
Security and Assurance Architectures

Ricardo Villalón

Security Architecture Description



Security Architecture Description


Based on ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010

Stakeholders: consumers, developers, technical working group, evaluators, security officers, auditors, architects, designers, accreditors.

Concerns: how to consider organization security policies, threats, vulnerabilities, more security properties, security objectives for TOE and OE, system global security, automation of security, different system sizes and complexity, security governance

Viewpoints: system, security, process.


Models: system representation, security representation, security methodology.



System Representation


Representing system structure

Whole-parts diagrams




Representing system functions/capabilities

Interaction diagrams



Physical Interaction



Digital Interaction

Security Representation

Direct security objectives: describing the main (initial) security goals

Direct
Security
Objectives


What to do about security
Where to do it
When to do it

Indirect security objectives: can be found when security relationships are identified


Indirect
Security
Objectives

Isolation relationship
Interaction relationship
Representation relationship


Security Methodology Proposal




Cup Package Example



a) Cup-Package System



b) Whole-parts Tree



c) Interaction Diagrams

Component 1	Component 2	Representation
Cups	No. of Cups	Size of Cups
No. of Cups	Content Label	Physical Representation
Cup1, Cup 2	Fragile Msg	Fragility of Cup 1 and Cup 2
Fragile Msg	Fragile Label	Physical Representation

d) Representation Relationship Table

Cup Package Security Objectives

*We want to prevent the cups from being
broken or lost while transported to their
destination*



DO[1][1] *We want to prevent the Cup 1
from being broken while transported to its
destination.*

DO[1][2] *We want to prevent the Cup 1
from being lost while transported to its des-
tination.*

DO[2][1] *We want to prevent the Cup 2
from being broken while transported to its
destination.*

DO[2][2] *We want to prevent the Cup 2
from being lost while transported to its des-
tination.*

DO[3][1] *We want to prevent the Cups
from being broken while transported to
their destination.*

DO[3][2] *We want to prevent the Cups
from being lost while transported to their
destination.*

DO[10][1] *We want to prevent the
Cup-Package from being broken while
transported to its destination.*

DO[10][2] *We want to prevent the
Cup-Package from being lost while
transported to its destination.*

Assurance Architecture Description



Assurance Architecture Description

Based on ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010

Stakeholders: consumers, developers, technical working group, evaluators, security officers, auditors, architects, designers, accreditors.

Concerns: Threats to security and organizational security policy commitments clearly articulated and the security controls be demonstrably sufficient. Measures to reduce the likelihood of vulnerabilities, the ability to exercise them, and the extent of the damage. Measures to facilitate subsequent identification elimination, mitigation, and/or notification of exploited or triggered vulnerabilities.

Viewpoints: security solution, evaluation, process.

Model kinds: system representation, evaluation representation, assurance methodology.

