.2.8. *Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. We define a sequence $V_n(A, B, \mathcal{H})$, or simply V_n , of subsets of A recursively as follows:*

$$V_0 = B.$$

$$V_{n+1} = V_n \cup \{c \in A : \text{There exists } k \in \mathbb{N}^+, h \in \mathcal{H}_k, \text{ and } a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in V_n \text{ such that } c \in h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)\}.$$

$$\text{Let } V(A, B, \mathcal{H}) = V = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} V_n = \{a \in A : \text{There exists } n \in \mathbb{N} \text{ with } a \in V_n\}.$$

Notice that if we work with a simple generating system directly (i.e. not coded as set-valued functions), then we should replace the definition of V_{n+1} by

$$V_{n+1} = V_n \cup \{h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) : k \in \mathbb{N}^+, h \in \mathcal{H}_k, \text{ and } a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in V_n\}.$$

Let's take a look at our three examples above in this context.

1. For the first example of a simple generating system given above, we have $V_0 = B = \{7\}$. Since V_0 has only element and the unique element h in \mathcal{H} is unary with $h(7) = 14$, we have $V_1 = \{7, 14\}$. Apply h to each of these elements gives 14 and 28, so $V_2 = \{7, 14, 28\}$. From here, it is straightforward to check that $V_3 = \{7, 14, 28, 56\}$. In general, it appears that $V_n = \{7 \cdot 2^m : 0 \leq m \leq n\}$, and indeed it is possible to show this by induction on \mathbb{N} . From here, we can conclude that $V = \{7 \cdot 2^m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$. See Example 2.3.2.
2. For the group theory example, we start with $V_0 = B = \{id, (1\ 2), (2\ 3), (3\ 4)\}$. To determine V_1 , we add to the V_0 the result of inverting all elements of V_0 , and the result of multiplying pairs of elements of V_0 together. Since every element of V_0 is its own inverse, we just need to multiply *distinct* elements of V_0 together. We have $(1\ 2)(2\ 3) = (1\ 2\ 3)$, $(2\ 3)(1\ 2) = (1\ 3\ 2)$, etc. Computing all of the possibilities, we find that

$$V_1 = \{id, (1\ 2), (2\ 3), (3\ 4), (1\ 2\ 3), (1\ 3\ 2), (1\ 2)(3\ 4), (2\ 3\ 4), (2\ 4\ 3)\}.$$

Notice that V_1 is closed under inverses, but we now need to multiply elements of V_1 together to form new elements of V_2 . For example, we have $(1\ 2)(1\ 3\ 2) = (1\ 3)$, so $(1\ 3) \in V_2$. We also have $(1\ 2)(2\ 3\ 4) = (1\ 2\ 3\ 4)$, so $(1\ 2\ 3\ 4) \in V_2$. In general, determining V_2 explicitly involves performing all of these calculations and collecting the results together. It turns out that V_3 has 20 of the 24 elements in S_4 (everything except $(1\ 4)$, $(1\ 4)(2\ 3)$, $(1\ 3\ 2\ 4)$, and $(1\ 4\ 2\ 3)$), and that $V_4 = S_4$. From here, it follows that $V_n = S_4$ for all $n \geq 4$.

3. For the directed graph example, we start with $V_0 = B = \{3\}$. Now $h(3) = \{1\}$, so $V_1 = \{1, 3\}$. Applying h to each element of V_1 , we have $h(1) = \{1, 2, 7\}$ and $h(3) = \{1\}$, so $V_2 = \{1, 2, 3, 7\}$. Continuing on, we have $h(2) = \{8\}$ and $h(7) = \emptyset$, so $V_3 = \{1, 2, 3, 8\}$. At the next level, we see that $V_4 = \{1, 2, 3, 8\}$ as well, and from here it follows that $V_n = \{1, 2, 3, 8\}$ for all $n \geq 3$, and hence $V = \{1, 2, 3, 8\}$.

Proposition 2.2.9. , Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. If $m \leq n$, then $V_m \subseteq V_n$.

Proof. Notice that we have $V_n \subseteq V_{n+1}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ immediately from the definition. From here, the statement follows by fixing an arbitrary m and inducting on $n \geq m$. \square

Proposition 2.2.10. Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. For all $c \in V$, either $c \in B$ or there exists $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in V$ with $c \in h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$.

Proof. Let $c \in V$ be arbitrary. Since $V = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} V_n$, we know that there exists an $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $c \in V_n$. By well-ordering, there is a smallest $m \in \mathbb{N}$ with $c \in V_m$. We have two cases.

- Suppose that $m = 0$. We then have $c \in V_0$, so $c \in B$.
- Suppose that $m > 0$. We then have $m - 1 \in \mathbb{N}$, and by choice of m , we know that $c \notin V_{m-1}$. By definition of V_m , this implies that there exists $k \in \mathbb{N}^+, h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in V_n$ such that $c \in h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$.

\square

2.2.3 From Below: Witnessing Sequences

The V_n construction of building a system of levels, obtained by repeatedly applying the elements of \mathcal{H} to everything accumulated so far, is natural and elegant. However, the size of the levels can blow up quickly. If we want to argue that it's possible to generate a given element of A , we want be able to find a direct reason that does not involve generating all sorts of irrelevant elements along the way. Our third method therefore considers those elements of A which we are forced to put in because we see a witnessing construction.

Definition 2.2.11. *Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. A witnessing sequence is an element $\sigma \in A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$ such that for all $j < |\sigma|$, one of the following holds:*

1. $\sigma(j) \in B$.
2. There exists $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, and $i_1, i_2, \dots, i_k < j$ such that $\sigma(j) \in h(\sigma(i_1), \sigma(i_2), \dots, \sigma(i_k))$.

If σ is a witnessing sequence, we call it a witnessing sequence for $\sigma(|\sigma| - 1)$ (i.e. a witnessing sequence for the last element of that sequence).

Notice that if we working with a simple generating system directly (i.e. not coded as set-valued functions), then we should replace $\sigma(j) \in h(\sigma(i_1), \sigma(i_2), \dots, \sigma(i_k))$ with $\sigma(j) = h(\sigma(i_1), \sigma(i_2), \dots, \sigma(i_k))$.

Definition 2.2.12. *Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. Set*

$$W(A, B, \mathcal{H}) = W = \{a \in A : \text{There exists a witnessing sequence for } a\}.$$

It is sometimes useful to look only at those elements reachable which are witnessed by sequences of a bounded length, so for each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, set

$$W_n = \{a \in A : \text{There exists a witnessing sequence for } a \text{ of length } n\}.$$

Notice then that $W = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}^+} W_n$.

Let's take a look at our three examples above in this final context.

1. For the first example of a simple generating system given above, here's an example of a witnessing sequence is the sequence 7, 14, 28 of length 3. Notice that the first element is in B , the second is the result of applying h to the first, and the third is the result of applying h to the second. Therefore, $28 \in W$, and in fact $28 \in W_3$. Notice that 7, 14, 7, 28 is also a witnessing sequence for 28.
2. For the group theory example, notice that

$$(2\ 3), (3\ 4), (2\ 3\ 4), (1\ 2), (1\ 2\ 3\ 4)$$

is a witnessing sequence of length 5. This follows from the fact that the first, second, and fourth elements are in B , that $(2\ 3\ 4) = (2\ 3)(3\ 4)$, and that $(1\ 2\ 3\ 4) = (1\ 2)(2\ 3\ 4)$. Since we have a witnessing sequence for $(1\ 2\ 3\ 4)$, it follows that $(1\ 2\ 3\ 4) \in W$. Notice that we can extend this witnessing sequence to another as follows:

$$(2\ 3), (3\ 4), (2\ 3\ 4), (1\ 2), (1\ 2\ 3\ 4), (1\ 3)(2\ 4).$$

Here, we are using the fact that $(1\ 2\ 3\ 4)(1\ 2\ 3\ 4) = (1\ 3)(2\ 4)$ (notice that the i_ℓ in the definition of a witnessing sequence need not be distinct). Therefore, $(1\ 3)(2\ 4) \in W$.

3. For the directed graph example, the sequence 3, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 8, 3, 2 is a witnessing sequence for 2, despite it's inefficiency.

The first simple observation is that if we truncate a witnessing sequence, what remains is a witnessing sequence.

Proposition 2.2.13. *If σ is a witnessing sequence and $|\sigma| = n$, then for all $m \in \mathbb{N}^+$ with $m < n$ we have that $\sigma \upharpoonright [m]$ is a witnessing sequence.*

Another straightforward observation is that if we concatenate two witnessing sequences, the result is a witnessing sequence.

Proposition 2.2.14. *If σ and τ are witnessing sequences, then so is $\sigma\tau$.*

Finally, since we can always insert “dummy” elements from B (assuming it’s nonempty because otherwise the result is trivial), we have the following observation.

Proposition 2.2.15. *Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. If $m \leq n$, then $W_m \subseteq W_n$.*

2.2.4 Equivalence of the Definitions

We now prove that the three different constructions that we’ve developed all produce the same set.

Theorem 2.2.16. *Given a generating system (A, B, \mathcal{H}) , we have*

$$I(A, B, \mathcal{H}) = V(A, B, \mathcal{H}) = W(A, B, \mathcal{H}).$$

Proof. Let $I = I(A, B, \mathcal{H})$, $V = V(A, B, \mathcal{H})$, and $W = W(A, B, \mathcal{H})$.

We first show that V is inductive, from which it follows $I \subseteq V$. Notice first that $B = V_0 \subseteq V$. Suppose now that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in V$. For each i with $1 \leq i \leq k$, we can fix an n_i with $a_i \in V_{n_i}$. Let $m = \max\{n_1, n_2, \dots, n_k\}$. Using Proposition 2.2.9, we then have $a_i \in V_m$ for all i , hence $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \subseteq V_{m+1}$, and therefore $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \subseteq V$. It follows that V is inductive. By definition of I , we conclude that $I \subseteq V$.

We next show that W is inductive, from which it follows that $I \subseteq W$. Notice first that for every $b \in B$, the sequence b is a witnessing sequence, so $b \in W_1 \subseteq W$. Thus, $B \subseteq W$. Suppose now that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in W$. Let $c \in h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$ be arbitrary. For each i with $1 \leq i \leq k$, we can fix a witnessing sequence σ_i for a_i . Using Proposition 2.2.14, we then have that the sequence $\sigma_1\sigma_2 \cdots \sigma_k$ obtained by concatenating all of the σ_i is a witnessing sequence. Since each of a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k appear as entries in this witnessing sequence, if we append the element c onto the end to form $\sigma_1\sigma_2 \cdots \sigma_k c$, we obtain a witnessing sequence for c . Thus, $c \in W$. Since $c \in h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$ was arbitrary, it follows that $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \subseteq W$. It follows that W is inductive. By definition of I , we conclude that $I \subseteq W$.

We next show that $V_n \subseteq I$ by induction on $n \in \mathbb{N}$, from which it follows $V \subseteq I$. Notice first that $V_0 = B \subseteq I$ because I is inductive. For the inductive step, let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ be arbitrary with $V_n \subseteq I$. We show that $V_{n+1} \subseteq I$. By definition, we have

$$V_{n+1} = V_n \cup \{c \in A : \text{There exists } k \in \mathbb{N}^+, h \in \mathcal{H}_k, \text{ and } a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in V_n \text{ such that } c \in h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)\}.$$

Now $V_n \subseteq I$ by the inductive hypothesis. Suppose then that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in V_n$, and fix an arbitrary $c \in h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$. Since $V_n \subseteq I$, we have $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in I$, hence $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \subseteq I$ because I is inductive. Thus, $c \in I$. Since c was arbitrary, we conclude that $V_{n+1} \subseteq I$. By induction, $V_n \subseteq I$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, hence $V \subseteq I$.

We finally show that $W_n \subseteq I$ by induction on $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, from which it follows $W \subseteq I$. Since a witnessing sequence of length 1 must just be an element of B , we have $W_1 = B \subseteq I$ because I is inductive. For the inductive step, let $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$ be arbitrary with $W_n \subseteq I$. We show that $W_{n+1} \subseteq I$. Let σ be an arbitrary witnessing sequence of length $n+1$. By Proposition 2.2.13, we then have that $\sigma \upharpoonright [m]$ is a witnessing sequence of length m for all $m < n+1$. Thus, $\sigma(m) \in W_m$ for all $m < n+1$. Since $W_m \subseteq I$ whenever

$m < n$ by Proposition 2.2.15, we conclude that $\sigma(m) \in W_n$ for all $m < n$, and hence by induction that $\sigma(m) \in I$ for all $m < n$. By definition of a witnessing sequence, we know that either $\sigma(n) \in B$ or there exists $i_1, i_2, \dots, i_k < n$ such that $\sigma(n) = h(\sigma(i_1), \sigma(i_2), \dots, \sigma(i_k))$. In either case, $\sigma(n) \in I$ because I is inductive. It follows that $W_{n+1} \subseteq I$. By induction, $W_n \subseteq I$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, hence $W \subseteq I$. \square

Definition 2.2.17. Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. We denote the common value of I, V, W by $G(A, B, \mathcal{H})$ or simply G .

The ability to view the elements generated in three different ways is often helpful, as we can use the most convenient one when proving a theorem. For example, using Proposition 2.2.10, we obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 2.2.18. Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. For all $c \in G$, either $c \in B$ or there exists $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in G$ with $c \in h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$.

2.3 Step Induction

Now that we have developed the idea of generation, we can formalize the concept of inductive proofs on generated sets. In this case, using our top-down definition of I makes the proof trivial.

Proposition 2.3.1 (Step Induction). Let (A, B, \mathcal{H}) be a generating system. Suppose that $X \subseteq A$ satisfies the following:

1. $B \subseteq X$.
2. $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \subseteq X$ whenever $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in X$.

We then have that $G \subseteq X$. Thus, if $X \subseteq G$, we have $X = G$.

Proof. Our assumption simply asserts that X is inductive, hence $G = I \subseteq X$ immediately from the definition of I . \square

Notice that if we are working with a simple generating system directly (i.e. not coded as set-valued functions), then we should replace $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \subseteq X$ by $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in X$. Proofs that employ Proposition 2.3.1 are simply called “proofs by induction” (on G). Proving the first statement that $B \subseteq X$ is the *base case*, where we show that all of the initial elements lie in X . Proving the second statement is the *inductive step*, where we show that if we have some elements of X and apply some h to them, the result consists entirely of elements of X .

The next example (which was our first example in each of the above constructions) illustrates how we can sometimes identify G explicitly. Notice that we use two different types of induction in the argument. One direction uses induction on \mathbb{N} and the other uses induction on G as just described.

Example 2.3.2. Consider the following simple generating system. Let $A = \mathbb{R}$, $B = \{7\}$, and $\mathcal{H} = \{h\}$ where $h: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is the function $h(x) = 2x$. Determine G explicitly.

Proof. As described previously, it appears that we want the set $\{7, 14, 28, 56, \dots\}$, which we can write more formally as $\{7 \cdot 2^n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$. Let $X = \{7 \cdot 2^n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$.

We first show that $X \subseteq G$ by showing that $7 \cdot 2^n \in G$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ by induction (on \mathbb{N}). We have $7 \cdot 2^0 = 7 \cdot 1 = 7 \in G$ because $B \subseteq G$, as G is inductive. Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ be arbitrary such that $7 \cdot 2^n \in G$. Since G is inductive, we know that $h(7 \cdot 2^n) \in G$. Now $h(7 \cdot 2^n) = 2 \cdot 7 \cdot 2^n = 7 \cdot 2^{n+1}$, so $7 \cdot 2^{n+1} \in G$. Therefore, $7 \cdot 2^n \in G$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ by induction on \mathbb{N} , and hence $X \subseteq G$.

We now show that $G \subseteq X$ by induction (on G). In other words, we use Proposition 2.3.1 by showing that X is inductive. Notice that $B \subseteq X$ because $7 = 7 \cdot 1 = 7 \cdot 2^0 \in X$. Now let $x \in X$ be arbitrary. Fix $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $x = 7 \cdot 2^n$. We then have $h(x) = 2 \cdot x = 7 \cdot 2^{n+1} \in X$. Therefore $G \subseteq X$ by induction.

Combining both containments, we conclude that $X = G$. \square

In many cases, it's very hard to give a simple explicit description of the set G . This is where induction in the form of Proposition 2.3.1 really shines, because it allows us to prove something about all elements of G despite the fact that we might have a hard time getting a handle on what exactly the elements of G look like. Here's an example.

Example 2.3.3. *Consider the following simple generating system. Let $A = \mathbb{Z}$, $B = \{6, 183\}$, and $\mathcal{H} = \{h\}$ where $h: A^3 \rightarrow A$ is given by $h(k, m, n) = k \cdot m + n$. Show that every element of G is divisible by 3.*

Proof. Let $X = \{n \in \mathbb{Z} : n \text{ is divisible by } 3\}$. We prove by induction that $G \subseteq X$. We first handle the base case. Notice that $6 = 3 \cdot 2$ and $183 = 3 \cdot 61$, so $B \subseteq X$.

We now do the inductive step. Suppose that $k, m, n \in X$, and fix $\ell_1, \ell_2, \ell_3 \in \mathbb{Z}$ with $k = 3\ell_1$, $m = 3\ell_2$, and $n = 3\ell_3$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} h(k, m, n) &= k \cdot m + n \\ &= (3\ell_1) \cdot (3\ell_2) + 3\ell_3 \\ &= 9\ell_1\ell_2 + 3\ell_3 \\ &= 3(3\ell_1\ell_2 + \ell_3), \end{aligned}$$

hence $h(k, m, n) \in X$.

By induction (i.e. by Proposition 2.3.1), we have $G \subseteq X$. Thus, every element of G is divisible by 3. \square

2.4 Freeness and Step Recursion

In this section, we restrict attention to simple generating systems for simplicity (and also because all examples that we'll need which support definition by recursion will be simple). Naively, one might expect that a straightforward analogue of Step Form of Recursion on \mathbb{N} (Theorem 2.1.3) will carry over to recursion on generated sets. The hope would then be that the following is true.

Hope 2.4.1. *Suppose that (A, B, \mathcal{H}) is a simple generating system and X is a set. Suppose also that $\alpha: B \rightarrow X$ and that for every $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, we have a function $g_h: (A \times X)^k \rightarrow X$. There exists a unique function $f: G \rightarrow X$ with the following two properties:*

1. $f(b) = \alpha(b)$ for all $b \in B$.
2. $f(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)) = g_h(a_1, f(a_1), a_2, f(a_2), \dots, a_k, f(a_k))$ for all $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and all $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in G$.

In other words, suppose that we assign initial values for the elements of B should go (via α), and we have iterating functions g_h for each $h \in \mathcal{H}$ telling us what to do with each generated element, based on what happened to the elements that generated it. Is there necessarily a unique function that satisfies the requirements? Unfortunately, this hope is too good to be true. Intuitively, we may generate an element $a \in A$ in several very different ways, and our different iterating functions conflict on what value we should assign to a . Or we loop back and generate an element of A in multiple ways through just one function from \mathcal{H} . Here's a simple example to see what can go wrong.

Example 2.4.2. *Consider the following simple generating system. Let $A = \{1, 2\}$, $B = \{1\}$, and $\mathcal{H} = \{h\}$ where $h: A \rightarrow A$ is given by $h(1) = 2$ and $h(2) = 1$. Let $X = \mathbb{N}$. Define $\alpha: B \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ by letting $\alpha(1) = 1$ and define $g_h: A \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ by letting $g_h(a, n) = n + 1$. There is no function $f: G \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ with the following two properties:*

1. $f(b) = \alpha(b)$ for all $b \in B$.
2. $f(h(a)) = g_h(a, f(a))$ for all $a \in G$.

The intuition here is that we are starting with 1, which then generates 2 via h , which then loops back around to generate 1 via h . Now $f(1)$ must agree for each of these possibilities. Here's the formal argument.

Proof. Notice first that $G = \{1, 2\}$. Suppose that $f: G \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ satisfies (1) and (2) above. Since f satisfies (1), we must have $f(1) = \alpha(1) = 1$. By (2), we then have that

$$f(2) = f(h(1)) = g_h(1, f(1)) = f(1) + 1 = 1 + 1 = 2.$$

By (2) again, it follows that

$$f(1) = f(h(2)) = g_h(2, f(2)) = f(2) + 2 = 1 + 2 = 3,$$

contradicting the fact that $f(1) = 1$. □

To get around this problem, we want a definition of a “nice” simple generating system. Intuitively, we want to say something like “every element of G is generated in a unique way”. The following definition is a relatively straightforward way to formulate this idea.

Definition 2.4.3. A simple generating system (A, B, \mathcal{H}) is free if the following are true:

1. $\text{range}(h \upharpoonright G^k) \cap B = \emptyset$ whenever $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$.
2. $h \upharpoonright G^k$ is injective for every $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$.
3. $\text{range}(h_1 \upharpoonright G^k) \cap \text{range}(h_2 \upharpoonright G^\ell) = \emptyset$ whenever $h_1 \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and $h_2 \in \mathcal{H}_\ell$ with $h_1 \neq h_2$.

Intuitively the first property is saying that we don't loop around and generate an element of B again (like in the previous bad example), the second is saying that no element of \mathcal{H} generates the same element in two different ways, and the last is saying that there do not exist two different elements of \mathcal{H} that generate the same element.

Here's a simple example that will be useful in the next section. We'll see more subtle and important examples soon.

Example 2.4.4. Let X be a set. Consider the following simple generating system. Let $A = X^*$ be the set of all finite sequences from X , let $B = X$ (viewed as one element sequences), and let $\mathcal{H} = \{h_x : x \in X\}$ where $h_x: X^* \rightarrow X^*$ is the unary function $h_x(\sigma) = x\sigma$. We then have that $G = X^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$ and that (A, B, \mathcal{H}) is free.

Proof. First notice that $X^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$ is inductive because $\lambda \notin B$ and $h_x(\sigma) \neq \lambda$ for all $\sigma \in X^*$. Next, a simple induction on $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$ shows that $X^n \subseteq G$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, so $X^* \setminus \{\lambda\} \subseteq G$. It follows that $G = X^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$.

We now show that (A, B, \mathcal{H}) is free. We have to check the three properties.

- First notice that for any $x \in X$, we have that $\text{range}(h_x \upharpoonright G) \cap X = \emptyset$ because every element of $\text{range}(h_x \upharpoonright G)$ has length at least 2 (since $\lambda \notin G$).
- For any $x \in X$, we have that $h_x \upharpoonright G$ is injective because if $h_x(\sigma) = h_x(\tau)$, then $x\sigma = x\tau$, and hence $\sigma = \tau$.
- Finally, notice that if $x, y \in X$ with $x \neq y$, we have that $\text{range}(h_x \upharpoonright G) \cap \text{range}(h_y \upharpoonright G) = \emptyset$ because every element of $\text{range}(h_x \upharpoonright G)$ begins with x while every element of $\text{range}(h_y \upharpoonright G)$ begins with y .

Therefore, (A, B, \mathcal{H}) is free. □

On to the theorem saying that if a simple generating system is free, then we can perform recursive definitions on the elements that are generated.

Theorem 2.4.5. *Suppose that the simple generating system (A, B, \mathcal{H}) is free and X is a set. Suppose also that $\alpha: B \rightarrow X$ and that for every $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, we have a function $g_h: (A \times X)^k \rightarrow X$. There exists a unique function $f: G \rightarrow X$ with the following two properties:*

1. $f(b) = \alpha(b)$ for all $b \in B$.
2. $f(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)) = g_h(a_1, f(a_1), a_2, f(a_2), \dots, a_k, f(a_k))$ for all $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and all $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in G$.

It turns out that the uniqueness part of the theorem follows by a reasonably straightforward induction on G , and in fact does not require the assumption that (A, B, \mathcal{H}) is free. The hard part is proving existence. We need to define an f , and so we need to take an arbitrary a in A and determine where to send it. How can we do that? The basic idea is to build a new simple generating system whose elements are pairs (a, x) where $a \in A$ and $x \in X$. Intuitively, we want to generate the pair (a, x) if something (either α or one of the g_h functions) tells us that we'd better set $f(a) = x$ if we want to satisfy the above conditions. We then go on to prove (by induction on G) that for every $a \in A$, there exists a unique $x \in X$ such that (a, x) is in our new generating system. Thus, there are no conflicts, so we can use this to define our function. In other words, we watch the generation of elements of G happen, and carry along added information telling us where we need to send the elements as we generate them. Now for the details.

Proof. Let $A' = A \times X$, $B' = \{(b, \alpha(b)) : b \in B\} \subseteq A'$, and $\mathcal{H}' = \{g'_h : h \in \mathcal{H}\}$ where for each $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$, the function $g'_h: (A \times X)^k \rightarrow A \times X$ is given by

$$g'_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k) = (h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), g_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k)).$$

Let $G' = G(A', B', \mathcal{H}')$. A straightforward induction (on G'), which we omit, shows that if $(a, x) \in G'$, then $a \in G$. Let

$$Z = \{a \in G : \text{There exists a unique } x \in X \text{ such that } (a, x) \in G'\}.$$

We prove by induction (on G) that $Z = G$.

Base Case: Notice that for each $b \in B$, we have $(b, \alpha(b)) \in B' \subseteq G'$, hence there exists an $x \in X$ such that $(b, x) \in G'$. Let $b \in B$ be arbitrary, and suppose that $y \in X$ is such that $(b, y) \in G'$ and $y \neq \alpha(b)$. We then have $(b, y) \notin B'$, hence by Corollary 2.2.18 there exists $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and $(a_1, x_1), (a_2, x_2), \dots, (a_k, x_k) \in G'$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} (b, y) &= g'_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k) \\ &= (h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), g_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k)). \end{aligned}$$

In particular, we then have $b = h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$. Since $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in G$, this contradicts the fact that $\text{range}(h \upharpoonright G^k) \cap B = \emptyset$. Therefore, for every $b \in B$, there exists a unique $x \in X$, namely $\alpha(b)$, such that $(b, x) \in G'$. Hence, $B \subseteq Z$.

Inductive Step: Let $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in Z$ be arbitrary. For each i , let x_i be the unique element of X with $(a_i, x_i) \in G'$. Since G' is inductive, we have that

$$g'_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k) \in G',$$

which means that

$$(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), g_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k)) = g'_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k) \in G'.$$

Thus, there exists $x \in X$ such that $(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), x) \in G'$. Suppose now that $y \in X$ is such that $(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), y) \in G'$. We have $(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), y) \notin B'$ because $\text{range}(h \upharpoonright G^k) \cap B = \emptyset$, hence by Corollary 2.2.18 there exists $\hat{h} \in \mathcal{H}_\ell$ together with $(c_1, z_1), (c_2, z_2), \dots, (c_\ell, z_\ell) \in G'$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} (h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), y) &= g'_h(c_1, z_1, c_2, z_2, \dots, c_\ell, z_\ell) \\ &= (\hat{h}(c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\ell), g_{\hat{h}}(c_1, z_1, c_2, z_2, \dots, c_\ell, z_\ell)). \end{aligned}$$

In particular, we have $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) = \hat{h}(c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\ell)$. Since $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\ell \in G$, it follows that $h = \hat{h}$ because $\text{range}(h \upharpoonright G^k) \cap \text{range}(\hat{h} \upharpoonright G^\ell) = \emptyset$ if $h \neq \hat{h}$. Since $h = \hat{h}$, we also have $k = \ell$. Now using the fact that $h \upharpoonright G^k$ is injective, we conclude that $a_i = c_i$ for all i . Therefore,

$$y = g_{\hat{h}}(c_1, z_1, c_2, z_2, \dots, c_\ell, z_\ell) = g_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k).$$

Hence, there exists a unique $x \in X$, namely $g_h(a_1, x_1, a_2, x_2, \dots, a_k, x_k)$, such that $(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), x) \in G'$. It now follows by induction that $Z = G$.

Define $f: G \rightarrow X$ by letting $f(a)$ be the unique $x \in X$ such that $(a, x) \in G'$. We need to check that f satisfies the required conditions. As stated above, for each $b \in B$, we have $(b, \alpha(b)) \in G'$, so $f(b) = \alpha(b)$. Thus, f satisfies condition (1). Now let $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in G$ be arbitrary. We have $(a_i, f(a_i)) \in G'$ for all i , hence

$$(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k), g_h(a_1, f(a_1), a_2, f(a_2), \dots, a_k, f(a_k))) \in G'$$

by the argument in the inductive step above (since $G = Z$). It follows that

$$f(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)) = g_h(a_1, f(a_1), a_2, f(a_2), \dots, a_k, f(a_k)),$$

so f also satisfies condition (2).

Finally, we need to show that f is unique. Suppose that $f_1, f_2: G \rightarrow X$ satisfy the conditions (1) and (2). Let $Y = \{a \in G : f_1(a) = f_2(a)\}$. We show that $Y = G$ by induction on G . First notice that for any $b \in B$ we have

$$f_1(b) = \alpha(b) = f_2(b),$$

hence $b \in Y$. It follows that $B \subseteq Y$. Now let $h \in \mathcal{H}_k$ and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in Y$ be arbitrary. Since $a_i \in Y$ for each i , we have $f_1(a_i) = f_2(a_i)$ for each i , and hence

$$\begin{aligned} f_1(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)) &= g_h(a_1, f_1(a_1), a_2, f_1(a_2), \dots, a_k, f_1(a_k)) \\ &= g_h(a_1, f_2(a_1), a_2, f_2(a_2), \dots, a_k, f_2(a_k)) \\ &= f_2(h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)). \end{aligned}$$

Thus, $h(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in Y$. It follows by induction that $Y = G$, hence $f_1(a) = f_2(a)$ for all $a \in G$. \square

2.5 An Illustrative Example

We now embark on a careful formulation and proof of the following statement: If $f: A^2 \rightarrow A$ is associative, i.e. $f(a, f(b, c)) = f(f(a, b), c)$ for all $a, b, c \in A$, then any “grouping” of terms which preserves the ordering of the elements inside the grouping gives the same value. In particular, if we are working in a group A , then we can write things like $acabba$ without parentheses, because any allowable insertion of parentheses gives the same value. Of course, this result is not terribly surprising, and you’ve likely made extensive use of it when doing algebra. However, a careful proof is a bit tricky, simply because it’s not immediately obvious how to define “an allowable insertion of parentheses” in a rigorous way.

Throughout this section, let A be a set not containing the symbols $[,]$, or \star . The symbols $[$ and $]$ will code our parentheses, and \star will code the application of our function. We choose to use square brackets for our parentheses to distinguish them from the normal parentheses we will use as in our mathematical reasoning. For example, we will plug these symbols into normal mathematical functions, and writing something like $g([])$ is much more confusing than $g([])$. In other words, we want to distinguish between the parentheses in our expressions and the parentheses we use in the mathematical metatheory to study the expressions. We will also use infix notation with \star as usual, rather than the standard function notation, i.e. we will write $[a \star b]$ in place of $f(a, b)$.

Let $Sym_A = A \cup \{[,], \star\}$, so Sym_A is the collection of symbols that we are allowed to work with. When thinking about the expressions that we can form using the symbols in Sym_A , we want to treat everything in a purely syntactic manner. That is, we just want to write down valid sequence of symbols, without thinking about how to interpret them. For instance, we want to keep a distinction between the sequence of symbols $[a \star b]$ and the result of evaluating $f(a, b)$ for a given function $f: A^2 \rightarrow A$.

With all of that in mind, how do we define what a valid expression is? Since we are treating expressions as syntactic objects, every expression will be a sequence of symbols, i.e. will be an element of Sym_A^* . However, we don't want to include every element of Sym_A^* , because $a[\star \star b]$ should not be considered a reasonable expression. The way that we obtain all valid expressions is we start with the elements of A , and build up more complicated expressions by inserting \star between valid expressions, and surrounding with parentheses.

Definition 2.5.1. Define a binary function $h: (Sym_A^*)^2 \rightarrow Sym_A^*$ by letting $h(\sigma, \tau)$ be the sequence $[\sigma \star \tau]$. We then have that $(Sym_A^*, A, \{h\})$ is a simple generating system, where we are viewing the elements of A as length 1 sequences in Sym_A . Let $Exp_A = G(Sym_A^*, A, \{h\})$.

For example, suppose that $A = \{a, b, c\}$. Typical elements of $G(Sym_A^*, A, \{h\})$ are c , $[b \star [a \star c]]$ and $[c \star [[c \star b] \star a]]$. Again, elements of Exp_A are just certain special sequences of symbols, so they do not “mean” anything. In order to attach meaning, we need to have a function $f: A^2 \rightarrow A$ that will serve as an interpretation of \star . Once we have such an f , it seems reasonable that it will provide a way to *evaluate* the elements of Exp_A . That is, with an $f: A^2 \rightarrow A$ in hand, we should be able to define a function from Exp_A to A , which essentially replaces each occurrence of the symbol \star by an application of f . The natural way to define this function is recursively, but in order to do that, we need to know that the generating system is free.

2.5.1 Proving Freeness

Notice that if we did not use parentheses, i.e. if we defined $h': (Sym_A^*)^2 \rightarrow Sym_A^*$ by letting $h'(\sigma, \tau)$ be the sequence $\sigma \star \tau$, then $(Sym_A^*, A, \{h'\})$ would not be free. For example if $A = \{a, b, c\}$, then $a \star b \star c$ would be an element of G , which can be built up in two distinct ways. More formally, we would have $h'(a \star b, c) = h'(a, b \star c)$, so $h' \upharpoonright G^2$ is not injective.

However, the natural hope is that the inclusion of parentheses forces every element of Exp_A to be generated in a unique way. How can we argue this carefully? Suppose that we have element of Exp_A . Could it be written as both $[\varphi_1 \star \psi_1]$ and $[\varphi_2 \star \psi_2]$ in some nontrivial way (i.e. except in the case where $\varphi_1 = \varphi_2$ and $\psi_1 = \psi_2$)? Since $[\varphi_1 \star \psi_1]$ and $[\varphi_2 \star \psi_2]$ are the same sequence of symbols, either $\varphi_1 = \varphi_2$, or one of the φ_i is a proper initial segment of the other. This is situation that happened in above without parentheses. The sequence $a \star b \star c$ could be decomposed in two ways, and a was a proper initial segment of $a \star b$.

With this in mind, our first goal will be to prove that no element of Exp_A is a proper initial segment of another elements of Exp_A . To accomplish this task, we will employ a simple “weight” function. The idea is as follows. Given a sequence Sym_A of symbols, we scan it from left to right. We give the symbol $[$ a weight of -1 , and when we encounter it in a sequence, we think about incurring a small debt that we need to pay off. Analogously, we give the symbol $]$ a weight of 1 , and when we encounter it, we think about paying off a small debt. Here is the formal definition.

Definition 2.5.2. Define $W: Sym_A^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ as follows. We begin by defining $w: Sym_A \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ in the following way:

- $w(a) = 0$ for all $a \in A$.
- $w(\star) = 0$.
- $w([) = -1$.
- $w(]) = 1$.

We then define $W: \text{Sym}_A^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ by letting $W(\lambda) = 0$ and letting

$$W(\sigma) = \sum_{i < |\sigma|} w(\sigma(i))$$

for all $\sigma \in \text{Sym}_A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$.

Notice that if $\sigma, \tau \in \text{Sym}_A^*$, then we trivially have $W(\sigma\tau) = W(\sigma) + W(\tau)$, since W is just defined as the sums of the weights of the individual symbols. Now the following proposition is intuitively obvious, because any valid expression must have an equal number of left and right parentheses, so every debt will be payed off. Formally, we prove it by induction on the generating system.

Proposition 2.5.3. *If $\varphi \in \text{Exp}_A$, then $W(\varphi) = 0$.*

Proof. The proof is by induction on φ . In other words, we let $X = \{\varphi \in \text{Exp}_A : W(\varphi) = 0\}$, and we prove by induction that $X = \text{Exp}_A$. For the base case, notice that for every $a \in A$, we have that $W(a) = 0$. For the inductive step, let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Exp}_A$ be arbitrary with $W(\varphi) = 0 = W(\psi)$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} W([\varphi \star \psi]) &= W([]) + W(\varphi) + W(\star) + W(\psi) + W([]) \\ &= -1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 \\ &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

By induction, it follows that $X = \text{Exp}_A$, concluding the proof. \square

Recall that given σ and τ , we use the notation $\sigma \preceq \tau$ to mean that σ is an initial segment of τ , and use $\sigma \prec \tau$ to mean that σ is a proper initial segment of τ , i.e. that $\sigma \preceq \tau$ and $\sigma \neq \tau$.

Proposition 2.5.4. *If $\varphi \in \text{Exp}_A$ and $\sigma \prec \varphi$ with $\sigma \neq \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) \leq -1$.*

Proof. Again, the proof is by induction on φ . That is, we let

$$X = \{\varphi \in \text{Exp}_A : \text{For all } \sigma \prec \varphi \text{ with } \sigma \neq \lambda, \text{ we have } W(\sigma) \leq -1\},$$

and we prove by induction that $X = \text{Exp}_A$. Notice that the base case is trivial, because given any $a \in A$, there is no $\sigma \neq \lambda$ with $\sigma \prec a$, and hence $a \in X$ vacuously.

For the inductive step, let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Exp}_A$ be arbitrary with $\varphi, \psi \in X$. We prove that $[\varphi \star \psi] \in X$. Let $\sigma \prec [\varphi \star \psi]$ be an arbitrary proper initial segment with $\sigma \neq \lambda$. We handle several cases.

- If σ is $[$, then $W(\sigma) = -1$.
- If σ is $[\tau$ where $\tau \neq \lambda$ and $\tau \prec \varphi$, then

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= -1 + W(\tau) \\ &\leq -1 - 1 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\leq -1. \end{aligned}$$

- If σ is $[\varphi$ or $[\varphi \star$, then

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= -1 + W(\varphi) \\ &= -1 + 0 && \text{(by Proposition 2.5.3)} \\ &= -1. \end{aligned}$$

- If σ is $[\varphi \star \tau]$, where $\tau \neq \lambda$ and $\tau \prec \varphi$, then

$$\begin{aligned}
 W(\sigma) &= -1 + W(\varphi) + W(\tau) \\
 &= -1 + 0 + W(\tau) && \text{(by Proposition 2.5.3)} \\
 &\leq -1 + 0 - 1 && \text{(by induction)} \\
 &\leq -1.
 \end{aligned}$$

- Otherwise, σ is $[\varphi \star \psi]$, and

$$\begin{aligned}
 W(\sigma) &= -1 + W(\varphi) + W(\psi) \\
 &= -1 + 0 + 0 && \text{(by Proposition 2.5.3)} \\
 &= -1.
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, in all cases, we have $W(\sigma) \leq -1$. Since σ was an arbitrary proper initial segment of $[\varphi \star \psi]$ with $\sigma \neq \lambda$, we conclude that $[\varphi \star \psi] \in X$.

By induction, it follows that $X = \text{Exp}_A$, concluding the proof. \square

Corollary 2.5.5. *If $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Exp}_A$, then $\varphi \not\prec \psi$.*

Proof. This follows by combining Proposition 2.5.3 and Proposition 2.5.4, along with noting that $\lambda \notin \text{Exp}_A$ (which follows by a trivial induction). \square

We now have the essential tool that will help us prove freeness.

Theorem 2.5.6. *The generating system $(\text{Sym}_A^*, A, \{h\})$ is free.*

Proof. Notice that our simple generating system only has one binary function, so we need only check two things.

- First notice that $\text{range}(h \upharpoonright (\text{Exp}_A)^2) \cap A = \emptyset$ because all elements of $\text{range}(h)$ begin with $[\cdot$.
- We now show that $\text{range}(h \upharpoonright (\text{Exp}_A)^2)$ is injective. Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \psi_1, \psi_2 \in \text{Exp}_A$ be arbitrary with $h(\varphi_1, \psi_1) = h(\varphi_2, \psi_2)$. We then have $[\varphi_1 \star \psi_1] = [\varphi_2 \star \psi_2]$, hence $\varphi_1 \star \psi_1 = \varphi_2 \star \psi_2$. Since $\varphi_1 \prec \varphi_2$ and $\varphi_2 \prec \varphi_1$ are both impossible by Corollary 2.5.5, it follows that $\varphi_1 = \varphi_2$. Therefore, $\star \psi_1 = \star \psi_2$, and so $\psi_1 = \psi_2$. It follows that $h \upharpoonright (\text{Exp}_A)^2$ is injective.

Combining these two facts, we conclude that the generating system is free. \square

2.5.2 The Result

Since we have established freeness, we can define functions on Exp_A recursively. The first such function we define is the “evaluation” function.

Definition 2.5.7. *Let $f: A^2 \rightarrow A$. We define a function $\text{Eval}_f: \text{Exp}_A \rightarrow A$ recursively as follows:*

- $\text{Eval}_f(a) = a$ for all $a \in A$.
- $\text{Eval}_f([\varphi \star \psi]) = f(\text{Eval}_f(\varphi), \text{Eval}_f(\psi))$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Exp}_A$.

Formally, here is how we use freeness to justify the definition. Let $\alpha: A \rightarrow A$ be the identity map, and let $g_h: (\text{Sym}_A^* \times A)^2 \rightarrow A$ be the function defined by letting $g_h(\sigma, a, \tau, b) = f(a, b)$. By Theorem 2.4.5, there is a unique function $\text{Eval}_f: \text{Exp}_A \rightarrow A$ with the following two properties:

1. $Eval_f(a) = \alpha(a)$ for all $a \in A$.
2. $Eval_f(h(\varphi, \psi)) = g_h(\varphi, Eval_f(\varphi), \psi, Eval_f(\psi))$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in Exp_A$.

Unravelling definitions, this is exactly what we wrote above. In the future, we will typically avoid this level of formality, and just define recursive functions as in the above definition.

Recall that our goal is to prove the following: If $f: A^2 \rightarrow A$ is associative, i.e. $f(a, f(b, c)) = f(f(a, b), c)$ for all $a, b, c \in A$, then any “grouping” of terms which preserves the ordering of the elements inside the grouping gives the same value. In order to define “preserves the ordering of the elements” carefully, we now introduce a function that eliminates all parentheses and occurrences of \star in an element of Exp_A . In other words, it produces the sequence of elements from A within the given expression, in order of their occurrence. Since the function destroys characters, we’ll call it D . Notice that D is also defined recursively.

Definition 2.5.8. Define a function $D: Exp_A \rightarrow A^*$ recursively as follows:

- $D(a) = a$ for all $a \in A$.
- $D([\varphi \star \psi]) = D(\varphi)D(\psi)$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in Exp_A$, where $D(\varphi)D(\psi)$ is just the concatenation of the sequences $D(\varphi)$ and $D(\psi)$.

With these definitions in hand, we can now precisely state our theorem.

Theorem 2.5.9. Suppose that $f: A^2 \rightarrow A$ is associative, i.e. $f(a, f(b, c)) = f(f(a, b), c)$ for all $a, b, c \in A$. For all $\varphi, \psi \in Exp_A$ with $D(\varphi) = D(\psi)$, we have $Eval_f(\varphi) = Eval_f(\psi)$.

In order to prove our theorem, we need to a way to take a sequence $\sigma \in A^*$ of elements of A , and provide a canonical element $\varphi \in Exp_A$ with $D(\varphi) = \sigma$ that we can evaluate. The most natural way to do this is to pick a side to group terms on. We’ll choose to “associate to the right”, so that the sequence $cabc$ will product $[c \star [a \star [b \star c]]]$. The definition is intuitively clear, but to make it more precise, we define this grouping recursively. We could define it recursively on the length of an element of A^* , but its more elegant to use the simple generating system $(A^*, A, \{h_a : a \in A\})$ where $h_a: A^* \rightarrow A^*$ is defined by $h_a(\sigma) = a\sigma$. As shown in Example 2.4.4, we know that $(A^*, A, \{h_a : a \in A\})$ is free and we have that $G = A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$, which justifies the following recursive definition.

Definition 2.5.10. We define $R: A^* \setminus \{\lambda\} \rightarrow Sym_A^*$ recursively by letting $R(a) = a$ for all $a \in A$, and letting $R(a\sigma) = [a \star R(\sigma)]$ for all $a \in A$ and all $\sigma \in A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$.

The following result can be proven by a simple induction on the generating system $(A^*, A, \{h_a : a \in A\})$.

Proposition 2.5.11. For all $\sigma \in A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$, we have $R(\sigma) \in Exp_A$.

Now in order to prove Theorem 2.5.9, we will show that $Eval_f(\varphi) = Eval_f(R(D(\varphi)))$ for all $\varphi \in Exp_A$, i.e. that we can take any $\varphi \in Exp_A$, rip it apart so that we see the elements of A in order, and then associate to the right, without affecting the result of the evaluation. We first need the following lemma.

Lemma 2.5.12. $Eval_f([R(\sigma) \star R(\tau)]) = Eval_f(R(\sigma\tau))$ for all $\sigma, \tau \in A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$.

Proof. Let $\tau \in A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$ be arbitrary. We prove the result for this fixed τ by induction on $A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$. That is, we let

$$X = \{\sigma \in A^* \setminus \{\lambda\} : Eval_f([R(\sigma) \star R(\tau)]) = Eval_f(R(\sigma\tau))\},$$

and prove by induction on $(A^*, A, \{h_a : a \in A\})$ that $X = A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$. Suppose first that $a \in A$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} Eval_f([R(a) \star R(\tau)]) &= Eval_f([a \star R(\tau)]) && \text{(by definition of } R) \\ &= Eval_f(R(a\tau)) && \text{(by definition of } R), \end{aligned}$$

so $a \in X$. Suppose now that $\sigma \in X$ and that $a \in A$. We show that $a\sigma \in X$. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
Eval_f([R(a\sigma) \star R(\tau)]) &= Eval_f([a \star R(\sigma)] \star R(\tau)) && \text{(by definition of } R) \\
&= f(Eval_f([a \star R(\sigma)]), Eval_f(R(\tau))) && \text{(by definition of } Eval_f) \\
&= f(f(a, Eval_f(R(\sigma))), Eval_f(R(\tau))) && \text{(by definition of } Eval_f, \text{ using } Eval_f(a) = a) \\
&= f(a, f(Eval_f(R(\sigma)), Eval_f(R(\tau)))) && \text{(since } f \text{ is associative)} \\
&= f(a, Eval_f([R(\sigma) \star R(\tau)])) && \text{(by definition of } Eval_f) \\
&= f(a, Eval_f(R(\sigma\tau))) && \text{(since } \sigma \in X) \\
&= Eval_f([a \star R(\sigma\tau)]) && \text{(by definition of } Eval_f, \text{ using } Eval_f(a) = a) \\
&= Eval_f(R(a\sigma\tau)) && \text{(by definition of } R),
\end{aligned}$$

so $a\sigma \in X$. The result follows by induction. \square

We can now prove our key lemma.

Lemma 2.5.13. *$Eval_f(\varphi) = Eval_f(R(D(\varphi)))$ for all $\varphi \in Exp_A$.*

Proof. By induction on Exp_A . If $a \in A$, this is trivial because $R(D(a)) = R(a) = a$. Suppose that $\varphi, \psi \in Exp_A$ and the result holds for φ and ψ . We then have

$$\begin{aligned}
Eval_f([\varphi \star \psi]) &= f(Eval_f(\varphi), Eval_f(\psi)) && \text{(by definition of } Eval_f) \\
&= f(Eval_f(R(D(\varphi))), Eval_f(R(D(\psi)))) && \text{(by induction)} \\
&= Eval_f([R(D(\varphi)) \star R(D(\psi))]) && \text{(by definition of } Eval_f) \\
&= Eval_f(R(D(\varphi)D(\psi))) && \text{(by Lemma 2.5.12)} \\
&= Eval_f(R(D([\varphi \star \psi]))) && \text{(by definition of } D).
\end{aligned}$$

\square

Finally, we can finish the proof of our theorem.

Proof of Theorem 2.5.9. Let $\varphi, \psi \in Exp_A$ be arbitrary such that $D(\varphi) = D(\psi)$. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
Eval_f(\varphi) &= Eval_f(R(D(\varphi))) && \text{(by Lemma 2.5.13)} \\
&= Eval_f(R(D(\psi))) && \text{(since } D(\varphi) = D(\psi)) \\
&= Eval_f(\psi) && \text{(by Lemma 2.5.13).}
\end{aligned}$$

\square

It's certainly reasonable to ask if the amount of formality and rigor that we used to prove this theorem was worth it. After all, the result was intuitive and reasonably obvious. These concerns are certainly valid, but working through all of the details in this simple setting will ease the transition to more complicated arguments.

2.5.3 An Alternate Syntax - Polish Notation

It is standard mathematical practice to place binary operations like \star between two elements (called “infix notation”) to signify the application of a binary function, and throughout this section we have followed that tradition in building up valid expressions. However, the price that we have pay is that we needed to use parentheses to avoid ambiguity, i.e. to provide freeness. As mentioned, without parentheses, it is not clear

how to parse $a \star b \star c$. Should it be $[(a \star b) \star c]$ or $[a \star (b \star c)]$? If the underlying function f is not associative, then the distinction really matters.

We can of course move the operation to the front and write $\star[a, b]$ instead of $[a \star b]$ similar to how we might write $f(x, y)$ for a function of two variables. At first sight, this looks even worse because now we introduced a comma. However, it turns out that we can eliminate all of the extra symbols. That is, we simply write $\star ab$ without any additional punctuation, and build further expressions up in this way, then we avoid any ambiguity. This syntactic approach is called “Polish notation”. For example, we have the following translations in Polish notation.

- $[(a \star b) \star c] \implies \star \star abc$
- $[a \star (b \star c)] \implies \star a \star bc.$
- $[(a \star b) \star (c \star d)] \implies \star \star ab \star cd.$

We now go about proving that every expression in Polish notation is built up in a unique way. That is, we prove that the corresponding generating system is free. For this section, let A be a set not containing the symbol \star and let $Sym_A = A \cup \{\star\}$. That is, we no longer include parentheses in Sym_A .

Definition 2.5.14. Define a binary function $h: (Sym_A^*)^2 \rightarrow Sym_A^*$ by letting $h(\sigma, \tau)$ be the sequence $\star\sigma\tau$. We then have that $(Sym_A^*, A, \{h\})$ is a simple generating system, where we are viewing the elements of A as length 1 sequences in Sym_A^* . Let $PolishExp_A = G(Sym_A^*, A, \{h\})$.

In order to prove that $(Sym_A^*, A, \{h\})$ is free, we follow the structure of our previous argument. We start by defining a weight function, but here it is less obvious how to proceed. Unlike the previous case, where parentheses carried all of the weight and the elements of A were neutral, we now can only have the elements of A to signify when we have paid off a debt. As a result, instead of giving elements of A a weight of 0, we will give them weight 1. This leads to the following definition.

Definition 2.5.15. Define $W: Sym_A^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ as follows. We begin by defining $w: Sym_A \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ in the following way:

- $w(a) = 1$ for all $a \in A$.
- $w(\star) = -1$.

We then define $W: Sym_A^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ by letting $W(\lambda) = 0$ and letting

$$W(\sigma) = \sum_{i < |\sigma|} w(\sigma(i))$$

for all $\sigma \in Sym_A^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$.

Notice again that if $\sigma, \tau \in Sym_A^*$, then we trivially have $W(\sigma\tau) = W(\sigma) + W(\tau)$. Now when we scan an element of Sym_A^* from left to right, we invoke a debt of -1 when we run across a \star , and end up paying back 2 when we encounter elements of A . As a result, valid expressions now have weight 1 instead of weight 0.

Proposition 2.5.16. If $\varphi \in PolishExp_A$, then $W(\varphi) = 1$.

Proof. The proof is by induction on φ . Notice that for every $a \in A$, we have that $W(a) = 1$ by definition. Let $\varphi, \psi \in PolishExp_A$ be arbitrary with $W(\varphi) = 1 = W(\psi)$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} W(\star\varphi\psi) &= W(\star) + W(\varphi) + W(\psi) \\ &= W(\varphi) \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

The result follows by induction. □

We now show that proper initial segments of valid expressions have smaller weight. In this case, we do not have to treat λ differently.

Proposition 2.5.17. *If $\varphi \in PolishExp_A$ and $\sigma \prec \varphi$, then $W(\sigma) \leq 0$.*

Proof. The proof is by induction on φ . Again the base case is trivial, because given any $a \in A$, the only $\sigma \prec a$ is $\sigma = \lambda$, and we have $W(\lambda) = 0$. For the inductive step, assume that $\varphi, \psi \in PolishExp_A$ and that the result holds for φ and ψ . We prove the result for $\star\varphi\psi$. Let $\sigma \prec \star\varphi\psi$ be arbitrary. We have several cases.

- If $\sigma = \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) = 0$.
- If σ is $\star\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \varphi$, then

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= W(\star) + W(\tau) \\ &\leq -1 + 0 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\leq -1 \\ &\leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

- Otherwise, σ is $\star\varphi\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \psi$, in which case

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= W(\star) + W(\varphi) + W(\tau) \\ &= -1 + 1 + W(\tau) && \text{(by Proposition 2.5.16)} \\ &\leq -1 + 1 + 0 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the result holds for $\star\varphi\psi$. □

Corollary 2.5.18. *If $\varphi, \psi \in PolishExp_A$, then $\varphi \not\prec \psi$.*

Proof. This follows by combining Proposition 2.5.16 and Proposition 2.5.17. □

Theorem 2.5.19. *The generating system $(Sym_A^*, A, \{h\})$ is free.*

Proof. Notice that our simple generating system only has one binary function, so we need only check two things.

- First notice that $\text{range}(h \upharpoonright (PolishExp_A)^2) \cap A = \emptyset$ because all elements of $\text{range}(h)$ begin with \star .
- We now show that $\text{range}(h \upharpoonright (PolishExp_A)^2)$ is injective. Suppose that $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \psi_1, \psi_2 \in PolishExp_A$ and that $h(\varphi_1, \psi_1) = h(\varphi_2, \psi_2)$. We then have $\star\varphi_1\psi_1 = \star\varphi_2\psi_2$, hence $\varphi_1\psi_1 = \varphi_2\psi_2$. Since $\varphi_1 \prec \varphi_2$ and $\varphi_2 \prec \varphi_1$ are both impossible by Corollary 2.5.18, it follows that $\varphi_1 = \varphi_2$. Therefore, $\psi_1 = \psi_2$. It follows that $h \upharpoonright (PolishExp_A)^2$ is injective.

Combining these two facts, we conclude that the generating system is free. □

If we wanted, we could recursively define an evaluation function (given an $f: A^2 \rightarrow A$), and prove analogous results. However, now that we have become acquainted with Polish notation, we can move on to our study of logic.

Chapter 3

Propositional Logic

3.1 The Syntax of Propositional Logic

We now embark on a careful study of Propositional Logic. As described in Chapter 1, in this setting, we start with an arbitrary set P , which we think of as our collection of primitive statements. From here, we build up more complicated statements by repeatedly applying connectives. As in Section 2.5, we have multiple syntactic approaches that we can follow. We develop both here.

3.1.1 Standard Syntax

We start with the more human readable syntax that uses infix notation for binary connectives, and hence must employ parentheses in order to avoid ambiguity. In Section 2.5, we used square brackets to distinguish the formal syntactic constructs from their normal mathematical use. Since we have some experience now, we will forego that pedantic distinction here in order to have more natural looking objects.

Definition 3.1.1. *Let P be a nonempty set not containing the symbols $(,), \neg, \wedge, \vee$, and \rightarrow , and define $Sym_P = P \cup \{ (,), \neg, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow \}$. Define a unary function h_{\neg} and binary functions h_{\wedge}, h_{\vee} , and h_{\rightarrow} on Sym_P^* as follows:*

$$\begin{aligned} h_{\neg}(\sigma) &= (\neg\sigma) \\ h_{\wedge}(\sigma, \tau) &= (\sigma \wedge \tau) \\ h_{\vee}(\sigma, \tau) &= (\sigma \vee \tau) \\ h_{\rightarrow}(\sigma, \tau) &= (\sigma \rightarrow \tau). \end{aligned}$$

We then let $Form_P = G(Sym_P^*, P, \mathcal{H})$ where $\mathcal{H} = \{h_{\neg}, h_{\wedge}, h_{\vee}, h_{\rightarrow}\}$.

In other words, we generate more complicated statements by starting with the elements of P and applying the functions that introduce connectives. We call the results syntactic objects *formulas*. We now argue the generating system is free by following the outline in Section 2.5.

Definition 3.1.2. *Define $W: Sym_P^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ as follows. We begin by defining $w: Sym_P \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ in the following way:*

- $w(A) = 0$ for all $A \in P$.
- $w(\diamond) = 0$ for all $\diamond \in \{\neg, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.
- $w(()) = -1$.

- $w(()) = 1$.

We then define $W: \text{Sym}_P^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ by letting $W(\lambda) = 0$ and letting

$$W(\sigma) = \sum_{i < |\sigma|} w(\sigma(i))$$

for all $\sigma \in \text{Sym}_P^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$.

With this weight function in hand, the proof that the generating system is free proceeds in the same way as the example in Section 2.5.

Proposition 3.1.3. *We have the following:*

1. If $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$, then $W(\varphi) = 0$.
2. If $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$ and $\sigma \prec \varphi$ with $\sigma \neq \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) \leq -1$.
3. If $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$, then $\varphi \neq \lambda$, and either φ is an element of P , or φ begins with $($.

Proof. These all follow using straightforward inductive arguments (with multiple inductive steps, since we now have 4 generating functions), the first two of which are completely analogous to Proposition 2.5.3 and Proposition 2.5.4. \square

Corollary 3.1.4. *If $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$, then $\varphi \not\prec \psi$.*

Proof. First notice that $\varphi \neq \lambda$ by part (3) of Proposition 3.1.3. Now apply parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 3.1.3. \square

Theorem 3.1.5. *The generating system $(\text{Sym}_P^*, P, \mathcal{H})$ is free.*

Proof. We have to check the three properties.

- First notice that $\text{range}(h_{\neg} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P) \cap P = \emptyset$ because all elements of $\text{range}(h_{\neg})$ begin with $($. Similarly, for any $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$, we have $\text{range}(h_{\diamond} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2) \cap P = \emptyset$ since all elements of $\text{range}(h_{\diamond})$ begin with $($.

- We next need to check that each element of \mathcal{H} is injective, when restricted to formulas.

Let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary with $h_{\neg}(\varphi) = h_{\neg}(\psi)$. We then have $(\neg\varphi) = (\neg\psi)$, hence $\varphi = \psi$. Therefore, $h_{\neg} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P$ is injective.

Suppose $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \psi_1, \psi_2 \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary with $h_{\diamond}(\varphi_1, \psi_1) = h_{\diamond}(\varphi_2, \psi_2)$. We then have $(\varphi_1 \diamond \psi_1) = (\varphi_2 \diamond \psi_2)$, hence $\varphi_1 \diamond \psi_1 = \varphi_2 \diamond \psi_2$. Since $\varphi_1 \prec \varphi_2$ and $\varphi_2 \prec \varphi_1$ are both impossible by Corollary 3.1.4, it follows that $\varphi_1 = \varphi_2$. Therefore, $\diamond \psi_1 = \diamond \psi_2$, and so $\psi_1 = \psi_2$. It follows that $h_{\diamond} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2$ is injective.

- Finally, we must show that two distinct elements of \mathcal{H} have disjoint ranges, when restricted to formulas.

Suppose $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. Let $\varphi, \psi_1, \psi_2 \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary with $h_{\neg}(\varphi) = h_{\diamond}(\psi_1, \psi_2)$. We then have $(\neg\varphi) = (\psi_1 \diamond \psi_2)$, hence $\neg\varphi = \psi_1 \diamond \psi_2$, contradicting the fact that no element of Form_P begins with \neg (by part (3) of Proposition 3.1.3). Therefore, $\text{range}(h_{\neg} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P) \cap \text{range}(h_{\diamond} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2) = \emptyset$.

Suppose $\diamond_1, \diamond_2 \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$ with $\diamond_1 \neq \diamond_2$. Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \psi_1, \psi_2 \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary with $h_{\diamond_1}(\varphi_1, \psi_1) = h_{\diamond_2}(\varphi_2, \psi_2)$. We then have $(\varphi_1 \diamond_1 \psi_1) = (\varphi_2 \diamond_2 \psi_2)$, hence $\varphi_1 \diamond_1 \psi_1 = \varphi_2 \diamond_2 \psi_2$. Since $\varphi_1 \prec \varphi_2$ and $\varphi_2 \prec \varphi_1$ are both impossible by Corollary 3.1.4, it follows that $\varphi_1 = \varphi_2$. Therefore, $\diamond_1 = \diamond_2$, a contradiction. It follows that $\text{range}(h_{\diamond_1} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2) \cap \text{range}(h_{\diamond_2} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2) = \emptyset$. \square

3.1.2 Polish Notation

Definition 3.1.6. Let P be a set not containing the symbols \neg, \wedge, \vee , and \rightarrow , and define $Sym_P = P \cup \{\neg, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. Define a unary function h_\neg and binary functions h_\wedge, h_\vee , and h_\rightarrow on Sym_P^* as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} h_\neg(\sigma) &= \neg\sigma \\ h_\wedge(\sigma, \tau) &= \wedge\sigma\tau \\ h_\vee(\sigma, \tau) &= \vee\sigma\tau \\ h_\rightarrow(\sigma, \tau) &= \rightarrow\sigma\tau. \end{aligned}$$

We then let $Form_P = G(Sym_P^*, P, \mathcal{H})$ where $\mathcal{H} = \{h_\neg, h_\wedge, h_\vee, h_\rightarrow\}$.

Definition 3.1.7. Define $W: Sym_P^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ as follows. We begin by defining $w: Sym_P \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ in the following way:

- $w(A) = 1$ for all $A \in P$.
- $w(\neg) = 0$.
- $w(\diamond) = -1$ for all $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.

We then define $W: Sym_P^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ by letting $W(\lambda) = 0$ and letting

$$W(\sigma) = \sum_{i < |\sigma|} w(\sigma(i))$$

for all $\sigma \in Sym_P^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$.

Proposition 3.1.8. If $\varphi \in Form_P$, then $W(\varphi) = 1$.

Proof. The proof is by induction on φ . Notice that for every $A \in P$, we have that $W(A) = 1$. Suppose that $\varphi \in Form_P$ is such that $W(\varphi) = 1$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} W(\neg\varphi) &= 0 + W(\varphi) \\ &= W(\varphi) \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose now that $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$ are such that $W(\varphi) = 1 = W(\psi)$, and $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} W(\diamond\varphi\psi) &= -1 + W(\varphi) + W(\psi) \\ &= -1 + 1 + 1 \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

The result follows by induction. □

Proposition 3.1.9. If $\varphi \in Form_P$ and $\sigma \prec \varphi$, then $W(\sigma) \leq 0$.

Proof. The proof is by induction on φ . For every $A \in P$, this is trivial because the only $\sigma \prec A$ is $\sigma = \lambda$, and we have $W(\lambda) = 0$.

Suppose that $\varphi \in Form_P$ and the result holds for φ . We prove the result for $\neg\varphi$. Suppose that $\sigma \prec \neg\varphi$. If $\sigma = \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) = 0$. Otherwise, σ is $\neg\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \varphi$, in which case

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= 0 + W(\tau) \\ &\leq 0 + 0 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the result holds for $\neg\varphi$.

Suppose that $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$ and the result holds for φ and ψ . Let $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. We prove the result for $\diamond\varphi\psi$. Suppose that $\sigma \prec \diamond\varphi\psi$. If $\sigma = \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) = 0$. If σ is $\diamond\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \varphi$, then

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= -1 + W(\tau) \\ &\leq -1 + 0 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\leq -1 \\ &\leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Otherwise, σ is $\diamond\varphi\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \psi$, in which case

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= -1 + W(\varphi) + W(\tau) \\ &= -1 + 1 + W(\tau) && \text{(by Proposition 3.1.8)} \\ &\leq -1 + 1 + 0 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the result holds for $\diamond\varphi\psi$. □

Corollary 3.1.10. *If $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$, then $\varphi \not\prec \psi$.*

Proof. This follows by combining Proposition 3.1.8 and Proposition 3.1.9. □

Theorem 3.1.11. *The generating system $(\text{Sym}_P^*, P, \mathcal{H})$ is free.*

Proof. We have to check the three properties.

- First notice that $\text{range}(h_{\neg} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P) \cap P = \emptyset$ because all elements of $\text{range}(h_{\neg})$ begin with \neg . Similarly, for any $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$, we have $\text{range}(h_{\diamond} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2) \cap P = \emptyset$ since all elements of $\text{range}(h_{\diamond})$ begin with \diamond .

- We next need to check that each element of \mathcal{H} is injective, when restricted to formulas.

Let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary with $h_{\neg}(\varphi) = h_{\neg}(\psi)$. We then have $\neg\varphi = \neg\psi$, hence $\varphi = \psi$. Therefore, $h_{\neg} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P$ is injective.

Suppose $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \psi_1, \psi_2 \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary with $h_{\diamond}(\varphi_1, \psi_1) = h_{\diamond}(\varphi_2, \psi_2)$. We then have $\diamond\varphi_1\psi_1 = \diamond\varphi_2\psi_2$, hence $\varphi_1\psi_1 = \varphi_2\psi_2$. Since $\varphi_1 \prec \varphi_2$ and $\varphi_2 \prec \varphi_1$ are both impossible by Corollary 3.1.10, it follows that $\varphi_1 = \varphi_2$. Therefore, $\psi_1 = \psi_2$. Therefore, $h_{\diamond} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2$ is injective.

- Finally, we must show that two distinct elements of \mathcal{H} have disjoint ranges, when restricted to formulas.

Suppose $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. We have $\text{range}(h_{\neg} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P) \cap \text{range}(h_{\diamond} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2) = \emptyset$ because all elements of $\text{range}(h_{\neg})$ begin with \neg and all elements of $\text{range}(h_{\diamond})$ begin with \diamond .

Suppose $\diamond_1, \diamond_2 \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$ with $\diamond_1 \neq \diamond_2$. We have $\text{range}(h_{\diamond_1} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2) \cap \text{range}(h_{\diamond_2} \upharpoonright \text{Form}_P^2) = \emptyset$ because all elements of $\text{range}(h_{\diamond_1})$ begin with \diamond_1 and all elements of $\text{range}(h_{\diamond_2})$ begin with \diamond_2 .

□

3.1.3 Official Syntax and Our Abuses of It

Since we should probably fix an official syntax, we'll choose to use Polish notation. The ability to use fewer symbols is more elegant, and we'll find that it is more natural to generalize to later context (when we talk about the possibility of adding new connectives, and when we get to first-order logic). However, as with many official definitions in mathematics, we'll ignore and abuse this convention constantly in the interest of readability. For example, we'll often write things in standard syntax or in more abbreviated forms. For example, we'll write $A \wedge B$ instead of either $\wedge AB$ or $(A \wedge B)$. We'll also write something like

$$A_1 \wedge A_2 \wedge \cdots \wedge A_{n-1} \wedge A_n$$

or

$$\bigwedge_{i=1}^n A_i$$

in place of $(A_1 \wedge (A_2 \wedge (\cdots (A_{n-1} \wedge A_n) \cdots)))$ in standard syntax or $\wedge A_1 \wedge A_2 \cdots \wedge A_{n-1} A_n$ in Polish notation. Notice that each of these can be defined formally by using a variant of the function R defined in Section 2.5. In general, when we string together multiple applications of an operation (such as \wedge) in order, we always associate to the right.

When it comes to mixing symbols, we'll follow conventions about "binding" similar to how we think of \cdot as more binding than $+$ (so that $3 \cdot 5 + 2$ is read as $(3 \cdot 5) + 2$). We think of \neg as the most binding, so we read $\neg A \wedge B$ as $((\neg A) \wedge B)$. After that, we consider \wedge and \vee as the next most binding, and \rightarrow has the least binding. We'll insert parentheses when we wish to override this binding. For example, $A \wedge \neg B \rightarrow C \vee D$ is really $((A \wedge (\neg B)) \rightarrow (C \vee D))$ while $A \wedge (\neg B \rightarrow C \vee D)$ is really $(A \wedge ((\neg B) \rightarrow (C \vee D)))$.

3.1.4 Recursive Definitions

Since we've shown that our generating system is free, we can define functions recursively. Now it is possible to define some of functions directly, without appealing to recursion. In such cases, you may wonder why we bother. Since our only powerful way to prove things about the set $Form_P$ is by induction, and definitions of functions by recursion are well-suited to induction, it's simply the easiest way to proceed.

Our first function takes as input a formula φ , and outputs the set of element of P that occur within the formula φ .

Definition 3.1.12. *Given a set P , we define a function $OccurProp: Form_P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(P)$ recursively as follows:*

- $OccurProp(A) = \{A\}$ for all $A \in P$.
- $OccurProp(\neg\varphi) = OccurProp(\varphi)$.
- $OccurProp(\diamond\varphi\psi) = OccurProp(\varphi) \cup OccurProp(\psi)$ for each $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.

In order to make the definition precise, we're starting with functions $\alpha: P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(P)$, $g_{h_{\neg}}: Sym_P^* \times \mathcal{P}(P) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(P)$ and $g_{h_{\diamond}}: (Sym_P^* \times \mathcal{P}(P))^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(P)$ for each $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$ defined as follows:

- $\alpha(A) = \{A\}$ for all $A \in P$.
- $g_{h_{\neg}}(\sigma, Z) = Z$.
- $g_{h_{\diamond}}(\sigma_1, Z_1, \sigma_2, Z_2) = Z_1 \cup Z_2$ for each $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.

We are then appealing to Theorem 2.4.5, which tells us that there is a unique function $OccurProp: Form_P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(P)$ satisfying the necessary requirements. Of course, this method is more precise, but it's significantly less intuitive to use and understand. It's a good exercise to make sure that you can translate a few more

informal recursive definitions in this way, but once you understand how it works you can safely keep the formalism in the back of your mind (at least until we work to develop formal definitions of computation).

Here's a basic example of using induction to prove a result based on a recursive definition.

Proposition 3.1.13. *We have the following:*

1. *If $Q \subseteq P$, then $Form_Q \subseteq Form_P$.*
2. *For any $\varphi \in Form_P$, we have $\varphi \in Form_{OccurProp(\varphi)}$.*

Proof. The first is a straightforward induction on $\varphi \in Form_Q$, and is left as an exercise.

For the second, the proof is by induction on $\varphi \in Form_P$. For the base case, let $A \in P$ be arbitrary. Since $OccurProp(A) = \{A\}$ and $A \in Form_{\{A\}}$, we have $A \in Form_{OccurProp(A)}$.

Let $\varphi \in Form_P$ be such that the statement is true for φ , i.e. such that $\varphi \in Form_{OccurProp(\varphi)}$. Since $OccurProp(\neg\varphi) = OccurProp(\varphi)$, it follows that $\varphi \in Form_{OccurProp(\neg\varphi)}$. Hence, $\neg\varphi \in Form_{OccurProp(\neg\varphi)}$.

Finally, suppose that $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$, that $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$, and that the statement is true for φ and ψ , i.e. that we have $\varphi \in Form_{OccurProp(\varphi)}$ and $\psi \in Form_{OccurProp(\psi)}$. Since

$$OccurProp(\varphi) \subseteq OccurProp(\diamond\varphi\psi) \quad \text{and} \quad OccurProp(\psi) \subseteq OccurProp(\diamond\varphi\psi)$$

by definition, it follows from (1) that $\varphi, \psi \in Form_{OccurProp(\diamond\varphi\psi)}$. Therefore, $\diamond\varphi\psi \in Form_{OccurProp(\diamond\varphi\psi)}$. \square

On to some more important recursive definitions.

Definition 3.1.14. *We define a function $NumConn: Form_P \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ recursively as follows:*

- $NumConn(A) = 0$ for all $A \in P$.
- $NumConn(\neg\varphi) = NumConn(\varphi) + 1$.
- $NumConn(\diamond\varphi\psi) = NumConn(\varphi) + NumConn(\psi) + 1$ for each $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.

Although we have defined propositional formulas as certain finite sequences of symbols, it's more natural to view them as tree structures. The idea is to view a formula like $\wedge AB$ as a tree having one internal node \wedge , and then two leaves as children (with A to the left and B to the right). More complicated formulas lead to more complex trees, but the connectives always serve as internal nodes, and the propositional symbols are the leaves. In computer science, if we view our propositional formulas as code in a programming language, then these trees are called the *syntax trees* of the corresponding formulas. From this perspective, $NumConn$ gives the number of internal nodes of the corresponding tree. Viewing propositional formulas as trees leads to another interesting and fundamental recursive function:

Definition 3.1.15. *We define a function $Depth: Form_P \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ recursively as follows:*

- $Depth(A) = 0$ for all $A \in P$.
- $Depth(\neg\varphi) = Depth(\varphi) + 1$.
- $Depth(\diamond\varphi\psi) = \max\{Depth(\varphi), Depth(\psi)\} + 1$ for each $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.

For example, although $NumConn(\vee \wedge AB \vee CD) = 3$, we have $Depth(\vee \wedge AB \vee CD) = 2$. Intuitively, the depth of a formula is the height of the corresponding syntax tree (or 1 off from the height, depending on how you count). If we view these syntax trees as electrical circuits built out of logical gates, then the depth is a good measure of how long it takes the electrical circuit to propagate from the inputs (the propositional symbols at the leaves) to the output (the root of the tree). In other words, an engineer building a circuit to compute as quickly as possible would try to minimize the depth of a circuit, rather than just the number of gates.

Definition 3.1.16. We define a function $Subform: Form_P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Form_P)$ recursively as follows:

- $Subform(A) = \{A\}$ for all $A \in P$.
- $Subform(\neg\varphi) = \{\neg\varphi\} \cup Subform(\varphi)$.
- $Subform(\diamond\varphi\psi) = \{\diamond\varphi\psi\} \cup Subform(\varphi) \cup Subform(\psi)$ for each $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.

In other words, $Subform$ takes a formula as input, and produces the set of all formulas that went into building up the formula recursively. For example, we have $Subform(\wedge\neg AB) = \{\wedge\neg AB, \neg A, A, B\}$. In terms of the syntax trees, $Subform(\varphi)$ is the set of all subtrees of the syntax tree of φ , obtained by taking each node as a new root. Since our formulas are formally defined as syntactic sequences, a natural question is whether $Subform(\varphi)$ is the set of subsequences of φ that happen to be formulas. This turns out to be true, but is left as an exercise.

We end with a recursive definition of substituting one formula for another.

Definition 3.1.17. Let $\theta, \gamma \in Form_P$. We define a function $Subst_\gamma^\theta: Form_P \rightarrow Form_P$ recursively as follows.

- $Subst_\gamma^\theta(A) = \begin{cases} \theta & \text{if } \gamma = A \\ A & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$
- $Subst_\gamma^\theta(\neg\varphi) = \begin{cases} \theta & \text{if } \gamma = \neg\varphi \\ \neg Subst_\gamma^\theta(\varphi) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$
- $Subst_\gamma^\theta(\diamond\varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} \theta & \text{if } \gamma = \diamond\varphi\psi \\ \diamond Subst_\gamma^\theta(\varphi) Subst_\gamma^\theta(\psi) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$
for each $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.

For example, we have

$$Subst_{\neg C}^{\wedge AB}(\vee C \rightarrow \vee \neg CA \neg C) = \vee C \rightarrow \vee \wedge ABA \wedge AB.$$

Intuitively, $Subst_\gamma^\theta(\varphi)$ finds all subtrees of the syntax tree of φ that equal the syntax tree of γ , and replaces all of those with the syntax tree of θ .

3.2 Truth Assignments and Semantic Implication

So far, we've treated formulas only as syntactic objects. We briefly alluded to thinking of the syntax tree of a formula as looking like a circuit that computes based on assigning inputs to the propositional symbols, and it is now time to formalize that idea. Recall that, in isolation, a formula like $(A \wedge B) \vee C$ does not have any meaning. However, once we assign true/false values to each of A , B , and C , then the formula obtains a natural truth value. We start with the following definition to codify this assigning of values to the symbols.

Definition 3.2.1. Given a set P , a truth assignment on P is a function $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$.

We are using the number 0 and 1 as natural codings of “false” and “true”. Once we have a truth assignment M on P , we can define the “truth value” of any formula. Of course, the definition is recursive.

Definition 3.2.2. Let P be a set and let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a truth assignment on P . We define a function $v_M: Form_P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ recursively as follows:

- $v_M(A) = M(A)$ for all $A \in P$.
- $v_M(\neg\varphi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1. \end{cases}$
- $v_M(\wedge\varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1. \end{cases}$
- $v_M(\vee\varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1. \end{cases}$
- $v_M(\rightarrow\varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1. \end{cases}$

Before moving on, we should note a couple of simple facts about what happens when we either shrink or enlarge the set P . Intuitively, if $\varphi \in \text{Form}_Q$ and $Q \subseteq P$, then we can extend the truth assignment from Q to P arbitrarily without affecting the value of $v_M(\varphi)$. In fact, it seems clear that the value $v_M(\varphi)$ depends only on the values $M(A)$ for those A that actually occur in φ . The next result formalizes these ideas.

Proposition 3.2.3. *Let P be a set.*

1. *Suppose that $Q \subseteq P$ and that $M: P \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is a truth assignment on P . For all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_Q$, we have $v_M(\varphi) = v_{M \upharpoonright Q}(\varphi)$.*
2. *Suppose $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$. Whenever M and N are truth assignments on P such that $M(A) = N(A)$ for all $A \in \text{OccurProp}(\varphi)$, we have $v_M(\varphi) = v_N(\varphi)$.*

Proof. The first part follows by a straightforward induction on $\varphi \in \text{Form}_Q$, and is left as an exercise. For the second, let $Q = \text{OccurProp}(\varphi)$. We then have that $\varphi \in \text{Form}_Q$ by Proposition 3.1.13, and so

$$\begin{aligned}
 v_M(\varphi) &= v_{M \upharpoonright Q}(\varphi) && \text{(by part (1))} \\
 &= v_{N \upharpoonright Q}(\varphi) && \text{(since } M \upharpoonright Q = N \upharpoonright Q) \\
 &= v_N(\varphi) && \text{(by part (1)).}
 \end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof. □

With a method of assigning true/false values to formulas in hand (once we've assigned them to P), we are now in position to use our semantic definitions to give a precise meaning to "The set of formulas Γ implies the formula φ ".

Definition 3.2.4. *Let P be a set, let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_P$, and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$. We write $\Gamma \models_P \varphi$ to mean that whenever M is a truth assignment on P with the property that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$, we have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. We pronounce $\Gamma \models_P \varphi$ as Γ semantically implies φ .*

For example, if $P = \{A, B, C\}$, then we claim that $\{A \vee B, \neg(A \wedge (\neg C))\} \models_P B \vee C$. To see this, let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a truth assignment such that $v_M(A \vee B) = 1$ and $v_M(\neg(A \wedge (\neg C))) = 1$. We then have $v_M(A \wedge (\neg C)) = 0$, so either $v_M(A) = 0$ or $v_M(\neg C) = 0$. We handle the two cases:

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $v_M(A) = 0$. Since $v_M(A \vee B) = 1$, it follows that $v_M(B) = 1$, and hence $v_M(B \vee C) = 1$.
- *Case 2:* Suppose that $v_M(\neg C) = 0$. We then have $v_M(C) = 1$, and hence $v_M(B \vee C) = 1$.

Therefore, we have $v_M(B \vee C) = 1$ in either case. It follows that $\{A \vee B, \neg(A \wedge (\neg C))\} \models B \vee C$.

For another example, we claim that for any set P and any $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$, we have $\{\varphi \rightarrow \psi, \varphi\} \models_P \psi$. Again, let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an arbitrary truth assignment such that both $v_M(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 1$ and $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. If $v_M(\psi) = 0$, it would follow that $v_M(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 0$, a contradiction. Therefore, $v_M(\psi) = 1$.

As above, it is intuitively clear that in order to understand whether $\Gamma \models_P \varphi$, we need only think about the values of the truth assignments $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ on the symbols that actually appear in $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$.

Proposition 3.2.5. *Suppose that $Q \subseteq P$, that $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_Q$, and that $\varphi \in \text{Form}_Q$. We then have that $\Gamma \models_P \varphi$ if and only if $\Gamma \models_Q \varphi$.*

Proof. First notice that $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_P$ and $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$ by Proposition 3.1.13.

Suppose first that $\Gamma \models_Q \varphi$. Let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a truth assignment such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. By Proposition 3.2.3, we then have that $v_{M \upharpoonright Q}(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Since $\Gamma \models_Q \varphi$, it follows that $v_{M \upharpoonright Q}(\varphi) = 1$. Using Proposition 3.2.3 again, we conclude that $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. Therefore, $\Gamma \models_P \varphi$.

Suppose conversely that $\Gamma \models_P \varphi$. Let $M: Q \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a truth assignment such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Define a truth assignment $N: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by letting $N(A) = M(A)$ for all $A \in Q$ and letting $N(A) = 0$ for all $A \in P \setminus Q$. Since $N \upharpoonright Q = M$, Proposition 3.2.3 implies that $v_N(\gamma) = v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Since $\Gamma \models_P \varphi$, it follows that $v_N(\varphi) = 1$. Using Proposition 3.2.3 again, we conclude that $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. Therefore, $\Gamma \models_Q \varphi$. \square

Since the ambient set P does not matter, we will almost always omit the P in \models_P . We also adopt the following conventions in order to simplify notation.

Notation 3.2.6. *Let P be a set.*

1. If $\Gamma = \emptyset$, we write $\models \varphi$ instead of $\emptyset \models \varphi$.
2. If $\Gamma = \{\gamma\}$, we write $\gamma \models \varphi$ instead of $\{\gamma\} \models \varphi$.

Given a finite set $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_P$ and a formula $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$, there is a basic procedure that we can always follow in order to determine whether $\Gamma \models \varphi$. By Proposition 3.2.5, instead of examining all truth assignments on P , we need only consider truth assignments on the finite set Q of propositional symbols that actually occur in $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$. Since Q is a finite set, there are only finitely many such truth assignments. Thus, one way of determining whether $\Gamma \models \varphi$ is simply to check them all. We can systematically arrange the truth assignments in a table (see below), where we ensure that we put the elements of Q in the first columns, and put all elements of $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ in later columns. We also ensure that if ψ is in a column, then all subformulas of ψ appear in an earlier column, which allows us to fill in the table one column at a time. This simple-minded exhaustive technique is called the method of *truth tables*.

For example, suppose that we want to show that $\{(A \vee B) \wedge C, A \rightarrow (\neg C)\} \models (\neg C) \rightarrow B$. We build the following table:

A	B	C	$A \vee B$	$(A \vee B) \wedge C$	$\neg C$	$A \rightarrow (\neg C)$	$(\neg C) \rightarrow B$
0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1

Notice that in every row where both the $(A \vee B) \wedge C$ column and the $A \rightarrow (\neg C)$ column have a 1, namely just the row beginning with 011, we have that the entry under the $(\neg C) \rightarrow B$ column is a 1. Therefore, $\{(A \vee B) \wedge C, A \rightarrow (\neg C)\} \models (\neg C) \rightarrow B$.

Definition 3.2.7.

1. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$. We say that φ is a tautology if $\models \varphi$.
2. If $\varphi \models \psi$ and $\psi \models \varphi$, we say that φ and ψ are semantically equivalent.

The formula $(A \wedge B) \rightarrow (A \vee B)$ is a tautology, as is $A \vee (\neg A)$. In fact, for any formula $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$, the formula $\varphi \vee (\neg \varphi)$ is a tautology.

In terms of truth tables, to check that φ is a tautology, we simply check that every entry in the column of φ is a 1. To check that φ and ψ are semantically equivalent, the next result states that we can examine whether the entries in the column of φ equal the corresponding entries in the column of ψ .

Proposition 3.2.8. Let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$. The following are equivalent.

1. φ and ψ are semantically equivalent.
2. For all truth assignments $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, we have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ if and only if $v_M(\psi) = 1$.
3. For all truth assignments $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, we have $v_M(\varphi) = 0$ if and only if $v_M(\psi) = 0$.
4. For all truth assignments $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, we have $v_M(\varphi) = v_M(\psi)$.

Proof. By definition, φ and ψ are semantically equivalent if and only if both $\varphi \models \psi$ and $\psi \models \varphi$. In other words, φ and ψ are semantically equivalent if and only if whenever $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a truth assignment, then either both $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ and $v_M(\psi) = 1$ are true, or both are false. Since the only possible values of v_M are 0 and 1, this is equivalent to saying that $v_M(\varphi) = v_M(\psi)$ for all truth assignments $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. \square

For example, we claim that $\neg(A \wedge B)$ is semantically equivalent to $\neg A \vee \neg B$. Here is the corresponding truth table that includes both formulas $\neg(A \wedge B)$ and $\neg A \vee \neg B$:

A	B	$A \wedge B$	$\neg(A \wedge B)$	$\neg A$	$\neg B$	$\neg A \vee \neg B$
0	0	0	1	1	1	1
0	1	0	1	1	0	1
1	0	0	1	0	1	1
1	1	1	0	0	0	0

Notice that the rows in which the $\neg(A \wedge B)$ column has a 1 are exactly the same as the rows in which the $\neg A \vee \neg B$ column has a 1. Therefore, $\neg(A \wedge B)$ is semantically equivalent to $\neg A \vee \neg B$.

For any $\varphi \in Form_P$, it's easy to see that the formulas φ and $\neg\neg\varphi$ are semantically equivalent. Here is a slightly more interesting example: The formulas $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ and $\neg\varphi \vee \psi$ are semantically equivalent for any $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$. To see this, notice that given an arbitrary truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} v_M(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 1 &\iff v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ or } v_M(\psi) = 1 \\ &\iff v_M(\neg\varphi) = 1 \text{ or } v_M(\psi) = 1 \\ &\iff v_M(\neg\varphi \vee \psi) = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, $v_M(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = v_M(\neg\varphi \vee \psi)$ for all truth assignments $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Alternatively, we could build a truth table like above, except starting with φ and ψ in the first columns rather than specific propositional symbols.

Since $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ and $\neg\varphi \vee \psi$ are semantically equivalent for any $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$, it seems redundant to include the symbol \rightarrow . Intuitively, we can replace every occurrence of \rightarrow using this rule without affecting the “meaning” of the formula. We now prove a formal version of this statement.

Proposition 3.2.9. *Let $Form_P^-$ be the subset of $Form_P$ obtained by omitting h_{\rightarrow} from the generating system, i.e. $Form_P^- = G(Sym_P^*, P, \{h_{\neg}, h_{\wedge}, h_{\vee}\})$. For all $\varphi \in Form_P$, there exists $\psi \in Form_P^-$ such that φ and ψ are semantically equivalent.*

Proof. Define a function $h: Form_P \rightarrow Form_P^-$ recursively as follows:

- $h(A) = A$ for all $A \in P$.
- $h(\neg\varphi) = \neg h(\varphi)$ for all $\varphi \in Form_P$.
- $h(\wedge\varphi\psi) = \wedge h(\varphi)h(\psi)$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$.
- $h(\vee\varphi\psi) = \vee h(\varphi)h(\psi)$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$.
- $h(\rightarrow\varphi\psi) = \vee\neg h(\varphi)h(\psi)$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$.

We prove that φ and $h(\varphi)$ are semantically equivalent for all $\varphi \in Form_P$ by induction. In other words, we let

$$X = \{\varphi \in Form_P : \varphi \text{ and } h(\varphi) \text{ are semantically equivalent}\},$$

and show that $X = Form_P$ by proving that X is an inductive set. For the base case, we have $h(A) = A$ for all $A \in P$ by definition, so trivially we have that A and $h(A)$ are semantically equivalent for all $A \in P$. We now handle the four inductive steps.

- Let $\varphi \in Form_P$ be arbitrary such that φ and $h(\varphi)$ are semantically equivalent. Let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an arbitrary truth assignment. We have

$$\begin{aligned} v_M(h(\neg\varphi)) = 1 &\iff v_M(\neg h(\varphi)) = 1 && \text{(by definition of } h) \\ &\iff v_M(h(\varphi)) = 0 \\ &\iff v_M(\varphi) = 0 && \text{(by Proposition 3.2.8)} \\ &\iff v_M(\neg\varphi) = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Using Proposition 3.2.8, we conclude that $\neg\varphi$ and $h(\neg\varphi)$ are semantically equivalent.

