CVM Extension: Confidential Virtual Machine Extension for RISC-V

Dingji Li *IPADS, SJTU*





MULTIPLE C-MODE ID

Infinite Isolated Environment

- Goal: each CVM should be isolated from all other software
 - Last meeting: prefer infinite modes with isolation
 - Each CVM resides in its own isolated mode
- CPU states isolation
 - CPU states at run-time are intrinsically isolated from other CPUs
- Memory isolation
 - PMP mechanisms isolate memory of different modes
- I/O isolation
 - IOPMP


Multiple C-mode ID

- For global trusted secure shim model
 - The seshim is the TCB that can isolate CVMs with G-stage page tables
 - Binary modes are sufficient to isolate seshim and HS-mode hypervisor


- For per-CVM secure shim model
 - Each CVM (with its seshim) can reside in an isolated mode
 - Multiple C-mode ID: each CVM is tagged with a unique ID

Design Direction

Previous (binary modes)



- Multiple C-mode ID
 - Indicate C-mode ID in leaf PMP table entries



Permissions for a 4KiB physical page in leaf pmpte

INTERACTION WITH AP-TEE

Interaction with AP-TEE


- AP-TEE: a software guideline/arch based on existing hardware
 - Switching between host OS/VMM and trusted OS/VMM via M-mode
 - ABIs: S-mode to M-mode, V-mode to HS-mode

- Hardware extension is still necessary for confidential VM
 - Attestation (local & remote)
 - Memory confidentiality and integrity
 - Fine-grained dynamic confidential memory adjustment
 - Performance improvement

PMP TABLE EXTENSION


Problem Recap

- Why not reuse existing PMP by changing PMP rule in M-mode?
 - Pros: less modifications to existing spec if there are enough PMP entries
 - Cons: cannot support fine-grained memory accessibility




Existing PMP is Not Ideal

- High resource utilization is one main goal of VMs
 - Existing PMP entries: static memory partition / contiguous memory allocation
 - Memory demand of VMs: dynamic and nonconsecutive memory allocation
- Limited number of PMP entries is inadequate
 - For high memory utilization / high VM density
 - For fine-grained memory accessibility (e.g., 4KB granularity)



Problem from Google Doc

- Why not reuse existing MMU by adding a C-bit in PTEs?
 - Pros: small modifications to existing hardware, reuse cache and TLB
 - Cons: complicated software implementation




Trade-offs of Extending MMU

- Must ensure the correctness of C-bit in PTEs
 - Untrusted software can corrupt PTEs
- Trusted components must control all modifications to PTEs
 - Modify untrusted software, forward PT ops to trusted components
 - Pros: less modifications to hardware
 - Cons: intrusive modifications to untrusted software
 - Trap and emulate PT ops of untrusted software
 - Pros: transparent to untrusted software
 - Cons: excessive mode switches can result in poor performance
- What if MMU is disabled by untrusted software?

M-MODE INTERRUPT

Problem Recap

- Can CHS-mode CSRs really reduce M-mode software complexity?
 - Does M-mode still need to swap context when an M-mode interrupt happens?



M-mode needs to save a copy of GP-registers in C mode, then enters non-C mode?

M-mode Interrupt Handling

M-mode interrupts

- Cause an immediate jump to the trap vector running in M-mode
- Depend on the mideleg, mie and mip

Non-Maskable Interrupts (NMIs)

Non-maskable interrupts (NMIs) are only used for hardware error conditions, and cause an immediate jump to an implementation-defined NMI vector running in M-mode regardless of the state of a hart's interrupt enable bits. The mepc register is written with the virtual address of the instruction that was interrupted, and mcause is set to a value indicating the source of the NMI. The NMI can thus overwrite state in an active machine-mode interrupt handler.

√ No additional context swap logic is needed

- 1. Trap to M-mode and save GP-regs
- 2. Handle the interrupt in M-mode
- 3. Return to the trap point

Thanks!