# FTZ: A State-Inferring Fuzzer for the TCP/IP Stack of Zephyr

**Master's Thesis** 

# Background

#### Real-Time Operating System

Open Source

## Zephyr

Networking is Central

Widely Used

#### Significant Developments


### Repeated Execution of a Target with Random(-ish) Inputs

## Fuzzing

Widely Used and Proven Effective

Looking for Illegal Program States

#### Mutational Fuzzing



Deep Integration with Operating System

- Deep Integration with Operating System
- Network Packets Are Highly Structured

Layer		Ethe	rnet			IPv4														Payload	Ethernet							
Field	Destination MAC	Source MAC	802.1Q VLAN Tag	EtherType	Version	Internet Header Length	DSCP & ECN	Total Length	Identification	Flags & Fragment Offset	Time To Live	Protocol	Header Checksum	Source IP	Destination IP	Options	Source Port	Destination Port	Sequence Number	Acknowledgment Number	Data Offset & Reserved	Flags	Window	Checksum	Urgent Pointer	Options	Payload	Frame Check Sequence
Size	9	9	4	7	_	_	_	N	0	N	_	_	0	4	4	var	2	2	4	4	_	_	2	8	7	var	var	4

- Deep Integration with Operating System
- Network Packets Are Highly Structured
- TCP Stacks Have Internal State

Contributions: 27 PRs, 10,000 LoC

Fuzzing Library in Rust

LibAFL

Advanced Implementations

Common Structures

Incompatible Improvements

native\_sim

- native\_sim
- SanitizerCoverage

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- Custom Ethernet Driver

- native\_sim
- SanitizerCoverage
- Custom Ethernet Driver
- Input Modeling and Mutation

#### Input Modeling and Mutation

Message Modeling

Layer		Ethe	ernet							IP	v4						TCP										Payload	Ethernet
Field	Destination MAC	Source MAC	802.1Q VLAN Tag	EtherType	Version	Internet Header Length	DSCP & ECN	Total Length	Identification	Flags & Fragment Offset	Time To Live	Protocol	Header Checksum	Source IP	Destination IP	Options	Source Port	Destination Port	Sequence Number	Acknowledgment Number	Data Offset & Reserved	Flags	Window	Checksum	Urgent Pointer	Options	Payload	Frame Check Sequence
Size	9	9	4	2	_	_	-	7	2	2	_	_	7	4	4	var	7	2	4	4	-	_	7	7	2	var	var	4

#### Input Modeling and Mutation

- Message Modeling
- Trace Modeling

#### Input Modeling and Mutation


- Message Modeling
- Trace Modeling
- Appending Mutators

- native\_sim
- SanitizerCoverage
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- native\_sim
- SanitizerCoverage
- Custom Ethernet Driver
- Input Modeling and Mutation
- State Inference

## Evaluation


### Zephyr behaves inconsistently




#### Coverage Is Inconsistent

- 1. k\_work\_init\_delayable from kernel/work.c
- 2. net\_ipv6\_mld\_init from net/ip/ipv6\_mld.c
- 3. sys\_slist\_init from sys/slist.h
- 4. z\_slist\_tail\_set from sys/slist.h
- 5. net\_conn\_init from net/ip/connection.c


#### Coverage Is Inconsistent





#### Packet Responses Are Inconsistent




#### State Is Inconsistent














## Evaluating Input Modeling and State-Inference Feedback

















## Conclusion

### Future Work

### github.com/riesentoaster/FTZ