- Let $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$ be arbitrary such that φ and $h(\varphi)$ are semantically equivalent, and such that ψ and $h(\psi)$ are semantically equivalent. Let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an arbitrary truth assignment. We have

$$\begin{aligned} v_M(h(\wedge\varphi\psi)) = 1 &\iff v_M(\wedge h(\varphi)h(\psi)) = 1 && \text{(by definition of } h) \\ &\iff v_M(h(\varphi)) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(h(\psi)) = 1 \\ &\iff v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1 && \text{(by Proposition 3.2.8)} \\ &\iff v_M(\wedge\varphi\psi) = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Using Proposition 3.2.8, we conclude that $\wedge\varphi\phi$ and $h(\wedge\varphi\psi)$ are semantically equivalent.

- Let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary such that φ and $h(\varphi)$ are semantically equivalent, and such that ψ and $h(\psi)$ are semantically equivalent. Let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an arbitrary truth assignment. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
 v_M(h(\vee\varphi\phi)) = 1 &\iff v_M(\vee h(\varphi)h(\psi)) = 1 && \text{(by definition of } h) \\
 &\iff \text{Either } v_M(h(\varphi)) = 1 \text{ or } v_M(h(\psi)) = 1 \\
 &\iff \text{Either } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ or } v_M(\psi) = 1 && \text{(by Proposition 3.2.8)} \\
 &\iff v_M(\vee\varphi\psi) = 1.
 \end{aligned}$$

Using Proposition 3.2.8, we conclude that $\vee\varphi\phi$ and $h(\vee\varphi\psi)$ are semantically equivalent.

- Let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary such that φ and $h(\varphi)$ are semantically equivalent, and such that ψ and $h(\psi)$ are semantically equivalent. Let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an arbitrary truth assignment. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
 v_M(h(\rightarrow\varphi\phi)) = 1 &\iff v_M(\vee\neg h(\varphi)h(\psi)) = 1 && \text{(by definition of } h) \\
 &\iff \text{Either } v_M(\neg h(\varphi)) = 1 \text{ or } v_M(h(\psi)) = 1 \\
 &\iff \text{Either } v_M(h(\varphi)) = 0 \text{ or } v_M(h(\psi)) = 1 \\
 &\iff \text{Either } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ or } v_M(\psi) = 1 && \text{(by Proposition 3.2.8)} \\
 &\iff v_M(\rightarrow\varphi\psi) = 1.
 \end{aligned}$$

Using Proposition 3.2.8, we conclude that $\rightarrow\varphi\phi$ and $h(\rightarrow\varphi\psi)$ are semantically equivalent.

By induction, it follows that φ and $h(\varphi)$ are semantically equivalent for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$. \square

In fact, it is possible to improve this result in several orthogonal ways. For instance, since $\varphi \vee \psi$ and $\neg((\neg\varphi) \wedge (\neg\psi))$ are semantically equivalent for any $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$, a similar argument to Proposition 3.2.9 shows that we can also do away with the function h_\vee . In other words, every element of Form_P is semantically equivalent to a formula in $G(\text{Sym}_P^*, P, \{h_\neg, h_\wedge\})$. We can instead choose to eliminate the \wedge connective. That is, since $\varphi \wedge \psi$ and $\neg((\neg\varphi) \vee (\neg\psi))$ are semantically equivalent for any $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$, it follows that element of Form_P is semantically equivalent to a formula in $G(\text{Sym}_P^*, P, \{h_\neg, h_\vee\})$.

We can also follow a middle way by keeping both the \wedge and \vee connectives, but only allow a very limited version of negations. In particular, we can restrict negations to only apply to the propositional symbols directly. Here is the formal definition.

Definition 3.2.10. A literal is a element of $P \cup \{\neg A : A \in P\}$. We denote the set of literals by Lit_P .

Now we build up our restricted formulas by starting with the literals, and then generating using only h_\wedge and h_\vee . Following a recursive construction similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2.9, one can show the following.

Proposition 3.2.11. For all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$, there exists $\psi \in G(\text{Sym}_P^*, \text{Lit}_P, \{h_\vee, h_\wedge\})$ such that φ and ψ are semantically equivalent.

Proof. Exercise, although we'll see a nonrecursive way to prove this fact in the next section. \square

Finally, we end this section with a semantic way to say that a set of formulas is not contradictory.

Definition 3.2.12. Let P be a set and let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_P$. We say that Γ is satisfiable if there exists a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Otherwise, we say that Γ is unsatisfiable.

For example, the set

$$\{A \vee (B \wedge C), A \rightarrow (\neg C), B \rightarrow C\}$$

is satisfiable, as witnessed by the truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ defined by $M(A) = 1$, $M(B) = 0$, and $M(C) = 0$. In contrast, the set

$$\{A \wedge (B \vee C), A \rightarrow (\neg C), B \rightarrow C\}$$

is unsatisfiable, which can be verified by a simple exhaustive check. In general, determining if a finite set of formulas is satisfiable is very difficult. In fact, the computational problem that consists of taking a finite set of formulas, and determining whether it is satisfiable, is one of the most important problems in computer science. We know of no efficient method that works in general. Any fast algorithm that solves the satisfiability problem can be repurposed to solve an enormous number of seemingly disparate problems throughout computer science (all problems in the complexity class NP). Unfortunately, we can't delve into the theory of NP-completeness here.

3.3 Boolean Functions and Connectives

After seeing that some of our connectives are unnecessary (i.e. can be removed without affecting the expressive power of our formulas), it is natural to wonder if our choice of connectives is the “right” one. For example, why didn't we introduce a new connective \leftrightarrow , allow ourselves to build the formula $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ (or $\leftrightarrow \varphi\psi$ in Polish notation) whenever $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$, and then extend our recursive definition of v_M so that

$$v_M(\leftrightarrow \varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1. \end{cases}$$

Of course, there is no real need to introduce this connective because for any $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$ we would have that $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ is semantically equivalent to $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$. Using a recursive construction analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2.9, it follows that every formula with this expanded connective is semantically equivalent to one without it.

Perhaps we could be more exotic and introduce a new connective \square that takes three formulas, allow ourselves to build the formula $\square\varphi\psi\theta$ (here's an instance when Polish notation becomes important) whenever $\varphi, \psi, \theta \in \text{Form}_P$, and extend our definition of v_M so that

$$v_M(\square\varphi\psi\theta) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if at least two of } v_M(\varphi) = 1, v_M(\psi) = 1, \text{ and } v_M(\theta) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

In other words, our new connective \square is the “majority” connective, i.e. it evaluates the individual truth values of the three formulas, and outputs the one that occurs most. It's not hard (and a good exercise) to show that for any $\varphi, \psi, \theta \in \text{Form}_P$, there exists $\alpha \in \text{Form}_P$ such that $\square\varphi\psi\theta$ is semantically equivalent to α . From here, we can again show that every formula with this expanded connective is semantically equivalent to one without it.

We want a general theorem which says that no matter how exotic a connective one invents, it's always possible to find an element of Form_P which is semantically equivalent, and thus our choice of connectives is sufficient to express everything we'd ever want. Rather than deal with arbitrary connectives, the real issue here is whether we can express any possible function taking k true/false values to true/false values.

Definition 3.3.1. Let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. A function $f: \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is called a boolean function of arity k .

Definition 3.3.2. Suppose that $P = \{A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{k-1}\}$. Given $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$, we define a boolean function $B_\varphi: \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ as follows. Given $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^k$, define a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by letting $M(A_i) = \sigma(i)$ for all i , and set $B_\varphi(\sigma) = v_M(\varphi)$.

Notice that when $P = \{A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{k-1}\}$, then given arbitrary $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_P$, we have that φ and ψ are semantically equivalent if and only if $B_\varphi = B_\psi$, because as we vary $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^k$, we are covering all possible truth assignments. We now show that we can express all possible boolean functions using the connectives that we have.

Theorem 3.3.3. Let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ be arbitrary, and let $P = \{A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{k-1}\}$. For any boolean function $f: \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ of arity k , there exists $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$ such that $f = B_\varphi$.

In fact, we'll prove a stronger theorem below which says that we may assume that our formula φ is in a particularly simple form. Before diving into the general argument, let's look at an example. Suppose that $f: \{0, 1\}^3 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is given by the following table:

0	0	0	1
0	0	1	0
0	1	0	1
0	1	1	0
1	0	0	0
1	0	1	0
1	1	0	1
1	1	1	1

Suppose we wanted to come up with a formula φ such that $f = B_\varphi$. One option is to use a lot of thought to come up with an elegant solution. Another is simply to think as follows. Since $f(000) = 1$, perhaps we should put

$$\neg A_0 \wedge \neg A_1 \wedge \neg A_2$$

into the formula somewhere. This subformula will “light up” on the input 000, but not on any other inputs. Similarly, since $f(010) = 1$, we could imagine putting

$$\neg A_0 \wedge A_1 \wedge \neg A_2$$

into the formula somewhere to activate on the input 010. If we do the same to the other lines which have value 1, we can put all of these pieces together in a manner which makes them all play nice by connecting them with \vee . Thus, our formula is

$$(\neg A_0 \wedge \neg A_1 \wedge \neg A_2) \vee (\neg A_0 \wedge A_1 \wedge \neg A_2) \vee (A_0 \wedge A_1 \wedge \neg A_2) \vee (A_0 \wedge A_1 \wedge A_2).$$

Since we connecting the various subformulas with the \vee connective, the entire formula will output 1 exactly when at least one of our special subformulas outputs a 1.

Notice the special form of the formula that we have produced in our previous example. We only applied the negation symbols to propositional symbols, i.e. the only use of negations was to form literals. From the literals, we applied the \wedge connective repeatedly to form the subformulas. And then from these formulas we applied the \vee connective repeatedly to form our formula. The formulas that can be obtained in this way are said to be in *disjunctive normal form*. Here is the formal definition.

Definition 3.3.4. Let P be a set. We let $\text{Conj}_P = G(\text{Sym}_P^*, \text{Lit}_P, \{h_\wedge\})$ be the formulas obtained by starting with the literals and generating using only h_\wedge , and call Conj_P the set of conjunctive formulas. From here, we define $\text{DNF}_P = G(\text{Sym}_P^*, \text{Conj}_P, \{h_\vee\})$ to be the formulas obtained by starting with the conjunctive formulas, and generating using only h_\vee . The elements of DNF_P are said to be in disjunctive normal form.

We now prove the following theorem, which trivially implies Theorem 3.3.3.

Theorem 3.3.5. *Let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ be arbitrary, and let $P = \{A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{k-1}\}$. For any boolean function $f: \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ of arity k , there exists $\varphi \in DNF_P$ such that $f = B_\varphi$.*

Proof. Let $T = \{\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^k : f(\sigma) = 1\}$. If $T = \emptyset$, we may let φ be $A_0 \wedge (\neg A_0)$, which is trivially an element of DNF_P . Suppose then that $T \neq \emptyset$. For each $\sigma \in T$, let

$$\psi_\sigma = \bigwedge_{i=0}^{k-1} \theta_i$$

where

$$\theta_i = \begin{cases} A_i & \text{if } \sigma(i) = 1 \\ \neg A_i & \text{if } \sigma(i) = 0. \end{cases}$$

For each $\sigma \in T$, notice that $\psi_\sigma \in Conj_P$ because $\theta_i \in Lit_P$ for all i . Finally, let

$$\varphi = \bigvee_{\sigma \in T} \psi_\sigma$$

and notice that $\varphi \in DNF_P$. We then have that $f = B_\varphi$. \square

3.4 Syntactic Implication

We now work to define a different notion of implication, which is based on syntactic manipulations instead of a detour through truth assignments and other semantic notions. Our goal is to set up a “proof system” that states the basic implications that we are allowed to write down, and then gives rules about how to transform certain implications into other implications. Although we will fix a choice of basic implications and transformation rules, there are many other choices that one can make. Some approaches pride themselves on being minimalistic by using very few basic implications and rules, often at the expense of making the system extremely unnatural to work with (but easier to prove things about!). We’ll take a different approach and set down our rules based on the types of steps in a proof that are used naturally throughout mathematics.

Since we will want our rules to be simple and mechanistic, we will ensure that everything in sight is finite and easily coded by a computer. The objects that we will manipulate will be pairs, where the first component is a finite sequence of formulas, and the second is a formula. Given a finite sequence $S \in Form_P^*$ and a formula $\varphi \in Form_P$, we will write $S \vdash \varphi$ to intuitively mean that there is a formal syntactic proof of φ from the assumptions that appear in the sequence S . We begin with the most basic proofs.

Trivial Implications: We can assert $S \vdash \varphi$ if φ appears as an element in the sequence S , i.e. if there exists an $i < |S|$ such that $S(i) = \varphi$. We denote these uses of this by writing $(Assume_P)$, since our conclusion appears in our assumptions.

With these in hand, we describe ways to generate new formal proof from ones that we already have established. To ease notation, we will write S, γ to mean that we add γ as a new element onto the end of the sequence S . In other words, S, γ means that we concatenate S with the one element sequence γ . In each case, we interpret these rules as follows: If we have already established the formal proof(s) appearing above the horizontal line, then we are allowed to conclude the formal proof appearing below the horizontal line.

Rules for \wedge : We have two rules for \wedge -elimination and one for \wedge -introduction:

$$\frac{S \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{S \vdash \varphi} \quad (\wedge EL) \qquad \frac{S \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{S \vdash \psi} \quad (\wedge ER) \qquad \frac{S \vdash \varphi \quad S \vdash \psi}{S \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi} \quad (\wedge I)$$

Rules for \vee : We have two rules for introducing \vee :

$$\frac{S \vdash \varphi}{S \vdash \varphi \vee \psi} \quad (\vee IL) \qquad \frac{S \vdash \psi}{S \vdash \varphi \vee \psi} \quad (\vee IR)$$

Rules for \rightarrow : We have two rules here, one for elimination and for introduction:

$$\frac{S \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi}{S, \varphi \vdash \psi} \quad (\rightarrow E) \qquad \frac{S, \varphi \vdash \psi}{S \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi} \quad (\rightarrow I)$$

Rules for proofs by cases: We have two ways to give an argument based on cases:

$$\frac{S, \varphi \vdash \theta \quad S, \psi \vdash \theta}{S, \varphi \vee \psi \vdash \theta} \quad (\vee PC) \qquad \frac{S, \psi \vdash \varphi \quad S, \neg \psi \vdash \varphi}{S \vdash \varphi} \quad (\neg PC)$$

Rule for proof by contradiction:

$$\frac{S, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \quad S, \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi}{S \vdash \varphi} \quad (Contr)$$

Assumption transformation rules:

$$\frac{S \vdash \varphi}{S, \gamma \vdash \varphi} \quad (Expand) \qquad \frac{S, \gamma, \gamma \vdash \varphi}{S, \gamma \vdash \varphi} \quad (Delete) \qquad \frac{S_1, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, S_2 \vdash \varphi}{S_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_1, S_2 \vdash \varphi} \quad (Reorder)$$

As alluded to above, the idea is to start with the trivial formal proofs where the conclusion is included in the assumptions, and then use the given rules to generate new formal proofs. For a very simple of how these rules can be iterated to form more complex implications, consider the following layering of two rules:

$$\begin{array}{ll} A \wedge B \vdash A \wedge B & (Assume_P) \quad (1) \\ A \wedge B \vdash A & (\wedge EL \text{ on } 1) \quad (2) \\ A \wedge B \vdash A \vee B & (\vee I \text{ on } 2) \quad (3) \end{array}$$

Therefore, we conclude that $A \wedge B \vdash A \vee B$. From this example, it's clear that we are generating new implications from others, so we can really view this situation as a generating system. Each line of an argument like the one above is a pair, consisting of a sequence from $Form_P$ and an element of $Form_P$, leading us to the following definition.

Definition 3.4.1. Let $Line_P = Form_P^* \times Form_P$.

When viewing the formal proofs as the elements that arise from a generating system, we need to define the set of elements that we start generating from.

Definition 3.4.2. Let $Assume_P = \{(S, \varphi) \in Line_P : \text{There exists } i < |S| \text{ such that } S(i) = \varphi\}$.

We next need to interpret the various rules as arising from functions in our generating system. In this case, it's most natural to define a generating system that is not simple, although it's possible to hack together a simple one that works as well. For an example of one of the functions in our (non-simple) generating system, we define $h_{\wedge EL} : Line_P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Line_P)$ as follows:

$$h_{\wedge EL}(S, \alpha) = \begin{cases} \{(S, \varphi)\} & \text{if there exists } \varphi, \psi \in Form_P \text{ with } \alpha = \varphi \wedge \psi \\ \emptyset & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Notice that the above definition makes sense because the system that generated formulas was free, so if there exists $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$ with $\alpha = \varphi \wedge \psi$, then there is a unique such choice. The definition of $h_{\wedge EL}$ is similar.

For the $\wedge I$ rule, we define a function $h_{\wedge I}: (Line_P)^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Line_P)$ as follows:

$$h_{\wedge I}((S_1, \varphi_1), (S_2, \varphi_2)) = \begin{cases} \{(S_1, \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2)\} & \text{if } S_1 = S_2 \\ \emptyset & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For the $\vee IL$ rule, we define a function $h_{\vee IL}: Line_P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Line_P)$ as follows:

$$h_{\vee IL}(S, \varphi) = \{(S, \varphi \vee \psi) : \psi \in Form_P\}.$$

We define $h_{\vee IR}$ similarly. It is more complicated, but reasonably straightforward, to write down functions for the other rules. Letting \mathcal{H} be the collection of all of such functions, we arrive at the following definition.

Definition 3.4.3. Let $S \in Form_P^*$ and let $\varphi \in Form_P$. We write $S \vdash \varphi$ to mean that

$$(S, \varphi) \in G(Line_P, Assume_P, \mathcal{H}).$$

Let's go back and examine our argument showing that $A \wedge B \vdash A \vee B$:

$$\begin{array}{ll} A \wedge B \vdash A \wedge B & (Assume_P) \quad (1) \\ A \wedge B \vdash A & (\wedge EL \text{ on } 1) \quad (2) \\ A \wedge B \vdash A \vee B & (\vee I \text{ on } 2) \quad (3) \end{array}$$

Notice that this is just a sequence where each line is either in $Assume_P$, or following from previous lines by applications of the rules. In other words, we have just written down a witnessing sequence in our generating system.

Definition 3.4.4. A deduction is a witnessing sequence in $(Line_P, Assume_P, \mathcal{H})$.

In other words, a deduction is a kind of “formal proof”, where each step is governed by a limited collection of simple syntactic manipulations. Here is an example of deduction showing that $\neg A, A \vee B \vdash B$. Notice that our deduction here sometimes adds and loses assumptions as it progresses:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \neg A, A, \neg B \vdash A & (Assume_P) \quad (1) \\ \neg A, A, \neg B \vdash \neg A & (Assume_P) \quad (2) \\ \neg A, A \vdash B & (Contr \text{ on } 1 \text{ and } 2) \quad (3) \\ \neg A, B \vdash B & (Assume_P) \quad (4) \\ \neg A, A \vee B \vdash B & (\vee PC \text{ on } 3 \text{ and } 4) \quad (5) \end{array}$$

We are now ready to define a syntactic analogue to our semantic notion $\Gamma \models \varphi$.

Definition 3.4.5. Let P be a set, let $\Gamma \subseteq Form_P$, and let $\varphi \in Form_P$. We write $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ if there exists a finite sequence $S \in \Gamma^*$ such that $S \vdash \varphi$. We pronounce $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ as “ Γ syntactically implies φ ”.

Notice the slight distinction between Γ and S in this definition. We are using Γ to denote a *set* of formulas, and it's certainly possible that the set Γ is infinite. In contrast, S is a finite sequence of formulas from Γ . In particular, S is an ordered collection and allows repetition. More importantly, S must be finite. We enforce this condition because we want our formal proofs to be completely finite, and to follow simple syntactic rules which can be mechanically checked. We showed above that $\neg A, A \vee B \vdash B$, and hence we can conclude that $\{\neg A, A \vee B\} \vdash B$. If we have a countably infinite set $P = \{A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots\}$, we still have that $\{A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots\} \vdash A_1 \wedge A_2$ because we have $A_1, A_2 \vdash A_1 \wedge A_2$ (via a simple 3-line deduction).

For a longer example, but reasonably straightforward, example, we give a deduction showing that $\{A \vee (B \wedge C) \vdash (A \vee B) \wedge (A \vee C)$:

$A \vdash A$	$(Assume_P)$	(1)
$A \vdash A \vee B$	$(\vee IL \text{ on } 1)$	(2)
$A \vdash A \vee C$	$(\vee IL \text{ on } 1)$	(3)
$A \vdash (A \vee B) \wedge (A \vee C)$	$(\wedge I \text{ on } 2 \text{ and } 3)$	(4)
$B \wedge C \vdash B \wedge C$	$(Assume_P)$	(5)
$B \wedge C \vdash B$	$(\wedge EL \text{ on } 5)$	(6)
$B \wedge C \vdash A \vee B$	$(\vee IR \text{ on } 6)$	(7)
$B \wedge C \vdash C$	$(\wedge ER \text{ on } 5)$	(8)
$B \wedge C \vdash A \vee C$	$(\vee IR \text{ on } 8)$	(9)
$B \wedge C \vdash (A \vee B) \wedge (A \vee C)$	$(\wedge I \text{ on } 7 \text{ and } 9)$	(10)
$A \vee (B \wedge C) \vdash (A \vee B) \wedge (A \vee C)$	$(\vee PC \text{ on } 4 \text{ and } 10)$	(11)

We can also give deductions showing that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$, even if we don't have concrete formulas. For example, our previous deduction showing that $\{\neg A, A \vee B\} \vdash B$ can be generalized to the following result.

Proposition 3.4.6. *For any set P and any $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$, we have $\{\neg\varphi, \varphi \vee \psi\} \vdash \psi$.*

Proof. Let $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$ be arbitrary. We give a deduction.

$\neg\varphi, \varphi, \neg\psi \vdash \varphi$	$(Assume_P)$	(1)
$\neg\varphi, \varphi, \neg\psi \vdash \neg\varphi$	$(Assume_P)$	(2)
$\neg\varphi, \varphi \vdash \psi$	$(Contr \text{ on } 1 \text{ and } 2)$	(3)
$\neg\varphi, \psi \vdash \psi$	$(Assume_P)$	(4)
$\neg\varphi, \varphi \vee \psi \vdash \psi$	$(\vee PC \text{ on } 3 \text{ and } 4)$	(5)

Therefore, $\{\neg\varphi, \varphi \vee \psi\} \vdash \psi$. □

For a more complicated example, consider the following deduction showing that $\{(\neg\varphi) \vee (\neg\psi)\} \vdash \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in Form_P$:

$\neg\varphi, \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi), \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$	$(Assume_P)$	(1)
$\neg\varphi, \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi), \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$	$(Assume_P)$	(2)
$\neg\varphi, \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi$	$(Contr \text{ on } 1 \text{ and } 2)$	(3)
$\neg\varphi, \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \varphi$	$(\wedge EL \text{ on } 3)$	(4)
$\neg\varphi, \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \neg\varphi$	$(Assume_P)$	(5)
$\neg\varphi \vdash \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$	$(Contr \text{ on } 4 \text{ and } 5)$	(6)
$\neg\psi, \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi), \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$	$(Assume_P)$	(7)
$\neg\psi, \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi), \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$	$(Assume_P)$	(8)
$\neg\psi, \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi$	$(Contr \text{ on } 7 \text{ and } 8)$	(9)
$\neg\psi, \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \psi$	$(\wedge ER \text{ on } 9)$	(10)
$\neg\psi, \neg\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \neg\psi$	$(Assume_P)$	(11)
$\neg\psi \vdash \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$	$(Contr \text{ on } 10 \text{ and } 11)$	(12)
$(\neg\varphi) \vee (\neg\psi) \vdash \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$	$(\vee PC \text{ on } 6 \text{ and } 12)$	(13)

We next show that $\vdash \varphi \vee \neg\varphi$ (i.e. that $\emptyset \vdash \varphi \vee \neg\varphi$) for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$, illustrating how we can obtain a conclusion with an empty sequence of assumptions:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\varphi \vdash \varphi & (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1) \\
\varphi \vdash \varphi \vee \neg\varphi & (\vee IL \text{ on } 1) \quad (2) \\
\neg\varphi \vdash \neg\varphi & (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (3) \\
\neg\varphi \vdash \varphi \vee \neg\varphi & (\vee IR \text{ on } 3) \quad (4) \\
\lambda \vdash \varphi \vee \neg\varphi & (\neg PC \text{ on } 2 \text{ and } 4) \quad (5)
\end{array}$$

Just as we defined a semantic way to say that set $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_P$ is not contradictory (see our definition of satisfiable), we now define a syntactic counterpart.

Definition 3.4.7. Γ is inconsistent if there exists $\theta \in \text{Form}_P$ such that $\Gamma \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma \vdash \neg\theta$. Otherwise, we say that Γ is consistent.

With all of these definitions and simple examples in hand, we can start to prove some simple results *about* the relation \vdash .

Proposition 3.4.8. Let $\Gamma_1 \subseteq \text{Form}_P$ and $\Gamma_2 \subseteq \text{Form}_P$ be such that $\Gamma_1 \subseteq \Gamma_2$. If $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$ is such that $\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi$, then $\Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi$.

Proof. Suppose that $\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi$. We can then fix $S \in \Gamma_1^*$ with $S \vdash \varphi$. Since $S \in \Gamma_1^*$ and $\Gamma_1 \subseteq \Gamma_2$, we have that $S \in \Gamma_2^*$. Therefore, $\Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi$. \square

Proposition 3.4.9. Suppose that $S \in \text{Form}_P^*$ and $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$ are such that $S \vdash \varphi$. If T is any permutation of S , then $T \vdash \varphi$.

Proof. Using the *Reorder* rule, we can repeatedly flip adjacent elements of S until we form T . More formally, we are using the fact that the set of transpositions

$$\{(1\ 2), (2\ 3), (3\ 4), \dots, (n-1\ n)\}$$

generates the symmetric group on n symbols. \square

Proposition 3.4.10. If $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_P$ is inconsistent, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$.

Proof. Suppose that Γ is inconsistent. Fix $\theta \in \text{Form}_P$ with both $\Gamma \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma \vdash \neg\theta$. By definition, we can then fix $S, T \in \Gamma^*$ with both $S \vdash \theta$ and $T \vdash \neg\theta$. Using the *Expand* rule together with Proposition 3.4.9, we conclude that $ST \vdash \theta$ and $ST \vdash \neg\theta$, where ST is the result of concatenating the sequences S and T .

Now let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$ be arbitrary. By the *Expand* rule, we have that $ST, \neg\varphi \vdash \theta$ and $ST, \neg\varphi \vdash \neg\theta$ (where the notation just means that we are concatenating the one element sequence $\neg\theta$ onto the end of ST). Using the *Contr* rule, we conclude that $ST \vdash \varphi$. Since $ST \in \Gamma^*$, it follows that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. \square

Proposition 3.4.11. Let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_P$ and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$.

1. If $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ is inconsistent, then $\Gamma \vdash \neg\varphi$.
2. If $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is inconsistent, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

Proof.

1. Suppose that $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ is inconsistent. By Proposition 3.4.10, we then have that $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \neg\varphi$. Fix $S \in (\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\})^*$ such that $S \vdash \neg\varphi$. By the *Expand* rule, we then have $S, \varphi \vdash \neg\varphi$. Using Proposition 3.4.9 and the *Delete* rule, we can fix $T \in \Gamma^*$ with $T, \varphi \vdash \neg\varphi$. Now we also trivially have $T, \neg\varphi \vdash \neg\varphi$ from *Assume_P*. Using the $\neg PC$ rule, it follows that $T \vdash \neg\varphi$. Since $T \in \Gamma^*$, we conclude that $\Gamma \vdash \neg\varphi$.

2. Suppose that $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is inconsistent. By Proposition 3.4.10, we then have that $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\} \vdash \varphi$. Fix $S \in (\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\})^*$ such that $S \vdash \varphi$. By the *Expand* rule, we then have $S, \neg\varphi \vdash \varphi$. Using Proposition 3.4.9 and the *Delete* rule, we can fix $T \in \Gamma^*$ with $T, \neg\varphi \vdash \varphi$. Now we also trivially have $T, \varphi \vdash \varphi$ from *Assume_P*. Using the $\neg PC$ rule, it follows that $T \vdash \varphi$. Since $T \in \Gamma^*$, we conclude that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

□

Corollary 3.4.12. *Let $\varphi \in Form_P$. If $\Gamma \subseteq Form_P$ is consistent, then either $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ is consistent or $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is consistent.*

Proof. We prove the contrapositive. If both $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ and $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ are inconsistent, then both $\Gamma \vdash \neg\varphi$ and $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ by Proposition 3.4.11, so Γ is inconsistent. □

Proposition 3.4.13. *Let $\Gamma \subseteq Form_P$ and let $\varphi \in Form_P$.*

1. *If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \psi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \psi$.*
2. *If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \psi$.*

Proof.

1. Suppose that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \psi$. Using Proposition 3.4.8, we conclude that $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\} \vdash \varphi$. Now we also trivially have $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\} \vdash \neg\varphi$, so Γ is inconsistent. Using Proposition 3.4.10, it follows that $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\} \vdash \psi$. By definition, together with the *Expand* rule, the *Delete* rule, and Proposition 3.4.9, we can fix $S \in \Gamma^*$ such that $S, \neg\varphi \vdash \psi$. Similarly, using the fact that $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \psi$, we can fix $T \in \Gamma^*$ such that $T, \varphi \vdash \psi$. By using the *Expand* rule and Proposition 3.4.9 again, we have both $ST, \neg\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $ST, \varphi \vdash \psi$. Applying the $\neg PC$ rule, we conclude that $ST \vdash \varphi$. Since $ST \in \Gamma^*$, it follows that $\Gamma \vdash \psi$.
2. Suppose that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$. Fix $S \in \Gamma$ with $S \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$. Using the $\rightarrow E$ rule, we have $S, \varphi \vdash \psi$. Since $S \in \Gamma^*$, it follows that $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \psi$. Now apply (1).

□

Since deductions are defined entirely in terms of finite sequences, we also have the following simple result.

Proposition 3.4.14. *$\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ if and only if there is a finite $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ such that $\Gamma_0 \vdash \varphi$.*

Proof. The right-to-left direction is immediate from Proposition 3.4.8. For the left-to-right direction, suppose that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. Fix $S \in \Gamma^*$ such that $S \vdash \varphi$. Letting Γ_0 be the finite subset of Γ consisting of those elements that occur in S , we immediately conclude that $\Gamma_0 \vdash \varphi$. □

Corollary 3.4.15. *If every finite subset of Γ is consistent, then Γ is consistent.*

Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that Γ is inconsistent, and fix $\theta \in Form_P$ such that $\Gamma \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma \vdash \neg\theta$. By Proposition 3.4.14, there exists finite sets $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ and $\Gamma_1 \subseteq \Gamma$ such that $\Gamma_0 \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma_1 \vdash \neg\theta$. Using Proposition 3.4.8, it follows that $\Gamma_0 \cup \Gamma_1 \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma_0 \cup \Gamma_1 \vdash \neg\theta$, so $\Gamma_0 \cup \Gamma_1$ is a finite inconsistent subset of Γ . □

3.5 Soundness and Completeness

We now have two notions of implications: the semantic $\Gamma \models \varphi$ and the syntactic $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. We also have two ways to say that a set of formulas is not contradictory: the semantic notion of satisfiability and the syntactic notion of consistency. Although these concepts are defined in very different ways, it turns out that the semantic and syntactic notions are the same in both cases. One direction of each of these equivalences is known and the Soundness Theorem, and the other direction is known as the Completeness Theorem.

The heart of the Soundness Theorem is the statement that if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$, then $\Gamma \models \varphi$. Intuitively, if we have a formal proof of a statement, then whenever we assign true/false values in a way that makes the assumptions true, we should expect that the conclusion is also true. More formally, we need need to argue that if we have a deduction witnessing that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$, and we have a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ with the property that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$, then we must have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. A deduction is just a finite sequence of steps, and a deduction showing that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ ends with a line $T \vdash \varphi$ for some $T \in \Gamma^*$. Now in order to show that $\Gamma \models \varphi$, it suffices to show that whenever we have a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ with the property that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all γ that appear in T , then we must have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. Rather than deal with the last line of the deduction directly, it is much easier to work through the deduction from beginning to end, and argue that each line has this property. To do that, what we really want to show is that the elements of $Assume_P$ have this property, and that each of our proof rules *preserve* this property. In other words, we want to given an inductive argument on the generating set used to define syntactic implication. In order to carry out this argument, we extend our notation for \models to allow finite sequences of formulas.

Notation 3.5.1. Given $S \in Form_P^*$ and $\varphi \in Form_P$, we write $S \models \varphi$ to mean that whenever M is a truth assignment on P with the property that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all γ that appear in S , we have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. In other words, whenever M is a truth assignment on P with the property that $v_M(S(i)) = 1$ for all $i < |S|$, we have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$.

Now we are ready to state and prove the Soundness Theorem. As alluded to above, instead of working with deductions directly and thinking about going line by line, it is more elegant to organize the argument as induction on the generating system tied to syntactic implication.

Theorem 3.5.2 (Soundness Theorem). *Let P be a set.*

1. *If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$, then $\Gamma \models \varphi$.*
2. *Every satisfiable set of formulas is consistent.*

Proof.

1. We prove the following fact: If $S \in Form_P^*$ and $\varphi \in Form_P$ are such that $S \vdash \varphi$, then $S \models \varphi$. To see why this suffices, suppose that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. By definition, we can then fix $S \in \Gamma^*$ with $S \vdash \varphi$. From here we can conclude that $S \models \varphi$. Since every element of S is an element of Γ , it follows that $\Gamma \models \varphi$.

We prove the statement “Whenever $S \vdash \varphi$, we have $S \models \varphi$ ” by induction. In other words, if G is the set generated by starting with $Assume_P$ and using our proof rules, and we let

$$X = \{(S, \varphi) \in G : S \models \varphi\},$$

then we show by induction on G that $X = G$. We begin by noting that if φ appears in the sequence S , then we trivially have $S \models \varphi$ by definition. Therefore, $(S, \varphi) \in X$ for all $(S, \varphi) \in Assume_P$. We now handle the inductive steps, one for each rule.

- We first handle the $\wedge EL$ rule. Suppose that $S \models \varphi \wedge \psi$. We need to show that $S \models \varphi$. However, this is straightforward because if $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all γ appearing in S , then $v_M(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1$ because $S \models \varphi \wedge \psi$, hence $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. Therefore, $S \models \varphi$. The other \wedge rules and the \vee rules are similar.

- Consider $\rightarrow E$ rule. Suppose that $S \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$. We need to show that $S, \varphi \models \psi$. Let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all γ appearing in S, φ . Since $S \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, we have $v_M(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 1$. Since $v_M(\varphi) = 1$, it follows that we must have $v_M(\psi) = 1$. Therefore, $S, \varphi \models \psi$. The $\rightarrow I$ rule is similar.
- We now handle the $\neg PC$ rule. Suppose that $S, \psi \models \varphi$ and $S, \neg\psi \models \varphi$. We need to show that $S \models \varphi$. Let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all γ appearing in S . Now either $v_M(\psi) = 1$ or $v_M(\psi) = 0$. If $v_M(\psi) = 1$, then we must have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ because $S, \psi \models \varphi$. Otherwise, we have $v_M(\psi) = 0$, hence $v_M(\neg\psi) = 1$, and thus $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ because $S, \neg\psi \models \varphi$. Therefore, $S \models \varphi$. The $\vee PC$ rule is similar.
- Consider the *Contr* rule. Suppose that $S, \neg\varphi \models \psi$ and $S, \neg\varphi \models \neg\psi$. We need to show that $S \models \varphi$. Let $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all γ appearing in S . Suppose instead that $v_M(\varphi) = 0$. We then have $v_M(\neg\varphi) = 1$, and using the fact that $S, \neg\varphi \models \psi$ and $S, \neg\varphi \models \neg\psi$, we conclude that both $v_M(\psi) = 1$ and $v_M(\neg\psi) = 1$. This is a contradiction, hence we must have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. Therefore, $S \models \varphi$.
- The assumption transformation rules are all completely straightforward.

By induction, it follows that $X = G$, which is to say that whenever $S \vdash \varphi$, we have $S \models \varphi$. By the comments above, statement (1) follows

2. Let Γ be a satisfiable set of formulas. Fix a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Suppose instead that Γ is inconsistent, and fix $\theta \in \text{Form}_P$ such that $\Gamma \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma \vdash \neg\theta$. We then have $\Gamma \models \theta$ and $\Gamma \models \neg\theta$ by part (1), hence both $v_M(\theta) = 1$ and $v_M(\neg\theta) = 1$, a contradiction. It follows that Γ must be consistent.

□

The Completeness Theorem is the converse (of both parts) of the Soundness Theorem. In other words, it says that (1) If $\Gamma \models \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and (2) every consistent set of formulas is satisfiable. Part (1) looks quite difficult to tackle directly (think about the amount of cleverness that went into finding the simple deductions above), so instead we go after (2) first and then use it to prove (1).

Assume then that we have a consistent set of formulas $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_P$. We need to build a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Suppose that we are trying to define $M(A)$ for a given $A \in P$. If $A \in \Gamma$, then we should certainly set $M(A) = 1$. Similarly, if $\neg A \in \Gamma$, then we should set $M(A) = 0$. But what should we do if both $A \notin \Gamma$ and $\neg A \notin \Gamma$? What if every formula in Γ is very long and complex, so we have no idea how to start defining the truth assignment? The idea is to expand Γ to a larger consistent set which has some “simpler” formulas that aid us in deciphering how to define M . Ideally, we would like to extend Γ to consistent set Γ' such that for all $A \in P$, either $A \in \Gamma'$ or $\neg A \in \Gamma'$, because that would give us a clear way to define M . Once we have such a natural way to define M , we would then have to verify that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma'$. In order to “move up” from the literals to more complicated formulas in Γ' , we would prefer to have intermediate formulas along the way so that we can keep track of what is happening, which will aid an inductive argument. To this end, we generalize the idea of having either A or $\neg A$ appear in our set to the following.

Definition 3.5.3. Let $\Delta \subseteq \text{Form}_P$. We say that Δ is complete if for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$, either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$.

Our first task is to show that if Γ is consistent, then it can be expanded to a consistent and complete set Δ . We begin by proving this in the special case when P is countable because the construction is more transparent and avoids more powerful set-theoretic tools.

Proposition 3.5.4. Suppose that P is countable. If Γ is consistent, then there exists a set $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma$ which is consistent and complete.

Proof. Since P is countable, we have that $Sym_P = P \cup \{\neg, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$ is countable, and therefore Sym_P^* is countable by Corollary 1.5.11. Since $Form_P \subseteq Sym_P^*$, it follows that $Form_P$ is countable. Alternatively, we could use apply Problem 6 on Homework 1 to conclude that $Form_P$ is countable.

Since $Form_P$ is countable, we can list $Form_P$ as $\psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \dots$ (formally, we are fixing a surjection $f: \mathbb{N}^+ \rightarrow Form_P$). We define a sequence of sets $\Gamma_0, \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \dots$ recursively as follows. We begin by letting $\Gamma_0 = \Gamma$. Suppose that $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and we that we have defined Γ_n . Let

$$\Gamma_{n+1} = \begin{cases} \Gamma_n \cup \{\psi_n\} & \text{if } \Gamma_n \cup \{\psi_n\} \text{ is consistent} \\ \Gamma_n \cup \{\neg\psi_n\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Using induction on \mathbb{N} together with Corollary 3.4.12, it follows that Γ_n is consistent for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $\Delta = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Gamma_n$.

We first argue that Δ is consistent. For any finite subset Δ_0 of Δ , there exists an $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\Delta_0 \subseteq \Gamma_n$, and so Δ_0 is consistent because every Γ_n is consistent (here we are using the fact that a finite sequence from Δ_0 is a finite sequence from some Γ_n). Therefore, Δ is consistent by Corollary 3.4.15. We end by arguing that Δ is complete. Let $\varphi \in Form_P$ be arbitrary, and fix $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$ such that $\varphi = \psi_n$. By construction, we either have $\varphi \in \Gamma_{n+1} \subseteq \Delta$ or $\neg\varphi \in \Gamma_{n+1} \subseteq \Delta$. Therefore, Δ is complete. \square

How can we handle the case where P is uncountable? Intuitively, we want to allow the listing of the formulas to continue “beyond” finite stages, and we will eventually develop the tools of transfinite induction and recursion to accomplish such awe-inspiring tasks. Another approach is to invoke a useful tool known as Zorn’s Lemma (which is really a transfinite recursion in disguise, as we will eventually see). The idea is that a complete consistent set is just a maximal consistent set, where *maximal* means that it is not strictly contained in any other consistent set. The connection here is that Zorn’s Lemma allows us to prove the existence of maximal elements in certain partial orderings. If you are unfamiliar with Zorn’s Lemma, feel free to focus only on the countable case until we cover set theory.

Definition 3.5.5. Δ is maximal consistent if Δ is consistent and there is no $\Delta' \supset \Delta$ which is consistent.

Proposition 3.5.6. Let $\Delta \subseteq Form_P$. Δ is maximal consistent if and only if Δ is consistent and complete.

Proof. Suppose that Δ is maximal consistent. We certainly have that Δ is consistent. Let $\varphi \in Form_P$ be arbitrary. By Corollary 3.4.12, either $\Delta \cup \{\varphi\}$ is consistent or $\Delta \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is consistent. If $\Delta \cup \{\varphi\}$ is consistent, then $\varphi \in \Delta$ because Δ is maximal consistent. Similarly, If $\Delta \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is consistent, then $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$ because Δ is maximal consistent. Therefore, either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$.

Suppose conversely that Δ is consistent and complete. Let $\Delta' \supset \Delta$ be arbitrary and fix $\varphi \in \Delta' \setminus \Delta$. Since Δ is complete and $\varphi \notin \Delta$, we have $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$. Since we have both $\varphi, \neg\varphi \in \Delta'$, we trivially have both $\Delta' \vdash \varphi$ and $\Delta' \vdash \neg\varphi$, so Δ' is inconsistent. It follows that Δ is maximal consistent. \square

Proposition 3.5.7. If $\Gamma \subseteq Form_P$ is consistent, then there exists a set $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma$ which is consistent and complete.

Proof. Consider an arbitrary consistent $\Gamma \subseteq Form_P$. Let $\mathcal{Q} = \{\Phi \subseteq Form_P : \Gamma \subseteq \Phi \text{ and } \Phi \text{ is consistent}\}$, and order \mathcal{Q} by \subseteq . Notice that \mathcal{Q} is nonempty because $\Gamma \in \mathcal{Q}$. Let $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{Q}$ be an arbitrary chain in \mathcal{Q} . Let $\Psi = \bigcup \mathcal{C} = \{\psi \in Form_P : \psi \in \Phi \text{ for some } \Phi \in \mathcal{C}\}$. We need to argue that Ψ is consistent. Suppose that Ψ_0 is a finite subset of Ψ , say $\Psi_0 = \{\psi_1, \psi_2, \dots, \psi_n\}$. For each ψ_i , fix $\Phi_i \in \mathcal{C}$ with $\psi_i \in \Phi_i$. Since \mathcal{C} is a chain, there exists j such that $\Phi_j \supseteq \Phi_i$ for all i . Now $\Phi_j \in \mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{Q}$, so Φ_j is consistent, and hence Ψ_0 is consistent. Therefore, Ψ is consistent by Corollary 3.4.15. It follows that $\Psi \in \mathcal{Q}$ and using the fact that $\Phi \subseteq \Psi$ for all $\Phi \in \mathcal{C}$, we may conclude that \mathcal{C} has an upper bound.

Therefore, by Zorn’s Lemma, \mathcal{Q} has a maximal element Δ . Notice that Δ is maximal consistent, hence Δ is complete and consistent by Proposition 3.5.6. \square

Lemma 3.5.8. *Let $\Delta \subseteq \text{Form}_P$ be consistent and complete, and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$. If $\Delta \vdash \varphi$, then $\varphi \in \Delta$.*

Proof. Suppose that $\Delta \vdash \varphi$. Since Δ is complete, we have that either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$. Now if $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$, then we would trivially have $\Delta \vdash \neg\varphi$ (in addition to our assumed $\Delta \vdash \varphi$), contradicting the fact that Δ is consistent. It follows that $\varphi \in \Delta$. \square

Suppose now that we have a consistent and complete $\Delta \subseteq \text{Form}_P$. For each $A \in P$, we then have that either $A \in \Delta$ or $\neg A \in \Delta$, but not both. As mentioned above, this provides us with a natural truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that will make all of the literals in Δ true. Now we need to argue that the rest of the formulas in Δ are true under M , and the following lemma is the key inductive “glue” that we will use to work our way up through more complicated formulas.

Lemma 3.5.9. *Suppose that Δ is consistent and complete. We have the following:*

1. $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$ if and only if $\varphi \notin \Delta$.
2. $\varphi \wedge \psi \in \Delta$ if and only if $\varphi \in \Delta$ and $\psi \in \Delta$.
3. $\varphi \vee \psi \in \Delta$ if and only if either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\psi \in \Delta$.
4. $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta$ if and only if either $\varphi \notin \Delta$ or $\psi \in \Delta$.

Proof.

1. Suppose first that $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$. Now if $\varphi \in \Delta$ as well, then we would have both $\Delta \vdash \neg\varphi$ and $\Delta \vdash \varphi$ trivially, contradicting the fact that Δ is consistent. It follows that $\varphi \notin \Delta$.

Conversely, if $\varphi \notin \Delta$, then $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$ because Δ is complete.

2. Suppose first that $\varphi \wedge \psi \in \Delta$. Since

$$\varphi \wedge \psi \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1)$$

$$\varphi \wedge \psi \vdash \varphi \quad (\wedge EL \text{ on } 1) \quad (2)$$

and

$$\varphi \wedge \psi \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1)$$

$$\varphi \wedge \psi \vdash \psi \quad (\wedge ER \text{ on } 1) \quad (2)$$

are both deductions, and $\varphi \wedge \psi \in \Delta$, we have both $\Delta \vdash \varphi$ and $\Delta \vdash \psi$. Using Lemma 3.5.8, we conclude that both $\varphi \in \Delta$ and $\psi \in \Delta$.

Conversely, suppose that $\varphi \in \Delta$ and $\psi \in \Delta$. Consider the following deduction:

$$\varphi, \psi \vdash \varphi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1)$$

$$\varphi, \psi \vdash \psi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (2)$$

$$\varphi, \psi \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi \quad (\vee I \text{ on } 2) \quad (3).$$

Since $\varphi, \psi \in \Delta$, we have $\Delta \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi$. Using Lemma 3.5.8, we conclude that $\varphi \wedge \psi \in \Delta$.

3. Suppose first that $\varphi \vee \psi \in \Delta$. If $\varphi \in \Delta$, then we are done, so assume that $\varphi \notin \Delta$. Since Δ is complete, we have that $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$. Now in Proposition 3.4.6, we showed that $\neg\varphi, \varphi \vee \psi \vdash \psi$, so since we have both $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$ and $\varphi \vee \psi \in \Delta$, we conclude that $\Delta \vdash \psi$. Using Lemma 3.5.8, we conclude that $\psi \in \Delta$.

Conversely, suppose that either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\psi \in \Delta$. Since

$$\varphi \vdash \varphi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1)$$

$$\varphi \vdash \varphi \vee \psi \quad (\vee IL \text{ on } 1) \quad (2)$$

and

$$\psi \vdash \psi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1)$$

$$\psi \vdash \varphi \vee \psi \quad (\vee IR \text{ on } 1) \quad (2)$$

are both deductions, and we are assuming that either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\psi \in \Delta$, we conclude that either $\Delta \vdash \varphi$ or $\Delta \vdash \psi$. Using Lemma 3.5.8, we conclude that either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\psi \in \Delta$.

4. Suppose first that $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta$. If $\varphi \notin \Delta$, then we are done, so assume that $\varphi \in \Delta$. Since

$$\varphi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1)$$

$$\varphi \rightarrow \psi, \varphi \vdash \psi \quad (\rightarrow E \text{ on } 1) \quad (2)$$

is a deduction, and both $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta$ and $\varphi \in \Delta$, we have $\Delta \vdash \psi$. Using Lemma 3.5.8, we conclude that $\psi \in \Delta$.

Conversely, suppose that either $\varphi \notin \Delta$ or $\psi \in \Delta$.

Case 1: Suppose that $\varphi \notin \Delta$. Since Δ is complete, we then have $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$. Since

$$\neg\varphi, \varphi, \neg\psi \vdash \varphi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1)$$

$$\neg\varphi, \varphi, \neg\psi \vdash \neg\varphi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (2)$$

$$\neg\varphi, \varphi \vdash \psi \quad (\text{Contr on } 1 \text{ and } 2) \quad (3)$$

$$\neg\varphi \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \quad (\rightarrow I \text{ on } 3) \quad (4)$$

is a deduction, and $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$, we have $\Delta \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$. Using Lemma 3.5.8, we conclude that $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta$.

Case 2: Suppose that $\psi \in \Delta$. Since

$$\psi, \varphi \vdash \psi \quad (\text{Assume}_P) \quad (1)$$

$$\psi \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \quad (\rightarrow I \text{ on } 1) \quad (2)$$

is a deduction, and $\psi \in \Delta$, we have $\Delta \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$. Using Lemma 3.5.8, we conclude that $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta$.

Therefore, in either case, we have $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta$.

□

Proposition 3.5.10. *If Δ is consistent and complete, then Δ is satisfiable.*

Proof. Suppose that Δ is complete and consistent. Define $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ as follows:

$$M(A) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } A \in \Delta \\ 0 & \text{if } A \notin \Delta. \end{cases}$$

We prove by induction on φ that $\varphi \in \Delta$ if and only if $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. For any $A \in P$, we have

$$A \in \Delta \Leftrightarrow M(A) = 1 \Leftrightarrow v_M(A) = 1$$

by our definition of M .

Suppose that the result holds for φ . We have

$$\begin{aligned}\neg\varphi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \varphi \notin \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 3.5.9)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow v_M(\varphi) = 0 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow v_M(\neg\varphi) = 1\end{aligned}$$

Suppose that the result holds for φ and ψ . We have

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi \wedge \psi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \varphi \in \Delta \text{ and } \psi \in \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 3.5.9)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_M(\psi) = 1 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow v_M(\varphi \wedge \psi) = 1\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi \vee \psi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \varphi \in \Delta \text{ or } \psi \in \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 3.5.9)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow v_M(\varphi) = 1 \text{ or } v_M(\psi) = 1 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow v_M(\varphi \vee \psi) = 1\end{aligned}$$

and finally

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \varphi \notin \Delta \text{ or } \psi \in \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 3.5.9)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow v_M(\varphi) = 0 \text{ or } v_M(\psi) = 1 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow v_M(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = 1\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, by induction, we have $\varphi \in \Delta$ if and only if $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. In particular, we have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \Delta$, hence Δ is satisfiable. \square

We now have all of the ingredients in place to prove Completeness Theorem. We state it for an arbitrary set P , but recall that the uncountable case used Zorn's Lemma to extend to a complete and consistent set.

Theorem 3.5.11 (Completeness Theorem). *Let P be a set.*

1. *Every consistent set of formulas is satisfiable.*

2. *If $\Gamma \models \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.*

Proof.

1. Suppose that Γ is consistent. By Proposition 3.5.7, we may fix $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma$ which is consistent and complete. Now Δ is satisfiable by Proposition 3.5.10, so we may fix $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $v_M(\delta) = 1$ for all $\delta \in \Delta$. Since $\Gamma \subseteq \Delta$, it follows that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Therefore, Γ is satisfiable.
2. Suppose that $\Gamma \models \varphi$. We then have that $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is unsatisfiable, hence $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is inconsistent by part 1. Using Proposition 3.4.11, it follows that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

\square

3.6 Compactness and Applications

We have done a lot of hard work to show that our semantic and syntactic definitions coincide. As a result, we now know that it is possible, at least in principle, to find all semantic consequences by following simple syntactic rules on finite sequences. The primary way that will take advantage of this fact is by using Proposition 3.4.14 and Corollary 3.4.15, which are formalizations of the intuition that any syntactic deduction can only make use of finitely many of the assumptions. Translating to the semantic side, we arrive at the following fundamental, and surprising, result.

Corollary 3.6.1 (Compactness Theorem). *Let P be a set.*

1. *If $\Gamma \models \varphi$, then there exists a finite $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ such that $\Gamma_0 \models \varphi$.*
2. *If every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable, then Γ is satisfiable.*

Proof. We first prove 1. Suppose that $\Gamma \models \varphi$. By the Completeness Theorem, we have $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. Using Proposition 3.4.14, we may fix a finite $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ such that $\Gamma_0 \vdash \varphi$. By the Soundness Theorem, we have $\Gamma_0 \models \varphi$.

We now prove 2. If every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable, then every finite subset of Γ is consistent by the Soundness Theorem, hence Γ is consistent by Corollary 3.4.15, and so Γ is satisfiable by the Completeness Theorem. \square

We now show how to use the Compactness Theorem to prove mathematical results. We start with an example about graphs. For our purposes here, a *graph* is an ordered pair (V, E) , where V is a set, and $E \subseteq V^2$ is a binary relation on V that is symmetric, i.e. whenever $(a, b) \in E$, we also have $(b, a) \in E$. In other words, instead of coding edges are (unordered) subsets of V of size 2, we simply code them as ordered pairs, and require that whenever we have an ordered pair, then we also have the reverse pair. If we wanted to define directed graphs in this way, we simply drop the symmetric assumption. Notice that our graphs also allow loops (since we could have $(a, a) \in E$), but does not permit multiple edges with the same endpoints.

Given a graph G , an interesting problem in both mathematical modeling and computer science is to determine whether we can color the vertices of the graph (using a small number of colors), in such a way that adjacent vertices have distinct colorings. We begin by formally defining these vertex colorings.

Definition 3.6.2. *Let $G = (V, E)$ be a graph and let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$.*

1. *A k -coloring of G is a function $f: V \rightarrow [k]$.*
2. *We say that a k -coloring f of G is proper if $f(u) \neq f(w)$ whenever $(u, w) \in E$.*
3. *We say that G is k -colorable if there exists a proper k -coloring of G .*

Proposition 3.6.3. *Let $G = (V, E)$ be a (possibly infinite) graph and let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. If every finite subgraph of G is k -colorable, then G is k -colorable.*

The idea is to introduce a propositional symbol $A_{u,i}$ for each ordered pair consisting of a vertex $u \in V$ and possible color $i \in [k]$. Intuitively, a truth assignment M with $M(A_{u,i}) = 1$ is an instruction to color the vertex u with the color i . We then code the various requirements on a coloring into formulas. Here is the argument.

Proof. Let $P = \{A_{u,i} : u \in V \text{ and } i \in [k]\}$, and let Γ be the union of the following sets:

- $\left\{ \bigvee_{i=0}^{k-1} A_{u,i} : u \in V \right\}$.
- $\left\{ \neg(A_{u,i} \wedge A_{u,j}) : u \in V \text{ and } i, j \in [k] \text{ with } i \neq j \right\}$.

- $\{\neg(A_{u,i} \wedge A_{w,i}) : (u, w) \in E \text{ and } i \in [k]\}.$

We use the Compactness Theorem to show that Γ is satisfiable. Let $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ be an arbitrary finite subset of Γ . Let $\{u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n\}$ be all of the elements $u \in V$ such that $A_{u,i}$ occurs in some element of Γ_0 for some i . Since every finite subgraph of G is k -colorable, we may fix a proper k -coloring $f: \{u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n\} \rightarrow [k]$ of the subgraph of G induced by $\{u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n\}$. If we define a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by

$$M(A_{w,i}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if there exists } \ell \text{ with } w = u_\ell \text{ and } f(u_\ell) = i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

then we have $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \Gamma_0$. Thus, Γ_0 is satisfiable. By the Compactness Theorem, it follows that Γ is satisfiable.

Fix a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \Gamma$. Notice that for each $u \in V$, there exists a unique i such that $M(A_{u,i}) = 1$ because of the first two sets in the definition of Γ . If we define $f: V \rightarrow [k]$ by letting $f(u)$ be the unique i such that $v(A_{u,i}) = 1$, then whenever $(u, w) \in E$, we have that $f(u) \neq f(w)$ (because of the third set in the definition of Γ). Therefore, G is k -colorable. \square

Corollary 3.6.4. *Every (possibly infinite) planar graph is 4-colorable.*

Proof. Since every subgraph of a planar graph is planar, this follows trivially from the previous proposition and the highly nontrivial theorem that every finite planar graph is 4-colorable. \square

Our next result is about infinite binary trees. We could code binary trees as connected acyclic graphs with certain degree restrictions, but for our purposes here, it will be more convenient to think about them differently. We start with a root, and at each node, we can have at most 2 children. It is then natural to code the two potential children of a node using two symbols, like 0 for left and 1 for right. In this way, we can uniquely find our place in a tree using a finite sequence of 0's and 1's. As a result, we might as well code trees by these binary sequences.

Definition 3.6.5. *A set $T \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ is called a tree if whenever $\sigma \in T$ and $\tau \preceq \sigma$, we have $\tau \in T$.*

For example, the set $\{\lambda, 0, 1, 00, 01, 011, 0110, 0111\}$ is a tree.

Theorem 3.6.6 (Weak König's Lemma). *Every infinite tree has an infinite branch. In other words, if $T \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ is a tree with infinitely many elements, then there exists an $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $f \upharpoonright [n] \in T$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.*

Proof. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, let $T_n = \{\sigma \in T : |\sigma| = n\}$. Notice that each T_n is finite, because the set $\{0, 1\}^n$ is finite. Since T is infinite, there must be infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $T_n \neq \emptyset$. Since T is tree, and hence closed under initial segments, we know that if $T_n \neq \emptyset$, then $T_m \neq \emptyset$ for all $m < n$. Combining these facts, it follows that $T_n \neq \emptyset$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

Let $P = \{A_\sigma : \sigma \in T\}$, and let Γ be the union of the following sets:

- $\{\bigvee_{\sigma \in T_n} A_\sigma : n \in \mathbb{N}\}.$
- $\{\neg(A_\sigma \wedge A_\tau) : \sigma, \tau \in T_n \text{ and } \sigma \neq \tau\}.$
- $\{A_\sigma \rightarrow A_\tau : \sigma, \tau \in T, \tau \preceq \sigma\}.$

We use the Compactness Theorem to show that Γ is satisfiable. Suppose that $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ is finite. Let $\Sigma = \{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_k\}$ be all of the elements $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that A_σ occurs in some element of Γ_0 . Let $n =$

$\max\{|\sigma_1|, |\sigma_2|, \dots, |\sigma_k|\}$. Since $T_n \neq \emptyset$, we may fix $\tau \in T_n$. If we define a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by

$$M(A_\sigma) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \sigma \preceq \tau \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

then we see that $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \Gamma_0$. Thus, Γ_0 is satisfiable. By the Compactness Theorem, it follows that Γ is satisfiable.

Fix a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \Gamma$. Notice that for each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, there exists a unique $\sigma \in T_n$ such that $v(A_\sigma) = 1$ because of the first two sets in the definition of Γ . For each n , denote the unique such σ by ρ_n and notice that $\rho_m \preceq \rho_n$ whenever $m \leq n$. Define $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by letting $f(n) = \rho_{n+1}(n)$. We then have that $f \upharpoonright [n] = \rho_n \in T$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. \square

We end with an interesting algebraic application about abelian groups. Since we will only discuss abelian groups in this section, we will use $+$ for the binary operation, 0 for the identity, and $-a$ for the inverse of a . We begin with a definition that captures when we can put a linear (or total) ordering on the elements of the group that respects the binary operation.

Definition 3.6.7. *An ordered abelian group is an abelian group $(A, +, 0)$ together with a relation \leq on A^2 with the following properties:*

1. \leq is a linear ordering on A , i.e. we have the following:

- For all $a \in A$, we have $a \leq a$.
- For all $a, b \in A$, either $a \leq b$ or $b \leq a$.
- If $a \leq b$ and $b \leq a$, then $a = b$.
- If $a \leq b$ and $b \leq c$, then $a \leq c$.

2. If $a \leq b$ and $c \in A$, then $a + c \leq b + c$.

For example, $(\mathbb{Z}, +, 0)$ with its usual ordering is an ordered abelian group. Similarly, both $(\mathbb{Q}, +, 0)$ and $(\mathbb{R}, +, 0)$ are ordered abelian groups with their usual orderings. Recall that given two groups G and H , we can form the direct product $G \times H$, where the operation on $G \times H$ happens componentwise. In fact, we can form the direct product $G_1 \times G_2 \times \dots \times G_n$ of finitely many groups (or even infinitely many). By taking the finite direct product of \mathbb{Z} with itself a finite number n many times, we obtain an abelian group \mathbb{Z}^n . It turns out that we can equip \mathbb{Z}^n with several interesting orderings, but we focus on one here. Define \leq on \mathbb{Z}^n by using the lexicographic, or dictionary, ordering. In other words, given elements $\vec{a} = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n)$ and $\vec{b} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n)$ in \mathbb{Z}^n , say that $\vec{a} \leq \vec{b}$ if either of the following holds:

1. $\vec{a} = \vec{b}$, i.e. $a_i = b_i$ for all i .
2. $\vec{a} \neq \vec{b}$, and if i is least such that $a_i \neq b_i$, then $a_i <_{\mathbb{Z}} b_i$.

We can also state this by saying that $\vec{a} \leq \vec{b}$ if either $\vec{b} - \vec{a}$ is the zero vector, or the first nonzero element of $\vec{b} - \vec{a}$ is positive. With this ordering, it's straightforward to check that $(\mathbb{Z}^n, +, 0)$ is an ordered abelian group. In fact, it's relatively easy to generalize the construction to show that if G_1, G_2, \dots, G_n are all ordered abelian groups, then the direct product $G_1 \times G_2 \times \dots \times G_n$ equipped with the lexicographic ordering is an ordered abelian group.

We want to understand what general ordered abelian groups look like, and which abelian groups we can equip with an ordering. To work toward this goal, we start with a simple property of ordered abelian groups.

Proposition 3.6.8. *Let $(A, +, 0, \leq)$ be an ordered abelian group. If $a \leq b$ and $c \leq d$, then $a + c \leq b + d$.*

Proof. Let $a, b, c, d \in A$ be arbitrary with $a \leq b$ and $c \leq d$. Since $a \leq b$ and $c \in A$, we know that $a + c \leq b + c$. Similarly, since $c \leq d$ and $b \in A$, we have $c + b \leq d + b$. Using the fact that $+$ is commutative, it follows that $b + c \leq b + d$. Finally, since we have both $a + c \leq b + c$ and also $b + c \leq b + d$, we can use the transitivity of \leq to conclude that $a + c \leq b + d$. \square

Now whenever we have a linear ordering \leq on a set A , we can define a corresponding strict ordering $<$.

Proposition 3.6.9. *Suppose that $(A, +, 0, \leq)$ is an ordered abelian group. Define $<$ by letting $a < b$ if $a \leq b$ and $a \neq b$. We then have the following properties:*

1. *For all $a, b \in A$, exactly one of $a < b$, $a = b$, or $b < a$ holds.*
2. *If $a < b$ and $c \in A$, then $a + c < b + c$.*

Proof.

1. Let $a, b \in A$ be arbitrary. We first show that at least one of the three conditions holds. Assume then that $a \neq b$. By definition, we know that either $a \leq b$ or $b \leq a$ holds. If the former case we have $a < b$, while in the latter we have $b < a$.

We now show that at most one holds. Clearly, we can't have both $a < b$ and $a = b$, nor can we have both $a = b$ and $b < a$. Suppose then that we have both $a < b$ and $b < a$. We would then have both $a \leq b$ and $b \leq a$, hence $a = b$, a contradiction.

2. Since $a < b$, we know that $a \leq b$, and hence $a + c \leq b + c$. Now if $a + c = b + c$, then by adding $-c$ to both sides we would have $a = b$, which is a contradiction. Therefore, $a + c < b + c$.

\square

We are now ready to establish a simple restriction on the algebraic structure of any ordered abelian group.

Proposition 3.6.10. *In any ordered abelian group, every nonzero element has infinite order.*

Proof. Let $(A, +, 0, \leq)$ be an ordered abelian group. Let $a \in A$ be arbitrary with $a \neq 0$. For any $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let $n \cdot a$ be the result of adding a to itself n times in the abelian group. Now $0 \in A$ and $a \neq 0$, and we have two possible cases.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $0 < a$. Adding a to both sides we conclude that $a < a + a$. Using the fact that $0 < a$ together with transitivity, it follows that $0 < a + a$. If we add a to both sides again and follow the same argument, we conclude that $0 < a + a + a$. From here, a simple induction establishes that $0 < n \cdot a$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$. In particular, $n \cdot a \neq 0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, so a has infinite order.
- *Case 2:* Suppose that $a < 0$. Following the logic in Case 1, a simple induction shows that $n \cdot a < 0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$. In particular, $n \cdot a \neq 0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, so a has infinite order.

Therefore, every nonidentity element of A has infinite order. \square

Somewhat surprisingly, the converse to this statement is also true, i.e. given an abelian group $(A, +, 0)$ in which every nonzero element has infinite order, we can find an ordering \leq such that $(A, +, 0, \leq)$ is an ordered abelian group. Attacking this problem directly is difficult, as it's unclear how to define an ordering \leq on a general group, using only the assumption that each nonidentity element has infinite order. The key idea is to use the Compactness Theorem to restrict to an appropriate "finite" case. We will need the following important algebraic result.

Theorem 3.6.11 (Fundamental Theorem of Finitely Generated Abelian Groups). *Let G be a finitely generated abelian group. There exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ with*

$$A \cong \mathbb{Z}^n \times \mathbb{Z}/m_1\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/m_2\mathbb{Z} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}/m_k\mathbb{Z}.$$

In fact, it is possible (though not necessary for our purposes) to say more. For example, one can choose $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ with $m_i \mid m_{i+1}$ for all i with $1 \leq i < k$. Alternatively, one can choose the m_i to be prime powers. Consult a standard algebra book for details.

Theorem 3.6.12. *If $(A, +, 0)$ is an abelian group in which every nonzero element has infinite order, we can find an ordering \leq such that $(A, +, 0, \leq)$ is an ordered abelian group.*

Proof. We first prove the result for any finitely generated abelian group A . Given such a group A we know from the Fundamental Theorem of Finitely-Generated Abelian Groups that A must be isomorphic to \mathbb{Z}^n for some $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, because each $\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$ for $m \geq 2$ has nonidentity elements of finite order. Since \mathbb{Z}^n can be equipped with the lexicographic ordering, we can transfer this ordering across the isomorphism to order A .

Suppose now that A is an arbitrary torsion-free abelian group. Let P be the set $\{\mathbb{L}_{a,b} : a, b \in A\}$ and let Γ be the union of the following sets:

- $\{\mathbb{L}_{a,a} : a \in A\}.$
- $\{\mathbb{L}_{a,b} \vee \mathbb{L}_{b,a} : a, b \in A\}.$
- $\{\neg(\mathbb{L}_{a,b} \wedge \mathbb{L}_{b,a}) : a, b \in A \text{ with } a \neq b\}.$
- $\{(\mathbb{L}_{a,b} \wedge \mathbb{L}_{b,c}) \rightarrow \mathbb{L}_{a,c} : a, b, c \in A\}.$
- $\{\mathbb{L}_{a,b} \rightarrow \mathbb{L}_{a+c, b+c} : a, b, c \in A\}.$

We show that Γ is satisfiable. By Compactness, it suffices to show that any finite subset of Γ is satisfiable. Suppose that $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ is finite, and let S be the finite subset of A consisting of all elements of A appearing as a subscript of a symbol occurring in Γ_0 . Let B be the subgroup of A generated by S . We then have that B is a finitely generated torsion-free abelian group, so from above we may fix an ordering \leq on it. If we define a truth assignment $v : P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by

$$M(\mathbb{L}_{a,b}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a \leq b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

we see that $v_M(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \Gamma_0$. Thus, Γ_0 is satisfiable. By the Compactness Theorem, we conclude that Γ is satisfiable.

Fix a truth assignment $M : P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $v_M(\gamma) = 1$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Define \leq on A^2 by letting $a \leq b$ if and only if $M(\mathbb{L}_{a,b}) = 1$. We then have that \leq is an ordering on A . \square

In the parlance of group theory, a group in which every element has infinite order is called *torsion-free*. Thus, we can state the above results as stating that an abelian group can be ordered if and only if it is torsion-free.

Chapter 4

First-Order Logic: Languages and Structures

Now that we've succeeded in giving a decent analysis of propositional logic, together with proving a few nontrivial theorems, it's time to move on to a much more substantial and important logic: first-order logic. As summarized in the introduction, the general idea is as follows. Many areas of mathematics deal with mathematical structures consisting of special constants, relations, and functions, together with certain axioms that these objects obey. We want our logic to be able to handle many different types of situations, so we allow ourselves to vary the number and types of the symbols. For example, in group theory, we have a special identity element and a binary function corresponding to the group operation. If we wanted, we could also add in a unary function corresponding to the inverse operation. For ring theory, we have two constants for 0 and 1 along with two binary operations for addition and multiplication (and possibly a unary function for additive inverses). For partial orderings, we have one binary relation. Any such choice gives rise to a *language*.

Once we've fixed such a language, we can build up formulas that will express something meaningful. As an example, we mentioned in the introduction that

$$\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x)),$$

is a formula in the language of group theory. Now in isolation, this formula is neither true nor false, just like the propositional formula $A \wedge (B \vee C)$ is neither true nor false without a truth assignment. The analogue to a truth assignment in first-order logic is called a *structure*. In this setting, a structure provides an interpretation for all of the symbols, and once we've fixed a structure (i.e. once we've fixed an actual group, ring, partial ordering, etc.), we can ask whether the formula is true in that world.

Building up the fundamental definitions (like formulas and structures) will take some time. Our experience with propositional logic will certainly help here, but the complexity is considerably higher.

4.1 Terms and Formulas

Since our logic will have quantifiers, the first thing that we need is a collection of variables, like the x and y in the formula $\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$. Since our formulas will consist of only finitely many characters, and since we will want to ensure that we always have an extra variable around if we need it, we start with the fixing a large enough set.

Definition 4.1.1. Fix a countably infinite set Var called variables.

We now define a language. As mentioned, we want to allow flexibility in the number and types of symbols here, depending on what field of mathematics we want to model.

Definition 4.1.2. A first-order language, or simply a language, consists of the following:

1. A set \mathcal{C} of constant symbols.
2. A set \mathcal{F} of function symbols together with a function $\text{Ariety}_{\mathcal{F}}: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}^+$.
3. A set \mathcal{R} of relation symbols together with a function $\text{Ariety}_{\mathcal{R}}: \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}^+$.

We also assume that \mathcal{C} , \mathcal{R} , \mathcal{F} , Var , and $\{\forall, \exists, =, \neg, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$ are pairwise disjoint. For each $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we let

$$\mathcal{F}_k = \{f \in \mathcal{F} : \text{Ariety}_{\mathcal{F}}(f) = k\}$$

and we let

$$\mathcal{R}_k = \{R \in \mathcal{R} : \text{Ariety}_{\mathcal{R}}(R) = k\}.$$

Finally, given a language \mathcal{L} , we let $\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}} = \mathcal{C} \cup \mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{F} \cup \text{Var} \cup \{\forall, \exists, =, \neg, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.

We are now in a position to formally define a couple of languages. For a basic group theory language, we let $\mathcal{C} = \{c\}$, let $\mathcal{F} = \{f\}$ where f has arity 2, and we let $\mathcal{R} = \emptyset$. Intuitively, the symbol c will represent the identity (we could use e , but the choice of symbol does not matter) and f will represent the group operation. For an enhanced group theory language, we let $\mathcal{C} = \{c\}$, let $\mathcal{F} = \{f, g\}$ where f has arity 2 and g has arity 1, and we let $\mathcal{R} = \emptyset$. In this setting, g will represent the inverse operation in the group. In contrast, the language of partial orderings has $\mathcal{C} = \emptyset$, $\mathcal{F} = \emptyset$, and $\mathcal{R} = \{R\}$ where R has arity 2.

Once we have chosen a language, we have fixed the collection of symbols that are available. The first major task is to determine how to generate formulas, like $\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$ in the group theory language. Before doing this, however, we need a way to name elements. Intuitively, our constant symbols and variables name elements once we've fixed an interpretation (i.e. once we've fixed a *structure*, which we will define in our next section). However, we can form more complex names for elements if we have function symbols. For example, in our basic group theory language, if x and y are variables, then the $f(x, y)$ in the above formula would also name an element. We can then go on to form more complex names from here, such as $f(f(x, y), x)$. The idea then is to start with the constant symbols and variables, and then generate new names by repeatedly applying function symbols. As we've started to appreciate from our exposure to Polish notation, it turns out that we can avoid the parentheses and commas. Putting it all together, we obtain the following definition.

Definition 4.1.3. Let \mathcal{L} be a language. For each $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$, define $h_f: (\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*)^k \rightarrow \text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ by letting

$$h_f(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_k) = f\sigma_1\sigma_2 \cdots \sigma_k.$$

We then define

$$\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}} = G(\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \mathcal{C} \cup \text{Var}, \{h_f : f \in \mathcal{F}\}).$$

and call the elements of $\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ the terms of the language.

Now that we have terms, which intuitively name elements once we've fixed an interpretation, we can start to think about formulas. In propositional logic, our most basic formulas were the symbols from P themselves. In this new setting, the basic formulas are more interesting. The idea is that the most fundamental things that we can say are whether or not two elements are equal, and whether or not a k -tuple is in the interpretation of some relation symbol $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$.

Definition 4.1.4. Let \mathcal{L} be a language. We let

$$\text{AtomicForm}_{\mathcal{L}} = \{Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k : k \in \mathbb{N}^+, R \in \mathcal{R}_k, \text{ and } t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}\} \cup \{=t_1t_2 : t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}\}.$$

and call the elements of $\text{AtomicForm}_{\mathcal{L}}$ the atomic formulas of the language.

Starting with atomic formulas, we now generate more complex formulas by introducing our old propositional logic connectives, and by allowing the use of quantifiers.

Definition 4.1.5. Let \mathcal{L} be a language. Define a unary function h_{\neg} and binary functions h_{\wedge} , h_{\vee} , and h_{\rightarrow} on $Sym_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} h_{\neg}(\sigma) &= \neg\sigma \\ h_{\wedge}(\sigma, \tau) &= \wedge\sigma\tau \\ h_{\vee}(\sigma, \tau) &= \vee\sigma\tau \\ h_{\rightarrow}(\sigma, \tau) &= \rightarrow\sigma\tau. \end{aligned}$$

Also, for each $x \in Var$, define two unary functions $h_{\forall, x}$ and $h_{\exists, x}$ on $Sym_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} h_{\forall, x}(\sigma) &= \forall x\sigma \\ h_{\exists, x}(\sigma) &= \exists x\sigma. \end{aligned}$$

Let

$$Form_{\mathcal{L}} = G(Sym_{\mathcal{L}}^*, AtomicForm_{\mathcal{L}}, \{h_{\neg}, h_{\wedge}, h_{\vee}, h_{\rightarrow}\} \cup \{h_{\forall, x}, h_{\exists, x} : x \in Var\}).$$

As with propositional logic, we'd like to be able to define things recursively, so we need to check that our generating systems are free. Notice that in the construction of formulas, we have two generating systems around. We first generate all terms. With terms taken care of, we next describe the atomic formulas, and from them we generate all formulas. Thus, we'll need to prove that two generating systems are free. The general idea is to make use of the insights gained by proving the corresponding result for Polish notation in propositional logic.

Definition 4.1.6. Let \mathcal{L} be a language. Define $W : Sym_{\mathcal{L}}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ as follows. We first define $w : Sym_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} w(c) &= 1 && \text{for all } c \in \mathcal{C} \\ w(f) &= 1 - k && \text{for all } f \in \mathcal{F}_k \\ w(R) &= 1 - k && \text{for all } R \in \mathcal{R}_k \\ w(x) &= 1 && \text{for all } x \in Var \\ w(=) &= -1 \\ w(Q) &= -1 && \text{for all } Q \in \{\forall, \exists\} \\ w(\neg) &= 0 \\ w(\diamond) &= -1 && \text{for all } \diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}. \end{aligned}$$

We then define W on all of $Sym_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ by letting $W(\lambda) = 0$ and letting $W(\sigma) = \sum_{i < |\sigma|} w(\sigma(i))$ for all $\sigma \in Sym_{\mathcal{L}}^* \setminus \{\lambda\}$.

As usual, notice that if $\sigma, \tau \in Sym_{\mathcal{L}}^*$, then $W(\sigma\tau) = W(\sigma) + W(\tau)$.

Proposition 4.1.7. Let \mathcal{L} be a language. For all $t \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $W(t) = 1$.

Proof. The proof is by induction on t . Notice first that $W(c) = 1$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$ and $W(x) = 1$ for all $x \in Var$. Suppose that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$, and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ are such that $W(t_i) = 1$ for all i . We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} W(ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k) &= W(f) + W(t_1) + W(t_2) + \cdots + W(t_k) \\ &= (1 - k) + 1 + 1 + \cdots + 1 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

The result follows by induction. □

Proposition 4.1.8. *If $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\sigma \prec t$, then $W(\sigma) \leq 0$.*

Proof. The proof is by induction on t . For every $c \in \mathcal{C}$, this is trivial because the only $\sigma \prec c$ is $\sigma = \lambda$ and we have $W(\lambda) = 0$. Similarly, for every $x \in \text{Var}$, the only $\sigma \prec x$ is $\sigma = \lambda$ and we have $W(\lambda) = 0$.

Suppose that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$, and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ are such that the result holds for each t_i . We prove the result for $ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k$. Suppose that $\sigma \prec ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k$. If $\sigma = \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) = 0$. Otherwise, there exists $i < k$ and $\tau \prec t_i$ such that $\sigma = ft_1t_2 \cdots t_{i-1}\tau$, in which case

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= W(f) + W(t_1) + W(t_2) + \cdots + W(t_{i-1}) + W(\tau) \\ &= (1 - k) + 1 + 1 + \cdots + 1 + W(\tau) && \text{(by Proposition 4.1.7)} \\ &= (1 - k) + i + W(\tau) \\ &\leq (1 - k) + i + 0 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &= 1 + (i - k) \\ &\leq 0. && \text{(since } i < k) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the result holds for $ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k$. □

Corollary 4.1.9. *If $t, u \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, then $t \not\prec u$.*

Proof. This follows by combining Proposition 4.1.7 and Proposition 4.1.8. □

Theorem 4.1.10. *The generating system $(\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \mathcal{C} \cup \text{Var}, \{h_f : f \in \mathcal{F}\})$ is free.*

Proof. First notice that for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$, we have that $\text{range}(h_f \upharpoonright (\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}})^k) \cap (\mathcal{C} \cup \text{Var}) = \emptyset$ because all elements of $\text{range}(h_f)$ begin with f and we know that $f \notin \mathcal{C} \cup \text{Var}$.

Let $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$. Suppose that $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k, u_1, u_2, \dots, u_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $h_f(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k) = h_f(u_1, u_2, \dots, u_k)$. We then have $ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = fu_1u_2 \cdots u_k$, hence $t_1t_2 \cdots t_k = u_1u_2 \cdots u_k$. Since $t_1 \prec u_1$ and $u_1 \prec t_1$ are both impossible by Corollary 4.1.9, it follows that $t_1 = u_1$. Thus, $t_2 \cdots t_k = u_2 \cdots u_k$, and so $t_2 = u_2$ for the same reason. Continuing in this fashion, we conclude that $t_i = u_i$ for all i . It follows that $h_f \upharpoonright (\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}})^k$ is injective.

Finally notice that for any $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and any $g \in \mathcal{F}_\ell$ with $f \neq g$, we have that $\text{range}(h_f \upharpoonright (\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}})^k) \cap \text{range}(h_g \upharpoonright (\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}})^\ell) = \emptyset$ because all elements of $\text{range}(h_f \upharpoonright (\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}})^k)$ begin with f while all elements of $\text{range}(h_g \upharpoonright (\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}})^\ell)$ begin with g . □

Proposition 4.1.11. *If $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, then $W(\varphi) = 1$.*

Proof. The proof is by induction on φ . We first show that $W(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \text{AtomicForm}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Suppose that φ is $Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k$ where $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} W(Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k) &= W(R) + W(t_1) + W(t_2) + \cdots + W(t_k) \\ &= (1 - k) + 1 + 1 + \cdots + 1 && \text{(by Proposition 4.1.7)} \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose that φ is $= t_1t_2$ where $t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} W(= t_1t_2) &= W(=) + W(t_1) + W(t_2) \\ &= -1 + 1 + 1 && \text{(by Proposition 4.1.7)} \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, $W(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \text{AtomicForm}_{\mathcal{L}}$.

Suppose that $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ is such that $W(\varphi) = 1$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} W(\neg\varphi) &= W(\neg) + W(\varphi) \\ &= 0 + 1 \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

For any $Q \in \{\forall, \exists\}$ and any $x \in Var$ we also have

$$\begin{aligned} W(Qx\varphi) &= W(Q) + W(x) + W(\varphi) \\ &= -1 + 1 + 1 \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose now that $\varphi, \psi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ are such that $W(\varphi) = 1 = W(\psi)$, and $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} W(\diamond\varphi\psi) &= -1 + W(\varphi) + W(\psi) \\ &= -1 + 1 + 1 \\ &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

The result follows by induction. □

Proposition 4.1.12. *If $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\sigma \prec \varphi$, then $W(\sigma) \leq 0$.*

Proof. The proof is by induction on φ . We first show that the results holds for all $\varphi \in AtomicForm_{\mathcal{L}}$. Suppose that φ is $Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k$ where $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$. Suppose that $\sigma \prec Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k$. If $\sigma = \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) = 0$. Otherwise, there exists $i < k$ and $\tau \prec t_i$ such that σ is $Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_{i-1}\tau$, in which case

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= W(R) + W(t_1) + W(t_2) + \cdots + W(t_{i-1}) + W(\tau) \\ &= (1 - k) + 1 + 1 + \cdots + 1 + W(\tau) && \text{(by Proposition 4.1.7)} \\ &= (1 - k) + i + W(\tau) \\ &\leq (1 - k) + i + 0 && \text{(by induction)} \\ &= 1 + (i - k) \\ &\leq 0. && \text{(since } i < k) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the result holds for $Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k$. The same argument works for $= t_1t_2$ where $t_1, t_2 \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$, so the result holds for all $\varphi \in AtomicForm_{\mathcal{L}}$.

Suppose that the result holds for $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$. Suppose that $\sigma \prec \neg\varphi$. If $\sigma = \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) = 0$. Otherwise, $\sigma = \neg\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \varphi$, in which case

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= W(\neg) + W(\tau) \\ &= 0 + W(\tau) \\ &\leq 0. && \text{(by induction)} \end{aligned}$$

Suppose now that $Q \in \{\forall, \exists\}$, that $x \in Var$, and that $\sigma \prec Qx\varphi$. If $\sigma = \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) = 0$, and if $\sigma = Q$, then $W(\sigma) = -1$. Otherwise, $\sigma = Qx\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \varphi$, in which case

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= W(Q) + W(x) + W(\tau) \\ &= -1 + 1 + W(\tau) \\ &= 0 && \text{(by induction)} \end{aligned}$$

Suppose now that the result holds for $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$. Suppose that $\sigma \prec \diamond\varphi\psi$. If $\sigma = \lambda$, then $W(\sigma) = 0$. If σ is $\diamond\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \varphi$, then

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= W(\diamond) + W(\tau) \\ &= -1 + W(\tau) \\ &\leq -1. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{by induction})$$

Otherwise, σ is $\diamond\varphi\tau$ for some $\tau \prec \psi$, in which case

$$\begin{aligned} W(\sigma) &= W(\diamond) + W(\varphi) + W(\tau) \\ &= -1 + 0 + W(\tau) \\ &\leq -1. \end{aligned} \quad \begin{array}{l} (\text{by Proposition 4.1.11}) \\ (\text{by induction}) \end{array}$$

Thus, the result holds for $\diamond\varphi\psi$. □

Corollary 4.1.13. *If $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, then $\varphi \not\prec \psi$.*

Proof. This follows by combining Proposition 4.1.11 and Proposition 4.1.12. □

Theorem 4.1.14. *The generating system $(\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \text{AtomicForm}_{\mathcal{L}}, \{h_{\neg}, h_{\wedge}, h_{\vee}, h_{\rightarrow}\} \cup \{h_{\forall, x}, h_{\exists, x} : x \in V\})$ is free.*

Proof. Similar to the others. □

Although we have a formal syntax using Polish notation, we will often write formulas in more natural and intuitive way that employs parentheses and simple shortcuts in the interest of human readability. For example, we might write $\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$ instead of $\forall x \forall y = fxyfxy$. We will also sometimes employ infix notation for functions. For example, we could define the basic group theory language as having one constant symbol e and one binary function symbol $*$, and informally write $*$ between two arguments. In other words, instead of writing the proper formula $\forall x \forall y = *xy * yx$ in this language, we might refer to it by writing $\forall x \forall y (x * y = y * x)$.

With these freeness results, we are now able to define functions recursively on $\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Since we use terms in our definition of atomic formulas, which are the basic formulas, we will often need to make two recursive definitions (on terms first, then on formulas) in order to define a function on formulas. Here's an example of how to define a function that produces the set of variables that occur in a given formula.

Definition 4.1.15. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language.*

1. *We first define a function $\text{OccurVar} : \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{Var})$ recursively as follows:*

- $\text{OccurVar}(c) = \emptyset$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
- $\text{OccurVar}(x) = \{x\}$ for all $x \in \text{Var}$.
- $\text{OccurVar}(ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k) = \text{OccurVar}(t_1) \cup \text{OccurVar}(t_2) \cup \cdots \cup \text{OccurVar}(t_k)$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$.

2. *We then define a function $\text{OccurVar} : \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{Var})$ recursively as follows:*

- $\text{OccurVar}(Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k) = \text{OccurVar}(t_1) \cup \text{OccurVar}(t_2) \cup \cdots \cup \text{OccurVar}(t_k)$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $\text{OccurVar}(=t_1t_2) = \text{OccurVar}(t_1) \cup \text{OccurVar}(t_2)$ for all $t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $\text{OccurVar}(\neg\varphi) = \text{OccurVar}(\varphi)$ for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$.

- $OccurVar(\Diamond\varphi\psi) = OccurVar(\varphi) \cup OccurVar(\psi)$ for each $\Diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$ and $\varphi, \psi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $OccurVar(Qx\varphi) = OccurVar(\varphi) \cup \{x\}$ for each $Q \in \{\forall, \exists\}$, $x \in Var$, and $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.

Technically, we should probably use two different names for the functions above, since they have very different domains. However, there is little risk of confusion, so we just overload the function name. Although $OccurVar$ does produce the set of variables in a formula, notice that variables can occur in different ways within a formula. For example, if we are working in the basic language of group theory, and we let φ be the formula $\forall y(f(x, y) = f(y, x))$, then $OccurVar(\varphi) = \{x, y\}$. However, notice that the x and y “sit” differently within the formula. Intuitively, the occurrences of y are *bound* by the quantifier, while the occurrences of x are *free* (i.e. not bound). We will have a great deal more to say about the distinction between free and bound variables, but we first define the recursive functions that produce the set of free and bound variables.

Definition 4.1.16. Let \mathcal{L} be a language.

1. We define a function $FreeVar: Form_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Var)$ recursively as follows.

- $FreeVar(Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k) = OccurVar(t_1) \cup OccurVar(t_2) \cup \cdots \cup OccurVar(t_k)$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $FreeVar(= t_1t_2) = OccurVar(t_1) \cup OccurVar(t_2)$ for all $t_1, t_2 \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $FreeVar(\neg\varphi) = FreeVar(\varphi)$ for all $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $FreeVar(\Diamond\varphi\psi) = FreeVar(\varphi) \cup FreeVar(\psi)$ for each $\Diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$ and $\varphi, \psi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $FreeVar(Qx\varphi) = FreeVar(\varphi) \setminus \{x\}$ for each $Q \in \{\forall, \exists\}$, $x \in Var$, and $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.

