

# A Stateful Fuzzer for the TCP/IP Stack of the Real-Time Operating System Zephyr

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## Abstract

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**Keywords:** Software Testing, Fuzzing, Stateful Fuzzing, Zephyr, LibAFL.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Stateful Fuzzing

Daniele *et al.* introduce a taxonomy of stateful fuzzing in which they define a stateful system as “a system that takes a sequence of messages as input, producing outputs along the way, and where each input may result in an internal state change” [1].

“To avoid confusion, we reserve the term message or input message for the individual input that the System Under Test (SUT) consumes at each step and the term trace for a sequence of such messages that make up the entire input.” [1]

“The input language of a stateful system consists of two levels: (1) the language of the individual messages, which we will refer to as the message format, and (2) the language of traces, built on top of that. A description or specification of such an input language will usually come in two parts, one for each of the levels: for example, a context-free grammar for the message format and a finite state machine describing sequences of these messages. We will call the latter the state model or, if it is described as a state machine, the protocol state machine.” [1]

“the internal state changes increase the state space that we try to explore: it may be hard for a fuzzer to reach ‘deeper’ states. Indeed, fuzzing stateful systems is listed as one of the challenges in fuzzing by Boehme *et al.* [2]” [1].

### 1.1.1 TCP/IP

Checksums such as in TCP/IP are challenging. [3] Approaches to deal with this include removing the program sections from the target program [4].

## 1.2 Zephyr

## 1.3 Contributions of this Paper

# 2 Related Works

## 2.1 Read

- *Stateful Greybox Fuzzing* [5]: “In this paper, we argue that protocols are often explicitly encoded using state variables that are assigned and compared to named constants [...] More specifically, using pattern matching, we identify state variables using enumerated types (enums). An enumerated type is a group of named constants that specifies all possible values for a variable of that type. Our instrumentation injects

a call to our runtime at every program location where a state variable is assigned to a new value. Our runtime efficiently constructs the state transition tree (STT). The STT captures the sequence of values assigned to state variables across all fuzzer-generated input sequences, and as a global data structure, it is shared with the fuzzer.” [5] Built on LibFuzzer

- *StateAFL: Greybox fuzzing for stateful network servers* [6]: compile-time probes observing memory allocation and I/O operations; state inference based on fuzzy hashing of long-lived memory areas.
- *Ijon: Exploring Deep State Spaces via Fuzzing* [7]: Manual annotations of code, to manually add entries to an AFL-style map (set/inc at calculated offset), include state information (variable values) in how edge coverage is calculated, and store the max value a certain variable reaches during execution for the fuzzer to then maximize.
- *SandPuppy: Deep-State Fuzzing Guided by Automatic Detection of State-Representative Variables* [8]: Ijon [7], but automatic (initial run capturing variable-value traces, analyze along with source code, add Ijon-style instrumentation, repeat during fuzzing)
- *The Use of Likely Invariants as Feedback for Fuzzers* [9]: run for 24 hours, record variable values and relationships between them, then add a feedback that rewards when the generated assertions are violated
- *Ankou: guiding grey-box fuzzing towards combinatorial difference* [10]: take combination of executed branches into consideration, reduce to manageable adaptive fitness function
- *FuzzFactory: domain-specific fuzzing with waypoints* [11]: framework to add custom feedbacks like number of basic blocks executed, amount of memory allocated, etc.
- *ParmeSan: Sanitizer-guided Greybox Fuzzing* [12]: Use sanitizers checks as fuzzing targets
- *Fuzzing with Data Dependency Information* [13]: Use execution of new data dependencies as feedback
- *StateFuzz: System Call-Based State-Aware Linux Driver Fuzzing* [14]: Find state variables

