

# **FTZ: A State-Infering Fuzzer for the TCP/IP Stack of Zephyr**

**Master's Thesis**

**Valentin Huber, 28.02.2025**

# Agenda

1. Background
2. Related Works
3. Implementation
4. Evaluation
5. Conclusion

# Background

Real-Time Operating System

Open Source

# Zephyr

Networking is Central

Widely Used

Repeated Execution of a Target  
with Random(-ish) Inputs


Significant Developments

# Fuzzing

Widely Used and Proven Effective

Looking for Illegal Program States

# Mutational Fuzzing



# Fuzzing OS Network Stacks Is Hard

# Fuzzing OS Network Stacks Is Hard

- Deep Integration with Operating System




# Fuzzing OS Network Stacks Is Hard

- Deep Integration with Operating System
- Network Packets Are Highly Structured

Layer	Ethernet				IPv4											TCP						Payload	Ethernet					
Field	Destination MAC	Source MAC	802.1Q VLAN Tag	EtherType	Version	Internet Header Length	DSCP & ECN	Total Length	Identification	Flags & Fragment Offset	Time To Live	Protocol	Header Checksum	Source IP	Destination IP	Options	Source Port	Destination Port	Sequence Number	Acknowledgment Number	Data Offset & Reserved	Flags	Window	Checksum	Urgent Pointer	Options	Payload	Frame Check Sequence
Size	6	6	4	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	var	2	2	4	4	1	1	2	2	2	var	var	4

# Fuzzing OS Network Stacks Is Hard

- Deep Integration with Operating System
- Network Packets Are Highly Structured
- TCP Stacks Have Internal State



Contributions: 27 PRs, 10,000 LoC

Fuzzing Library in Rust

# LibAFL

Advanced Implementations

Common Structures

Incompatible Improvements

# Related Works

**TCP-Fuzz**

**FitM**

# Implementation

# Implementation

- native\_sim
- SanitizerCoverage
- Custom Ethernet Driver
- Input Modeling and Mutation

# Input Modeling and Mutation

- Message Modeling

Layer	Ethernet				IPv4											TCP						Payload	Ethernet					
Field	Destination MAC	Source MAC	802.1Q VLAN Tag	EtherType	Version	Internet Header Length	DSCP & ECN	Total Length	Identification	Flags & Fragment Offset	Time To Live	Protocol	Header Checksum	Source IP	Destination IP	Options	Source Port	Destination Port	Sequence Number	Acknowledgment Number	Data Offset & Reserved	Flags	Window	Checksum	Urgent Pointer	Options	Payload	Frame Check Sequence
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# Input Modeling and Mutation


- Message Modeling
- Trace Modeling
- Appending Mutators

# Implementation

- native\_sim
- SanitizerCoverage
- Custom Ethernet Driver
- Input Modeling and Mutation
- State Inference

# Evaluation


**Zephyr behaves inconsistently**




# Coverage Is Inconsistent

1. `k_work_init_delayable` from `kernel/work.c`
2. `net_ipv6_mld_init` from `net/ip/ipv6_mld.c`
3. `sys_slist_init` from `sys/slist.h`
4. `z_slist_tail_set` from `sys/slist.h`
5. `net_conn_init` from `net/ip/connection.c`

# Coverage Is Inconsistent




# Packet Responses Are Inconsistent






# State Is Inconsistent




**Zephyr behaves inconsistently**

# Overcommit


# Overcommit




# Overcommit




# Overcommit





# Evaluating Input Modeling and State-Inference Feedback





















# Conclusion

# Future Work

- Instability
- Additional Parts of Zephyr
- Additional Targets
- Comparison to Other Fuzzers
- State-Inference Heuristic vs. Instrumented State Feedback
- Other Uses for State Feedback



# FTZ: A State-Infering Fuzzer for the TCP/IP Stack of Zephyr

- Efficient Execution and Interaction
- Improvements for Dealing With and Evaluation of Inconsistent Behaviour
- Evaluation of Different Message Modeling and Mutation Approaches
- Evaluation of Different Mutation Targeting Strategies
- Evaluation of State-Inference Feedback
- Contributions to Various Open-Source Projects

[github.com/riesentoaster/FTZ](https://github.com/riesentoaster/FTZ)

# Seeding