2. We define a function $BoundVar: Form_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Var)$ recursively as follows.

- $BoundVar(Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k) = \emptyset$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $BoundVar(= t_1t_2) = \emptyset$ for all $t_1, t_2 \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $BoundVar(\neg\varphi) = BoundVar(\varphi)$ for all $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $BoundVar(\Diamond\varphi\psi) = BoundVar(\varphi) \cup BoundVar(\psi)$ for each $\Diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$ and $\varphi, \psi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $BoundVar(Qx\varphi) = BoundVar(\varphi) \cup \{x\}$ for each $Q \in \{\forall, \exists\}$, $x \in Var$, and $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.

Returning to our example formula φ , which was in the basic language of group theory and equaled $\forall y(f(x, y) = f(y, x))$, we now have that $FreeVar(\varphi) = \{x\}$ and $BoundVar(\varphi) = \{y\}$. However, notice that it is possible for a variable to be both free and bound. For example, if we work in the same language, but consider the formula ψ equal to $(f(x, x) = x) \wedge \exists x(x = c)$, then we have $FreeVar(\psi) = \{x\} = BoundVar(\psi)$. In other words, some occurrences of x are free and others are bound.

Definition 4.1.17. Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$. We say that φ is an \mathcal{L} -sentence, or simply a sentence, if $FreeVar(\varphi) = \emptyset$. We let $Sent_{\mathcal{L}}$ be the set of sentences.

As we will see, sentences will play an important role for us, since they do not have any “hanging” variables that not captured by quantifiers.

4.2 Structures

Up until this point, all that we’ve dealt with in first-order logic are sequences of symbols without meaning. Sure, our motivation was to capture meaningful situations with our languages and the way we’ve described formulas, but all we’ve done so far is describe the grammar. If we want our formulas to actually express something, we need to set up a context in which to interpret them. In propositional logic, we needed truth

assignments on P to give a “meaning” to arbitrary formulas. Since we have quantifiers now, the first thing we’ll need is a nonempty set M to serve as the domain of objects that the quantifiers range over. Once we’ve fixed that, we need to interpret the symbols of our language as actual elements of our set (in the case of constant symbols c), actual k -ary relations on M (in the case of k -ary relation symbols R), and actual k -ary functions on M (in the case of k -ary function symbols f).

Definition 4.2.1. Let \mathcal{L} be a language. An \mathcal{L} -structure, or simply a structure, is a set $\mathcal{M} = (M, g_{\mathcal{C}}, g_{\mathcal{F}}, g_{\mathcal{R}})$ where

- M is a nonempty set called the universe of \mathcal{M} .
- $g_{\mathcal{C}}: \mathcal{C} \rightarrow M$.
- $g_{\mathcal{R}}$ is a function on \mathcal{R} such that $g_{\mathcal{R}}(R)$ is a subset of M^k for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$.
- $g_{\mathcal{F}}$ is a function on \mathcal{F} such that $g_{\mathcal{F}}(f)$ is a k -ary function on M for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$.

We use the following notation:

- For each $c \in \mathcal{C}$, we use $c^{\mathcal{M}}$ to denote $g_{\mathcal{C}}(c)$.
- For each $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$, we use $R^{\mathcal{M}}$ to denote $g_{\mathcal{R}}(R)$.
- For each $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$, we use $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ to denote $g_{\mathcal{F}}(f)$.

For example, let \mathcal{L} be the basic group theory language, so $\mathcal{L} = \{c, f\}$, where c is a constant symbol and f is a binary function symbol. To given an \mathcal{L} -structure, we need to provide a set of elements M (to serve as the universe of discourse), pick an element of M to serve as the interpretation of c , and pick a function from M^2 to M to serve as the interpretation of f . Here are some examples of \mathcal{L} -structures.

1. $M = \mathbb{Z}$, $c^{\mathcal{M}} = 3$ and $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ is the subtraction function $(m, n) \mapsto m - n$ (in other words, $f^{\mathcal{M}}(m, n) = m - n$).
2. $M = \mathbb{R}$, $c^{\mathcal{M}} = \pi$ and $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ is the function $(a, b) \mapsto \sin(a \cdot b)$.
3. For any group (G, e, \cdot) , we get an \mathcal{L} -structure by letting $M = G$, $c^{\mathcal{M}} = e$, and letting $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ be the group operation.

In particular, notice that in our basic group theory language \mathcal{L} , there are \mathcal{L} -structures that are not groups! In other words, an \mathcal{L} -structure need not respect our intentions when writing down the symbols of \mathcal{L} ! An \mathcal{L} -structure is *any* way to pick a set and a way to interpret the symbols as constants, relations, and functions. It is possible to carve out special collections of structures by only looking at those structures that make certain formulas true, but we first have to define “truth”, as we will shortly!

For another example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is a binary relation symbol. Here are some examples of \mathcal{L} -structures:

1. $M = \mathbb{N}$ and $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(m, n) \in M^2 : m \mid n\}$.
2. $M = \{0, 1\}^*$ and $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(\sigma, \tau) \in M^2 : \sigma \preceq \tau\}$.
3. $M = \mathbb{R}^2$ and $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{((a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2)) \in M^2 : a_1 = a_2\}$.
4. $M = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4\}$ and $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(0, 2), (3, 3), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3)\}$.

At first, it may appear that an \mathcal{L} -structure provides a means to make sense out of any formula. However, this is not the case, as we can see by looking at the formula $x = y$ where $x, y \in \text{Var}$. Even given an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} , we can't say whether the formula $x = y$ is “true” in \mathcal{M} until we know how to interpret both x and y . For a more interesting example, consider the basic group theory language where $\mathcal{L} = \{c, f\}$. Let \mathcal{M} be the integers \mathbb{Z} with $c^{\mathcal{M}} = 0$ and with $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ being addition. Consider the formula $fx y = z$. If we “interpret” x as 7, y as -3 , and z as 4, then the formula $fx y = z$ is “true” in \mathcal{M} . However, if we “interpret” x as -2 , y as 7, and z as 1, then the formula $fx y = z$ is “false” in \mathcal{M} . Once we fix an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} , the need to interpret the elements of Var as elements of \mathcal{M} motivates the following definition.

Definition 4.2.2. Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. A function $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ is called a variable assignment on \mathcal{M} .

Recall that in propositional logic, every truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ gave rise to a function $v_M: \text{Form}_P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ telling us how to assign a true/false value to every formula. In the first-order logic case, we need an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} together with a variable assignment $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ to make sense of things. We first show how this apparatus allows us to assign an element of M to every term. We extend our function $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ to a function $\bar{s}: \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow M$, similar to how we extend a truth assignment M to a function v_M . The distinction here is that s and \bar{s} output elements of M rather than true/false values.

Definition 4.2.3. Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, and let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ be a variable assignment. By freeness, there exists a unique $\bar{s}: \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow M$ with the following properties:

- $\bar{s}(x) = s(x)$ for all $x \in \text{Var}$.
- $\bar{s}(c) = c^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
- $\bar{s}(ft_1 t_2 \cdots t_k) = f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(t_1), \bar{s}(t_2), \dots, \bar{s}(t_k))$.

Notice that there is nothing deep going on here. Given an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and a variable assignment s , to apply \bar{s} to a term, we simply unravel the term and attach “meaning” to each symbol (using \mathcal{M} and s) as we bottom-out through the recursion. For example, assume that $\mathcal{L} = \{c, f\}$ where c is a constant symbol and f is a binary function symbol. Given an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and a variable assignment $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$, then working through the definitions, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s}(\text{ffczfxffczy}) &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(\text{fcz}), \bar{s}(\text{fxffczy})) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(c), \bar{s}(z)), f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(x), \bar{s}(\text{ffczy}))) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(c), \bar{s}(z)), f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(x), f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(\text{fcz}), \bar{s}(y)))) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(c), \bar{s}(z)), f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(x), f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(c), \bar{s}(z)), \bar{s}(y)))) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(c^{\mathcal{M}}, s(z)), f^{\mathcal{M}}(s(x), f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(c^{\mathcal{M}}, s(z)), s(y)))) \end{aligned}$$

In other words, we're taking the *syntactic* formula ffczfxffczy and assigning a *semantic* meaning to it by returning the element of \mathcal{M} described in the last line. For a specific example of how this would be interpreted, let \mathcal{M} be the integers \mathbb{Z} with $c^{\mathcal{M}} = 5$ and with $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ being addition. Let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ be an arbitrary variable assignment with $s(x) = 3$, $s(y) = -11$, and $s(z) = 2$. We then have

$$\bar{s}(\text{ffczfxffczy}) = 6$$

because

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s}(\text{ffczfxffczy}) &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(c^{\mathcal{M}}, s(z)), f^{\mathcal{M}}(s(x), f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(c^{\mathcal{M}}, s(z)), s(y)))) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(0, 2), f^{\mathcal{M}}(3, f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(0, 2), -11))) \\ &= ((5 + 2) + (3 + (5 + 2) + (-11))) \\ &= 6. \end{aligned}$$

We're now ready to define the intuitive statement “ φ is true in the \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} with variable assignment s ” recursively. We need the following definition in order to handle quantifiers.

Definition 4.2.4. Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, and let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ be a variable assignment. Given $x \in \text{Var}$ and $a \in M$, we let $s[x \Rightarrow a]$ denote the variable assignment

$$s[x \Rightarrow a](y) = \begin{cases} a & \text{if } y = x \\ s(y) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Now we can actually define the analogue of v_M from propositional logic. Given an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and variable assignment $s: M \rightarrow \text{Var}$, we should be able to “make sense of” every $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. In other words, we should be able to define a function $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}: \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, where the value 0 corresponds to false and 1 corresponds to true. Of course, the definition is recursive.

Definition 4.2.5. Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. We recursively define a function $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}: \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all variable assignments s as follows:

- We first handle the case where φ is an atomic formula.

– If $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$, and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we let

$$v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(Rt_1t_2 \dots t_k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (\bar{s}(t_1), \bar{s}(t_2), \dots, \bar{s}(t_k)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

– If $t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we let

$$v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(= t_1t_2) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \bar{s}(t_1) = \bar{s}(t_2) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- For any s , we let $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\neg\varphi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1. \end{cases}$

- For any s , we let $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\wedge\varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 1. \end{cases}$

- For any s , we let $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\vee\varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 1. \end{cases}$

- For any s , we let $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\rightarrow\varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 0 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\psi) = 1. \end{cases}$

- For any s , we let $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\exists x\varphi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if there exists } a \in M \text{ with } v_{(\mathcal{M},s[x \Rightarrow a])}(\varphi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$

- For any s , we let $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\forall x\varphi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for all } a \in M, \text{ we have } v_{(\mathcal{M},s[x \Rightarrow a])}(\varphi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$

The above recursive definition takes a little explanation, because some recursive “calls” change the variable assignment. Thus, we are *not* fixing an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and a variable assignment s on \mathcal{M} , and then doing a recursive definition on $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. To fit this recursive definition into our framework from Chapter 2, we can adjust it as follows. Fix an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} . Let $\text{VarAssign}_{\mathcal{M}}$ be the set of all variable assignments on \mathcal{M} . We then define a function $g_{\mathcal{M}}: \text{Form}_{\mathcal{P}} \rightarrow \text{VarAssign}_{\mathcal{M}}$ recursively using the above rules as guides, with the intention that $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1$ to mean that $s \in g_{\mathcal{M}}(\varphi)$. Here are three representative examples of how we define $g_{\mathcal{M}}$:

$$\begin{aligned} g_{\mathcal{M}}(\text{R}t_1t_2 \dots t_k) &= \{s \in \text{VarAssign}_{\mathcal{M}} : (\bar{s}(t_1), \bar{s}(t_2), \dots, \bar{s}(t_k)) \in \text{R}^{\mathcal{M}}\} \\ g_{\mathcal{M}}(\wedge\varphi\psi) &= g_{\mathcal{M}}(\varphi) \cap g_{\mathcal{M}}(\psi) \\ g_{\mathcal{M}}(\exists x\varphi) &= \bigcup_{a \in M} \{s \in \text{VarAssign}_{\mathcal{M}} : s[x \Rightarrow a] \in g_{\mathcal{M}}(\varphi)\}. \end{aligned}$$

From here, we then *define* $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1$ to mean that $s \in g_{\mathcal{M}}(\varphi)$, and check that it has the required properties.

Let's consider a simple example. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{\text{R}, \text{f}\}$ where R is a unary relation symbol and f is a unary function symbol. Let \mathcal{M} be the following \mathcal{L} -structure:

- $M = \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$.
- $\text{R}^{\mathcal{M}} = \{1, 3\}$.
- $\text{f}^{\mathcal{M}}: M \rightarrow M$ is the function defined by

$$\text{f}^{\mathcal{M}}(0) = 3 \quad \text{f}^{\mathcal{M}}(1) = 1 \quad \text{f}^{\mathcal{M}}(2) = 0 \quad \text{f}^{\mathcal{M}}(3) = 3$$

We now explore the values of $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi)$ for various choices of variable assignments s and formulas φ .

1. Given any variable assignment $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\neg \text{R}x) &= 1 \Leftrightarrow v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\text{R}x) = 0 \\ &\Leftrightarrow s(x) \notin \text{R}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow s(x) = 0 \text{ or } s(x) = 2. \end{aligned}$$

2. Given any variable assignment $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\exists x \text{R}x) &= 1 \Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } v_{(\mathcal{M},s[x \Rightarrow a])}(\text{R}x) = 1 \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } \overline{s[x \Rightarrow a]}(x) \in \text{R}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } s[x \Rightarrow a](x) \in \text{R}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } a \in \text{R}^{\mathcal{M}}. \end{aligned}$$

Since $\text{R}^{\mathcal{M}} \neq \emptyset$, it follows that $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\exists x \text{R}x) = 1$ for all variable assignments $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$.

3. Given any variable assignment $s: Var \rightarrow M$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\forall x(Rx \rightarrow (fx = x))) &= 1 \Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } v_{(\mathcal{M},s[x \Rightarrow a])}((Rx \rightarrow (fx = x))) = 1 \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have either} \\
&\quad v_{(\mathcal{M},s[x \Rightarrow a])}(Rx) = 0 \text{ or } v_{(\mathcal{M},s[x \Rightarrow a])}(fx = x) = 1 \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have either} \\
&\quad \overline{s[x \Rightarrow a]}(x) \notin R^{\mathcal{M}} \text{ or } \overline{s[x \Rightarrow a]}(fx) = \overline{s[x \Rightarrow a]}(x) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have either} \\
&\quad s[x \Rightarrow a](x) \notin R^{\mathcal{M}} \text{ or } f^{\mathcal{M}}(\overline{s[x \Rightarrow a]}(x)) = \overline{s[x \Rightarrow a]}(x) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have either} \\
&\quad s[x \Rightarrow a](x) \notin R^{\mathcal{M}} \text{ or } f^{\mathcal{M}}(s[x \Rightarrow a](x)) = s[x \Rightarrow a](x) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have either } a \notin R^{\mathcal{M}} \text{ or } f^{\mathcal{M}}(a) = a.
\end{aligned}$$

Since $0 \notin R^{\mathcal{M}}$, $f^{\mathcal{M}}(1) = 1$, $2 \notin R^{\mathcal{M}}$, and $f^{\mathcal{M}}(3) = 3$, it follows that $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\forall x(Rx \rightarrow (fx = x))) = 1$ for all variable assignments $s: Var \rightarrow M$.

In the above examples, notice that only the values of s on the free variables in φ affect whether or not $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)} = 1$. In general, this seems intuitively clear, and we now state the corresponding precise result

Proposition 4.2.6. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure.*

1. *Suppose that $t \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $s_1, s_2: Var \rightarrow M$ are two variable assignments such that $s_1(x) = s_2(x)$ for all $x \in OccurVar(t)$. We then have $\overline{s_1}(t) = \overline{s_2}(t)$.*
2. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. Suppose that $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $s_1, s_2: Var \rightarrow M$ are two variable assignments such that $s_1(x) = s_2(x)$ for all $x \in FreeVar(\varphi)$. We then have*

$$v_{(\mathcal{M},s_1)}(\varphi) = 1 \text{ if and only if } v_{(\mathcal{M},s_2)}(\varphi) = 1.$$

Proof. Each of these is a straightforward induction, the first on $t \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ and the second on $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$. \square

We introduced the notation $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi)$ to correspond to our old notation $v_M(\varphi)$. In propositional logic, we need a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ to assign true/false values to all formulas. In first-order logic, we need both an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and a variable assignment $s: Var \rightarrow M$ to assign true/false values to all formulas. Despite the advantages of the similar notation, it is tiresome to keep writing so much in the subscripts, and so people who work in mathematical logic have adopted other standard notation, which we now introduce.

Notation 4.2.7. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, let $s: Var \rightarrow M$ be a variable assignment, and let $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$. We write $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ to mean that $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 1$, and write $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi$ to mean that $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}(\varphi) = 0$.*

In some ways, using the symbol \models is natural, because we are defining the semantic notion that φ is *true* in (\mathcal{M}, s) . However, in other ways, this notation is incredibly confusing. In propositional logic, we used the symbol \models only in $\Gamma \models \varphi$ where $\Gamma \subseteq Form_P$ and $\varphi \in Form_P$. In other words, we used \models for *semantic implication*, not semantic truth. Our new first-order logic notation would be akin to also writing $M \models \varphi$ in propositional logic to mean that $v_M(\varphi) = 1$. Although we could have done that in the Chapter 3, we avoided the temptation to overload the notation at that stage. We will eventually define $\Gamma \models \varphi$ in first-order logic when $\Gamma \subseteq Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$, and at that point we will just have to know which version of \models we are using based on what type of object appears on the left. Consider yourself warned!

With this new notation in hand, we can rewrite the recursive definition of $v_{(\mathcal{M},s)}$ in the following way:

- Suppose first that φ is an atomic formula.
 - If φ is $Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ if and only if $(\bar{s}(t_1), \bar{s}(t_2), \dots, \bar{s}(t_k)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$.
 - If φ is t_1t_2 , we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ if and only if $\bar{s}(t_1) = \bar{s}(t_2)$.
- For any s , we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg\varphi$ if and only if $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi$.
- For any s , we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \wedge \psi$ if and only if $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ and $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi$.
- For any s , we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \vee \psi$ if and only if either $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ or $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi$.
- For any s , we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ if and only if either $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi$ or $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi$.
- For any s , we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x\varphi$ if and only if there exists $a \in M$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$.
- For any s , we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x\varphi$ if and only if for all $a \in M$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$.

We now introduce some other notation in light of Proposition 4.2.6.

Notation 4.2.8. Let \mathcal{L} be a language.

1. If $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \in \text{Var}$ are distinct, and we refer to a formula $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ we mean that $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\text{FreeVar}(\varphi) \subseteq \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$.
2. Suppose that \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure, $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n \in M$. We write $(\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) \models \varphi$ to mean that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ for some (any) $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ with $s(x_i) = a_i$ for all i .
3. As a special case of 2, we have the following. Suppose that \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure and $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We write $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ to mean that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \sigma$ for some (any) $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$.

As we've seen, given a language \mathcal{L} , an \mathcal{L} -structure can be any set M together with any interpretation of the symbols. In particular, although we might only have certain structures in mind when we describe a language, the structures themselves need not respect our desires. However, since we have now formally defined the intuitive notion that a sentence $\varphi \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is true in an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} (recall that a sentence has no free variables, so we don't need a variable assignment), we now carve out classes of structures which satisfy certain sentences of our language.

Definition 4.2.9. Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We let $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ be the class of all \mathcal{L} -structures \mathcal{M} such that $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$. If $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we write $\text{Mod}(\sigma)$ instead of $\text{Mod}(\{\sigma\})$.

Definition 4.2.10. Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let \mathcal{K} be a class of \mathcal{L} -structures.

1. \mathcal{K} is an elementary class if there exists $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\sigma)$.
2. \mathcal{K} is a weak elementary class if there exists $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$.

By taking conjunctions, we have the following simple proposition.

Proposition 4.2.11. Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let \mathcal{K} be a class of \mathcal{L} -structures. \mathcal{K} is an elementary class if and only if there exists a finite $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$.

For example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is a binary relation symbol.

1. The class of partially ordered sets is an elementary class as we saw in Chapter 1, because we can let Σ be the following collection of sentences:

(a) $\forall xRxx$.

- (b) $\forall x \forall y ((Rxy \wedge Ryx) \rightarrow (x = y))$.
 - (c) $\forall x \forall y \forall z ((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz)$.
2. The class of equivalence relations is an elementary class, by letting Σ be the following collection of sentences:
- (a) $\forall x Rxx$.
 - (b) $\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)$.
 - (c) $\forall x \forall y \forall z ((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz)$.
3. The class of simple undirected graphs (i.e. edges have no direction, and there are no loops and no multiple edges) is an elementary class by letting Σ be the following collection of sentences:
- (a) $\forall x (\neg Rxx)$.
 - (b) $\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)$.

For another example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$ where $0, 1$ are constant symbols and $+, \cdot$ are binary function symbols.

1. The class of fields is an elementary class, by letting Σ be the following collection of sentences:
- (a) $\forall x \forall y \forall z (x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z)$.
 - (b) $\forall x ((x + 0 = x) \wedge (0 + x = x))$.
 - (c) $\forall x \exists y ((x + y = 0) \wedge (y + x = 0))$.
 - (d) $\forall x \forall y (x + y = y + x)$.
 - (e) $\forall x \forall y \forall z (x \cdot (y \cdot z) = (x \cdot y) \cdot z)$.
 - (f) $\forall x ((x \cdot 1 = x) \wedge (1 \cdot x = x))$.
 - (g) $\forall x ((\neg(x = 0)) \rightarrow \exists y ((x \cdot y = 1) \wedge (y \cdot x = 1)))$.
 - (h) $\forall x \forall y (x \cdot y = y \cdot x)$.
 - (i) $\forall x \forall y \forall z (x \cdot (y + z) = (x \cdot y) + (x \cdot z))$.
2. For each prime $p > 0$, the class of fields of characteristic p is an elementary class. Fix a prime $p > 0$, and let Σ_p be the above sentences together with the sentence $1 + 1 + \cdots + 1 = 0$ (where there are p many 1's in the sum).
3. The class of fields of characteristic 0 is a weak elementary class. Let Σ be the above sentences together with $\{\tau_n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}$ where for each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we have $\tau_n = \neg(1 + 1 + \cdots + 1 = 0)$ (where there are n many 1's in the sum).

We now consider an example with an infinite language. Let F be a field, and let $\mathcal{L}_F = \{0, +\} \cup \{h_\alpha : \alpha \in F\}$ where 0 is a constant symbol, $+$ is binary function symbol, and each h_α is a unary function symbol. The class of vector spaces over F is a weak elementary class, by letting Σ be the following collection of sentences:

- 1. $\forall x \forall y \forall z (x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z)$.
- 2. $\forall x ((x + 0 = x) \wedge (0 + x = x))$.
- 3. $\forall x \exists y ((x + y = 0) \wedge (y + x = 0))$.
- 4. $\forall x \forall y (x + y = y + x)$.

5. $\forall x \forall y (h_\alpha(x + y) = h_\alpha(x) + h_\alpha(y))$ for each $\alpha \in F$.
6. $\forall x (h_{\alpha+\beta}(x) = (h_\alpha(x) + h_\beta(x)))$ for each $\alpha, \beta \in F$.
7. $\forall x (h_{\alpha \cdot \beta}(x) = h_\alpha(h_\beta(x)))$ for each $\alpha, \beta \in F$.
8. $\forall x (h_1(x) = x)$.

Notice that if F is infinite, then we really have infinitely many formulas here, because three of the sentences are parametrized by elements of F .

Finally, notice that given *any* language \mathcal{L} and any $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, the class of \mathcal{L} -structures of cardinality at least n is an elementary class as witnessed by the formula

$$\exists x_1 \exists x_2 \cdots \exists x_n \left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} (x_i \neq x_j) \right).$$

Furthermore, the class of \mathcal{L} -structures of cardinality equal to n is an elementary class. To see this, let σ_n be the above formula for n , and consider the sentence $\sigma_n \wedge (\neg \sigma_{n+1})$.

At this point, it's often clear how to show that a certain class of structures is a (weak) elementary class: simply exhibit the correct sentences. However, it may seem very difficult to show that a class is not a (weak) elementary class. For example, is the class of fields of characteristic 0 an elementary class? Is the class of finite groups a weak elementary class? There are no obvious ways to answer these questions affirmatively. We'll develop some tools later which will allow us to resolve these questions negatively.

Another interesting case is that of Dedekind-complete ordered fields. Now the ordered field axioms are easily written down in the first-order language $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, \leq, +, \cdot\}$. In contrast, the Dedekind-completeness axiom, which says that every nonempty subset which is bounded above has a least upper bound, can not be directly translated in the language \mathcal{L} because it involves quantifying over subsets instead of elements. However, we are unable to immediately conclude that this isn't due to a lack of cleverness on our part. Perhaps there is an alternative approach which captures Dedekind-complete ordered fields in a first-order way (by finding a clever equivalent first-order expression of Dedekind-completeness). More formally, the precise question is whether the complete ordered fields are a (weak) elementary class in the language \mathcal{L} . We'll be able to answer this question in the negative later as well.

4.3 Substructures and Homomorphisms

One of the basic ways to obtain new algebraic structures (whether vector spaces, groups, or rings) is to find them “inside” already established ones. For example, when working in the vector space of all functions $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ under the usual pointwise operations, we can form the subspace of continuous functions, or the subspace of differentiable functions. Within the symmetric groups S_n , one naturally defines the alternating groups A_n and dihedral groups D_n . These ideas also arise in combinatorial structures, such as when examining subgraphs of a given graph, or viewing a partial ordering as a piece of a larger one. The general unifying concept here is that of a substructure.

Definition 4.3.1. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{A} be \mathcal{L} -structures. We say that \mathcal{A} is a substructure of \mathcal{M} if the following conditions hold:*

1. $A \subseteq M$, where A and M are the underlying sets of \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{M} , respectively.
2. $c^{\mathcal{A}} = c^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $c \in C$.
3. $R^{\mathcal{A}} = R^{\mathcal{M}} \cap A^k$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$.
4. $f^{\mathcal{A}} = f^{\mathcal{M}} \upharpoonright A^k$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$.

In other words, a structure \mathcal{A} is a substructure of \mathcal{M} if we may have thrown away some of the elements of the set M , but on the remaining set A we have faithfully maintained the interpretation of every symbol. Notice that the second and fourth conditions imply a few simple facts about our set $A \subseteq M$. We prove that these are necessary and sufficient conditions for A to be the universe (i.e. the underlying set) of a substructure of \mathcal{M} .

Proposition 4.3.2. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, and let $A \subseteq M$ be nonempty. The following are equivalent:*

1. *A is the universe of a substructure of \mathcal{M} , i.e. there is a substructure \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{M} with A as the underlying set.*
2. *Every element of M that is named by a constant must appear in A , and A must be closed under every function $f^{\mathcal{M}}$. More formally, we have $\{c^{\mathcal{M}} : c \in \mathcal{C}\} \subseteq A$ and $f^{\mathcal{M}}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in A$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and all $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in A$.*

Proof. We first prove that (1) implies (2). Let \mathcal{A} be a substructure of \mathcal{M} with underlying set A . For any $c \in \mathcal{C}$, we have $c^{\mathcal{A}} \in A$ by definition of a structure, and $c^{\mathcal{A}} = c^{\mathcal{M}}$ by definition of a substructure, so we conclude that $c^{\mathcal{M}} \in A$. Now let $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in A$ be arbitrary. We have $f^{\mathcal{A}}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in A$ by definition of a structure, so since $f^{\mathcal{A}} = f^{\mathcal{M}} \upharpoonright A^k$, we conclude that $f^{\mathcal{M}}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) = f^{\mathcal{A}}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in A$.

We now prove that (2) implies (1). Assume then that $\{c^{\mathcal{M}} : c \in \mathcal{C}\} \subseteq A$ and $f^{\mathcal{M}}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in A$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and all $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in A$. We can then define each $c^{\mathcal{A}}$, $R^{\mathcal{A}}$, and $f^{\mathcal{A}}$ as in Definition 4.3.1, and notice that these definitions make sense by our assumptions (i.e. we have each $c^{\mathcal{A}} \in A$ and each $f^{\mathcal{A}}$ is actually a function from A^k to A). Therefore, A is the universe of a substructure of \mathcal{A} . \square

For example, suppose that we are working in the basic group theory language $\mathcal{L} = \{c, f\}$, and we let \mathcal{M} be the \mathcal{L} -structure with universe \mathbb{Z} , $c^{\mathcal{M}} = 0$, and $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ equal to the usual addition. We then have that \mathcal{M} is a group. Notice that if we let $A = \mathbb{N}$, then A contains $0 = c^{\mathcal{M}}$ and is closed under $f^{\mathcal{M}}$. In other words, we can view A as the universe of a substructure \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{M} . However, notice that \mathcal{A} is *not* a subgroup of \mathcal{M} , because it is not closed under inverses. The problem here is that the inverse function is not the interpretation of any of the function symbols, so a substructure need not be closed under it. However, if we use the enhanced group theory language where we include a unary function that is interpreted as the inverse function, then a substructure is precisely the same thing as a subgroup. In other words, our choice of language affects what our substructures are.

Notice that our definition of a substructure also requires that a tuple from A^k is an element of $R^{\mathcal{A}}$ if and only if it is an element of $R^{\mathcal{M}}$, and this condition does not always match up with standard definitions of “subobjects” in some areas of mathematics. For example, suppose we are working in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$, where R is a binary relation symbol. Suppose that \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure that is a graph, i.e. such that $\mathcal{M} \models \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)$. The standard definition of a subgraph is one where we are allowed to omit vertices and edges, and this includes the possibility of removing an edge despite keeping its endpoints. For example, if $M = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ and

$$R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3), (3, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 4), (4, 3)\},$$

then the graph with $A = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and

$$R^{\mathcal{A}} = \{(1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3), (3, 1)\}$$

is a subgraph under the standard definition. Notice, however, that the corresponding \mathcal{A} is *not* a substructure of \mathcal{M} , because

$$R^{\mathcal{M}} \upharpoonright A^2 = \{(1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3), (3, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)\}.$$

In this context, the definition of a substructure matches up with the concept of an *induced* subgraph. To handle situations like this, some sources define the concept of a *weak substructure* by leaving conditions (1), (3), and (4) of Definition 4.3.1 alone, but changing condition (2) to be $R^{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq R^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}$.

Suppose that we have a structure \mathcal{M} , and we have an arbitrary set $B \subseteq M$. How can we get a substructure \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{M} such that $B \subseteq A$? By Proposition 4.3.2, we need to ensure that A contains both B and the interpretation of the constants, and is closed under the functions $f^{\mathcal{M}}$. Thus, we can build a substructure (in fact the smallest substructure containing B) by starting with B and the various $c^{\mathcal{M}}$, and then generating new elements. In other words, we have the following result. Notice that we need to assume that either $B \neq \emptyset$ or $\mathcal{C} \neq \emptyset$ so that we start with a nonempty set, since we require that $A \neq \emptyset$.

Corollary 4.3.3. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure and let $B \subseteq M$ be an arbitrary set. Suppose either that $B \neq \emptyset$ or $\mathcal{C} \neq \emptyset$. If we let $A = G(M, B \cup \{c^{\mathcal{M}} : c \in \mathcal{C}\}, \{f^{\mathcal{M}} : f \in \mathcal{F}\})$, then A is the universe of a substructure of \mathcal{M} . Moreover, if \mathcal{N} is any substructure of \mathcal{M} with $B \subseteq N$, then $A \subseteq N$.*

We now seek to generalize the concept of a homomorphisms from their algebra roots to more general structures. In group theory, a homomorphism is a function that preserves the only binary operation. In this setting, it is straightforward to check that a group homomorphism automatically sends the identity to the identity. For rings with identity, it is possible to have a function that preserves both addition and multiplication, but not the multiplicative identity. As a result, some sources enforce the additional condition that a ring homomorphism must also preserve the multiplicative identity. In first-order logic, we require that the interpretation of the all of the first-order symbols in \mathcal{L} is preserved. In other words, if we choose to include a constant symbol for the multiplicative identity in our language, then the multiplicative identity of the first ring must be sent to the multiplicative identity of the second. Thus, as with substructures, our choice of language will affect what functions we call homomorphisms.

Definition 4.3.4. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} be \mathcal{L} -structures.*

1. *A function $h: M \rightarrow N$ is called a homomorphism if it satisfies the following conditions:*

(a) *For all $c \in \mathcal{C}$, we have $h(c^{\mathcal{M}}) = c^{\mathcal{N}}$.*

(b) *For all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and all $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in M$, we have*

$$(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in R^{\mathcal{M}} \text{ if and only if } (h(a_1), h(a_2), \dots, h(a_k)) \in R^{\mathcal{N}}.$$

(c) *For all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and all $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in M$, we have*

$$h(f^{\mathcal{M}}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)) = f^{\mathcal{N}}(h(a_1), h(a_2), \dots, h(a_k)).$$

2. *A function $h: M \rightarrow N$ is called an embedding if it is an injective homomorphism.*

3. *A function $h: M \rightarrow N$ is called an isomorphism if it is a bijective homomorphism.*

We now jump into our primary theorem about homomorphisms and isomorphisms. The last part of this theorem gives one precise way to say that all “reasonable” properties are preserved by an isomorphism. It’s not at all clear how to make this precise in algebra, but now we have a formal language that allows us to codify (at least some) “reasonable” properties. Since first-order formulas are generated from atomic formulas using simple rules, we can prove by induction that all properties expressible by first-order formulas are preserved.

Theorem 4.3.5. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} be \mathcal{L} -structures. Suppose that $h: M \rightarrow N$ is a homomorphism, and suppose that $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ is a variable assignment. We have the following.*

1. *The function $h \circ s$ is a variable assignment on \mathcal{N} .*

2. *For any $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $h(\overline{s}(t)) = \overline{h \circ s}(t)$.*

3. For every quantifier-free $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ not containing the equality symbol, i.e. for all φ generated by starting only with atomic formulas using elements of \mathcal{R} , and generating with just the propositional connectives, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \varphi.$$

4. If h is an embedding, then for every quantifier-free $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, i.e. for all φ generated by starting with all atomic formulas and using just the propositional connectives, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \varphi.$$

5. If h is an isomorphism, then for every $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \varphi.$$

Proof.

1. This is immediate from the fact that $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ and $h: M \rightarrow N$, so $h \circ s: \text{Var} \rightarrow N$.
2. The proof is by induction on t . We have two base cases. For any $c \in \mathcal{C}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} h(\bar{s}(c)) &= h(c^{\mathcal{M}}) \\ &= c^{\mathcal{N}} && \text{(since } h \text{ is a homomorphism)} \\ &= \overline{h \circ s}(c). \end{aligned}$$

Also, for any $x \in \text{Var}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} h(\bar{s}(x)) &= h(s(x)) \\ &= (h \circ s)(x) \\ &= \overline{h \circ s}(x). \end{aligned}$$

For the inductive step, let $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and let $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be such that the statement is true for each t_i . We then have

$$\begin{aligned} h(\bar{s}(ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k)) &= h(f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(t_1), \bar{s}(t_2), \dots, \bar{s}(t_k))) && \text{(by definition of } \bar{s}) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(h(\bar{s}(t_1)), h(\bar{s}(t_2)), \dots, h(\bar{s}(t_k))) && \text{(since } h \text{ is a homomorphism)} \\ &= f^{\mathcal{N}}(\overline{h \circ s}(t_1), \overline{h \circ s}(t_2), \dots, \overline{h \circ s}(t_k)) && \text{(by induction)} \\ &= \overline{h \circ s}(ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k) && \text{(by definition of } \overline{h \circ s}). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the statement is true for $ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k$, which completes the induction.

3. Assume that h is an embedding. The proof is by induction φ . Let $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. We have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k &\Leftrightarrow (\bar{s}(t_1), \bar{s}(t_2), \dots, \bar{s}(t_k)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (h(\bar{s}(t_1)), h(\bar{s}(t_2)), \dots, h(\bar{s}(t_k))) \in R^{\mathcal{N}} && \text{(since } h \text{ is a homomorphism)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\overline{h \circ s}(t_1), \overline{h \circ s}(t_2), \dots, \overline{h \circ s}(t_k)) \in R^{\mathcal{N}} && \text{(by part 1)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose that the result holds for φ . We prove it for $\neg\varphi$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg\varphi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \not\models \varphi && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \neg\varphi. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose that the result holds for φ and ψ . We have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \wedge \psi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \text{ and } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \varphi \text{ and } (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \psi && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \varphi \wedge \psi, \end{aligned}$$

and similarly for \vee and \rightarrow . The result follows by induction.

4. In light of the proof of (3), we need only show that if φ is $= t_1 t_2$ where $t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, then $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ if and only if $(\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \varphi$. For any $t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models = t_1 t_2 &\Leftrightarrow \bar{s}(t_1) = \bar{s}(t_2) \\ &\Leftrightarrow h(\bar{s}(t_1)) = h(\bar{s}(t_2)) && \text{(since } h \text{ is injective)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \overline{h \circ s}(t_1) = \overline{h \circ s}(t_2) && \text{(by part 1)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models = t_1 t_2. \end{aligned}$$

5. Suppose that the result holds for φ and $x \in \text{Var}$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x \varphi &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{N}, h \circ (s[x \Rightarrow a])) \models \varphi && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{N}, (h \circ s)[x \Rightarrow h(a)]) \models \varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } b \in N \text{ such that } (\mathcal{N}, (h \circ s)[x \Rightarrow b]) \models \varphi && \text{(since } h \text{ is bijective)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \exists x \varphi, \end{aligned}$$

and also

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x \varphi &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{N}, h \circ (s[x \Rightarrow a])) \models \varphi && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{N}, (h \circ s)[x \Rightarrow h(a)]) \models \varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } b \in N, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{N}, (h \circ s)[x \Rightarrow b]) \models \varphi && \text{(since } h \text{ is bijective)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \forall x \varphi. \end{aligned}$$

□

Definition 4.3.6. Let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} be \mathcal{L} -structures. We say that \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} are isomorphic if there exists an isomorphism $h: \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{N}$. In this case, we write $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{N}$.

We now introduce one of the central definitions of logic.

Definition 4.3.7. Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} be \mathcal{L} -structures. We write $\mathcal{M} \equiv \mathcal{N}$, and say that \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} are elementarily equivalent, if for all $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ if and only if $\mathcal{N} \models \sigma$.

In other words, two structures are elementarily equivalent if the same sentences are true in each structure. Notice that, by Proposition 4.2.6 we do not need to include any variable assignments in our definition, since sentences do not have free variables. The fact that a given sentence can be evaluated to a true/false value without a variable assignment is precisely what allows us to compare sentences across structures with perhaps very different underlying sets.

Corollary 4.3.8. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} be \mathcal{L} -structures. If $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{N}$, then $\mathcal{M} \equiv \mathcal{N}$.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} be \mathcal{L} -structures, and assume that $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{N}$. Fix an isomorphism $h: M \rightarrow N$. Let $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. Fix some (any) variable assignment on M . By Theorem 4.3.5, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \sigma \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{N}, h \circ s) \models \sigma.$$

Now since σ has no free variables, the variable assignments don't matter (see Notation 4.2.8), so we conclude that $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ if and only if $\mathcal{N} \models \sigma$. Since $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ was arbitrary, it follows that $\mathcal{M} \equiv \mathcal{N}$. \square

Somewhat surprisingly, the converse of Corollary 4.3.8 is *not* true. In other words, there are elementarily equivalent structures that are not isomorphic. In fact, not only do such examples exist, but we will see that for essentially every structure \mathcal{M} , we can build a structure \mathcal{N} with $\mathcal{M} \equiv \mathcal{N}$ but $\mathcal{M} \not\cong \mathcal{N}$. Beyond how intrinsically amazing this is, it turns out to be useful. If we want to show that $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ for a given $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we can think about going to an elementarily equivalent structure \mathcal{N} that is easier to work with or understand, and show that $\mathcal{N} \models \sigma$. We will eventually see some extraordinary examples of arguments in this style.

Returning to substructures, notice that if \mathcal{A} is a substructure of \mathcal{M} , then we typically have $\mathcal{A} \not\equiv \mathcal{M}$. For example, it's possible that a subgroup of a nonabelian group is abelian. For example, if \mathcal{M} is the group S_3 , and \mathcal{A} is the substructure of \mathcal{M} with underlying set $\{id, (1\ 2)\}$ (where id is the identity function), then we have

$$\mathcal{M} \not\models \forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$$

but

$$\mathcal{A} \models \forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x)).$$

Nonetheless, there are connections between when some restricted types of formulas are true in \mathcal{A} versus in \mathcal{M} . To see this, we start with the following simple remark.

Proposition 4.3.9. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{A} be \mathcal{L} -structures with $A \subseteq M$. We then have that \mathcal{A} is a substructure of \mathcal{M} if and only if the inclusion function $i: A \rightarrow M$ given by $i(a) = a$ is a homomorphism.*

Proof. Immediate from the corresponding definitions. \square

Definition 4.3.10. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let $\text{QuantFreeForm}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be the set of all quantifier-free formulas.*

1. A Σ_1 formula is an element of $G(\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \text{QuantFreeForm}_{\mathcal{L}}, \{h_{\exists, x} : x \in \text{Var}\})$.
2. A Π_1 formula is an element of $G(\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \text{QuantFreeForm}_{\mathcal{L}}, \{h_{\forall, x} : x \in \text{Var}\})$.

In other words, a Σ_1 formula is a formula that begins with a block of existential quantifiers, and then is followed by a quantifier-free formula. A Π_1 formula instead begins with a block of universal quantifiers, followed by a quantifier-free formula. For example,

$$\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$$

is a Π_1 formula in the language of group theory. We can now state and prove some simple connections between how the truth of these formulas can vary between a substructure and the bigger structure.

Proposition 4.3.11. *Suppose that $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{M}$.*

1. *For any quantifier-free formula φ and any $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have*

$$(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi.$$

2. *For any Σ_1 formula φ and any $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have*

$$\text{If } (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi, \text{ then } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi.$$

3. *For any Π_1 formula φ and any $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have*

$$\text{If } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi, \text{ then } (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi.$$

Proof.

1. This follows from Proposition 4.3.9 and Theorem 4.3.5, using the embedding i (since $i \circ s = s$).
2. We prove this by induction. If φ is quantifier-free, the part (1) can be directly applied. Suppose that we know the result for φ , and suppose that $(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \exists x \varphi$. By definition, we can fix $a \in A$ such that $(\mathcal{A}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$. By induction, we know that $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$, hence $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x \varphi$.
3. We prove this by induction. If φ is quantifier-free, the part (1) can be directly applied. Suppose that we know the result for φ , and suppose that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x \varphi$. By definition, we know that for every $a \in A$, we then have $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$, and hence $(\mathcal{A}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$ by induction. It follows that $(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \forall x \varphi$.

□

For example, the sentence σ equal to $\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$ is a Π_1 formula. If \mathcal{M} is a structure with $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$, then whenever \mathcal{A} is a substructure of \mathcal{M} , we have that $\mathcal{A} \models \sigma$. In particular, every subgroup of an abelian group is abelian. As mentioned above, the converse does not hold, and this is the reason why we only have one direction in Proposition 4.3.11 in the case of Σ_1 and Π_1 formulas.

For more complicated formulas, we may not be able to go in either direction. For example, consider the language $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$ of ring theory. Let σ be the sentence

$$\forall x (\neg(x = 0) \rightarrow \exists y (x \cdot y = 1)),$$

which says that every nonzero element has a multiplicative inverse. Notice that σ is neither a Σ_1 formula nor a Π_1 formula. Now if we consider the \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} consisting of the rational field and let \mathcal{A} be the substructure consisting of the integers, then $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ but $\mathcal{A} \not\models \sigma$. In contrast, if we consider the \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} consisting of the polynomial ring $\mathbb{R}[x]$ and let \mathcal{A} be the substructure consisting of the real numbers (i.e. constant polynomials), then $\mathcal{M} \not\models \sigma$ but $\mathcal{A} \models \sigma$. In other words, if a formula is neither Σ_1 nor Π_1 , it is possible that the truth of the formula in a structure has no relation to its truth in a substructure.

4.4 Definability

A wonderful side-effect of developing a formal language is the ability to talk about what objects we can define using that language.

Definition 4.4.1. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, and let $X \subseteq M^k$. We say that X is definable in \mathcal{M} if there exists $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that*

$$X = \{(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in M^k : (\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \models \varphi\}.$$

In other words, a set $X \subseteq M^k$ is definable in \mathcal{M} if we can find a formula φ with k free variables such that the formula is true in \mathcal{M} when we interpret the free variables as a k -tuple in X , and is false otherwise. For example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$ be the language of ring theory, where 0 and 1 are constant symbols and $+$ and \cdot are binary function symbols.

1. The set $X = \{(m, n) \in \mathbb{N}^2 : m < n\}$ is definable in the structure $(\mathbb{N}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ as witnessed by the formula

$$\exists z(z \neq 0 \wedge (x + z = y)).$$

2. The set $X = \{n \in \mathbb{N} : n \text{ is prime}\}$ is definable in the structure $(\mathbb{N}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ as witnessed by the formula

$$\neg(x = 1) \wedge \forall y \forall z (x = y \cdot z \rightarrow (y = 1 \vee z = 1)).$$

3. The set $X = \{r \in \mathbb{R} : r \geq 0\}$ is definable in the structure $(\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ as witnessed by the formula

$$\exists y(y \cdot y = x).$$

Let's consider another language. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{<\}$ where $<$ is a binary relation symbol. For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, the set $\{n\}$ is definable in $(\mathbb{N}, <)$. To see this, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let $\varphi_n(x)$ be the formula

$$\exists y_1 \exists y_2 \cdots \exists y_n \left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} (y_i \neq y_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (y_i < x) \right).$$

For each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, the formula $\varphi_n(x)$ defines the set $\{k \in \mathbb{N} : n \leq k\}$. Now notice that $\{0\}$ is definable as witnessed by the formula

$$\neg \exists y(y < x),$$

and for each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, the set $\{n\}$ is definable as witnessed by the formula

$$\varphi_n(x) \wedge \neg \varphi_{n+1}(x).$$

Finally, let $\mathcal{L} = \{e, f\}$ be the basic group theory language. Let (G, e, \cdot) be a group interpreted as an \mathcal{L} -structure. The center of G is definable in (G, e, \cdot) as witnessed by the formula

$$\forall y(f(x, y) = f(y, x))$$

Sometimes, there isn't an obvious way to show that a set is definable, but some cleverness and/or nontrivial mathematics comes to the rescue. In each of the examples below, let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$ be the language of ring theory.

1. The set \mathbb{N} is definable in $(\mathbb{Z}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ as witnessed by the formula

$$\exists y_1 \exists y_2 \exists y_3 \exists y_4 (x = y_1 \cdot y_1 + y_2 \cdot y_2 + y_3 \cdot y_3 + y_4 \cdot y_4)$$

Certainly every element of \mathbb{Z} that is a sum of squares must be an element of \mathbb{N} . The fact that every element of \mathbb{N} is a sum of four squares is Lagrange's Theorem, an important result in number theory.

2. Let $(R, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ be a commutative ring. The Jacobson radical of R , denoted $Jac(R)$ is the intersection of all maximal ideal of R . As stated, it is not clear that this is definable in $(R, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ because it appears to quantify over subsets. However, a basic result in commutative algebra says that

$$\begin{aligned} a \in Jac(R) &\iff ab - 1 \text{ is a unit for all } b \in R \\ &\iff \text{For all } b \in R, \text{ there exists } c \in R \text{ with } (ab - 1)c = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Using this, it follows that $Jac(R)$ is definable in $(R, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ as witnessed by the formula

$$\forall y \exists z ((x \cdot y) \cdot z = z + 1).$$

3. The set \mathbb{Z} is definable in $(\mathbb{Q}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$. This is a deep result of Julia Robinson using some nontrivial number theory.
4. The set $X = \{(k, m, n) \in \mathbb{N}^3 : k^m = n\}$ is definable in $(\mathbb{N}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, as is the set

$$\{(m, n) \in \mathbb{N}^2 : m \text{ is the } n^{\text{th}} \text{ digit in the decimal expansion of } \pi\}.$$

In fact, every set $C \subseteq \mathbb{N}^k$ which is “computable” (i.e. for which it is possible to write a computer program that outputs *yes* on elements of C and *no* on elements of $\mathbb{N}^k \setminus C$) is definable in $(\mathbb{N}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$. We will prove this challenging, but fundamental, result later.

The collection of definable sets in a structure have some simple closure properties.

Proposition 4.4.2. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Let*

$$\mathcal{D}_k = \{X \in \mathcal{P}(M^k) : X \text{ is definable in } \mathcal{M}\}.$$

We have the following:

1. *If $X, Y \in \mathcal{D}_k$, then $X \cup Y \in \mathcal{D}_k$.*
2. *If $X, Y \in \mathcal{D}_k$, then $X \cap Y \in \mathcal{D}_k$.*
3. *If $X \in \mathcal{D}_k$, then $M \setminus X \in \mathcal{D}_k$.*

Proof. Each of these follow by taking the \vee , \wedge , and \neg of the respective formulas. □

Determining which sets in a structure are definable is typically a challenging task, but classifying the collection of definable sets is one of the primary goals when seeking to fully “understand” a structure. Let’s return to the language $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$ of ring theory. Here we outline several important restrictions on definable sets in a few natural \mathcal{L} -structures. We will prove each of these facts later.

1. In the structure $(\mathbb{C}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, every subset of \mathbb{C} that is definable is either finite or cofinite (i.e. its complement is finite). The converse is not true. For example, any element of \mathbb{C} that is transcendental over \mathbb{Q} is not an element of any finite definable set.
2. In the structure $(\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, every subset of \mathbb{R} that is definable is a finite union of intervals and points (but again, the converse is not true).
3. In the structure $(\mathbb{N}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, every computable subset of \mathbb{N} is definable. In fact, many other subsets of \mathbb{Z} are also definable, and it is challenging to describe a subset of \mathbb{N} that is not definable (although we will eventually do this).
4. Since \mathbb{N} is definable in $(\mathbb{Z}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, it turns out that the definable subsets of \mathbb{Z} are also rich and complicated.
5. Since \mathbb{Z} is definable in $(\mathbb{Q}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, the definable subsets of \mathbb{Q} are similarly complicated.

As for elementary classes, it’s clear how to attempt to show that something is definable (although as we’ve seen this may require a great deal of cleverness). However, it’s not at all obvious how one could show that a set is not definable. Fortunately, Theorem 4.3.5 can be used to prove negative results.

Definition 4.4.3. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. An isomorphism $h: M \rightarrow M$ is called an automorphism.*

Proposition 4.4.4. *Suppose that \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure and $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Suppose also that $X \subseteq M^k$ is definable in \mathcal{M} and that $h: M \rightarrow M$ is an automorphism. For every $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in M$, we have*

$$(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in X \text{ if and only if } (h(a_1), h(a_2), \dots, h(a_k)) \in X.$$

Proof. Fix $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that

$$X = \{(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in M^k : (\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \models \varphi\}.$$

By part 4 of Theorem 4.3.5, we know that for every $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in M$, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{M}, h(a_1), h(a_2), \dots, h(a_k)) \models \varphi.$$

Therefore, for every $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in M$, we have

$$(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in X \text{ if and only if } (h(a_1), h(a_2), \dots, h(a_k)) \in X.$$

□

In other words, automorphisms of a structure must fix definable sets as a whole (note that this is not saying must fix definable sets pointwise). Therefore, in order to show that a given set is not definable, we can find an automorphism that does not fix the set.

Corollary 4.4.5. *Suppose that \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure and $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Suppose also that $X \subseteq M^k$ and that $h: M \rightarrow M$ is an automorphism. Suppose that there exists $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in M$ such that exactly one of the following holds:*

- $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in X$.
- $(h(a_1), h(a_2), \dots, h(a_k)) \in X$.

We then have that X is not definable in \mathcal{M} .

For example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{\mathbf{R}\}$ where \mathbf{R} is a binary relation symbol, and let \mathcal{M} be the \mathcal{L} -structure where $M = \mathbb{Z}$ and $\mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : a < b\}$. We show that a set $X \subseteq M$ is definable in \mathcal{M} if and only if either $X = \emptyset$ or $X = \mathbb{Z}$. First notice that \emptyset is definable as witnessed by $\neg(x = x)$ and \mathbb{Z} as witnessed by $x = x$. Suppose now that $X \subseteq \mathbb{Z}$ is such that $X \neq \emptyset$ and $X \neq \mathbb{Z}$. Fix $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $a \in X$ and $b \notin X$. Define $h: M \rightarrow M$ by letting $h(c) = c + (b - a)$ for all $c \in M$. Notice that h is automorphism of \mathcal{M} because it is bijective (the map $g(c) = c - (b - a)$ is clearly an inverse) and a homomorphism. For the latter, notice that if $c_1, c_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ are arbitrary, then have have

$$\begin{aligned} (c_1, c_2) \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}} &\Leftrightarrow c_1 < c_2 \\ &\Leftrightarrow c_1 + (b - a) < c_2 + (b - a) \\ &\Leftrightarrow h(c_1) < h(c_2) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (h(c_1), h(c_2)) \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}}. \end{aligned}$$

Notice also that $h(a) = a + (b - a) = b$, so $a \in X$ but $h(a) \notin X$. Using Corollary 4.4.5, it follows that X is not definable in \mathcal{M} .

Definition 4.4.6. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. Suppose that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ and $X \subseteq M^k$. We say that X is definable with parameters in \mathcal{M} if there exists $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ together with $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n \in M$ such that*

$$X = \{(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in M^k : (\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k, b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n) \models \varphi\}$$

Intuitively, this means that we use elements of M inside our formulas to help us define sets. For example, for each $n \in \mathbb{Z}$ the set $\{n\}$ is trivially definable with parameters in the structure $\mathcal{M} = (\mathbb{Z}, <)$: simply let $\varphi(x, y)$ be the formula $x = y$, and notice that for each $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, a, n) \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow a = n.$$

In fact, given *any* structure \mathcal{M} , the set $\{m\}$ is definable with parameters in \mathcal{M} .

Let's return to the language $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$. Above, we talked about restrictions on definable sets in several natural \mathcal{L} -structures. We now discuss the situation when we switch to looking at those sets that are definable with parameters.

1. In the structure $(\mathbb{C}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, a subset of \mathbb{C} is definable with parameters if and only if it is either finite or cofinite.
2. In the structure $(\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, a subset of \mathbb{R} is definable with parameters if and only if it is finite union of intervals and points.
3. In the structures with underlying sets \mathbb{N} , \mathbb{Z} , and \mathbb{Q} , we can already define each specific element without parameters, so it turns out that a set is definable with parameters if and only if it is definable.

4.5 Elementary Substructures

Suppose that \mathcal{A} is a substructure of \mathcal{M} . In Proposition 4.3.11, we showed that for all quantifier-free formulas φ and all $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have

$$(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi.$$

Once we look at more general formulas involving quantifiers, this connection can easily break down. After all, a quantifier ranges over the entire underlying set, so if A is a proper subset of M , the recursive definitions of \models will greatly differ. Regardless, it is at least conceivable that a proper substructure of a larger structure might occasionally satisfy the same formulas. We give these (at the moment seemingly magical) substructures a special name.

Definition 4.5.1. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, and let \mathcal{A} be a substructure of \mathcal{M} . We say that \mathcal{A} is an elementary substructure if for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have*

$$(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi.$$

We write $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$ to mean that \mathcal{A} is an elementary substructure of \mathcal{M} .

Notice that if \mathcal{A} is an elementary substructure of \mathcal{M} , then in particular we have that $\mathcal{A} \equiv \mathcal{M}$, i.e. that \mathcal{A} is elementarily equivalent to \mathcal{M} . To see this, simply notice that every $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is in particular a formula, and that variable assignments do not affect the truth of sentences (since sentences have no free variables).

However, it is possible that to have a substructure \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{M} with $\mathcal{A} \equiv \mathcal{M}$, but where $\mathcal{A} \not\preceq \mathcal{M}$. For example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{f\}$ where f is a unary function symbol. Let \mathcal{M} be the \mathcal{L} -structure with $M = \mathbb{N}$ and $f^{\mathcal{M}}(n) = n + 1$. Let \mathcal{A} be \mathcal{L} -structure with $A = \mathbb{N}^+$ and $f^{\mathcal{A}}(n) = n + 1$. We then have that \mathcal{A} is a substructure of \mathcal{M} . Now $\mathcal{A} \equiv \mathcal{M}$ via the function $h(m) = m - 1$, so $\mathcal{A} \equiv \mathcal{M}$ by Corollary 4.3.8. However, notice that $\mathcal{A} \not\preceq \mathcal{M}$ because if $\varphi(x)$ is the formula $\exists y(fy = x)$, we then have that $(\mathcal{A}, 1) \not\models \varphi$ but $(\mathcal{M}, 1) \models \varphi$. Generalizing this example, one can show that the only elementary substructure of \mathcal{M} is the structure \mathcal{M} itself (noting that \mathcal{A} has to have a smallest element by well-ordering, then using the above argument to argue that this smallest element is 0, and finally using the fact that A must be closed under the successor function).

Before jumping into a result that will greatly simplify the construction of elementary substructures, we start with a simple lemma that will allow us to turn one type of quantifier into the other.

Lemma 4.5.2. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, and let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ be a variable assignment. For any $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have*

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg \exists x \neg \varphi.$$

Proof. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. Using the recursive definition of \models , we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x \varphi &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \not\models \neg \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \text{There does not exist } a \in M \text{ with } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \neg \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \exists x \neg \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg \exists x \neg \varphi.
 \end{aligned}$$

□

As mentioned above, the quantifiers are the obstacle in pushing Proposition 4.3.11 from simple formulas to more complex ones. The next test simplifies the process to that of checking one existential quantifier at a time. Notice that the condition it provides is only about truth in the structure \mathcal{M} , and hence does not reference truth in \mathcal{A} .

Theorem 4.5.3 (Tarski-Vaught Test). *Suppose that \mathcal{A} is a substructure of \mathcal{M} . The following are equivalent:*

1. $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$, i.e. \mathcal{A} is an elementary substructure of \mathcal{M} .
2. Whenever $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, $x \in \text{Var}$, and $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$ satisfy $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x \varphi$, there exists $a \in A$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$.

Proof. We first prove that 1 implies 2. Suppose then that $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$ be arbitrary such that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x \varphi$. Using the fact that $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$, it follows that $(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \exists x \varphi$. Fix $a \in A$ such that $(\mathcal{A}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$. Using again the fact that $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$.

We now prove that 2 implies 1. We prove by induction on $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ that for all $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have $(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi$ if and only if $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$. That is, we let

$$X = \{\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} : \text{For all } s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A \text{ we have } (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi\},$$

and prove that $X = \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ by induction. First notice that $\varphi \in X$ for all quantifier-free φ by Proposition 4.3.11.

Suppose now that $\varphi \in X$. For any $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \neg \varphi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{A}, s) \not\models \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi && (\text{since } \varphi \in X) \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg \varphi
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $\neg \varphi \in X$.

Suppose now that $\varphi, \psi \in X$. For any $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi \wedge \psi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi \text{ and } (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \psi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \text{ and } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi && (\text{since } \varphi, \psi \in X) \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \wedge \psi
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $\varphi \wedge \psi \in X$. Similarly, we have $\varphi \vee \psi \in X$ and $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in X$.

Suppose now that $\varphi \in X$ and $x \in \text{Var}$. For any $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \exists x \varphi &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in A \text{ such that } (\mathcal{A}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in A \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi && (\text{since } \varphi \in X) \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x \varphi && (\text{by our assumption 2}).
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $\exists x\varphi \in X$.

Suppose now that $\varphi \in X$ and $x \in \text{Var}$. We then have that $\neg\varphi \in X$ from above, hence $\exists x\neg\varphi \in X$ from above, hence $\neg\exists x\neg\varphi \in X$ again from above. Thus, for any $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \forall x\varphi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \neg\exists x\neg\varphi && \text{(by Lemma 4.5.2)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg\exists x\neg\varphi && \text{(since } \neg\exists x\neg\varphi \in X) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x\varphi && \text{(by Lemma 4.5.2).} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $\forall x\varphi \in X$. □

The Tarski-Vaught Test gives an interesting way to build an elementary substructure of a given structure \mathcal{M} . Start by taking the set $A_0 = \{c^{\mathcal{M}} : c \in \mathcal{C}\}$, which must be a subset of the universe of any substructure. Now we need to do two things. First, by Proposition 4.3.2, we need to ensure that our set is closed under the functions $f^{\mathcal{M}}$. Suppose that we close off A_0 under all of the functions and end up with a set A_1 . Now we need to make sure that the Tarski-Vaught criterion is satisfied. The idea is to look at a formula $\varphi(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_k, x) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ together with an assignment sending each y_i to an $a_i \in A_1$. If we find that

$$(\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \models \exists x\varphi(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_k, x),$$

then we can fix an $m \in M$ with

$$(\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k, m) \models \varphi(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_k, x).$$

The idea then is to add m to our set A_1 , so that our substructure will now have a witness to this existential statement. In fact, we want to fix a witnessing m for *all* formulas and assignments of free variables to A_1 , and add all of them to A_1 in order form another set A_2 . Now A_2 may not be closed under the functions $f^{\mathcal{M}}$. Moreover, if we allow variable assignments that take values in A_2 (rather than just A_1), then we may now have even *more* existential witnesses that we need to consider. The idea is to keep iterating the process of closing off under the functions $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ and adding existential witnesses. In other words, we want to generate a set using these processes.

We formalize these ideas in the following fundamental theorem. We even generalize it a bit by allowing us to start with any countable set X that we want to include in our elementary substructure.

Theorem 4.5.4 (Countable Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem). *Suppose that \mathcal{L} is countable (i.e. each of the set \mathcal{C} , \mathcal{R} , and \mathcal{F} are countable), that \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure, and that $X \subseteq M$ is countable. There exists a countable $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$ such that $X \subseteq A$.*

Proof. Since structures are nonempty, we first fix an element $d \in M$. We will use d as “dummy” element of M to ensure that we always have something to go to when all else fails.

- For each $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x \in \text{Var}$ such that $\text{FreeVar}(\varphi) = \{x\}$, we define an element $n_{\varphi, x} \in M$ as follows. If $\mathcal{M} \models \exists x\varphi$, fix an arbitrary $m \in M$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, m) \models \varphi$, and let $n_{\varphi, x} = m$. Otherwise, let $n_{\varphi, x} = d$.
- Now for each $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x \in \text{Var}$ such that $\{x\} \subsetneq \text{FreeVar}(\varphi)$, we define a function. Suppose that $\text{FreeVar}(\varphi) = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_k, x\}$. We define a function $h_{\varphi, x}: M^k \rightarrow M$ as follows. Let $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in M$ be arbitrary. If $(\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \models \exists x\varphi$, fix some $b \in M$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k, b) \models \varphi$, and let $h_{\varphi, x}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) = b$. Otherwise, let $h_{\varphi, x}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) = d$.

We now start with a the set

$$B = X \cup \{d\} \cup \{c^{\mathcal{M}} : c \in \mathcal{C}\} \cup \{n_{\varphi, x} : \varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}, x \in \text{Var}, \text{ and } \text{FreeVar}(\varphi) = \{x\}\},$$

and generate by closing off under the functions $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ and $h_{\varphi, \mathbf{x}}$. In other words, we let

$$A = G(M, B, \{f^{\mathcal{M}} : f \in \mathcal{F}_k\} \cup \{h_{\varphi, \mathbf{x}} : \varphi \in \text{Form}_P, \mathbf{x} \in \text{FreeVar}(\varphi), \text{ and } |\text{FreeVar}(\varphi)| \geq 2\}).$$

Since \mathcal{L} is countable, we have that $\text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is countable by Problem 6 on Homework 1. Since Var is also countable, it follows that $\text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \times \text{Var}$ is countable. Combining this with the fact that both X and \mathcal{C} are countable, it follows that B is countable. Moreover, using the fact that \mathcal{F} is countable, it follows that

$$\{f^{\mathcal{M}} : f \in \mathcal{F}_k\} \cup \{h_{\varphi, \mathbf{x}} : \varphi \in \text{Form}_P, \mathbf{x} \in \text{FreeVar}(\varphi), \text{ and } |\text{FreeVar}(\varphi)| \geq 2\}$$

is countable. Using Problem 6 on Homework 1 again, we conclude that A is countable. Since A is closed under the functions $f^{\mathcal{M}}$, Proposition 4.3.2 implies that A is the universe of a substructure \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{M} . Notice also that $X \subseteq A$ since $X \subseteq B$.

Thus, we need only show that $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$, which we do by using the Tarski-Vaught test. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, $\mathbf{x} \in \text{Var}$, and $s : \text{Var} \rightarrow A$ be arbitrary such that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists \mathbf{x} \varphi$.

- Suppose first that $\mathbf{x} \notin \text{FreeVar}(\varphi)$. Since $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists \mathbf{x} \varphi$, we may fix $m \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s[\mathbf{x} \mapsto m]) \models \varphi$. Now using the fact that $\mathbf{x} \notin \text{FreeVar}(\varphi)$, it follows that $(\mathcal{M}, s[\mathbf{x} \mapsto d]) \models \varphi$.
- Suppose now that $\text{FreeVar}(\varphi) = \{\mathbf{x}\}$, and let $a = n_{\varphi, \mathbf{x}} \in A$. Since $\mathcal{M} \models \exists \mathbf{x} \varphi$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, a) \models \varphi$ by definition of $n_{\varphi, \mathbf{x}}$, so there exists $a \in A$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s[\mathbf{x} \mapsto a]) \models \varphi$.
- Finally, suppose that $\text{FreeVar}(\varphi) = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_k, \mathbf{x}\}$. For each i with $1 \leq i \leq k$, let $a_i = s(y_i)$, and let $b = h_{\varphi, \mathbf{x}}(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \in A$. Since $(\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k) \models \exists \mathbf{x} \varphi$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k, b) \models \varphi$ by definition of $h_{\varphi, \mathbf{x}}$, so there exists $a \in A$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s[\mathbf{x} \mapsto a]) \models \varphi$.

Therefore, we have $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$. □

Corollary 4.5.5. *Suppose that \mathcal{L} is countable and that \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure. There exists a countable \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{N} such that $\mathcal{N} \equiv \mathcal{M}$.*

Proof. Applying Theorem 4.5.4 with $X = \emptyset$, we can fix a countable elementary substructure $\mathcal{N} \preceq \mathcal{M}$. For any $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we then have that $\mathcal{N} \models \sigma$ if and only if $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$, so $\mathcal{N} \equiv \mathcal{M}$. □

This is our first indication that first-order logic is not powerful enough to distinguish certain aspects of cardinality, and we'll see more examples of this phenomenon after the Compactness Theorem (for first-order logic) and once we talk about infinite cardinalities and extend the Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski result.

This restriction already has some interesting consequences. For example, you may be familiar with the result that $(\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, <, +, \cdot)$ is the unique (up to isomorphism) Dedekind-complete ordered field.

Corollary 4.5.6. *The Dedekind-complete ordered fields are not a weak elementary class in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, <, +, \cdot\}$.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{K} be the class of all Dedekind-complete ordered fields. Suppose that $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is such that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$. By the Countable Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem, there exists a countable \mathcal{N} such that $\mathcal{N} \equiv (\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, <, +, \cdot)$. Since $(\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, <, +, \cdot) \in \mathcal{K}$, we have $(\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, <, +, \cdot) \models \sigma$ for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$, so $\mathcal{N} \models \sigma$ for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$, and hence $\mathcal{N} \in \mathcal{K}$. However, this is a contradiction because all Dedekind-complete ordered fields are isomorphic to $(\mathbb{R}, 0, 1, <, +, \cdot)$, hence are uncountable. □

4.6 Substitution

Given an \mathcal{L} -structure together with a variable assignment $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$, we know that every term names an element of M . Specifically, the term t names the element $\bar{s}(t)$. In normal mathematical practice, if we know that a given statement is true for all elements of a set, then we can invoke the universal quantifier on any specific element. To make this idea precise, we want to think about “substituting” a term t for a variable. Roughly, one might naturally think that if $\forall x \varphi$ is true (\mathcal{M}, s) , then upon taking a term t and substituting it in for x in the formula φ , the resulting formula would also be true in (\mathcal{M}, s) . We need a way to relate truth before substituting with truth after substituting. The hope would be the following, where we use the notation φ_x^t to intuitively mean that you substitute t for x :

Hope 4.6.1. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$, let $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and let $x \in \text{Var}$. For all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have*

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^t \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]) \models \varphi.$$

In order to make this precise, we first need to define substitution. However, even with the “correct” definition of substitution, the above statement is not true. We first define substitution for terms and show that it behaves as expected.

Definition 4.6.2. *Let $x \in \text{Var}$ and let $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We define a function $\text{Subst}_x^t: \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, where we use u_x^t to denote $\text{Subst}_x^t(u)$, as follows:*

1. $c_x^t = c$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
2. $y_x^t = \begin{cases} t & \text{if } y = x \\ y & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
for all $y \in \text{Var}$.
3. $(f u_1 u_2 \dots u_k)_x^t = f(u_1)_x^t (u_2)_x^t \dots (u_k)_x^t$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and all $u_1, u_2, \dots, u_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$.

Here’s the key lemma that relates how to interpret a term before and after substitution.

Lemma 4.6.3. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$, let $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and let $x \in \text{Var}$. For all $u \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have*

$$\bar{s}(u_x^t) = \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]}(u).$$

Although the statement of the lemma is symbol heavy, it expresses something quite natural. In order to determine the “value” of the term u_x^t according to the variable assignment imposed by s , we need only change s so that x now gets sent to $\bar{s}(t)$ (the “value” of t assigned by s), and evaluate u using this new variable assignment.

Proof. The proof is by induction on $\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. For any $c \in \mathcal{C}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s}(c_x^t) &= \bar{s}(c) \\ &= c^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)](c) \\ &= \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]}(c). \end{aligned}$$

We now handle the case where $u \in \text{Var}$. If $u = x$, then

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s}(x_x^t) &= \bar{s}(t) \\ &= s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)](x) \\ &= \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]}(x). \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, if $u = y \in Var$ and $y \neq x$, then we have

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{s}(y_x^t) &= \bar{s}(y) \\ &= s(y) \\ &= y \\ &= s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)](y) \\ &= \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]}(y).\end{aligned}$$

Finally, let $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ be arbitrary, and that the statement is true for $u_1, u_2, \dots, u_k \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{s}(f(u_1 u_2 \cdots u_k)_x^t) &= \bar{s}(f(u_1)_x^t (u_2)_x^t \cdots (u_k)_x^t) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}((u_1)_x^t), \bar{s}((u_2)_x^t), \dots, \bar{s}((u_k)_x^t)) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(\overline{s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]}(u_1), \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]}(u_2), \dots, \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]}(u_k)) \quad (\text{by induction}) \\ &= \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]}(f(u_1 u_2 \cdots u_k))\end{aligned}$$

This completes the induction. \square

Now that we have handled terms, we move to to define substitution for formulas. For terms, we naturally replaced every occurrence of x with the term t . However, we do have to be a bit more discriminating when faced with formulas. For example, we certainly don't want to change $\forall x \varphi$ into $\forall t \varphi$ (which wouldn't make sense), nor do we want to mess with an x inside the scope of such a quantifier. We thus make the following recursive definition.

Definition 4.6.4. We now define $FreeSubst_x^t: Form_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow Form_{\mathcal{L}}$, again denoted φ_x^t , as follows:

1. $(Ru_1 u_2 \cdots u_k)_x^t = R(u_1)_x^t (u_2)_x^t \cdots (u_k)_x^t$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and all $u_1, u_2, \dots, u_k \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$.
2. We define $(= u_1 u_2)_x^t$ to be $(u_1)_x^t (u_2)_x^t$ for all $u_1, u_2 \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$.
3. $(\neg \varphi)_x^t = \neg(\varphi_x^t)$ for all $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.
4. $(\diamond \varphi \psi)_x^t = \diamond \varphi_x^t \psi_x^t$ for all $\varphi, \psi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $\diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.
5. $(Qy\varphi)_x^t = \begin{cases} Qy\varphi & \text{if } x = y \\ Qy(\varphi_x^t) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
for all $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$, $y \in Var$, and $Q \in \{\exists, \forall\}$.

With the definition in hand, let's analyze the above hope. Suppose that $\mathcal{L} = \emptyset$, and consider the formula $\varphi(x) \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ given by

$$\exists y \neg(y = x).$$

For any \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and any $s: Var \rightarrow M$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ if and only if $|M| \geq 2$. Now notice that the formula φ_x^y is

$$\exists y \neg(y = y)$$

so for any \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and any $s: Var \rightarrow M$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi_x^y$. Therefore, the above hope fails whenever \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure with $|M| \geq 2$. The problem is that the term we substituted (in this case y) had a variable which became “captured” by a quantifier, resulting in a fundamental change of the “meaning” of the formula. In order to define ourselves out of this obstacle, we define the following function.

Definition 4.6.5. Let $t \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ and let $x \in Var$. We define a function $ValidSubst_x^t: Form_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ as follows.

1. $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1$ for all $\varphi \in \text{AtomicForm}_{\mathcal{L}}$.
2. $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\neg\varphi) = \text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi)$ for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$.
3. $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\Diamond\varphi\psi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1 \text{ and } \text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\psi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
for all $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $\Diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$.
4. $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\text{Qy}\varphi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\text{Qy}\varphi) \\ 1 & \text{if } y \notin \text{OccurVar}(t) \text{ and } \text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, $x, y \in \text{Var}$, and $\text{Q} \in \{\forall, \exists\}$.

Lemma 4.6.6. Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ be a variable assignment, and let $a \in M$. For any term $t \in \mathcal{L}$ and any $x \in \text{Var}$ with $x \notin \text{OccurVar}(t)$, we have $\overline{s[x \Rightarrow a]}(t) = \overline{s}(t)$.

Proof. A trivial induction on $\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. □

Theorem 4.6.7 (Substitution Theorem). Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$, let $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and let $x \in \text{Var}$. For all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ with $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1$, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^t \text{ if and only if } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]) \models \varphi.$$

Proof. The proof is by induction on φ . We first handle the case when $\varphi \in \text{AtomicForm}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Suppose that $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and that $u_1, u_2, \dots, u_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models (Ru_1u_2 \cdots u_k)_x^t &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models R(u_1)_x^t(u_2)_x^t \cdots (u_k)_x^t \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\overline{s}((u_1)_x^t), \overline{s}((u_2)_x^t), \dots, \overline{s}((u_k)_x^t)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\overline{s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]}(u_1), \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]}(u_2), \dots, \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]}(u_k)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}} \quad (\text{by Lemma 4.6.3}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]) \models Ru_1u_2 \cdots u_k. \end{aligned}$$

If $u_1, u_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models (=u_1u_2)_x^t &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models (=u_1)_x^t(u_2)_x^t \\ &\Leftrightarrow \overline{s}((u_1)_x^t) = \overline{s}((u_2)_x^t) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]}(u_1) = \overline{s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]}(u_2) \quad (\text{by Lemma 4.6.3}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]) \models =u_1u_2. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose that the results holds for φ and that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\neg\varphi) = 1$. We then have that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1$, and hence

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models (\neg\varphi)_x^t &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg(\varphi_x^t) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi_x^t \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]) \not\models \varphi \quad (\text{by induction}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \overline{s}(t)]) \models \neg\varphi. \end{aligned}$$

The connectives \wedge, \vee , and \rightarrow are similarly uninteresting.

We next handle the existential quantifier. Suppose that the statement is true for φ , that $y \in \text{Var}$, and that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\exists y\varphi) = 1$. By definition of ValidSubst_x^t , we have two cases. If $x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\exists y\varphi)$, then we have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models (\exists y\varphi)_x^t &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists y\varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]) \models \exists y\varphi \end{aligned} \quad (\text{by Proposition 4.2.6}).$$

Otherwise, we have $y \notin \text{OccurVar}(t)$ and $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1$. Also, since we are not in the first case, we have $x \in \text{FreeVar}(\exists y\varphi)$, and in particular $x \neq y$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models (\exists y\varphi)_x^t &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists y(\varphi_x^t) && (\text{since } x \neq y) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^t \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, (s[y \Rightarrow a])[x \Rightarrow \overline{s[y \Rightarrow a]}(t)]) \models \varphi && (\text{by induction}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, (s[y \Rightarrow a])[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]) \models \varphi && (\text{by Lemma 4.6.6}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, (s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)])[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi && (\text{since } x \neq y) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]) \models \exists y\varphi. \end{aligned}$$

We finally handle the universal quantifier. Suppose that the statement is true for φ , that $y \in \text{Var}$, and that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\forall y\varphi) = 1$. By definition of ValidSubst_x^t , we have two cases. If $x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\forall y\varphi)$, then we have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models (\forall y\varphi)_x^t &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall y\varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]) \models \forall y\varphi \end{aligned} \quad (\text{by Proposition 4.2.6}).$$

Otherwise, we have $y \notin \text{OccurVar}(t)$ and $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1$. Also, since we are not in the first case, we have $x \in \text{FreeVar}(\forall y\varphi)$, and in particular $x \neq y$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models (\forall y\varphi)_x^t &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall y(\varphi_x^t) && (\text{since } x \neq y) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^t \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, (s[y \Rightarrow a])[x \Rightarrow \overline{s[y \Rightarrow a]}(t)]) \models \varphi && (\text{by induction}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, (s[y \Rightarrow a])[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]) \models \varphi && (\text{by Lemma 4.6.6}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, (s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)])[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi && (\text{since } x \neq y) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]) \models \forall y\varphi. \end{aligned}$$

□

Chapter 5

Theories and Models

5.1 Semantic Implication and Theories

In propositional logic, we needed a truth assignment $M: P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ in order to assign true/false values to each formula $\varphi \in \text{Form}_P$. For first-order logic, we need an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and a variable assignment $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ in order to assign true/false values to each formula $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Since these pairs (\mathcal{M}, s) now provide the context that truth assignments M did in propositional logic, we can now define a first-order version of semantic implication.

Definition 5.1.1. Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. A model of Γ is a pair (\mathcal{M}, s) , where \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure and $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ is a variable assignment, such that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$.

Notice that this use of the word *model* matches up with the symbolism $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ from Definition 4.2.9. In that setting, we had a set Σ of *sentences*, and we were looking at all \mathcal{L} -structures that made all of the sentences in Σ true. In other words, we were looking at the class of all models of Σ . Since sentences do not have any free variables, we did not need to worry about the variable assignment in that case.

Definition 5.1.2. Let \mathcal{L} be a language. Let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We write $\Gamma \models \varphi$ to mean that whenever (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of Γ , we have that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$. We pronounce $\Gamma \models \varphi$ as Γ semantically implies φ .

For example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{f, g\}$ where f and g are unary function symbols. We claim that

$$\{\forall x(fgx = x), \forall x(gfx = x)\} \models \forall y \exists x(fx = y) \wedge \forall y \exists x(gx = y).$$

To see this, let (\mathcal{M}, s) be an arbitrary model of $\{\forall x(fgx = x), \forall x(gfx = x)\}$. We then have that $f^{\mathcal{M}}: M \rightarrow M$ and $g^{\mathcal{M}}: M \rightarrow M$ are inverses of each other. It follows that both of the functions $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ and $g^{\mathcal{M}}$ are bijective, and so in particular both are surjective. Therefore, $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall y \exists x(fx = y) \wedge \forall y \exists x(gx = y)$. Notice that the variable assignment s played no role in any of our reasoning here, because all of the formulas in question were sentences.

For another example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{f, R\}$ where f is a unary function symbol and R is a unary relation symbol. We claim that

$$\{\forall y(Ry \rightarrow fy = y), Rx\} \models fx = x.$$

To see this formally, let (\mathcal{M}, s) be an arbitrary model of $\{\forall y(Ry \rightarrow fy = y), Rx\}$. Let $a = s(x)$. Since $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models Rx$, we have $s(x) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$, which means that $a \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$. Now we also have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall y(Ry \rightarrow fy = y)$, so in particular we know that $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models Ry \rightarrow fy = y$. Since $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models Ry$, we conclude that $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models fy = y$, hence $f^{\mathcal{M}}(a) = a$. Since $s(x) = a$, it follows that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models fx = x$.

However, we claim that

$$\{\forall y(Ry \rightarrow fy = y), Rx\} \not\models fy = y.$$

To see this, it suffices to give a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of $\{\forall y(Ry \rightarrow fy = y), Rx\}$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models fy = y$. Let \mathcal{M} be the structure with $M = \{1, 2\}$, with $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{1\}$, and with $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ equal to the function with $f^{\mathcal{M}}(1) = 1$ and $f^{\mathcal{M}}(2) = 1$. Let $s: Var \rightarrow M$ be the variable assignment with

$$s(z) = \begin{cases} 2 & \text{if } z = y \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

It is then straightforward to check that (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of $\{\forall y(Ry \rightarrow fy = y), Rx\}$, but $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models fy = y$.

Now consider the basic group theory language $\mathcal{L} = \{e, f\}$. The group axioms can be written as \mathcal{L} -sentences:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_1 &: \forall x \forall y \forall z (f(f(x, y), z) = f(x, f(y, z))) \\ \sigma_2 &: \forall x (f(x, e) = x \wedge f(e, x) = x) \\ \sigma_3 &: \forall x \exists y (f(x, y) = e \wedge f(y, x) = e). \end{aligned}$$

We then have

$$\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3\} \models \forall x \forall y \forall z ((f(x, y) = f(x, z)) \rightarrow y = z)$$

by simple properties of groups (i.e. if $a, b, c \in G$ and $ab = ac$, then $b = c$). However, notice that we have both

$$\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3\} \not\models \forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$$

and

$$\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3\} \not\models \neg \forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$$

because there exist both nonabelian groups and abelian groups. In particular, given Γ and φ , it is possible that both $\Gamma \not\models \varphi$ and $\Gamma \not\models \neg \varphi$. This is a key distinction between what happens when we have a structure together with a variable assignment (\mathcal{M}, s) on the left of the \models , versus a set of formulas. Recall that for every formula φ , we have that exactly one of $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ and $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg \varphi$ is true, because of our recursive definition of \models in a structure. Always be mindful of how to interpret \models by looking at the type of object on the left.

Similarly, suppose that $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$, where R is a binary relation symbol. The partial ordering axioms can be written as \mathcal{L} -sentences:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_1 &: \forall x Rxx \\ \sigma_2 &: \forall x \forall y ((Rxy \wedge Ryx) \rightarrow (x = y)) \\ \sigma_3 &: \forall x \forall y \forall z ((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz). \end{aligned}$$

We have both

$$\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3\} \not\models \forall x \forall y (Rxy \vee Ryx)$$

and

$$\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3\} \not\models \neg \forall x \forall y (Rxy \vee Ryx)$$

because some partial ordering are not linear orderings, but others are.

We can also define satisfiability in the first-order context, in analogy with how we defined it in propositional logic.

Definition 5.1.3. Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We say that Γ is satisfiable if there exists a model of Γ . Otherwise, we say that Γ is unsatisfiable.

Theorem 5.1.4 (Countable Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem). *Suppose that \mathcal{L} is countable and that $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is satisfiable. There exists a countable model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ .*

Proof. Since Γ is satisfiable, we may fix a model (\mathcal{N}, s) of Γ . Let $X = \text{range}(s) \subseteq N$ and notice that X is countable. By the Countable Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem, there exists a countable elementary substructure $\mathcal{M} \preceq \mathcal{N}$ such that $X \subseteq M$. Notice that s is also a variable assignment on M . Now for any $\gamma \in \Gamma$, we have that $(\mathcal{N}, s) \models \gamma$ because (\mathcal{N}, s) is a model of Γ , hence $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \gamma$ because $\mathcal{M} \preceq \mathcal{N}$. It follows that (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of Γ . \square

As in the propositional logic, we have the same fundamental connection between semantic implication and satisfiability.

Proposition 5.1.5. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. The following are equivalent.*

1. $\Gamma \models \varphi$.
2. $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is unsatisfiable.

Proof. We prove the contrapositive of each direction. Suppose first that (1) is false, i.e. that $\Gamma \not\models \varphi$. By definition, we can fix an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and variable assignment $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$, but $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi$. By the recursive definition of \models , we then have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg\varphi$. Therefore, (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$, so $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is satisfiable. Hence, (2) is false.

Suppose now that (2) is false, i.e. that $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is unsatisfiable. By definition, we can fix a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$. We then have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$, and also that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg\varphi$. By the recursive definition of \models , we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi$. We have found a model of (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ with $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi$, so $\Gamma \not\models \varphi$. Hence, (1) is false. \square

Suppose that Γ is a finite set of formulas and φ is a formula. In propositional logic, we could use truth tables, i.e. try all of the finitely many truth assignments on the variables appearing in $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$, in order to determine whether $\Gamma \models \varphi$. Similarly, we could simply try all truth assignments to determine whether a finite set is satisfiable. Although tedious and quite slow (both take exponential time), at least there was an algorithm. In contrast, there is no obvious method that works in the first-order logic case. Intuitively, it appears that we would have to examine *all* possible \mathcal{L} -structures and variable assignments to determine whether $\Gamma \models \varphi$. Of course, there are infinitely many \mathcal{L} -structures. Even worse, many of these \mathcal{L} -structures are themselves infinite, so it's not even clear whether it's possible to check that a given pair (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of Γ . We'll have a lot more to say about these ideas later.

Definition 5.1.6. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language. An \mathcal{L} -theory, or simply a theory, is a set $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that whenever $\tau \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\Sigma \models \tau$, we have $\tau \in \Sigma$.*

In other words, a theory is a set of sentences that is closed under semantic implication (for sentences). There are two standard ways to get theories. The first way is to start with an arbitrary set of sentences, and close it off under semantic implication.

Definition 5.1.7. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We let $\text{Cn}(\Sigma) = \{\tau \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}} : \Sigma \models \tau\}$. We call $\text{Cn}(\Sigma)$ the set of consequences of Σ .*

Before proving that $\text{Cn}(\Sigma)$ is always a theory, we prove a simple fact.

Proposition 5.1.8. *Let $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. \mathcal{M} is a model of Σ if and only if \mathcal{M} is a model of $\text{Cn}(\Sigma)$.*

Proof. Notice that for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$, we trivially have $\Sigma \models \sigma$, so $\sigma \in Cn(\Sigma)$. Therefore, $\Sigma \subseteq Cn(\Sigma)$. It follows that any model of $Cn(\Sigma)$ is a model of Σ .

Conversely, suppose that \mathcal{M} is a model of Σ . Let $\tau \in Cn(\Sigma)$ be arbitrary. By definition, we have $\Sigma \models \tau$. Since \mathcal{M} is a model of Σ , we know by definition of semantic implication that \mathcal{M} is a model of τ . Since $\tau \in Cn(\Sigma)$ was arbitrary, it follows that \mathcal{M} is a model of $Cn(\Sigma)$. \square

Proposition 5.1.9. *For any language \mathcal{L} and any $\Sigma \subseteq Sent_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have that $Cn(\Sigma)$ is an \mathcal{L} -theory.*

Proof. Let $\tau \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary such that $Cn(\Sigma) \models \tau$. We need to show that $\tau \in Cn(\Sigma)$, i.e. that $\Sigma \models \tau$. Let \mathcal{M} be an arbitrary model of Σ . By Proposition 5.1.8, we know that \mathcal{M} is a model of $Cn(\Sigma)$. Since $Cn(\Sigma) \models \tau$, it follows that $\mathcal{M} \models \tau$. Since \mathcal{M} was an arbitrary model of Σ , we conclude that $\Sigma \models \tau$, and hence $\tau \in Cn(\Sigma)$. \square

For example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{f, e\}$ be the basic group theory language, and consider the following sentences:

$$\sigma_1 : \forall x \forall y \forall z (f(f(x, y), z) = f(x, f(y, z)))$$

$$\sigma_2 : \forall x (f(x, e) = x \wedge f(e, x) = x)$$

$$\sigma_3 : \forall x \exists y (f(x, y) = e \wedge f(y, x) = e).$$

The theory $Grp = Cn(\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3\})$ is the theory of groups. The set Grp is the set of all first-order sentences that are true in *every* group.