- (long-lived, can be updated by users, change control flow or memory access) using static analysis, use that to guide fuzzing (new coverage, new value-range, new extreme value). (Talk: Good Example of why coverage-guided alone is insufficient). Check value ranges instead of all values (static symbex!). 4-digit number of state variables in linux kernel and Qualcomm MSM kernel (Google Pixel).
- *ProFuzzBench: a benchmark for stateful protocol fuzzing* [15]: Suite of 10 protocols and 11 open-source implementations of those to be tested. TCP is notably absent from this list. Certain protocols (like FTP) already return HTTP status codes, others are patched to do so. Dockerized. The authors note that configuration is not taken into account and multiparty ( $\geq 3$ ) protocols can not be fuzzed right now. Non-determinism in the programs make feedback (like code coverage) less predictable and thus fuzzing less performant because it introduces non-differentiable duplicate entries into the corpus. Speed is another issue, where complex setup-processes, costly network operations (resp. synchronization for me), and long multipart-inputs contribute. Finally, state identification is only superficially handled.
  - *AFLNET: A Greybox Fuzzer for Network Protocols* [16]: FTP and RTSP as targets, state transition (+coverage) feedback, corpus from traces, mutation on random entry (havoc and insert/delete/duplicate etc.), corpus scheduling based on statistics about each state.
  - *TCP-Fuzz: Detecting Memory and Semantic Bugs in TCP Stacks with Fuzzing* [17]: TCP targets, differential fuzzing, input: syscalls + packets, complex mutators including intelligent dependencies between the current and all previous packets and syscalls in the input, feedback: inter-package diff in coverage.
  - *FitM: Binary-Only Coverage-Guided Fuzzing for Stateful Network Protocols* [18]: Use persistent snapshots of userspace processes (CRIU), fuzzer-in-the-middle, multiple strategies such as input deduplication and resynchronization necessary because of the approach
  - *Autofuzz: Automated network protocol fuzzing framework* [19]: Man-in-the-middle, learn protocol by constructing a FSA and packet syntax using a bioinformatics technique. Fuzz server and client.
  - *EPF: An Evolutionary, Protocol-Aware, and Coverage-Guided Network Fuzzing Framework* [20]: Target SCADA, uses population-based simulated annealing to schedule which packet type to add/mutate next in conjunction with coverage feedback. Requires Scapy-compatible implementation of packet types to ensure packet structure.
  - *A model-based approach to security flaw detection of network protocol implementations* [21]: Build FSM and minimize it, then use it to schedule basic mutations.
  - *GANFuzz: a GAN-based industrial network protocol fuzzing framework* [22]: Learn GAN to generate next inputs. Targets Modbus-TCP.
  - *Fuzzers for Stateful Systems: Survey and Research Directions* [1]: Provides taxonomy of components and categorizes stateful fuzzers, compares approaches and lists challenges and future directions.
  - *Automated Attack Discovery in TCP Congestion Control Using a Model-guided Approach* [23]: Manual FSM from RFC to generate abstract attack models against congestion control implementations, which are then transformed to concrete attacks strategies and tested on actual implementations.
  - *A Modbus/TCP Fuzzer for testing internet-worked industrial systems* [24] is a Modbus fuzzer, that only seems to use TCP as transport. Generation of packets happens only for Modbus itself. *MTF-Storm: a High Performance Fuzzer for Modbus/TCP* [25] is follow-up work that does the same more systematically.
  - *A survey on fuzz testing technologies for industrial control protocols* [26] review industrial control protocol. Notably, Modbus/TCP fuzzing seems common, but TCP is only used as transport layer, not target.
  - *MTA Fuzzer: A low-repetition rate Modbus TCP fuzzing method based on Transformer and Mutation Target Adaptation* [27] use machine learning models to generate Modbus/TCP packets, but target Modbus and again only use TCP as a transportation layer.
  - *A vulnerability detecting method for Modbus-TCP based on smart fuzzing mechanism* [28] is another Modbus/TCP fuzzer that does not fuzz the TCP stack. See also [29].

- A similar approach using a Scapy-based fuzzer was implemented for the industrial protocol EtherNet/IP, where TCP was declared as out-of-scope [30].

- *Fuzz Testing of Protocols Based on Protocol Process State Machines* [31] calculate a directed graph from the measured state variables, and schedule mutations based on a formula incorporating state depth, coverage, number of transitions, and number of mutations based on this state.

## 2.2 ToDo

- *A Survey of Protocol Fuzzing* [32]

## 3 Approach and Implementation

### 3.1 NativeSim

### 3.2 Layer 1 Mocking

### 3.3 Feedback

#### 3.3.1 Coverage

#### 3.3.2 State

### 3.4 LibAFL

#### 3.4.1 Snapshotting

#### 3.4.2 Overcommit

#### 3.4.3 MappingMutators

## 4 Evaluation and Results

### 4.1 Consistency

### 4.2 Performance

#### 4.2.1 Overcommit

### 4.3 Mutation Strategies

#### 4.3.1 Naïve `havoc_mutations`

#### 4.3.2 Fixed Header Checksums

### 4.4 Feedback

#### 4.4.1 Coverage

### 4.5 States Visited

#### 4.5.1 States Counted

#### 4.5.2 State Combinations

## 5 Discussion

### 5.1 Contributions

### 5.2 Future Work

In the interest of open science, the source code of this project is publicly available and released under an open-source license. During development, thousands of lines of code have been introduced to upstream projects.

All artifacts produced for this project are available at

[github.com/riesentoaster/fuzzing-zephyr-network-stack](https://github.com/riesentoaster/fuzzing-zephyr-network-stack).

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