The other standard way to construct a theory is to take a structure \mathcal{M} , and consider all of the sentences that are true in that structure.

Definition 5.1.10. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. We let $Th(\mathcal{M}) = \{\tau \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}} : \mathcal{M} \models \tau\}$. We call $Th(\mathcal{M})$ the theory of \mathcal{M} .*

Proposition 5.1.11. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. $Th(\mathcal{M})$ is an \mathcal{L} -theory.*

Proof. Let $\sigma \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary such that $Th(\mathcal{M}) \models \sigma$. Since \mathcal{M} is a model of $Th(\mathcal{M})$ by definition, it follows that $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$, and hence $\sigma \in Th(\mathcal{M})$. \square

For example, if \mathcal{L} is the basic group theory language, and we let \mathcal{M} be the group S_5 , then $Th(\mathcal{M})$ is the set of all first-order sentences that are true in the specific group S_5 . Notice that $Grp \subseteq Th(\mathcal{M})$. For example, the sentence asserting that there are exactly 60 elements is an element of $Th(\mathcal{M})$, but is not an element of Grp .

Let's compare the definitions of $Cn(\Sigma)$ and $Th(\mathcal{M})$. We have

$$Cn(\Sigma) = \{\tau \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}} : \Sigma \models \tau\}$$

$$Th(\mathcal{M}) = \{\tau \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}} : \mathcal{M} \models \tau\}.$$

On the face of it, the definitions look identical. We've simply alternated between putting a set of sentences on the left of \models and putting a structure on the left of \models . However, remember that there is a crucial difference between how we interpret \models in these two situations. To elaborate on this, we introduce the following definition.

Definition 5.1.12. *An \mathcal{L} -theory Σ is complete if for all $\tau \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}}$, either $\tau \in \Sigma$ or $\neg\tau \in \Sigma$.*

Proposition 5.1.13. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. $Th(\mathcal{M})$ is a complete \mathcal{L} -theory.*

Proof. We've already seen in Proposition 5.1.11 that $Th(\mathcal{M})$ is a theory. Let $\tau \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. If $\mathcal{M} \models \tau$, we then have that $\tau \in Th(\mathcal{M})$. Otherwise, we have $\mathcal{M} \not\models \tau$, so $\mathcal{M} \models \neg\tau$ (by the recursive definition of \models in a structure), and hence $\neg\tau \in Th(\mathcal{M})$. \square

As mentioned above, if Σ is a set of sentences and τ is a sentence, then it is possible that both $\Sigma \not\models \tau$ and $\Sigma \not\models \neg\tau$ are both true. In particular, the set $Cn(\Sigma)$ may not be a complete theory. For example, Grp is not complete because it neither contains $\forall x \forall y (f(x, y) = f(y, x))$ nor its negation (again because there are both abelian groups and nonabelian groups).

For another example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is a binary relation symbol. Consider the following sentences:

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_1 &: \forall x \neg Rxx \\ \sigma_2 &: \forall x \forall y \forall z ((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz) \\ \sigma_3 &: \forall x \forall y (x = y \vee Rxy \vee Ryx).\end{aligned}$$

The theory $LO = Cn(\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3\})$ is called the theory of (strict) linear orderings. LO is not complete because it neither contains $\exists y \forall x (x = y \vee Rxy)$ nor its negation, because there are linear orderings with greatest elements and linear orderings without greatest elements.

5.2 Counting Models of Theories

Given a theory T and an $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we want to count the number of models of T of cardinality n up to isomorphism. There are some technical set-theoretic difficulties here which will be elaborated upon later, but the key fact that limits the number of isomorphism classes is the following result.

Proposition 5.2.1. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$. For every \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} with $|M| = n$, there exists an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{N} with $N = [n]$ such that $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{N}$.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure with $|M| = n$. Fix a bijection $h: M \rightarrow [n]$. Let \mathcal{N} be the \mathcal{L} -structure where

- $N = [n]$.
- $c^{\mathcal{N}} = h(c^{\mathcal{M}})$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
- $R^{\mathcal{N}} = \{(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k) \in N^k : (h^{-1}(b_1), h^{-1}(b_2), \dots, h^{-1}(b_k)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}\}$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$.
- $f^{\mathcal{N}}$ is the function from N^k to N defined by $f^{\mathcal{N}}(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k) = h(f^{\mathcal{M}}(h^{-1}(b_1), h^{-1}(b_2), \dots, h^{-1}(b_k)))$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}^k$.

It is then straightforward to check that h is an isomorphism from \mathcal{M} to \mathcal{N} . □

Proposition 5.2.2. *If \mathcal{L} is finite and $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, then there are only finitely many \mathcal{L} -structures with universe $[n]$.*

Proof. Since \mathcal{L} is finite and we are working with the fixed universe $[n]$, there are only a finite number of choices for each $c^{\mathcal{M}}$, $R^{\mathcal{M}}$, and $f^{\mathcal{M}}$. □

Definition 5.2.3. *Let \mathcal{L} be a finite language and let T be an \mathcal{L} -theory. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let $I(T, n)$ be the number of models of T of cardinality n up to isomorphism. Formally, we consider the set of all \mathcal{L} -structures with universe $[n]$, and count the number of equivalence classes under the equivalence relation of isomorphism.*

For example, if Grp is the theory of groups, then $I(Grp, n)$ is a very interesting function that you study in algebra courses. For example, you show that $I(Grp, p) = 1$ for all primes p , that $I(Grp, 6) = 2$, and that $I(Grp, 8) = 5$.

Example 5.2.4. *Let $\mathcal{L} = \emptyset$ and let $T = Cn(\emptyset)$. We have $I(T, n) = 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$.*

Proof. First notice that for every $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, the \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} with universe $[n]$ is a model of T of cardinality n , so $I(T, n) \geq 1$. Now notice that if \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} are models of T of cardinality n , then any bijection $h: M \rightarrow N$ is an isomorphism (because $\mathcal{L} = \emptyset$), so $I(T, n) \leq 1$. It follows that $I(T, n) = 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. □

Example 5.2.5. $I(LO, n) = 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$.

Proof. First notice that for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, the \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} where $M = [n]$ and $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(k, \ell) \in [n]^2 : k < \ell\}$ is a model of LO of cardinality n , so $I(LO, n) \geq 1$. Next notice that any two linear orderings of cardinality n are isomorphic. Intuitively, this works as follows. Notice (by induction on the number of elements) that every finite linear ordering has a least element. Let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} be two linear orderings of cardinality n . Each must have a least element, so map the least element of \mathcal{M} to that of \mathcal{N} . Remove these elements, then map the least element remaining in \mathcal{M} to the least element remaining in \mathcal{N} , and continue. This gives an isomorphism. Formally, you can turn this into a proof by induction on n . \square

Example 5.2.6. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{f\}$ where f is a unary function symbol, and let $T = Cn(\{\forall x(fx = x)\})$. We have $I(T, n) = \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor + 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$.

Proof. Let's first analyze the finite models of T . Suppose that \mathcal{M} is a model of T of cardinality n . For every $a \in M$, we then have $f^{\mathcal{M}}(f^{\mathcal{M}}(a)) = a$. There are now two cases. Either $f^{\mathcal{M}}(a) = a$, or $f^{\mathcal{M}}(a) = b \neq a$ in which case $f^{\mathcal{M}}(b) = a$. Let

- $Fix_{\mathcal{M}} = \{a \in M : f^{\mathcal{M}}(a) = a\}$.
- $Move_{\mathcal{M}} = \{a \in M : f^{\mathcal{M}}(a) \neq a\}$.

From above, we then have that $|Move_{\mathcal{M}}|$ is even and that $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}| + |Move_{\mathcal{M}}| = n$. Now the idea is that two models \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} of T of cardinality n are isomorphic if and only if they have the same number of fixed points, because then we can match up the fixed points and then match up the “pairings” left over to get an isomorphism. Here's a more formal argument.

We now show that if \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} are models of T of cardinality n , then $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{N}$ if and only if $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}| = |Fix_{\mathcal{N}}|$. Clearly, if $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{N}$, then $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}| = |Fix_{\mathcal{N}}|$. Suppose conversely that $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}| = |Fix_{\mathcal{N}}|$. We then must have $|Move_{\mathcal{M}}| = |Move_{\mathcal{N}}|$. Let $X_{\mathcal{M}} \subseteq Move_{\mathcal{M}}$ be a set of cardinality $\frac{|Move_{\mathcal{M}}|}{2}$ such that $f^{\mathcal{M}}(x) \neq y$ for all $x, y \in X_{\mathcal{M}}$ (that is, we pick out one member from each pairing given by $f^{\mathcal{M}}$), and let $X_{\mathcal{N}}$ be such a set for \mathcal{N} . Define a function $h: M \rightarrow N$. Fix a bijection $\alpha: Fix_{\mathcal{M}} \rightarrow Fix_{\mathcal{N}}$ and a bijection $\beta: X_{\mathcal{M}} \rightarrow X_{\mathcal{N}}$. Define h by letting $h(a) = \alpha(a)$ for all $a \in Fix_{\mathcal{M}}$, letting $h(x) = \beta(x)$ for all $x \in X_{\mathcal{M}}$, and letting $h(y) = f^{\mathcal{N}}(\beta(f^{\mathcal{M}}(y)))$ for all $y \in Move_{\mathcal{M}} \setminus X_{\mathcal{M}}$. We then have that h is an isomorphism from \mathcal{M} to \mathcal{N} .

Now we need only count how many possible values there are for $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}|$. Let $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Suppose first that n is even. Since $|Move_{\mathcal{M}}|$ must be even, it follows that $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}|$ must be even. Thus, $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}| \in \{0, 2, 4, \dots, n\}$, so there are $\frac{n}{2} + 1$ many possibilities, and it's easy to construct models in which each of these possibilities occurs. Suppose now that n is odd. Since $|Move_{\mathcal{M}}|$ must be even, it follows that $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}|$ must be odd. Thus, $|Fix_{\mathcal{M}}| \in \{1, 3, 5, \dots, n\}$, so there are $\frac{n-1}{2} + 1$ many possibilities, and it's easy to construct models in which each of these possibilities occurs. Thus, in either case, we have $I(T, n) = \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor + 1$. \square

Definition 5.2.7. Suppose that \mathcal{L} is a finite language and $\sigma \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}}$. Let

$$Spec(\sigma) = \{n \in \mathbb{N}^+ : I(Cn(\sigma), n) > 0\}.$$

The set $Spec(\sigma)$ is called the spectrum of σ .

Proposition 5.2.8. There exists a finite language \mathcal{L} and a $\sigma \in Sent_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $Spec(\sigma) = \{2n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}$.

Proof. We give two separate arguments. First, let $\mathcal{L} = \{e, f\}$ be the language of group theory. Let σ be the conjunction of the group axioms with the sentence $\exists x(\neg(x = e) \wedge fx = e)$ expressing that there is an element of order 2. Now for every $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, the group $\mathbb{Z}/(2n)\mathbb{Z}$ is a model of σ of cardinality $2n$ because \bar{n} is an element of order 2. Thus, $\{2n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\} \subseteq Spec(\sigma)$. Suppose now that $k \in Spec(\sigma)$, and fix a model \mathcal{M} of σ with cardinality k . We then have that \mathcal{M} is a group with an element of order 2, so by Lagrange's Theorem it follows that $2 \mid k$, so $k \in \{2n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}$. It follows that $Spec(\sigma) = \{2n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}$.

For a second example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is a binary relation symbol. Let σ be the conjunction of the following sentences:

- $\forall x Rxx$.
- $\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)$.
- $\forall x \forall y \forall z ((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz)$.
- $\forall x \exists y (\neg(y = x) \wedge Rxy \wedge \forall z (Rxz \rightarrow (z = x \vee z = y)))$.

Notice that a model of σ is simply an equivalence relation in which every equivalence class has exactly 2 elements. It is now straightforward to show that $\text{Spec}(\sigma) = \{2^n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}$. \square

Proposition 5.2.9. *There exists a finite language \mathcal{L} and a $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\text{Spec}(\sigma) = \{2^n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}$.*

Proof. Again, we give two separate arguments. First, let $\mathcal{L} = \{e, f\}$ be the language of group theory. Let σ be the conjunction of the group axioms with the sentences $\exists x \neg(x = e)$ and $\forall x (fx = e)$ expressing that the group is nontrivial and that every nonidentity element has order 2. Now for every $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, the group $(\mathbb{Z}/2\mathbb{Z})^n$ is a model of σ of cardinality 2^n . Thus, $\{2^n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\} \subseteq \text{Spec}(\sigma)$. Suppose now that $k \in \text{Spec}(\sigma)$, and fix a model \mathcal{M} of σ of cardinality k . We then have that $k > 1$ and that \mathcal{M} is a group such that every nonidentity element has order 2. Now for any prime $p \neq 2$, it is not the case that p divides k because otherwise \mathcal{M} would have to have an element of order p by Cauchy's Theorem. Thus, the only prime that divides k is 2, and so $k \in \{2^n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}$. It follows that $\text{Spec}(\sigma) = \{2^n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}$.

For a second example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$ be the language where $0, 1$ are constant symbols and $+, \cdot$ are binary function symbols. Let σ be the conjunction of the field axioms together with $1 + 1 = 0$. Thus, the models of σ are exactly the fields of characteristic 2. By results in algebra, there is a finite field of characteristic 2 of cardinality k if and only if k is a power of 2. \square

For the theory of linear orderings LO , we saw that $I(LO, n) = 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Now the theory of linear orderings is not complete, because some linear orderings have a maximum element, and some do not. For example, every finite linear ordering has a maximum element, but $(\mathbb{N}, <)$ does not. More formally, for the sentence τ equal to

$$\exists x \forall y (Ryx \vee y = x),$$

we have both $\tau \notin LO$ and also $\neg\tau \notin LO$. Similarly, some linear orderings have a minimum elements, and some do not. Suppose that we start with our three linear ordering axioms $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3$, and then add two axioms σ_4 and σ_5 saying that there is no minimum element and there is no maximum element. The theory $Cn(\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3, \sigma_4, \sigma_5\})$ is called the theory of linear orderings without endpoints. It turns out that this theory is also not complete. Consider the two models $(\mathbb{Z}, <)$ and $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$. The rational ordering is *dense*, i.e. between any two elements we can always find another. In other words, we have

$$(\mathbb{Q}, <) \models \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow \exists z (Rxz \wedge Rzy)).$$

However, we have

$$(\mathbb{Z}, <) \not\models \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow \exists z (Rxz \wedge Rzy))$$

because there is no element between 0 and 1. Thus, the theory of linear orderings without endpoints is also not complete, because it neither contains $\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow \exists z (Rxz \wedge Rzy))$ nor its negation. If we add the density condition as an axiom, we obtain an important theory.

Definition 5.2.10. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is a binary relation symbol. Consider the following sentences

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_1 &: \forall x \neg Rxx \\ \sigma_2 &: \forall x \forall y \forall z ((Rxy \wedge Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz) \\ \sigma_3 &: \forall x \forall y (x = y \vee Rxy \vee Ryx) \\ \sigma_4 &: \forall x \exists y Rxy \\ \sigma_5 &: \forall x \exists y Ryx \\ \sigma_6 &: \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow \exists z (Rxz \wedge Rzy))\end{aligned}$$

and let $DLO = Cn(\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3, \sigma_4, \sigma_5, \sigma_6, \})$. DLO is called the theory of dense (strict) linear orderings without endpoints.

Notice that $I(DLO, n) = 0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$ because every finite linear ordering has a least element (see Example 5.2.5). Of course, there are countable models of DLO , such as $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$. Somewhat amazingly, any two countably infinite models of DLO are isomorphic.

Theorem 5.2.11 (Cantor). Suppose that \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} are two countably infinite models of DLO . We then have that $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{N}$.

Proof. Since \mathcal{M} is countably infinite, we can list the elements of M without repetition as m_0, m_1, m_2, \dots . Similarly, we can list the elements of N without repetition as n_0, n_1, n_2, \dots . We now define a sequence of “partial isomorphisms” $h_k: M \rightarrow N$, i.e. each h_k will be a function from some finite subset of M to N that preserves the relation. More formally, we will have the following for each $k \in \mathbb{N}$:

- $\text{domain}(h_k)$ is a finite nonempty set.
- Each h_k is injective.
- For each $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $\{m_0, m_1, \dots, m_\ell\} \subseteq \text{domain}(h_{2\ell})$.
- For each $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $\{n_0, n_1, \dots, n_\ell\} \subseteq \text{range}(h_{2\ell+1})$.
- $h_k \subseteq h_{k+1}$, i.e. whenever $a \in \text{domain}(h_k)$, we have $a \in \text{domain}(h_{k+1})$ and $h_{k+1}(a) = h_k(a)$.
- Each h_k is a partial isomorphism, i.e. for all $a, b \in \text{domain}(h_k)$, we have $(a, b) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$ if and only if $(h_k(a), h_k(b)) \in R^{\mathcal{N}}$.

We start by letting h_0 be the partial function with domain $\{m_0\}$ where $h_0(m_0) = n_0$, and then we let $h_1 = h_0$ (since n_0 is already in $\text{range}(h_0)$). Suppose that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ and we have defined h_k . We have two cases.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that k is odd, and fix $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ with $k = 2\ell - 1$. If $m_\ell \in \text{domain}(h_k)$, let $h_{k+1} = h_k$. Suppose then that $m_\ell \notin \text{domain}(h_k)$. Notice that $A = \text{domain}(h_k) \cup \{m_\ell\}$ is a finite nonempty subset of M , so when we restrict $R^{\mathcal{M}}$ to this finite set, we obtain a finite linear ordering. Similarly, we have that $C = \text{range}(h_k)$ is a finite nonempty subset of N , so when we restrict $R^{\mathcal{N}}$ to this finite set, we obtain a finite linear ordering.
 - *Subcase 1:* Suppose m_ℓ is the least element of the finite linear ordering A . Since C is a finite linear ordering, it has a least element, say c . Since \mathcal{N} is a model of DLO , we can fix $d \in N$ with $(d, c) \in R^{\mathcal{N}}$. We now extend h_k to h_{k+1} by letting $h_{k+1}(m_\ell) = d$.
 - *Subcase 2:* Suppose m_ℓ is the greatest element of the finite linear ordering A . Since C is a finite linear ordering, it has a greatest element, say c . Since \mathcal{N} is a model of DLO , we can fix $d \in N$ with $(c, d) \in R^{\mathcal{N}}$. We now extend h_k to h_{k+1} by letting $h_{k+1}(m_\ell) = d$.

- *Subcase 3:* Otherwise, m_ℓ has an immediate predecessor a and immediate successor b in the finite linear ordering A . Since $(a, b) \in R^M$, we have $(h_k(a), h_k(b)) \in R^N$. As N is a model of DLO , we can fix $d \in N$ with $(h_k(a), d) \in R^N$ and $(d, h_k(b)) \in R^N$. We now extend h_k to h_{k+1} by letting $h_{k+1}(m_\ell) = d$.
- *Case 2:* Suppose that k is even, and fix $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ with $k = 2\ell$. If $n_\ell \in \text{range}(h_k)$, let $h_{k+1} = h_k$. Suppose then that $n_\ell \notin \text{range}(h_k)$. Notice that $A = \text{domain}(h_k)$ is a finite nonempty subset of M , so when we restrict R^M to this finite set, we obtain a finite linear ordering. Similarly, we have that $C = \text{range}(h_k) \cup \{n_\ell\}$ is a finite nonempty subset of N , so when we restrict R^N to this finite set, we obtain a finite linear ordering.
 - *Subcase 1:* Suppose n_ℓ is the least element of the finite linear ordering C . Since A is a finite linear ordering, it has a least element, say a . Since M is a model of DLO , we can fix $b \in M$ with $(b, a) \in R^M$. We now extend h_k to h_{k+1} by letting $h_{k+1}(b) = n_\ell$.
 - *Subcase 2:* Suppose n_ℓ is the greatest element of the finite linear ordering C . Since A is a finite linear ordering, it has a greatest element, say a . Since M is a model of DLO , we can fix $b \in M$ with $(a, b) \in R^M$. We now extend h_k to h_{k+1} by letting $h_{k+1}(b) = n_\ell$.
 - *Subcase 3:* Otherwise, n_ℓ has an immediate predecessor c and immediate successor d in the finite linear ordering C . Fix $a, b \in M$ with $h(a) = c$ and $h(b) = d$. Since $(c, d) \in R^N$, we have $(h(a), h(b)) \in R^N$, so $(a, b) \in R^M$. As M is a model of DLO , we can fix $x \in M$ with $(a, x) \in R^M$ and $(x, b) \in R^M$. We now extend h_k to h_{k+1} by letting $h_{k+1}(x) = n_\ell$.

Now it is straightforward to check that if h_k satisfies all of the above conditions, then h_{k+1} also satisfies all of the necessary conditions, regardless of which subcase we take.

Now define $h: M \rightarrow N$ by letting $h(m_\ell) = h_{2\ell}(m_\ell)$ for each $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$. Using the second through fifth conditions on the h_k , we conclude that h is a bijection. Now let $a, b \in M$ be arbitrary. Fix $k, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$ with $a = m_k$ and $b = m_\ell$. Let $t = \max\{k, \ell\}$. Since $a, b \in \text{domain}(h_{2t})$, we have $(a, b) \in R^M$ if and only if $(h_{2t}(a), h_{2t}(b)) \in R^M$, which by fifth condition on the h_k is if and only if $(h(a), h(b)) \in R^M$. Therefore, h is an isomorphism. \square

Proposition 5.2.12. *Let T be a theory. The following are equivalent.*

1. T is complete.
2. Every two models of T are elementarily equivalent.

Proof. Suppose that T is not complete. Fix $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\sigma \notin T$ and also $\neg\sigma \notin T$. Since T is theory, we have both $T \not\models \sigma$ and also $T \not\models \neg\sigma$. Since $T \not\models \sigma$, we can fix a model \mathcal{M} of $T \cup \{\neg\sigma\}$. Since $T \not\models \neg\sigma$, we can fix a model \mathcal{N} of $T \cup \{\sigma\}$. Now $\mathcal{M} \models \neg\sigma$ and $\mathcal{N} \models \sigma$, so $\mathcal{M} \not\equiv \mathcal{N}$. Thus, there exist two models of T that are not elementarily equivalent.

Suppose that T is complete, and let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} be two arbitrary models of T . Let $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. If $\sigma \in T$, we then have that both $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ and $\mathcal{N} \models \sigma$. Suppose that $\sigma \notin T$. Since T is complete, we then have that $\neg\sigma \in T$, hence $\mathcal{M} \models \neg\sigma$ and $\mathcal{N} \models \neg\sigma$. It follows that both $\mathcal{M} \not\models \sigma$ and $\mathcal{N} \not\models \sigma$. Therefore, for all $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have that $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ if and only if $\mathcal{N} \models \sigma$, so $\mathcal{M} \equiv \mathcal{N}$. \square

Theorem 5.2.13 (Countable Los-Vaught Test). *Let \mathcal{L} be a countable language. Suppose that T is an \mathcal{L} -theory such that all models of T are infinite, and suppose also that every two countably infinite models of T are isomorphic. We then have that T is complete.*

Proof. We show that any two models of T are elementarily equivalent. Let \mathcal{M}_1 and \mathcal{M}_2 be two arbitrary models of T . By the Countable Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem, we can fix countable elementary substructures $\mathcal{N}_1 \preceq \mathcal{M}_1$ and $\mathcal{N}_2 \preceq \mathcal{M}_2$. Now \mathcal{N}_1 and \mathcal{N}_2 are also both models of T , are hence are both infinite

by assumption. Since any two countably infinite models of T are isomorphic, we conclude that $\mathcal{N}_1 \cong \mathcal{N}_2$, and hence $\mathcal{N}_1 \equiv \mathcal{N}_2$ by Corollary 4.3.8. Now since each \mathcal{N}_i is an elementary substructure of \mathcal{M}_i , we also have both $\mathcal{M}_1 \equiv \mathcal{N}_1$ and $\mathcal{M}_2 \equiv \mathcal{N}_2$. Therefore, $\mathcal{M}_1 \equiv \mathcal{M}_2$. \square

Corollary 5.2.14. *DLO is complete.*

Proof. Immediate from Theorem 5.2.11 and the Countable Los-Vaught Test, together with the fact that DLO has no finite models (since a finite linear ordering has a least element) \square

Corollary 5.2.15. *In the language $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is a binary relation symbol, we have $(\mathbb{Q}, <) \equiv (\mathbb{R}, <)$.*

Proof. Both $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$ and $(\mathbb{R}, <)$ are models of DLO, so this follows from Corollary 5.2.14 and Proposition 5.2.12. \square

5.3 Equivalent Formulas

Given formulas φ and ψ , we use $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ as shorthand for $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$.

Definition 5.3.1. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We say that φ and ψ are semantically equivalent if $\varphi \models \psi$ and $\psi \models \varphi$. This is equivalent to saying that $\emptyset \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$.*

We now list a bunch of simple rules for manipulating formulas that preserve semantic equivalence.

Proposition 5.3.2. *Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \psi_1, \psi_2 \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and suppose that $\emptyset \models \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \psi_1$ and that $\emptyset \models \varphi_2 \leftrightarrow \psi_2$. We have the following:*

1. $\emptyset \models (\neg\varphi_1) \leftrightarrow (\neg\psi_1)$.
2. $\emptyset \models \exists x\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \exists x\psi_1$.
3. $\emptyset \models \forall x\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \forall x\psi_1$.
4. $\emptyset \models (\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow (\psi_1 \wedge \psi_2)$.
5. $\emptyset \models (\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow (\psi_1 \vee \psi_2)$.
6. $\emptyset \models (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow (\psi_1 \rightarrow \psi_2)$.

Proposition 5.3.3. *For all $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have the following:*

1. $\emptyset \models \neg(\exists x\varphi) \leftrightarrow \forall x(\neg\varphi)$.
2. $\emptyset \models \neg(\forall x\varphi) \leftrightarrow \exists x(\neg\varphi)$.
3. If $x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\psi)$, then $\emptyset \models (\exists x\varphi) \wedge \psi \leftrightarrow \exists x(\varphi \wedge \psi)$.
4. If $x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\psi)$, then $\emptyset \models (\forall x\varphi) \wedge \psi \leftrightarrow \forall x(\varphi \wedge \psi)$.
5. If $x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\psi)$, then $\emptyset \models (\exists x\varphi) \vee \psi \leftrightarrow \exists x(\varphi \vee \psi)$.
6. If $x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\psi)$, then $\emptyset \models (\forall x\varphi) \vee \psi \leftrightarrow \forall x(\varphi \vee \psi)$.
7. If $x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\psi)$, then $\emptyset \models (\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \psi \leftrightarrow \forall x(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$.
8. If $x \notin \text{FreeVar}(\psi)$, then $\emptyset \models (\forall x\varphi) \rightarrow \psi \leftrightarrow \exists x(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$.

Proposition 5.3.4. *For any $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x \in \text{Var}$, we have the following:*

1. If $y \notin \text{OccurVar}(\varphi)$, then $\emptyset \models \exists x \varphi \leftrightarrow \exists y(\varphi_x^y)$.
2. If $y \notin \text{OccurVar}(\varphi)$, then $\emptyset \models \forall x \varphi \leftrightarrow \forall y(\varphi_x^y)$.

Definition 5.3.5. Let \mathcal{L} be a language. A literal is either an atomic formula over \mathcal{L} , or the negation of an atomic formula. We let $\text{Lit}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be the set of literals.

Definition 5.3.6. Let \mathcal{L} be a set. We let $\text{Conj}_{\mathcal{L}} = G(\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \text{Lit}_{\mathcal{L}}, \{h_{\wedge}\})$ be the formulas obtained by starting with the literals and generating using only h_{\wedge} , and call $\text{Conj}_{\mathcal{L}}$ the set of conjunctive formulas. From here, we define $\text{DNF}_{\mathcal{L}} = G(\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \text{Conj}_{\mathcal{L}}, \{h_{\vee}\})$ to be the formulas obtained by starting with the conjunctive formulas, and generating using only h_{\vee} . The elements of $\text{DNF}_{\mathcal{L}}$ are said to be in disjunctive normal form.

Proposition 5.3.7. Suppose that $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is quantifier-free. There exists a quantifier-free formula $\theta(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$ in disjunctive normal form such that $\emptyset \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \theta$.

Proof. As in Proposition 3.2.11, it's possible to show by induction that every quantifier-free formula is semantically equivalent to one built up by starting with literals, and then generated using \wedge and \vee (here we are using the fact that $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ is semantically equivalent to $(\neg\varphi) \vee \psi$, that $\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ is semantically equivalent to $(\neg\varphi) \vee (\neg\psi)$, and that $\neg(\varphi \vee \psi)$ is semantically equivalent to $(\neg\varphi) \wedge (\neg\psi)$). Now we can use the fact that $\varphi \wedge (\psi \vee \gamma)$ is semantically equivalent to $(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vee (\varphi \wedge \gamma)$ and that $(\varphi \vee \psi) \wedge \gamma$ is semantically equivalent to $(\varphi \wedge \gamma) \vee (\psi \wedge \gamma)$ to push the \wedge connectives to the inside. \square

Definition 5.3.8. A formula φ is called a prenex formula if it is an element of

$$G(\text{Sym}_{\mathcal{L}}^*, \text{QuantFreeForm}_{\mathcal{L}}, \{h_{\forall, x}, h_{\exists, x} : x \in \text{Var}\}).$$

In other words, a prenex formula is a quantifier-free formula with a block of quantifiers (potentially mixed \exists and \forall quantifiers) at the front.

Proposition 5.3.9. For every $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, there exists a prenex formula ψ such that $\emptyset \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$.

Proof. Repeatedly apply Proposition 5.3.4 and Proposition 5.3.3 to move all of the quantifiers to the front of the formula. \square

5.4 Quantifier Elimination

In the previous section, we showed how to transform formulas into semantically equivalent ones that had a particularly simple “structure”. In that setting, the equivalence was relative to the empty set. In other words, the two formulas had to have the same meaning in *every* choice of \mathcal{L} -structure and variable assignments. What if we allow ourselves to include sets of formulas on the left to help us simplify the formulas even more?

For example, consider putting a theory T on the left of \models . Now a theory is a set of sentences, but we can still consider putting formulas with free variable on the right-hand side of \models . In such circumstances, we have to think about variable assignments as well, but the hope is that we can find a “simpler” equivalent formula to a given one. For example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$, where R is a binary relation symbol. Notice that

$$\emptyset \not\models \exists x(Rax \wedge Rbx) \leftrightarrow Rab$$

because we can let \mathcal{M} be the \mathcal{L} -structure with $M = \{0, 1, 2\}$ and $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(0, 2), (1, 2)\}$, and then

$$(\mathcal{M}, 0, 1) \models \exists x(Rax \wedge Rbx)$$

but

$$(\mathcal{M}, 0, 1) \not\models Rab,$$

so

$$(\mathcal{M}, 0, 1) \not\models \exists x(\text{Rax} \wedge \text{Rbx}) \leftrightarrow \text{Rab}.$$

Even though these formulas are not equivalent over the theory $Cn(\emptyset)$, it turns out that they are equivalent over the theory of equivalence relations. Let $EqRel$ is the theory of equivalence relations, i.e. $EqRel = Cn(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3)$ where the σ_i express that the relation is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. We then have that

$$EqRel \models \exists x(\text{Rax} \wedge \text{Rbx}) \leftrightarrow \text{Rab}.$$

In other words, in every model (\mathcal{M}, s) of $EqRel$, we have that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x(\text{Rax} \wedge \text{Rbx}) \leftrightarrow \text{Rab}.$$

Thus, relative to the theory $EqRel$, the formula $\exists x(\text{Rax} \wedge \text{Rbx})$, which has a quantifier and two free variables, is equivalent to the quantifier-free formula Rab in the same free variables. Notice that if we work with DLO instead of $EqRel$, then we have

$$DLO \models \exists x(\text{Rax} \wedge \text{Rbx}) \leftrightarrow (a = a).$$

For another example, consider solving linear equations. If we are working in the real numbers, then we can always solve the equation $ax + b = 0$, unless $a = 0$ and $b \neq 0$. More formally, let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$ be the language of ring theory. If we let \mathcal{M} be the ring \mathbb{R} , and let $a, b \in Var$, then so any variable assignment $s: Var \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x(a \cdot x + b = 0) \leftrightarrow (\neg(a = 0) \vee b = 0).$$

Notice that

$$\emptyset \not\models \exists x(a \cdot x + b = 0) \leftrightarrow (\neg(a = 0) \vee b = 0).$$

In fact, if R is the theory of rings, then we still have

$$R \not\models \exists x(a \cdot x + b = 0) \leftrightarrow (\neg(a = 0) \vee b = 0),$$

because we can let \mathcal{M} be the ring \mathbb{Z} , and notice that we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, 2, 1) \not\models \exists x(a \cdot x + b = 0) \leftrightarrow (\neg(a = 0) \vee b = 0).$$

However, if F is the theory of fields, then we do have

$$F \models \exists x(a \cdot x + b = 0) \leftrightarrow (\neg(a = 0) \vee b = 0).$$

Again, relative to a sufficiently strong theory, we can found a quantifier-free equivalent to a formula with two free variables.

Definition 5.4.1. *Let T be a theory. We say that T has quantifier elimination, or has QE, if for every $k \geq 1$ and every $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k) \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$, there exists a quantifier-free $\psi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$ such that*

$$T \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi.$$

This seems like an awful lot to ask of a theory. However, it is a pleasant surprise that several natural and important theories have QE, and in several more cases we can obtain a theory with QE by only adding a few things to the language. We first prove that it suffices to eliminate one quantifier from formulas of a very specific form.

Proposition 5.4.2. *Let T be a theory. The following are equivalent*

1. T has QE.

2. For each formula $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k, y)$ that is a conjunction of literals, each of which has y as a free variable, there exists a quantifier-free $\psi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$ such that

$$T \models (\exists y \varphi) \leftrightarrow \psi.$$

Proof. The idea is to put a general formula in prenex form. If the innermost quantifier is \forall , change it to $\neg \exists \neg$ so that the innermost block is a existential quantifier followed by a quantifier-free formula φ . Now find a formula θ that is in disjunctive normal form that is semantically equivalent to φ . From here, the key fact to use is that

$$\emptyset \models \exists x(\theta_1 \vee \theta_2) \leftrightarrow (\exists x \theta_1) \vee (\exists x \theta_2).$$

We can then use the assumption to find quantifier-free equivalents (relative to T) of each formulas that is an existential quantifier followed by a conjunction of literals. Now that we have eliminated the innermost quantifier, we can continue in turn to eliminate later quantifiers. \square

We now do the hard work of proving QE for two specific theories. We start with the very basic theory of infinite structures in the empty language.

Theorem 5.4.3. Let $\mathcal{L} = \emptyset$. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let σ_n be the sentence

$$\exists x_1 \exists x_2 \dots \exists x_n \bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} \neg(x_i = x_j)$$

Let $T = Cn(\{\sigma_n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\})$. T has QE.

Proof. Suppose that $k \geq 1$ and we have have a formula $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k, y)$ that is a conjunction of literals α_i , each of which has y as a free variable. We want to find a quantifier-free formula $\psi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$ such that

$$T \models \exists y \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi.$$

If one of the literals is $y = x_j$ (or $x_j = y$) for some j , then

$$T \models \exists y \varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi_y^{x_j}.$$

Suppose then that none of the literals is of the form $y = x_j$. We can remove any literals of the form $y = y$, and if there is a literal of the form $\neg(y = y)$, then the formula is trivially equivalent to $\neg(x_1 = x_1)$. Thus, we need only examine the case where every literal is of the form $\neg(y = x_j)$ or $\neg(x_j = y)$ for some j . We then have

$$T \models \exists y \varphi \leftrightarrow (x_1 = x_1).$$

because every model of T has infinitely many elements. \square

We next show that DLO has QE. Before diving into the general proof, we first give a specific example. Suppose that we want to find a quantifier-free equivalent to

$$\exists y(Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge \neg(Rx_1y)).$$

We begin by noticing that $DLO \models \neg(Rx_1y) \leftrightarrow ((y = x_1) \vee Ryx_1)$, so we want to find a quantifier-free equivalent to

$$\exists y(Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge ((y = x_1) \vee Ryx_1)).$$

Since \wedge distributes over \vee , it suffices to find a quantifier-free equivalent to

$$\exists y((Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge (y = x_1)) \vee ((Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge Ryx_1))).$$

Since this last formula is equivalent to

$$\exists y(Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge (y = x_1)) \vee \exists y(Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge Ryx_1),$$

it suffices to find a quantifier-free equivalent to each of

$$\exists y(Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge (y = x_1))$$

and

$$\exists y(Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge Ryx_1).$$

Now we have

$$DLO \models \exists y(Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge (y = x_1)) \leftrightarrow (Rx_2x_1 \wedge \neg(x_1 = x_3) \wedge Rx_1x_4),$$

and we have

$$DLO \models \exists y(Rx_2y \wedge \neg(y = x_3) \wedge Ryx_4 \wedge Ryx_1) \leftrightarrow (Rx_2x_4 \wedge Rx_2x_1),$$

where we use the fact that if $a < b$ in a model of DLO , then there are infinitely many c with $a < c < b$. Thus, our original formula is equivalent over DLO to

$$(Rx_2x_1 \wedge \neg(x_1 = x_3) \wedge Rx_1x_4) \vee (Rx_2x_4 \wedge Rx_2x_1).$$

We generalize this example in the following proof.

Theorem 5.4.4. *DLO has QE.*

Proof. Suppose that we have a formula $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k, y)$ that is a conjunction of literals α_i , each of which has y as a free variable. We want to find a quantifier-free formula $\psi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$ such that

$$DLO \models \exists y \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi.$$

If one of the literals is $y = x_j$ (or $x_j = y$) for some j , then

$$DLO \models \exists y \varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi_y^{x_j}.$$

Suppose then that none of the literals is of the form $y = x_j$. If any of the literals is of the form $\neg Rx_j y$, we can replace it with $(y = x_j) \vee Ryx_j$, distribute the various \wedge over the \vee , distribute the \exists over \vee , and find quantifier-free equivalents to the two resulting clauses separately (as in the previous example). Similarly, if any of the literals is of the form $\neg Ryx_j$, we can replace it with $(y = x_j) \vee Rx_j y$. Thus, we may assume that all of the literals are of the form $\neg(y = x_j)$, Ryx_j , or $Rx_j y$. Let

- $L = \{j \in \{1, 2, \dots, k\} : \text{There exists an } \alpha_i \text{ equal to } Rx_j y\}.$
- $U = \{j \in \{1, 2, \dots, k\} : \text{There exists an } \alpha_i \text{ equal to } Ryx_j\}.$

Now if either L or U is empty, then

$$DLO \models \exists y \varphi \leftrightarrow x_1 = x_1$$

because, if $U = \emptyset$ say, we need only notice that in any model \mathcal{M} of DLO together with $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k \in M$, there are infinitely many $d \in M$ such that $(c_i, d) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all i .

Suppose then that both $L \neq \emptyset$ and $U \neq \emptyset$. We claim that

$$DLO \models \exists y \varphi \leftrightarrow \bigwedge_{\ell \in L} \bigwedge_{u \in U} Rx_\ell x_u$$

To see this, consider an arbitrary model \mathcal{M} of DLO together with $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k \in M$.

- Assume that there exists a $d \in M$ with $(c_\ell, d) \in R^M$ for all $\ell \in L$ and $(d, c_u) \in R^M$ for all $u \in U$. We then have $(c_\ell, c_u) \in R^M$ for all $\ell \in L$ and $u \in U$ by transitivity.
- For the converse, assume that we know that $(c_\ell, c_u) \in R^M$ for all $\ell \in L$ and $u \in U$. Since M is a linear ordering, there exists $\ell^* \in L$ with (c_ℓ, c_{ℓ^*}) for all $\ell \in L$. Similarly, there exists $u^* \in U$ with (c_{u^*}, c_u) for all $u \in U$. By assumption, we then have that $(c_{\ell^*}, c_{u^*}) \in R^M$. Now the *DLO* axioms imply that there exists infinitely many $a \in M$ with $(c_{\ell^*}, a) \in R^M$ and $(a, c_{u^*}) \in R^M$. Thus, we can fix such an a with $a \neq c_i$ for all i , and this a will make be an existential witness for φ .

Therefore, *DLO* has *QE*. □

Notice that in our definition of *QE*, we assumed that $k \geq 1$. In other words, we did not require that we could always find a quantifier-free equivalent sentence for each $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We chose to do this because if our language does not have any constant symbols (such as the language for *DLO*), then there simply are no quantifier-free sentences! If our language does have a constant symbol, then the proof that a theory has *QE* typically also applies in the case when there are no free variables. And in the case when our language does not, we can perform an ugly hack by taking a sentence σ , and finding a quantifier-free equivalent to the formula $\varphi(x)$ equal to $\sigma \wedge (x = x)$. Of course, in this case, the value of x does not affect the truth in any structure, so the truth value of the formula output by a quantifier elimination procedure must also not depend on x in any fixed structure.

What do we gain by knowing that a formula has *QE*? The first advantage is that it is much easier to understand the definable sets in any model.

Proposition 5.4.5. *Suppose that T is a theory with *QE*. Given any model M of T , a set $X \subseteq M^k$ is definable in M if and only if it is definable by a quantifier-free formula.*

Proof. Immediate. □

Corollary 5.4.6. *Let T be a theory that has *QE*, let M be a model of T , and let $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Let \mathcal{Z} be the set of all subsets of M^k which are definable by atomic formulas. The set of definable subsets of M^k equals $G(\mathcal{P}(M^k), \mathcal{Z}, \{h_1, h_2\})$ where $h_1: \mathcal{P}(M^k) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(M^k)$ is the complement function and $h_2: \mathcal{P}(M^k)^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(M^k)$ is the union function.*

Proof. A quantifier-free formula is built up from atomic formulas using \neg , \wedge , \vee , and \rightarrow . Moreover, we know that every quantifier-free formula is semantically equivalent to one that only uses \neg and \vee . Since these operations correspond to complement and union on the corresponding definable sets, we obtain the result. □

For example, in $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$, which is a model of *DLO*, the only atomic formula with one free variable are $x = x$, $\neg(x = x)$, $x < x$, and $\neg(x < x)$. Each of these defines either \emptyset or \mathbb{Q} . Since the collection of sets $\{\emptyset, \mathbb{Q}\}$ is closed under complement and union, we now have another proof (without using automorphisms) that \emptyset and \mathbb{Q} are the only definable subsets of \mathbb{Q} in $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$. We can also use this method to determine the definable sets of \mathbb{Q}^2 in the structure $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$ (see the homework).

Another interesting consequence of a theory having *QE* is the following surprising fact.

Proposition 5.4.7. *Let T be a theory that has *QE*. Suppose that \mathcal{A} and M are models of T and that \mathcal{A} is a substructure of M . We then have that $\mathcal{A} \preceq M$.*

Proof. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and let $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$ be a variable assignment. Suppose first that $\varphi \notin \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Since T has *QE*, we may fix a quantifier-free $\psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $T \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi && \text{(since } \mathcal{M} \text{ is a model of } T\text{)} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \psi && \text{(by Proposition 4.3.11)} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi && \text{(since } \mathcal{A} \text{ is a model of } T\text{).}
 \end{aligned}$$

Let $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, then we can use the hack alluded to above. That is, let $\varphi(x)$ be the formula $\sigma \wedge (x = x)$. Since T has QE , we may fix a quantifier-free $\psi(x) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $T \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$. Now fix some $a \in A$. By the above argument, we then have that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ if and only if $(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi$. Now notice that we trivially have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \sigma$ if and only if $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$, and similarly that $(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \sigma$ if and only if $(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \varphi$. Therefore, we conclude that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \sigma$ if and only if $(\mathcal{A}, s) \models \sigma$. \square

In particular, since DLO has QE , we now know that $(\mathbb{Q}, <) \preceq (\mathbb{R}, <)$. Recall that we already established that $(\mathbb{Q}, <) \equiv (\mathbb{R}, <)$, but this new result is stronger.

By a similar argument, we can also use QE in an interesting way to find connections between two models that share a common substructure.

Proposition 5.4.8. *Let T be a theory that has QE . Suppose that \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} are models of T , and that \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} have a common substructure \mathcal{A} (note that we are not assuming that \mathcal{A} is a model of T). For all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ if and only if $(\mathcal{N}, s) \models \varphi$.*

Proof. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary and $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow A$ be arbitrary. First, assume that φ is not a sentence. Since T has QE , we can fix a quantifier-free ψ with $T \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi && \text{(since } \mathcal{M} \text{ is a model of } T\text{)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{A}, s) \models \psi && \text{(by Proposition 4.3.11)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, s) \models \psi && \text{(by Proposition 4.3.11)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, s) \models \varphi && \text{(since } \mathcal{N} \text{ is a model of } T\text{)} \end{aligned}$$

If φ is a sentence, then we can argue as in the previous result. \square

The final application of using QE using the same ideas is to show that certain theories are complete. QE itself is not sufficient, but a very mild additional assumption gives us what we want.

Proposition 5.4.9. *Let T be a theory that has QE . If there exists an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{N} such that for every model \mathcal{M} of T there is an embedding $h: \mathcal{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ from \mathcal{N} to \mathcal{M} , then T is complete. (Notice, there is no assumption that \mathcal{N} is a model of T .)*

Proof. Fix an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{N} such that for every model \mathcal{M} of T there is an embedding $h: \mathcal{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ from \mathcal{N} to \mathcal{M} , and fix $n \in N$. Let \mathcal{M}_1 and \mathcal{M}_2 be two models of T . Fix embeddings $h_1: \mathcal{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_1$ and $h_2: \mathcal{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_2$. For each i , let $A_i = \text{range}(h_i)$, and notice that A_i is the universe of a substructure \mathcal{A}_i of \mathcal{M}_i . Furthermore, notice that h_i is an isomorphism from \mathcal{N} to \mathcal{A}_i .

Let $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and let $\varphi(x) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be the formula $\sigma \wedge (x = x)$. Since T has QE , we may fix a quantifier-free $\psi(x) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $T \models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{M}_1 \models \sigma &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}_1, h_1(n)) \models \varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}_1, h_1(n)) \models \psi && \text{(since } \mathcal{M}_1 \text{ is a model of } T\text{)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{A}_1, h_1(n)) \models \psi && \text{(by Proposition 4.3.11)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{N}, n) \models \psi && \text{(by Theorem 4.3.5)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{A}_2, h_2(n)) \models \psi && \text{(by Theorem 4.3.5)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}_2, h_2(n)) \models \psi && \text{(by Proposition 4.3.11)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}_2, h_2(n)) \models \varphi && \text{(since } \mathcal{M}_2 \text{ is a model of } T\text{)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \mathcal{M}_2 \models \sigma \end{aligned}$$

\square

5.5 Algebraically Closed Fields

A field F is algebraically closed if every nonzero polynomial in $F[x]$ has a root in F . We can write down infinitely many first-order axioms, each one saying all polynomials of a given degree have a root. We choose to work in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, -, \cdot\}$, where $-$ is a unary function symbol, which the field axioms will use as notation for the additive inverse of an element.

Definition 5.5.1. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, -, \cdot\}$. Let $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be the field axioms together with the sentences

$$\forall a_0 \forall a_1 \cdots \forall a_n (a_n \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists x (a_n x^n + \cdots + a_1 x + a_0 = 0))$$

for each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Let $ACF = \text{Cn}(\Sigma)$. ACF_p is the theory obtained by also adding $1 + 1 + \cdots + 1 = 0$ (where there are p many 1's) to Σ , and ACF_0 is the theory obtained by adding all of $\neg(1 = 0)$, $\neg(1 + 1 = 0)$, \dots to Σ .

We collect a few facts about algebraically closed fields.

- Every algebraically closed field is infinite.
- The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra is the statement that \mathbb{C} is an algebraically closed field.
- The set $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$, consisting of those elements of \mathbb{C} that are algebraic over \mathbb{Q} (i.e. are roots of some nonzero polynomial over \mathbb{Q}), is also an algebraically closed field.
- Every field can be embedded in an algebraically closed field.

Theorem 5.5.2. ACF has QE.

Proof Sketch. The first thing to notice is that every term corresponds to a polynomial in several variables. More formally, for all terms t with variables x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k , there exists a term u that corresponds to a polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}[x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n]$ such that $ACF \models t = u$ (in fact, t and u are equivalent over the theory of fields). From here, the fundamental observation is that we can think of atomic formulas with free variables in $\{y, x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k\}$ as equations $p(\vec{x}, y) = 0$ where $p(\vec{x}, y) \in \mathbb{Z}[\vec{x}, y]$ is a polynomial.

Thus, we have to find quantifier-free equivalents to formulas of the form

$$\exists y \left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^m (p_i(\vec{x}, y) = 0) \wedge \bigwedge_{j=1}^n (q_j(\vec{x}, y) \neq 0) \right]$$

If we just have a bunch of negated atomic formulas, i.e. if $m = 0$, then the formula is equivalent to saying that each polynomial has a nonzero coefficient (since algebraically closed fields are infinite, and a nonzero polynomial has only finitely many roots). Thus, we can assume that $m \geq 1$. Also, if $n \geq 1$, then by letting $q(\vec{x}, y) = \prod_{j=1}^n q_j(\vec{x}, y)$, our formula is equivalent over ACF to

$$\exists y \left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^m (p_i(\vec{x}, y) = 0) \wedge q(\vec{x}, y) \neq 0 \right].$$

Thus, we can assume that $m \geq 1$ and that $n \in \{0, 1\}$.

Suppose now that R is an integral domain, that $m \geq 2$ and that $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m, q \in R[y]$ listed in decreasing order of degrees. Let the leading term of p_1 be ay^n and let the leading term of p_m be by^k (in our case, R will be the polynomial ring $\mathbb{Z}[x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n]$). We then have that there is a simultaneous root of polynomials p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m which is not a root of q if and only if either of the following happens:

1. $b = 0$ and there is simultaneous root of the polynomials $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{m-1}, p_m^*$ which is not a root of q , where p_m^* is the polynomial that results by deleting the leading term of p_m .

2. $b \neq 0$ and there is a simultaneous root of the polynomials $bp_1 - ay^{n-k}p_m, p_2, \dots, p_m$ which is not a root of q .

If there is no q , i.e. if $n = 0$, then there is a simultaneous root of polynomials p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m if and only if either of the following happens:

1. $b = 0$ and there is simultaneous root of the polynomials $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{m-1}, p_m^*$, where p_m^* is the polynomial that results by deleting the leading term of p_m .
2. $b \neq 0$ and there is a simultaneous root of the polynomials $bp_1 - ay^{n-k}p_m, p_2, \dots, p_m$.

For example, we have that

$$\exists y(((x_1^3 + 2x_1x_2)y^2 + (5x_2 + x_2^2x_3)y + x_2 = 0) \wedge (3x_2 + x_1x_2x_3)y + (x_1 - x_2) = 0)$$

is equivalent to the disjunction of

$$x_1^3 + 2x_1x_2 = 0 \wedge \exists y(((5x_2 + x_2^2x_3)y + x_2 = 0) \wedge (3x_2 + x_1x_2x_3)y + (x_1 - x_2) = 0)$$

and

$$\exists y(((3x_2 + x_1x_2x_3)(5x_2 + x_2^2x_3) - (x_1 - x_2))y + (3x_2 + x_1x_2x_3)x_2 = 0)$$

Repeating this, we may assume that we have a formula of the form

$$\exists y[p(\vec{x}, y) = 0 \wedge q(\vec{x}, y) \neq 0]$$

or

$$\exists y[p(\vec{x}, y) = 0].$$

In the latter case, then we may use the fact that in an algebraically closed field, the polynomial $a_ny^n + \dots + a_1y + a_0$ has a root if and only if some $a_i \neq 0$ for $i > 0$, or $a_0 = 0$. Suppose then that we are in the former case. The key fact is to use here is that if p and q are polynomials over an algebraically closed field and the degree of p is at most n , then every root of p is a root of q if and only if $p \mid q^n$.

Thus, suppose that we have two polynomials p and q , and we want to find a quantifier-free formula equivalent to $p \mid q$. Suppose that $p(y) = \sum_{i=0}^m a_i y^i$ and that $q(y) = \sum_{j=0}^n b_j y^j$ (where the a_i and b_j are really polynomials in x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k). Now if $m = 0$, then we have $p \mid q$ if and only if either of the following is true:

- $a_0 \neq 0$.
- $a_0 = 0$ and each $b_j = 0$.

If $n = 0$, then we have $p \mid q$ if and only if either of the following is true:

- $b_0 = 0$.
- $b_0 \neq 0$, $a_0 \neq 0$, and $a_i = 0$ for $1 \leq i \leq m$.

Suppose that $1 \leq n < m$. We then have that $p \mid q$ if and only if either of the following is true:

- Each $b_j = 0$.
- $a_i = 0$ for all i with $n < i \leq m$, and $p^* \mid q$, where p^* is the result of deleting all terms from p with degree greater than n .

Finally, suppose that $1 \leq m \leq n$. We then have that $p \mid q$ if and only if either of the following is true:

- $a_m = 0$ and $p^* \mid q$, where p^* is the polynomial that results by deleting the leading term of p .

- $a_m \neq 0$ and $p \mid (a_m q - b_n y^{n-m} p)$.

Thus, in all cases, we've reduced the degree of one of the two polynomials. By repeatedly applying these latter two, and bottoming out as appropriate, we eventually obtain a quantifier-free equivalent to our formula. \square

Corollary 5.5.3. *If F and K are algebraically closed fields such that F is a subfield of K , then $(F, 0, 1, +, \cdot) \preceq (K, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$.*

Proof. Immediate from Proposition 5.4.7. \square

Since $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$ and \mathbb{C} are both algebraically closed, and $(\overline{\mathbb{Q}}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ is a substructure of $(\mathbb{C}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$, we obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 5.5.4. $(\overline{\mathbb{Q}}, 0, 1, +, \cdot) \preceq (\mathbb{C}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$.

Corollary 5.5.5. *Suppose that F is an algebraically closed field. Every set $X \subseteq F$ that is definable in $(F, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ is either finite or cofinite.*

Proof. Every atomic formula in one variable is equivalent to either $p(x) = 0$ or $\neg(p(x) = 0)$, for some choice of polynomial $p(x)$ in the variable x with integer coefficients. In the former case, notice that any nonzero polynomial has only finitely many roots, so the corresponding definable set is finite. In the latter case, the same argument shows that the corresponding definable set is cofinite. Now notice that the collection of subsets of F that are either finite or cofinite is closed under complement and union. Using Corollary 5.4.6, we conclude that every definable set is either finite or cofinite. \square

Corollary 5.5.6. ACF_0 is complete and ACF_p is complete for all primes p .

Proof. Apply Proposition 5.4.9, together with the fact that \mathbb{Q} embeds in all fields of characteristic 0, and $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ embeds in all fields of characteristic p . \square

Chapter 6

Soundness, Completeness, and Compactness

6.1 Syntactic Implication and Soundness

Ever since we defined the syntactic construction of formulas we first-order logic, we have stayed on the semantic side. That is, we talked about structures and variable assignments (which taken together formed the analogue of truth assignments), and then we proceeded to define semantic implication in terms of these objects. We now extend the proof rules that we developed in propositional logic in order to define a concept of syntactic implication in first-order logic. Most of our new rules will deal with quantifiers, but we also have the special equality symbol in every first-order language.

Once again, the objects that we will manipulate will be pairs, where the first component is a finite sequence of formulas, and the second is a formula. Given a finite sequence $S \in Form_P^*$ and a formula $\varphi \in Form_P$, we will write $S \vdash \varphi$ to intuitively mean that there is a formal syntactic proof of φ from the assumptions that appear in the sequence S . We begin with the most basic proofs, and we now have two types.

Trivial Implications:

- We can assert $S \vdash \varphi$ if φ appears as an element in the sequence S , i.e. if there exists an $i < |S|$ such that $S(i) = \varphi$. We denote these uses of this by writing $(Assume_{\mathcal{L}})$, since our conclusion appears in our assumptions.
- For any sequence S and any $t \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$, we can assert $S \vdash t = t$. We denote a use of this rule by writing $(= Refl)$.

With these in hand, we describe ways to generate new formal proof from ones that we already have established. We begin with all of the old rules, but now add five new rules: one dealing with equality, and two for each quantifier:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \frac{S \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{S \vdash \varphi} \quad (\wedge EL) & \frac{S \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{S \vdash \psi} \quad (\wedge ER) & \frac{S \vdash \varphi \quad S \vdash \psi}{S \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi} \quad (\wedge I) \\[10pt] \frac{S \vdash \varphi}{S \vdash \varphi \vee \psi} \quad (\vee IL) & \frac{S \vdash \psi}{S \vdash \varphi \vee \psi} \quad (\vee IR) & \\[10pt] \frac{S \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi}{S, \varphi \vdash \psi} \quad (\rightarrow E) & \frac{S, \varphi \vdash \psi}{S \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi} \quad (\rightarrow I) & \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{S, \varphi \vdash \theta \quad S, \psi \vdash \theta}{S, \varphi \vee \psi \vdash \theta} \quad (\vee PC) \qquad \frac{S, \psi \vdash \varphi \quad S, \neg \psi \vdash \varphi}{S \vdash \varphi} \quad (\neg PC) \\
\\
\frac{S, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \quad S, \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi}{S \vdash \varphi} \quad (Contr) \\
\\
\frac{S \vdash \varphi}{S, \gamma \vdash \varphi} \quad (Expand) \qquad \frac{S, \gamma, \gamma \vdash \varphi}{S, \gamma \vdash \varphi} \quad (Delete) \qquad \frac{S_1, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, S_2 \vdash \varphi}{S_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_1, S_2 \vdash \varphi} \quad (Reorder)
\end{array}$$

Equality Rules:

$$\frac{S \vdash \varphi_x^t \quad S \vdash t = u}{S \vdash \varphi_x^u} \quad \text{if } ValidSubst_x^t(\varphi) = 1 = ValidSubst_x^u(\varphi) \quad (= Sub)$$

Existential Rules:

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{S \vdash \varphi_x^t}{S \vdash \exists x \varphi} \quad \text{if } ValidSubst_x^t(\varphi) = 1 \quad (\exists I) \\
\\
\frac{S, \varphi_x^y \vdash \psi}{S, \exists x \varphi \vdash \psi} \quad \text{if } y \notin FreeVar(S, \exists x \varphi, \psi) \text{ and } ValidSubst_x^y(\varphi) = 1 \quad (\exists P)
\end{array}$$

Universal Rules:

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{S \vdash \forall x \varphi}{S \vdash \varphi_x^t} \quad \text{if } ValidSubst_x^t(\varphi) = 1 \quad (\forall E) \\
\\
\frac{S \vdash \varphi_x^y}{S \vdash \forall x \varphi} \quad \text{if } y \notin FreeVar(S, \forall x \varphi) \text{ and } ValidSubst_x^y(\varphi) = 1 \quad (\forall I)
\end{array}$$

To formalize these ideas, we follow the outline from propositional logic.

Definition 6.1.1. Let \mathcal{L} be language. We define the following:

- $Line_{\mathcal{L}} = Form_{\mathcal{L}}^* \times Form_{\mathcal{L}}$.
- $Assume_{\mathcal{L}} = \{(S, \varphi) \in Line_{\mathcal{L}} : \text{There exists } i < |S| \text{ such that } S(i) = \varphi\}$.
- $EqRefl_{\mathcal{L}} = \{(S, t = t) : S \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}^*, t \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}\}$.

As in propositional logic, we then define a set-valued functions from $Line_{\mathcal{L}}$ (or $Line_{\mathcal{L}}^2$) to $Line_{\mathcal{L}}$ for each rule, and let \mathcal{H} be the collection of all such functions. With this collection of function in hand, we define the following.

Definition 6.1.2. Let $S \subseteq Form_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ and let $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$. We write $S \vdash \varphi$ to mean that

$$(S, \varphi) \in (Line_{\mathcal{L}}, Assume_{\mathcal{L}} \cup EqRefl_{\mathcal{L}}, \mathcal{H}).$$

Definition 6.1.3. A deduction is a witnessing sequence in $(Line_{\mathcal{L}}, Assume_{\mathcal{L}} \cup EqRefl_{\mathcal{L}}, \mathcal{H})$.

We have defined the concept of $S \vdash \varphi$ when S is a finite sequence of formulas. Using this, we can define $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ in the case where Γ is an arbitrary (possibly infinite) set of formulas.

Definition 6.1.4. Let \mathcal{L} be a language, let $\Gamma \subseteq Form_{\mathcal{L}}$, and let $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$. We write $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ if there exists a finite sequence $S \in \Gamma^*$ such that $S \vdash \varphi$. We pronounce $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ as “ Γ syntactically implies φ ”.

For example, consider the language $\mathcal{L} = \{f, g\}$ where f and g are unary function symbols. Given *distinct* $x, y \in Var$, here is an example of a deduction showing that $\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash \forall y \exists x(fx = y)$:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash \forall x(fgx = x) & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (1) \\
\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash fgx = y & (\forall E \text{ on 2 with } fgx = x) \quad (2) \\
\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash \exists x(fx = y) & (\exists I \text{ on 1 with } fx = y) \quad (3) \\
\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash \forall y \exists x(fx = y) & (\forall I \text{ on 3 with } \exists x(fx = y)) \quad (4)
\end{array}$$

Notice that this deduction is a formal syntactic derivation of the fact that if f is a left inverse of g (where f and g are functions with the same common domain and codomain), then f is surjective. Furthermore, we are using the fact that $ValidSubst_x^y(fgx = x) = 1$ on line (2), that $ValidSubst_x^y(fx = y) = 1$ on line (3), and that both $y \notin FreeVar(\forall x(fgx = x), \forall y \exists x(fx = y))$ and $ValidSubst_y^y(\exists x(fx = y)) = 1$ on line (4).

For another example in the same language, given distinct $x, y \in Var$, here a deduction showing that $\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash \forall x \forall y(gx = gy \rightarrow x = y)$:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\forall x(fgx = x), gx = gy \vdash \forall x(fgx = x) & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (1) \\
\forall x(fgx = x), gx = gy \vdash fgx = x & (\forall E \text{ on 1 with } fgx = x) \quad (2) \\
\forall x(fgx = x), gx = gy \vdash fgy = y & (\forall E \text{ on 1 with } fgx = x) \quad (3) \\
\forall x(fgx = x), gx = gy \vdash gx = gy & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (4) \\
\forall x(fgx = x), gx = gy \vdash fgx = fgx & (= Refl) \quad (5) \\
\forall x(fgx = x), gx = gy \vdash fgx = fgy & (= Sub \text{ on 4 and 5 with } fgx = fz) \quad (6) \\
\forall x(fgx = x), gx = gy \vdash x = fgy & (= Sub \text{ on 2 and 6 with } z = fgy) \quad (7) \\
\forall x(fgx = x), gx = gy \vdash x = y & (= Sub \text{ on 3 and 7 with } x = z) \quad (8) \\
\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash gx = gy \rightarrow x = y & (\rightarrow I \text{ on 8}) \quad (9) \\
\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash \forall y(gx = gy \rightarrow x = y) & (\forall I \text{ on 9 with } gx = gy \rightarrow x = y) \quad (10) \\
\forall x(fgx = x) \vdash \forall x \forall y(gx = gy \rightarrow x = y) & (\forall I \text{ on 10 with } \forall y(gx = gy \rightarrow x = y)) \quad (11)
\end{array}$$

We leave it as an exercise to check that all of the restrictions on the rules are satisfied (i.e. that $ValidSubst$ equals 1 in all appropriate cases, and no variable is free in the wrong circumstance).

We now prove a few simple results that will be essential later.

Proposition 6.1.5. *For any $t, u \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $t = u \vdash u = t$.*

Proof. Let $t, u \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. Consider the following deduction:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
t = u \vdash t = t & (= Refl) \quad (1) \\
t = u \vdash t = u & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (2) \\
t = u \vdash u = t & (= Sub \text{ on 1 and 2 with } x = t) \quad (3)
\end{array}$$

□

Proposition 6.1.6. *For any $t, u, w \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $t = u, u = w \vdash t = w$.*

Proof. Let $t, u, w \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary.

$$\begin{array}{ll}
t = u, u = w \vdash t = u & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (1) \\
t = u, u = w \vdash u = w & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (2) \\
t = u, u = w \vdash t = w & (= Sub \text{ on 1 and 2 with } t = x) \quad (3)
\end{array}$$

□

Proposition 6.1.7. *For any $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and any $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have*

$$\{Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k, t_1 = u_1, t_2 = u_2, \dots, t_k = u_k\} \vdash Ru_1u_2 \cdots u_k.$$

Proof. Let $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. Since Var is infinite and each term has only finitely many variables that occur in it, we can fix $x \notin \bigcup_{i=1}^k (\text{OccurVar}(t_i) \cup \text{OccurVar}(u_i))$. Let S be the sequence of formulas $Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k, t_1 = u_1, t_2 = u_2, \dots, t_k = u_k$. Consider the following deduction:

$$\begin{array}{ll} S \vdash Rt_1t_2 \cdots t_k & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (1) \\ S \vdash t_1 = u_1 & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (2) \\ S \vdash Ru_1t_2t_3 \cdots t_k & (= \text{Sub on 1 and 2 with } Rxt_2t_3 \cdots t_k) \quad (3) \\ S \vdash t_2 = u_2 & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (4) \\ S \vdash Ru_1u_2t_3 \cdots t_k & (= \text{Sub on 3 and 4 with } Ru_1xt_3 \cdots t_k) \quad (5) \\ \vdots & \\ S \vdash t_k = u_k & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (2k) \\ S \vdash Ru_1u_2 \cdots u_k & (= \text{Sub on } 2k-1 \text{ and } 2k \text{ with } Ru_1u_2 \cdots x) \quad (2k+1) \end{array}$$

□

Proposition 6.1.8. *For any $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and any $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have*

$$\{t_1 = u_1, t_2 = u_2, \dots, t_k = u_k\} \vdash ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = fu_1u_2 \cdots u_k$$

Proof. Let $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. Since Var is infinite and each term has only finitely many variables that occur in it, we can fix $x \notin \bigcup_{i=1}^k (\text{OccurVar}(t_i) \cup \text{OccurVar}(u_i))$. Let S be the sequence of formulas $t_1 = u_1, t_2 = u_2, \dots, t_k = u_k$. Consider the following deduction:

$$\begin{array}{ll} S \vdash ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k & (= \text{Ref}) \quad (1) \\ S \vdash t_1 = u_1 & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (2) \\ S \vdash ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = fu_1t_2 \cdots t_k & (= \text{Sub on 1 and 2 with } ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = fxt_2 \cdots t_k) \quad (3) \\ S \vdash t_2 = u_2 & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (4) \\ S \vdash ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = fu_1u_2 \cdots t_k & (= \text{Sub on 1 and 2 with } ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = fu_1x \cdots t_k) \quad (3) \\ \vdots & \\ S \vdash t_k = u_k & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (2k) \\ S \vdash ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = fu_1u_2 \cdots u_k & (= \text{Sub on } 2k-1 \text{ and } 2k \text{ with } ft_1t_2 \cdots t_k = fu_1u_2 \cdots x) \quad (2k+1) \end{array}$$

□

Proposition 6.1.9. *For any $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x \in \text{Var}$, we have $\exists x \varphi \vdash \neg \forall x \neg \varphi$.*

Proof. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x \in \text{Var}$ be arbitrary. Since Var is infinite and each formula has only finitely many variables that occur in it, we can fix $y \in \text{Var}$ with both $y \neq x$ with $y \notin \text{OccurVar}(\varphi)$. Consider the

following deduction:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\varphi_x^y, \neg\neg\forall x\neg\varphi, \neg\forall x\neg\varphi \vdash \neg\forall x\neg\varphi & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (1) \\
\varphi_x^y, \neg\neg\forall x\neg\varphi, \neg\forall x\neg\varphi \vdash \neg\neg\forall x\neg\varphi & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (2) \\
\varphi_x^y, \neg\neg\forall x\neg\varphi \vdash \forall x\neg\varphi & (\text{Contr on 1 and 2}) \quad (3) \\
\varphi_x^y, \neg\neg\forall x\neg\varphi \vdash \neg\varphi_x^y & (\forall E \text{ on 3}) \quad (4) \\
\varphi_x^y, \neg\neg\forall x\neg\varphi \vdash \varphi_x^y & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (5) \\
\varphi_x^y \vdash \neg\forall x\neg\varphi & (\text{Contr on 4 and 5}) \quad (6) \\
\exists x\varphi \vdash \neg\forall x\neg\varphi & (\exists P \text{ on 6}) \quad (7)
\end{array}$$

□

Proposition 6.1.10. *For any $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x \in \text{Var}$, we have $\neg\exists x\neg\varphi \vdash \forall x\varphi$.*

Proof. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x \in \text{Var}$ be arbitrary. Since Var is infinite and each formula has only finitely many variables that occur in it, we can fix $y \in \text{Var}$ with both $y \neq x$ with $y \notin \text{OccurVar}(\varphi)$. Consider the following deduction:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\neg\exists x\neg\varphi, \neg\varphi_x^y \vdash \neg\exists x\neg\varphi & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (1) \\
\neg\exists x\neg\varphi, \neg\varphi_x^y \vdash \neg\varphi_x^y & (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) \quad (2) \\
\neg\exists x\neg\varphi, \neg\varphi_x^y \vdash \exists x\neg\varphi & (\exists I \text{ on 2}) \quad (3) \\
\neg\exists x\neg\varphi \vdash \varphi_x^y & (\text{Contr on 1 and 3}) \quad (4) \\
\neg\exists x\neg\varphi \vdash \forall x\varphi & (\forall I \text{ on 4}) \quad (5)
\end{array}$$

□

The following definition and results following in precisely the same way as they did for propositional logic (because we still include all of the old proof rules).

Definition 6.1.11. Γ is inconsistent if there exists $\theta \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\Gamma \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma \vdash \neg\theta$. Otherwise, we say that Γ is consistent.

Proposition 6.1.12. *Let $\Gamma_1 \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\Gamma_2 \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be such that $\Gamma_1 \subseteq \Gamma_2$. If $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is such that $\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi$, then $\Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi$.*

Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.4.8. □

Proposition 6.1.13. *Suppose that $S \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ and $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ are such that $S \vdash \varphi$. If T is any permutation of S , then $T \vdash \varphi$.*

Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.4.9. □

Proposition 6.1.14. *If Γ is inconsistent, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$.*

Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.4.10. □

Proposition 6.1.15. *Let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$.*

1. *If $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ is inconsistent, then $\Gamma \vdash \neg\varphi$.*
2. *If $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is inconsistent, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.*

Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.4.11. □

Corollary 6.1.16. *If $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is consistent and $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, then either $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ is consistent or $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is consistent.*

Proof. See the proof of Corollary 3.4.12. □

Proposition 6.1.17. *Let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$.*

1. *If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \psi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \psi$.*
2. *If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \psi$.*

Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.4.13. □

Proposition 6.1.18. *$\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ if and only if there is a finite $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ such that $\Gamma_0 \vdash \varphi$.*

Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.4.14. □

Corollary 6.1.19. *If every finite subset of Γ is consistent, then Γ is consistent.*

Proof. See the proof of Corollary 3.4.15. □

Theorem 6.1.20 (Soundness Theorem).

1. *If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$, then $\Gamma \models \varphi$.*
2. *Every satisfiable set of formulas is consistent.*

Proof.

1. As in the proof of the Soundness Theorem for propositional logic, we prove the following fact: If $S \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ and $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ are such that $S \vdash \varphi$, then $S \models \varphi$. To see why this suffices, suppose that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. By definition, we can then fix $S \in \Gamma^*$ with $S \vdash \varphi$. From here we can conclude that $S \models \varphi$. Since every element of S is an element of Γ , it follows that $\Gamma \models \varphi$.

We now prove the statement “Whenever $S \vdash \varphi$, we have $S \models \varphi$ ” by induction. In other words, if G is the set generated by starting with $\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}} \cup \text{EqRef}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and using our proof rules, and we let

$$X = \{(S, \varphi) \in G : S \models \varphi\},$$

then we show by induction on G that $X = G$. We begin by noting that if φ appears in the sequence S , then we trivially have $S \models \varphi$ by definition. Therefore, $(S, \varphi) \in X$ for all $(S, \varphi) \in \text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Also, for any $S \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ and any $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $S \models t = t$ because for any any model (\mathcal{M}, s) of S we trivially have $\bar{s}(t) = \bar{s}(t)$, hence $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models t = t$. Therefore, $(S, t = t) \in X$ for all $S \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ and $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$.

We now handle the inductive steps. All of the old rules go through in a similar manner as before.

- We first handle the $= \text{Sub}$ rule. Suppose that $S \models \varphi_x^t$, that $S \models t = u$, and that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1 = \text{ValidSubst}_x^u(\varphi)$. We need to show that $S \models \varphi_x^u$. Let (\mathcal{M}, s) be an arbitrary model of S . Since $S \models \varphi_x^t$, we have that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^t$. Also, since $S \models t = u$, we have that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models t = u$, and hence $\bar{s}(t) = \bar{s}(u)$. Since

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^t$$

we can use Theorem 4.6.7 together with the fact that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1$ to conclude that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)])$$

Since $\bar{s}(t) = \bar{s}(u)$, it follows that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(u)]).$$

Finally, we can use Theorem 4.6.7 together with the fact that $ValidSubst_x^u(\varphi) = 1$ to conclude that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^u.$$

Since (\mathcal{M}, s) was an arbitrary model of S , it follows that $S \models \varphi_x^u$.

- We now handle the $\exists I$ rule. Suppose that $S \models \varphi_x^t$ where $ValidSubst_x^t(\varphi) = 1$. We need to show that $S \models \exists x\varphi$. Let (\mathcal{M}, s) be an arbitrary model of S . Since $S \models \varphi_x^t$, it follows that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^t$. Using Theorem 4.6.7 together with the fact that $ValidSubst_x^t(\varphi) = 1$, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]).$$

Therefore, there exists $a \in M$ such that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]),$$

from which we conclude that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x\varphi.$$

Since (\mathcal{M}, s) was an arbitrary model of S , it follows that $S \models \exists x\varphi$.

- Let's next attack the $\exists P$ rule. Suppose that $S, \varphi_x^y \models \psi$, that $y \notin FreeVar(S, \exists x\varphi, \psi)$, and that $ValidSubst_x^y(\varphi) = 1$. We need to show that $S, \exists x\varphi \models \psi$. Let (\mathcal{M}, s) be an arbitrary model of $S, \exists x\varphi$. Since $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x\varphi$, we may fix $a \in M$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$. We first divide into two cases to show that $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^y$.
 - *Case 1:* Suppose that $y = x$. We then have $\varphi_x^y = \varphi_x^x = \varphi$ and $s[x \Rightarrow a] = s[y \Rightarrow a]$, hence $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^y$ because $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$.
 - *Case 2:* Suppose that $y \neq x$. We know that $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$, so since $y \neq x$ and $y \notin FreeVar(\varphi)$, we can conclude that

$$(\mathcal{M}, (s[y \Rightarrow a])[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi.$$

From here, it follows that

$$(\mathcal{M}, (s[y \Rightarrow a])[x \Rightarrow \overline{s[y \Rightarrow a]}(y)]) \models \varphi,$$

so using the Theorem 4.6.7 together with the fact that $ValidSubst_x^y(\varphi) = 1$, we conclude that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^y.$$

Thus, $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^y$ in either case. Now since $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in S$ and $y \notin FreeVar(S)$, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in S$. Since we are assuming that $S, \varphi_x^y \models \psi$, and we know that $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in S$, and that $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^y$, we conclude that $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \psi$. Finally, since $y \notin FreeVar(\psi)$, it follows that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi$.

- We next do the $\forall E$ rule. Suppose that $S \models \forall x\varphi$ and that $t \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ is such that $ValidSubst_x^t(\varphi) = 1$. We need to show that $S \models \varphi_x^t$. Let (\mathcal{M}, s) be an arbitrary model of S . Since $S \models \forall x\varphi$, it follows that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x\varphi$. By definition, we conclude that $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$ for all $a \in M$. Now $\bar{s}(t) \in M$, so in particular we have that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(t)]) \models \varphi$$

Using Theorem 4.6.7 together with the fact that $ValidSubst_x^t(\varphi) = 1$, it follows that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^t.$$

- We finally end with the $\forall I$ rule. Suppose that $S \models \varphi_x^y$, that $y \notin \text{FreeVar}(S, \forall x\varphi)$, and that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^y(\varphi) = 1$. We need to show that $S \models \forall x\varphi$. Let (\mathcal{M}, s) be an arbitrary model of S . We handle two cases.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $y = x$. Since $y = x$, we have $\varphi_x^y = \varphi_x^x = \varphi$. Let $a \in M$ be arbitrary. Since (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of S , we know that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in S$. Now we are assuming that $x = y \notin \text{FreeVar}(S)$, so we may conclude that $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in S$. Since we are also assuming that $S \models \varphi_x^y$, it follows that $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^y$, and hence $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$ (because $\varphi_x^y = \varphi$ in this case). Now $a \in M$ was arbitrary, so $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$ for every $a \in M$. Therefore, by definition, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x\varphi$.
- *Case 2:* Suppose that $y \neq x$. Let $a \in M$ be arbitrary. Since (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of S , we know that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in S$. Now we are assuming that $y \notin \text{FreeVar}(S)$, so we may conclude that $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in S$. Since we are also assuming that $S \models \varphi_x^y$, it follows that $(\mathcal{M}, s[y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi_x^y$. Using Theorem 4.6.7 together with the fact $\text{ValidSubst}_x^y(\varphi) = 1$, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, (s[y \Rightarrow a])[x \Rightarrow \overline{s[y \Rightarrow a]}(y)]) \models \varphi,$$

and hence

$$(\mathcal{M}, (s[y \Rightarrow a])[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi.$$

Since we are assuming that $y \notin \text{FreeVar}(\varphi)$ and $y \neq x$, it follows that

$$(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi.$$

Now $a \in M$ was arbitrary, so $(\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi$ for every $a \in M$, hence $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x\varphi$.

The result follows by induction.

2. Let Γ be an arbitrary satisfiable set of formulas. Fix a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ . Suppose that Γ is inconsistent, and fix $\theta \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\Gamma \vdash \theta$ and $\Gamma \vdash \neg\theta$. We then have $\Gamma \models \theta$ and $\Gamma \models \neg\theta$ by part (1), hence $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \theta$ and $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg\theta$, a contradiction. It follows that Γ is consistent.

□

6.2 Completeness

Let's recall the outline of our proof of the Completeness Theorem for propositional logic. We wanted to show that every consistent set was satisfiable. Suppose then that we had an arbitrary consistent set Γ . Since Γ could consist of many very complex formulas, and perhaps no simple formulas, it seemed hard to define an appropriate truth assignment. Thus, our first step was to enlarge Γ to a consistent and complete set Δ . In particular, we then had that property that for every $A \in P$, either $A \in \Delta$ or $\neg A \in \Delta$. With this start, we were able to define an appropriate truth assignment M , and then continue to use the fact that Δ was complete to verify that $v_M(\delta) = 1$ for all $\delta \in \Delta$.

Suppose now that we are in the first-order logic setting. Thus, we have a language \mathcal{L} and a set $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ that is consistent. We will take our cue from propositional logic, and first expand the set appropriately. Here is the definition.

Definition 6.2.1. *Suppose that \mathcal{L} is a language and that $\Delta \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We say that Δ is complete if for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$.*

Notice that this definition resembles the definition of a complete theory, but differs in the fact that we are assuming that either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$ for each *formula* φ (which is more general than for each *sentence*). Let's assume that we can indeed expand every consistent set Γ to a set Δ that is both consistent

and complete (the proof is completely analogous to the proof in the propositional logic case). In order to show that Γ is satisfiable, it suffices to show that Δ is satisfiable. Thus, we need to construct an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} and a variable assignment $s: Var \rightarrow M$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \delta$ for all $\delta \in \Delta$. Now all that we have is the syntactic information that Δ provides, so it seems that the only way to proceed is to define our \mathcal{M} from these syntactic objects. Since terms intuitively name elements, it is natural to try to define the universe M to simply be $Term_{\mathcal{L}}$. We would then define the structure as follows:

1. $c^{\mathcal{M}} = c$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
2. $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k) \in M^k : Rt_1 t_2 \dots t_k \in \Delta\}$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$.
3. $f^{\mathcal{M}}(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k) = ft_1 t_2 \dots t_k$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and all $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in M$.

Finally, it seems reasonable to define $s: Var \rightarrow M$ to be the variable assignment $s(x) = x$ for all $x \in Var$.

Despite the promise and elegance of this approach, there is one minor problem and one major problem that we must address. First, let's think about the minor problem. Suppose that $\mathcal{L} = \{f, e\}$ is the basic group theory language, and that Γ is the set of group axioms. Suppose that $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma$ is consistent and complete. We then have $fee = e \in \Delta$ because $\Gamma \vdash fee = e$. However, the two terms fee and e are syntactically different objects. In other words, if we allow the above idea by letting $M = Term_{\mathcal{L}}$, we would run into a problem because fee and e are distinct, despite the fact that Δ says that they must be equal. Of course, when we have distinct objects that we want to make equal, we should define an equivalence relation. The natural relation here is to define \sim on $Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ by letting $t \sim u$ mean that $t = u \in \Delta$. We would then need to check that \sim is an equivalence relation and that the definition of the structure above is independent of our choice of representatives for the classes. This is all fairly straightforward, and we will carry the details below.

On to the more serious obstacle. Suppose that $\mathcal{L} = \{P\}$ where P is a unary relation symbol. Let $\Gamma = \{\neg Px : x \in Var\} \cup \{\neg(x = y) : x, y \in Var \text{ with } x \neq y\} \cup \{\exists x Px\}$ and notice that Γ is consistent because it is satisfiable (let $M = \mathbb{N}$, let $s: Var \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be $s(x_k) = k + 1$, and let $P^{\mathcal{M}} = \{0\}$). Suppose that $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma$ is consistent and complete. In the structure \mathcal{M} described above, we have $M = Term_{\mathcal{L}} = Var$ (notice that the equivalence relation defined above will be trivial in this case). Thus, since $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \neg Px$ for all $x \in Var$, it follows that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \exists x Px$. Hence, \mathcal{M} is not a model of Δ .

The problem in the above example is that there was an existential statement in Δ , but whenever we plugged a term in for the quantified variable, the resulting formula was not in Δ . Since we are building our structure directly from the terms, this is a serious problem. However, if Δ had the following property, then this problem would not arise.

Definition 6.2.2. Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let $\Gamma \subseteq Form_{\mathcal{L}}$. We say that Γ contains witnesses if for all $\varphi \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $x \in Var$, there exists $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $(\exists x \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c \in \Gamma$.

Our goal then is to show that if Γ is consistent, then there exists a $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma$ which is consistent, complete, and contains witnesses. On the face of it, this is not true, as the above example shows (because there are no constant symbols). However, if we allow ourselves to expand our language with new constant symbols, we can repeatedly add witnessing statements by using these fresh constant symbols as our witnesses. The key question we need to consider is the following. Suppose that \mathcal{L} is a language and $\Gamma \subseteq Form_{\mathcal{L}}$ is consistent. If we expand the language \mathcal{L} to a language \mathcal{L}' obtained by adding a new constant symbol, is the set Γ still consistent when viewed as a set of \mathcal{L}' formulas? It might seem absolutely harmless to add a new constant symbol about which we say nothing (and it's not hard very hard to see that it is *semantically* harmless), but we are introducing new deductions in \mathcal{L}' . We need a way to convert a possibly bad \mathcal{L}' -deduction into a similarly bad \mathcal{L} -deduction to argue that Γ is still consistent as a set of \mathcal{L}' -formulas.

We can also define substitution of variables for constants in the obvious recursive fashion.

Definition 6.2.3. Let $z \in Var$ and let $c \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$. We define a function $Subst_c^z: Term_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow Term_{\mathcal{L}}$, where we use t_c^z to denote $Subst_c^z(t)$, as follows:

$$1. d_c^z = \begin{cases} z & \text{if } d = c \\ d & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

for all $d \in \mathcal{C}$.

$$2. x_c^z = x \text{ for all } x \in \text{Var}.$$

$$3. (ft_1t_2 \dots t_k)_c^z = f(t_1)_c^z(t_2)_c^z \dots (t_k)_c^z \text{ for all } f \in \mathcal{F}_k \text{ and all } t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}.$$

We now extend our function to $\text{Subst}_c^z: \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \rightarrow \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, again denoted φ_x^t , as follows:

$$1. (Ru_1u_2 \dots u_k)_c^z = R(t_1)_c^z(t_2)_c^z \dots (t_k)_c^z \text{ for all } R \in \mathcal{R}_k \text{ and all } t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}.$$

$$2. \text{ We define } (= t_1t_2)_c^z \text{ to be } = (t_1)_c^z(t_2)_c^z \text{ for all } t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}.$$

$$3. (\neg\varphi)_c^z = \neg(\varphi_c^z) \text{ for all } \varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}.$$

$$4. (\Diamond\varphi\psi)_c^z = \Diamond\varphi_c^z\psi_c^z \text{ for all } \varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \text{ and all } \Diamond \in \{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}.$$

$$5. (Qx\varphi)_c^z = Qx(\varphi_c^z).$$

Lemma 6.2.4. Let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, let $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, let $c \in \mathcal{C}$, and let $x, z \in \text{Var}$. Suppose that $z \notin \text{OccurVar}(\varphi)$. We have the following:

$$1. (\varphi_x^t)_c^z \text{ equals } (\varphi_c^z)_x^{t_c^z}.$$

$$2. \text{ If } \text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1, \text{ then } \text{ValidSubst}_x^{t_c^z}(\varphi_c^z) = 1.$$

Proof. A straightforward induction. □

Lemma 6.2.5. Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let \mathcal{L}' be \mathcal{L} together with a new constant symbol c . Suppose that

$$\begin{aligned} S_0 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_0 \\ S_1 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_1 \\ S_2 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_2 \\ &\vdots \\ S_n &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_n \end{aligned}$$

is an \mathcal{L}' -deduction. For any $z \in \text{Var}$ with $z \notin \bigcup_{i=0}^n \text{OccurVar}(S_i, \varphi_i)$, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} (S_0)_c^z &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_0)_c^z \\ (S_1)_c^z &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_1)_c^z \\ (S_2)_c^z &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_2)_c^z \\ &\vdots \\ (S_n)_c^z &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_n)_c^z \end{aligned}$$

is an \mathcal{L} -deduction.

Proof. We prove by induction on i that

$$\begin{aligned} (S_0)_c^z &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_0)_c^z \\ (S_1)_c^z &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_1)_c^z \\ (S_2)_c^z &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_2)_c^z \\ &\vdots \\ (S_i)_c^z &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_i)_c^z \end{aligned}$$

is an \mathcal{L} -deduction.

If $\varphi \in S$, then $\varphi_c^z \in S_c^z$.

Suppose that line i is $S \vdash t = t$ where $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}'}$. Since $(t = t)_c^z$ equals $t_c^z = t_c^z$, we can place $S_c^z \vdash t_c^z = t_c^z$ on line i by the $= \text{Refl}$ rule.

Suppose that $S \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi \wedge \psi$ was a previous line and we inferred $S \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi$. Inductively, we have $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi \wedge \psi)_c^z$ on the corresponding line. Since $(\varphi \wedge \psi)_c^z = \varphi_c^z \wedge \psi_c^z$, we may use the $\wedge EL$ rule to put $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi_c^z$ on the corresponding line. The other propositional rules are similarly uninteresting.

Suppose that $S \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_x^t$ and $S \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} t = u$ were previous lines, that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1 = \text{ValidSubst}_x^u(\varphi)$, and we inferred $S \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_x^u$. Inductively, we have $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_x^t)_c^z$ and $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (t = u)_c^z$ on the corresponding lines. Now $(\varphi_x^t)_c^z$ equals $(\varphi_c^z)_x^{t_c^z}$ by the previous lemma, and $(t = u)_c^z$ equals $t_c^z = u_c^z$. Thus, we have $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_c^z)_x^{t_c^z}$ and $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} t_c^z = u_c^z$ on the corresponding lines. Using the fact that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^{t_c^z}(\varphi) = 1 = \text{ValidSubst}_x^{u_c^z}(\varphi)$, we can use the previous lemma to conclude that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^{t_c^z}(\varphi_c^z) = 1 = \text{ValidSubst}_x^{u_c^z}(\varphi_c^z)$. Hence, we may use that $= \text{Sub}$ rule to put $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_c^z)_x^{u_c^z}$ on the corresponding line. We now need only note that $(\varphi_c^z)_x^{u_c^z}$ equals $(\varphi_x^u)_c^z$ by the previous lemma.

Suppose that $S \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_x^t$ where $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(\varphi) = 1$ was a previous line and we inferred $S \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \exists x \varphi$. Inductively, we have $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_x^t)_c^z$ on the corresponding line. Now $(\varphi_x^t)_c^z$ equals $(\varphi_c^z)_x^{t_c^z}$ and $\text{ValidSubst}_x^{t_c^z}(\varphi_c^z) = 1$ by the previous lemma. Hence, we may use the $\exists I$ rule to put $S_c^z \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \exists x(\varphi_c^z)$ on the corresponding line. We now need only note that $\exists x(\varphi_c^z)$ equals $(\exists x \varphi)_c^z$.

The other rules are similar. □

Corollary 6.2.6. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$.*

1. *Let \mathcal{L}' be \mathcal{L} together with a new constant symbol. If $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi$.*
2. *Let \mathcal{L}' be \mathcal{L} together with finitely many new constant symbols. If $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi$.*
3. *Let \mathcal{L}' be \mathcal{L} together with (perhaps infinitely many) new constant symbols. If $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi$.*

Proof.

1. Since $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi$, we may fix an \mathcal{L}' -deduction

$$\begin{aligned} S_0 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_0 \\ S_1 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_1 \\ S_2 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_2 \\ &\vdots \\ S_n &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_n \end{aligned}$$

such that each $S_i \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}'}^*$, and where $S_n \in \Gamma^*$ and $\varphi_n = \varphi$. Fix $y \in \text{Var}$ such that

$$y \notin \bigcup_{i=0}^n \text{OccurVar}(S_i, \varphi_i).$$

From Lemma 6.2.5, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} (S_0)_c^\forall &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_0)_c^\forall \\ (S_1)_c^\forall &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_1)_c^\forall \\ (S_2)_c^\forall &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_2)_c^\forall \\ &\vdots \\ (S_n)_c^\forall &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_n)_c^\forall \end{aligned}$$

is an \mathcal{L} -deduction. Since $S_n \in \Gamma^* \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}^*$ and $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, it follows that $(S_n)_c^\forall = S_n$ and $(\varphi_n)_c^\forall = \varphi$. Thus, $S_n \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi$ and so $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi$.

2. This is proved by induction on the number of new constant symbols, using part (1) for both the base case and the inductive step.
3. Since $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi$, we may fix an \mathcal{L}' -deduction

$$\begin{aligned} S_0 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_0 \\ S_1 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_1 \\ S_2 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_2 \\ &\vdots \\ S_n &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_n \end{aligned}$$

such that each $S_i \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}'}^*$, and where $S_n \in \Gamma^*$ and $\varphi_n = \varphi$. Let $\{c_0, c_1, \dots, c_m\}$ be all of the constant symbols appearing in some S_i or φ_i , and let $\mathcal{L}_0 = \mathcal{L} \cup \{c_0, c_1, \dots, c_m\}$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} S_0 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}_0} \varphi_0 \\ S_1 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}_0} \varphi_1 \\ S_2 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}_0} \varphi_2 \\ &\vdots \\ S_n &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}_0} \varphi_n \end{aligned}$$

is an \mathcal{L}_0 -deduction, so $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}_0} \varphi$. Therefore, $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi$ by part (2).

□

Corollary 6.2.7. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let \mathcal{L}' be \mathcal{L} together with (perhaps infinitely many) new constant symbols. Let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Γ is \mathcal{L} -consistent if and only if Γ is \mathcal{L}' -consistent.*

Proof. Since any \mathcal{L} -deduction is also a \mathcal{L}' -deduction, if Γ is \mathcal{L} -inconsistent then it is trivially \mathcal{L}' -inconsistent. Suppose that Γ is \mathcal{L}' -inconsistent. We then have that $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi$ for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ by Proposition 6.1.14, hence $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi$ for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ by Corollary 6.2.6. Therefore, Γ is \mathcal{L} -inconsistent. □

Corollary 6.2.8 (Generalization on Constants). *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let \mathcal{L}' be \mathcal{L} together with a new constant symbol c . Suppose that $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. If $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_x^c$, then $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \forall x \varphi$.*

Proof. Since $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_x^c$, we may fix an \mathcal{L}' -deduction

$$\begin{aligned} S_0 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_0 \\ S_1 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_1 \\ S_2 &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_2 \\ &\vdots \\ S_n &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \varphi_n \end{aligned}$$

such that each $S_i \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}'}^*$, and that $S_n \in \Gamma^*$ and $\varphi_n = \varphi_x^c$. Fix $y \in \text{Var}$ such that

$$y \notin \bigcup_{i=0}^n \text{OccurVar}(S_i, \varphi_i).$$

From Lemma 6.2.5, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} (S_0)_c^y &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_0)_c^y \\ (S_1)_c^y &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_1)_c^y \\ (S_2)_c^y &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_2)_c^y \\ &\vdots \\ (S_n)_c^y &\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} (\varphi_n)_c^y \end{aligned}$$

is an \mathcal{L} -deduction. Since $S_n \in \Gamma^* \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}^*$, we have $(S_n)_c^y = S_n$. Now $(\varphi_n)_c^y = (\varphi_x^c)_c^y = \varphi_x^y$. We therefore have $S_n \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \varphi_x^y$. We may then use the $\forall I$ rule to conclude that $S_n \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \forall x \varphi$. Since $S_n \in \Gamma^*$, it follows that $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \forall x \varphi$. \square

Lemma 6.2.9. *For all $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $\neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \vdash \varphi \wedge \neg\psi$.*

Proof. Let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary. Consider the following deduction:

$$\begin{aligned} \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\varphi, \varphi, \neg\psi &\vdash \varphi && (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) && (1) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\varphi, \varphi, \neg\psi &\vdash \neg\varphi && (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) && (2) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\varphi, \varphi &\vdash \psi && (\text{Contr on 1 and 2}) && (3) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\varphi &\vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi && (\rightarrow I \text{ on 3}) && (4) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\varphi &\vdash \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) && (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) && (5) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) &\vdash \varphi && (\text{Contr on 4 and 5}) && (6) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\neg\psi, \varphi, \neg\psi &\vdash \neg\psi && (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) && (7) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\neg\psi, \varphi, \neg\psi &\vdash \neg\neg\psi && (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) && (8) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\neg\psi, \varphi &\vdash \psi && (\text{Contr on 7 and 8}) && (9) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\neg\psi &\vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi && (\rightarrow I \text{ on 9}) && (10) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi), \neg\neg\psi &\vdash \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) && (\text{Assume}_{\mathcal{L}}) && (11) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) &\vdash \neg\psi && (\text{Contr on 10 and 11}) && (12) \\ \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) &\vdash \varphi \wedge \neg\psi && (\wedge I \text{ on 6 and 12}) && (13) \end{aligned}$$

\square

Lemma 6.2.10. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let \mathcal{L}' be \mathcal{L} together with a new constant symbol c . Let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and let $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. If Γ is \mathcal{L} -consistent, then $\Gamma \cup \{(\exists x \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c\}$ is \mathcal{L}' -consistent.*

Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose then that $\Gamma \cup \{(\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c\}$ is \mathcal{L}' -inconsistent. By Proposition 6.1.15, we then have that

$$\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \neg((\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c).$$

From Lemma 6.2.9, we have

$$\neg((\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c) \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} (\exists x\varphi) \wedge \neg(\varphi_x^c),$$

and hence

$$\Gamma \cup \{\neg((\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c)\} \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} (\exists x\varphi) \wedge \neg(\varphi_x^c).$$

Using Proposition 6.1.17, we conclude that

$$\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} (\exists x\varphi) \wedge \neg(\varphi_x^c).$$

Using the $\wedge EL$ rule, we conclude that $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \exists x\varphi$. Since $\exists x\varphi \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \neg\forall x\neg\varphi$ by Proposition 6.1.9, we can again use Proposition 6.1.17 to conclude that $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} \neg\forall x\neg\varphi$. Since $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $\neg\forall x\neg\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, Corollary 6.2.6 allows us to conclude that

$$\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \neg\forall x\neg\varphi.$$

Using the $\wedge ER$ rule instead, together with the fact that $\neg(\varphi_x^c)$ equals $(\neg\varphi)_x^c$, we also have $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}'} (\neg\varphi)_x^c$, so

$$\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \forall x\neg\varphi$$

by Generalization on Constants. Therefore, Γ is \mathcal{L} -inconsistent. \square

Lemma 6.2.11. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be \mathcal{L} -consistent. There exists a language $\mathcal{L}' \supseteq \mathcal{L}$, obtained from \mathcal{L} by only adding constant symbols, and $\Gamma' \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}'}$ with the following properties:*

1. $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma'$.
2. Γ' is \mathcal{L}' -consistent.
3. For all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $x \in \text{Var}$, there exists $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $(\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c \in \Gamma'$.

Proof. For each $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and each $x \in \text{Var}$, let $c_{\varphi,x}$ be a new constant symbol (distinct from all symbols in \mathcal{L}). Let $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} \cup \{c_{\varphi,x} : \varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \text{ and } x \in \text{Var}\}$. Let

$$\Gamma' = \Gamma \cup \{(\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_{x_1}^{c_{\varphi,x_1}} : \varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \text{ and } x \in \text{Var}\}.$$

Conditions 1 and 3 are clear, so we need only check that Γ' is \mathcal{L}' -consistent. By Corollary 6.1.19, it suffices to check that all finite subsets of Γ' are \mathcal{L}' -consistent, and for this it suffices to show that

$$\Gamma \cup \{(\exists x_1\varphi_1) \rightarrow (\varphi_1)_{x_1}^{c_{\varphi_1,x_1}}, (\exists x_2\varphi_2) \rightarrow (\varphi_2)_{x_2}^{c_{\varphi_2,x_2}}, \dots, (\exists x_n\varphi_n) \rightarrow (\varphi_n)_{x_n}^{c_{\varphi_n,x_n}}\}$$

is \mathcal{L}' -consistent whenever $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_n \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \in \text{Var}$. Formally, one can prove this by induction on n . A slightly informal argument is as follows. Let $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_n \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \in \text{Var}$ be arbitrary. Since Γ is \mathcal{L} -consistent, we can apply Lemma 6.2.10 to conclude that

$$\Gamma \cup \{(\exists x_1\varphi_1) \rightarrow (\varphi_1)_{x_1}^{c_{\varphi_1,x_1}}\}$$

is $(\mathcal{L} \cup \{c_{\varphi_1,x_1}\})$ -consistent. Applying Lemma 6.2.10, we conclude that

$$\Gamma \cup \{(\exists x_1\varphi_1) \rightarrow (\varphi_1)_{x_1}^{c_{\varphi_1,x_1}}, (\exists x_2\varphi_2) \rightarrow (\varphi_2)_{x_2}^{c_{\varphi_2,x_2}}\}$$

is $(\mathcal{L} \cup \{c_{\varphi_1,x_1}, c_{\varphi_2,x_2}\})$ -consistent. By repeated applications of Lemma 6.2.10, we eventually conclude that

$$\Gamma \cup \{(\exists x_1\varphi_1) \rightarrow (\varphi_1)_{x_1}^{c_{\varphi_1,x_1}}, (\exists x_2\varphi_2) \rightarrow (\varphi_2)_{x_2}^{c_{\varphi_2,x_2}}, \dots, (\exists x_n\varphi_n) \rightarrow (\varphi_n)_{x_n}^{c_{\varphi_n,x_n}}\}$$

is $(\mathcal{L} \cup \{c_{\varphi_1,x_1}, c_{\varphi_2,x_2}, \dots, c_{\varphi_n,x_n}\})$ -consistent. Therefore,

$$\Gamma \cup \{(\exists x_1\varphi_1) \rightarrow (\varphi_1)_{x_1}^{c_{\varphi_1,x_1}}, (\exists x_2\varphi_2) \rightarrow (\varphi_2)_{x_2}^{c_{\varphi_2,x_2}}, \dots, (\exists x_n\varphi_n) \rightarrow (\varphi_n)_{x_n}^{c_{\varphi_n,x_n}}\}$$

is \mathcal{L}' -consistent by Corollary 6.2.7, which completes the proof by the above comments. \square

Proposition 6.2.12. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and let $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be consistent. There exists a language $\mathcal{L}' \supseteq \mathcal{L}$, obtained from \mathcal{L} by only adding constant symbols, and $\Gamma' \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}'}$ with the following properties:*

1. $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma'$.
2. Γ' is \mathcal{L}' -consistent.
3. Γ' contains witnesses.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{L}_0 = \mathcal{L}$ and $\Gamma_0 = \Gamma$. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, use Lemma 6.2.11 to obtain \mathcal{L}_{n+1} and Γ_{n+1} from \mathcal{L}_n and Γ_n . Now let $\mathcal{L}' = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \mathcal{L}_n$ and set $\Gamma' = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Gamma_n$. We then clearly have properties (1) and (3), and property (2) follows from Corollary 6.1.19 and Corollary 6.2.7. \square

Proposition 6.2.13. *If Γ is consistent, then there exists a set $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma$ which is consistent and complete.*

Proof. Exactly the same proof as the propositional logic case, using Zorn's Lemma in the uncountable case (see Proposition 3.5.4 and Proposition 3.5.7). \square

Proposition 6.2.14. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language. If $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ is consistent, then there a language $\mathcal{L}' \supseteq \mathcal{L}$, obtained from \mathcal{L} by only adding constant symbols, and $\Delta \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}'}$ with the following properties:*

- $\Gamma \subseteq \Delta$.
- Δ is consistent.
- Δ is complete.
- Δ contains witnesses.

Proof. First apply Proposition 6.2.12 to obtain \mathcal{L}' and Γ' , and then apply Proposition 6.2.13 to obtain Δ from Γ' \square

Lemma 6.2.15. *Suppose that Δ is consistent and complete. If $\Delta \vdash \varphi$, then $\varphi \in \Delta$.*

Proof. Suppose that $\Delta \vdash \varphi$. Since Δ is complete, we have that either $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$. Now if $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$, then we would trivially have $\Delta \vdash \neg\varphi$ (in addition to our assumed $\Delta \vdash \varphi$), contradicting the fact that Δ is consistent. It follows that $\varphi \in \Delta$. \square

Lemma 6.2.16. *Suppose that Δ is consistent, complete, and contains witnesses. For every $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, there exists $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $t = c \in \Delta$.*

Proof. Let $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Fix $x \in \text{Var}$ such that $x \notin \text{OccurVar}(t)$. Since Δ contains witnesses, we may fix $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $(\exists x(t = x)) \rightarrow (t = c) \in \Delta$ (using the formula $t = x$). Now $\Delta \vdash (t = x)_x^t$, so we may use the $\exists I$ rule (because $\text{ValidSubst}_x^t(t = x) = 1$) to conclude that $\Delta \vdash \exists x(t = x)$. Since we have both $\Delta \vdash \exists x(t = x)$ and $\Delta \vdash (\exists x(t = x)) \rightarrow (t = c)$, we can apply Proposition 6.1.17 to conclude that $\Delta \vdash t = c$. Using Lemma 6.2.15, it follows that $t = c \in \Delta$. \square

Lemma 6.2.17. *Suppose that Δ is consistent, complete, and contains witnesses. We have*

1. $\neg\varphi \in \Delta$ if and only if $\varphi \notin \Delta$.
2. $\varphi \wedge \psi \in \Delta$ if and only if $\varphi \in \Delta$ and $\psi \in \Delta$.
3. $\varphi \vee \psi \in \Delta$ if and only if $\varphi \in \Delta$ or $\psi \in \Delta$.
4. $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta$ if and only if $\varphi \notin \Delta$ or $\psi \in \Delta$.

5. $\exists x\varphi \in \Delta$ if and only if there exists $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $\varphi_x^c \in \Delta$.

6. $\forall x\varphi \in \Delta$ if and only if $\varphi_x^c \in \Delta$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$.

Proof. The proofs of the first four statements are identical to the proofs in the propositional logic case (see Lemma 3.5.9). We prove the last two.

5. Suppose first that $\exists x\varphi \in \Delta$. Since Δ contains witnesses, we may fix $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $(\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c \in \Delta$. We therefore have $\Delta \vdash \exists x\varphi$ and $\Delta \vdash (\exists x\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi_x^c$, hence $\Delta \vdash \varphi_x^c$ by Proposition 6.1.17. Using Lemma 6.2.15, we conclude that $\varphi_x^c \in \Delta$.

Conversely, suppose that there exists $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $\varphi_x^c \in \Delta$. We then have $\Delta \vdash \varphi_x^c$, hence $\Delta \vdash \exists x\varphi$ using the $\exists I$ rule (notice that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^c(\varphi) = 1$). Using Lemma 6.2.15, we conclude that $\exists x\varphi \in \Delta$.

6. Suppose first that $\forall x\varphi \in \Delta$. We then have $\Delta \vdash \forall x\varphi$, hence $\Delta \vdash \varphi_x^c$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$ using the $\forall E$ rule (notice that $\text{ValidSubst}_x^c(\varphi) = 1$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$). Using Lemma 6.2.15, we conclude that $\varphi_x^c \in \Delta$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$.

Conversely, suppose that $\varphi_x^c \in \Delta$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$. Since Δ is consistent, this implies that there does not exist $c \in \mathcal{C}$ with $\neg(\varphi_x^c) = (\neg\varphi)_x^c \in \Delta$. Therefore, $\exists x\neg\varphi \notin \Delta$ by part 5, so $\neg\exists x\neg\varphi \in \Delta$ by part (1). It follows from Proposition 6.1.10 that $\Delta \vdash \forall x\varphi$. Using Lemma 6.2.15, we conclude that $\forall x\varphi \in \Delta$.

□

Proposition 6.2.18. *If Δ is consistent, complete, and contains witnesses, then Δ is satisfiable.*

Proof. Suppose that Δ is consistent, complete, and contains witnesses. Define a relation \sim on $\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ by letting $t \sim u$ if $t = u \in \Delta$. We first check that \sim is an equivalence relation. Reflexivity follows from the $= \text{Ref}$ rule and Lemma 6.2.15. Symmetry and transitivity follow from Proposition 6.1.5 and Proposition 6.1.6, together with Lemma 6.2.15.

We now define our \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} . We first let $M = \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}} / \sim$ be the set of all equivalence classes of our equivalence relation. For each $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we let $[t]$ denote the equivalence class of t . Notice that $M = \{[c] : c \in \mathcal{C}\}$ by Lemma 6.2.16. We now finish our description of the \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} by saying how to interpret the constant, relation, and function symbols. We define the following:

1. $c^{\mathcal{M}} = [c]$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
2. $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{([t_1], [t_2], \dots, [t_k]) \in M^k : Rt_1t_2 \dots t_k \in \Delta\}$ for all $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$.
3. $f^{\mathcal{M}}([t_1], [t_2], \dots, [t_k]) = [ft_1t_2 \dots t_k]$ for all $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$.

Notice that our definitions of $R^{\mathcal{M}}$ do not depend on our choice of representatives for the equivalence classes by Proposition 6.1.7. Similarly, our definitions of $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ do not depend on our choice of representatives for the equivalence classes by Proposition 6.1.8. Finally, define $s : \text{Var} \rightarrow M$ by letting $s(x) = [x]$ for all $x \in \text{Var}$.

We first show that $\bar{s}(t) = [t]$ for all $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ by induction. We have $\bar{s}(c) = c^{\mathcal{M}} = [c]$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}$ and $\bar{s}(x) = s(x) = [x]$ for all $x \in \text{Var}$. Suppose that $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ are such that $\bar{s}(t_i) = [t_i]$ for all i . We then have

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s}(ft_1t_2 \dots t_k) &= f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{s}(t_1), \bar{s}(t_2), \dots, \bar{s}(t_k)) \\ &= f^{\mathcal{M}}([t_1], [t_2], \dots, [t_k]) && \text{(by induction)} \\ &= [ft_1t_2 \dots t_k] \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $\bar{s}(t) = [t]$ for all $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$.

We now show that by induction that for all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $\varphi \in \Delta$ if and only if $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$. We first prove the result for $\varphi \in \text{AtomicForm}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Given arbitrary $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} Rt_1 t_2 \cdots t_k \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow ([t_1], [t_2], \dots, [t_k]) \in R^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\bar{s}(t_1), \bar{s}(t_2), \dots, \bar{s}(t_k)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models Rt_1 t_2 \cdots t_k. \end{aligned}$$

Given arbitrary $t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} t_1 = t_2 \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow [t_1] = [t_2] \\ &\Leftrightarrow \bar{s}(t_1) = \bar{s}(t_2) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models t_1 = t_2. \end{aligned}$$

If the statement is true for φ , then

$$\begin{aligned} \neg\varphi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \varphi \notin \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 6.2.17)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, if the statement is true for φ and ψ , then

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi \wedge \psi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \varphi \in \Delta \text{ and } \psi \in \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 6.2.17)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \text{ and } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \wedge \psi \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi \vee \psi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \varphi \in \Delta \text{ or } \psi \in \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 6.2.17)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \text{ or } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \vee \psi \end{aligned}$$

and finally

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi \rightarrow \psi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \varphi \notin \Delta \text{ or } \psi \in \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 6.2.17)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \not\models \varphi \text{ or } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \psi && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi. \end{aligned}$$

If the statement is true for φ and $x \in \text{Var}$ is arbitrary, then

$$\begin{aligned} \exists x\varphi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } c \in \mathcal{C} \text{ such that } \varphi_x^c \in \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 6.2.17)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } c \in \mathcal{C} \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^c && \text{(by induction)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } c \in \mathcal{C} \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(c)]) \models \varphi && \text{(by the Substitution Theorem)} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } c \in \mathcal{C} \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow [c]]) \models \varphi \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi && \text{(since } M = \{[c] : c \in \mathcal{C}\}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \exists x\varphi \end{aligned}$$

and also

$$\begin{aligned}
\forall x \varphi \in \Delta &\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } c \in \mathcal{C}, \text{ we have } \varphi_x^c \in \Delta && \text{(by Lemma 6.2.17)} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } c \in \mathcal{C}, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi_x^c && \text{(by induction)} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } c \in \mathcal{C}, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow \bar{s}(c)]) \models \varphi && \text{(by the Substitution Theorem)} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } c \in \mathcal{C}, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow [c]]) && \\
&\Leftrightarrow \text{For all } a \in M, \text{ we have } (\mathcal{M}, s[x \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi && \text{(since } M = \{[c] : c \in \mathcal{C}\}) \\
&\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, s) \models \forall x \varphi.
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, by induction, we have $\varphi \in \Delta$ if and only if $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$. In particular, we have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ for all $\varphi \in \Delta$, hence Δ is satisfiable. \square

Theorem 6.2.19 (Completeness Theorem). *Let \mathcal{L} be a language.*

1. *Every consistent set of formulas is satisfiable.*
2. *If $\Gamma \models \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.*

Proof.

1. Suppose that Γ is consistent. By Proposition 6.2.14, we may fix a language $\mathcal{L}' \supseteq \mathcal{L}$ and $\Delta \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}'}$ such that $\Delta \supseteq \Gamma$ is consistent, complete, and contains witnesses. Now Δ is satisfiable by Proposition 6.2.18, so we may fix an \mathcal{L}' -structure \mathcal{M}' together with $s: \text{Var} \rightarrow M'$ such that $(\mathcal{M}', s) \models \varphi$ for all $\varphi \in \Delta$. We then have $(\mathcal{M}', s) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Letting \mathcal{M} be the restriction of \mathcal{M}' to \mathcal{L} , we then have $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \gamma$ for all $\gamma \in \Gamma$. Therefore, Γ is satisfiable.
2. Suppose that $\Gamma \models \varphi$. We then have that $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is unsatisfiable, hence $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is inconsistent by part 1. It follows from Proposition 6.1.15 that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

\square

We now give another proof of the Countable Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem which does not go through the concept of elementary substructures.

Corollary 6.2.20 (Countable Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem). *Suppose that \mathcal{L} is countable and $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is consistent. There exists a countable model of Γ .*

Proof. Notice that if \mathcal{L} is consistent, then the \mathcal{L}' formed in Lemma 6.2.11 is countable because $\text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}} \times \text{Var}$ is countable. Thus, each \mathcal{L}_n in the proof of Proposition 6.2.12 is countable, so the \mathcal{L}' formed in Proposition 6.2.12 is countable. It follows that $\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}'}$ is countable, and since the \mathcal{L}' -structure \mathcal{M} we construct in the proof of Proposition 6.2.18 is formed by taking the quotient from an equivalence relation on the countable $\text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}'}$, we can conclude that \mathcal{M} is countable. Therefore, the \mathcal{L} -structure which is the restriction of \mathcal{M} to \mathcal{L} from the proof of the Completeness Theorem is countable. \square

6.3 Compactness and Applications

Now that we have completed proofs of the Soundness and Completeness Theorems, we immediately obtain the following result, which is one of the primary tools in logic.

Corollary 6.3.1 (Compactness Theorem). *Let \mathcal{L} be a language.*

1. *If $\Gamma \models \varphi$, then there exists a finite $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ such that $\Gamma_0 \models \varphi$.*

2. If every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable, then Γ is satisfiable.

Proof.

1. Suppose that $\Gamma \models \varphi$. By the Completeness Theorem, we have $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. Using Proposition 6.1.18, we may fix a finite $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$ such that $\Gamma_0 \vdash \varphi$. By the Soundness Theorem, we have $\Gamma_0 \models \varphi$.
2. If every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable, then every finite subset of Γ is consistent by the Soundness Theorem, hence Γ is consistent by Corollary 6.1.19, and so Γ is satisfiable by the Soundness Theorem. \square

For our first application of Compactness, we prove another result expressing the fact that first-order logic is not powerful enough to distinguish certain aspects of cardinality. We already have the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem saying that any satisfiable set has a countable model (assuming that \mathcal{L} is countable), and hence first-order logic does not have the expressive power to force all models to be uncountable. In this case, our distinction is between large finite numbers and the infinite.

Proposition 6.3.2. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language. Suppose that $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is such that for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ such that $|M| > n$. We then have that there exists a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ such that M is infinite.*

We give two proofs.

Proof 1. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $n \geq 2$, let σ_n be the sentence

$$\exists x_1 \exists x_2 \dots \exists x_n \left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} \neg(x_i = x_j) \right),$$

and let

$$\Gamma' = \Gamma \cup \{\sigma_n : n \geq 2\}.$$

We claim that every finite subset of Γ' is satisfiable. Let $\Gamma'_0 \subseteq \Gamma'$ be an arbitrary finite subset of Γ . We can then fix $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\Gamma'_0 \subseteq \Gamma \cup \{\sigma_n : 2 \leq n \leq N\}.$$

By assumption, we may fix a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ such that $|M| > N$. Since $|M| > N$, we have that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \sigma_n$ whenever $2 \leq n \leq N$, and hence (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of Γ'_0 . Therefore, every finite subset of Γ' is satisfiable.

By the Compactness Theorem, it follows that Γ' is satisfiable. Fix a model (\mathcal{M}', s) of Γ' . We then have that (\mathcal{M}', s) is a model of Γ and that M' is infinite (because it is a model of σ_n for all $n \geq 2$). \square

Our second proof changes the language in order to force many distinct elements.

Proof 2. Let $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} \cup \{c_k : k \in \mathbb{N}\}$ where the c_k are new distinct constant symbols, and let

$$\Gamma' = \Gamma \cup \{\neg(c_k = c_\ell) : k, \ell \in \mathbb{N} \text{ and } k \neq \ell\}.$$

We claim that every finite subset of Γ' is satisfiable. Let $\Gamma'_0 \subseteq \Gamma'$ be an arbitrary finite subset of Γ . We can then fix $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\Gamma'_0 \subseteq \Gamma \cup \{\neg(c_k = c_\ell) : k, \ell \leq N \text{ and } k \neq \ell\}.$$

By assumption, we may fix a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ such that $|M| > N$. Let \mathcal{M}' be the \mathcal{L}' structure \mathcal{M} together with interpreting the constants c_0, c_1, \dots, c_N as distinct elements of M , and interpreting each c_i for $i > N$ arbitrarily. We then have that (\mathcal{M}', s) is a model of Γ'_0 . Therefore, every finite subset of Γ' is satisfiable.

By the Compactness Theorem, it follows that Γ' is satisfiable. Fix a model (\mathcal{M}', s) of Γ' . If we let \mathcal{M} be the restriction of \mathcal{M}' to \mathcal{L} , then (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of Γ which is infinite. \square

As a simple application, we can show that many natural classes of finite structures are not weak elementary classes. Recall that if $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, then we let $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ be the class of all \mathcal{L} -structures \mathcal{M} such that $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$. Also recall that we say that a class \mathcal{K} of \mathcal{L} -structures is a weak elementary class if there exists $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$. Furthermore, \mathcal{K} is an elementary class if we can choose a *finite* such Σ , which is equivalent to saying that we can choose just Σ to consist of just one sentence (by taking the conjunction of the finitely many sentences).

Corollary 6.3.3. *The class \mathcal{K} of all finite groups is not a weak elementary class in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{f, e\}$.*

Proof. Let $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary such that $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$. We show that there is an element of $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ that is not in \mathcal{K} . Using the trivial fact that there are arbitrarily large finite groups, we know that there for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a element of \mathcal{K} with at least n elements. Therefore, for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there is a model of Σ with at least n elements. By Proposition 6.3.2, we conclude that there an infinite model \mathcal{M} of Σ . We then have that \mathcal{M} is an element of $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ that is not a model of \mathcal{K} . \square

In fact, we can greatly extend Proposition 6.3.2 to much larger structures. In this case, it is essential to follow the second proof and add lots of symbols to the language (because if \mathcal{L} is countable, then every satisfiable set of formulas over \mathcal{L} has a countable model by Lowenheim-Skolem).

Proposition 6.3.4. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language. Suppose that $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is such that there exists a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ with M infinite. We then have that there exists a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ such that M is uncountable.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} \cup \{c_a : a \in \mathbb{R}\}$ where the c_a are new distinct constant symbols, and let

$$\Gamma' = \Gamma \cup \{\neg(c_a = c_b) : a, b \in \mathbb{R} \text{ and } a \neq b\}.$$

We claim that every finite subset of Γ' is satisfiable. Let $\Gamma'_0 \subseteq \Gamma'$ be an arbitrary finite subset of Γ' . We can then fix a finite $Z \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$\Gamma'_0 \subseteq \Gamma \cup \{\neg(c_a = c_b) : a, b \in Z\}.$$

By assumption, we may fix a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ such that M is infinite. Let \mathcal{M}' be the \mathcal{L}' structure \mathcal{M} together with interpreting the constants c_a for $a \in Z$ as distinct elements of M , and interpreting each c_b for $b \notin Z$ arbitrarily. We then have that (\mathcal{M}', s) is a model of Γ' . Hence, every finite subset of Γ' is satisfiable.

By the Compactness Theorem, it follows that Γ' is satisfiable. Fix a model (\mathcal{M}', s) of Γ' . If we let \mathcal{M} be the restriction of \mathcal{M}' to \mathcal{L} , then (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of Γ which is uncountable. \square

By using the idea of adding a special new constant symbol to our language, we can show that other natural classes are not weak elementary classes. As an example, consider the class of all *torsion* groups, i.e. the class of groups in which every element has finite order.

Proposition 6.3.5. *The class \mathcal{K} of all torsion groups is not a weak elementary class in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{f, e\}$.*

Proof. Let $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ be arbitrary such that $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$. Let $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} \cup \{c\}$ where c is a new constant symbol. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let $\tau_n \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}'}$ be $\neg(c^n = e)$. More formally, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we let τ_n be the sentence $\neg(fcf c \cdots f c c = e)$, where there are $n - 1$ many f 's. Now let

$$\Sigma' = \Sigma \cup \{\tau_n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}.$$

We claim that every finite subset of Σ' has a model. Let $\Sigma'_0 \subseteq \Sigma'$ be an arbitrary finite subset of Σ' . Fix $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\Sigma'_0 \subseteq \Sigma \cup \{\tau_n : n < N\}.$$

Notice that if we let \mathcal{M}' be the group $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and let $c^{\mathcal{M}'} = \bar{1}$, then \mathcal{M}' is a model of Σ'_0 . Thus, every finite subset of Σ' has a model, so Σ' has a model by Compactness. If we restrict this model to \mathcal{L} , we obtain a structure \mathcal{M} in $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ which is not in \mathcal{K} because it has an element (namely $c^{\mathcal{M}'}$) of infinite order. Therefore, $\mathcal{K} \neq \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$. \square

Proposition 6.3.6. *The class \mathcal{K} of all equivalence relations in which all equivalence classes are finite is not a weak elementary class in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$.*

Proof. Suppose that $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is such that $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$. Let $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} \cup \{c\}$ where c is new constant symbol. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let $\tau_n \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}'}$ be

$$\exists x_1 \exists x_2 \cdots \exists x_n \left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} (x_i \neq x_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^n Rcx_i \right)$$

and let

$$\Sigma' = \Sigma \cup \{\tau_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}.$$

We claim that every finite subset of Σ' has a model. Let $\Sigma'_0 \subseteq \Sigma'$ be an arbitrary finite subset of Σ' . Fix $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma \cup \{\tau_n : n \leq N\}.$$

Notice that if we let $M' = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N\}$, $R^{M'} = (M')^2$, and $c^{M'} = 0$, then M' is a model of Σ'_0 . Thus, every finite subset of Σ' has a model, so Σ' has a model by Compactness. If we restrict this model to \mathcal{L} , we get an element of $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ which is not in \mathcal{K} because it has an infinite equivalence class. \square

We can also use the Compactness Theorem to show that certain weak elementary classes are not actually elementary classes. The key result behind such arguments is the following proposition, which says that if we have an elementary class \mathcal{K} that we have already know is equal to $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ for an infinite set Σ , then we can find a finite subset of Σ itself witnessing the fact that \mathcal{K} is elementary.

Proposition 6.3.7. *Suppose that \mathcal{K} is an elementary class, that $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, and that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$. There exists a finite $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$ such that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma_0)$.*

Proof. Since \mathcal{K} is an elementary class, we may fix $\tau \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ with $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\tau)$. We then have $\Sigma \models \tau$ because an model of Σ is an element of $\text{Mod}(\Sigma) = \mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\tau)$, and hence is a model of τ . Therefore, by Compactness we may fix a finite $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$ such that $\Sigma_0 \models \tau$. Now notice that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma) \subseteq \text{Mod}(\Sigma_0)$ and $\text{Mod}(\Sigma_0) \subseteq \text{Mod}(\tau) = \mathcal{K}$, so $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma_0)$. \square

Corollary 6.3.8. *The class \mathcal{K} of all fields of characteristic 0 is a weak elementary class, but not an elementary class, in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot\}$.*

Proof. We already know that \mathcal{K} is a weak elementary class because if we let σ be the conjunction of the fields axioms and let τ_n be $1 + 1 + \cdots + 1 \neq 0$ (where there are n 1's) for each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, then $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma)$ where

$$\Sigma = \{\sigma\} \cup \{\tau_n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}.$$

Assume then that \mathcal{K} is an elementary class. By Proposition 6.3.7, we may fix a finite $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$ such that $\mathcal{K} = \text{Mod}(\Sigma_0)$. Fix $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\Sigma_0 \subseteq \{\sigma\} \cup \{\tau_n : n \leq N\}.$$

Now if fix a prime $p > N$ (which is possible because there are infinitely many primes) we see that $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}, 0, 1, +, \cdot)$ is a model of Σ_0 which is not an element of \mathcal{K} . This is a contradiction, so \mathcal{K} is not an elementary class. \square

For each prime p , there is a field with p elements, namely the ring $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. For the remainder of this section, we use the notation \mathbb{F}_p to denote this field. Recall that every field F can be embedded in an algebraically closed field, and in fact, there is a unique (up to isomorphism) algebraically closed field K extending F that is an algebraic extension of F . Such a field K is called an algebraic closure of F . Since this field is unique up to isomorphism, we denote any particular algebraic closure of F by the notation \overline{F} .

Theorem 6.3.9. *Let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, -, \cdot\}$ be the language of rings, and let $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$. The following are equivalent:*

1. $ACF_0 \models \sigma$ (which is equivalent to $\sigma \in ACF_0$ because ACF_0 is a theory).
2. $\mathbb{C} \models \sigma$.
3. There exists $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $ACF_p \models \sigma$ for all primes $p > m$.
4. There exists $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p \models \sigma$ for all primes $p > m$.
5. $ACF_p \models \sigma$ for infinitely many primes p .
6. $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p \models \sigma$ for infinitely many primes p .

Proof. Recall from Corollary 5.5.6 that ACF_0 is complete. We claim that this implies that (1) and (2) are equivalent. To see this, notice first that if $ACF_0 \models \sigma$, then $\mathbb{C} \models \sigma$ because \mathbb{C} is a model of ACF_0 . For the converse, notice that if $ACF_0 \not\models \sigma$, then $ACF_0 \models \neg\sigma$ because ACF_0 is complete, so $\mathbb{C} \models \neg\sigma$ and hence $\mathbb{C} \not\models \sigma$. Similarly, since each ACF_p is complete by Corollary 5.5.6, and since each $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ is a model of ACF_p , we obtain the equivalence of (3) and (4), along with the equivalence of (5) and (6). Next notice that (3) implies (5) trivially. To complete the proof, we show that (1) implies (3) and that (5) implies (1).

First, we show that (1) implies (3). Suppose then that $ACF_0 \models \sigma$. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let τ_n be the sentence saying that 1 added to itself n times does not equal 0, and let ρ_n be the sentence saying that every polynomial of degree n with nonzero leading coefficient has a root (see the beginning of Section 5.5 for the formal sentences). Finally, let π be the conjunction of the field axioms, and let

$$\Sigma = \{\pi\} \cup \{\rho_n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\} \cup \{\tau_n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\}.$$

We then have that $ACF_0 = Cn(\Sigma)$, so since $ACF_0 \models \sigma$, it follows that $\Sigma \models \sigma$. By Compactness, we can fix a finite $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$ such that $\Sigma_0 \models \sigma$. Fix an $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\Sigma_0 \subseteq \{\pi\} \cup \{\rho_n : n \in \mathbb{N}^+\} \cup \{\tau_n : n \leq N\}.$$

Now if p is any prime greater than N , then any algebraically closed field of characteristic p is a model of Σ_0 , and hence is a model of τ . Therefore, $ACF_p \models \sigma$ for all $p > N$.

We finally show that (5) implies (1) by proving the contrapositive. Suppose then that $ACF_0 \not\models \sigma$. Since ACF_0 is complete, we have that $ACF_0 \models \neg\sigma$. Since we have already established that (1) implies (3), we can fix $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $ACF_p \models \neg\sigma$ for all primes $p > m$. Since each ACF_p is satisfiable, it follows that $ACF_p \not\models \sigma$ for all primes $p > m$. Therefore, the set of primes p such that $ACF_p \models \sigma$ is finite. \square

Before using this theorem to prove an amazing result, we first summarize several important facts about finite fields. Recall that every finite field has characteristic equal to some prime p . Furthermore, if F has characteristic p , then F contains a copy of $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. From here, it follows that a finite field of characteristic p can be viewed as a vector space of $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, and hence has p^n many elements for some n (because if we fix a basis of F over $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, then there is a finite number n of elements of the basis, from which we can describe elements of F uniquely by picking n coefficients from $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$). Next, if F is a field of characteristic p , and $a, b \in F$, then $(a + b)^p = a^p + b^p$ for all $a, b \in F$ (essentially this comes from the fact that all of the other coefficients of binomial expansion is divisible by p , and hence equal 0 in F). By induction, it follows that for all $a, b \in F$ and $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we have

$$(a + b)^{p^n} = a^{p^n} + b^{p^n}.$$

Another important fact is that if F is a finite field with $|F| = p^n$ (and hence of characteristic p), then we have

$$a^{p^n - 1} = 1$$

for all nonzero $a \in F$ by Lagrange's Theorem (because $F \setminus \{0\}$ is a finite group of order $p^n - 1$ under multiplication). Therefore, we have

$$a^{p^n} = a$$

for all $a \in F$, including 0. With all of this in mind, we have the following fact.

Proposition 6.3.10. *Let p be prime. Every finitely generated subfield of $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ is finite.*

Proof. Let p be an arbitrary prime. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let $K_n = \{a \in \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p : a^{p^n} = a\}$, and notice that K_n is the set of roots of $x^{p^n} - x$ in $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. Since $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ is algebraically closed, we know that $x^{p^n} - x$ splits in $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. Notice that $x^{p^n} - x$ is a separable polynomial because it has formal derivative equal to -1 , which is trivially relatively prime to $x^{p^n} - x$. Therefore, the roots of $x^{p^n} - x$ in $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ are distinct, and hence $|K_n| = p^n$. Furthermore, we have that each K_n is closed under addition and multiplication because if $a, b \in K_n$, then

$$(a + b)^{p^n} = a^{p^n} + b^{p^n} = a + b$$

from above, and

$$(ab)^{p^n} = a^{p^n} b^{p^n} = ab.$$

Notice that $-1 \in K_n$ because we have $(-1)^{p^n} = -1$ whenever p is odd, and $(-1)^{p^n} = 1 = -1$ when $p = 2$. Since K_n is closed under multiplication, it follows that if $a \in K_n$ is arbitrary, then $-a = (-1) \cdot a \in K_n$. Finally, if $a \in K$ is nonzero, then

$$(a^{-1})^{p^n} = (a^{p^n})^{-1} = a^{-1},$$

so K_n is closed under multiplicative inverses (of nonzero elements). Therefore, K_n is a subfield of $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ with p^n elements. Moreover, if L is an arbitrary subfield of $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ with p^n many elements, then $a^{p^n} = a$ for all $a \in L$ from above, so $L \subseteq K_n$, and hence $L = K_n$ because L and K_n are finite sets of the same cardinality. In other words, K_n is the unique subfield of $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ with p^n elements.

Next, let us claim that if $d \mid n$, then $K_d \subseteq K_n$. To see this, let $a \in K_d$ be arbitrary. We then have $a^{p^d} = a$, so

$$a^{p^{2 \cdot d}} = (a^{p^d})^{p^d} = a^{p^d} = a$$

hence

$$a^{p^{3 \cdot d}} = (a^{p^{2 \cdot d}})^{p^d} = a^{p^d} = a.$$

By a simple induction, it follows that $a^{p^{md}} = a$ for all $m \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Thus, if $d \mid n$, then $K_d \subseteq K_n$.

Let $K = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} K_n$. We claim that $K = \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. We clearly have that $K \subseteq \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. To show equality, it suffices to show that K itself is algebraically closed. Let $f(x) \in K[x]$ be an arbitrary nonconstant polynomial, and write $f(x) = a_m x^m + a_{m-1} x^{m-1} + \cdots + a_1 x + a_0$ where each $a_i \in K$. Using the fact that $K = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} K_n$ and that $K_d \subseteq K_n$ whenever $d \mid n$, there exists $N \in \mathbb{N}^+$ such that $a_i \in K_N$ for all i (by taking a least common multiple). Now $f(x) \in K_N[x] \subseteq \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p[x]$, so since $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ is algebraically closed, we know that it has some root α of $f(x)$. We now have $K_N \subseteq K_N(\alpha) \subseteq \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$, and that $K_N(\alpha)$ is a finite extension of K_N . Since K_N is a finite field, and $K_N(\alpha)$ is a finite extension of K_N , the field $K_N(\alpha)$ is a finite subfield of $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. Since every finite subfield of $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ equals some K_n , we conclude that $K_N(\alpha) \subseteq K$, and hence $\alpha \in K$. Therefore, every polynomial over K has a root in K , and hence K is algebraically closed. It follows that $K = \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$.

We now prove the result. Let $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m \in \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ be arbitrary. Since $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p = K$, we have $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m \in K$. By taking a least common multiple, we can fix $N \in \mathbb{N}^+$ such that $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m \in K_N$. We then have that the subfield of $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ generated by a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m is a subfield of K_N , and hence is finite. \square

Given a field F , each polynomial in $F[x]$ determines a function from F to F via evaluation. Similarly, an element of $F[x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n]$, i.e. a polynomial of several variables, determines a function from F^n to F via evaluation. By putting several such polynomial functions (in the same number of variables) together, we can define polynomial functions from F^n to F^m . For example, if $f_1(x, y) = x^2 y + 5x$ and $f_2(x, y) = x^5 y - 3xy^2 + 7y^3$, then $f(x, y) = (f_1(x, y), f_2(x, y))$ can be viewed as a polynomial function from \mathbb{Q}^2 to \mathbb{Q}^2 (or really from F^2 to F^2 for any field F).

Theorem 6.3.11 (Ax-Grothendieck). *Every injective polynomial map from \mathbb{C}^n to \mathbb{C}^n is surjective.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, -, \cdot\}$ be the language of rings. Notice that given any $n, d \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we can write a sentence $\sigma_{n,d} \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ expressing that every injective polynomial map from F^n to F^n , where each polynomial has degree at most d , is surjective. We want to show that $\mathbb{C} \models \sigma_{n,d}$ for all $n, d \in \mathbb{N}^+$. By Theorem 6.3.9, it suffices to show that $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p \models \sigma_{n,d}$ for all primes p and all $n, d \in \mathbb{N}^+$. Thus, it suffices to show that for all primes p and all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, every injective polynomial map from $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p^n$ to $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p^n$ is surjective.

Let $p, n \in \mathbb{N}^+$ be arbitrary with p prime. Let $f: \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p^n \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p^n$ be an arbitrary injective polynomial map, and let $(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n) \in \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p^n$ be arbitrary. We need to show that there exists $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) \in \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p^n$ with $f(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n)$. Let $f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n \in \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p[x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n]$ be such that $f = (f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n)$, and let C be the finite set of coefficients appearing in f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n . Let K be the subfield of $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ generated by $C \cup \{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n\}$ and notice that K is a finite field by Proposition 6.3.10. Now $f \upharpoonright K^n$ maps K^n into K^n and is injective, so must be surjective because K^n is finite. Thus, there exists $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) \in K^n \subseteq \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p^n$ such that $f(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n)$. \square

6.4 Random Graphs

Throughout this section, we work in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is binary relation symbol. We consider loopless undirected graphs, which we view as \mathcal{L} -structures that are models of $\{\forall x \neg Rxx, \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)\}$.

Definition 6.4.1. *For each $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, let \mathcal{G}_n be the set of all models of $\{\forall x \neg Rxx, \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)\}$ with universe $[n]$.*

Definition 6.4.2. *For each $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{G}_n$, we let*

$$Pr_n(\mathcal{A}) = \frac{|\mathcal{A}|}{|\mathcal{G}_n|}.$$

For each $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we let

$$Pr_n(\sigma) = \frac{|\{\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{G}_n : \mathcal{M} \models \sigma\}|}{|\mathcal{G}_n|}.$$

We use the suggestive Pr because we think of constructing a graph randomly by flipping a fair coin for each 2-element subset $\{i, j\}$ of $[n]$ to determine whether or not there is an edge linking them. In this context, $Pr_n(\mathcal{A})$ is the probability the graph so constructed with vertex set $[n]$ is an element of \mathcal{A} . Notice that if \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} are both subsets of \mathcal{G}_n , then we trivially have $|\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B}| \leq |\mathcal{A}| + |\mathcal{B}|$, and hence

$$\begin{aligned} Pr_n(\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B}) &= \frac{|\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B}|}{|\mathcal{G}_n|} \\ &\leq \frac{|\mathcal{A}| + |\mathcal{B}|}{|\mathcal{G}_n|} \\ &\leq \frac{|\mathcal{A}|}{|\mathcal{G}_n|} + \frac{|\mathcal{B}|}{|\mathcal{G}_n|} \\ &= Pr_n(\mathcal{A}) + Pr_n(\mathcal{B}). \end{aligned}$$

More generally if $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2, \dots, \mathcal{A}_k$ are all subsets of \mathcal{G}_n , then

$$Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_1 \cup \mathcal{A}_2 \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{A}_k) \leq Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_1) + Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_2) + \dots + Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_k).$$

Notice that if $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathcal{G}_n$, then

$$\begin{aligned} Pr_n(\mathcal{A}) &= \frac{|\mathcal{A}|}{|\mathcal{G}_n|} \\ &\leq \frac{|\mathcal{B}|}{|\mathcal{G}_n|} \\ &= Pr_n(\mathcal{B}) \end{aligned}$$

and for any $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{G}_n$, we have

$$Pr_n(\mathcal{G}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}) = 1 - Pr_n(\mathcal{A}).$$

Now given two distinct 2-element subsets $\{i, j\}$ and $\{i', j'\}$ of $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$, the question of whether there is an edge linking i and j and the question of whether there is an edge linking i' and j' is independent. More formally, if

$$\mathcal{A}_1 = \{\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{G}_n : (i, j) \in \mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{M}}\}$$

and

$$\mathcal{A}_2 = \{\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{G}_n : (i', j') \in \mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{M}}\},$$

then we have

$$Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_1 \cap \mathcal{A}_2) = \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_1) \cdot Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_2).$$

More generally, suppose that we have sets E_1, E_2, \dots, E_k , where each E_i is set of 2-element subsets of $[n]$. Suppose that we fix choices for whether each pair in E_i should be in the graph or not, and let \mathcal{A}_i be the subset of \mathcal{G}_n consisting of those edges that meet the requirements for the edges in E_i . If the sets E_1, E_2, \dots, E_k are pairwise disjoint, then

$$Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_1 \cap \mathcal{A}_2 \cap \dots \cap \mathcal{A}_k) = Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_1) \cdot Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_2) \cdots Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_k).$$

In other words, the events saying that the edges in each of E_i behave according to a specified pattern are mutually independent when the E_i are pairwise disjoint.

For example, suppose that σ is the sentence

$$\exists x \exists y \exists z (Rxy \wedge Ryz \wedge Rzx)$$

saying that the graph has a triangle. We want to understand $Pr_n(\sigma)$. Determining the exact values for various n is difficult, but we can classify the long term behavior as n gets large. To see this, let $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$ be arbitrary. Consider partitioning the n vertices of $[n]$ into $\lfloor \frac{n}{3} \rfloor$ many set of size 3 (with perhaps 1 or 2 vertices left over) by considering the sets $\{1, 2, 3\}$, then $\{4, 5, 6\}$, etc. Now for any one of these sets, the probability that the vertices in the set forms a triangle is $(\frac{1}{2})^3 = \frac{1}{8}$, so the probability that the vertices in a set does not form a triangle is $1 - \frac{1}{8} = \frac{7}{8}$. Since these events are mutually independent (as the corresponding potential edge sets are disjoint), the probability that none of these families forms a triangle equals

$$\left(\frac{7}{8}\right)^{\lfloor \frac{n}{3} \rfloor}.$$

Therefore, the probability that there is *no* triangle, which is $Pr_n(\neg\sigma)$, satisfies the following inequality:

$$Pr_n(\neg\sigma) \leq \left(\frac{7}{8}\right)^{\lfloor \frac{n}{3} \rfloor} \leq \left(\frac{7}{8}\right)^{\frac{n}{3}}.$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} Pr_n(\sigma) &= 1 - Pr_n(\neg\sigma) \\ &\geq 1 - \left(\frac{7}{8}\right)^{\frac{n}{3}}. \end{aligned}$$

Since

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \left(1 - \left(\frac{7}{8}\right)^{\frac{n}{3}}\right) = 1 - 0 = 1,$$

and we trivially have $Pr_n(\sigma) \leq 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$, we conclude that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\sigma) = 1$. In other words, when n is large, a randomly constructed graph on $[n]$ will almost surely have a triangle.

For another example, consider the sentence

$$\forall x_1 \forall x_2 (\neg(x_1 = x_2) \rightarrow \exists z (\neg(z = x_1) \wedge \neg(z = x_2) \wedge Rx_1 z \wedge Rx_2 z))$$

saying that whenever we have two distinct vertices, we can find a common neighbor. Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $n \geq 3$ be arbitrary. Consider arbitrary distinct $a_1, a_2 \in [n]$. For each $c \in [n]$ distinct from the a_1 and a_2 , let

$$\mathcal{A}_c = \{\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{G}_n : c \text{ is adjacent to both } a_1 \text{ and } a_2\},$$

so that

$$\mathcal{G}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}_c = \{\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{G}_n : c \text{ is not adjacent to at least one of } a_1 \text{ or } a_2\}.$$

For each such c , we have $Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_c) = (\frac{1}{2})^2 = \frac{1}{4}$, so $Pr_n(\mathcal{G}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}_c) = 1 - \frac{1}{4} = \frac{3}{4}$. As we vary c through the $n-2$ other vertices, the corresponding events $\mathcal{G}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}_c$ are mutually independent, so the probability that no c is a common neighbor for this particular pair $\{a_1, a_2\}$ equals

$$Pr_n\left(\bigcap_c (\mathcal{G}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}_c)\right) = \prod_c Pr_n(\mathcal{G}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}_c) = \left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^{n-2}.$$

Now there are $\binom{n}{2}$ possible pairs of distinct vertices a_1 and a_2 , so the probability that there exists such a pair with no common neighbor is

$$\begin{aligned} Pr_n(\neg\sigma) &\leq \binom{n}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^{n-2} \\ &= \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^{n-2}. \end{aligned}$$

Since

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^{n-2} = 0$$

(see the proof of Proposition 6.4.5), it follows that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr(\neg\sigma) = 0$. Using the fact that $Pr_n(\sigma) = 1 - Pr_n(\neg\sigma)$, we conclude that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\sigma) = 1$.

We aim to prove the following result, originally proven by Glebskii, Kogan, Liagonkii, and Talanov, but also independently by Fagin.

Theorem 6.4.3. *For all $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, either $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\sigma) = 1$ or $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\sigma) = 0$.*

The key step in proving this result is generalizing the last example.

Definition 6.4.4. For each $r, s \in \mathbb{N}$ with $\max\{r, s\} > 0$, let $\sigma_{r,s}$ be the sentence

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x_1 \forall x_2 \cdots \forall x_r \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \cdots \forall y_s \Big(\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq r} (x_i \neq x_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq s} (y_i \neq y_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^r \bigwedge_{j=1}^s (x_i \neq y_j) \\ \rightarrow \exists z \Big(\bigwedge_{i=1}^r (z \neq x_i) \wedge \bigwedge_{j=1}^s (z \neq y_j) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^r R x_i z \wedge \bigwedge_{j=1}^s \neg R y_j z \Big) \Big) \end{aligned}$$

If $s = 0$, we simply omit all quantifiers and conjuncts mentioning a y_j . Similarly, if $r = 0$, we simply omit all quantifiers and conjuncts mentioning a x_i .

Intuitively, a graph is model of $\sigma_{r,s}$ if it has the property that whenever A and B are disjoint sets of vertices with $|A| = r$ and $|B| = s$, we can always find a vertex $u \notin A \cup B$ that is adjacent to every element of A , but not adjacent to any element of B . Peter Winkler has called the statements $\sigma_{r,s}$ the *Alice's Restaurant* axioms, references Arlo Guthrie's story/song containing the line "You can get anything you want at Alice's Restaurant".

Proposition 6.4.5. For all $r, s \in \mathbb{N}$ with $\max\{r, s\} > 0$, we have $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\sigma_{r,s}) = 1$.

Proof. Let $r, s \in \mathbb{N}$ be arbitrary with $\max\{r, s\} > 0$. Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ be arbitrary with $n > r + s$. Consider arbitrary disjoint subsets U and W of $[n]$ with $|U| = r$ and $|W| = s$. For each $c \in [n] \setminus (U \cup W)$, let

$$\mathcal{A}_c = \{\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{G}_n : c \text{ is adjacent to each element of } U \text{ and to no element of } W\}$$

For each such c , we have $Pr_n(\mathcal{A}_c) = \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}$, so $Pr_n(\mathcal{G}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}_c) = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}$. As we vary c through the $n - r - s$ vertices in $[n] \setminus (U \cup W)$, the corresponding events $\mathcal{G}_n \setminus \mathcal{A}_c$ are mutually independent, so the probability that no c works for this choice of U and W equals

$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}\right)^{n-r-s}.$$

Now there are $\binom{n}{r} \cdot \binom{n-r}{s}$ possible choices for the sets U and W , so

$$\begin{aligned} Pr_n(\neg \sigma_{r,s}) &\leq \binom{n}{r} \binom{n-r}{s} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}\right)^{n-r-s} \\ &\leq n^r \cdot n^s \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}\right)^{n-r-s} \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}\right)^{-r-s} \cdot n^{r+s} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}\right)^n \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}\right)^{-r-s} \cdot n^{r+s} \cdot \left(\frac{2^{r+s} - 1}{2^{r+s}}\right)^n \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{r+s}}\right)^{-r-s} \cdot \frac{n^{r+s}}{\left(\frac{2^{r+s}}{2^{r+s}-1}\right)^n} \end{aligned}$$

Now we use the fact that if $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ and $r \in \mathbb{R}$ with $r > 1$, then

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{n^k}{r^n} = 0$$

(i.e. that any exponential eventually dominates any polynomial) to conclude that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\neg \sigma_{r,s}) = 0$.

Therefore $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\sigma_{r,s}) = 1$. \square

Definition 6.4.6. Let $\Sigma = \{\forall x \neg Rxx, \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)\} \cup \{\sigma_{r,s} : r, s \in \mathbb{N}^+ \text{ and } \max\{r, s\} > 0\}$ and let $RG = Cn(\Sigma)$.

Proposition 6.4.7. RG is satisfiable.

Proof. We build a countable model \mathcal{M} of RG with $M = \mathbb{N}$. Notice first that since $\mathcal{P}_{fin}(\mathbb{N})$ (the set of all finite subsets of \mathbb{N}) is countable, so is the set $\mathcal{P}_{fin}(\mathbb{N})^2$. Hence the set

$$\{(A, B) \in \mathcal{P}_{fin}(\mathbb{N})^2 : A \cap B = \emptyset \text{ and } A \cup B \neq \emptyset\}$$

is countable. Therefore, we may list it as

$$(A_1, B_1), (A_2, B_2), (A_3, B_3), \dots$$

and furthermore we may assume that $\max(A_n \cup B_n) < n$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Let \mathcal{M} be the \mathcal{L} -structure where $M = \mathbb{N}$ and $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{(k, n) : k \in A_n\} \cup \{(n, k) : k \in A_n\}$. Suppose now that $A, B \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ are finite with $A \cap B = \emptyset$ and $A \cup B \neq \emptyset$. Fix $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $A = A_n$ and $B = B_n$. We then have that $(k, n) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $k \in A$ (because $k \in A_n$) and $(\ell, n) \notin R^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $\ell \in B$ (because $\ell \notin A_n$ and $n \notin A_\ell$ since $\ell < n$). Therefore, $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma_{r,s}$ for all $r, s \in \mathbb{N}$ with $\max r, s > 0$. Thus, \mathcal{M} is a model of RG . \square

Theorem 6.4.8. All models of RG are infinite, and any two countable models of RG are isomorphic.

Proof. Let \mathcal{M} be an arbitrary model of RG . Suppose that \mathcal{M} is finite, and let $n = |M|$. Since $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma_{n,0}$, there exists $b \in M$ such that $(b, a) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $a \in M$. However, this is a contradiction because $(a, a) \notin R^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $a \in M$. It follows that all models of RG are infinite.

Suppose now that \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{N} are two countable models of RG . From above, we know that M and N are both countably infinite. List M as m_0, m_1, m_2, \dots and list N as n_0, n_1, n_2, \dots . We build an isomorphism via a back-and-forth construction as in the proof of the corresponding result for DLO . In other words, we define a sequence of “partial isomorphisms” $h_k : M \rightarrow N$, i.e. each h_k will be a function from some finite subset of M to N that preserves the relation. More formally, we will have the following for each $k \in \mathbb{N}$:

- $\text{domain}(h_k)$ is a finite nonempty set.
- Each h_k is injective.
- For each $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $\{m_0, m_1, \dots, m_\ell\} \subseteq \text{domain}(h_{2\ell})$.
- For each $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $\{n_0, n_1, \dots, n_\ell\} \subseteq \text{range}(h_{2\ell+1})$.
- $h_k \subseteq h_{k+1}$, i.e. whenever $a \in \text{domain}(h_k)$, we have $a \in \text{domain}(h_{k+1})$ and $h_{k+1}(a) = h_k(a)$.
- Each h_k is a partial isomorphism, i.e. for all $a, b \in \text{domain}(h_k)$, we have $(a, b) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$ if and only if $(h_k(a), h_k(b)) \in R^{\mathcal{N}}$.

We start by letting h_0 be the partial function with domain $\{m_0\}$ where $h_0(m_0) = n_0$, and then we let $h_1 = h_0$ (since n_0 is already in $\text{range}(h_0)$). Suppose that $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$ and we have defined h_k . We have two cases.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that k is odd, and fix $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ with $k = 2\ell - 1$. If $m_\ell \in \text{domain}(h_k)$, let $h_{k+1} = h_k$. Suppose then that $m_\ell \notin \text{domain}(h_k)$. Let

$$\begin{aligned} A &= \{a \in \text{domain}(h_k) : (a, m_\ell) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}\} \\ B &= \{b \in \text{domain}(h_k) : (b, m_\ell) \notin R^{\mathcal{M}}\} \\ C &= \{h_k(a) : a \in A\} \\ D &= \{h_k(b) : b \in B\}. \end{aligned}$$

Since $\text{domain}(h_k)$ is finite, we have that A and B are finite disjoint subsets of M with $A \cup B = \text{domain}(h_k)$. Since h_k is injective, we have that C and D are disjoint subsets of N with $C \cup D = \text{range}(h_k)$, and that $|A| = |C|$ and $|B| = |D|$. Now \mathcal{N} is model of RG and $C \cap D = \emptyset$, so we can fix $w \in N \setminus (C \cup D)$ such that $(c, w) \in R^{\mathcal{N}}$ for all $c \in C$ and $(d, w) \notin R^{\mathcal{N}}$ for all $d \in D$. We now extend h_k to h_{k+1} by letting $h_{k+1}(m_\ell) = w$. It is straightforward to check that if h_k satisfies all of the above conditions, then h_{k+1} also satisfies all of the necessary conditions.

- *Case 2:* Suppose that k is even, and fix $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ with $k = 2\ell$. If $n_\ell \in \text{range}(h_k)$, let $h_{k+1} = h_k$. Suppose then that $n_\ell \notin \text{range}(h_k)$. Let

$$\begin{aligned} C &= \{c \in \text{range}(h_k) : (c, n_\ell) \in R^{\mathcal{N}}\} \\ D &= \{d \in \text{range}(h_k) : (d, n_\ell) \notin R^{\mathcal{N}}\} \\ A &= \{a \in \text{domain}(h_k) : h_k(a) \in C\} \\ B &= \{b \in \text{domain}(h_k) : h_k(b) \in D\}. \end{aligned}$$

Since $\text{domain}(h_k)$ is finite, we have that $\text{range}(h_k)$ is finite, and so C and D are finite disjoint subsets of N with $C \cup D = \text{range}(h_k)$. Since h_k is injective, we have that A and B are disjoint subsets of M with $A \cup B = \text{domain}(h_k)$, and that $|A| = |C|$ and $|B| = |D|$. Now \mathcal{M} is model of RG and $A \cap B = \emptyset$, so we can fix $u \in M \setminus (A \cup B)$ such that $(a, u) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $a \in A$ and $(b, u) \notin R^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $b \in B$. We now extend h_k to h_{k+1} by letting $h_{k+1}(u) = n_\ell$. It is straightforward to check that if h_k satisfies all of the above conditions, then h_{k+1} also satisfies all of the necessary conditions.

Now define $h: M \rightarrow N$ by letting $h(m_\ell) = h_{2\ell}(m_\ell)$ for each $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$. Using the second through fifth conditions on the h_k , we conclude that h is a bijection. Now let $a, b \in M$ be arbitrary. Fix $k, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$ with $a = m_k$ and $b = m_\ell$. Let $t = \max\{k, \ell\}$. Since $a, b \in \text{domain}(h_{2t})$, we have $(a, b) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$ if and only if $(h_{2t}(a), h_{2t}(b)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$, which by fifth condition on the h_k is if and only if $(h(a), h(b)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}}$. Therefore, h is an isomorphism. \square

Corollary 6.4.9. *RG is a complete theory.*

Proof. Immediate from the Countable Los-Vaught Test. \square

Theorem 6.4.10. *Let $\tau \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$.*

1. *If $\tau \in RG$, then $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\tau) = 1$.*
2. *If $\tau \notin RG$, then $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\tau) = 0$.*

Proof.

1. Let $\tau \in RG$ be arbitrary. We then have $\Sigma \models \tau$, so by Compactness we may fix $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that

$$\{\forall x \neg Rxx, \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)\} \cup \{\sigma_{r,s} : r, s \leq N\} \models \tau.$$

We then have that if $\mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{G}_n$ is such that $\mathcal{M} \models \neg\tau$, then

$$\mathcal{M} \models \bigvee_{0 \leq r, s \leq N, \max\{r, s\} > 0} \neg\sigma_{r,s}$$

Hence for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ we have

$$Pr_n(\neg\tau) \leq \sum_{0 \leq r, s \leq N, \max\{r, s\} > 0} Pr_n(\neg\sigma_{r,s})$$

Since $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\neg\sigma_{r,s}) = 0$ for each fixed choice of r and s , and since we have a finite sum, we conclude that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\neg\tau) = 0$. Therefore, $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\tau) = 1$.

2. Suppose that $\tau \notin RG$. Since RG is complete, it follows that $\neg\tau \in RG$. Thus, $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\neg\tau) = 1$ by part 1, and hence $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Pr_n(\tau) = 0$.

□

With this background, the theorem that we want to prove is now immediate.

Proof of Theorem 6.4.3. Apply the previous theorem together with the fact that RG is complete. □

6.5 Nonstandard Models of Arithmetic

Throughout this section, we work in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, <, +, \cdot\}$, where $0, 1$ are constant symbols, $<$ is a binary relation symbol, and $+, \cdot$ are binary function symbols. We also let $\mathfrak{N} = (\mathbb{N}, 0, 1, <, +, \cdot)$ where the symbol 0 is interpreted as the “real” 0 , the symbol $+$ is interpreted as “real” addition, etc. Be careful to distinguish when $+$ means the symbol in the language \mathcal{L} , and when it mean the addition function on \mathbb{N} . Our first question is whether $Th(\mathfrak{N})$ completely determines the model \mathfrak{N} .

Question 6.5.1. *Are all models of $Th(\mathfrak{N})$ isomorphic to \mathfrak{N} ?*

Using Proposition 6.3.4, we can immediately give a negative answer to this question because there is an uncountable model of $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, and an uncountable model is certainly not isomorphic to \mathfrak{N} . What would such a model look like? In order to answer this question, let’s think a little about the kinds of sentences that are in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$.

Definition 6.5.2. *For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we define a term $\underline{n} \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ as follows. Let $\underline{0} = 0$ and let $\underline{1} = 1$. Now define \underline{n} recursively by letting $\underline{n+1} = \underline{n} + 1$ for each $n \geq 1$. Notice here that the 1 and the $+$ in $\underline{n+1}$ means the actual number 1 and the actual addition function, whereas the 1 and $+$ in $\underline{n} + 1$ mean the symbols 1 and $+$ in our language \mathcal{L} . Thus, for example, $\underline{2}$ is the term $1 + 1$ and $\underline{3}$ is the term $(1 + 1) + 1$.*

Definition 6.5.3. *Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. We know that given any $t \in Term_{\mathcal{L}}$ containing no variables, t corresponds to an element of M given by $\bar{s}(t)$ for some (any) variable assignment $s: Var \rightarrow M$. We denote this value by $t^{\mathcal{M}}$.*

Notice that $\underline{n}^{\mathfrak{N}} = n$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ be a simple induction. Here are some important examples of some sentences that are true in \mathfrak{N} , and hence are elements of $Th(\mathfrak{N})$:

1. $\underline{2} + \underline{2} = \underline{4}$ and in general $\underline{m} + \underline{n} = \underline{m+n}$ and $\underline{m} \cdot \underline{n} = \underline{m \cdot n}$ for all $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$.
2. $\forall x \forall y (x + y = y + x)$.
3. $\forall x (\neg(x = 0) \rightarrow \exists y (y + 1 = x))$.
4. $\forall x \neg(\exists y ((x < y) \wedge (y < x + 1)))$.
5. For each $\varphi(x) \in Form_{\mathcal{L}}$, the sentence

$$(\varphi_x^0 \wedge \forall x (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi_x^{x+1})) \rightarrow \forall x \varphi$$

expressing that induction holds on the subset of \mathbb{N} defined by $\varphi(x)$ is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$. We often write this sentence in the following informal way:

$$(\varphi(0) \wedge \forall x (\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x+1))) \rightarrow \forall x \varphi.$$

Now any model \mathcal{M} of $Th(\mathfrak{N})$ must satisfy all of these sentences. The basic sentences in 1 above roughly tell us that \mathcal{M} has a piece which looks just like \mathfrak{N} . We make this precise with the following result.

Proposition 6.5.4. *For any model \mathcal{M} of $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, the function $h: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow M$ given by $h(n) = \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ is an embedding of \mathfrak{N} into \mathcal{M} .*

Proof. Notice that

$$h(0^{\mathfrak{N}}) = h(0) = \underline{0}^{\mathcal{M}} = 0^{\mathcal{M}}$$

and

$$h(1^{\mathfrak{N}}) = h(1) = \underline{1}^{\mathcal{M}} = 1^{\mathcal{M}}.$$

Now let $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ be arbitrary. We have

$$\begin{aligned} m < n &\Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{N} \models \underline{m} < \underline{n} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \underline{m} < \underline{n} \in Th(\mathfrak{N}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \models \underline{m} < \underline{n} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}} <^{\mathcal{M}} \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow h(m) <^{\mathcal{M}} h(n). \end{aligned}$$

Also, since $\underline{m} + \underline{n} = \underline{m+n} \in Th(\mathfrak{N})$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} h(m+n) &= (\underline{m+n})^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}} +^{\mathcal{M}} \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= h(m) +^{\mathcal{M}} h(n), \end{aligned}$$

and since $\underline{m} \cdot \underline{n} = \underline{m \cdot n} \in Th(\mathfrak{N})$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} h(m \cdot n) &= (\underline{m \cdot n})^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}} \cdot^{\mathcal{M}} \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= h(m) \cdot^{\mathcal{M}} h(n). \end{aligned}$$

Finally, for any $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $m \neq n$, we have $\neg(\underline{m} = \underline{n}) \in Th(\mathfrak{N})$, so $\mathcal{M} \models \neg(\underline{m} = \underline{n})$, and hence $h(m) \neq h(n)$. Therefore, h is injective. \square

Proposition 6.5.5. *Let \mathcal{M} be a model of $Th(\mathfrak{N})$. The following are equivalent:*

1. $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathfrak{N}$.
2. $M = \{\underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$.

Proof. If (2) holds, then the h of the Proposition 6.5.4 is surjective and hence an isomorphism. Suppose then that (1) holds and fix an isomorphism $h: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ from \mathfrak{N} to \mathcal{M} . We show that $h(n) = \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ by induction. We have

$$h(0) = h(0^{\mathfrak{N}}) = 0^{\mathcal{M}}$$

and

$$h(1) = h(1^{\mathfrak{N}}) = 1^{\mathcal{M}}.$$

Suppose that $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $h(n) = \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} h(n+1) &= h(n) +^{\mathcal{M}} h(1) \\ &= \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} +^{\mathcal{M}} 1^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= (\underline{n+1})^{\mathcal{M}}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $h(n) = \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, so $M = \{\underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ because h is surjective. \square

Definition 6.5.6. A nonstandard model of arithmetic is a model \mathcal{M} of $Th(\mathfrak{N})$ such that $\mathcal{M} \not\cong \mathfrak{N}$.

We've already seen that there are nonstandard models of arithmetic by cardinality considerations, but we can also build countable nonstandard models of arithmetic using the Compactness Theorem and the Countable Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem.

Theorem 6.5.7. There exists a countable nonstandard model of arithmetic.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} \cup \{c\}$ where c is a new constant symbol. Consider the following set of \mathcal{L}' -sentences:

$$\Sigma' = Th(\mathfrak{N}) \cup \{c \neq \underline{n} : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$$

Notice that every finite subset of Σ' is satisfiable (by taking \mathfrak{N} and interpreting c large enough), so Σ' is satisfiable by the Compactness Theorem. Furthermore, by the Countable Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem (notice that \mathcal{L}' is countable), there is a countable model \mathcal{M} of Σ' . Restricting this model to the original language \mathcal{L} , we may use Proposition 6.5.5 to conclude that \mathcal{M} is a countable nonstandard model of arithmetic. \square

For the rest of this section, we work with a structure \mathcal{M} that is a nonstandard model of arithmetic. As mentioned, anything that we can express in the first-order language of \mathcal{L} that is true of \mathfrak{N} is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, and hence is true in \mathcal{M} . For example, we have the following.

Proposition 6.5.8. Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic.

- $+^{\mathcal{M}}$ is associative on M .
- $+^{\mathcal{M}}$ is commutative on M .
- $<^{\mathcal{M}}$ is a linear ordering on M .
- For all $a \in M$ with $a \neq 0^{\mathcal{M}}$, there exists $b \in M$ with $a + 1^{\mathcal{M}} = b$.

Proof. Consider the following sentences:

- $\forall x \forall y \forall z (x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z)$
- $\forall x \forall y (x + y = y + x)$
- $\forall x \forall y (x < y \vee y < x \vee x = y)$
- $\forall x (x \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists y (y + 1 = x))$

Each of these sentences is true in \mathfrak{N} , so is an element of $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, and hence is true in \mathcal{M} . \square

Since we already know that \mathfrak{N} naturally embeds in \mathcal{M} , and it gets tiresome to write $+^{\mathcal{M}}$, $\cdot^{\mathcal{M}}$, and $<^{\mathcal{M}}$, we'll abuse notation by using just $+$, \cdot , and $<$ to also denote the interpretations in \mathcal{M} . Thus, these symbols now have three different meanings, depending on context: as formal symbols in our language, as the normal functions and relations in \mathfrak{N} , and as their interpretations in \mathcal{M} .

Definition 6.5.9. Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. We let $M_{fin} = \{\underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ and we call M_{fin} the set of finite elements of \mathcal{M} . We also let $M_{inf} = M \setminus M_{fin}$ and we call M_{inf} the set of infinite elements of \mathcal{M} .

The following proposition justifies our choice of name.

Proposition 6.5.10. Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic, and let $a \in M_{inf}$. For any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $\underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} < a$.

Proof. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, the sentence

$$\forall x(x < \underline{n} \rightarrow \bigvee_{i=0}^{n-1} (x = \underline{i}))$$

is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, and hence true in \mathcal{M} . Since $a \in M_{inf}$, we have $a \neq \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Now given an arbitrary $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we have that $a \not< \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ because the above sentence is true in \mathcal{M} . Since $<$ is a linear ordering on M and $a \neq \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we conclude that $\underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} < a$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. \square

Definition 6.5.11. Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. Define a relation \sim on M by letting $a \sim b$ if there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that either $a + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = b$ or $b + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = a$.

In other words, we let $a \sim b$ if a and b are “finitely” far apart. Notice that if there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $a + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = b$, then we must have $a \leq b$ in \mathcal{M} , because the sentence $\forall x \forall y ((x = x + y) \vee (x < x + y))$ is true in \mathfrak{N} .

Proposition 6.5.12. If \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic, then \sim is an equivalence relation on M .

Proof. \sim is clearly reflexive and symmetric by definition. Let $a, b, c \in M$ be arbitrary such that both $a \sim b$ and $b \sim c$.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that we can fix $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $a + \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}} = b$ and $b + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = c$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} a + (\underline{m} + \underline{n})^{\mathcal{M}} &= a + (\underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}} + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}) && \text{(by Proposition 6.5.4)} \\ &= (a + \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}}) + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} && \text{(since } + \text{ is associative on } \mathcal{M}) \\ &= b + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= c, \end{aligned}$$

so $a \sim c$.

- *Case 2:* Suppose that we can fix $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $a + \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}} = b$ and $c + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = b$.
 - *Subcase 1:* Suppose that $m \leq n$. Let $k = n - m \in \mathbb{N}$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} (c + \underline{k}^{\mathcal{M}}) + \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}} &= c + (\underline{k}^{\mathcal{M}} + \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}}) && \text{(since } + \text{ is associative on } \mathcal{M}) \\ &= c + (\underline{k} + \underline{m})^{\mathcal{M}} && \text{(by Proposition 6.5.4)} \\ &= c + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= b \\ &= a + \underline{m}^{\mathcal{M}}. \end{aligned}$$

Now $\forall x \forall y \forall z (x + z = y + z \rightarrow x = y)$ is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, so is true in \mathcal{M} . Therefore, we must have $c + \underline{k}^{\mathcal{M}} = a$, so $a \sim c$.

- *Subcase 2:* Suppose that $m > n$. Let $k = n - m \in \mathbb{N}$. Following the argument in Subcase 1, it follows that $a + \underline{k}^{\mathcal{M}} = c$, so $a \sim c$.

- The other two cases are similar.

\square

Definition 6.5.13. Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic, and let $a, b \in M$. We write $a \ll b$ to mean that $a < b$ and $a \not\sim b$.

We'd like to know that that relation \ll is well-defined on the equivalence classes of \sim . The following lemma is useful.

Lemma 6.5.14. *Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. Let $a, b, c \in M$ be such that $a \leq b \leq c$ and suppose that $a \sim c$. We then have $a \sim b$ and $b \sim c$.*

Proof. If either $a = b$ or $b = c$, this is trivial, so assume that $a < b < c$. Since $a < c$ and $a \sim c$, we can fix $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$ with $a + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = c$. Now the sentence

$$\forall x \forall z \forall w (x + w = z \rightarrow \forall y ((x < y \wedge y < z) \rightarrow \exists u (u < w \wedge x + u = y)))$$

is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, so is true in \mathcal{M} . Thus, we can fix $d \in M$ such that $d < \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ and $a + d = b$. Since $d < \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ and

$$\forall x (x < \underline{n} \rightarrow \bigvee_{i=0}^{n-1} (x = \underline{i}))$$

is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, we can fix $i \in \mathbb{N}$ with $d = \underline{i}^{\mathcal{M}}$. We then have $a + \underline{i}^{\mathcal{M}} = b$, hence $a \sim b$. The proof that $b \sim c$ is similar. \square

Proposition 6.5.15. *Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. Suppose that $a_0, b_0 \in M$ are such that $a_0 \ll b_0$. For any $a, b \in M$ with $a \sim a_0$ and $b \sim b_0$, we have $a \ll b$.*

Proof. We first show that $a < b$. Notice that $a_0 < b$, because otherwise we would have $b \leq a_0 < b_0$, so $a_0 \sim b_0$ by Lemma 6.5.14. Similarly, $a < b_0$, because otherwise we would have $a_0 < b_0 \leq a$, so $a_0 \sim b_0$ by Lemma 6.5.14. Now if $b \leq a$, then we would have

$$a_0 < b \leq a < b_0,$$

so $b \sim a_0$ by Lemma 6.5.14, hence $a_0 \sim b_0$, a contradiction. Since $<$ is a linear ordering on \mathcal{M} , we conclude that $a < b$.

We next show that $a \not\sim b$. If $a \sim b$, then using $a_0 \sim a$ and $b_0 \sim b$, together with the fact that \sim is an equivalence relation, we can conclude that $a_0 \sim b_0$, a contradiction. Therefore, $a \not\sim b$. \square

This allows us to define an ordering on the equivalence classes.

Definition 6.5.16. *Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. Given $a, b \in M$, we write $[a] < [b]$ to mean that $a \ll b$.*

The next proposition implies that there is no largest equivalence class under the ordering $<$ on the equivalence classes.

Proposition 6.5.17. *Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. For any $a \in M_{inf}$, we have $a \ll a + a$.*

Proof. Let $a \in M_{inf}$ be arbitrary. Now

$$\forall x (\neg(x = 0) \rightarrow x < x + x)$$

is true in \mathfrak{N} , and hence is true in \mathcal{M} . Since $a \in M_{inf}$, we have $a \neq 0$, and thus $a < a + a$. Suppose, for the same of obtaining a contradiction, that $a \sim a + a$. Since $a < a + a$, we can fix $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $a + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = a + a$. Since

$$\forall x \forall y \forall z (x + y = x + z \rightarrow y = z)$$

is true in \mathfrak{N} , it is also true in \mathcal{M} . Therefore, we would have $\underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = a$, contradicting the fact that $a \in M_{inf}$. It follows that $a \not\sim a + a$. \square

Lemma 6.5.18. *Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. For all $a \in M$, one of the following holds:*

1. *There exists $b \in M$ such that $a = \underline{2}^{\mathcal{M}} \cdot b$.*
2. *There exists $b \in M$ such that $a = \underline{2}^{\mathcal{M}} \cdot b + \underline{1}^{\mathcal{M}}$.*

Proof. The sentence

$$\forall x \exists y (x = \underline{2} \cdot y \vee x = \underline{2} \cdot y + \underline{1})$$

is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, and hence is true in \mathcal{M} . □

Proposition 6.5.19. *Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. For any $a \in M_{inf}$, there exists $b \in M_{inf}$ with $b \ll a$.*

Proof. Let $a \in M_{inf}$ be arbitrary. Using Lemma 6.5.18, we have two cases:

- *Case 1:* Suppose first that there exists $b \in M$ such that $a = \underline{2}^{\mathcal{M}} \cdot b$, and fix such a b . We then have $a = b + b$ (because $\forall x (\underline{2} \cdot x = x + x)$ is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$). Notice that $b \notin M_{fin}$ because otherwise we would have $a \in M_{fin}$. Using Proposition 6.5.17, we conclude that $b \ll b + b = a$.
- *Case 2:* Suppose now that there exists $b \in M$ such that $a = \underline{2}^{\mathcal{M}} \cdot b + \underline{1}^{\mathcal{M}}$. We then have $a = (b + b) + \underline{1}^{\mathcal{M}}$ because $\forall x (\underline{2} \cdot x + \underline{1} = (x + x) + \underline{1})$ is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$. Notice that $b \notin M_{fin}$ because otherwise we would have $a \in M_{fin}$. By Proposition 6.5.17, we know that $b \ll b + b$. Now $b + b \sim b + b + \underline{1}^{\mathcal{M}}$, so $b \ll b + b + \underline{1} = a$ by Proposition 6.5.15. □

Proposition 6.5.20. *Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic. For any $a, b \in M_{inf}$ with $a \ll b$, there exists $c \in M_{inf}$ with $a \ll c \ll b$.*

Proof. Let $a, b \in M_{inf}$ with $a \ll b$ be arbitrary. We again have two cases:

- *Case 1:* Suppose first that there exists $c \in M$ with $a + b = \underline{2}^{\mathcal{M}} \cdot c$, and fix such a c . We then have $a + b = c + c$. Since

$$\forall x \forall y \forall z ((x < y \wedge x + y = z + z) \rightarrow (x < z \wedge z < y))$$

is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$ it follows that $a < c < b$. Thus, we need only show that $a \not\sim c$ and $c \not\sim b$.

Suppose that $a \sim c$. Since $a < c$, we can fix $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $a + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = c$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} a + b &= c + c \\ &= a + a + (\underline{2n})^{\mathcal{M}}. \end{aligned}$$

Since additive cancellation is expressible as a first-order sentence that is true in \mathfrak{N} , we conclude that $b = a + (\underline{2n})^{\mathcal{M}}$, contradicting the fact that $a \ll b$. Therefore $a \not\sim c$.

Suppose that $c \sim b$. Since $c < b$, we can fix $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $c + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} = b$. We then have that

$$\begin{aligned} a + (\underline{2n})^{\mathcal{M}} + b &= a + b + (\underline{2n})^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= c + c + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= (c + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}) + (c + \underline{n}^{\mathcal{M}}) \\ &= b + b. \end{aligned}$$

Since additive cancellation is expressible as a first-order sentence that is true in \mathfrak{N} , we conclude that $a + (\underline{2n})^{\mathcal{M}} = b$, contradicting the fact that $a \not\sim b$. Therefore, $b \not\sim c$.

- *Case 2:* Otherwise, there exists $c \in M$ with $a + b = \underline{2}^{\mathcal{M}} \cdot c + \underline{1}^{\mathcal{M}}$. In this case, a similar argument shows that $a \ll c \ll b$.

□

Now clearly $[0^{\mathcal{M}}]$ is a smallest equivalence class in our ordering. If we omit this one equivalence class, then Proposition 6.5.17, Proposition 6.5.19, and Proposition 6.5.20 taken together say that the remaining equivalence classes form a dense linear ordering without endpoints. If our nonstandard model \mathcal{M} is countable, then we know that this ordering of (infinite) equivalence classes is isomorphic to $(\mathbb{Q}, <)$.

Our last proposition shows how nonstandard models can simplify quantifiers. It says that asking whether a first-order statement holds for infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is equivalent to asking whether it holds for at least one infinite element of a nonstandard model.

Proposition 6.5.21. *Let \mathcal{M} be a nonstandard model of arithmetic, and let $\varphi(x) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$. The following are equivalent:*

1. *There are infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $(\mathfrak{N}, n) \models \varphi$.*
2. *There exists $a \in M_{inf}$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, a) \models \varphi$.*

Proof. Suppose first that there are infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $(\mathfrak{N}, n) \models \varphi$. In this case, the sentence

$$\forall y \exists x (y < x \wedge \varphi)$$

is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, so it holds in \mathcal{M} . Fixing any $b \in M_{inf}$, we may conclude that there exists $a \in M$ with $b < a$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, a) \models \varphi$. Since $b < a$ and $b \in M_{inf}$, we may conclude that $a \in M_{inf}$.

Conversely, suppose that there are only finitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $(\mathfrak{N}, n) \models \varphi$. Fix $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $n < N$ for all n with $(\mathfrak{N}, n) \models \varphi$. We then have that the sentence

$$\forall x (\varphi \rightarrow x < \underline{N})$$

is in $Th(\mathfrak{N})$, so it holds in \mathcal{M} . Since there is no $a \in M_{inf}$ with $a < \underline{N}^{\mathcal{M}}$, it follows that there is no $a \in M_{inf}$ such that $(\mathcal{M}, a) \models \varphi$. □

6.6 Nonstandard Models of Analysis

With a basic understanding of nonstandard models of arithmetic, let's think about nonstandard models of other theories. One of the more amazing and useful such theories is the theory of the real numbers. The idea is that we will have nonstandard models of the theory of the reals which contain both “infinite” and “infinitesimal” elements. We can then transfer first-order statements back-and-forth, and do “calculus” in this expanded structure where the basic definitions (of say continuity) are simpler and more intuitive.

The first thing we need to decide on is what our language will be. Since we want to do calculus, we want to have analogs of all of our favorite functions (such as \sin) in the nonstandard models. Once we throw these in, it's hard to know where to draw the line. In fact, there is no reason to draw a line at all. Simply throw in relation symbols for every possible subset of \mathbb{R}^k , and throw in function symbols for every possible function $f: \mathbb{R}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Thus, throughout this section, we work in the language $\mathcal{L} = \{\underline{r} : r \in \mathbb{R}\} \cup \{\underline{P} : P \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k\} \cup \{\underline{f} : f: \mathbb{R}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\}$ where the various \underline{P} and \underline{f} have the corresponding arities. We also let \mathfrak{R} be the structure with universe \mathbb{R} and where we interpret all symbols in the natural way.

Proposition 6.6.1. *For any model \mathcal{M} of $Th(\mathfrak{R})$, the function $h: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow M$ given by $h(r) = \underline{r}^{\mathcal{M}}$ is an embedding of \mathfrak{R} into \mathcal{M} .*

Proof. Notice that

$$h(\underline{r}^{\mathfrak{A}}) = h(r) = \underline{r}^{\mathcal{M}}$$

for every $r \in \mathbb{R}$. Now let $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$ and let $r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k \in \mathbb{R}$ be arbitrary. We have

$$\begin{aligned} (r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k) \in \underline{P}^{\mathfrak{A}} &\Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{A} \models \underline{P} \, \underline{r_1} \, \underline{r_2} \cdots \underline{r_k} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \underline{P} \, \underline{r_1} \, \underline{r_2} \cdots \underline{r_k} \in Th(\mathfrak{A}) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \models \underline{P} \, \underline{r_1} \, \underline{r_2} \cdots \underline{r_k} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\underline{r_1}^{\mathcal{M}}, \underline{r_2}^{\mathcal{M}}, \dots, \underline{r_k}^{\mathcal{M}}) \in \underline{P}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow (h(r_1), h(r_2), \dots, h(r_k)) \in \underline{P}^{\mathcal{M}} \end{aligned}$$

Now let $f: \mathbb{R}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and let $r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k \in \mathbb{R}$ be arbitrary. Since $\underline{f} \, \underline{r_1} \, \underline{r_2} \cdots \underline{r_k} = \underline{f(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k)} \in Th(\mathfrak{A})$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} h(\underline{f}^{\mathfrak{A}}(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k)) &= h(f(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k)) \\ &= \underline{f(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_k)}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= \underline{f}^{\mathcal{M}}(\underline{r_1}^{\mathcal{M}}, \underline{r_2}^{\mathcal{M}}, \dots, \underline{r_k}^{\mathcal{M}}) \\ &= \underline{f}^{\mathcal{M}}(h(r_1), h(r_2), \dots, h(r_k)) \end{aligned}$$

Finally, for any $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{R}$ with $r_1 \neq r_2$, we have $\neg(\underline{r_1} = \underline{r_2}) \in Th(\mathfrak{A})$, so $\mathcal{M} \models \neg(\underline{r_1} = \underline{r_2})$, and hence $h(r_1) \neq h(r_2)$. Therefore, h is injective. \square

Proposition 6.6.2. *Let \mathcal{M} be a model of $Th(\mathfrak{A})$. The following are equivalent:*

1. $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathfrak{A}$.
2. $M = \{\underline{r}^{\mathcal{M}} : r \in \mathbb{R}\}$.

Proof. If (2) holds, then the h of the Proposition 6.6.1 is surjective and hence an isomorphism. Suppose then that (1) holds and fix an isomorphism $h: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ from \mathfrak{A} to \mathcal{M} . For any $r \in \mathbb{R}$, we must have $h(r) = h(\underline{r}^{\mathfrak{A}}) = \underline{r}^{\mathcal{M}}$. Therefore, $M = \{\underline{r}^{\mathcal{M}} : r \in \mathbb{R}\}$ because h is surjective. \square

Definition 6.6.3. *A nonstandard model of analysis is a model \mathcal{M} of $Th(\mathfrak{A})$ such that $\mathcal{M} \not\cong \mathfrak{A}$.*

Theorem 6.6.4. *There exists a nonstandard model of analysis.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} \cup \{c\}$ where c is a new constant symbol. Consider the following set of \mathcal{L}' -sentences.

$$\Sigma' = Th(\mathfrak{A}) \cup \{\neg(c = \underline{r}) : r \in \mathbb{R}\}$$

Notice that every finite subset of Σ' has a model (by taking \mathfrak{A} and interpreting c distinct from each r such that \underline{r} appears in Σ'), so Σ' has a model \mathcal{M} by the Compactness Theorem. Restricting this model to the original language \mathcal{L} , we may use the Proposition 6.6.2 to conclude that \mathcal{M} is a nonstandard model of analysis. \square

Definition 6.6.5. *For the rest of this section, fix a nonstandard model of analysis and denote it by ${}^*\mathfrak{A}$. Instead of writing $\underline{f}^{{}^*\mathfrak{A}}$ for each $f: \mathbb{R}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we simply write *f . We use similar notation for each $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$. Also, since there is a natural embedding (the h above) from \mathfrak{A} into ${}^*\mathfrak{A}$, we will identify \mathbb{R} with its image and hence think of \mathbb{R} as a subset of ${}^*\mathbb{R}$. Finally, for operations like $+$ and \cdot , we will abuse notation and omit the $*$'s.*

Proposition 6.6.6. *There exists $z \in {}^*\mathbb{R}$ such that $z > 0$ and $z < \varepsilon$ for all $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\varepsilon > 0$.*

Proof. Since ${}^*\mathbb{R}$ is a nonstandard model of analysis, we can fix $b \in {}^*\mathbb{R}$ such that $b \neq r$ for all $r \in \mathbb{R}$.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $b > r$ for all $r \in \mathbb{R}$. Let $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be the function

$$f(r) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{r} & \text{if } r \neq 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Let $z = {}^*f(b)$. We then have that $z > 0$ using the sentence

$$\forall x (\underline{0} < x \rightarrow \underline{0} < \underline{f}x).$$

Also, for any $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\varepsilon > 0$, we have that $b > \frac{1}{\varepsilon}$, hence $z < \varepsilon$ using the sentence

$$\forall x (\underline{f} \underline{\varepsilon} < x \rightarrow \underline{f}x < \underline{\varepsilon}).$$

- *Case 2:* Suppose that $b < r$ for all $r \in \mathbb{R}$. We then have that $b < -r$ for all $r \in \mathbb{R}$ and hence $r < -b$ for all $r \in \mathbb{R}$. Thus, we may take $z = {}^*f(-b)$ by the argument in Case 1.
- *Case 3:* Suppose then that there exists $r \in \mathbb{R}$ with $r < b$ and there exists $r \in \mathbb{R}$ with $b < r$. Let

$$X = \{r \in \mathbb{R} : r < b\}.$$

Notice that X is downward closed (if $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{R}$ with $r_2 \in X$ and $r_1 < r_2$, then $r_1 \in X$), nonempty, and bounded above. Let $s = \sup X \in \mathbb{R}$. Now $b = s$ is impossible, so either $s < b$ or $b < s$.

- *Subcase 1:* Suppose that $s < b$. We claim that we may take $z = b - s$. Since $s < b$, we have $z = b - s > 0$. Suppose that $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\varepsilon > 0$. We then have that $s + \varepsilon > s = \sup X$, so $s + \varepsilon \notin X$ and hence $s + \varepsilon \geq b$. Now $s + \varepsilon \neq b$ because $s + \varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$, so $s + \varepsilon > b$. It follows that $z = b - s < \varepsilon$.
- *Subcase 2:* Suppose that $b < s$. We claim that we may take $z = s - b$. Since $b < s$, we have $z = s - b > 0$. Suppose that $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\varepsilon > 0$. We then have that $s - \varepsilon < s = \sup X$, so we may fix $r \in X$ with $s - \varepsilon < r$. Since X is downward closed, we have that $s - \varepsilon \in X$, so $s - \varepsilon < b$. It follows that $z = s - b < \varepsilon$.

□

From now on, we'll use the more natural notation $\frac{1}{b}$ for ${}^*f(b)$ (where f is the function in the above proof) whenever $b \neq 0$.

Definition 6.6.7.

1. $\mathcal{Z} = \{a \in {}^*\mathbb{R} : |a| < \varepsilon \text{ for all } \varepsilon \in \mathbb{R} \text{ with } \varepsilon > 0\}$. We call \mathcal{Z} the set of infinitesimals.
2. $\mathcal{F} = \{a \in {}^*\mathbb{R} : |a| < r \text{ for some } r \in \mathbb{R} \text{ with } r > 0\}$. We call \mathcal{F} the set of finite or limited elements.
3. $\mathcal{I} = {}^*\mathbb{R} \setminus \mathcal{F}$. We call \mathcal{I} the set of infinite or unlimited elements.

Proposition 6.6.8.

1. \mathcal{Z} is a subring of ${}^*\mathbb{R}$.
2. \mathcal{F} is a subring of ${}^*\mathbb{R}$.
3. \mathcal{Z} is a prime ideal of \mathcal{F} .

Proof.

1. First notice that $\mathcal{Z} \neq \emptyset$ because $0 \in \mathcal{Z}$ (or we can use Proposition 6.6.6). Let $a, b \in \mathcal{Z}$ be arbitrary. Let $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\varepsilon > 0$. We have that $\frac{\varepsilon}{2} \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\frac{\varepsilon}{2} > 0$, hence $|a| < \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ and $|b| < \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$. It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} |a + b| &\leq |a| + |b| \\ &< \frac{\varepsilon}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \\ &= \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $a + b \in \mathcal{Z}$. We also have that $|a| < 1$ and $|b| < \varepsilon$, hence

$$\begin{aligned} |a \cdot b| &= |a| \cdot |b| \\ &< 1 \cdot \varepsilon \\ &= \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $a \cdot b \in \mathcal{Z}$. Finally, \mathcal{Z} is clearly closed under negation.

2. Clearly, $\mathcal{F} \neq \emptyset$. Let $a, b \in \mathcal{F}$ be arbitrary. Fix $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{R}$ with $r_1, r_2 > 0$ such that $|a| < r_1$ and $|b| < r_2$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} |a + b| &\leq |a| + |b| \\ &< r_1 + r_2, \end{aligned}$$

so $a + b \in \mathcal{F}$. We also have

$$\begin{aligned} |a \cdot b| &= |a| \cdot |b| \\ &< r_1 \cdot r_2 \end{aligned}$$

so $a \cdot b \in \mathcal{F}$. Finally, \mathcal{F} is clearly closed under negation.

3. We first show that \mathcal{Z} is an ideal of \mathcal{F} . We already know from part (1) that \mathcal{Z} is closed under addition and negation. Let $a \in \mathcal{F}$ and $b \in \mathcal{Z}$ be arbitrary. Fix $r \in \mathbb{R}$ with $r > 0$ and $|a| < r$. Let $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\varepsilon > 0$. We then have that $\frac{\varepsilon}{r} \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\frac{\varepsilon}{r} > 0$, hence $|a| < \frac{\varepsilon}{r}$. It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} |a \cdot b| &= |a| \cdot |b| \\ &< \frac{\varepsilon}{r} \cdot r \\ &= \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $a \cdot b \in \mathcal{Z}$. It follows that \mathcal{Z} is an ideal of \mathcal{F} .

We now show that \mathcal{Z} is a prime ideal of \mathcal{F} . Let $a, b \in \mathcal{F} \setminus \mathcal{Z}$ be arbitrary. We show that $a \cdot b \notin \mathcal{Z}$. Fix $\varepsilon, \delta \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\varepsilon, \delta > 0$ such that $|a| > \varepsilon$ and $|b| > \delta$. We then have $|a \cdot b| = |a| \cdot |b| > \varepsilon \cdot \delta$, hence $a \cdot b \notin \mathcal{Z}$.

□

Definition 6.6.9. Let $a, b \in {}^*\mathbb{R}$.

1. We write $a \approx b$ to mean that $a - b \in \mathcal{Z}$.
2. We write $a \sim b$ to mean that $a - b \in \mathcal{F}$.

Proposition 6.6.10. \approx and \sim are equivalence relations on ${}^*\mathbb{R}$.

Proof. Exercise using Proposition 6.6.8.

□

Definition 6.6.11. Let $a \in {}^*\mathbb{R}$. The \approx -equivalence class of a is called the halo of a . The \sim -equivalence class of a is called the galaxy of a .

Proposition 6.6.12. Let $a_1, b_1, a_2, b_2 \in {}^*\mathbb{R}$ with $a_1 \approx b_1$ and $a_2 \approx b_2$. We have the following:

1. $a_1 + a_2 \approx b_1 + b_2$.
2. $a_1 - a_2 \approx b_1 - b_2$.
3. If $a_1, b_1, a_2, b_2 \in \mathcal{F}$, then $a_1 \cdot a_2 \approx b_1 \cdot b_2$.
4. If $a_1, b_1 \in \mathcal{F}$ and $a_2, b_2 \in \mathcal{F} \setminus \mathcal{Z}$, then $\frac{a_1}{a_2} \approx \frac{b_1}{b_2}$.

Proof.

1. We have $a_1 - b_1 \in \mathcal{Z}$ and $a_2 - b_2 \in \mathcal{Z}$, hence

$$(a_1 + a_2) - (b_1 + b_2) = (a_1 - b_1) + (a_2 - b_2)$$

is in \mathcal{Z} by Proposition 6.6.8.

2. We have $a_1 - b_1 \in \mathcal{Z}$ and $a_2 - b_2 \in \mathcal{Z}$, hence

$$(a_1 - a_2) - (b_1 - b_2) = (a_1 - b_1) - (a_2 - b_2)$$

is in \mathcal{Z} by Proposition 6.6.8.

3. We have $a_1 - b_1 \in \mathcal{Z}$ and $a_2 - b_2 \in \mathcal{Z}$. Notice that

$$\begin{aligned} a_1 \cdot a_2 - b_1 \cdot b_2 &= a_1 \cdot a_2 - a_1 \cdot b_2 + a_1 \cdot b_2 - b_1 \cdot b_2 \\ &= a_1 \cdot (a_2 - b_2) + b_2 \cdot (a_1 - b_1). \end{aligned}$$

Since $a_1 \in \mathcal{F}$ and $a_2 - b_2 \in \mathcal{Z}$, we may use Proposition 6.6.8 to conclude that $a_1 \cdot (a_2 - b_2) \in \mathcal{Z}$. Similarly, we have $b_2 \cdot (a_1 - b_1) \in \mathcal{Z}$. Applying Proposition 6.6.8 again, we conclude that $a_1 \cdot a_2 - b_1 \cdot b_2 \in \mathcal{Z}$.

4. We have $a_1 - b_1 \in \mathcal{Z}$ and $a_2 - b_2 \in \mathcal{Z}$. Now

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{a_1}{a_2} - \frac{b_1}{b_2} &= \frac{a_1 \cdot b_2 - a_2 \cdot b_1}{a_2 \cdot b_2} \\ &= \frac{1}{a_2 \cdot b_2} \cdot (a_1 \cdot b_2 - a_2 \cdot b_1), \end{aligned}$$

and we know by part (3) that $a_1 \cdot b_2 - a_2 \cdot b_1 \in \mathcal{Z}$. Since $a_2, b_2 \in \mathcal{F} \setminus \mathcal{Z}$, it follows from Proposition 6.6.8 that $a_2 \cdot b_2 \in \mathcal{F} \setminus \mathcal{Z}$. Therefore, $\frac{1}{a_2 \cdot b_2} \in \mathcal{F}$ (if $\varepsilon > 0$ is such that $|a_2 \cdot b_2| > \varepsilon$, then $|\frac{1}{a_2 \cdot b_2}| < \frac{1}{\varepsilon}$), so $\frac{a_1}{a_2} - \frac{b_1}{b_2} \in \mathcal{Z}$ by Proposition 6.6.8.

□

Proposition 6.6.13. For every $a \in \mathcal{F}$, there exists a unique $r \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $a \approx r$.

Proof. Fix $a \in \mathcal{F}$. We first prove existence. Let

$$X = \{r \in \mathbb{R} : r < a\}$$

and notice that X is downward closed, nonempty, and bounded above because $a \in \mathcal{F}$. Now let $s = \sup X$ and argue as in Case 3 of Proposition 6.6.6 that $a \approx s$.

Suppose now that $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{R}$ are such that $a \approx r_1$ and $a \approx r_2$. We then have that $r_1 \approx r_2$ because \approx is an equivalence relation. However, this is a contradiction because $|r_1 - r_2| > \frac{|r_1 - r_2|}{2} \in \mathbb{R}$. □

Definition 6.6.14. We define a map $st: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by letting $st(a)$ be the unique $r \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $a \approx r$. We call $st(a)$ the standard part, or shadow, of a .

Corollary 6.6.15. The function $st: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a surjective ring homomorphism and $\ker(st) = \mathcal{Z}$.

Proposition 6.6.16. Suppose that $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and that $r, \ell \in \mathbb{R}$. The following are equivalent:

1. $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} f(x) = \ell$.
2. For all $a \approx r$ with $a \neq r$, we have ${}^*f(a) \approx \ell$.

Proof. Suppose first that $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} f(x) = \ell$. Let $a \in {}^*\mathbb{R} \setminus \{r\}$ be arbitrary with $a \approx r$. Let $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\varepsilon > 0$. Since $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} f(x) = \ell$, we may fix $\delta \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\delta > 0$ such that $|f(x) - \ell| < \varepsilon$ whenever $0 < |x - r| < \delta$. Notice that the sentence

$$\forall x((0 < |x - \underline{r}| \wedge |x - \underline{r}| < \underline{\delta}) \rightarrow |\underline{f}(x) - \underline{\ell}| < \underline{\varepsilon})$$

is in $Th(\mathfrak{A}) = Th({}^*\mathfrak{A})$. Now we have $a \in {}^*\mathbb{R}$ and $0 < |a - r| < \delta$, so $|{}^*f(a) - \ell| < \varepsilon$. Since ε was an arbitrary positive element of \mathbb{R} , it follows that ${}^*f(a) - \ell \in \mathcal{Z}$, hence ${}^*f(a) \approx \ell$.

Suppose conversely that for all $a \approx r$ with $a \neq r$, we have ${}^*f(a) \approx \ell$. Fix $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ with $z > 0$. Let $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ with $\varepsilon > 0$. By assumption, whenever $a \in {}^*\mathbb{R}$ and $0 < |a - r| < z$, we have that ${}^*f(a) - \ell \in \mathcal{Z}$. Thus, the sentence

$$\exists \delta(\delta > 0 \wedge \forall x((0 < |x - \underline{r}| \wedge |x - \underline{r}| < \underline{\delta}) \rightarrow |\underline{f}(x) - \underline{\ell}| < \underline{\varepsilon}))$$

is in $Th({}^*\mathfrak{A}) = Th(\mathfrak{A})$. By fixing a witnessing δ , we see that the limit condition holds for ε . \square

Proposition 6.6.17. Suppose that $f, g: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and that $r, \ell, m \in \mathbb{R}$. Suppose also that $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} f(x) = \ell$ and $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} g(x) = m$. We then have the following:

1. $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} (f + g)(x) = \ell + m$.
2. $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} (f - g)(x) = \ell - m$.
3. $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} (f \cdot g)(x) = \ell \cdot m$.
4. If $m \neq 0$, then $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} \left(\frac{f}{g}\right)(x) = \frac{\ell}{m}$.

Proof. In each case, we use Proposition 6.6.16. Let $a \approx r$ be arbitrary with $a \neq r$. By assumption and Proposition 6.6.16, we then have ${}^*f(a) \approx \ell$ and ${}^*g(a) \approx m$.

1. Notice that the sentence

$$\forall x((\underline{f} + \underline{g})x = \underline{f}x + \underline{g}x)$$

is in $Th({}^*\mathfrak{A}) = Th(\mathfrak{A})$. Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} {}^*(f + g)(a) &= {}^*f(a) + {}^*g(a) \\ &\approx \ell + m \end{aligned} \quad (\text{by Proposition 6.6.12}).$$

Using Proposition 6.6.16 again, we conclude that $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} (f + g)(x) = \ell + m$.

2. Completely analogous to (1).

3. As in part (1), we have $^*(f \cdot g)(a) = ^*f(a) \cdot ^*g(a)$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} ^*(f + g)(a) &= ^*f(a) + ^*g(a) \\ &\approx \ell + m \end{aligned} \quad (\text{by Proposition 6.6.12})$$

where we are using the fact that $\ell, m, ^*f(a), ^*g(a) \in \mathcal{F}$, the latter two of which follow from the fact that they are infinitely close to the former two. Using Proposition 6.6.16 again, we conclude that $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} (f + g)(x) = \ell + m$.

4. Notice that $^*f(a) \in \mathcal{F}$ because $^*f(a) \approx \ell \in \mathbb{R}$, and $^*g(a) \in \mathcal{F}$ because $^*g(a) \approx m$. We also have $^*g(a) \notin \mathcal{Z}$ because $m \neq 0$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} ^*\left(\frac{f}{g}\right)(a) &= \frac{^*f(a)}{^*g(a)} \\ &\approx \frac{\ell}{m} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{by Proposition 6.6.12}).$$

Using Proposition 6.6.16 again, we conclude that $\lim_{x \rightarrow r} \left(\frac{f}{g}\right)(x) = \frac{\ell}{m}$.

□

Since continuity and differentiability can be defined in terms of limits, we immediately obtain the following two facts.

Corollary 6.6.18. *Suppose that $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and that $r \in \mathbb{R}$. The following are equivalent:*

1. f is continuous at r .
2. For all $a \approx r$, we have $^*f(a) \approx f(r)$.

Corollary 6.6.19. *Suppose that $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and that $r, \ell \in \mathbb{R}$. The following are equivalent:*

1. f is differentiable at r with $f'(r) = \ell$.
2. For all $a \approx r$ with $a \neq r$, we have $\frac{^*f(a) - f(r)}{a - r} \approx \ell$.

Proposition 6.6.20. *If f is differentiable at r , then f is continuous at r .*

Proof. Let $a \approx r$ be arbitrary with $a \neq r$. Since f is differentiable at r , we have

$$\frac{^*f(a) - f(r)}{a - r} \approx f'(r).$$

Now $f'(r) \in \mathcal{F}$ trivially, so $\frac{^*f(a) - f(r)}{a - r} \in \mathcal{F}$. Furthermore, we have $a - r \in \mathcal{Z}$, so

$$^*f(a) - f(r) = \frac{^*f(a) - f(r)}{a - r} \cdot (a - r) \in \mathcal{Z}$$

by Proposition 6.6.8. It follows that $^*f(a) \approx f(r)$.

□

Chapter 7

Introduction to Axiomatic Set Theory

No one shall expel us from the paradise that Cantor has created. - David Hilbert

7.1 Why Set Theory?

Set theory originated in an attempt to understand and somehow classify “small” or “negligible” sets of real numbers. Cantor’s early explorations in the realm of the transfinite were motivated by a desire to understand the points of convergence of trigonometric series. The basic ideas quickly became a fundamental part of analysis.

Since then, set theory has become *a* way to unify mathematical practice, and *the* way in which mathematicians deal with the infinite in all areas of mathematics. We’ve all seen the proof that the set of real numbers is uncountable, but what more can be said? Exactly how uncountable is the set of real numbers? Does this taming of the infinite give us any new tools to prove interesting mathematical theorems? Is there anything more that the set-theoretic perspective provides to the mathematical toolkit other than a crude notion of size and cute diagonal arguments?

We begin by listing a few basic questions from various areas of mathematics that can only be tackled with a well-defined theory of the infinite which set theory provides.

Algebra: A fundamental result in linear algebra is that every finitely generated vector space has a basis, and any two bases have the same size. We call the unique size of any basis of a vector space the dimension of that space. Moreover, given two finitely generated vector spaces, they are isomorphic precisely when they have the same dimension. What can be said about vector spaces that aren’t finitely generated? Does every vector space have a basis? Is there a meaningful way to assign a “dimension” to every vector space in such a way that two vector spaces over the same field are isomorphic if and only if they have the same “dimension”? We need a well-defined and robust notion of infinite sets and infinite cardinality to deal with these questions.

Analysis: Lebesgue’s theory of measure and integration require an important distinction between countable and uncountable sets. Aside from this use, the study of the basic structure of the Borel sets or the projective sets (an extension of the Borel sets) require some sophisticated use of set theory, in a way that can be made precise.

Foundations: A remarkable side-effect of our undertaking to systematically formalize the infinite is that we can devise a formal axiomatic and finitistic system in which virtually all of mathematical practice can be embedded in an extremely faithful manner. Whether this fact is interesting or useful depends on your philosophical stance about the nature of mathematics, but it does have an important consequence. It puts us in a position to prove that certain statements do not follow from the axioms (which have now been formally defined and are thus susceptible to a mathematical analysis), and hence can not be proven by the currently

accepted axioms. For better or worse, this feature has become the hallmark of set theory. For example, we can ask questions like:

1. Do we really need the Axiom of Choice to produce a nonmeasurable set of real numbers?
2. Is there an uncountable set of real numbers which can not be in one-to-one correspondence with the set of all real numbers?

Aside from these ideas which are applicable to other areas of mathematics, set theory is a very active area of mathematics with its own rich and beautiful structure, and deserves study for this reason alone.

7.2 Motivating the Axioms

In every modern mathematical theory (say group theory, topology, the theory of Banach spaces), we start with a list of axioms, and derive results from these. In most of the fields that we axiomatize in this way, we have several models of the axioms in mind (many different groups, many different topological spaces, etc.), and we're using the axiomatization to prove abstract results which will be applicable to each of these models. In set theory, we may think that it is our goal to study one unique universe of sets, and so our original motivation in writing down axioms is simply to state precisely what we are assuming in an area that can often be very counterintuitive. Since we will build our system in first-order logic, it turns out that there are many models of set theory as well (assuming that there is at least one...), and this is the basis for proving independence results, but this isn't our initial motivation. This section will be a little informal. We'll give the formal axioms (in a formal first-order language) and derive consequences starting in the next section.

Whether the axioms that we are writing down now are "obviously true", "correct", "justified", or even worthy of study are very interesting philosophical questions, but we will not spend much time on them here. Regardless of their epistemological status, they are now nearly universally accepted as the "right" axioms to use in the development of set theory. The objects of our theory are sets, and we have one binary relation \in which represents set membership. That is, we write $x \in y$ to mean that x is an element of y . We begin with an axiom which ensures that our theory is not vacuous.

Axiom of Existence: There exists a set.

We need to have an axiom which says how equality of sets is determined in terms of the membership relation. In mathematical practice using naive set theory, the most common way to show that two sets A and B are equal is to show that each is a subset of the other. We therefore define $A \subseteq B$ to mean that for all $x \in A$, we have $x \in B$, and we want to be able to conclude that $A = B$ from the facts that $A \subseteq B$ and $B \subseteq A$. That is, we want to think of a set as being completely determined by its members, thus linking $=$ and \in , but we need to codify this as an axiom.

Axiom of Extensionality: For any two sets A and B , if $A \subseteq B$ and $B \subseteq A$, then $A = B$.

The Axiom of Extensionality implicitly implies a few, perhaps unexpected, consequences about the nature of sets. First, if a is a set, then we should consider the two sets $\{a\}$ and $\{a, a\}$ (if we are allowed to assert their existence) to be equal because they have the same elements. Similarly, if a and b are sets, then we should consider $\{a, b\}$ and $\{b, a\}$ to be equal. Hence, whatever a set is, it should be inherently unordered and have no notion of multiplicity. Also, since the only objects we are considering are sets, we are ruling out the existence of "atoms" other than the empty set, i.e. objects a which are not the empty set but which have no elements.

We next need some rules about how we are allowed to build sets. The naive idea is that any property we write down determines a set. That is, for any property P of sets, we may form the set $\{x : P(x)\}$. For

example, if we have a group G , we may form the center of G given by $Z(G) = \{x : x \in G \text{ and } xy = yx \text{ for all } y \in G\}$. Of course, this naive approach leads to the famous contradiction known as Russell's paradox. Let $P(x)$ be the property $x \notin x$, and let $z = \{x : P(x)\} = \{x : x \notin x\}$. We then have $z \in z$ if and only if $z \notin z$, a contradiction.

This gives our first indication that it may be in our best interest to tread carefully when giving rules about how to build sets. One now standard reaction to Russell's Paradox and other similar paradoxes in naive set theory is that the set-theoretic universe is too "large" to encapsulate into one set. Thus, we shouldn't allow ourselves the luxury of forming the set $\{x : P(x)\}$ because by doing so we may package too much into one set, and the set-theoretic universe is too "large" to make this permissible. In other words, we should only christen something as a set if it is not too "large".

However, if we already have a set A and a property P , we should be allowed to form $\{x \in A : P(x)\}$ because A is a set (hence not too "large"), so we should be allowed to assert that the subcollection consisting of those sets x in A such that $P(x)$ holds is in fact a set. For example, if we have a group G (so G is already known to be a set), its center $Z(G)$ is a set because $Z(G) = \{x \in G : xy = yx \text{ for all } y \in G\}$. Following this idea, we put forth the following axiom.

Axiom of Separation: For any set A and any property P of sets, we may form the set consisting of precisely those $x \in A$ such that $P(x)$, i.e. we may form the set $\{x \in A : P(x)\}$.

You may object to this axiom because of the vague notion of a "property" of sets, and that would certainly be a good point. We'll make it precise when we give the formal first-order axioms in the next section. The Axiom of Separation allows us to form sets from describable subcollections of sets we already know exist, but we currently have no way to build larger sets from smaller ones. We now give axioms which allow us to build up sets in a permissible manner.

Our first axiom along these lines will allow us to conclude that for any two sets x and y , we may put them together into a set $\{x, y\}$. Since we already have the Axiom of Separation, we will state the axiom in the (apparently) weaker form that for any two sets x and y , there is a set with both x and y as elements.

Axiom of Pairing: For any two sets x and y , there is a set A such that $x \in A$ and $y \in A$.

We next want to have an axiom which allows us to take unions. However, in mathematics, we often want to take a union over a (possibly infinite) family of sets. For example, we may have a set A_n for each natural number n , and then want to consider $\bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} A_n$. By being clever, we can incorporate all of these ideas of taking unions into one axiom. The idea is the following. Suppose that we have two sets A and B , say $A = \{u, v, w\}$ and $B = \{x, z\}$. We want to be able to assert the existence of the union of A and B , which is $\{u, v, w, x, z\}$. First, by the Axiom of Pairing, we may form the set $\mathcal{F} = \{A, B\}$, which equals $\{\{u, v, w\}, \{x, z\}\}$. Now the union of A and B is the set of elements of elements of \mathcal{F} . In the above example, if we can form the set $\mathcal{F} = \{A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots\}$ (later axioms will justify this), then $\bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} A_n$ is the set of elements of elements of \mathcal{F} . Again, in the presence of the Axiom of Separation, we state this axiom in the (apparently) weaker form that for any set \mathcal{F} , there is set containing all elements of elements of \mathcal{F} .

Axiom of Union: For any set \mathcal{F} , there is a set U such that for all sets x , if there exists $A \in \mathcal{F}$ with $x \in A$, then $x \in U$.

We next put forward two axioms which really allow the set-theoretic universe to expand. The first is the Power Set Axiom which tells us that if we have a set A , it is permissible to form the set consisting of all subsets of A .

Axiom of Power Set: For any set A , there is a set \mathcal{F} such that for all sets B , if $B \subseteq A$, then $B \in \mathcal{F}$.

Starting with the empty set \emptyset (which exists using the Axiom of Existence and the Axiom of Separation), we can build a very rich collection of finite sets using the above axioms. For example, we can form $\{\emptyset\}$ using the Axiom of Pairing. We can also form $\{\emptyset\}$ by applying the Axiom of Power Set to \emptyset . We can then go on to form $\{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}$ and many other finite sets. However, our axioms provide no means to build an infinite set.

Before getting to the Axiom of Infinity, we will lay some groundwork about ordinals. If set theory is going to serve as a basis for mathematics, we certainly need to be able to embed within it the natural numbers. It seems natural to represent the number n as some set which we think of as having n elements. Which set should we choose? Let's start from the bottom-up. The natural choice to play the role of 0 is \emptyset because it is the only set without any elements. Now that we have 0, and we want 1 to be a set with one element, perhaps we should let 1 be the set $\{0\} = \{\emptyset\}$. Next, a canonical choice for a set with two elements is $\{0, 1\}$, so we let $2 = \{0, 1\} = \{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}$. In general, if we have defined $0, 1, 2, \dots, n$, we can let $n + 1 = \{0, 1, \dots, n\}$. This way of defining the natural numbers has many advantages which we'll come to appreciate. For instance, we'll have $n < m$ if and only if $n \in m$, so we may use the membership relation to define the standard ordering of the natural numbers.

However, the \dots in the above definition of $n + 1$ may make you a little nervous. Fortunately, we can give another description of $n + 1$ which avoids this unpleasantness. If we've defined n , we let $n + 1 = n \cup \{n\}$, which we can justify the existence of using the Axiom of Pairing and the Axiom of Union. The elements of $n + 1$ will then be n , and the elements of n which should "inductively" be the natural numbers up to, but not including, n .

Using the above outline, we can use our axioms to justify the existence of any particular natural number n (or, more precisely, the set that we've chosen to represent our idea of the natural number n). However, we can't justify the existence of the set of natural numbers $\{0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\}$. To enable us to do this, we make the following definition. For any set x , let $S(x) = x \cup \{x\}$. We call $S(x)$ the *successor* of x . We want an axiom which says that there is a set containing $0 = \emptyset$ which is closed under successors.

Axiom of Infinity: There exists a set A such that $\emptyset \in A$ and for all x , if $x \in A$, then $S(x) \in A$.

With the Axiom of Infinity asserting existence, it's not too difficult to use the above axioms to show that there is a smallest (with respect to \subseteq) set A such that $\emptyset \in A$ and for all x , if $x \in A$, then $S(x) \in A$. Intuitively, this set is the collection of all natural numbers. Following standard set-theoretic practice, we denote this set by ω (this strange choice, as opposed to the typical \mathbb{N} , conforms with the standard practice of using lowercase greek letters to represent infinite ordinals).

With the set of natural numbers ω in hand, there's no reason to be timid and stop counting. We started with $0, 1, 2, \dots$, where each new number consisted of collecting the previous numbers into a set, and we've now collected all natural numbers into a set ω . Why not continue the counting process by considering $S(\omega) = \omega \cup \{\omega\} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, \omega\}$? We call this set $\omega + 1$ for obvious reasons. This conceptual leap of counting into the so-called transfinite gives rise to the ordinals, the "numbers" which form the backbone of set theory.

Once we have $\omega + 1$, we can then form the set $\omega + 2 = S(\omega + 1) = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, \omega, \omega + 1\}$, and continue on to $\omega + 3, \omega + 4$, and so on. Why stop there? If we were able to collect all of the natural numbers into a set, what's preventing us from collecting these into the set $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, \omega, \omega + 1, \omega + 2, \dots\}$, and continuing? Well, our current axioms are preventing us, but we shouldn't let that stand in our way. If we can form ω , surely we should have an axiom allowing us to make this new collection a set. After all, if ω isn't too "large", this set shouldn't be too "large" either since it's just another sequence of ω many sets after ω .

The same difficulty arises when you want to take the union of an infinite family of sets. In fact, the previous problem is a special case of this one, but in this generality it may feel closer to home. Suppose we have sets A_0, A_1, A_2, \dots , that is, we have a set A_n for every $n \in \omega$. Of course, we should be able to justify making the union $\bigcup_{n \in \omega} A_n$ into a set. If we want to apply the Axiom of Union, we should first form the

set $\mathcal{F} = \{A_0, A_1, A_2, \dots\}$ and apply the axiom to \mathcal{F} . However, in general, our current axioms don't justify forming this set despite its similarity to asserting the existence of ω .

To remedy these defects, we need a new axiom. In light of the above examples, we want to say something along the lines of “if we can index a family of sets with ω , then we can form this family into a set”. Using this principle, we should be able to form the set $\{\omega, \omega + 1, \omega + 2, \dots\}$ and hence $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, \omega, \omega + 1, \omega + 2, \dots\}$ is a set by the Axiom of Union. Similarly, in the second example, we should be able to form the set $\{A_0, A_1, A_2, \dots\}$. In terms of our restriction of not allowing sets to be too “large”, this seems justified because if we consider ω to not be too “large”, then any family of sets it indexes shouldn't be too “large” either.

There is no reason to limit our focus to ω . If we have any set A , and we can index a family of sets using A , then we should be able to assert the existence of a set containing the elements of the family. We also want to make the notion of indexing more precise, and we will do it using the currently vague notion of a property of sets as used in the Axiom of Separation.

Axiom of Collection: Suppose that A is a set and $P(x, y)$ is a property of sets such that for every $x \in A$, there is a unique set y such that $P(x, y)$ holds. Then there is a set B such that for every $x \in A$, we have $y \in B$ for the unique y such that $P(x, y)$ holds.

Our next axiom is often viewed as the most controversial due to its nonconstructive nature and the sometimes counterintuitive results it allows us to prove. I will list it here as a fundamental axiom, but we will avoid using it in the basic development of set theory below until we get to a position to see its usefulness in mathematical practice.

The Axiom of Separation and the Axiom of Collection involved the somewhat vague notion of property, but whenever we think of a property (and the way we will make the notion of property precise using a formal language) we have a precise unambiguous definition which describes the property in mind. Our next axiom, the Axiom of Choice, asserts the existence of certain sets without the need for such a nice description. Intuitively, it says that if we have a set consisting only of nonempty sets, there is a function which picks an element out of each of these nonempty sets without requiring that there be a “definable” description of such a function. We haven't defined the notion of a function in set theory, and it takes a little work to do, so we will state the axiom in the following form: For every set \mathcal{F} of nonempty pairwise disjoint sets, there is a set C consisting of exactly one element from each element of \mathcal{F} . We think of C as a set which “chooses” an element from each of the elements of \mathcal{F} . Slightly more precisely, we state the axiom as follows.

Axiom of Choice: Suppose that \mathcal{F} is a set such every $A \in \mathcal{F}$ is nonempty, and for every $A, B \in \mathcal{F}$, if there exists a set x with $x \in A$ and $x \in B$, then $A = B$. There exists a set C such that for every $A \in \mathcal{F}$, there is a unique $x \in C$ with $x \in A$.

Our final axiom is in no way justified by mathematical practice because it never appears in arguments outside set theory. It is also somewhat unique among our axioms in that it asserts that certain types of sets do not exist. However, adopting it gives a much clearer picture of the set-theoretic universe and it will come to play an important role in the study of set theory itself. As with the Axiom of Choice, we will avoid using it in the basic development of set theory below until we are able to see its usefulness to us.

The goal is to eliminate sets which appear circular in terms of the membership relation. For example, we want to forbid sets x such that $x \in x$ (so there is no set x such that $x = \{x\}$). Similarly, we want to forbid the existence of sets x and y such that $x \in y$ and $y \in x$. In more general terms, we don't want to have a set with an infinite descending chain each a member of the next, such as having sets x_n for each $n \in \omega$ such that $\dots \in x_2 \in x_1 \in x_0$. We codify this by saying every nonempty set A has an element which is minimal with respect to the membership relation.

Axiom of Foundation: If A is a nonempty set, then there exists $x \in A$ such that there is no set z with both $z \in A$ and $z \in x$.

7.3 Formal Axiomatic Set Theory

We now give the formal version of our axioms. We work in a first-order language \mathcal{L} with a single binary relation symbol \in . By working in this first-order language, we are able to make precise the vague notion of property discussed above by using first-order formulas instead. However, this comes at the cost of replacing the Axiom of Separation and the Axiom of Collection by infinitely many axioms (also called an axiom scheme) since we can't quantify over formulas within the theory itself. There are other more subtle consequences of formalizing the above intuitive axioms in first-order logic which we will discuss below.

Notice also that we allow parameters (denoted by \vec{p}) in the Axioms of Separation and Collection so that we will be able to derive statements which universally quantified over a parameter, such as “For all groups G , the set $Z(G) = \{x \in G : xy = yx \text{ for all } x \in G\}$ exists”, rather than having to reprove that $Z(G)$ is a set for each group G that we know exists. Finally, notice how we can avoid using defined notions (like \emptyset , \subseteq , and $S(x)$ in the Axiom of Infinity) by expanding them out into our fixed language. For example, we replace $x \subseteq y$ by $\forall w(w \in x \rightarrow w \in y)$ and replace $\emptyset \in z$ by $\exists w(\forall y(y \notin w) \wedge w \in z)$ (we could also replace it by $\forall w(\forall y(y \notin w) \rightarrow w \in z)$).

In each of the following axioms, when we write a formula $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$, we implicitly mean that the x_i 's are distinct variables and that every free variable of φ is one of the x_i . We also use \vec{p} to denote a finite sequence of variables p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k . Notice that we don't need the Axiom of Existence because it is true in all \mathcal{L} -structures (recall that all \mathcal{L} -structures are nonempty).

Axiom of Extensionality:

$$\forall x \forall y (\forall w (w \in x \leftrightarrow w \in y) \rightarrow x = y)$$

Axiom (Scheme) of Separation: For each formula $\varphi(x, y, \vec{p})$ we have the axiom

$$\forall \vec{p} \forall y \exists z \forall x (x \in z \leftrightarrow (x \in y \wedge \varphi(x, y, \vec{p})))$$

Axiom of Pairing:

$$\forall x \forall y \exists z (x \in z \wedge y \in z)$$

Axiom of Union:

$$\forall x \exists u \forall z (\exists y (z \in y \wedge y \in x) \rightarrow z \in u)$$

Axiom of Power Set:

$$\forall x \exists z \forall y (\forall w (w \in y \rightarrow w \in x) \rightarrow y \in z)$$

Axiom of Infinity:

$$\exists z (\exists w (\forall y (y \notin w) \wedge w \in z) \wedge \forall x (x \in z \rightarrow \exists y (\forall w (w \in y \leftrightarrow (w \in x \vee w = x)) \wedge y \in z)))$$

Axiom (Scheme) of Collection: For each formula $\varphi(x, y, \vec{p})$ we have the axiom

$$\begin{aligned} \forall \vec{p} \forall w ((\forall x (x \in w \rightarrow \exists y \varphi(x, y, \vec{p}))) \wedge \forall x (x \in w \rightarrow \forall u \forall v ((\varphi(x, u, \vec{p}) \wedge \varphi(x, v, \vec{p})) \rightarrow u = v))) \\ \rightarrow \exists z \forall x (x \in w \rightarrow \exists y (y \in z \wedge \varphi(x, y, \vec{p})))) \end{aligned}$$

Axiom of Choice:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall z ((\forall x (x \in z \rightarrow \exists w (w \in x)) \wedge \forall x \forall y ((x \in z \wedge y \in z \wedge \exists w (w \in x \wedge w \in y)) \rightarrow x = y)) \\ \rightarrow \exists c \forall x (x \in z \rightarrow (\exists w (w \in x \wedge w \in c) \wedge \forall u \forall v ((u \in x \wedge v \in x \wedge u \in c \wedge v \in c) \rightarrow u = v)))) \end{aligned}$$

Axiom of Foundation:

$$\forall z(\exists x(x \in z) \rightarrow \exists x(x \in z \wedge \neg(\exists y(y \in z \wedge y \in x))))$$

Let Ax_{ZFC} be the above set of sentences, and let $ZFC = Cn(Ax_{ZFC})$ (ZFC stands for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice). Other presentations state the axioms of ZFC a little differently, but they all give the same theory. Some people refer to the Axiom of Separation as the Axiom of Comprehension, but Comprehension is sometimes also used to mean the contradictory statement (via Russell's Paradox) that we can always form the set $\{x : P(x)\}$, so I prefer to call it Separation. Also, some presentations refer to the Axiom of Collection as the Axiom of Replacement, but this name is more applicable to the statement that replaces the last \rightarrow in the statement of Collection with a \leftrightarrow , and this formulation implies the Axiom of Separation.

7.4 Working from the Axioms

We have set up ZFC as a first-order theory similar to the group axioms, ring axioms, or partial orderings axioms. The fact that we have created formal first-order axioms for set theory has several far-reaching and surprising consequences. For example, if ZFC is satisfiable, then since \mathcal{L} is countable, there must be a countable model of ZFC. This shocking result may seem to contradict the fact that (as we will see) ZFC proves the existence of uncountable sets. How can these statements not contradict each other? This seeming paradox, known as Skolem's paradox, can only be understood and resolved once we have a better sense of what models of ZFC look like. Notice also that if ZFC is satisfiable, then there is an uncountable model of ZFC by Proposition 6.3.4. Therefore, if ZFC has a model, then it has several nonisomorphic models. It is very natural to find all of these facts disorienting, because our original motivation was to write down axioms for “the” universe of sets.

What does a model of ZFC look like? Recall that we are working in a language \mathcal{L} with just one binary relation symbol. An \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} in this language can be visualized as a directed graph, where we draw an arrow from vertex u to vertex v if (u, v) is an element of $\in^{\mathcal{M}}$. Given a vertex v in such a directed graph, the set of *predecessors* of v is just the set of vertices that have an arrow pointing to v . From this perspective, the Axiom of Extensionality says that if two vertices have the same set of predecessors, they then must be the same vertex. The Axiom of Pairing says that given any two vertices u and w , we can always find a vertex v such that u and w are both predecessors of v . For a more interesting example, the Axiom of Separation says that given any vertex v , if we consider any subset of the predecessors of v that is definable (with parameters), then there is a vertex u whose predecessors consist of exactly this definable subset. Moreover, a defined notion like “ u is a subset of w ” just means that the set of predecessors of u is a subset of the set of predecessors of w .

For a concrete example, consider the \mathcal{L} -structure $\mathfrak{N} = (\mathbb{N}, <)$. As a directed graph, we have a vertex m for each natural number, and we have an arrow from m to n if and only if $m < n$. We determine which of the ZFC axioms are true in \mathfrak{N} :

- *Axiom of Extensionality:* In the structure \mathfrak{N} , this interprets as saying that whenever two elements of \mathbb{N} have the same elements of \mathbb{N} less than them, then they are equal. This holds in \mathfrak{N} .
- *Axiom (Scheme) of Separation:* This does not hold in \mathfrak{N} . Let $\varphi(x, y)$ be the formula $\exists w(w \in x)$. The corresponding instance of Separation is:

$$\forall y \exists z \forall x(x \in z \leftrightarrow (x \in y \wedge \exists w(w \in x)))$$

In the structure \mathfrak{N} , this interprets as saying that for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there is an $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $k < m$ if and only if $k < n$ and $k \neq 0$. This does not hold in \mathfrak{N} because if we consider $n = 2$, there is no $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $0 \not< m$ and yet $1 < m$.

- *Axiom of Pairing:* In the structure \mathfrak{N} , this interprets as saying that whenever $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists $k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m < k$ and $n < k$. This holds in \mathfrak{N} because given $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$, we may take $k = \max\{m, n\} + 1$.
- *Axiom of Union:* In the structure \mathfrak{N} , this interprets as saying that whenever $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ such that whenever $k \in \mathbb{N}$ has the property that there exists $m \in \mathbb{N}$ with $k < m$ and $m < n$, then $k < \ell$. This holds in \mathfrak{N} because given $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we may take $\ell = n$ since if $k < m$ and $m < n$, then $k < n$ by transitivity of $<$ in \mathbb{N} (in fact, we may take $\ell = n - 1$ if $n \neq 0$).
- *Axiom of Power Set:* In the structure \mathfrak{N} , this interprets as saying that whenever $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ such that whenever $m \in \mathbb{N}$ has the property that every $k < m$ also satisfies $k < n$, then $m < \ell$. This holds in \mathfrak{N} because given $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we may take $\ell = n + 1$ since if $m \in \mathbb{N}$ has the property that every $k < m$ also satisfies $k < n$, then $m \leq n$ and hence $m < n + 1$.
- *Axiom of Infinity:* In the structure \mathfrak{N} , this interprets as saying that there exists $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $0 < n$ and whenever $m < n$, we have $m + 1 < n$. This does not hold in \mathfrak{N} .
- *Axiom (Scheme) of Collection:* This holds in \mathfrak{N} , as we now check. Fix a formula $\varphi(x, y, \vec{p})$. Interpreting in \mathfrak{N} , we need to check that if we fix natural numbers \vec{q} and an $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $k < n$ there exists a unique $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $(\mathfrak{N}, k, \ell, \vec{q}) \models \varphi$, then there exists $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $k < n$ there exists an $\ell < m$ such that $(\mathfrak{N}, k, \ell, \vec{q}) \models \varphi$. Let's then fix natural numbers \vec{q} and an $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and suppose that for all $k < n$ there exists a unique $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $(\mathfrak{N}, k, \ell, \vec{q}) \models \varphi$. For each $k < n$, let ℓ_k be the unique element of \mathbb{N} such that $(\mathfrak{N}, k, \ell_k, \vec{q}) \models \varphi$. Letting $m = \max\{\ell_k : k < n\} + 1$, we see that m suffices. Therefore, this holds in \mathfrak{N} .
- *Axiom of Choice:* In the structure \mathfrak{N} , this interprets as saying that whenever $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is such that
 - Every $m < n$ is nonzero.
 - For all $\ell, m < n$, there is no k with $k < \ell$ and $k < m$

then there exists $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $k < n$, there is exactly one $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ with $\ell < m$ and $\ell < n$. Notice that the only $n \in \mathbb{N}$ satisfying the hypothesis (that is, the above two conditions) is $n = 0$. Now for $n = 0$, the condition is trivial because we may take $m = 0$ as there is no $k < 0$. Therefore, this holds in \mathfrak{N} .

- *Axiom of Foundation:* In the structure \mathfrak{N} , this interprets as saying that whenever $n \in \mathbb{N}$ has the property that there is some $m < n$, there there exists $m < n$ such that there is no k with $k < m$ and $k < n$. Notice that $n \in \mathbb{N}$ has the property that there is some $m < n$ if and only if $n \neq 0$. Thus, this holds in \mathfrak{N} because if $n \neq 0$, then we have that $0 < n$ and there is no k with $k < 0$ and $k < n$.

Is ZFC, or equivalently Ax_{ZFC} , satisfiable? Can we somehow construct a model of ZFC? These are interesting questions with subtle answers. For now, we'll just have to live with a set of axioms with no obvious models. How then do we show that an \mathcal{L} -sentence σ is in ZFC? Since we have two notions of implication (semantic and syntactic), we can show that either $Ax_{ZFC} \models \sigma$ or $Ax_{ZFC} \vdash \sigma$. Given our experience with syntactic deductions, of course we will choose the former. When attempting to show that $Ax_{ZFC} \models \sigma$, we must take an arbitrary model of Ax_{ZFC} and show that it is a model of σ . Even though we do not have a simple natural example of such a model, we can still argue in this way, but we must be mindful of strange \mathcal{L} -structures and perhaps unexpected models.

Thus, when we develop set theory below, we will be arguing semantically via models. Rather than constantly saying “Fix a model \mathcal{M} of Ax_{ZFC} ” at the beginning of each proof, and proceeding by showing that $(\mathcal{M}, s) \models \varphi$ for various φ , we will keep the models in the background and assume that we are “living” inside one for each proof. When we are doing this, a “set” is simply an element of the universe M of

our model \mathcal{M} , and given two “sets” a and b , we write $a \in b$ to mean that (a, b) is an element of $\in^{\mathcal{M}}$. Notice that this approach is completely analogous to what we do in group theory. That is, when proving that statement is true in all groups, we take an arbitrary group, and “work inside” that group with the appropriate interpretations of the symbols.

Also, although there is no hierarchy of sets in our axioms, we will often follow the practice of using lowercase letters a, b, c , etc. to represent sets that we like to think of as having no internal structure (such as numbers, elements of a group, points of a topological space), use capital letters A, B, C , etc. to represent sets whose elements we like to think of as having no internal structure, and use script letters \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{F} , etc. to represent sets of such sets. Again, an arbitrary model of ZFC can be viewed as a directed graph, so *every* element of the model is a certain vertex (like any other) in this structure. In other words, our notational choices are just for our own human understanding.

7.5 ZFC as a Foundation for Mathematics

In the next few chapters, we’ll show how to develop mathematics quite faithfully within the framework of ZFC. This raises the possibility of using set theory as a foundation for mathematical practice. However, this seems circular because our development of logic presupposed normal mathematical practice and “naive” set theory (after all, we have the *set* of axioms of ZFC). It seems that logic depends on set theory and set theory depends on logic, so how have we gained anything from a foundational perspective?

It is indeed possible, at least in principle, to get out of this vicious circle and have a completely finitistic basis for mathematics. The escape is to buckle down and use syntactic arguments. In other words, we can show that $Ax_{ZFC} \vdash \sigma$ instead of showing that $Ax_{ZFC} \models \sigma$. Now there are infinitely many axioms of ZFC (because of the two axioms schemes), but any given deductions will only use finitely many of the axioms. Furthermore, although there are infinitely many axioms, we can mechanically check if a given \mathcal{L} -sentence really is an axiom. Informally, the set of axioms is a “computable” set. In this way, it would be possible in principle to make every proof completely formal and finitistic, where each line follows from previous lines by one of our proof rules. If we held ourselves to this style, then we could reduce mathematical practice to a game with finitely many symbols (if we insisted on avoiding reference to the natural numbers explicitly, we could replace our infinite stock of variables Var with one variable symbol x , introduce a new symbol $'$, and refer to x_3 as x''' , etc.) where each line could be mechanically checked according to our finitely many rules. Thus, it would even be possible to program a computer to check every proof.

In practice (for human beings at least), the idea of giving deductions for everything is outlandish. Leaving aside the fact that actually giving short deductions is often a painful endeavor, it turns out that even the most basic statements of mathematics, when translated into ZFC, are many thousands of symbols long, and elementary mathematical proofs (such as say the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic) are many thousands of lines long. We’ll discuss how to develop the real numbers below, but any actual formulas talking about real numbers would be ridiculously long and incomprehensible to the human reader. Due to these reasons, and since the prospect of giving syntactic deductions for everything should give me nightmares, we will argue everything semantically in the style of any other axiomatic subject in mathematics. It is an interesting and worthwhile exercise, however, to imagine how everything could be done syntactically.

Chapter 8

Developing Basic Set Theory

8.1 First Steps

We first establish some basic set theoretic facts carefully from the axioms.

Definition 8.1.1. *If A and B are sets, we write $A \subseteq B$ to mean for all $c \in A$, we have $c \in B$.*

Although the symbol \subseteq is not part of our language, we will often use \subseteq in our formulas and arguments. This use is justified because it can always be transcribed into our language by replacing it with the corresponding formula as we did in the axioms. As mentioned previously, if we have a model \mathcal{M} of ZFC viewed as a directed graph, and we also have $a, b \in M$, then $a \subseteq b$ will be true in M if every vertex that points to a also points to b . In other words, always remember that although we call elements “sets”, in any given model, these “sets” can be viewed as vertices of a directed graph with certain properties. From this perspective, the next result says that in any model of ZFC, there is a unique vertex that has no incoming arrows.

Proposition 8.1.2. *There is a unique set with no elements.*

Proof. Fix a set b (which exists by the Axiom of Existence, or because \mathcal{L} -structures are nonempty by definition). By Separation applied to the formula $x \neq x$, there is a set c such that for all a , we have $a \in c$ if and only if $a \in b$ and $a \neq a$. Now for all sets a , we have $a = a$, hence $a \notin c$. Therefore, there is a set with no elements. If c_1 and c_2 are two sets with no elements, then by the Axiom of Extensionality, we may conclude that $c_1 = c_2$. \square

Definition 8.1.3. *We use \emptyset to denote the unique set with no elements.*

As above, we will often use \emptyset in our formulas and arguments despite the fact that there is no constant in our language representing it. Again, this use can always be eliminated by replacing it with a formula, as we did in the Infinity, Choice, and Foundation axioms. We will continue to follow this practice without comment in the future when we introduce new definitions to stand for sets for which ZFC proves both existence and uniqueness. In each case, be sure to understand how these definitions could be eliminated.

We now show how to turn the idea of Russell’s Paradox into a proof that there is no universal set.

Proposition 8.1.4. *There is no set u such that $a \in u$ for every set a .*

Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that u is a set with the property that $a \in u$ for every set a . By Separation applied to the formula $\neg(x = x)$, there is a set c such that for all sets a , we have $a \in c$ if and only if $a \in u$ and $a \notin a$. Since $a \in u$ for every set a , it follows that for each set a , we have $a \in c$ if and only if $a \notin a$. Therefore, $c \in c$ if and only if $c \notin c$, a contradiction. \square

Proposition 8.1.5. *For all sets a and b , there is a unique set c such that, for all sets d , we have $d \in c$ if and only if either $d = a$ or $d = b$.*

Proof. Let a and b be arbitrary sets. By Pairing, there is a set e such that $a \in e$ and $b \in e$. By Separation applied to the formula $x = a \vee x = b$ (notice that we are using parameters a and b in this use of Separation), there is a set c such that for all d , we have $d \in c$ if and only if both $d \in e$ and either $d = a$ or $d = b$. It follows that $a \in c$, $b \in c$, and for any $d \in c$, we have either $d = a$ or $d = b$. Uniqueness again follows from Extensionality. \square

Corollary 8.1.6. *For every set a , there is a unique set c such that, for all sets d , we have $d \in c$ if and only if $d = a$.*

Proof. Apply the previous proposition with $b = a$. \square

Definition 8.1.7. *Given two sets a and b , we use the notation $\{a, b\}$ to denote the unique set guaranteed to exist by the Proposition 8.1.5. Given a set a , we use the notation $\{a\}$ to denote the unique set guaranteed to exist by the Corollary 8.1.6.*

Using the same style of argument, we can use Union and Separation to show that for every set \mathcal{F} , there is a unique set z consisting precisely of elements of elements of \mathcal{F} .

Proposition 8.1.8. *Let \mathcal{F} be a set. There is a unique set U such that for all a , we have $a \in U$ if and only if there exists $B \in \mathcal{F}$ with $a \in B$.*

Proof. Exercise. \square

Definition 8.1.9. *Let \mathcal{F} be a set. We use the notation $\bigcup \mathcal{F}$ to denote the unique set guaranteed to exist by the previous proposition. If A and B are sets, we use the notation $A \cup B$ to denote $\bigcup \{A, B\}$.*

We now introduce some notation which conforms with the normal mathematical practice of writing sets.

Definition 8.1.10. *Suppose that $\varphi(x, y, \vec{p})$ is a formula (in our language $\mathcal{L} = \{\in\}$), and that B and \vec{q} are sets. By Separation and Extensionality, there is a unique set C such that for all sets a , we have $a \in C$ if and only if $a \in B$ and $\varphi(a, B, \vec{q})$. More formally, given a model \mathcal{M} of ZFC and elements B, \vec{q} of \mathcal{M} , there is unique element C of \mathcal{M} such that for all a , we have $a \in C$ if and only if $a \in B$ and $(\mathcal{M}, a, B, \vec{q}) \models \varphi$. We denote this unique set by $\{a \in B : \varphi(a, B, \vec{q})\}$.*

With unions in hand, what about intersections? As in unions, the general case to consider is when we have a set \mathcal{F} , which we think of as a family of sets. We then want to collect those a such that $a \in B$ for all $B \in \mathcal{F}$ into a set. However, we do need to be a little careful. What happens if $\mathcal{F} = \emptyset$? It seems that our definition would want to make the intersection of the sets in \mathcal{F} consists of all sets, contrary to Proposition 8.1.4. However, this is the only case which gives difficulty, because if $\mathcal{F} \neq \emptyset$, we can take the intersection to be a subset of one (any) of the elements of \mathcal{F} .

Proposition 8.1.11. *Let \mathcal{F} be a set with $\mathcal{F} \neq \emptyset$. There is a unique set I such that for all a , we have $a \in I$ if and only if $a \in B$ for all $B \in \mathcal{F}$.*

Proof. Since $\mathcal{F} \neq \emptyset$, we may fix $C \in \mathcal{F}$. Let $I = \{a \in C : \forall B (B \in \mathcal{F} \rightarrow a \in B)\}$. For all a , we have $a \in I$ if and only if $a \in B$ for all $B \in \mathcal{F}$. Uniqueness again follows from Extensionality. \square

Definition 8.1.12. *Let \mathcal{F} be a set with $\mathcal{F} \neq \emptyset$. We use the notation $\bigcap \mathcal{F}$ to denote the unique set guaranteed to exist by the previous proposition. If A and B are sets, we use the notation $A \cap B$ to denote $\bigcap \{A, B\}$.*

If A is a set, then we can not expect the complement of A to be a set because the union of such a purported set with A would be a set which has every set as an element, contrary to Proposition 8.1.4. However, if A and B are sets, and $A \subseteq B$, we can take the relative complement of A in B .

Proposition 8.1.13. *Let A and B be sets with $A \subseteq B$. There is a unique set C such that for all a , we have $a \in C$ if and only if $a \in B$ and $a \notin A$.*

Proof. Exercise. □

Definition 8.1.14. *Let A and B be sets with $A \subseteq B$. We use the notation $B \setminus A$, or $B - A$, to denote the unique set guaranteed to exist by the previous proposition.*

Since sets have no internal order to them, we need a way to represent ordered pairs. Fortunately (since it means we don't have to extend our notion of set), there is a hack that allows us to build sets capturing the only essential property of an ordered pair.

Definition 8.1.15. *Given two sets a and b , we let $(a, b) = \{\{a\}, \{a, b\}\}$.*

Proposition 8.1.16. *Let a, b, c, d be sets. If $(a, b) = (c, d)$, then $a = c$ and $b = d$.*

Proof. Let a, b, c, d be arbitrary sets with $\{\{a\}, \{a, b\}\} = \{\{c\}, \{c, d\}\}$. We first show that $a = c$. Since $\{c\} \in \{\{a\}, \{a, b\}\}$, either $\{c\} = \{a\}$ or $\{c\} = \{a, b\}$. In either case, we have $a \in \{c\}$, hence $a = c$. We now need only show that $b = d$. Suppose instead that $b \neq d$. Since $\{a, b\} \in \{\{c\}, \{c, d\}\}$, we have either $\{a, b\} = \{c\}$ or $\{a, b\} = \{c, d\}$. In either case, we conclude that $b = c$ (because either $b \in \{c\}$, or $b \in \{c, d\}$ and $b \neq d$). Similarly, since $\{c, d\} \in \{\{a\}, \{a, b\}\}$, we have either $\{c, d\} = \{a\}$ or $\{c, d\} = \{a, b\}$, and in either case we conclude that $d = a$. Therefore, using the fact that $a = c$, it follows that $b = d$. □

We next turn to Cartesian products. Given two sets A and B , we would like to form the set $\{(a, b) : a \in A \text{ and } b \in B\}$. Justifying that we can collect these elements into a set takes a little work, since we don't have a set that we are “carving” out from. The idea is as follows. For each fixed $a \in A$, we can assert the existence of $\{a\} \times B = \{(a, b) : b \in B\}$ using Collection (and Separation) because B is a set. Then using Collection (and Separation) again, we can assert the existence of $\{\{a\} \times B : a \in A\}$ since A is a set. The Cartesian product is then the union of this set. At later points, we will consider this argument sufficient, but we give a slightly more formal version here to really see how the axioms of Collection and Separation are applied and where the formulas come into play.

Proposition 8.1.17. *For any two sets A and B , there exists a unique set, denoted by $A \times B$, such that for all x , we have $x \in A \times B$ if and only if there exists $a \in A$ and $b \in B$ with $x = (a, b)$.*

Proof. Let $\varphi(x, a, b)$ be a formula expressing that “ $x = (a, b)$ ” (think about how to write this down). Letting $\exists!$ be shorthand for “there is a unique”, the following sentence follows (either semantically or syntactically) from Ax_{ZFC} , and hence is an element of ZFC:

$$\forall a \forall B (\forall b (b \in B \rightarrow \exists! x \varphi(x, a, b))).$$

Therefore, by Collection, we may conclude that the following sentence is an element of ZFC:

$$\forall a \forall B \exists C \forall b (b \in B \rightarrow \exists x (x \in C \wedge \varphi(x, a, b))).$$

Next using Separation and Extensionality, we have the following:

$$\forall a \forall B \exists! C \forall b (b \in B \leftrightarrow \exists x (x \in C \wedge \varphi(x, a, b))).$$

From here, it follows that

$$\forall A \forall B \forall a (a \in A \rightarrow \exists! C \forall b (b \in B \leftrightarrow \exists x (x \in C \wedge \varphi(x, a, b)))).$$

Using Collection again, we may conclude that

$$\forall A \forall B \exists \mathcal{F} \forall a (a \in A \rightarrow \exists C (C \in \mathcal{F} \wedge \forall b (b \in B \leftrightarrow \exists x (x \in C \wedge \varphi(x, a, b))))),$$

and hence the following is an element of ZFC:

$$\forall A \forall B \exists \mathcal{F} \forall a \forall b ((a \in A \wedge b \in B) \rightarrow \exists C (C \in \mathcal{F} \wedge \exists x (x \in C \wedge \varphi(x, a, b)))).$$

Now let A and B be arbitrary sets. From the last line above, we may conclude that there exists \mathcal{F} such that for all $a \in A$ and all $b \in B$, there exists $C \in \mathcal{F}$ with $(a, b) \in C$. Let $D = \bigcup \mathcal{F}$. Given any $a \in A$ and $b \in B$, we then have $(a, b) \in D$. Now applying Separation to the set D and the formula $\exists a \exists b (a \in A \wedge b \in B \wedge \varphi(x, a, b))$, there is a set E such that for all x , we have $x \in E$ if and only if there exists $a \in A$ and $b \in B$ with $x = (a, b)$. As usual, Extensionality gives uniqueness. \square

Now that we have ordered pairs and Cartesian products, we can really make some progress.

Definition 8.1.18. A relation is a set R such that every set $x \in R$ is an ordered pair, i.e. if for every $x \in R$, there exists sets a, b such that $x = (a, b)$.

Given a relation R , we want to define its domain to be the set of first elements of ordered pairs which are elements of R , and we want to define its range to be the set of second elements of ordered pairs which are elements of R . These are good descriptions which can easily (though not shortly) be turned into formulas, but we need to know that there is some set which contains all of these elements in order to apply Separation. Since the elements of an ordered pair $(a, b) = \{\{a\}, \{a, b\}\}$ are “two deep”, a good exercise is to convince yourself that $\bigcup \bigcup R$ will work. This justifies the following definitions.

Definition 8.1.19. Let R be a relation

1. $\text{domain}(R)$ is the set of a such that there exists b with $(a, b) \in R$.
2. $\text{range}(R)$ is the set of b such that there exists a with $(a, b) \in R$.

We can define the composition of two relations, generalizing the idea of a composition of functions (we talk about this special case below).

Definition 8.1.20. Let R and S be relations. Let $A = \text{domain}(R)$ and $C = \text{range}(S)$. We define

$$S \circ R = \{(a, c) \in A \times C : \text{There exists } b \text{ with } (a, b) \in R \text{ and } (b, c) \in S\}.$$

Definition 8.1.21. Let R be a relation. We write aRb if $(a, b) \in R$.

Definition 8.1.22. Let A be a set. We say that R is a relation on A if $\text{domain}(R) \subseteq A$ and $\text{range}(R) \subseteq A$.

We define functions in the obvious way.

Definition 8.1.23. A function f is a relation which is such that for all $a \in \text{domain}(f)$, there exists a unique $b \in \text{range}(f)$ such that $(a, b) \in f$.

Definition 8.1.24. Let f be a function. We write $f(a) = b$ if $(a, b) \in f$.

The definition of function composition is now a special case of the definition of the composition of relations. We do need the following result.

Proposition 8.1.25. If f and g are both functions, then $g \circ f$ is a function with $\text{domain}(g \circ f) \subseteq \text{domain}(f)$.

Definition 8.1.26. Let f be a function. f is injective (or an injection) if whenever $f(a_1) = b$ and $f(a_2) = b$, we have $a_1 = a_2$.

Definition 8.1.27. Let A and B be sets. We write $f: A \rightarrow B$ to mean that f is a function, $\text{domain}(f) = A$ and $\text{range}(f) \subseteq B$.

We are now in a position to define when a function f is surjective and bijective. Notice that surjectivity and bijectivity are not properties of a function itself because these notions depend on a set which you consider to contain $\text{range}(f)$. Once we have a fixed such set in mind, however, we can make the definitions.

Definition 8.1.28. Let A and B be sets, and let $f: A \rightarrow B$.

1. f is surjective (or a surjection) if $\text{range}(f) = B$.
2. f is bijective (or a bijection) if f is injective and surjective.

Definition 8.1.29. Let A and B be sets.

1. We write $A \preceq B$ to mean that there is an injection $f: A \rightarrow B$.
2. We write $A \approx B$ to mean that there is a bijection $f: A \rightarrow B$.

Proposition 8.1.30. Let A , B , and C be sets. If $A \preceq B$ and $B \preceq C$, then $A \preceq C$.

Proof. Use the fact that the composition of injective functions is injective. □

Proposition 8.1.31. Let A , B , and C be sets.

1. $A \approx A$.
2. If $A \approx B$, then $B \approx A$.
3. If $A \approx B$ and $B \approx C$, then $A \approx C$.

Definition 8.1.32. Let R be a relation on a set A .

1. R is reflexive on A if for all $a \in A$, we have aRa .
2. R is symmetric on A if for all $a, b \in A$, if aRb then bRa .
3. R is asymmetric on A if for all $a, b \in A$, if aRb then it is not the case that bRa .
4. R is antisymmetric on A if for all $a, b \in A$, if aRb and bRa , then $a = b$.
5. R is transitive on A if for all $a, b, c \in A$, if aRb and bRc , then aRc .
6. R is connected on A if for all $a, b \in A$, either aRb , $a = b$, or bRa .

Definition 8.1.33. Let R be a relation on a set A .

1. R is a (strict) partial ordering on A if R is transitive on A and asymmetric on A .
2. R is a (strict) linear ordering on A if R is a partial ordering on A and R is connected on A .
3. R is a (strict) well-ordering on A if R is a linear ordering on A and for every $X \subseteq A$ with $X \neq \emptyset$, there exists $m \in X$ such that for all $x \in X$, either $m = x$ or mRx .

8.2 The Natural Numbers and Induction

We specifically added the Axiom of Infinity with the hope that it captured the idea of the set of natural numbers. We now show how this axiom, in league with the others, allows us to embed the theory of the natural numbers into set theory. We start by defining the initial natural number and successors of sets.

Definition 8.2.1. $0 = \emptyset$

Definition 8.2.2. Given a set x , we let $S(x) = x \cup \{x\}$, and we call $S(x)$ the successor of x .

With 0 and the notion of successor, we can then go on to define $1 = S(0)$, $2 = S(1) = S(S(0))$, and continue in this way to define any particular natural number. However, we want to form the set of all natural numbers.

Definition 8.2.3. A set I is inductive if $0 \in I$ and for all $x \in I$, we have $S(x) \in I$.

The Axiom of Infinity simply asserts the existence of some inductive set J . Intuitively, we have $0 \in J$, $S(0) \in J$, $S(S(0)) \in J$, and so on. However, J may very well contain more than just repeated applications of S to 0. We now use the top-down approach of generation to define the natural numbers (the other two approaches will not work yet because their very definitions rely on the natural numbers).

Proposition 8.2.4. There is a smallest inductive set. That is, there is an inductive set K such that $K \subseteq I$ for every inductive set I .

Proof. By the Axiom of Infinity, we may fix an inductive set J . Let $K = \{x \in J : x \in I \text{ for every inductive set } I\}$. Notice that $0 \in K$ because $0 \in I$ for every inductive set I (and so, in particular, $0 \in J$). Suppose that $x \in K$. If I is inductive, then $x \in I$, hence $S(x) \in I$. It follows that $S(x) \in I$ for every inductive set I (and so, in particular, $S(x) \in J$), hence $S(x) \in K$. Therefore, K is inductive. By definition of K , we have $K \subseteq I$ whenever I is inductive. \square

By Extensionality, there is a unique smallest inductive set, so this justifies the following definition.

Definition 8.2.5. We denote the unique smallest inductive set by ω .

We think that ω captures our intuitive idea of the set of natural numbers, and it is now our goal to show how to prove the basic statements about the natural numbers which are often accepted axiomatically. We first define a relation $<$ on ω . Remember our intuitive idea is that \in captures the order relationship on the natural numbers.

Definition 8.2.6.

1. We define a relation $<$ on ω by setting $< = \{(n, m) \in \omega \times \omega : n \in m\}$.
2. We define a relation \leq on ω by setting $\leq = \{(n, m) \in \omega \times \omega : n < m \text{ or } n = m\}$.
3. We define a relation $>$ on ω by setting $> = \{(n, m) \in \omega \times \omega : m < n\}$.
4. We define a relation \geq on ω by setting $\geq = \{(n, m) \in \omega \times \omega : n > m \text{ or } n = m\}$.

Lemma 8.2.7. There is no $n \in \omega$ with $n < 0$.

Proof. Since $0 = \emptyset$, there is no set x such that $x \in 0$. Therefore, there is no $n \in \omega$ with $n < 0$. \square

Lemma 8.2.8. Let $m, n \in \omega$ be arbitrary. We have $m < S(n)$ if and only if $m \leq n$.

Proof. Let $m, n \in \omega$. We then have $S(n) \in \omega$ since ω is inductive, and

$$\begin{aligned} m < S(n) &\Leftrightarrow m \in S(n) \\ &\Leftrightarrow m \in n \cup \{n\} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{Either } m \in n \text{ or } m \in \{n\} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{Either } m < n \text{ or } m = n \\ &\Leftrightarrow m \leq n. \end{aligned}$$

This proves the lemma. \square

Our primary objective is to show that $<$ is a well-ordering on ω . Due to the nature of the definition of ω , it seems that only way to prove nontrivial results about ω is “by induction”. We state the Step Induction Principle in two forms. The first is much cleaner and seemingly more powerful (because it immediately implies the second and we can quantify over sets but not over formulas), but the second is how one often thinks about induction in practice by using “properties” of natural numbers, and will be the only form that we can generalize to the collection of all ordinals.

Proposition 8.2.9 (Step Induction Principle on ω).

1. Suppose that X is a set, $0 \in X$, and for all $n \in \omega$, if $n \in X$ then $S(n) \in X$. We then have $\omega \subseteq X$.
2. For any formula $\varphi(n, \vec{p})$, the sentence

$$\forall \vec{p} ((\varphi(0, \vec{p}) \wedge (\forall n \in \omega)(\varphi(n, \vec{p}) \rightarrow \varphi(S(n), \vec{p}))) \rightarrow (\forall n \in \omega)\varphi(n, \vec{p}))$$

is in ZFC, where $\varphi(0, \vec{p})$ is shorthand for the formula

$$\exists x (\forall y (\neg(y \in x)) \wedge \varphi(x, \vec{p})),$$

and $\varphi(S(n), \vec{p})$ is shorthand for the formula

$$\exists x (\forall y (y \in x \leftrightarrow (y \in n \vee y = n)) \wedge \varphi(x, \vec{p})).$$

Proof.

1. Let $Y = X \cap \omega$. Notice first that $0 \in Y$. Suppose now that $n \in Y = X \cap \omega$. We then have $n \in \omega$ and $n \in X$, so $S(n) \in \omega$ (because ω is inductive), and $S(n) \in X$ by assumption. Hence, $S(n) \in Y$. Therefore, Y is inductive, so we may conclude that $\omega \subseteq Y$. It follows that $\omega \subseteq X$.
2. Let \vec{q} be an arbitrary sequence of sets, and suppose $\varphi(0, \vec{q})$ and $(\forall n \in \omega)(\varphi(n, \vec{q}) \rightarrow \varphi(S(n), \vec{q}))$. Let $X = \{n \in \omega : \varphi(n, \vec{q})\}$, which exists by Separation. Notice that $0 \in X$ and for all $n \in \omega$, if $n \in X$ then $S(n) \in X$ by assumption. It follows from part 1 that $\omega \subseteq X$. Therefore, we have $(\forall n \in \omega)\varphi(n, \vec{q})$.

\square

With the Step Induction Principle in hand, we can begin to prove the basic facts about the natural numbers. Our goal is to prove that $<$ is a well-ordering on ω , but it will take some time to get there. We first give a very simple inductive proof. For this proof only, we will give careful arguments using both versions of Step Induction to show how a usual induction proof can be formalized in either way.

Lemma 8.2.10. For all $n \in \omega$, we have $0 \leq n$.

Proof. The following two proofs correspond to the above two versions of the Induction Principle.

1. Let $X = \{n \in \omega : 0 \leq n\}$, and notice that $0 \in X$. Suppose now that $n \in X$. We then have $n \in \omega$ and $0 \leq n$, hence $0 < S(n)$ by Lemma 8.2.8, so $S(n) \in X$. Thus, by Step Induction, we have $\omega \subseteq X$. Therefore, for all $n \in \omega$, we have $0 \leq n$.
2. Let $\varphi(n)$ be the formula " $0 \leq n$ ". We clearly have $\varphi(0)$ because $0 = 0$. Suppose now that $n \in \omega$ and $\varphi(n)$. We then have $0 \leq n$, hence $0 < S(n)$ by Lemma 8.2.8. It follows that $\varphi(S(n))$. Therefore, by Step Induction, we have $0 \leq n$ for all $n \in \omega$.

□

We give a few more careful inductive proof using the second version of the Induction Principle to illustrate how parameters can be used. Afterwards, our later inductive proofs will be given in a more natural relaxed style.

Our relation $<$ is given by \in , but it is only defined on elements of ω . We thus need the following proposition which says that every element of a natural number is a natural number.

Proposition 8.2.11. *Suppose that $n \in \omega$ and $m \in n$. We then have $m \in \omega$.*

Proof. The proof is "by induction on n "; that is, we hold m fixed by treating it as a parameter. Thus, let $m \in \omega$ be arbitrary, and let $X = \{n \in \omega : m \in n \rightarrow m \in \omega\}$. In other words, we have $X = \{n \in \omega : m \notin n \text{ or } m \in \omega\}$. Notice that $0 \in X$ because $m \notin 0 = \emptyset$. Suppose now that $n \in X$. We show that $S(n) \in X$. Suppose that $m \in S(n) = n \cup \{n\}$ (otherwise we trivially have $m \in \omega$). We then know that either $m \in n$, in which case $m \in \omega$ by induction (i.e. because $n \in X$), or $m = n$, in which case we clearly have $m \in \omega$. It follows that $S(n) \in X$. Therefore, by Step Induction, we may conclude that $X = \omega$. Since $m \in \omega$ was arbitrary, the result follows. □

Proposition 8.2.12. *$<$ is transitive on ω .*

Proof. We prove the result by induction on n . Let $k, m \in \omega$ be arbitrary, and let

$$X = \{n \in \omega : (k < m \wedge m < n) \rightarrow k < n\}.$$

We then have that $0 \in X$ vacuously because we do not have $m < 0$ by Lemma 8.2.7. Suppose now that $n \in X$. We show that $S(n) \in X$. Suppose that $k < m$ and $m < S(n)$ (if not, then $S(n) \in X$ vacuously). By Lemma 8.2.8, we have $m \leq n$, hence either $m < n$ or $m = n$. If $m < n$, then $k < n$ because $n \in X$. If $m = n$, then $k < n$ because $k < m$. Therefore, in either case, we have $k < n$, and hence $k < S(n)$ by Lemma 8.2.8. It follows that $S(n) \in X$. Thus, by Step Induction, we may conclude that $X = \omega$. Since $k, m \in \omega$ were arbitrary, the result follows. □

Lemma 8.2.13. *Let $m, n \in \omega$. We have $S(m) \leq n$ if and only if $m < n$.*

Proof. Suppose first that $m, n \in \omega$ and $S(m) \leq n$.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $S(m) = n$. We have $m < S(m)$ by Lemma 8.2.8, hence $m < n$.
- *Case 2:* Suppose that $S(m) < n$. We have $m < S(m)$ by Lemma 8.2.8, hence $m < n$ by Proposition 8.2.12.

Therefore, for all $n, m \in \omega$, if $S(m) \leq n$, then $m < n$.

We prove the converse statement that for all $m, n \in \omega$, if $m < n$, then $S(m) \leq n$ by induction on n . Let $m \in \omega$ be arbitrary, and let $X = \{n \in \omega : m < n \rightarrow S(m) \leq n\}$. We have $0 \in X$ vacuously because we do not have $m < 0$ by Lemma 8.2.7. Suppose now that $n \in X$. We show that $S(n) \in X$. Suppose that $m < S(n)$ (otherwise $S(n) \in X$ vacuously). By Lemma 8.2.8, we have $m \leq n$.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $m = n$. We then have $S(m) = S(n)$, hence $S(n) \in X$.

- *Case 2:* Suppose that $m < n$. Since $n \in X$, we have $S(m) \leq n$. By Lemma 8.2.8, we know that $n < S(n)$. If $S(m) = n$, this immediately gives $S(m) < S(n)$, while if $S(m) < n$, we may conclude that $S(m) < S(n)$ by Proposition 8.2.12. Hence, we have $S(n) \in X$.

Thus, by Step Induction, we may conclude that $X = \omega$. Since $m \in \omega$ was arbitrary, the result follows. \square

Lemma 8.2.14. *There is no $n \in \omega$ with $n < n$.*

Proof. This follows immediately from the Axiom of Foundation, but we prove it without that assumption. Let $X = \{n \in \omega : \neg(n < n)\}$. We have that $0 \in X$ by Lemma 8.2.7. Suppose that $n \in X$. We prove that $S(n) \in X$ by supposing that $S(n) < S(n)$ and deriving a contradiction. Suppose then that $S(n) < S(n)$. By Lemma 8.2.8, we have $S(n) \leq n$, hence either $S(n) = n$ or $S(n) < n$. Also by Lemma 8.2.8, we have $n < S(n)$. Therefore, if $S(n) = n$, then $n < n$, and if $S(n) < n$, then $n < n$ by Proposition 8.2.12 (since $n < S(n)$ and $S(n) < n$), a contradiction. It follows that $S(n) \in X$. Therefore, there is no $n \in \omega$ with $n < n$. \square

Proposition 8.2.15. *$<$ is asymmetric on ω .*

Proof. Suppose that $n, m \in \omega$, $n < m$, and $m < n$. By Proposition 8.2.12, it follows that $n < n$, contradicting Lemma 8.2.14. \square

Proposition 8.2.16. *$<$ is connected on ω .*

Proof. We prove that for all $m, n \in \omega$, either $m < n$, $m = n$, or $n < m$ by induction on n . Let $m \in \omega$ be arbitrary, and let $X = \{n \in \omega : (m < n) \vee (m = n) \vee (n < m)\}$. We have $0 \leq m$ by Lemma 8.2.10, hence either $m = 0$ or $0 < m$, and so $0 \in X$. Suppose then that $n \in X$, so that either $m < n$, $m = n$, or $n < m$.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $m < n$. Since $n < S(n)$ by Lemma 8.2.8, we have $m < S(n)$ by Proposition 8.2.12.
- *Case 2:* Suppose that $m = n$. Since $n < S(n)$ by Lemma 8.2.8, it follows that $m < S(n)$.
- *Case 3:* Suppose that $n < m$. We have $S(n) \leq m$ by Lemma 8.2.13. Hence, either $m = S(n)$ or $S(n) < m$.

Therefore, in all cases, either $m < S(n)$, $m = S(n)$, or $S(n) < m$, so $S(n) \in X$. The result follows by induction. \square

In order to finish off the proof that $<$ is a well-ordering on ω , we need a new version of induction. You may have heard it referred to as “Strong Induction”.

Proposition 8.2.17 (Induction Principle on ω).

1. Suppose that X is set and for all $n \in \omega$, if $m \in X$ for all $m < n$, then $n \in X$. We then have $\omega \subseteq X$.
2. For any formula $\varphi(n, \vec{p})$, we have the sentence

$$\forall \vec{p}((\forall n \in \omega)((\forall m < n)\varphi(m, \vec{p}) \rightarrow \varphi(n, \vec{p})) \rightarrow (\forall n \in \omega)\varphi(n, \vec{p}))$$

Proof.

1. Let $Y = \{n \in \omega : (\forall m < n)(m \in X)\}$. Notice that $Y \subseteq \omega$ and $0 \in Y$ because there is no $m \in \omega$ with $m < 0$ by Lemma 8.2.7. Suppose that $n \in Y$. We show that $S(n) \in Y$. Suppose that $m < S(n)$. By Lemma 8.2.8, we have $m \leq n$, hence either $m < n$ or $m = n$. If $m < n$, then $m \in X$ because $n \in Y$. For the case $m = n$, notice that $n \in X$ by assumption (because $m \in X$ for all $m < n$). Therefore, $S(n) \in Y$. By Step Induction, it follows that $\omega \subseteq Y$.

Now let $n \in \omega$ be arbitrary. We have $n \in \omega$, hence $S(n) \in \omega$ because ω is inductive, so $S(n) \in Y$. Since $n < S(n)$ by Lemma 8.2.8, it follows that $n \in X$. Therefore, $\omega \subseteq X$.

2. This follows from part 1 using Separation. Fix sets \vec{q} , and suppose that

$$(\forall n \in \omega)((\forall m < n)\varphi(m, \vec{q}) \rightarrow \varphi(n, \vec{q}))$$

Let $X = \{n \in \omega : \varphi(n, \vec{q})\}$. Suppose that $n \in \omega$ and $m \in X$ for all $m < n$. We then have $(\forall m < n)\varphi(m, \vec{q})$, hence $\varphi(n, \vec{q})$ by assumption, so $n \in X$. It follows from part 1 that $\omega \subseteq X$. Therefore, we have $(\forall n \in \omega)\varphi(n, \vec{q})$.

□

It is possible to give a proof of part 2 which makes use of part 2 of the Step Induction Principle, thus avoiding the detour through sets and using only formulas. This proof simply mimics how we obtained part 1 above, but uses formulas everywhere instead of working with sets. Although it is not nearly as clean, when we treat ordinals, there will times when we need to argue at the level of formulas.

Theorem 8.2.18. *$<$ is a well-ordering on ω*

Proof. By Proposition 8.2.12, Proposition 8.2.15, and Proposition 8.2.16, it follows that $<$ is a linear ordering on ω . Suppose then that $Z \subseteq \omega$ and there is no $n \in Z$ such that for all $m \in Z$, either $n = m$ or $n < m$. We show that $Z = \emptyset$. Notice that for every $n \in Z$, there exists $m \in Z$ with $m < n$ by Proposition 8.2.12.

Let $Y = \omega \setminus Z$. We show that $Y = \omega$ using the Induction Principle. Let $n \in \omega$ be arbitrary with the property that $m \in Y$ for all $m < n$. We then have that $m \notin Z$ for all $m < n$. Therefore, by the last sentence of the previous paragraph, we must have that $n \notin Z$, and so $n \in Y$. By the Induction Principle, we have that $Y = \omega$, and hence $Z = \emptyset$.

Therefore, if $Z \subseteq \omega$ and $Z \neq \emptyset$, there exists $n \in X$ such that for all $m \in Z$, either $n = m$ or $n < m$. It follows that $<$ is a well-ordering on ω . □

8.3 Sets and Classes

We know from Proposition 8.1.4 that there is no set u such that $a \in u$ for all sets a . Thus, our theory forbids us from placing every set into one universal set which we can then play with and manipulate. However, this formal impossibility within our theory does not prevent us from thinking about or referring to the “collection” of all sets or other “collections” which are too “large” to form into a set. After all, our universal quantifiers do indeed range over the “collection” of all sets. Also, if we are arguing semantically, then given a model \mathcal{M} of ZFC, we may “externally” work with the power set of M .

We want to be able to reason about such “collections” of sets in a natural manner within our theory without violating our theory. We will call such “collections” *classes* to distinguish them from sets. The idea is to recall that any first-order theory can say things about certain subsets of every model: the definable subsets. In our case, a formula $\varphi(x)$ is implicitly defining a certain collection of sets. Perhaps this collection is too “large” to put together into a set inside the model, but we may nevertheless use the formula in various ways within our theory. For example, for any formulas $\varphi(x)$ and $\psi(x)$, the sentence $\forall x(\varphi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x))$ says that every set which satisfies φ also satisfies ψ . If there exist sets C and D such that $\forall x(\varphi(x) \rightarrow x \in C)$ and $\forall x(\psi(x) \rightarrow x \in D)$, then we can use Separation to form the sets $A = \{x \in C : \varphi(x)\}$ and $B = \{x \in D : \psi(x)\}$, in which case the sentence $\forall x(\varphi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x))$ simply asserts that $A \subseteq B$. However, even if we can’t form these sets (intuitively because $\{x : \varphi(x)\}$ and $\{x : \psi(x)\}$ are too “large” to be sets), the sentence is expressing the same underlying idea. Allowing the possibility of parameters, this motivates the following “internal” definition.

Definition 8.3.1. *A class C is a formula $\varphi(x, \vec{p})$.*

Our course, this isn't a very good way to think about classes. Externally, a class is simply a definable set (with the possibility of parameters). The idea is that once we fix sets \vec{q} to fill in for the position of the parameters, the formula describes the collection of those sets a such that $\varphi(a, \vec{q})$. The first class to consider is the class of all sets, which we denote by \mathbf{V} . Formally, we define \mathbf{V} to be the formula $x = x$, but we will content ourselves with defining classes in the following more informal "external" style.

Definition 8.3.2. \mathbf{V} is the class of all sets.

Here's a more interesting illustration of how classes can be used and why we want to consider them. Let \mathbf{C}_R be the class of all relations and let \mathbf{C}_F be the class of all functions. More formally, \mathbf{C}_R is the formula $\varphi_R(x)$ given by

$$\forall y(y \in x \rightarrow \exists a \exists b(y = (a, b)))$$

while \mathbf{C}_F is the formula $\varphi_F(x)$ given by

$$\forall y(y \in x \rightarrow \exists a \exists b(y = (a, b))) \wedge \forall a \forall b_1 \forall b_2(((a, b_1) \in x \wedge (a, b_2) \in x) \rightarrow b_1 = b_2)$$

With this shorthand in place, we can write things like $\mathbf{C}_F \subseteq \mathbf{C}_R$ to stand for the provable sentence $\forall x(\varphi_F(x) \rightarrow \varphi_R(x))$. Thus, by using the language of classes, we can express complicated formulas in a simplified, more suggestive, fashion. Of course, there's no real need to introduce classes because we could always just refer to the formulas, but it is psychologically easier to think of a class as some kind of ultra-set which our theory is able to handle, even if we are limited in what we can do with classes.

With the ability to refer to classes, why deal with sets at all? The answer is that classes are much less versatile than sets. For example, if \mathbf{C} and \mathbf{D} are classes, it makes no sense to write $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbf{D}$ because this doesn't correspond to a formula built from the implicit formulas giving \mathbf{C} and \mathbf{D} . This inability corresponds to the intuition that classes are too "large" to collect together into a set and then put into other collections. Hence, asking whether $\mathbf{V} \in \mathbf{V}$ is meaningless. Also, since classes are given by formulas, we are restricted to referring only to "definable" collections. Thus, there is no way to talk about or quantify over all "collections" of sets (something that is meaningless internally). However, there are many operation which do make sense on classes.

For instance, suppose that \mathbf{R} is a class of ordered pairs (with parameters \vec{p}). That is, \mathbf{R} is a formula $\varphi(x, \vec{p})$ such that the formula $\forall x(\varphi(x, \vec{p}) \rightarrow \exists a \exists b(x = (a, b)))$ is provable. We think of \mathbf{R} as a *class relation*. Using suggestive notation, we can then go on to define $\text{domain}(\mathbf{R})$ to be the class consisting of those sets a such that there exists a set b with $(a, b) \in \mathbf{R}$. To be precise, $\text{domain}(\mathbf{R})$ is the class which is the formula $\psi(a, \vec{p})$ given by $\exists x \exists b(x = (a, b) \wedge \varphi(x, \vec{p}))$. Thus, we can think of $\text{domain}(\cdot)$ as a operation on classes (given any formula $\varphi(x, \vec{p})$ which is a class relation, applying $\text{domain}(\cdot)$ results in the class given by the formula $\exists x \exists b(x = (a, b) \wedge \varphi(x, \vec{p}))$).

Similarly, we can talk about *class functions*. We can even use notation like $\mathbf{F} : \mathbf{V} \rightarrow \mathbf{V}$ to mean that \mathbf{F} is a class function with $\text{domain}(\mathbf{F}) = \mathbf{V}$. Again, each of these expressions could have been written out as formulas in our language, but the notation is so suggestive that it's clear how to do this without actually having to do it. An example of a general class function is $\mathbf{U} : \mathbf{V} \times \mathbf{V} \rightarrow \mathbf{V}$ given by $\mathbf{U}(a, b) = a \cup b$. Convince yourself how to write \mathbf{U} as a formula.

We can not quantify over classes within our theory in the same way that we can quantify over sets because there is no way to quantify over the formulas of set theory within set theory. However, we can, at the price of considering one "theorem" as infinitely many (one for each formula), make sense of a theorem which does universally quantify over classes. For example, consider the following.

Proposition 8.3.3. Suppose that \mathbf{C} is a class, $0 \in \mathbf{C}$, and for all $n \in \omega$, if $n \in \mathbf{C}$ then $S(n) \in \mathbf{C}$. We then have $\omega \subseteq \mathbf{C}$.

This proposition is what is obtained from the first version of Step Induction on ω by replacing the set X with the class \mathbf{C} . Although the set version can be written as one sentence which is provable in ZFC, this

version can not because we can't quantify over classes in the theory. Unwrapping this proposition into formulas, it says that for every formula $\varphi(x, \vec{p})$, if we can prove $\varphi(0, \vec{p})$ and $(\forall n \in \omega)(\varphi(n, \vec{p}) \rightarrow \varphi(S(n), \vec{p}))$, then we can prove $(\forall n \in \omega)\varphi(n, \vec{p})$. That is, for each formula $\varphi(x, \vec{p})$, we can prove the sentence

$$\forall \vec{p}((\varphi(0, \vec{p}) \wedge (\forall n \in \omega)(\varphi(n, \vec{p}) \rightarrow \varphi(S(n), \vec{p}))) \rightarrow (\forall n \in \omega)\varphi(n, \vec{p})).$$

Thus, the class version is simply a neater way of writing the second version of Step Induction on ω which masks the fact that the quantification over classes requires us to write it as infinitely many different propositions (one for each formula $\varphi(x, \vec{p})$) in our theory.

Every set can be viewed as a class by making use of the class \mathbf{M} given by the formula $x \in p$. That is, once we fix a set p , the class $x \in p$ describes exactly the elements of p . For example, using \mathbf{M} in class version of Step Induction on ω , we see that the following sentence is provable:

$$\forall p((0 \in p \wedge (\forall n \in \omega)(n \in p \rightarrow S(n) \in p)) \rightarrow (\forall n \in \omega)(n \in p)).$$

Notice that this is exactly the set version of Step Induction on ω .

On the other hand, not every class can be viewed as a set (look at \mathbf{V} , for example). Let \mathbf{C} be a class. We say that \mathbf{C} is a set if there exists a set A such that for all x , we have $x \in \mathbf{C}$ if and only if $x \in A$. At the level of formulas, this means that if \mathbf{C} is given by the formula $\varphi(x, \vec{p})$, then we can prove the formula $\exists A \forall x(\varphi(x, \vec{p}) \leftrightarrow x \in A)$. By Separation, this is equivalent to saying that there is a set B such that for all x , if $x \in \mathbf{C}$ then $x \in B$ (i.e. we can prove the formula $\exists B \forall x(\varphi(x, \vec{p}) \rightarrow x \in B)$).

Definition 8.3.4. Let \mathbf{C} be a class defined by a formula $\varphi(x, \vec{p})$. We say that \mathbf{C} is a proper class if \mathbf{C} is not a set, i.e. if we can prove $\neg(\exists A \forall x(\varphi(x, \vec{p}) \leftrightarrow x \in A))$.

For example, \mathbf{V} is a proper class. The following proposition will be helpful to us when we discuss transfinite constructions. Intuitively, it says that proper classes are too large to be embedded into any set.

Proposition 8.3.5. Let \mathbf{C} be a proper class and let A be a set. There is no injective class function $\mathbf{F} : \mathbf{C} \rightarrow A$.

Proof. Suppose that $\mathbf{F} : \mathbf{C} \rightarrow A$ is an injective class function. Let $B = \{a \in A : \exists c(c \in \mathbf{C} \wedge \mathbf{F}(c) = a)\}$ and notice that B is a set by Separation (recall that \mathbf{C} and \mathbf{F} are given by formulas). Since for each $b \in B$, there is a unique $c \in \mathbf{C}$ with $\mathbf{F}(c) = b$ (using the fact that \mathbf{F} is injective), we may use Collection and Separation to conclude that \mathbf{C} is a set, contradicting the fact that \mathbf{C} is a proper class. \square

We end this section by seeing how to simply restate the Axiom of Separation and the Axiom of Collection in the language of classes.

Axiom of Separation: Every subclass of a set is a set.

Axiom of Collection: If \mathbf{F} is a class function and A is a set, then there is a set containing the image of A under \mathbf{F} .

8.4 Finite Sets and Finite Powers

Definition 8.4.1. Let A be a set. A is finite if there exists $n \in \omega$ such that $A \approx n$. If A is not finite, we say that A is infinite.

Proposition 8.4.2. Suppose that $n \in \omega$. Every injective $f : n \rightarrow n$ is bijective.

Proof. The proof is by induction on $n \in \omega$. Suppose first that $n = 0$ and $f: 0 \rightarrow 0$ is injective. We then have $f = \emptyset$, so f is trivially bijective. Assume now that the result holds for n , i.e. assume that every injective $f: n \rightarrow n$ is bijective. Let $f: S(n) \rightarrow S(n)$ be an arbitrary injective function. We then have $f(n) \leq n$, and we consider two cases.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $f(n) = n$. Since f is injective, we have $f(m) \neq n$ for every $m < n$, hence $f(m) < n$ for every $m < n$ (because $f(m) < S(n)$ for every $m < n$). It follows that $f \upharpoonright n: n \rightarrow n$. Notice that $f \upharpoonright n: n \rightarrow n$ is injective because f is injective, hence $f \upharpoonright n$ is bijective by induction. Therefore, $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright n) = n$, and hence $\text{range}(f) = S(n)$ (because $f(n) = n$). It follows that f is surjective, so f is bijective.
- *Case 2:* Suppose that $f(n) < n$. We first claim that $n \in \text{range}(f)$. Suppose instead that $n \notin \text{range}(f)$. Notice that $f \upharpoonright n: n \rightarrow n$ is injective because f is injective, hence $f \upharpoonright n$ is bijective by induction. Therefore, $f(n) \in \text{range}(f \upharpoonright n)$ (because $f(n) < n$), so there exists $\ell < n$ with $f(\ell) = f(n)$, contrary to the fact that f is injective. It follows that $n \in \text{range}(f)$.

Fix $k < n$ with $f(k) = n$. Define a function $g: n \rightarrow n$ by

$$g(m) = \begin{cases} f(m) & \text{if } m \neq k \\ f(n) & \text{if } m = k. \end{cases}$$

Notice that if $m_1, m_2 < n$ with $m_1 \neq m_2$ and $m_1, m_2 \neq k$, then $g(m_1) \neq g(m_2)$ since $f(m_1) \neq f(m_2)$ (because f is injective). Also, if $m < n$ with $m \neq k$, then $g(m) \neq g(k)$ since $f(m) \neq f(n)$ (again because f is injective). It follows that $g: n \rightarrow n$ is injective, hence bijective by induction. From this we can conclude that $\text{range}(f) = S(n)$ as follows. Notice that $f(n) \in \text{range}(f)$ trivially, and $n \in \text{range}(f)$ because $f(k) = n$. Suppose that $\ell < n$ with $\ell \neq f(n)$. Since $g: n \rightarrow n$ is bijective, there exists a unique $m < n$ with $g(m) = \ell$. Since $\ell \neq f(n)$, we have $m \neq k$, hence $f(m) = g(m) = \ell$, so $\ell \in \text{range}(f)$. Therefore, $\text{range}(f) = S(n)$, and hence f is bijective. □

Corollary 8.4.3 (Pigeonhole Principle). *If $n, m \in \omega$ and $m > n$, then $m \not\preceq n$.*

Proof. Suppose that $f: m \rightarrow n$ is injective. It then follows that $f \upharpoonright n: n \rightarrow n$ is injective, hence $f \upharpoonright n$ is bijective by Proposition 8.4.2. Therefore, since $f(n) \in n$, it follows that there exists $k < n$ with $f(k) = f(n)$, contradicting the fact that f is injective. Hence, $m \not\preceq n$. □

Corollary 8.4.4. *If $m, n \in \omega$ and $m \approx n$, then $m = n$.*

Proof. Suppose that $m \neq n$ so that either $m > n$ or $m < n$. If $m > n$, then $m \not\preceq n$ by the Pigeonhole Principle, so $m \not\approx n$. If $m < n$, then $n \not\preceq m$ by the Pigeonhole Principle, so $n \not\approx m$ and hence $m \not\approx n$. □

Corollary 8.4.5. *If A is finite, there exists a unique $n \in \omega$ such that $A \approx n$.*

Definition 8.4.6. *If A is finite, the unique $n \in \omega$ such that $A \approx n$ is called the cardinality of A and is denoted by $|A|$.*

Proposition 8.4.7. *Let A be a nonempty set and let $n \in \omega$. The following are equivalent:*

1. $A \preceq n$.
2. There exists a surjection $g: n \rightarrow A$.
3. A is finite and $|A| \leq n$.

Proof. We prove four implications.

- 1 implies 2: Suppose that $A \preceq n$ and fix an injection $f: A \rightarrow n$. Fix an element $b \in A$ (which exists since $A \neq \emptyset$). Define a set g by letting

$$g = \{(m, a) \in n \times A : f(a) = m\} \cup \{(m, a) \in n \times A : m \notin \text{range}(f) \text{ and } a = b\}.$$

Notice that g is a function because f is injective. Furthermore, we have that $\text{domain}(g) = n$ and $\text{range}(g) = A$, so the function $g: n \rightarrow A$ is surjective.

- 2 implies 1: Suppose that $g: n \rightarrow A$ is a surjection. Define a set f by letting

$$f = \{(a, m) \in A \times n : g(m) = a \text{ and } g(k) \neq a \text{ for all } k < m\}.$$

Notice that f is a function because $<$ is connected on ω by Proposition 8.2.16. Furthermore, using the assumption that g is a surjection together with the fact that $<$ is a well-ordering on ω , it follows that $\text{domain}(f) = A$ so $f: A \rightarrow n$. Finally, we have that f is injective because g is a function.

- 1 implies 3: Suppose that $A \preceq n$. Since $<$ is a well-ordering on ω , we may let m be the least element of ω such that $A \preceq m$. Notice that $m \leq n$. By definition of $A \preceq m$, we can fix an injection $g: A \rightarrow m$. We claim that g is also surjective. Suppose not, and fix $\ell < m$ such that $\ell \notin \text{range}(g)$. Notice that $m \neq 0$ because A is nonempty, so we may fix $k \in \omega$ with $m = S(k)$. If $\ell = k$, then we can view g as an injective function $g: A \rightarrow k$, contradicting our choice of m as least. Otherwise, we have $\ell < k$, and then the function $h: A \rightarrow k$ defined by

$$h(a) = \begin{cases} g(a) & \text{if } g(a) \neq \ell \\ \ell & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

would be injective, a contradiction. Therefore, g is surjective, hence bijective, and so $|A| = m \leq n$.

- 3 implies 1: Suppose that A is finite and $|A| \leq n$. Let $m = |A| \leq n$ and fix a bijection $f: A \rightarrow m$. We then have that $f: A \rightarrow n$ is an injection, so $A \preceq n$.

□

Corollary 8.4.8. *Suppose that $n \in \omega$. Every surjective $g: n \rightarrow n$ is bijective.*

Proof. Suppose that $g: n \rightarrow n$ is surjective. Let

$$f = \{(a, m) \in n \times n : g(m) = a \text{ and } g(k) \neq a \text{ for all } k < m\}$$

and notice that $f: n \rightarrow n$ is an injective function by the proof of “2 implies 1” above. By Proposition 8.4.2, we know that f is bijective. Now let $k, m \in n$ be arbitrary with $g(k) = g(m)$.

- *Case 1:* Suppose that $k < m$. Since f is bijective, we can fix $b \in n$ with $f(b) = m$. We then have $(b, m) \in f$, so by definition, we must have $g(m) = b$ and $g(k) \neq b$. However, this is a contradiction because $g(m) = g(k)$.
- *Case 2:* Suppose that $m < k$. Since f is bijective, we can fix $b \in n$ with $f(b) = k$. We then have $(b, k) \in f$, so by definition, we must have $g(k) = b$ and $g(m) \neq b$. However, this is a contradiction because $g(k) = g(m)$.

Since $<$ is connected on ω , the only possibility is that $k = m$. Therefore, g is injective, and hence bijective. □

It is possible to use ordered pairs to define ordered triples, ordered quadruples, and so on. For example, we could define the ordered triple (a, b, c) to be $((a, b), c)$. However, with the basic properties of ω in hand, we can give a much more elegant definition.

Proposition 8.4.9. *Let A be a set. For all $n \in \omega$, there is a unique set, denoted by A^n , such that for all f , we have $f \in A^n$ if and only if $f: n \rightarrow A$.*

Proof. Let A be an arbitrary set. As usual, uniqueness follows from Extensionality, so we need only prove existence. The proof is by induction on n . Suppose that $n = 0$. Since for all f , we have $f: 0 \rightarrow A$ if and only if $f = \emptyset$, we may take $A^0 = \{\emptyset\}$. Suppose that the statement is true for a given $n \in \omega$, i.e. there exists a set A^n such that for all f , we have $f \in A^n$ if and only if $f: n \rightarrow A$. We prove it for $S(n)$.

Let $a \in A$ be arbitrary. Notice that for each $f \in A^n$, there is a unique function $f_a: S(n) \rightarrow A$ such that $f_a(m) = f(m)$ for all $m < n$ and $f_a(n) = a$ (let $f_a = f \cup \{(n, a)\}$ and use Lemma 8.2.8). Therefore, by Collection (since A^n is a set), Separation, and Extensionality, there is a unique set C_a such that for all g , we have $g \in C_a$ if and only if $g = f_a$ for some $a \in A$. Notice that for every $g: S(n) \rightarrow A$ with $g(n) = a$, there is an $f: n \rightarrow A$ such that $g = f_a$ (let $f = g \setminus \{(n, a)\}$). Therefore, for every g , we have $g \in C_a$ if and only if $g: S(n) \rightarrow A$ and $g(n) = a$.

By Collection (since A is a set), Separation, and Extensionality again, there is a set \mathcal{F} such that for all D , we have $D \in \mathcal{F}$ if and only if there exists $a \in A$ with $D = C_a$. Notice that for all sets g , we have $g \in \bigcup \mathcal{F}$ if and only if there exists $a \in A$ with $g \in C_a$. Let $A^{S(n)} = \bigcup \mathcal{F}$. We then have $g \in A^{S(n)}$ if and only if $g: S(n) \rightarrow A$. \square

Proposition 8.4.10. *Let A be a set. There is a unique set, denoted by $A^{<\omega}$, such that for all f , we have $f \in A^{<\omega}$ if and only if $f \in A^n$ for some $n \in \omega$.*

Proof. By Collection (since ω is a set), Separation, and Extensionality, there is a unique set \mathcal{F} such that for all D , we have $D \in \mathcal{F}$ if and only if there exists $n \in \omega$ with $D = A^n$. Let $A^{<\omega} = \bigcup \mathcal{F}$. For every f , we then have $f \in A^{<\omega}$ if and only if $f \in A^n$ for some $n \in \omega$. \square

8.5 Definitions by Recursion

Theorem 8.5.1 (Step Recursive Definitions on ω - Set Form). *Let A be a set, let $b \in A$, and let $g: \omega \times A \rightarrow A$. There exists a unique function $f: \omega \rightarrow A$ such that $f(0) = b$ and $f(S(n)) = g(n, f(n))$ for all $n \in \omega$.*

Proof. We first prove existence. Call a set $Z \subseteq \omega \times A$ *sufficient* if $(0, b) \in Z$ and for all $(n, a) \in Z$, we have $(S(n), g(n, a)) \in Z$. Notice that sufficient sets exist (since $\omega \times A$ is sufficient). Let

$$Y = \{(n, a) \in \omega \times A : (n, a) \in Z \text{ for every sufficient set } Z\}.$$

We first show that Y is sufficient. Notice that $(0, b) \in Y$ because $(0, b) \in Z$ for every sufficient set Z . Let $(n, a) \in Y$ be arbitrary. For any sufficient set Z , we then have $(n, a) \in Z$, so $(S(n), g(n, a)) \in Z$. Therefore, $(S(n), g(n, a)) \in Z$ for every sufficient set Z , so $(S(n), g(n, a)) \in Y$. It follows that Y is sufficient.

We next show that for all $n \in \omega$, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(n, a) \in Y$. Let

$$X = \{n \in \omega : \text{There exists a unique } a \in A \text{ with } (n, a) \in Y\}.$$

Since Y is sufficient, we know that $(0, b) \in Y$. Let $d \in A$ be arbitrary with $d \neq b$. Since the set $(\omega \times A) \setminus \{(0, d)\}$ is sufficient (because $S(n) \neq 0$ for all $n \in \omega$), it follows that $(0, d) \notin Y$. Therefore, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(0, a) \in Y$ (namely, $a = b$), so $0 \in X$.

Now let $n \in X$ be arbitrary, and let c be the unique element of A such that $(n, c) \in Y$. Since Y is sufficient, we have $(S(n), g(n, c)) \in Y$. Let $d \in A$ be arbitrary with $d \neq g(n, c)$. We then have that $Y \setminus \{(S(n), d)\}$ is sufficient (otherwise, there exists $a \in A$ such that $(n, a) \in Y$ and $g(n, a) = d$, contrary to

the fact that in this case we have $a = c$ by induction), so by definition of Y it follows that $Y \subseteq Y \setminus \{(S(n), d)\}$. Hence, $(S(n), d) \notin Y$. Therefore, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(S(n), a) \in Y$ (namely, $a = g(n, c)$), so $S(n) \in X$.

By induction, we conclude that $X = \omega$, so for all $n \in \omega$, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(n, a) \in Y$. Let $f = Y$ and notice that $f: \omega \rightarrow A$ because $X = \omega$. Since Y is sufficient, we have $(0, b) \in Y$, so $f(0) = b$. Let $n \in \omega$ be arbitrary. Since $(n, f(n)) \in Y$ and Y is sufficient, it follows that $(S(n), g(n, f(n))) \in Y$, so $f(S(n)) = g(n, f(n))$.

We now prove uniqueness. Suppose that $f_1, f_2: \omega \rightarrow A$ are arbitrary function with the following properties:

1. $f_1(0) = b$.
2. $f_2(0) = b$.
3. $f_1(S(n)) = g(n, f_1(n))$ for all $n \in \omega$.
4. $f_2(S(n)) = g(n, f_2(n))$ for all $n \in \omega$.

Let $X = \{n \in \omega : f_1(n) = f_2(n)\}$. Notice that $0 \in X$ because $f_1(0) = b = f_2(0)$. Suppose that $n \in X$ so that $f_1(n) = f_2(n)$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} f_1(S(n)) &= g(n, f_1(n)) \\ &= g(n, f_2(n)) \\ &= f_2(S(n)), \end{aligned}$$

hence $S(n) \in X$. It follows by induction that $X = \omega$, so $f_1(n) = f_2(n)$ for all $n \in \omega$. Therefore, $f_1 = f_2$. \square

As an example of how to use this result (assuming we already know how to multiply - see below), consider how to define the factorial function. We want to justify the existence of a unique function $f: \omega \rightarrow \omega$ such that $f(0) = 1$ and $f(S(n)) = f(n) \cdot S(n)$ for all $n \in \omega$. We can make this work as follows. Let $A = \omega$, $b = 1$, and define $g: \omega \times \omega \rightarrow \omega$ by letting $g(n, a) = S(n) \cdot a$ (here we are thinking that the second argument of g will contain the “accumulated” value $f(n)$). The theorem now gives the existence and uniqueness of a function $f: \omega \rightarrow \omega$ such that $f(0) = 1$ and $f(S(n)) = S(n) \cdot f(n)$ for all $n \in \omega$.

However, this begs the question of how to define multiplication. Let’s start by thinking about how to define addition. The basic idea is to define it recursively. For any $m \in \omega$, we let $m + 0 = m$. If $m \in \omega$, and we know how to find $m + n$ for some fixed $n \in \omega$, then we should define $m + S(n) = S(m + n)$. It looks like an appeal to the above theorem is in order, but how do we treat the m that is fixed in the recursion? We need a slightly stronger version of the above theorem which allows a parameter to come along for the ride.

Theorem 8.5.2 (Step Recursive Definitions with Parameters on ω). *Let A and P be sets, let $h: P \rightarrow A$, and let $g: P \times \omega \times A \rightarrow A$. There exists a unique function $f: P \times \omega \rightarrow A$ such that $f(p, 0) = h(p)$ for all $p \in P$, and $f(p, S(n)) = g(p, n, f(p, n))$ for all $p \in P$ and all $n \in \omega$.*

Proof. One could reprove this from scratch following the above outline, but we give a simpler argument using Collection. For each $p \in P$, define $g_p: \omega \times A \rightarrow A$ by letting $g_p(n, a) = g(p, n, a)$ for all $(n, a) \in \omega \times A$. Using the above results without parameters, for each fixed $p \in P$, there exists a unique function $f_p: \omega \rightarrow A$ such that $f_p(0) = h(p)$ and $f_p(S(n)) = g_p(n, f_p(n))$ for all $n \in \omega$. By Collection and Separation, we may form the set $\{f_p : p \in P\}$. Let f be the union of this set. It is then straightforward to check that f is the unique function satisfying the necessary properties. \square

Definition 8.5.3. *Let $h: \omega \rightarrow \omega$ be defined by $h(m) = m$ and let $g: \omega \times \omega \times \omega \rightarrow \omega$ be defined by $g(m, n, a) = S(a)$. We denote the unique f from the previous theorem by $+$. Notice that $+: \omega \times \omega \rightarrow \omega$, that $m + 0 = m$ for all $m \in \omega$, and that $m + S(n) = S(m + n)$ for all $m, n \in \omega$.*

Now that we have the definition of $+$, we can prove all of the basic “axiomatic” facts about the natural numbers with $+$ by induction. Here’s a simple example.

Proposition 8.5.4. $0 + n = n$ for all $n \in \omega$.

Proof. The proof is by induction on n . For $n = 0$, simply notice that $0 + 0 = 0$. Suppose that $n \in \omega$ and $0 + n = n$. We then have $0 + S(n) = S(0 + n) = S(n)$. The result follows by induction. \square

A slightly more interesting example is a proof that $+$ is associative.

Proposition 8.5.5. For all $k, m, n \in \omega$, we have $(k + m) + n = k + (m + n)$.

Proof. We fix $k, m \in \omega$, and prove the result is my induction on n . Notice that $(k + m) + 0 = k + m = k + (m + 0)$. Suppose that we know the result for n , so that $(k + m) + n = k + (m + n)$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} (k + m) + S(n) &= S((k + m) + n) \\ &= S(k + (m + n)) && \text{(by induction)} \\ &= k + S(m + n) \\ &= k + (m + S(n)). \end{aligned}$$

The result follows by induction. \square

Definition 8.5.6. Let $h: \omega \rightarrow \omega$ be defined by $h(m) = 0$ and let $g: \omega \times \omega \times \omega \rightarrow \omega$ be defined by $g(m, a, n) = a + m$. We denote the unique f from the previous theorem by \cdot . Notice that $\cdot: \omega \times \omega \rightarrow \omega$, that $m \cdot 0 = 0$ for all $m \in \omega$, and that $m \cdot S(n) = m \cdot n + m$ for all $m, n \in \omega$.

From now on, we will present our recursive definitions in the usual mathematical style. For example, we define iterates of a function as follows.

Definition 8.5.7. Let B be a set, and let $h: B \rightarrow B$ be a function. We define, for each $n \in \omega$, a function h^n by letting $h^0 = id_B$ and letting $h^{S(n)} = h \circ h^n$ for all $n \in \omega$.

For each fixed $h: B \rightarrow B$, this definition can be justified by appealing to the theorem with $A = B^B$, $b = id_B$, and $g: A \times \omega \rightarrow \omega$ given by $g(a, n) = h \circ a$. However, we will content ourselves with the above more informal style when the details are straightforward and uninteresting.

The above notions of recursive definitions can only handle types of recursion where the value of $f(S(n))$ depends just on the previous value $f(n)$ (and also n). Thus, it is unable to deal with recursive definitions such as that used in defining the Fibonacci sequence where the value of $f(n)$ depends on the two previous values of f whenever $n \geq 2$. We can justify these more general types of recursions by carrying along all previous values of f in the inductive construction. Thus, instead of having our iterating function $g: A \times \omega \rightarrow A$, where we think of the first argument of g as carrying the current value $f(n)$, we will have an iterating function $g: A^{<\omega} \rightarrow A$, where we think of the first argument of g as carrying the finite sequence consisting of all values $f(m)$ for $m < n$. Thus, given such a g , we are seeking the existence and uniqueness of a function $f: \omega \rightarrow A$ such that $f(n) = g(f \upharpoonright n)$ for all $n \in \omega$. Notice that in this framework, we no longer need to put forward a $b \in A$ as a starting place for f because we will have $f(0) = g(\emptyset)$. Also, we do not need to include a number argument in the domain of g because the current n in the iteration can be recovered as the domain of the single argument of g .

Theorem 8.5.8 (Recursive Definitions on ω). Let A be a set and let $g: A^{<\omega} \rightarrow A$. There exists a unique function $f: \omega \rightarrow A$ such that $f(n) = g(f \upharpoonright n)$ for all $n \in \omega$.

Proof. We first prove existence. Call a set $Z \subseteq \omega \times A$ *sufficient* if for all $n \in \omega$ and all $q \in A^n$ such that $(k, q(k)) \in Z$ for all $k < n$, we have $(n, g(q)) \in Z$. Notice that sufficient sets exist (since $\omega \times A$ is sufficient). Let

$$Y = \{(n, a) \in \omega \times A : (n, a) \in Z \text{ for every sufficient set } Z\}.$$

We first show that Y is sufficient. Let $n \in \omega$ and $q \in A^n$ be arbitrary such that $(k, q(k)) \in Y$ for all $k < n$. For any sufficient set Z , we have $(k, q(k)) \in Z$ for all $k < n$, so $(n, g(q)) \in Z$. Therefore, $(n, g(q)) \in Y$ for every sufficient set Z , so $(n, g(q)) \in Y$. It follows that Y is sufficient.

We next show that for all $n \in \omega$, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(n, a) \in Y$. Let

$$X = \{n \in \omega : \text{There exists a unique } a \in A \text{ such that } (n, a) \in Y\}.$$

Let $n \in \omega$ be arbitrary such that $k \in X$ for all $k < n$. Let $q = Y \cap (n \times A)$ and notice that $q \in A^n$. Since $(k, q(k)) \in Y$ for all $k < n$ and Y is sufficient, it follows that $(n, g(q)) \in Y$. Let $b \in A$ be arbitrary with $b \neq g(q)$. We then have that $Y \setminus \{(n, b)\}$ is sufficient (otherwise, there exists $p \in A^n$ such that $(k, p(k)) \in Y$ for all $k < n$ and $g(p) = b$, but this implies that $p = q$ and hence $b = a$), so by definition of Y it follows that $Y \subseteq Y \setminus \{(n, b)\}$. Hence, $(n, b) \notin Y$. Therefore, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(n, a) \in Y$, so $n \in X$.

By induction, we conclude that $X = \omega$, so for all $n \in \omega$, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(n, a) \in Y$. Let $f = Y$ and notice that $f: \omega \rightarrow A$ because $X = \omega$. Let $n \in \omega$ be arbitrary. Let $q = Y \cap (n \times A)$ and notice that $q \in A^n$ and $q = f \upharpoonright n$. Since $(k, q(k)) \in Y$ for all $k < n$ and Y is sufficient, it follows that $(n, g(q)) \in Y$, so $f(n) = g(q) = g(f \upharpoonright n)$.

We now prove uniqueness. Suppose that $f_1, f_2: \omega \rightarrow A$ are arbitrary functions with the following properties:

1. $f_1(n) = g(f_1 \upharpoonright n)$ for all $n \in \omega$.
2. $f_2(n) = g(f_2 \upharpoonright n)$ for all $n \in \omega$.

Let $X = \{n \in \omega : f_1(n) = f_2(n)\}$. We prove by induction that $X = \omega$. Let $n \in \omega$ be arbitrary such that $k \in X$ for all $k < n$. We then have that $f_1 \upharpoonright n = f_2 \upharpoonright n$, hence

$$\begin{aligned} f_1(n) &= g(f_1 \upharpoonright n) \\ &= g(f_2 \upharpoonright n) \\ &= f_2(n), \end{aligned}$$

hence $n \in X$. It follows by induction that $X = \omega$, so $f_1(n) = f_2(n)$ for all $n \in \omega$. Therefore, $f_1 = f_2$. \square

As above, there is a similar version when we allow parameters. If $f: P \times \omega \rightarrow A$ and $p \in P$, we use the notation f_p to denote the function $f_p: \omega \rightarrow A$ given by $f_p(n) = f(p, n)$ for all $n \in \omega$.

Theorem 8.5.9 (Recursive Definitions with Parameters on ω). *Let A and P be sets and let $g: P \times A^{<\omega} \rightarrow A$. There exists a unique function $f: P \times \omega \rightarrow A$ such that $f(p, n) = g(p, f_p \upharpoonright n)$ for all $p \in P$ and $n \in \omega$.*

Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 8.5.2. \square

8.6 Infinite Sets and Infinite Powers

Theorem 8.6.1 (Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein). *Let A and B be sets. If $A \preceq B$ and $B \preceq A$, then $A \approx B$.*

Proof. We may assume that A and B are disjoint (otherwise, we can work with $A \times \{0\}$ and $B \times \{1\}$, and transfer the result back to A and B). Fix injections $f: A \rightarrow B$ and $g: B \rightarrow A$. We say that an element $a \in A$ is *B-originating* if there exists $b_0 \in B$ and $n \in \omega$ such that $b_0 \notin \text{range}(f)$ and $a = (g \circ f)^n(g(b_0))$. Similarly,

we say that an element $b \in B$ is *B-originating* if there exists $b_0 \in B$ and $n \in \omega$ such that $b_0 \notin \text{range}(f)$ and $b = (f \circ g)^n(b_0)$. Let

$$h = \{(a, b) \in A \times B : \text{Either } a \text{ is not } B\text{-originating and } f(a) = b \text{ or } a \text{ is } B\text{-originating and } g(b) = a\}.$$

Notice that h is a function (because f is a function and g is injective), $\text{domain}(h) \subseteq A$, and $\text{range}(h) \subseteq B$. We first show that $\text{domain}(h) = A$. Let $a \in A$ be arbitrary. If a is not B -originating, then $(a, f(a)) \in h$, hence $a \in \text{domain}(h)$. Suppose that a is B -originating, and fix $b_0 \in B$ and $n \in \omega$ with $a = (g \circ f)^n(g(b_0))$. If $n = 0$, then $a = g(b_0)$, so $(a, b_0) \in h$ and hence $a \in \text{domain}(h)$. Suppose that $n \neq 0$ and fix $m \in \omega$ with $n = S(m)$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} a &= (g \circ f)^{S(m)}(g(b_0)) \\ &= (g \circ f)((g \circ f)^m(g(b_0))) \\ &= g(f((g \circ f)^m(g(b_0)))). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $(a, f((g \circ f)^m(g(b_0)))) \in h$, and hence $a \in \text{domain}(h)$. It follows that $\text{domain}(h) = A$.

We now know that $h: A \rightarrow B$, and we need only show that h is a bijection. Let $a_1, a_2 \in A$ be arbitrary with $h(a_1) = h(a_2)$. We first show that either a_1 and a_2 are both B -originating or both a_1 and a_2 are both not B -originating. Without loss of generality, suppose that a_1 is B -originating and a_2 is not, so that $a_1 = g(h(a_1))$ and $h(a_2) = f(a_2)$. Since a_1 is B -originating, we may fix $b_0 \in B$ and $n \in \omega$ such that $b_0 \notin \text{range}(f)$ and $a_1 = (g \circ f)^n(g(b_0))$. Notice that

$$\begin{aligned} (g \circ f)^n(g(b_0)) &= a_1 \\ &= g(h(a_1)) \\ &= g(h(a_2)) \\ &= g(f(a_2)) \\ &= (g \circ f)(a_2). \end{aligned}$$

If $n = 0$, this implies that $g(b_0) = g(f(a_2))$, hence $f(a_2) = b_0$ (because g is injective), contrary to the fact that $b_0 \notin \text{range}(f)$. Suppose that $n \neq 0$ and fix $m \in \omega$ with $S(m) = n$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} (g \circ f)((g \circ f)^m(g(b_0))) &= (g \circ f)^n(g(b_0)) \\ &= (g \circ f)(a_2), \end{aligned}$$

hence $(g \circ f)^m(g(b_0)) = a_2$ (because $g \circ f$ is injective), contrary to the fact that a_2 is not B -originating. Therefore, either a_1 and a_2 are both B -originating or both a_1 and a_2 are both not B -originating. If a_1 and a_2 are both not B -originating, this implies that $f(a_1) = f(a_2)$, hence $a_1 = a_2$ because f is injective. If a_1 and a_2 are both B -originating, we then have $a_1 = g(h(a_1)) = g(h(a_2)) = a_2$. It follows that h is injective.

We finally show that h is surjective. Fix $b \in B$. Suppose first that b is B -originating, and fix $b_0 \in B$ and $n \in \omega$ such that $b_0 \notin \text{range}(f)$ and $b = (f \circ g)^n(b_0)$. We then have $g(b) = g((f \circ g)^n(b_0)) = (g \circ f)^n(g(b_0))$, hence $g(b) \in A$ is B -originating. It follows that $h(g(b)) = b$, so $b \in \text{range}(h)$. Suppose now that b is not B -originating. We then must have $b \in \text{range}(f)$, so we may fix $a \in A$ with $f(a) = b$. If a is B -originating, we may fix $b_0 \in B$ and $n \in \omega$ such that $b_0 \notin \text{range}(f)$ and $a = (g \circ f)^n(g(b_0))$, and notice that $(f \circ g)^{S(n)}(b_0) = f((g \circ f)^n(g(b_0))) = f(a) = b$, contrary to the fact that b is not B -originating. Therefore, a is not B -originating, so $h(a) = f(a) = b$, and hence $b \in \text{range}(h)$. It follows that h is surjective. \square

Definition 8.6.2. Let A and B be sets. We write $A \prec B$ to mean that $A \preceq B$ and $A \not\approx B$.

Definition 8.6.3. Let A be a set.

1. A is countably infinite if $A \approx \omega$.

2. A is countable if A is either finite or countably infinite.
3. A is uncountable if A is not countable.

Proposition 8.6.4. *Let A be a set. The following are equivalent:*

1. A is countable.
2. $A \preceq \omega$.
3. There is a surjection $g: \omega \rightarrow A$.

Proof. Exercise. □

Given a set A and an natural number $n \in \omega$, we defined A^n be the set of all functions from n to A . In fact, there is no reason to restrict to powers that are natural numbers. In general, we want to define A^B to be the set of all functions from B to A . We can certainly make this definition, but it is the first instance where we really need to use Power Set.

Proposition 8.6.5. *Let A and B be sets. There is a unique set, denoted by A^B , such that for all f , we have $f \in A^B$ if and only if $f: B \rightarrow A$.*

Proof. Notice that if $f: B \rightarrow A$, then $f \subseteq B \times A$, hence $f \in \mathcal{P}(B \times A)$. Therefore, $A^B = \{f \in \mathcal{P}(B \times A) : f \text{ is a function, } \text{domain}(f) = B, \text{ and } \text{range}(f) = A\}$. As usual, uniqueness follows from Extensionality. □

Theorem 8.6.6. *For any set A , we have $A \prec \mathcal{P}(A)$.*

Proof. First, define a function $f: A \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(A)$ by letting $f(a) = \{a\}$ for every $a \in A$. Notice that f is an injection, hence $A \preceq \mathcal{P}(A)$. We next show that $A \not\approx \mathcal{P}(A)$ by showing that there is no bijection $f: A \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(A)$. Let $f: A \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(A)$ be an arbitrary function. Let $B = \{a \in A : a \notin f(a)\}$, and notice that $B \in \mathcal{P}(A)$. Suppose that $B \in \text{range}(f)$, and fix $b \in A$ with $f(b) = B$. We then have $b \in f(b) \leftrightarrow b \in B \leftrightarrow b \notin f(b)$, a contradiction. It follows that $B \notin \text{range}(f)$, hence f is not surjective. Therefore, $A \prec \mathcal{P}(A)$. □

Chapter 9

Well-Orderings, Ordinals, and Cardinals

9.1 Well-Orderings

The ability to do induction and make definitions by recursion on ω was essential to developing the basic properties of the natural numbers. With such success, we now want to push inductive arguments and recursive constructions to other structures. In Chapter 2, we successfully generalized the "step" versions of induction and recursion to other contexts where we generate elements one at a time. Now, we seek to generalize the "order" versions. The key property underlying the order versions is the fact that $<$ is a well-ordering on ω . In fact, it is straightforward to see translate order induction to any well-ordering.

Proposition 9.1.1 (Induction on Well-Orderings). *Let $(W, <)$ be a well-ordering.*

1. *Suppose that X is set and for all $z \in W$, if $y \in X$ for all $y < z$, then $z \in X$. We then have $W \subseteq X$.*
2. *For any formula $\varphi(z, \vec{p})$, we have the sentence*

$$\forall \vec{p}((\forall z \in W)((\forall y < z)\varphi(y, \vec{p}) \rightarrow \varphi(z, \vec{p})) \rightarrow (\forall z \in W)\varphi(z, \vec{p}))$$

3. *Suppose that C is a class and for all $z \in W$, if $y \in C$ for all $y < z$, then $z \in C$. We then have $W \subseteq C$.*

Proof.

1. Suppose that $W \not\subseteq X$ so that $W \setminus X \neq \emptyset$. Since $(W, <)$ is a well-ordering, there exists $z \in W \setminus X$ such that for all $y \in W \setminus X$, either $z = y$ or $z < y$. Therefore, for all $y \in W$ with $y < z$, we have $y \in X$ (because $y \notin W \setminus X$). It follows from assumption that $z \in X$, contradicting the fact that $z \in W \setminus X$. Thus, it must be the case that $W \subseteq X$.
2. This follows from part 1 using Separation. Fix sets \vec{q} , and suppose that

$$(\forall z \in W)((\forall y < z)\varphi(y, \vec{q}) \rightarrow \varphi(z, \vec{q}))$$

Let $X = \{z \in W : \varphi(z, \vec{q})\}$. Suppose that $z \in W$ and $y \in X$ for all $y < z$. We then have $(\forall y < z)\varphi(y, \vec{q})$, hence $\varphi(z, \vec{q})$ by assumption, so $z \in X$. It follows from part 1 that $W \subseteq X$. Therefore, we have $(\forall z \in W)\varphi(z, \vec{q})$.

3. This is just a restatement of 2 using the language of classes.

□

This is all well and good, but are there other interesting well-orderings other than ω (and every $n \in \omega$)? Well, any well-ordering has a smallest element. If there are any elements remaining, there must be a next smallest element. Again, if there are any elements remaining, there must be a next smallest element, and so on. In other words, any infinite well-ordering begins with a piece that looks like ω .

However, we can build another “longer” well-ordering by taking ω , and adding a new element which is greater than every element of ω . This can be visualized by thinking of the following subset of \mathbb{R} :

$$A = \left\{ 1 - \frac{1}{n} : n \in \omega \setminus \{0\} \right\} \cup \{1\}.$$

It’s a simple exercise to check that A , ordered by inheritance from the usual order on \mathbb{R} , is a well-ordering. We can then add another new element which is greater than every element, and another and another and so on, to get a well-ordering that is a copy of ω with another copy of ω on top of the first. We can add a new element greater than all of these, and continue. These well-orderings “beyond” ω differ from ω (and all $n \in \omega$) in that they have points that are neither initial points nor immediate successors of other points.

Definition 9.1.2. Let $(W, <)$ be a well-ordering, and let $z \in W$.

1. If $z \leq y$ for all $y \in W$, we call z the *initial point* (such a z is easily seen to be unique).
2. If there exists $y \in W$ such that there is no $x \in W$ with $y < x < z$, we call z a *successor point*.
3. If z is neither an initial point nor a successor point, we call z a *limit point*.

A little thought will suggest that all well-orderings should be built up by starting at an initial point, taking successors (perhaps infinitely often), and then jumping to a limit point above everything previously. After all, if we already have an initial part that looks like ω , and we haven’t exhausted the well-ordering, then there must be a least element not accounted for, and this is the first limit point. If we still haven’t exhausted it, there is another least element, which is a successor, and perhaps another successor, and so on. If this doesn’t finish off the well-ordering, there is another least element not accounted for which will be the second limit point. For example, as a subset of the real line, the set

$$A = \left\{ 1 - \frac{1}{n} : n \in \omega \setminus \{0\} \right\} \cup \left\{ 2 - \frac{1}{n} : n \in \omega \setminus \{0\} \right\} \cup \{2\}.$$

is a well-ordering (under the inherited ordering from \mathbb{R}) with two limit points (namely 1 and 2).

This idea makes it seem plausible that we can take any two well-orderings and compare them by running through this procedure until one of them runs out of elements. That is, if $(W_1, <_1)$ and $(W_2, <_2)$ are well-orderings, then either they are isomorphic, or one is isomorphic to an initial segment of the other. We now develop the tools to prove this result. We first show that we can make recursive definitions along well-orderings. The proof is basically the same as the proof of the Induction Principle on ω because the only important fact that allowed that argument to work was the property of the order $<$ on ω (not the fact that every element of ω was either an initial point or a successor point).

Definition 9.1.3. Let $(W, <)$ be a well-ordering, and let $z \in W$. We let $W(z) = \{y \in W : y < z\}$.

Definition 9.1.4. Let $(W, <)$ be a well-ordering. A set $I \subseteq W$ is called an *initial segment* of W if $I \neq W$ and whenever $x \in I$ and $y < x$, we have $y \in I$.

Proposition 9.1.5. Suppose that $(W, <)$ is a well-ordering and I is an initial segment of W . There exists $z \in W$ with $I = W(z)$.

Proof. Since I is an initial segment of W , we have $I \subseteq W$ and $I \neq W$. Therefore, $W \setminus I \neq \emptyset$. Since $(W, <)$ is a well-ordering, there exists $z \in W \setminus I$ such that $z \leq y$ for all $y \in W \setminus I$. We claim that $I = W(z)$.

- Let $y \in W(z)$ be arbitrary. Since $y < z$, we then have $y \notin W \setminus I$, so $y \in I$. Therefore, $W(z) \subseteq I$.
- Let $y \in I$ be arbitrary with $y \notin W(z)$. We then have $y \not\leq z$, so $y \geq z$ because $<$ is a well-ordering (and hence a linear ordering). Therefore, $z \in I$ because I is an initial segment, contradicting the fact that $z \in W \setminus I$. It follows that $I \subseteq W(z)$.

Combining these, it follows from Extensionality that $I = W(z)$. \square

Definition 9.1.6. Let $(W, <)$ be a well-ordering and let A be a set. We let

$$A^{<W} = \{f \in \mathcal{P}(W \times A) : f \text{ is a function and } f: W(z) \rightarrow A \text{ for some } z \in W\}.$$

Theorem 9.1.7 (Recursive Definitions on Well-Orderings). Let $(W, <)$ be a well-ordering, let A be a set, and let $g: A^{<W} \rightarrow A$. There exists a unique function $f: W \rightarrow A$ such that $f(z) = g(f \upharpoonright W(z))$ for all $z \in W$.

Proof. We first prove existence. Call a set $Z \subseteq W \times A$ *sufficient* if for all $z \in W$ and all $q \in A^{W(z)}$ such that $(y, q(y)) \in Z$ for all $y < z$, we have $(z, g(q)) \in Z$. Notice that sufficient sets exist (since $W \times A$ is sufficient). Let

$$Y = \{(z, a) \in W \times A : (z, a) \in Z \text{ for every sufficient set } Z\}.$$

We first show that Y is sufficient. Let $z \in W$ and $q \in A^{W(z)}$ be arbitrary such that $(y, q(y)) \in Y$ for all $y < z$. For any sufficient set Z , we have $(y, q(y)) \in Z$ for all $y < z$, so $(z, g(q)) \in Z$. Therefore, $(z, g(q)) \in Y$ for every sufficient set Z , so $(z, g(q)) \in Y$. It follows that Y is sufficient.

We next show that for all $z \in W$, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(z, a) \in Y$. Let

$$X = \{z \in W : \text{There exists a unique } a \in A \text{ such that } (z, a) \in Y\}.$$

Let $z \in W$ be arbitrary such that $y \in X$ for all $y < z$. Let $q = Y \cap (W(z) \times A)$ and notice that $q \in A^{W(z)}$. Since $(y, q(y)) \in Y$ for all $y < z$ and Y is sufficient, it follows that $(z, g(q)) \in Y$. Fix $b \in A$ with $b \neq g(q)$. We then have that $Y \setminus \{(z, b)\}$ is sufficient (otherwise, there exists $p \in A^{W(z)}$ such that $(y, p(y)) \in Y$ for all $y < z$ and $g(p) = b$, but this implies that $p = q$ and hence $b = g(q)$), so by definition of Y it follows that $Y \subseteq Y \setminus \{(z, b)\}$. Hence, $(z, b) \notin Y$. Therefore, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(z, a) \in Y$, so $z \in X$.

By induction, we conclude that $X = W$, so for all $z \in W$, there exists a unique $a \in A$ such that $(z, a) \in Y$. Let $f = Y$ and notice that $f: W \rightarrow A$ because $X = W$. Let $z \in W$ be arbitrary. Define $q \in A^{W(z)}$ by letting $q = Y \cap (W(z) \times A)$ and notice that $q = f \upharpoonright W(z)$. Since $(y, q(y)) \in Y$ for all $y < z$ and Y is sufficient, it follows that $(z, g(q)) \in Y$, so $f(z) = g(q) = g(f \upharpoonright W(z))$.

We now prove uniqueness. Suppose that $f_1, f_2: W \rightarrow A$ are arbitrary functions with the following properties:

1. $f_1(z) = g(f_1 \upharpoonright W(z))$ for all $z \in W$.
2. $f_2(z) = g(f_2 \upharpoonright W(z))$ for all $z \in W$.

Let $X = \{z \in W : f_1(z) = f_2(z)\}$. We prove by induction that $X = W$. Let $z \in W$ and suppose that $y \in X$ for all $y < z$. We then have that $f_1 \upharpoonright W(z) = f_2 \upharpoonright W(z)$, hence

$$\begin{aligned} f_1(z) &= g(f_1 \upharpoonright W(z)) \\ &= g(f_2 \upharpoonright W(z)) \\ &= f_2(z), \end{aligned}$$

hence $z \in X$. It follows by induction that $X = W$, so $f_1(z) = f_2(z)$ for all $z \in W$. Therefore, $f_1 = f_2$. \square

Definition 9.1.8. Let $(W_1, <_1)$ and $(W_2, <_2)$ be well-orderings.

1. A function $f: W_1 \rightarrow W_2$ is order-preserving if whenever $x, y \in W_1$ and $x <_1 y$, we have $f(x) <_2 f(y)$.
2. A function $f: W_1 \rightarrow W_2$ is an isomorphism if it is bijective and order-preserving.
3. If W_1 and W_2 are isomorphic, we write $W_1 \cong W_2$.

Proposition 9.1.9. Suppose that $(W, <)$ is a well-ordering and $f: W \rightarrow W$ is order-preserving. We then have $f(z) \geq z$ for all $z \in W$.

Proof. We prove the result by induction on W . Suppose that $z \in W$ and $f(y) \geq y$ for all $y < z$. Suppose instead that $f(z) < z$, and let $x = f(z)$. Since f is order-preserving and $x < z$, it follows that $f(x) < f(z) = x$, contradicting the fact that $f(y) \geq y$ for all $y < z$. Therefore, $f(z) \geq z$. The result follows by induction. \square

Proposition 9.1.10. Let $(W_1, <_1)$ and $(W_2, <_2)$ be well-orderings. If $f: W_1 \rightarrow W_2$ is an isomorphism, then $f^{-1}: W_2 \rightarrow W_1$ is also an isomorphism.

Proof. Exercise. \square

Corollary 9.1.11.

1. If $(W, <)$ is a well-ordering and $z \in W$, then $W \not\cong W(z)$.
2. If $(W, <)$ is a well-ordering, then its only automorphism is the identity.
3. If $(W_1, <_1)$ and $(W_2, <_2)$ are well-orderings, and $W_1 \cong W_2$, then the isomorphism from W_1 to W_2 is unique.

Proof.

1. Suppose that $W \cong W(z)$ for some $z \in W$ and let $f: W \rightarrow W(z)$ be a witnessing isomorphism. Then $f: W \rightarrow W$ is order-preserving and $f(z) < z$ (because $f(z) \in W(z)$), contrary to Proposition 9.1.9.
2. Let $f: W \rightarrow W$ be an arbitrary automorphism of W . Let $z \in W$ be arbitrary. By Proposition 9.1.9, we have $f(z) \geq z$. Since $f^{-1}: W \rightarrow W$ is also an automorphism of W , Proposition 9.1.9 implies that $f^{-1}(f(z)) \geq f(z)$, hence $z \geq f(z)$. Combining $f(z) \geq z$ and $z \geq f(z)$, we conclude that $z = f(z)$. Since $z \in W$ was arbitrary, we conclude that f is the identity function.
3. Suppose that $f: W_1 \rightarrow W_2$ and $g: W_1 \rightarrow W_2$ are both isomorphisms. We then have that $g^{-1}: W_2 \rightarrow W_1$ is an isomorphism, hence $g^{-1} \circ f: W_1 \rightarrow W_1$ is an automorphism. Hence, by part b, we may conclude that $g^{-1} \circ f$ is the identity on W_1 . It follows that $f = g$.

\square

Theorem 9.1.12. Let $(W_1, <_1)$ and $(W_2, <_2)$ be well-orderings. Exactly one of the following holds:

1. $W_1 \cong W_2$.
2. There exists $z \in W_2$ such that $W_1 \cong W_2(z)$.
3. There exists $z \in W_1$ such that $W_1(z) \cong W_2$.

In each of the above cases, the isomorphism and the z (if appropriate) are unique.

Proof. We first prove that one of the three options holds. Fix a set a such that $a \notin W_1 \cup W_2$ (such an a exists by Proposition 8.1.4). Our goal is to define a function $f: W_1 \rightarrow W_2 \cup \{a\}$ recursively. Define $g: (W_2 \cup \{a\})^{<W_1} \rightarrow W_2 \cup \{a\}$ as follows. Let $q \in (W_2 \cup \{a\})^{<W_1}$ be arbitrary, and fix $z \in W_1$ such that $q: W_1(z) \rightarrow W_2 \cup \{a\}$. If $a \in \text{range}(q)$ or $\text{range}(q) = W_2$, let $g(q) = a$. Otherwise $\text{range}(q)$ is a proper subset of W_2 , and we let $g(q)$ be the $<_2$ -least element of $W_2 \setminus \text{range}(q)$. By Theorem 9.1.7, there is a unique $f: W_1 \rightarrow W_2 \cup \{a\}$ such that $f(z) = g(f \upharpoonright W_1(z))$ for all $z \in W_1$.

Suppose first that $a \notin \text{range}(f)$ so that $f: W_1 \rightarrow W_2$. We begin by showing that $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z))$ is an initial segment of W_2 for all $z \in W_1$ by induction. Let $z \in W_1$ be arbitrary such that $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(y))$ is an initial segment of W_2 for all $y < z$. We have three cases:

- *Case 1:* Suppose that z is the initial point of W_1 . We then $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z)) = \emptyset$ is certainly an initial segment of W_2 .
- *Case 2:* Suppose that z is a successor point of W_1 . Fix $y \in W_1$ such that there is no $x \in W_1$ with $y < x < z$. By induction, we know that $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(y))$ is an initial segment of W_2 . Since $f(y) = g(f \upharpoonright W_1(y))$ is the $<_2$ -least element of $W_2 \setminus \text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(y))$, it follows that $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z)) = \text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(y)) \cup \{f(y)\}$ is an initial segment of W_2 .
- *Case 3:* Suppose finally that z is a limit point of W_1 . It then follows that $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z)) = \bigcup_{y < z} \text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(y))$. Since every element of the union is an initial segment of W_2 , it follows that $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z))$ is an initial segment of W_2 (note that it can't equal W_2 because $f(z) \neq a$).

Therefore, $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z))$ is an initial segment of W_2 for all $z \in W_1$ by induction. It follows that for all $y, z \in W_1$ with $y < z$, we have $f(y) < f(z)$ (because $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z))$ is an initial segment of W_1 and $f(y) \in \text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z))$), so f is order-preserving. This implies that f is an injection, so if $\text{range}(f) = W_2$, we have $W_1 \cong W_2$. Otherwise, $\text{range}(f)$ is an initial segment of W_2 , so by Proposition 9.1.5 there is a $z \in W_2$ such that $W_1 \cong W_2(z)$.

Suppose now that $a \in \text{range}(f)$. Let $z \in W_1$ be the $<_1$ -least element of W_1 such that $f(z) = a$. It then follows that $f \upharpoonright W_1(z): W_1(z) \rightarrow W_2$ is order-preserving by induction as above. Also, we must have $\text{range}(f \upharpoonright W_1(z)) = W_2$ because $f(z) = a$. Therefore, $f \upharpoonright W_1(z): W_1(z) \rightarrow W_2$ is an isomorphism. This completes the proof that one of the above 3 cases must hold.

The uniqueness of the case, the isomorphism, and the z (if appropriate), all follow from Corollary 9.1.11 \square

With this result in hand, we now know that any well-ordering is uniquely determined by its “length”. The next goal is to find a nice system of representatives for the isomorphism classes of well-orderings. For that, we need to generalize the ideas that went into the construction of the natural numbers.

9.2 Ordinals

Our definition of the natural numbers had the advantage that the ordering was given by the membership relation \in . This feature allowed us to define successors easily and to think of a natural number n as the set of all natural numbers less than n . We now seek to continue this progression to measure well-orderings longer than ω . The idea is to define successors as in the case of the natural numbers, but now to take unions to achieve limit points.

The key property of ω (and each $n \in \omega$) that we want to use in our definition of ordinals is the fact that \in well-orders ω (and each $n \in \omega$). We need one more condition to ensure that there are no “holes” or “gaps” in the set. For example, \in well-orders the set $\{0, 2, 3, 5\}$, but we don't want to consider it as an ordinal because it skipped over 1 and 4. We therefore make the following definition.

Definition 9.2.1. A set z is *transitive* if whenever x and y are sets such that $x \in y$ and $y \in z$, we have $x \in z$.

Definition 9.2.2. Let z be a set. We define a relation \in_z on z by setting $\in_z = \{(x, y) \in z \times z : x \in y\}$.

Definition 9.2.3. An ordinal is a set α which is transitive and well-ordered by \in_α .

Our hard work developing the natural numbers gives us one interesting example of an ordinal.

Proposition 9.2.4. ω is an ordinal.

Proof. Proposition 8.2.11 says that ω is transitive, and Theorem 8.2.18 says that ω is well-ordered by $< = \in_\omega$. \square

Proposition 9.2.5. If α is an ordinal and $\beta \in \alpha$, then β is an ordinal.

Proof. We first show that β is transitive. Let x and y be sets with $x \in y$ and $y \in \beta$. Since $y \in \beta$, $\beta \in \alpha$, and α is transitive, it follows that $y \in \alpha$. Since $x \in y$ and $y \in \alpha$, it follows that $x \in \alpha$. Now since $x, y, \beta \in \alpha$, $x \in y$, $y \in \beta$, and \in_α is transitive on α , we may conclude that $x \in \beta$. Therefore, β is transitive.

Notice that $\beta \subseteq \alpha$ because $\beta \in \alpha$ and α is transitive. Therefore, \in_β is the restriction of \in_α to the subset $\beta \subseteq \alpha$. Since \in_α is a well-ordering on α , it follows that \in_β is a well-ordering on β . Hence, β is an ordinal. \square

Corollary 9.2.6. Every $n \in \omega$ is an ordinal.

Lemma 9.2.7. If α is an ordinal, then $\alpha \notin \alpha$.

Proof. Suppose that α is an ordinal and $\alpha \in \alpha$. Since $\alpha \in \alpha$, it follows that \in_α is not asymmetric on α , contradicting the fact that \in_α is a well-ordering on α . \square

Proposition 9.2.8. If α is an ordinal, then $S(\alpha)$ is an ordinal.

Proof. We first show that $S(\alpha)$ is transitive. Suppose that $x \in y \in S(\alpha)$. Since $y \in S(\alpha) = \alpha \cup \{\alpha\}$, either $y \in \alpha$ or $y = \alpha$. Suppose first that $y \in \alpha$. We then have $x \in y \in \alpha$, so $x \in \alpha$ because α is transitive. Hence, $x \in S(\alpha)$. Suppose now that $y = \alpha$. We then have $x \in \alpha$ because $x \in y$, so $x \in S(\alpha)$.

We next show that $\in_{S(\alpha)}$ is transitive on $S(\alpha)$. Let $x, y, z \in S(\alpha)$ with $x \in y \in z$. Since $z \in S(\alpha)$, either $z \in \alpha$ or $z = \alpha$. Suppose first that $z \in \alpha$. We then have $y \in \alpha$ (since $y \in z \in \alpha$ and α is transitive), and hence $x \in \alpha$ (since $x \in y \in \alpha$ and α is transitive). Thus, $x, y, z \in \alpha$, so we may conclude that $x \in z$ using the fact that \in_α is transitive on α . Suppose now that $z = \alpha$. We then have $x \in \alpha = z$ because $x \in y \in \alpha$ and α is transitive.

We next show that $\in_{S(\alpha)}$ is asymmetric on $S(\alpha)$. Let $x \in S(\alpha)$. If $x \in \alpha$, then $x \notin x$ because \in_α is asymmetric on α . If $x = \alpha$, then $x \notin x$ by Lemma 9.2.7.

We now show that $\in_{S(\alpha)}$ is connected on $S(\alpha)$. Let $x, y \in S(\alpha)$. If $x \in \alpha$ and $y \in \alpha$, then either $x \in y$, $x = y$, or $y \in x$ because \in_α is connected on α . If $x = \alpha$ and $y = \alpha$, we clearly have $x = y$. Otherwise, one of x, y equals α , and the other is an element of α , in which case we're done.

Finally, suppose that $X \subseteq S(\alpha)$ and $X \neq \emptyset$. If $X \cap \alpha = \emptyset$, then we must have $X = \{\alpha\}$, in which case X clearly has a $\in_{S(\alpha)}$ -least element. Suppose that $X \cap \alpha \neq \emptyset$. Since $X \cap \alpha \subseteq \alpha$ is nonempty and \in_α is a well-ordering on α , there exists a \in_α -least element β in $X \cap \alpha$. For any $\gamma \in X$, either $\gamma \in \alpha$ in which case we have either $\beta = \gamma$ or $\beta \in \gamma$ by choice of β , or $\gamma = \alpha$ in which case $\beta \in \gamma$ (because $\beta \in \alpha$). Therefore, X has a $\in_{S(\alpha)}$ -least element. \square

Proposition 9.2.9. Suppose that α and β are ordinals. We then have $\alpha \subseteq \beta$ if and only if either $\alpha = \beta$ or $\alpha \in \beta$.

Proof. (\Leftarrow) If $\alpha = \beta$, then clearly $\alpha \subseteq \beta$ and if $\alpha \in \beta$ we can use the fact that β is transitive to conclude that $\alpha \subseteq \beta$.

(\Rightarrow) Suppose that $\alpha \subseteq \beta$ and $\alpha \neq \beta$. Notice that $\beta \setminus \alpha$ is a nonempty subset of β , so there exists a \in_β -least element of $\beta \setminus \alpha$, call it z . We show that $\alpha = z$, hence $\alpha \in \beta$. We first show that $z \subseteq \alpha$. Let $x \in z$.

Since $z \in \beta$ and β is transitive, we have $x \in \beta$. Since $x \in z$, we can not have $x \in \beta \setminus \alpha$ by choice of z , so $x \in \alpha$. Thus, $z \subseteq \alpha$. We next show that $\alpha \subseteq z$. Let $x \in \alpha$. Since $\alpha \subseteq \beta$, we have $x \in \beta$. Using the fact that $x, z \in \beta$ and \in_β is connected on β , we know that either $x \in z$, $x = z$, or $z \in x$. We can not have $x = z$ because $x \in \alpha$ and $z \in \beta \setminus \alpha$. Also, we can not have $z \in x$, because if $z \in x$ we can also conclude that $z \in \alpha$ (because $z \in x \in \alpha$ and α is transitive), contradicting the fact that $z \in \beta \setminus \alpha$. Thus, $\alpha \subseteq z$. It follows that $z = \alpha$ (by Extensionality), so $\alpha \in \beta$. \square

Proposition 9.2.10. *Suppose that α and β are ordinals. Exactly one of $\alpha \in \beta$, $\alpha = \beta$, or $\beta \in \alpha$ holds.*

Proof. We first show that at least one of $\alpha \in \beta$, $\alpha = \beta$, $\beta \in \alpha$ holds. We first claim that $\alpha \cap \beta$ is an ordinal. If $x \in y \in \alpha \cap \beta$, then $x \in y \in \alpha$ and $x \in y \in \beta$, so $x \in \alpha$ and $x \in \beta$ (because α and β are transitive), and hence $x \in \alpha \cap \beta$. Thus, $\alpha \cap \beta$ is transitive. Notice that $\in_{\alpha \cap \beta}$ is the restriction of \in_α to the subset $\alpha \cap \beta \subseteq \alpha$. Since \in_α is a well-ordering on α , it follows that $\in_{\alpha \cap \beta}$ is a well-ordering on $\alpha \cap \beta$. Hence, $\alpha \cap \beta$ is an ordinal.

Now we have $\alpha \cap \beta \subseteq \alpha$ and $\alpha \cap \beta \subseteq \beta$. If $\alpha \cap \beta \neq \alpha$ and $\alpha \cap \beta \neq \beta$, then $\alpha \cap \beta \in \alpha$ and $\alpha \cap \beta \in \beta$ by Proposition 9.2.9, hence $\alpha \cap \beta \in \alpha \cap \beta$, contrary to Lemma 9.2.7. Therefore, either $\alpha \cap \beta = \alpha$ or $\alpha \cap \beta = \beta$. If $\alpha \cap \beta = \alpha$, we then have $\alpha \subseteq \beta$, hence either $\alpha = \beta$ or $\alpha \in \beta$ by Proposition 9.2.9. Similarly, if $\alpha \cap \beta = \beta$, we then have $\beta \subseteq \alpha$, hence either $\beta = \alpha$ or $\beta \in \alpha$ by Proposition 9.2.9. Thus, in any case, at least one $\alpha \in \beta$, $\alpha = \beta$, or $\beta \in \alpha$ holds.

We finish by showing that exactly one of $\alpha \in \beta$, $\alpha = \beta$, or $\beta \in \alpha$ holds. If $\alpha \in \beta$ and $\alpha = \beta$, then $\alpha \in \alpha$, contrary to Lemma 9.2.7. Similarly, if $\alpha = \beta$ and $\beta \in \alpha$, then $\beta \in \beta$, contrary to Lemma 9.2.7. Finally, if $\alpha \in \beta$ and $\beta \in \alpha$, then $\alpha \in \alpha$ (because α is transitive), contrary to Lemma 9.2.7. \square

Definition 9.2.11. *If α and β are ordinals, we write $\alpha < \beta$ to mean that $\alpha \in \beta$.*

Proposition 9.2.12. *Let α and β be arbitrary ordinals. We have $\alpha < S(\beta)$ if and only if $\alpha \leq \beta$.*

Proof. Notice that $S(\beta)$ is an ordinal by Proposition 9.2.8. Now

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha < S(\beta) &\Leftrightarrow \alpha \in S(\beta) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \alpha \in \beta \cup \{\beta\} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{Either } \alpha \in \beta \text{ or } \alpha \in \{\beta\} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \text{Either } \alpha < \beta \text{ or } \alpha = \beta \\ &\Leftrightarrow \alpha \leq \beta. \end{aligned}$$

\square

Proposition 9.2.13. *Suppose that α and β are ordinals. If $\alpha \cong \beta$ as well-orderings, then $\alpha = \beta$.*

Proof. If $\alpha \neq \beta$, then either $\alpha < \beta$ or $\beta < \alpha$ by Proposition 9.2.10. Suppose without loss of generality that $\beta < \alpha$. We then have that the well-ordering β is an initial segment of the well-ordering α (in the notation for well-orderings, we have $\beta = \alpha(\beta)$), hence $\alpha \not\cong \beta$ by Corollary 9.1.11. \square

By the above results, it seems that we are in a position to say that $<$ is a linear ordering on the collection of all ordinals. However, there is a small problem here. We do not know that the class of all ordinals is a set. In fact, we will see below that the collection of all ordinals is a proper class.

Definition 9.2.14. ***ORD** is the class of all ordinals.*

We first establish that nonempty sets of ordinals have least elements.

Proposition 9.2.15. *If A is a nonempty subset of **ORD**, then A has a least element. Furthermore the least element is given by $\bigcap A$.*

Proof. Since $A \neq \emptyset$, we may fix an ordinal $\alpha \in A$. If $A \cap \alpha = \emptyset$, then for any $\beta \in A$, we can not have $\beta \in \alpha$, hence either $\alpha = \beta$ or $\alpha \in \beta$ by Proposition 9.2.10. Suppose that $A \cap \alpha \neq \emptyset$. Since $A \cap \alpha \subseteq \alpha$ is nonempty, it has an \in_α -least element, call it δ . Let $\beta \in A$ and notice that β is an ordinal. By Proposition 9.2.10, either $\beta \in \alpha$, $\beta = \alpha$, or $\alpha \in \beta$. If $\beta \in \alpha$, then $\beta \in A \cap \alpha$, so either $\delta = \beta$ or $\delta \in \beta$ by choice of δ . If $\beta = \alpha$, then $\delta \in \beta$ because $\delta \in \alpha$. If $\alpha \in \beta$, we then have $\delta \in \alpha \in \beta$, so $\delta \in \beta$ because β is transitive. It follows that δ is the least element of A .

Therefore, we know that A has a least element, call it δ . Since $\delta \in A$, we certainly have $\bigcap A \subseteq \delta$. For all $\alpha \in A$, we then have either $\delta = \alpha$ or $\delta \in \alpha$, hence $\delta \subseteq \alpha$ by Proposition 9.2.9. Therefore, $\delta \subseteq \bigcap A$. It follows that $\delta = \bigcap A$. \square

Proposition 9.2.16. *If A is a subset of **ORD**, then $\bigcup A$ is an ordinal. Furthermore, we have $\bigcup A = \sup A$, i.e. $\alpha \leq \bigcup A$ for all $\alpha \in A$ and $\bigcup A \leq \beta$ whenever β is an ordinal with $\beta \geq \alpha$ for all $\alpha \in A$.*

Proof. We first show that $\bigcup A$ is transitive. Suppose that $x \in y \in \bigcup A$. Since $y \in \bigcup A$, there exists $\alpha \in A$, necessarily an ordinal, such that $y \in \alpha \in A$. Since α is transitive and $x \in y \in \alpha$, we can conclude that $x \in \alpha$. It follows that $x \in \bigcup A$. Hence, $\bigcup A$ is transitive.

We next show that $\in_{\bigcup A}$ is transitive on $\bigcup A$. Let $x, y, z \in \bigcup A$ with $x \in y \in z$. Since $z \in \bigcup A$, there exists $\alpha \in A$, necessarily an ordinal, such that $z \in \alpha \in A$. Since $z \in \alpha$ and α is an ordinal, we may use Proposition 9.2.5 to conclude that z is an ordinal. Thus, z is transitive, so we may use the fact that $x \in y \in z$ to conclude that $x \in z$.

We next show that $\in_{\bigcup A}$ is asymmetric on $\bigcup A$. Let $x \in \bigcup A$ and fix $\alpha \in A$, necessarily an ordinal, such that $x \in \alpha \in A$. Using Proposition 9.2.5 again, it follows that x is an ordinal, hence $x \notin x$ by Lemma 9.2.7.

We now show that $\in_{\bigcup A}$ is connected on $\bigcup A$. Let $x, y \in \bigcup A$. Fix $\alpha, \beta \in A$, necessarily ordinals, such that $x \in \alpha \in A$ and $y \in \beta \in A$. Again, using Proposition 9.2.5, we may conclude that x and y are ordinals, hence either $x \in y$, $x = y$, or $y \in x$ by Proposition 9.2.10.

Finally, suppose that $X \subseteq \bigcup A$ and $X \neq \emptyset$. Notice that for any $y \in X$, there exists $\alpha \in A$, necessarily an ordinal, such that $y \in \alpha \in A$, and hence y is an ordinal by Proposition 9.2.10. Therefore, X is a nonempty subset of **ORD**, so by Proposition 9.2.15 we may conclude that X has a least element (with respect to $\in_{\bigcup A}$).

We now show that $\bigcup A = \sup A$. Suppose that $\alpha \in A$. For any $\beta \in \alpha$, we have $\beta \in \alpha \in A$, hence $\beta \in \bigcup A$. It follows that $\alpha \subseteq \bigcup A$, hence $\alpha \leq \bigcup A$ by Proposition 9.2.9. Thus, $\bigcup A$ is an upper bound for A . Suppose that γ is an upper bound for A , i.e. γ is an ordinal and $\alpha \leq \gamma$ for all $\alpha \in A$. For any $\beta \in \bigcup A$, we may fix $\alpha \in A$ such that $\beta \in \alpha$ and notice that $\beta \in \alpha \subseteq \gamma$, so $\beta \in \gamma$. It follows that $\bigcup A \subseteq \gamma$, hence $\bigcup A \leq \gamma$ by Proposition 9.2.9. Therefore, $\bigcup A = \sup A$. \square

Proposition 9.2.17. ***ORD** is a proper class.*

Proof. Suppose that **ORD** is a set, so that there is a set O such that α is an ordinal if and only $\alpha \in O$. In this case, O is a transitive set (by Proposition 9.2.5) which is well-ordered by \in_O (transitivity follows from the fact that ordinals are transitive sets, asymmetry follows from Lemma 9.2.7, connectedness follows from Proposition 9.2.10, and the fact that every nonempty subset has a least element is given by Proposition 9.2.15). Therefore, O is an ordinal and so it follows that $O \in O$, contrary to Lemma 9.2.7. Hence, **ORD** is not a set. \square

Since **ORD** is a proper class, there are subclasses of **ORD** which are not subsets of **ORD**. We therefore extend Proposition 9.2.15 to the case of nonempty subclasses of **ORD**. The idea is that if we fix an $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$, then $\alpha \cap \mathbf{C}$ becomes a set of ordinals, so we can apply the above result.

Proposition 9.2.18. *If \mathbf{C} is a nonempty subclass of **ORD**, then \mathbf{C} has a least element.*

Proof. Since $\mathbf{C} \neq \emptyset$, we may fix an ordinal $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$. If $\mathbf{C} \cap \alpha = \emptyset$, then for any $\beta \in \mathbf{C}$, we can not have $\beta \in \alpha$, hence either $\alpha = \beta$ or $\alpha \in \beta$ by Proposition 9.2.10. Suppose that $\mathbf{C} \cap \alpha \neq \emptyset$. In this case, $\mathbf{C} \cap \alpha$ is

a nonempty set of ordinals by Separation, hence $\mathbf{C} \cap \alpha$ has a least element δ by Proposition 9.2.15. It now follows easily that δ is the least element of \mathbf{C} . \square

Proposition 9.2.19 (Induction on **ORD**). *Suppose that $\mathbf{C} \subseteq \mathbf{ORD}$ and that for all ordinals α , if $\beta \in \mathbf{C}$ for all $\beta < \alpha$, then $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$. We then have $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{ORD}$.*

Proof. Suppose that $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{ORD}$. Let $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{ORD} \setminus \mathbf{C}$ and notice that \mathbf{B} is a nonempty class of ordinals. By Proposition 9.2.18, it follows that \mathbf{B} has a least element, call it α . For all $\beta < \alpha$, we then have $\beta \notin \mathbf{B}$, hence $\beta \in \mathbf{C}$. By assumption, this implies that $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$, a contradiction. It follows that $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{ORD}$. \square

This gives a way to do “strong induction” on the ordinals, but there is a slightly more basic version.

Definition 9.2.20. *Let α be an ordinal.*

- *We say that α is a successor ordinal if there exists an ordinal β with $\alpha = S(\beta)$.*
- *We say that α is a limit ordinal if $\alpha \neq 0$ and α is not a successor ordinal.*

Notice that α is a limit ordinal if and only if $\alpha \neq 0$, and whenever $\beta < \alpha$, we have $S(\beta) < \alpha$. For example, ω is a limit ordinal. In an inductive argument, we can’t get around looking at many previous values at limit ordinals, but we can by with just looking at the previous ordinal in the case of successors.

Proposition 9.2.21 (Step/Limit Induction on **ORD**). *Suppose that $\mathbf{C} \subseteq \mathbf{ORD}$ with the following properties:*

1. $0 \in \mathbf{C}$.
2. Whenever $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$, we have $S(\alpha) \in \mathbf{C}$.
3. Whenever α is a limit ordinal and $\beta \in \mathbf{C}$ for all $\beta < \alpha$, we have $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$.

We then have $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{ORD}$.

Proof. Suppose that $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{ORD}$. Let $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{ORD} \setminus \mathbf{C}$ and notice that \mathbf{B} is a nonempty class of ordinals. By Proposition 9.2.18, it follows that \mathbf{B} has a least element, call it α . We can’t have $\alpha = 0$ because $0 \in \mathbf{C}$. Also, it is not possible that α is a successor, say $\alpha = S(\beta)$, because if so, then $\beta \notin \mathbf{B}$ (because $\beta < \alpha$), so $\beta \in \mathbf{C}$, hence $\alpha = S(\beta) \in \mathbf{C}$. Finally, suppose that α is a limit. Then for all $\beta < \alpha$, we have $\beta \notin \mathbf{B}$, hence $\beta \in \mathbf{C}$. By assumption, this implies that $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$, a contradiction. It follows that $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{ORD}$. \square

Theorem 9.2.22 (Recursive Definitions on **ORD**). *Let $\mathbf{G} : \mathbf{V} \rightarrow \mathbf{V}$ be a class function. There exists a unique class function $\mathbf{F} : \mathbf{ORD} \rightarrow \mathbf{V}$ such that $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$ for all $\alpha \in \mathbf{ORD}$.*

Theorem 9.2.23 (Recursive Definitions with Parameters on **ORD**). *Let \mathbf{P} be a class and let $\mathbf{G} : \mathbf{P} \times \mathbf{V} \rightarrow \mathbf{V}$ be a class function. There exists a unique class function $\mathbf{F} : \mathbf{P} \times \mathbf{ORD} \rightarrow \mathbf{V}$ such that $\mathbf{F}(p, \alpha) = \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{F}_p \upharpoonright \alpha)$ for all $p \in \mathbf{P}$ and all $\alpha \in \mathbf{ORD}$.*

Theorem 9.2.24. *Let $(W, <)$ be a well-ordering. There exists a unique ordinal α such that $W \cong \alpha$.*

Proof. Fix a set a such that $a \notin W$ (such an a exists by Proposition 8.1.4). We define a class function $\mathbf{F} : \mathbf{ORD} \rightarrow W \cup \{a\}$ recursively as follows. If $a \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$ or $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha) = W$, let $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = a$. Otherwise, $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha) \subsetneq W$, and we let $\mathbf{F}(\alpha)$ be the least element of $W \setminus \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$.

Since **ORD** is a proper class, it follows from Proposition 8.3.5 that \mathbf{F} is not injective. From this it follows that $a \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F})$ (otherwise, a simple inductive proof gives that \mathbf{F} would have to be injective). Let α be the least ordinal such that $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = a$. Now it is straightforward to prove (along the lines of the proof of Theorem 9.1.12) that $\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha : \alpha \rightarrow W$ is an isomorphism.

Uniqueness follows from Proposition 9.2.13 \square

Definition 9.2.25. *Let $(W, <)$ be a well-ordering. The unique ordinal α such that $W \cong \alpha$ is called the order-type of $(W, <)$.*

9.3 Arithmetic on Ordinals

Now that we have the ability to define functions recursively on all of the ordinals, we can extend our definitions of addition, multiplication, and exponentiation of natural numbers into the transfinite.

Definition 9.3.1. We define ordinal addition (that is a class function $+: \mathbf{ORD} \times \mathbf{ORD} \rightarrow \mathbf{ORD}$) recursively as follows.

1. $\alpha + 0 = \alpha$.
2. $\alpha + S(\beta) = S(\alpha + \beta)$.
3. $\alpha + \beta = \bigcup \{\alpha + \gamma : \gamma < \beta\}$ if β is a limit ordinal.

Similarly, we define ordinal multiplication recursively as follows.

1. $\alpha \cdot 0 = 0$.
2. $\alpha \cdot S(\beta) = \alpha \cdot \beta + \alpha$.
3. $\alpha \cdot \beta = \bigcup \{\alpha \cdot \gamma : \gamma < \beta\}$ if β is a limit ordinal.

Finally, we define ordinal exponentiation recursively as follows.

1. $\alpha^0 = 1$.
2. $\alpha^{S(\beta)} = \alpha^\beta \cdot \alpha$.
3. $\alpha^\beta = \bigcup \{\alpha^\gamma : \gamma < \beta\}$ if β is a limit ordinal.

Notice that we have

$$\begin{aligned} \omega + 1 &= \omega + S(0) \\ &= S(\omega + 0) \\ &= S(\omega). \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, since ω is a limit ordinal and $+$ is commutative on ω (by the homework), we have

$$\begin{aligned} 1 + \omega &= \bigcup \{1 + n : n < \omega\} \\ &= \bigcup \{n + 1 : n < \omega\} \\ &= \bigcup \{n + S(0) : n < \omega\} \\ &= \bigcup \{S(n + 0) : n < \omega\} \\ &= \bigcup \{S(n) : n \in \omega\} \\ &= \omega. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we have $\omega + 1 \neq 1 + \omega$, and hence addition of ordinals is *not* commutative in general. Moreover, notice that even though we have $0 < 1$, we do not have $0 + \omega < 1 + \omega$ (because $0 + \omega = \omega$ as well. In other words, addition on the right does not preserve the strict ordering relation. In contrast, addition on the left does preserve the ordering, as we now show. We start with the non-strict version.

Proposition 9.3.2. Let α , β , and γ be ordinals. If $\beta \leq \gamma$, then $\alpha + \beta \leq \alpha + \gamma$.

Proof. Fix arbitrary ordinals α and β . We prove by induction on γ that if $\beta \leq \gamma$, then $\alpha + \beta \leq \alpha + \gamma$. For the base case, notice that the statement is trivial when $\gamma = \beta$. For the successor step, let $\gamma \geq \beta$ be arbitrary such that $\alpha + \beta \leq \alpha + \gamma$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha + \beta &\leq \alpha + \gamma \\ &< S(\alpha + \gamma) \\ &= \alpha + S(\gamma),\end{aligned}$$

so the statement is true for $S(\gamma)$. For the limit case, suppose that $\gamma > \beta$ is a limit ordinal with the property that $\alpha + \beta \leq \alpha + \delta$ whenever $\beta \leq \delta < \gamma$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha + \beta &\leq \bigcup \{\alpha + \delta : \delta < \gamma\} && (\text{since } \beta < \gamma) \\ &= \alpha + \gamma,\end{aligned}$$

so the statement is true for γ . The result follows by induction. \square

Proposition 9.3.3. *Let α , β , and γ be ordinals. We have $\beta < \gamma$ if and only if $\alpha + \beta < \alpha + \gamma$.*

Proof. Let α and β be arbitrary ordinals. Notice first that

$$\alpha + \beta < S(\alpha + \beta) = \alpha + S(\beta).$$

Now if γ is an arbitrary ordinal with $\gamma > \beta$, then we have $S(\beta) \leq \gamma$, hence

$$\alpha + \beta < \alpha + S(\beta) \leq \alpha + \gamma$$

by Proposition 9.3.2. Therefore, we have $\alpha + \beta < \alpha + \gamma$. For the converse, notice that if $\gamma < \beta$, then $\alpha + \gamma < \alpha + \beta$ by what we just proved. \square

Proposition 9.3.4. *Let α and β be ordinals. If β is a limit ordinal, then $\alpha + \beta$ is a limit ordinal.*

Proof. Since β is a limit ordinal, we have

$$\alpha + \beta = \bigcup \{\alpha + \gamma : \gamma < \beta\}.$$

Let $\delta < \alpha + \beta$ be an arbitrary ordinal. We show that $S(\delta) < \alpha + \beta$. We have

$$\delta < \bigcup \{\alpha + \gamma : \gamma < \beta\},$$

so by Proposition 9.2.16, we can fix $\gamma < \beta$ with $\delta < \alpha + \gamma$. Since β is a limit ordinal, we then have $S(\gamma) < \beta$, so

$$\begin{aligned}S(\delta) &\leq \alpha + \gamma \\ &< S(\alpha + \gamma) \\ &= \alpha + S(\gamma) \\ &\leq \alpha + \beta.\end{aligned}$$

It follows that $\alpha + \beta$ is a limit ordinal. \square

Proposition 9.3.5. *For all ordinals α , β , and γ , we have $(\alpha + \beta) + \gamma = \alpha + (\beta + \gamma)$.*

Proof. Fix ordinals α and β . We prove that $(\alpha + \beta) + \gamma = \alpha + (\beta + \gamma)$ for all ordinals γ by induction. Suppose first that $\gamma = 0$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} (\alpha + \beta) + 0 &= \alpha + \beta \\ &= \alpha + (\beta + 0). \end{aligned}$$

For the successor step, let γ be arbitrary such that $(\alpha + \beta) + \gamma = \alpha + (\beta + \gamma)$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} (\alpha + \beta) + S(\gamma) &= S((\alpha + \beta) + \gamma) \\ &= S(\alpha + (\beta + \gamma)) \\ &= \alpha + S(\beta + \gamma) \\ &= \alpha + (\beta + S(\gamma)). \end{aligned}$$

For the limit case, let γ be an arbitrary limit ordinal such that $(\alpha + \beta) + \delta = \alpha + (\beta + \delta)$ for all $\delta < \gamma$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} (\alpha + \beta) + \gamma &= \bigcup \{(\alpha + \beta) + \delta : \delta < \gamma\} \\ &= \bigcup \{\alpha + (\beta + \delta) : \delta < \gamma\} \\ &= \bigcup \{\alpha + \varepsilon : \beta \leq \varepsilon < \beta + \gamma\} \\ &= \bigcup \{\alpha + \varepsilon : \varepsilon < \beta + \gamma\} \\ &= \alpha + (\beta + \gamma), \end{aligned}$$

where the last line follows because $\beta + \gamma$ is a limit ordinal. \square

Our recursive definitions of ordinal arithmetic are elegant, but there's an easier way to visualize what they represent.

Proposition 9.3.6. *Let $(W_1, <_1)$ and $(W_2, <_2)$ be well-orderings.*

1. *Let $W = (W_1 \times \{0\}) \cup (W_2 \times \{1\})$, and define a relation $<$ on W as follows.*

- *For any $v, w \in W_1$, we have $(v, 0) < (w, 0)$ if and only if $v <_1 w$.*
- *For any $y, z \in W_2$, we have $(y, 1) < (z, 1)$ if and only if $y <_2 z$.*
- *For any $w \in W_1$ and $z \in W_2$, we have $(w, 0) < (z, 1)$.*

We then have that $(W, <)$ is well-ordering.

2. *Let $W = W_1 \times W_2$, and define a relation $<$ on W as follows. For any $v, w \in W_1$ and $y, z \in W_2$, we have $(v, y) < (w, z)$ if and only if either $v <_1 w$ or $(v = w \text{ and } y <_2 z)$. We then have that $(W, <)$ is a well-ordering.*

Proof. Exercise (see homework). \square

Definition 9.3.7. *Let $(W_1, <_1)$ and $(W_2, <_2)$ be well-orderings.*

1. *We call the ordering $(W, <)$ from (1) above the sum of W_1 and W_2 and denote it by $W_1 \oplus W_2$.*
2. *We call the ordering $(W, <)$ from (2) above the product of W_1 and W_2 and denote it by $W_1 \otimes W_2$.*

Theorem 9.3.8. *Let α and β be ordinals.*

1. *The well-ordering $\alpha \oplus \beta$ has order-type $\alpha + \beta$.*
2. *The well-ordering $\beta \otimes \alpha$ has order-type $\alpha \cdot \beta$.*

Proof. Exercise. \square

9.4 Cardinals

Definition 9.4.1. A cardinal is an ordinal α such that $\alpha \not\approx \beta$ for all $\beta < \alpha$.

Proposition 9.4.2. An ordinal α is a cardinal if and only if $\alpha \not\leq \beta$ for all $\beta < \alpha$.

Proof. For any $\beta < \alpha$, we trivially have $\beta \preceq \alpha$ because $\beta \subseteq \alpha$. Thus, the result is an immediate consequence of the Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein Theorem. \square

Proposition 9.4.3. Every $n \in \omega$ is a cardinal, and ω is a cardinal.

Proof. Every $n \in \omega$ is a cardinal by Corollary 8.4.4. Now consider ω . If there existed $n < \omega$ when $\omega \approx n$, then by restricting a witnessing bijection $g: \omega \rightarrow n$ to the domain $S(n)$, we would obtain an injective function from $S(n)$ to n , contrary to the Pigeonhole Principle. Therefore, ω is a cardinal. \square

Proposition 9.4.4. If κ is a cardinal with $\kappa \not\leq \omega$, then κ is a limit ordinal.

Proof. By the homework, we know that $S(\alpha) \approx \alpha$ whenever $\omega \leq \alpha$. Therefore, any successor ordinal greater than or equal to ω must be a limit ordinal. \square

Proposition 9.4.5. Let A be a set. There is an ordinal α such that $\alpha \not\leq A$.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{F} = \{(B, R) \in \mathcal{P}(A) \times \mathcal{P}(A \times A) : R \text{ is a well-ordering on } B\}$ be the set of all well-orderings and all subsets of A . By Collection and Separation, the set $T = \{\text{order-type}(B, R) : (B, R) \in \mathcal{F}\}$ is a set of ordinals. Let α be an ordinal such that $\alpha > \bigcup T$ (such an α exists because **ORD** is a proper class).

We claim that $\alpha \not\leq A$. Suppose instead that $f: \alpha \rightarrow A$ was injective. Let $B = \text{range}(f)$ and let R be the well-ordering on B obtained by transferring the ordering of α to B via the function f . We would then have that $(B, R) \in \mathcal{F}$ and (B, R) has order-type α , so $\alpha \in T$. This is a contradiction (because $\alpha > \bigcup T$), so $\alpha \not\leq A$. \square

For example, letting $A = \omega$, we conclude that there is an ordinal α such that $\alpha \not\leq \omega$. In particular, there exists an uncountable ordinal.

Definition 9.4.6. Let A be a set. The least ordinal α such that $\alpha \not\leq A$ is called the Hartogs number of A , and is denoted by $H(A)$.

Proposition 9.4.7. $H(A)$ is a cardinal for every set A .

Proof. Let A be a set and let $\alpha = H(A)$. Suppose that $\beta < \alpha$ and $\alpha \approx \beta$. Let $f: \alpha \rightarrow \beta$ be a bijection. Since $\beta < \alpha = H(A)$, there exists an injection $g: \beta \rightarrow A$. We then have that $g \circ f: \alpha \rightarrow A$ is an injection, contrary to the fact that $\alpha \not\leq A$. It follows that $\alpha \not\approx \beta$ for any $\beta < \alpha$, so $H(A) = \alpha$ is a cardinal. \square

Definition 9.4.8. If κ is a cardinal, we let $\kappa^+ = H(\kappa)$.

Definition 9.4.9. We define \aleph_α for $\alpha \in \mathbf{ORD}$ recursively as follows:

1. $\aleph_0 = \omega$.
2. $\aleph_{\alpha+1} = \aleph_\alpha^+$.
3. $\aleph_\alpha = \bigcup \{\aleph_\beta : \beta < \alpha\}$ if α is a limit ordinal.

The following proposition can be proven with a straightforward induction.

Proposition 9.4.10. Let α and β be ordinals.

1. $\alpha \leq \aleph_\alpha$.

2. If $\alpha < \beta$, then $\aleph_\alpha < \aleph_\beta$.

Proposition 9.4.11. *Let κ be an ordinal. κ is an infinite cardinal if and only if there exists $\alpha \in \mathbf{ORD}$ with $\kappa = \aleph_\alpha$.*

Proof. We first prove that \aleph_α is an infinite cardinal for all $\alpha \in \mathbf{ORD}$ by induction. Notice that $\aleph_0 = \omega$ is a cardinal by Proposition 9.4.3. Also, if \aleph_α is a cardinal, then $\aleph_{\alpha+1} = \aleph_\alpha^+ = H(\aleph_\alpha)$ is a cardinal by Proposition 9.4.7. Suppose then that α is a limit ordinal and that \aleph_β is a cardinal for all $\beta < \alpha$. Notice that \aleph_α is an ordinal by Proposition 9.2.16. Let $\gamma < \aleph_\alpha$ be arbitrary. Since $\gamma < \aleph_\alpha = \bigcup \{\aleph_\beta : \beta < \alpha\}$, there exists $\beta < \alpha$ such that $\gamma < \aleph_\beta$. Since \aleph_β is a cardinal, we know that $\aleph_\beta \not\leq \gamma$. Now we also have $\aleph_\beta \leq \aleph_\alpha$, so $\aleph_\beta \subseteq \aleph_\alpha$, from which we can conclude that $\aleph_\alpha \not\leq \gamma$. Therefore $\aleph_\alpha \not\approx \gamma$ for any $\gamma < \aleph_\alpha$, hence \aleph_α is a cardinal.

Conversely, let κ be an arbitrary infinite cardinal. By Proposition 9.4.10, we have $\kappa \leq \aleph_\kappa$. If $\kappa = \aleph_\kappa$, we are done. Suppose then that $\kappa < \aleph_\kappa$ let α be the least ordinal such that $\kappa < \aleph_\alpha$. Notice that $\alpha \neq 0$ because κ is infinite, and also α can not be a limit ordinal (otherwise, $\kappa < \aleph_\beta$ for some $\beta < \alpha$). Thus, there exists β such that $\alpha = S(\beta)$. By choice of α , we have $\aleph_\beta \leq \kappa$. If $\aleph_\beta < \kappa$, then $\aleph_\beta < \kappa < \aleph_{S(\beta)} = H(\aleph_\beta)$, contradicting the definition of $H(\aleph_\beta)$. It follows that $\kappa = \aleph_\beta$. \square

Proposition 9.4.12. *Let A be a set. The following are equivalent:*

1. There exists an ordinal α such that $A \approx \alpha$.
2. A can be well-ordered.

Proof. Suppose first that there exists an ordinal α such that $A \approx \alpha$. We use a bijection between A and α to transfer the ordering on the ordinals to an ordering on A . Let $f: A \rightarrow \alpha$ be a bijection. Define a relation $<$ on A by letting $a < b$ if and only if $f(a) < f(b)$. It is then straightforward to check that $(A, <)$ is a well-ordering (using the fact that (α, \in_α) is a well-ordering).

For the converse direction, suppose that A can be well-ordered. Fix a relation $<$ on A so that $(A, <)$ is a well-ordering. By Theorem 9.2.24, there is an ordinal α such that $A \cong \alpha$. In particular, we have $A \approx \alpha$. \square

Of course, this leaves open the question of which sets can be well-ordered. Below, we will use the Axiom of Choice to show that every set can be well-ordered.

Definition 9.4.13. *Let A be a set which can be well-ordered. We define $|A|$ to be the least ordinal α such that $A \approx \alpha$.*

Proposition 9.4.14. *If A can be well-ordered, then $|A|$ is a cardinal.*

Proof. Suppose that A can be well-ordered, and let $\alpha = |A|$. Let $\beta < \alpha$ be arbitrary. If $\alpha \approx \beta$, then by composing a bijection from $f: A \rightarrow \alpha$ with a bijection $g: \alpha \rightarrow \beta$, we would obtain a bijection from A to β , contradicting the definition of $|A|$. Therefore, $\alpha \not\approx \beta$ for all $\beta < \alpha$, and hence α is a cardinal. \square

9.5 Addition and Multiplication Of Cardinals

Given ordinals α and β , we defined the ordinal sum $\alpha + \beta$ and the ordinal product $\alpha \cdot \beta$. Since ordinals are measures of “lengths” of well-orderings, these recursive definitions reflected the “length” of the sum/product of the two well-orderings. In contrast, cardinals are raw measures of “number of elements”, not of a length of an ordering of the elements. We now define different notions of *cardinal* addition and multiplication. Let κ and λ be cardinals. Since both $(\kappa \times \{0\}) \cup (\lambda \times \{1\})$ and $\kappa \times \lambda$ can be well-ordered by Proposition 9.3.6, we can make the following definition.

Definition 9.5.1. *Let κ and λ be cardinals. We define the following:*

1. $\kappa + \lambda = |(\kappa \times \{0\}) \cup (\lambda \times \{1\})|.$
2. $\kappa \cdot \lambda = |\kappa \times \lambda|.$

Proposition 9.5.2. *Let κ and λ be cardinals.*

1. $\kappa + \lambda = \lambda + \kappa.$
2. $\kappa \cdot \lambda = \lambda \cdot \kappa.$

Proof. Notice that there is a natural bijection between $(\kappa \times \{0\}) \cup (\lambda \times \{1\})$ and $(\lambda \times \{0\}) \cup (\kappa \times \{1\})$, and there is also a natural bijection between $\kappa \times \lambda$ and $\lambda \times \kappa$. \square

Lemma 9.5.3. *Let A_1, A_2, B_1, B_2 be sets with $A_1 \approx A_2$ and $B_1 \approx B_2$.*

1. $(A_1 \times \{0\}) \cup (B_1 \times \{1\}) \approx (A_2 \times \{0\}) \cup (B_2 \times \{1\}).$
2. $A_1 \times B_1 \approx A_2 \times B_2.$

Proof. Exercise. \square

The definition of cardinal addition and multiplication is natural, but it is not obvious how to compute many values. Notice that $\aleph_0 + \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$ because $(\aleph_0 \times \{0\}) \cup (\aleph_0 \times \{1\})$ is countable (as the union of two countable sets is countable). Similarly, we have $\aleph_0 \cdot \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$ because $\aleph_0 \times \aleph_0$ is countable (as the Cartesian product of two countable sets is countable). However, what is $\aleph_1 \cdot \aleph_1$? The key to answering this, and related, questions is the following important ordering on pairs of ordinals.

Definition 9.5.4. *We define an ordering $<$ on $\mathbf{ORD} \times \mathbf{ORD}$ as follows. Let $\alpha_1, \beta_1, \alpha_2, \beta_2$ be ordinals. We set $(\alpha_1, \beta_1) < (\alpha_2, \beta_2)$ if one of the following holds.*

1. $\max\{\alpha_1, \beta_1\} < \max\{\alpha_2, \beta_2\}.$
2. $\max\{\alpha_1, \beta_1\} = \max\{\alpha_2, \beta_2\}$ and $\alpha_1 < \alpha_2.$
3. $\max\{\alpha_1, \beta_1\} = \max\{\alpha_2, \beta_2\}, \alpha_1 = \alpha_2,$ and $\beta_1 < \beta_2.$

Although this ordering looks strange at first, it fixes several issues with more natural orderings. For example, suppose that we try to order $\mathbf{ORD} \times \mathbf{ORD}$ lexicographically. We could then have that $(0, \alpha) <_{lex} (1, 0)$ for *all* ordinals α , so the class of elements less than $(1, 0)$ is actually a proper class. In contrast, notice that given any $(\alpha, \beta) \in \mathbf{ORD} \times \mathbf{ORD}$, the class

$$\{(\gamma, \delta) \in \mathbf{ORD} \times \mathbf{ORD} : (\gamma, \delta) < (\alpha, \beta)\}$$

is a set, since it is contained in the set $(\max\{\alpha, \beta\} + 1) \times (\max\{\alpha, \beta\} + 1)$. Our ordering is a kind of “graded lexicographic ordering” in that we first order by some kind of “size” (given by the max of the entries), and then order lexicographically inside each “size”.

Lemma 9.5.5. *$<$ is a well-ordering on $\mathbf{ORD} \times \mathbf{ORD}$.*

Proof. Transitivity, asymmetry, and connectedness are easily shown by appealing to the transitivity, asymmetry, and connectedness of the ordering on \mathbf{ORD} . Let \mathbf{C} be a nonempty subclass of $\mathbf{ORD} \times \mathbf{ORD}$. Notice that $\mathbf{D} = \{\max\{\alpha, \beta\} : (\alpha, \beta) \in \mathbf{C}\}$ is a nonempty subclass of \mathbf{ORD} , hence has a least element δ by Proposition 9.2.18. Now let $A = \{\alpha \in \delta : (\alpha, \delta) \in \mathbf{C}\}.$

Suppose first that $A \neq \emptyset$, and let α_0 be the least element of A (which exists by Proposition 9.2.15). Let $(\alpha, \beta) \in \mathbf{C}$ be arbitrary. Notice that if $\max\{\alpha, \beta\} > \delta$, we then have $(\alpha_0, \delta) < (\alpha, \beta)$. Suppose then that

$\max\{\alpha, \beta\} = \delta$. If $\alpha = \delta$, we then have $(\alpha_0, \delta) < (\alpha, \beta)$ because $\alpha_0 < \delta$. If $\alpha \neq \delta$ and $\beta = \delta$, we then have $\alpha_0 \leq \alpha$ by choice of α_0 , hence $(\alpha_0, \delta) \leq (\alpha, \beta)$.

Suppose now that $A = \emptyset$. Let $B = \{\beta \in S(\delta) : (\delta, \beta) \in \mathbf{C}\}$ and notice that $B \neq \emptyset$. Let β_0 be the least element of B (which exists by Proposition 9.2.15). Let $(\alpha, \beta) \in \mathbf{C}$. Notice that if $\max\{\alpha, \beta\} > \delta$, we then have $(\delta, \beta_0) < (\alpha, \beta)$. Suppose then that $\max\{\alpha, \beta\} = \delta$. Notice that we must have $\alpha = \delta$ because $A = \emptyset$. It follows that $\beta_0 \leq \beta$ by choice of β_0 , hence $(\delta, \beta_0) \leq (\alpha, \beta)$. \square

Theorem 9.5.6. *For all $\alpha \in \mathbf{ORD}$, we have $\aleph_\alpha \cdot \aleph_\alpha = \aleph_\alpha$.*

Proof. The proof is by induction on $\alpha \in \mathbf{ORD}$. Suppose α is an ordinal and that $\aleph_\beta \cdot \aleph_\beta = \aleph_\beta$ for all $\beta < \alpha$. Notice that if we restrict the $<$ relation on $\mathbf{ORD} \times \mathbf{ORD}$ to $\aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha$, we still get a well-ordering. Given $(\gamma, \delta) \in \aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha$, we let

$$P_{\gamma, \delta} = \{(\theta_1, \theta_2) \in \aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha : (\theta_1, \theta_2) < (\gamma, \delta)\}.$$

Let $(\gamma, \delta) \in \aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha$ be arbitrary. We claim that $|P_{\gamma, \delta}| < \aleph_\alpha$. To see this, let $\varepsilon = \max\{\gamma, \delta\} + 1$. Now \aleph_α is an infinite cardinal by Proposition 9.4.11, so we know that \aleph_α is a limit ordinal by Proposition 9.4.4. Since $\gamma, \delta < \aleph_\alpha$, it follows that $\varepsilon < \aleph_\alpha$ and hence $|\varepsilon| < \aleph_\alpha$. Now if ε is finite, then $P_{\gamma, \delta}$ is finite, and hence $|P_{\gamma, \delta}| < \aleph_\alpha$ trivially. Otherwise, ε is infinite, and so we can fix $\beta < \alpha$ such that $|\varepsilon| = \aleph_\beta$. We then have $P_{\gamma, \delta} \subseteq \varepsilon \times \varepsilon \approx \aleph_\beta \times \aleph_\beta \approx \aleph_\beta$, by induction, so $|P_{\gamma, \delta}| \leq \aleph_\beta < \aleph_\alpha$. Therefore, $|P_{\gamma, \delta}| < \aleph_\alpha$ for every $(\gamma, \delta) \in \aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha$.

Since $\aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha$ is well-ordered by $<$, it follows from Theorem 9.2.24 that $\aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha \cong \theta$ for some ordinal θ . Let $f: \aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha \rightarrow \theta$ be a witnessing isomorphism. Then f is injective, so we must have $\aleph_\alpha \preceq \theta$, and hence $\aleph_\alpha \leq \theta$. Suppose that $\aleph_\alpha < \theta$. Since f is an isomorphism, there exists $(\gamma, \delta) \in \aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha$ such that $f((\gamma, \delta)) = \aleph_\alpha$. We then have $|P_{\gamma, \delta}| = \aleph_\alpha$, a contradiction. It follows that $\theta = \aleph_\alpha$, so f witnesses that $\aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha \approx \aleph_\alpha$. Hence $\aleph_\alpha \cdot \aleph_\alpha = \aleph_\alpha$. \square

Corollary 9.5.7. *Suppose that κ and λ are cardinals, $1 \leq \kappa \leq \lambda$, and $\lambda \geq \aleph_0$. We then have*

$$1. \quad \kappa + \lambda = \lambda = \lambda + \kappa.$$

$$2. \quad \kappa \cdot \lambda = \lambda = \lambda \cdot \kappa.$$

Proof. By Proposition 9.4.11, we can fix α such that $\lambda = \aleph_\alpha$. Notice that

$$\kappa \cdot \lambda \leq \lambda \cdot \lambda = \aleph_\alpha \cdot \aleph_\alpha = \aleph_\alpha = \lambda.$$

Since we clearly have $\lambda \leq \kappa \cdot \lambda$, it follows that $\kappa \cdot \lambda = \lambda$. Also, notice that

$$\kappa + \lambda \leq \lambda + \lambda = 2 \cdot \lambda = \lambda,$$

where the last line follows from what we just proved. Since we clearly have $\lambda \leq \kappa + \lambda$, it follows that $\kappa + \lambda = \lambda$. \square

Chapter 10

The Axiom Of Choice

10.1 The Axiom of Choice in Mathematics

Definition 10.1.1. Let \mathcal{F} be a family of nonempty sets. A choice function on \mathcal{F} is a function $h: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \bigcup \mathcal{F}$ such that $h(A) \in A$ for all $A \in \mathcal{F}$.

Proposition 10.1.2. The following are equivalent (over ZF).

1. The Axiom of Choice: If \mathcal{F} is a family of nonempty pairwise disjoint sets, then there is a set C such that $C \cap A$ has a unique element for every $A \in \mathcal{F}$.
2. Every family \mathcal{F} of nonempty sets has a choice function.
3. Every family \mathcal{F} of nonempty pairwise disjoint sets has a choice function.

Proof. • 1 implies 2: Let \mathcal{F} be a family of nonempty sets. Let $\mathcal{G} = \{\{A\} \times A : A \in \mathcal{F}\}$, and notice that \mathcal{G} is a set by Collection and Separation. Furthermore, \mathcal{G} is a family of nonempty pairwise disjoint sets. By 1, there is a set C such that there is unique element of $C \cap B$ for every $B \in \mathcal{G}$. By Separation, we may assume that $C \subseteq \bigcup \mathcal{G}$. Letting $h = C$, it now follows that $h: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \bigcup \mathcal{F}$ and $h(A) \in A$ for every $A \in \mathcal{F}$. Therefore, \mathcal{F} has a choice function.

- 2 implies 3: Trivial.
- 3 implies 1: Let \mathcal{F} be a family of nonempty pairwise disjoint sets. By 3, there is choice function h for \mathcal{F} . Let $C = \text{range}(h)$ and notice that there is a unique element of $C \cap A$ for every $A \in \mathcal{F}$ (because the sets in \mathcal{F} are pairwise disjoint).

□

Here are some examples where the Axiom of Choice is implicitly used in mathematics.

Proposition 10.1.3. If $f: A \rightarrow B$ is a surjective, there exists an injective $g: B \rightarrow A$ such that $f \circ g = \text{id}_B$.

The idea of constructing such a g is to let $g(b)$ be an arbitrary $a \in A$ such that $f(a) = b$. When you think about it, there doesn't seem to be a way to define g without making all of these arbitrary choices.

Proof. Define a function $H: B \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(A)$ by letting $H(b) = \{a \in A : f(a) = b\}$. Notice that $H(b) \neq \emptyset$ for every $b \in B$ because f is surjective. Let $h: \mathcal{P}(A) \setminus \{\emptyset\} \rightarrow A$ be a choice function, so $h(D) \in D$ for every

$D \in \mathcal{P}(A) \setminus \{\emptyset\}$. Set $g = h \circ H$ and notice that $g: B \rightarrow A$. We first show that $(f \circ g)(b) = b$ for every $b \in B$. Let $b \in B$ be arbitrary. Since $h(H(b)) \in H(b)$, it follows that $f(h(H(b))) = b$, hence

$$\begin{aligned} (f \circ g)(b) &= f(g(b)) \\ &= f(h(H(b))) \\ &= b. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $f \circ g$ is the identity function on B . We finally show that g is injective. Let $b_1, b_2 \in B$ be arbitrary with $g(b_1) = g(b_2)$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} b_1 &= (f \circ g)(b_1) \\ &= f(g(b_1)) \\ &= f(g(b_2)) \\ &= (f \circ g)(b_2) \\ &= b_2. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, g is injective. □

Proposition 10.1.4. *If $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $y \in \mathbb{R}$, then f is continuous at y if and only if for every sequence $\{x_n\}_{n \in \omega}$ with $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x_n = y$, we have $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} f(x_n) = f(y)$.*

The standard proof of the left-to-right direction makes no use of the Axiom of Choice. For the right-to-left direction, the argument is as follows. Suppose that f is not continuous at y , and fix $\varepsilon > 0$ such that there is no $\delta > 0$ such that whenever $|x - y| < \delta$, we have $|f(x) - f(y)| < \varepsilon$. We define a sequence as follows. Given $n \in \omega$, let x_n be an arbitrary real number with $|x_n - y| < \frac{1}{n}$ such that $|f(x_n) - f(y)| \geq \varepsilon$. Again, we're making infinitely many arbitrary choices in the construction.

Proof. Suppose that f is not continuous at y , and fix $\varepsilon > 0$ such that there is no $\delta > 0$ such that whenever $|x - y| < \delta$, we have $|f(x) - f(y)| < \varepsilon$. Define a function $H: \mathbb{R}^+ \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R})$ by letting $H(\delta) = \{x \in \mathbb{R} : |x - y| < \delta \text{ and } |f(x) - f(y)| \geq \varepsilon\}$. Notice that $H(\delta) \neq \emptyset$ for every $\delta \in \mathbb{R}^+$ by assumption. Let $h: \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R}) \setminus \{\emptyset\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a choice function. For each $n \in \omega$, let $x_n = h(H(\frac{1}{n}))$. One then easily checks that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x_n = y$ but it's not the case that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} f(x_n) = f(y)$. □

Another example is the proof is the countable union of countable sets is countable. Let $\{A_n\}_{n \in \omega}$ be countable sets. The first step is to fix injections $f_n: A_n \rightarrow \omega$ for each $n \in \omega$ and then build an injection $f: \bigcup_{n \in \omega} A_n \rightarrow \omega$ from these. However, we are again making infinitely many arbitrary choices when we fix the injections. We'll prove a generalization of this fact using the Axiom of Choice below.

Example. Let $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{P}(\omega) \setminus \{0\}$. Notice that $\bigcup \mathcal{F} = \omega$. We can prove the existence of a choice function for \mathcal{F} without the Axiom of Choice as follows. Define $g: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \omega$ by letting $g(A)$ be the $<$ -least element of A for every $A \in \mathcal{P}(\omega) \setminus \{0\}$. More formally, we define $g = \{(A, a) \in \mathcal{F} \times \omega : a \in A \text{ and } a \leq b \text{ for all } b \in A\}$ and prove that g is a choice function on \mathcal{F} . □

Proposition 10.1.5. *Without the Axiom of Choice, one can prove that if \mathcal{F} is a family of nonempty sets and \mathcal{F} is finite, then \mathcal{F} has a choice function.*

10.2 Equivalents of the Axiom of Choice

Theorem 10.2.1 (Zermelo). *The following are equivalent:*

1. *The Axiom of Choice.*
2. *Every set can be well-ordered.*

Proof. 2 implies 1: We show that every family of nonempty sets has a choice function. Let \mathcal{F} be a family of nonempty sets. By 2, we can fix a well-ordering $<$ of $\bigcup \mathcal{F}$. Define $g: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \bigcup \mathcal{F}$ by letting $g(A)$ be the $<$ -least element of A . Notice that g is a choice function on \mathcal{F} .

1 implies 2: Let A be a set. It suffices to show that there is an ordinal α such that $\alpha \approx A$. Our goal is to define a class function $\mathbf{F}: \mathbf{ORD} \rightarrow A$ recursively. First, let $g: \mathcal{P}(A) \setminus \{\emptyset\} \rightarrow A$ be a choice function. Fix $x \notin A$. We now define \mathbf{F} as follows. If $x \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$ or $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha) = A$, let $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = x$. Otherwise, $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha) \subsetneq A$, and we let $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = g(A \setminus \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha))$. Since A is a set and \mathbf{ORD} is a proper class, we know that \mathbf{F} is not injective. It follows that we must have $x \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F})$ (otherwise, a simple induction shows that \mathbf{F} is injective). Let α be the least ordinal such that $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = x$. A straightforward induction now shows that $\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha: \alpha \rightarrow A$ is injective, and we notice that it is surjective because $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = x$. It follows that $A \approx \alpha$. \square

Definition 10.2.2. *Zorn's Lemma is the statement that if $(P, <)$ is nonempty partially ordered set with the property that each chain in P has an upper bound in P , then P has a maximal element.*

Theorem 10.2.3. *The following are equivalent.*

1. *The Axiom of Choice.*
2. *Zorn's Lemma.*

Proof. 1 implies 2: Let $(P, <)$ be nonempty partially ordered set with the property that each chain in P has an upper bound in P . Let $g: \mathcal{P}(P) \setminus \{\emptyset\} \rightarrow P$ be a choice function. Fix $x \notin P$. We define a class function $\mathbf{F}: \mathbf{ORD} \rightarrow P$ recursively as follows. If $x \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$, let $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = x$. Also, if $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha) \subseteq A$ and there is no $q \in P$ such that $q > p$ for every $p \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$, let $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = x$. Otherwise, $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha) \subseteq A$ and $\{q \in P : q > p \text{ for every } p \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)\} \neq \emptyset$, and we let $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = g(\{q \in P : q > p \text{ for every } p \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)\})$. We know that \mathbf{F} can not be injective, so as above we must have $x \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F})$. Fix the least ordinal α such that $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) = x$. A straightforward induction shows that $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$ is injective and that $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$ is a chain in P .

Notice that $\alpha \neq 0$ because $P \neq \emptyset$. Suppose that α is a limit ordinal. Since $\text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$ is a chain in P , we know by assumption that there exists $q \in P$ with $q \geq p$ for all $p \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$. Notice that we can not have $q = \mathbf{F}(\beta)$ for any $\beta < \alpha$ because we would then have $\beta + 1 < \alpha$ (because α is a limit ordinal) and $q < \mathbf{F}(\beta + 1)$ by definition of \mathbf{F} , contrary to the fact that $q \geq p$ for all $p \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$. It follows that $q > p$ for all $p \in \text{range}(\mathbf{F} \upharpoonright \alpha)$, hence $\mathbf{F}(\alpha) \neq x$, a contradiction. It follows that α is a successor ordinal, say $\alpha = S(\beta)$. Since $\mathbf{F}(\beta) \neq x$ and $\mathbf{F}(S(\beta)) = x$, it follows that $\mathbf{F}(\beta)$ is a maximal element of P .

2 implies 1: Let \mathcal{F} be a family of nonempty sets. We use Zorn's Lemma to show that \mathcal{F} has a choice function. Let $P = \{q : q \text{ is a function, } \text{domain}(q) \subseteq \mathcal{F}, \text{ and } q(A) \in A \text{ for every } A \in \text{domain}(q)\}$. Given $p, q \in P$, we let $p < q$ if and only if $p \subsetneq q$. It is easy to check that $(P, <)$ is a partial ordering. Notice that $P \neq \emptyset$ because $\emptyset \in P$. Also, if H is a chain in P , then $\bigcup H \in P$, and $p \leq \bigcup H$ for all $p \in H$. It follows that every chain in P has an upper bound in P . By Zorn's Lemma, P has a maximal element which we call g . We need only show that $\text{domain}(g) = \mathcal{F}$. Suppose instead that $\text{domain}(g) \subsetneq \mathcal{F}$, and fix $A \in \mathcal{F} \setminus \text{domain}(g)$. Fix $a \in A$. We then have $g \cup \{(A, a)\} \in P$ and $g < g \cup \{(A, a)\}$, a contradiction. It follows that $\text{domain}(g) = \mathcal{F}$, so g is a choice function on \mathcal{F} . \square

Definition 10.2.4. Let V be a vector space over a field F , and let $S \subseteq V$. We define

$$\text{Span}_F(S) = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i w_i : n \in \mathbb{N}, \lambda_i \in F, w_i \in S \right\}.$$

In other words, $\text{Span}_F(S)$ is the set of all finite linearly combinations of elements of S .

Definition 10.2.5. Let V be a vector space over a field F , and let $S \subseteq V$.

- We say that S is linearly independent if for all distinct $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n \in S$ and all $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n \in F$ with $\lambda_1 w_1 + \lambda_2 w_2 + \dots + \lambda_n w_n = 0$, we have $\lambda_i = 0$ for all i .
- We say that S is a basis of V if S is linearly independent and $\text{Span}_F(S) = V$.

Proposition 10.2.6. Let S be a linearly independent subset of V , and let $v \in V \setminus S$. The following are equivalent:

1. $v \notin \text{Span}_F(S)$.
2. $S \cup \{v\}$ is linearly independent.

Proof. We prove the contrapositive of each direction. Suppose first that $v \in \text{Span}_F(S)$. Fix distinct $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n \in S$ and all $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n \in F$ with $\lambda_1 w_1 + \lambda_2 w_2 + \dots + \lambda_n w_n = v$. We then have $(-1)v + \lambda_1 w_1 + \lambda_2 w_2 + \dots + \lambda_n w_n = 0$, so since $-1 \neq 0$, we conclude that $S \cup \{v\}$ is linearly dependent.

Conversely, suppose that $S \cup \{v\}$ is linearly dependent. Fix $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n \in V$, and $\mu, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n \in F$, at least one of which is nonzero, with $\mu v + \lambda_1 w_1 + \lambda_2 w_2 + \dots + \lambda_n w_n = 0$. Since S is linearly independent, we must have $\mu \neq 0$. We then have

$$v = \left(\frac{-\lambda_1}{\mu} \right) w_1 + \left(\frac{-\lambda_2}{\mu} \right) w_2 + \dots + \left(\frac{-\lambda_n}{\mu} \right) w_n,$$

so $v \in \text{Span}_F(S)$. □

Theorem 10.2.7. If V is a vector space over F , then there exists a basis of V .

Proof. The key fact is that if \mathcal{G} is a set of linearly independent subsets of V that is linearly ordered by \subseteq (i.e. for all $S_1, S_2 \in \mathcal{G}$, either $S_1 \subseteq S_2$ or $S_2 \subseteq S_1$), then $\bigcup \mathcal{G}$ is linearly independent. To see this, let $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n \in \bigcup \mathcal{G}$ and $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n \in F$ be arbitrary with $\lambda_1 w_1 + \lambda_2 w_2 + \dots + \lambda_n w_n = 0$. For each i , fix $S_i \in \mathcal{G}$ with $w_i \in S_i$. Now the set \mathcal{G} is linearly ordered with respect to \subseteq , so we can fix k with $1 \leq k \leq n$ such that $S_i \subseteq S_k$ for all i . We then have $w_i \in S_k$ for all i , so since S_k is linearly independent and $\lambda_1 w_1 + \lambda_2 w_2 + \dots + \lambda_n w_n = 0$, we conclude that $\lambda_i = 0$ for all i . Therefore, $\bigcup \mathcal{G}$ is linearly independent.

We now apply either Zorn's Lemma on the set of linearly independent subsets of V ordered by inclusion, or use transfinite induction (taking unions of limit ordinals), to obtain a linearly independent set S that can not be extended to another linearly independent set. Using Proposition 10.2.6, we conclude that $\text{Span}_F(S) = V$. Therefore, S is a basis for V . □

10.3 The Axiom of Choice and Cardinal Arithmetic

Once we adopt the Axiom of Choice, it follows that every set can be well-ordered. Therefore, $|A|$ is defined for every set A .

Proposition 10.3.1. Let A and B be sets.

1. $A \preceq B$ if and only if $|A| \leq |B|$.

2. $A \approx B$ if and only if $|A| = |B|$.

Proof.

1. Suppose first that $|A| \leq |B|$. Let $\kappa = |A|$ and let $\lambda = |B|$, and fix bijections $f: A \rightarrow \kappa$ and $g: \lambda \rightarrow B$. Since $\kappa \leq \lambda$, we have $\kappa \subseteq \lambda$ and so we may consider $g \circ f: A \rightarrow B$. One easily checks that this is an injective function, so $A \preceq B$.

Suppose now that $A \preceq B$, and fix an injection $h: A \rightarrow B$. Let $\kappa = |A|$ and let $\lambda = |B|$, and fix bijections $f: \kappa \rightarrow A$ and $g: B \rightarrow \lambda$. We then have that $g \circ h \circ f: \kappa \rightarrow \lambda$ is injective, so $\kappa \preceq \lambda$. Since κ is cardinal, we know from Proposition 9.4.2 that $\lambda \not\prec \kappa$, so $\kappa \leq \lambda$.

2. Suppose first that $A \approx B$. We then have that $|A| \leq |B|$ and $|B| \leq |A|$ by part 1, hence $|A| = |B|$.

Suppose now that $|A| = |B|$. Let κ be this common value, and fix bijections $f: A \rightarrow \kappa$ and $g: \kappa \rightarrow B$. We then have that $g \circ f: A \rightarrow B$ is a bijection, so $A \approx B$.

□

Proposition 10.3.2. $|A \times A| = |A|$ for every infinite set A .

Proof. Since A is infinite, we can fix an ordinal α with $|A| = \aleph_\alpha$ by Proposition 9.4.11. We then have $A \times A \approx \aleph_\alpha \times \aleph_\alpha \approx \aleph_\alpha$ by Theorem 9.5.6, so $|A \times A| = \aleph_\alpha$. □

Proposition 10.3.3. Let \mathcal{F} be a family of sets. Suppose that $|\mathcal{F}| \leq \kappa$ and that $|A| \leq \lambda$ for every $A \in \mathcal{F}$. We then have $|\bigcup \mathcal{F}| \leq \kappa \cdot \lambda$.

Proof. Let $\mu = |\mathcal{F}|$ (notice that $\mu \leq \kappa$), and fix a bijection $f: \mu \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$. Also, for each $A \in \mathcal{F}$, fix an injection $g_A: A \rightarrow \lambda$ (using the Axiom of Choice). Define a function $h: \bigcup \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \kappa \times \lambda$ as follows. Given $b \in \bigcup \mathcal{F}$, let α be the least ordinal such that $b \in f(\alpha)$, and set $h(b) = (\alpha, g_{f(\alpha)}(b))$.

We claim that h is injective. Let $b_1, b_2 \in \bigcup \mathcal{F}$ be arbitrary with $h(b_1) = h(b_2)$. Let α_1 be the least ordinal such that $b_1 \in f(\alpha_1)$ and let α_2 be the least ordinal such that $b_2 \in f(\alpha_2)$. Since $h(b_1) = h(b_2)$, it follows that $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$, and we call their common value α . Therefore, using the fact that $h(b_1) = h(b_2)$ again, we conclude that $g_{f(\alpha)}(b_1) = g_{f(\alpha)}(b_2)$. Since $g_{f(\alpha)}$ is an injection, it follows that $b_1 = b_2$. Hence, $h: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \kappa \times \lambda$ is injective, so we may conclude that $|\mathcal{F}| \leq \kappa \cdot \lambda$. □

Proposition 10.3.4. $|A^{<\omega}| = |A|$ for every infinite set A .

Proof. Using Proposition 10.3.2 and induction (on ω), it follows that $|A^n| = |A|$ for every $n \in \omega$ with $n \geq 1$. Since $A^{<\omega} = \bigcup \{A^n : n \in \omega\}$, we may use Proposition 10.3.3 to conclude that $|A^{<\omega}| \leq \aleph_0 \cdot |A| = |A|$. We clearly have $|A| \leq |A^{<\omega}|$, hence $|A^{<\omega}| = |A|$. □

Definition 10.3.5. Let A and B be sets. We let A^B be the set of all functions from B to A .

Proposition 10.3.6. Let A_1, A_2, B_1, B_2 be sets with $A_1 \approx A_2$ and $B_1 \approx B_2$. We then have $A_1^{B_1} \approx A_2^{B_2}$.

Proof. Exercise. □

Now that we've adopted the Axiom of Choice, we know that A^B can be well-ordered for any sets A and B , so it makes sense to talk about $|A^B|$. This gives us a way to define cardinal exponentiation.

Definition 10.3.7. Let κ and λ be cardinals. We use κ^λ to also denote the cardinality of the set κ^λ . (So, we're using the same notation κ^λ to denote both the set of functions from λ to κ and also its cardinality).

Proposition 10.3.8. Let κ, λ , and μ be cardinals.

1. $\kappa^{\lambda+\mu} = \kappa^\lambda \cdot \kappa^\mu$.

$$2. \kappa^{\lambda \cdot \mu} = (\kappa^\lambda)^\mu.$$

$$3. (\kappa \cdot \lambda)^\mu = \kappa^\mu \cdot \lambda^\mu.$$

Proof. Fix sets A, B, C such that $|A| = \kappa$, $|B| = \lambda$, and $|C| = \mu$ (we could just use κ, λ , and μ , but it's easier to distinguish sets from cardinals).

1. It suffices to find a bijection $F: A^{B \times \{0\} \cup C \times \{1\}} \rightarrow A^B \times A^C$. We define F as follows. Given $f: B \times \{0\} \cup C \times \{1\} \rightarrow A$, let $F(f) = (g, h)$ where $g: B \rightarrow A$ is given by $g(b) = f((b, 0))$ and $h: C \rightarrow A$ is given by $h(c) = f((c, 1))$.
2. It suffices to find a bijection $F: (A^B)^C \rightarrow A^{B \times C}$. We define F as follows. Given $f: C \rightarrow A^B$, let $F(f): B \times C \rightarrow A$ be the function defined by $F(f)((b, c)) = f(c)(b)$ for all $b \in B$ and $c \in C$.
3. It suffices to find a bijection $F: A^C \times B^C \rightarrow (A \times B)^C$. We define F as follows. Given $g: C \rightarrow A$ and $h: C \rightarrow B$, let $F((g, h)): C \rightarrow A \times B$ be the function defined by $F((g, h))(c) = (g(c), h(c))$ for all $c \in C$.

In each case, it is straightforward to check the given F is indeed a bijection. □

Proposition 10.3.9. $2^\kappa = |\mathcal{P}(\kappa)|$ for all cardinals κ .

Proof. Let κ be an arbitrary cardinal. We define a function $F: 2^\kappa \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\kappa)$ as follows. Given $f: \kappa \rightarrow 2$, let $F(f) = \{\alpha \in \kappa : f(\alpha) = 1\}$. We then have that F is a bijection, hence $2^\kappa = |\mathcal{P}(\kappa)|$. □

Corollary 10.3.10. $\kappa < 2^\kappa$ for all cardinals κ .

Proof. We know that $\kappa < \mathcal{P}(\kappa)$ from Theorem 8.6.6. □

Proposition 10.3.11. If $2 \leq \lambda \leq \kappa$, then $\lambda^\kappa = 2^\kappa$

Proof. Notice that

$$2^\kappa \leq \lambda^\kappa \leq \kappa^\kappa \leq (2^\kappa)^\kappa = 2^{\kappa \cdot \kappa} = 2^\kappa,$$

so we must have $\lambda^\kappa = 2^\kappa$. □

Chapter 11

Set-theoretic Methods in Analysis and Model Theory

11.1 Subsets of \mathbb{R}

In this section, we try to understand the real numbers using set-theoretic tools. The first connection is expressing $|\mathbb{R}|$ in terms of cardinal exponentiation.

Proposition 11.1.1. $|\mathbb{R}| = 2^{\aleph_0}$.

Proof. The function $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{Q})$ given by $f(x) = \{q \in \mathbb{Q} : q < x\}$ is injective (because \mathbb{Q} is dense in \mathbb{R}), so

$$|\mathbb{R}| \leq |\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{Q})| = 2^{|\mathbb{Q}|} = 2^{\aleph_0}.$$

Now let \mathcal{F} be the set of all functions from ω to 2. The function $f: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ defined by

$$f(q) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{q(n)}{10^{n+1}}$$

is injective (by simple properties of decimal expansions). Therefore, $2^{\aleph_0} = |\mathcal{F}| \leq |\mathbb{R}|$. \square

Although interesting, we have not yet determined 2^{\aleph_0} . That is, we know that $2^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_\alpha$ for some $\alpha \in \mathbf{ORD}$, but we do not know the value of α . Since $2^{\aleph_0} = |\mathcal{P}(\omega)|$, we know that $\aleph_0 < 2^{\aleph_0}$, so $\alpha > 0$. A natural guess is that 2^{\aleph_0} is the first uncountable cardinal \aleph_1 . This guess is called the *Continuum Hypothesis*. One way to attack this problem is to try to show that for every $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}$, either A is countable or $A \approx \mathbb{R}$. If successful, then we could conclude that every cardinal strictly less than 2^{\aleph_0} is countable, which would solve the Continuum Hypothesis affirmatively. We start by analyzing the simplest types of subsets of \mathbb{R} .

Proposition 11.1.2. If $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ and $a < b$, then $|(a, b)| = 2^{\aleph_0}$.

Proof. If \mathcal{F} is the set of all functions from ω to 2, then the function $f: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow (0, 1)$ defined by

$$f(q) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{q(n) + 1}{10^{n+1}}$$

is injective (by simple properties of decimal expansions as above). Thus, $|(0, 1)| \geq 2^{\aleph_0}$. Since $(0, 1) \subseteq \mathbb{R}$, we also have $|(0, 1)| \leq 2^{\aleph_0}$, so $|(0, 1)| = 2^{\aleph_0}$.

Now given any $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ with $a < b$, we have $(0, 1) \approx (a, b)$ via the function $f(x) = a + x \cdot (b - a)$, so $|(a, b)| = |(0, 1)| = 2^{\aleph_0}$. \square

Proposition 11.1.3. *If O is a nonempty open subset of \mathbb{R} , then $|O| = 2^{\aleph_0}$.*

Proof. Every nonempty open subset of \mathbb{R} contains an open interval. \square

Now that we have handled open sets, we move on to closed sets. We start with the following special types of closed sets.

Definition 11.1.4. *Let $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}$. We say that P is perfect if it is closed and has no isolated points.*

For example, the closed interval $[a, b]$ is perfect for all $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ with $a < b$. A more interesting example is given by the Cantor set defined by

$$C = \left\{ \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{q(n)}{3^{n+1}} : q \in \{0, 2\}^{\omega} \right\}.$$

Consult your favorite analysis book to see that C is perfect.

Proposition 11.1.5. *If $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is perfect and $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ with $a < b$ and $a, b \notin P$, then $P \cap [a, b]$ is perfect.*

Proof. Since both P and $[a, b]$ are closed, it follows that $P \cap [a, b]$ is closed. Let $x \in P \cap [a, b]$ be arbitrary, and notice that $x > a$ and $x < b$ since $a, b \notin P$. Let $\varepsilon > 0$. Since P is perfect, we know that x is not isolated in P , so there exists $y \in P$ such that $0 < |x - y| < \min\{\varepsilon, x - a, b - x\}$. We then have that $0 < |x - y| < \varepsilon$ and also that $y \in [a, b]$ (by choice of ε). Therefore, x is not isolated in $P \cap [a, b]$. It follows that $P \cap [a, b]$ is perfect. \square

Definition 11.1.6. *Let $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}$. We define $\text{diam}(A) = \sup\{|x - y| : x, y \in A\}$.*

Proposition 11.1.7. *If $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a nonempty perfect set and $\varepsilon > 0$, then there exists nonempty perfect sets $P_1, P_2 \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ with the following properties:*

1. $P_1 \cap P_2 = \emptyset$.
2. $P_1 \cup P_2 \subseteq P$.
3. $\text{diam}(P_1), \text{diam}(P_2) < \varepsilon$.

Proof. Let $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ be a nonempty perfect set and let $\varepsilon > 0$. Since P is nonempty, we may fix $x \in P$.

- *Case 1:* There exists $\delta > 0$ such that $[x - \delta, x + \delta] \subseteq P$. We may assume (by making δ smaller if necessary) that $\delta < \varepsilon$. In this case, let $P_1 = [x - \delta, x - \frac{\delta}{2}]$ and let $P_2 = [x + \frac{\delta}{2}, x + \delta]$.
- *Case 2:* Otherwise, for every $\delta > 0$, there exists infinitely many $y \in [x - \delta, x + \delta] \setminus P$. Thus, there exists points $a, b, c, d \in [x - \frac{\varepsilon}{4}, x + \frac{\varepsilon}{4}] \setminus P$ such that $a < b < c < d$. In this case, let $P_1 = P \cap [a, b]$ and let $P_2 = P \cap [c, d]$.

\square

Proposition 11.1.8. *If $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a nonempty perfect set, then $|P| = 2^{\aleph_0}$.*

Proof. Since $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}$, we know that $|P| \leq 2^{\aleph_0}$. By the Proposition 11.1.7, there exists a nonempty perfect set $Q \subseteq P$ such that $\text{diam}(Q) < 1$. We can now use the Proposition 11.1.7 to recursively define a function $f: 2^{<\omega} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(P)$ with the following properties:

1. $f(\lambda) = Q$.
2. $f(\sigma)$ is a nonempty perfect set for all $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$.

3. $\text{diam}(f(\sigma)) < \frac{1}{2^{|\sigma|}}$ for all $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$.
4. $f(\sigma * 0) \cup f(\sigma * 1) \subseteq f(\sigma)$ for all $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$.
5. $f(\sigma * 0) \cap f(\sigma * 1) = \emptyset$ for all $\sigma \in 2^{<\omega}$.

Now define $g: 2^{\aleph_0} \rightarrow P$ by letting $g(q)$ be the unique element of $\bigcap_{n \in \omega} f(q \upharpoonright n)$ for all $q \in 2^{\aleph_0}$ (notice that such an element must exist because the intersection is of a nested sequence of compact sets, and that the element is unique because the diameters go to 0). Finally, notice that g is injective by virtue of property 5 of the function f . \square

Definition 11.1.9. Suppose that $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a closed set. We define

$$C' = C \setminus \{x \in \mathbb{R} : x \text{ is an isolated point of } C\}.$$

We call C' the Cantor-Bendixson derivative of C .

Notice that a closed set C is perfect if and only if $C = C'$.

Proposition 11.1.10. If $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a closed set, then $C' \subseteq C$ is also closed.

Proof. Recall that a set is closed if and only if its complement is open. We show that $\overline{C'}$ is open. Let $x \in \overline{C'}$ be arbitrary. If $x \notin C$, then since C is closed, we may fix $\delta > 0$ such that $(x - \delta, x + \delta) \subseteq \overline{C} \subseteq \overline{C'}$. Suppose then that $x \in C$. Since $x \notin C'$, we know that x is an isolated point of C . Fix $\delta > 0$ such that $C \cap (x - \delta, x + \delta) = \{x\}$. We then have that $(x - \delta, x + \delta) \subseteq \overline{C'}$. Therefore, $\overline{C'}$ is open. It follows that C' is closed. \square

Proposition 11.1.11. If $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a closed set, then $C \setminus C' = \{x \in \mathbb{R} : x \text{ is an isolated point of } C\}$ is countable.

Proof. Define a function $f: C \setminus C' \rightarrow \mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q}$ by letting $f(x) = (q, r)$ where (q, r) is least (under some fixed well-ordering of $\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q}$) such that $C \cap (q, r) = \{x\}$. We then have that f is injective, hence $C \setminus C'$ is countable because $\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q}$ is countable. \square

In attempting to find a perfect set inside of a closed set, we begin by throwing out the isolated points. However, there might be new isolated points once we throw out the original ones. Thus, we may have to repeat this process. In fact, we may have to repeat it beyond ω . Let ω_1 be the first uncountable ordinal (i.e. $\omega_1 = \aleph_1$, but thought of as an ordinal rather than a cardinal).

Definition 11.1.12. Let $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ be a closed set. We define a sequence $C^{(\alpha)}$ for $\alpha < \omega_1$ recursively as follows:

1. $C^{(0)} = C$.
2. $C^{(\alpha+1)} = (C^{(\alpha)})'$.
3. $C^{(\alpha)} = \bigcap \{C^{(\beta)} : \beta < \alpha\}$ if α is a limit.

Notice that each $C^{(\alpha)}$ is closed and that $C^{(\beta)} \subseteq C^{(\alpha)}$ whenever $\alpha < \beta < \omega_1$ by a trivial induction.

Proposition 11.1.13. Let $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ be a closed set. There exists an $\alpha < \omega_1$ such that $C^{(\alpha+1)} = C^{(\alpha)}$.

Proof. Suppose that $C^{(\alpha+1)} \neq C^{(\alpha)}$ for all $\alpha < \omega_1$. Define a function $f: \omega_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q}$ by letting $f(\alpha) = (q, r)$ where (q, r) is least (under some fixed well-ordering of $\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q}$) such that there is a unique element of $C^{(\alpha)} \cap (q, r)$. We then have that f is injective, contrary to the fact that $|\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q}| = \aleph_0$. \square

Theorem 11.1.14. Let $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ be a closed set. There exists a perfect set $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ and a countable $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ such that $C = A \cup P$ and $A \cap P = \emptyset$.

Proof. Fix $\alpha < \omega_1$ such that $C^{(\alpha+1)} = C^{(\alpha)}$. Let $P = C^{(\alpha)}$ and let $A = \bigcup_{\beta < \alpha} (C^{(\beta)} \setminus C^{(\beta+1)})$. Notice that $C = A \cup P$ and $A \cap P = \emptyset$. Furthermore, P is perfect because $P = P'$, and A is countable because it is the countable union of countable sets. \square

Corollary 11.1.15. *If $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is an uncountable closed set, then $|C| = 2^{\aleph_0}$.*

Proof. Let $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ be an uncountable closed set. We have $|C| \leq 2^{\aleph_0}$ because $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$. Let P be perfect and A countable such that $C = A \cup P$ and $A \cap P = \emptyset$. Since C is uncountable, we have $P \neq \emptyset$, hence $|P| = 2^{\aleph_0}$, and so $|C| \geq 2^{\aleph_0}$. \square

In order to move on, we need to discuss more complicated types of subsets of \mathbb{R} . The next most natural class of sets are the Borel sets.

Definition 11.1.16. *Let \mathcal{O} be the set of open subsets of \mathbb{R} . We define the set \mathcal{B} of Borel sets to be the smallest subset of $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R})$ such that*

1. $\mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathcal{B}$.
2. If $A \in \mathcal{B}$, then $\mathbb{R} \setminus A \in \mathcal{B}$.
3. If $A_n \in \mathcal{B}$ for all $n \in \omega$, then $\bigcup_{n \in \omega} A_n \in \mathcal{B}$.

It turns out that every Borel set is either countable or has size 2^{\aleph_0} . However, this is harder to prove. Also, there are subsets of \mathbb{R} that are not Borel, and it quickly becomes difficult to get a handle on these more “pathological” sets. The study of Borel sets and higher generalizations (such as analytic and projective sets) is part of a subject called *descriptive set theory*.

11.2 The Size of Models

Theorem 11.2.1 (Downward Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem). *Suppose that \mathcal{L} is a language with $|\mathcal{L}| \leq \kappa$ (i.e. $|\mathcal{C} \cup \mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{F}| \leq \kappa$), that \mathcal{M} is an \mathcal{L} -structure, and that $X \subseteq M$ is such that $|X| \leq \kappa$. There exists $\mathcal{A} \preceq \mathcal{M}$ such that $X \subseteq A$ and $|A| \leq \kappa$.*

Proof. Follow the proof of Theorem 4.5.4, with an appropriate analogue of Problem 6 on Homework 1. \square

Corollary 11.2.2. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and suppose that $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ is satisfiable. There exists a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ such that $|M| \leq |\mathcal{L}| + \aleph_0$.*

Proof. Since Γ is satisfiable, we can fix a model (\mathcal{N}, s) of Γ . Let $X = \text{range}(s)$. By the Downward Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem, we can fix $\mathcal{M} \preceq \mathcal{N}$ with $\text{range}(s) \subseteq M$ and $|M| \leq |\mathcal{L}| + \aleph_0$. \square

Theorem 11.2.3 (Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem). *Let \mathcal{L} be a language and suppose that $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ has an infinite model. Let $\kappa \geq |\mathcal{L}| + \aleph_0$. There exists a model (\mathcal{M}, s) of Γ such that $|M| = \kappa$.*

Proof. Suppose that $\kappa \geq |\mathcal{L}|$. Let \mathcal{L}' be \mathcal{L} together with new constant symbols c_α for all $\alpha < \kappa$. Notice that $|\mathcal{L}'| = |\mathcal{L}| + \kappa = \kappa$. Let

$$\Gamma' = \Gamma \cup \{c_\alpha \neq c_\beta : \alpha, \beta < \kappa \text{ and } \alpha \neq \beta\}$$

Notice that every finite subset of Γ' has a model by using an infinite model of Γ and interpreting the constants which appear in the finite subset as distinct elements. Therefore, by Compactness, we know that Γ' is satisfiable. By Corollary 11.2.2, there exists a model (\mathcal{M}', s) of Γ' such that $|M'| \leq |\mathcal{L}'| + \aleph_0 = \kappa$. Notice that we must also have $|M'| \geq \kappa$, hence $|M'| = \kappa$. Letting \mathcal{M} be the restriction of the structure \mathcal{M}' to the language \mathcal{L} , we see that (\mathcal{M}, s) is a model of Γ and that $|M| = \kappa$. \square

Definition 11.2.4. Given a theory T in a language \mathcal{L} and a cardinal κ , let $I(T, \kappa)$ be the number of models of T of cardinality κ up to isomorphism.

Proposition 11.2.5. Let T be a theory in a language \mathcal{L} with $|\mathcal{L}| = \lambda$. For any infinite cardinal κ , we have $I(T, \kappa) \leq 2^{\kappa \cdot \lambda}$. In particular, if $\kappa \geq \lambda$ is infinite, then $I(T, \kappa) \leq 2^\kappa$.

Proof. Let κ be an infinite cardinal. We have

$$\begin{aligned} I(T, \kappa) &\leq \kappa^{|\mathcal{C}|} \cdot |\mathcal{P}(\kappa^{<\omega})|^{|\mathcal{R}|} \cdot |\mathcal{P}(\kappa^{<\omega})|^{|\mathcal{F}|} \\ &\leq \kappa^{|\mathcal{C}|} \cdot |\mathcal{P}(\kappa)|^{|\mathcal{R}|} \cdot |\mathcal{P}(\kappa)|^{|\mathcal{F}|} \\ &\leq \kappa^\lambda \cdot (2^\kappa)^\lambda \cdot (2^\kappa)^\lambda \\ &\leq (2^\kappa)^\lambda \cdot (2^\kappa)^\lambda \cdot (2^\kappa)^\lambda \\ &= 2^{\kappa \cdot \lambda} \end{aligned}$$

Now if $\kappa \geq \lambda$, we have $\kappa \cdot \lambda = \kappa$, so $I(T, \kappa) \leq 2^\kappa$. \square

Proposition 11.2.6. If T is the theory of groups, then $I(T, \aleph_0) = 2^{\aleph_0}$.

Proof. Let P be the set of primes. Notice that the set of finite subsets of P is countable, so the set of infinite subsets of P has cardinality 2^{\aleph_0} . For each infinite $A \in \mathcal{P}(P)$, let

$$G_A = \bigoplus_{p \in A} \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}.$$

In other words, G_A is the set of all functions f with domain A with the following properties:

- $f(p) \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ for each $p \in A$.
- $\{p \in A : f(p) \neq 0\}$ is finite.

Notice that G_A is countable for each infinite $A \in \mathcal{P}(P)$. Now if $A, B \in \mathcal{P}(P)$ are both infinite with $A \neq B$, then $G_A \not\cong G_B$, because if $A \not\subseteq B$, say, and we fix $p \in A \setminus B$, then G_A has an element of order p but G_B does not. \square

Proposition 11.2.7. Let T be the theory of vector spaces over \mathbb{Q} . We have $I(T, \aleph_0) = \aleph_0$ and $I(T, \kappa) = 1$ for all $\kappa \geq \aleph_1$.

Proof. Notice first that if V is a vector space over \mathbb{Q} and $\dim_{\mathbb{Q}}(V) = n \in \omega$, then

$$|V| = |\mathbb{Q}^n| = \aleph_0.$$

Now if V is a vector space over \mathbb{Q} and $\dim_{\mathbb{Q}}(V) = \kappa \geq \aleph_0$, then since every element of V is a finite sum of scalar multiples of elements of a basis, it follows that

$$|V| \leq |(\mathbb{Q} \times \kappa)^{<\omega}| = |(\aleph_0 \cdot \kappa)^{<\omega}| = |\kappa^{<\omega}| = \kappa.$$

and we clearly have $|V| \geq \kappa$, so $|V| = \kappa$.

Since two vector spaces over \mathbb{Q} are isomorphic if and only if they have the same dimension, it follows that $I(T, \aleph_0) = \aleph_0$ (corresponding to dimensions in $\omega \cup \{\aleph_0\}$) and $I(T, \kappa) = 1$ for all $\kappa \geq \aleph_1$ (corresponding to dimension κ). \square

In field theory, there is an analogue of dimension that is called *transcendence degree*. While the dimension of a vector space is the cardinality of maximal linearly independent sets, the transcendence degree of a field extension is the cardinality of maximal algebraically independent sets. Following the above outline, it is possible to prove that two algebraic closed fields of a fixed characteristic are isomorphic if and only if they have the same transcendence degree over their prime subfield. This leads to the following result.

Theorem 11.2.8. *For any p , we have $I(ACF_p, \aleph_0) = \aleph_0$ and $I(ACF_p, \kappa) = 1$ for all $\kappa \geq \aleph_1$.*

Definition 11.2.9. *Let T be a theory and let κ be a cardinal. We say that T is κ -categorical if $I(T, \kappa) = 1$.*

Proposition 11.2.10 (Łos-Vaught Test). *Suppose that T is a theory such that all models of T are infinite. If there exists $\kappa \geq |\mathcal{L}| + \aleph_0$ such that T is κ -categorical, then T is complete.*

Proof. Let T be a theory such that all models of T are infinite. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that T is not complete and fix $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\sigma \notin T$ and $\neg\sigma \notin T$. We then have that $T \cup \{\sigma\}$ and $T \cup \{\neg\sigma\}$ are both satisfiable with infinite models (because all models of T are infinite), so by the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem we may fix a model \mathcal{M}_1 of $T \cup \{\sigma\}$ and a model \mathcal{M}_2 of $T \cup \{\neg\sigma\}$ such that $|M_1| = \kappa = |M_2|$. We then have that \mathcal{M}_1 and \mathcal{M}_2 are models of T which are not isomorphic, hence $I(T, \kappa) \geq 2$, and so T is not κ -categorical. \square

Corollary 11.2.11. *If T is the theory of vector spaces over \mathbb{Q} , then T is complete.*

Corollary 11.2.12. *ACF_0 is complete, and each ACF_p is complete.*

The Lowenheim-Skolem says that a first-order theory is unable to control the cardinalities of the infinite models (since as soon as there is one infinite model, there is an infinite model of every cardinality greater than or equal to $|\mathcal{L}|$). However, there are some surprising limitations on the *number* of models of various cardinalities. For example, we have the following result.

Theorem 11.2.13 (Morley's Theorem). *Let \mathcal{L} be a countable language and let T be a theory. If T is κ -categorical for some $\kappa \geq \aleph_1$, then T is κ -categorical for all $\kappa \geq \aleph_1$.*

Morley's Theorem is quite deep, and marks the beginning of modern model theory.

11.3 Ultraproducts and Compactness

Let \mathcal{L} be a language, let I be a set, and suppose that for each $i \in I$ we have an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M}_i . For initial clarity, think of the case where $I = \omega$, so we have \mathcal{L} -structures $\mathcal{M}_0, \mathcal{M}_1, \mathcal{M}_2, \dots$. We want a way to put together all of the \mathcal{M}_i which “blends” the properties of the \mathcal{M}_i together into one structure. An initial thought is to form a product of the structures \mathcal{M}_i with underlying set $\prod_{i \in I} M_i$. That is, M consists of all functions $g: I \rightarrow \bigcup_{i \in I} M_i$ such that $g(i) \in M_i$ for all $i \in I$. Interpreting the constants and functions would then be straightforward.

For example, suppose that $\mathcal{L} = \{e, f\}$ where e is a constant symbol and f is a binary relation symbol. Suppose that $I = \omega$ and that each \mathcal{M}_i is a group. Elements of M would then be sequences $\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}$, we would interpret e as the sequence of each identity in each group, and we would interpret f as the componentwise group operation (i.e. $f^{\mathcal{M}}(\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}, \langle b_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}) = \langle f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(a_i, b_i) \rangle_{i \in \omega}$). For a general set I and language with relation symbols, we would let $c^{\mathcal{M}}$ be the function $i \mapsto c^{\mathcal{M}_i}$ for each constant symbol c , and given $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$ we would let $f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(g_1, g_2, \dots, g_k)$ be the function $i \mapsto f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(g_1(i), g_2(i), \dots, g_k(i))$.

This certainly works, but it doesn't really “blend” the properties of the structures together particularly well. For example, if each \mathcal{M}_i is a group and all but one is abelian, the product is still nonabelian. Also, if we have relation symbols, it's not clear what the “right” way to determine how to interpret the relation on \mathcal{M} . For example, if $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is a binary relation symbol and $I = \omega$, do we say that the pair $(\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}, \langle b_i \rangle_{i \in \omega})$ is an element of $R^{\mathcal{M}}$ if *some* $(a_i, b_i) \in R^{\mathcal{M}_i}$, if *all* $(a_i, b_i) \in R^{\mathcal{M}_i}$, or something else? Which is the “right” definition? In other words, if each \mathcal{M}_i is a graph, do we put an edge between the sequences if some edge exists between the components, or if every pair has an edge?

To give a uniformly suitable answer to these questions, we want a more “democratic” approach of forming \mathcal{M} that also gives a way to nicely interpret the relation symbols. If I were finite, perhaps we could do a majority rules (if *most* of the pairs were in the relation), but what if I is infinite?

Definition 11.3.1. Let X be a set. A filter on X is a set $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{P}(X)$ such that

1. $X \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\emptyset \notin \mathcal{F}$.
2. If $A \in \mathcal{F}$ and $A \subseteq B \subseteq X$, then $B \in \mathcal{F}$.
3. $A \cap B \in \mathcal{F}$ whenever $A, B \in \mathcal{F}$.

Example. Let X be a nonempty set, and let $x \in X$. The set

$$\mathcal{F} = \{A \in \mathcal{P}(X) : x \in A\}$$

is a filter on X . Such a filter is called a *principal* filter on X generated by x . □

Proposition 11.3.2. Let X be an infinite set. The set

$$\mathcal{F} = \{A \in \mathcal{P}(X) : A \text{ is cofinite}\}$$

is a filter on X .

Proof. Immediate from the fact that the intersection of two cofinite sets is cofinite. □

Proposition 11.3.3. Let X be a set and let \mathcal{F} be a filter on X . For every finite $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$, we have $\bigcap \mathcal{T} \in \mathcal{F}$. In particular, for every finite $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$, we have $\mathcal{T} \neq \emptyset$.

Proof. A straightforward induction on $|\mathcal{T}|$. □

Definition 11.3.4. Let X be a set and suppose that $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}(X)$. We say that \mathcal{S} has the finite intersection property if $\bigcap \mathcal{T} \neq \emptyset$ for all finite $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{S}$.

Proposition 11.3.5. Let X be a set and suppose that $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}(X)$. The following are equivalent

1. \mathcal{S} has the finite intersection property.
2. There exists a filter \mathcal{F} on X such that $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$.

Proof. 1 implies 2: Let

$$\mathcal{F} = \{A \in \mathcal{P}(X) : \bigcap \mathcal{T} \subseteq A \text{ for some finite } \mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{S}\}$$

We claim that \mathcal{F} is a filter on X . Notice that we clearly have $X \in \mathcal{F}$, and that $\emptyset \notin \mathcal{F}$ because \mathcal{S} has the finite intersection property. Now if $A \in \mathcal{F}$, say $\bigcap \mathcal{T} \subseteq A$ where $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{S}$ is finite, and $A \subseteq B \subseteq X$, then $\bigcap \mathcal{T} \subseteq B$, so $B \in \mathcal{F}$. Finally, suppose that $A, B \in \mathcal{F}$, and fix finite $\mathcal{T}_1, \mathcal{T}_2 \subseteq \mathcal{S}$ such that $\bigcap \mathcal{T}_1 \subseteq A$ and $\bigcap \mathcal{T}_2 \subseteq B$. We then have that $\bigcap (\mathcal{T}_1 \cup \mathcal{T}_2) \subseteq A \cap B$, hence $A \cap B \in \mathcal{F}$.

2 implies 1: Fix a filter \mathcal{F} on X with $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$. Let \mathcal{T} be a finite subset of \mathcal{S} . Using Proposition 11.3.3, we can immediately conclude that $\bigcap \mathcal{T} \neq \emptyset$. □

Definition 11.3.6. Let X be a set. An ultrafilter on X is filter \mathcal{U} on X such that for all $A \subseteq X$, either $A \in \mathcal{U}$ or $X \setminus A \in \mathcal{U}$.

For example, every principal filter is an ultrafilter (because given $x \in X$, we have that for all $A \in \mathcal{P}(X)$, either $x \in A$ or $x \in X \setminus A$).

Proposition 11.3.7. Let \mathcal{F} be a filter on X . \mathcal{F} is an ultrafilter on X if and only if \mathcal{F} is a maximal filter on X (i.e. there is no filter \mathcal{G} on X with $\mathcal{F} \subsetneq \mathcal{G}$).

Proof. Suppose that \mathcal{F} is not a maximal filter on X . Fix a filter \mathcal{G} on X such that $\mathcal{F} \subsetneq \mathcal{G}$. Fix $A \in \mathcal{G} \setminus \mathcal{F}$. Notice that $X \setminus A \notin \mathcal{F}$ because otherwise we would have $X \setminus A \in \mathcal{G}$ and hence $\emptyset = A \cap (X \setminus A) \in \mathcal{G}$, a contradiction. Therefore, $A \notin \mathcal{F}$ and $X \setminus A \notin \mathcal{F}$, so \mathcal{F} is not an ultrafilter on X .

Conversely, suppose that \mathcal{F} is not an ultrafilter on X . Fix $A \in \mathcal{P}(X)$ such that $A \notin \mathcal{F}$ and $X \setminus A \notin \mathcal{F}$. We claim that $\mathcal{F} \cup \{A\}$ has the finite intersection property. To see this, suppose that $B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n \in \mathcal{F}$. We then have $B_1 \cap B_2 \cap \dots \cap B_n \in \mathcal{F}$, so $B_1 \cap B_2 \cap \dots \cap B_n \neq \emptyset$. Furthermore, since $B_1 \cap B_2 \cap \dots \cap B_n \in \mathcal{F}$ and $X \setminus A \notin \mathcal{F}$, we must have $B_1 \cap B_2 \cap \dots \cap B_n \not\subseteq X \setminus A$, so $B_1 \cap B_2 \cap \dots \cap B_n \cap A \neq \emptyset$. Therefore, $\mathcal{F} \cup \{A\}$ has the finite intersection property. Using Proposition 11.3.5, we can fix a filter \mathcal{G} on X such that $\mathcal{F} \cup \{A\} \subseteq \mathcal{G}$. Since $\mathcal{F} \subsetneq \mathcal{G}$ (as $A \in \mathcal{G} \setminus \mathcal{F}$), it follows that \mathcal{F} is not a maximal filter on X . \square

Proposition 11.3.8. *Let \mathcal{F} be a filter on X . There exists an ultrafilter \mathcal{U} on X such that $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$.*

Proof. Apply Zorn's Lemma, using the fact that a union of a chain of filters on X is a filter on X . \square

Corollary 11.3.9. *Let X be an infinite set. There exists a nonprincipal ultrafilter on X .*

Proof. Let \mathcal{F} be the filter on X consisting of all cofinite subsets of X . Fix an ultrafilter \mathcal{U} on X such that $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$. For all $x \in X$, we have $X \setminus \{x\} \in \mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$, hence $\{x\} \notin \mathcal{U}$. \square

Ultrafilters (or even just filters) solve our democratic blending problem for relation symbols beautifully. Suppose that $\mathcal{L} = \{R\}$ where R is a binary relation symbol and $I = \omega$. Suppose also that \mathcal{U} is an ultrafilter on ω . Given elements $\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}$ and $\langle b_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}$ of M , we could then say that the pair $(\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}, \langle b_i \rangle_{i \in \omega})$ is an element of R^M if the set of indices $i \in I$ such that $(a_i, b_i) \in R^{\mathcal{M}_i}$ is “large”, i.e. if $\{i \in I : (a_i, b_i) \in R^{\mathcal{M}_i}\} \in \mathcal{U}$. Of course, our notion of “large” depends on the ultrafilter, but that flexibility is the beauty of the construction!

However, we have yet to solve the dictatorial problem of function symbols (such as the product of groups in which each is abelian save one ending up nonabelian regardless of what we consider “large”). Wonderfully, and perhaps surprisingly, the ultrafilter can be used in another way to save the day. For concreteness, consider the situation where $\mathcal{L} = \{e, f\}$ where e is a constant symbol and f is a binary relation symbol, $I = \omega$, and each \mathcal{M}_i is a group. The idea is to flat out ignore variations on “small” sets by considering two sequences $\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}$ and $\langle b_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}$ to be the same if the set of indices in which they agree is “large”, i.e. if $\{i \in I : a_i = b_i\} \in \mathcal{U}$. In other words, we should define an equivalence relation \sim in this way and take a quotient! This is completely analagous to considering two function $f, g: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ to be the same if the set $\{x \in \mathbb{R} : f(x) \neq g(x)\}$ has measure 0. What does this solve? Suppose that \mathcal{M}_0 was our rogue nonabelian group, and each \mathcal{M}_i for $i \neq 0$ was an abelian group. Suppose also that $\omega \setminus \{0\} \in \mathcal{U}$ (i.e. our ultrafilter is not the principal ultrafilter generated by $\{0\}$, and thus we are considering $\{0\}$ to be a “small” set). Given a sequence $\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}$, let $[\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}]$ be the equivalence class of $\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}$ under the relation. Assuming that everything is well-defined (see below), we then have that $\langle f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(a_i, b_i) \rangle_{i \in \omega} \sim \langle f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(b_i, a_i) \rangle_{i \in \omega}$ and so

$$\begin{aligned} f^M([\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}], [\langle b_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}]) &= [\langle f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(a_i, b_i) \rangle_{i \in \omega}] \\ &= [\langle f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(b_i, a_i) \rangle_{i \in \omega}] \\ &= f^M([\langle b_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}], [\langle a_i \rangle_{i \in \omega}]) \end{aligned}$$

and so we have saved abelianess by ignoring problems on “small” sets!

To summarize before launching into details, here's the construction. Start with a language \mathcal{L} , a set I , and \mathcal{L} -structures \mathcal{M}_i for each $i \in I$. Form the product $\prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i$, but take a quotient by considering two elements of this product to be equivalent if the set of indices on which they agree is “large”. Elements of our structure are now equivalence classes, so we need to worry about things being well-defined, but the fundamental idea is to interpret constant symbols and functions componentwise, and interpret relation symbols by saying that that an k -tuple is in the interpretation of some $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$ if the set of indices on which the corresponding k -tuple is in $R^{\mathcal{M}_i}$ is “large”. Amazingly, this process behaves absolutely beautifully with regards to first-order

logic. For example, if we denote this “blended” structure by \mathcal{M} , we will prove below that for any $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$ we have

$$\mathcal{M} \models \sigma \text{ if and only if } \{i \in I : \mathcal{M}_i \models \sigma\} \in \mathcal{U}.$$

That is, an arbitrary sentence σ is true in the “blended” structure if and only if the set of indices $i \in I$ in which σ is true in \mathcal{M}_i is “large”!

Onward to the details. The notation is painful and easy to get lost in, but keep the fundamental ideas in mind and revert to thinking of $I = \omega$ whenever the situation looks hopelessly complicated. First we have the proposition saying that the \sim defined in this way is an equivalence relation and that our definitions are well-defined.

Proposition 11.3.10. *Let I be a set, and suppose that for each $i \in I$ we have an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M}_i . Let \mathcal{U} be an ultrafilter on I . Define a relation \sim on $\prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i$ by saying that $g \sim h$ if $\{i \in I : g(i) = h(i)\} \in \mathcal{U}$.*

1. \sim is an equivalence relation on $\prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i$.
2. Suppose that $g_1, g_2, \dots, g_k, h_1, h_2, \dots, h_k \in \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i$ are such that $g_j \sim h_j$ for all j .
 - (a) $\{i \in I : (g_1(i), g_2(i), \dots, g_k(i)) = (h_1(i), h_2(i), \dots, h_k(i))\} \in \mathcal{U}$.
 - (b) For each $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$, the following are equivalent:
 - $\{i \in I : (g_1(i), g_2(i), \dots, g_k(i)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}_i}\} \in \mathcal{U}$.
 - $\{i \in I : (h_1(i), h_2(i), \dots, h_k(i)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}_i}\} \in \mathcal{U}$.
 - (c) For each $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$, we have $\{i \in I : f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(g_1(i), g_2(i), \dots, g_k(i)) = f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(h_1(i), h_2(i), \dots, h_k(i))\} \in \mathcal{U}$.

Proof. Exercise. □

Definition 11.3.11. *Let I be a set, and suppose that for each $i \in I$ we have an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M}_i . Let \mathcal{U} be an ultrafilter on I . We define an \mathcal{L} -structure $\mathcal{M} = \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i / \mathcal{U}$ as follows. Define the relation \sim on $\prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i$ by saying that $g \sim h$ if $\{i \in I : g(i) = h(i)\} \in \mathcal{U}$ (as above), and let the universe of \mathcal{M} be the corresponding quotient (i.e. set of equivalence classes). Interpret the symbols of \mathcal{L} as follows:*

1. For each $c \in \mathcal{C}$, let $c^{\mathcal{M}} = [i \mapsto c^{\mathcal{M}_i}]$.
2. For each $R \in \mathcal{R}_k$, let $R^{\mathcal{M}} = \{([g_1], [g_2], \dots, [g_k]) \in M^k : \{i \in I : (g_1(i), g_2(i), \dots, g_k(i)) \in R^{\mathcal{M}_i}\} \in \mathcal{U}\}$.
3. For each $f \in \mathcal{F}_k$, let $f^{\mathcal{M}}([g_1], [g_2], \dots, [g_k]) = [i \mapsto f^{\mathcal{M}_i}(g_1(i), g_2(i), \dots, g_k(i))]$.

We call \mathcal{M} the ultraproduct of the \mathcal{M}_i over the ultrafilter \mathcal{U} .

Definition 11.3.12. *In the above situation, given variable assignments $s_i : \text{Var} \rightarrow M_i$ for each $i \in I$, we let $\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}$ denote the variable assignment $\text{Var} \rightarrow M$ given by $\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}(x) = [i \mapsto s_i(x)]$.*

Lemma 11.3.13. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, let I be a set, and let \mathcal{U} be an ultrafilter on I . Suppose that for each $i \in I$, we have an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M}_i , and let $\mathcal{M} = \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i / \mathcal{U}$. For all $t \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $s_i : \text{Var} \rightarrow M_i$, we have*

$$\overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t) = [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t)]$$

In other words, for all $t(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k) \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $g_1, g_2, \dots, g_k \in \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i$, we have

$$t^{\mathcal{M}}([g_1], [g_2], \dots, [g_k]) = [i \mapsto t^{\mathcal{M}_i}(g_1(i), g_2(i), \dots, g_k(i))]$$

Proof. Suppose that $\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}$. Let $s_i: \text{Var} \rightarrow M_i$ be variable assignments. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}\overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(\mathbf{c}) &= \mathbf{c}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &= [i \mapsto \mathbf{c}^{\mathcal{M}_i}] \\ &= [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(\mathbf{c})]\end{aligned}$$

Suppose that $\mathbf{x} \in \text{Var}$. Let $s_i: \text{Var} \rightarrow M_i$ be variable assignments. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}\overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(\mathbf{x}) &= \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}(\mathbf{x}) \\ &= [i \mapsto s_i(\mathbf{x})] \\ &= [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(\mathbf{x})]\end{aligned}$$

Suppose that $\mathbf{f} \in \mathcal{F}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$ are such that the result holds for the t_i . Let $s_i: \text{Var} \rightarrow M_i$ be variable assignments. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}\overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(\mathbf{f}t_1t_2 \cdots t_k) &= \mathbf{f}^{\mathcal{M}}(\overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t_1), \overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t_2), \dots, \overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t_k)) \\ &= \mathbf{f}^{\mathcal{M}}([i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t_1)], [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t_2)], \dots, [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t_k)]) \\ &= [i \mapsto \mathbf{f}^{\mathcal{M}_i}(\overline{s_i}(t_1), \overline{s_i}(t_2), \dots, \overline{s_i}(t_k))] \\ &= [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(\mathbf{f}t_1t_2 \cdots t_k)]\end{aligned}$$

□

Theorem 11.3.14 (Los). *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, let I be a set, and let \mathcal{U} be an ultrafilter on I . Suppose that for each $i \in I$, we have an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M}_i , and let $\mathcal{M} = \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i / \mathcal{U}$. For all $\varphi \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $s_i: \text{Var} \rightarrow M_i$, we have*

$$(\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \varphi\} \in \mathcal{U}$$

In other words, for all $\varphi(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k) \in \text{Form}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and all $g_1, g_2, \dots, g_k \in \prod_{i \in I} M_i$, we have

$$(\mathcal{M}, [g_1], [g_2], \dots, [g_k]) \models \varphi \text{ if and only if } \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, g_1(i), g_2(i), \dots, g_k(i)) \models \varphi\} \in \mathcal{U}$$

In particular, for any $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have

$$\mathcal{M} \models \sigma \text{ if and only if } \{i \in I : \mathcal{M}_i \models \sigma\} \in \mathcal{U}.$$

Proof. The proof is by induction.

Suppose that $t_1, t_2 \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Let $s_i: \text{Var} \rightarrow M_i$ be variable assignments. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}(\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \models t_1t_2 &\Leftrightarrow \overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t_1) = \overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t_2) \\ &\Leftrightarrow [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t_1)] = [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t_2)] \\ &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : \overline{s_i}(t_1) = \overline{s_i}(t_2)\} \in \mathcal{U} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models t_1t_2\} \in \mathcal{U}\end{aligned}$$

Suppose that $\mathbf{R} \in \mathcal{R}_k$ and $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k \in \text{Term}_{\mathcal{L}}$. Let $s_i: \text{Var} \rightarrow M_i$ be variable assignments. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}(\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \models \mathbf{R}t_1t_2 \cdots t_k &\Leftrightarrow (\overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t_1), \overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t_2), \dots, \overline{\langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}}(t_k)) \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow ([i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t_1)], [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t_2)], \dots, [i \mapsto \overline{s_i}(t_k)]) \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\overline{s_i}(t_1), \overline{s_i}(t_2), \dots, \overline{s_i}(t_k)) \in \mathbf{R}^{\mathcal{M}_i}\} \in \mathcal{U} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \mathbf{R}t_1t_2 \cdots t_k\} \in \mathcal{U}\end{aligned}$$

Suppose that the result holds for φ and ψ . Let $s_i : Var \rightarrow M_i$ be variable assignments. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \models \varphi \wedge \psi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \models \varphi \text{ and } (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \models \psi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \varphi\} \in \mathcal{U} \text{ and } \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \psi\} \in \mathcal{U} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \varphi\} \cap \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \psi\} \in \mathcal{U} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \varphi \text{ and } (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \psi\} \in \mathcal{U} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \varphi \wedge \psi\} \in \mathcal{U}
 \end{aligned}$$

Suppose that the result holds for φ . Let $s_i : Var \rightarrow M_i$ be variable assignments. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \models \neg \varphi &\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \not\models \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \varphi\} \notin \mathcal{U} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \not\models \varphi\} \in \mathcal{U} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \neg \varphi\} \in \mathcal{U}
 \end{aligned}$$

Suppose that the result holds for φ . Let $s_i : Var \rightarrow M_i$ be variable assignments. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I}) \models \exists y \varphi &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } a \in M \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I} [y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } g \in \prod_{i \in I} M_i \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i \rangle_{i \in I} [y \Rightarrow [g]]) \models \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } g \in \prod_{i \in I} M_i \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}, \langle s_i [y \Rightarrow g(i)] \rangle_{i \in I}) \models \varphi \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \text{There exists } g \in \prod_{i \in I} M_i \text{ such that } \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i [y \Rightarrow g(i)]) \models \varphi\} \in \mathcal{U} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : \text{There exists } a \in M_i \text{ such that } (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i [y \Rightarrow a]) \models \varphi\} \in \mathcal{U} \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \{i \in I : (\mathcal{M}_i, s_i) \models \exists y \varphi\} \in \mathcal{U}.
 \end{aligned}$$

□

Definition 11.3.15. Let \mathcal{N} be an \mathcal{L} -structure, let I be a set, and let \mathcal{U} be an ultrafilter on I . If we let $\mathcal{M}_i = \mathcal{N}$ for all $i \in I$, then the ultraproduct $\mathcal{M} = \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{M}_i / \mathcal{U}$ is called an *ultrapower* of \mathcal{N} .

For example, let $\mathcal{L} = \{0, 1, +, \cdot, <\}$, and let $\mathfrak{N} = (\mathbb{N}, 0, 1, +, \cdot, <)$. Let $I = \omega$, and let \mathcal{U} be an ultrafilter on ω . Consider the corresponding ultrapower on \mathcal{M} . Elements of M are equivalence classes of infinite sequences of natural numbers. For example, $[(2, 2, 2, 2, \dots)]$, $[(0, 1, 0, 1, \dots)]$ and $[(0, 1, 2, 3, \dots)]$ are all elements of \mathcal{M} . Given any $\sigma \in \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$, we have $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ if and only if $\{i \in I : \mathcal{M}_i \models \sigma\} \in \mathcal{U}$. However, each \mathcal{M}_i is just \mathfrak{N} , so since $\emptyset \notin \mathcal{U}$ and $\omega \in \mathcal{U}$, it follows that $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$ if and only if $\mathfrak{N} \models \sigma$. Therefore, $\mathcal{M} \equiv \mathfrak{N}$, and so \mathcal{M} is a model of $\text{Th}(\mathfrak{N})$.

Notice that $0^{\mathcal{M}} = [(0, 0, 0, 0, \dots)]$, that $1^{\mathcal{M}} = [(1, 1, 1, 1, \dots)]$. Addition and multiplication on \mathcal{M} are defined componentwise on the equivalence classes, and ordering is determined by taking two equivalence classes, and asking if the set of i where the i^{th} entry of the first element is less than the i^{th} entry of the second is an element of \mathcal{U} . However, this latter fact requires knowledge of \mathcal{U} . For example, let $a = [(0, 1, 0, 1, \dots)]$ and let $b = [(1, 0, 1, 0, \dots)]$. We know that $<^{\mathcal{M}}$ is a linear ordering on \mathcal{M} (since \mathcal{M} is a model of $\text{Th}(\mathfrak{N})$), so one of $a <^{\mathcal{M}} b$, $b <^{\mathcal{M}} a$, or $a =^{\mathcal{M}} b$ is true. The last is impossible because there is no i where the $a_i = b_i$ (where a_i is the i^{th} entry of $(0, 1, 0, 1, \dots)$, and similarly for b_i). Notice that

$$\{i \in \omega : a_i < b_i\} = \{2n : n \in \omega\} \quad \text{and} \quad \{i \in \omega : b_i < a_i\} = \{2n + 1 : n \in \omega\}$$

Now either $\{2n : n \in \omega\} \in \mathcal{U}$ or $\{2n + 1 : n \in \omega\} \in \mathcal{U}$, but not both, because \mathcal{U} is an ultrafilter. In the former case, we have $a <^{\mathcal{M}} b$, while in the latter case we have $b <^{\mathcal{M}} a$.

We have a natural function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow M$ given by letting $f(n) = [(n, n, n, n, \dots)]$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Notice that f is injective because if $m \neq n$, then the set of $i \in \omega$ where the i^{th} element of (m, m, m, m, \dots) equals the i^{th} element of (n, n, n, n, \dots) is the empty set, which is not in \mathcal{U} . Now if \mathcal{U} is principal, then it is straightforward to check that f is also surjective, and in fact that it gives an isomorphism from \mathfrak{N} to \mathcal{M} . Suppose instead that \mathcal{U} is nonprincipal. Consider the element $[(0, 1, 2, 3, \dots)]$. For each $n \in \omega$, the set of places where $(0, 1, 2, 3, \dots)$ equals (n, n, n, n, \dots) is a singleton, which is not in \mathcal{U} . Thus, $[(0, 1, 2, 3, \dots)] \notin \text{range}(f)$. In fact, since no finite set is in \mathcal{U} , we have $[(n, n, n, n, \dots)] < [(0, 1, 2, 3, \dots)]$ for each $n \in \omega$. Therefore, \mathcal{M} is a nonstandard model of arithmetic, and $[(0, 1, 2, 3, \dots)]$ is an example of an infinite element.

We now use ultraproducts to give another, purely semantic, proof of the Compactness Theorem for first-order logic. For simplicity of notation, we prove it for a set of sentences.

Theorem 11.3.16. *Let \mathcal{L} be a language, and let $\Sigma \subseteq \text{Sent}_{\mathcal{L}}$. If every finite subset of Σ has a model, then Σ has a model.*

Proof. Let I be the set of all finite subsets of Σ . For each $\Psi \in I$, fix a model \mathcal{M}_{Ψ} of Ψ . For each $\sigma \in \Sigma$, let $A_{\sigma} = \{\Psi \in I : \sigma \in \Psi\}$. Let $\mathcal{S} = \{A_{\sigma} : \sigma \in \Sigma\} \subseteq \mathcal{P}(I)$ and notice that \mathcal{S} has the finite intersection property because

$$\{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_n\} \in A_{\sigma_1} \cap A_{\sigma_2} \cap \dots \cap A_{\sigma_n}.$$

Since \mathcal{S} has the finite intersection property, we can fix an ultrafilter \mathcal{U} on I such that $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$. Let \mathcal{M} be the corresponding ultraproduct $\mathcal{M} = \prod_{\Psi \in I} \mathcal{M}_{\Psi} / \mathcal{U}$. For any $\sigma \in \Sigma$, we then have that $A_{\sigma} \subseteq \{\Psi \in I : \mathcal{M}_{\Psi} \models \sigma\}$, hence $\{\Psi \in I : \mathcal{M}_{\Psi} \models \sigma\} \in \mathcal{U}$, and so $\mathcal{M} \models \sigma$. Therefore, \mathcal{M} is a model of Σ . \square