



RISC-V External Debug Security Specification

Version v0.6.0, 2024-12-13: Draft

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Preamble



This document is in the [Development state](#)

Expect potential changes. This draft specification is likely to evolve before it is accepted as a standard. Implementations based on this draft may not conform to the future standard.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Debugging and tracing are essential for developers to identify and rectify software and hardware issues, optimize performance, and ensure robust system functionality. The debugging and tracing extensions in the RISC-V ecosystem play a pivotal role in enabling these capabilities, allowing developers to monitor and control the execution of programs during the development, testing and production phases. However, the current RISC-V Debug specification grants the external debugger the highest privilege in the system, regardless of the privilege level at which the target system is running. It leads to privilege escalation issues when multiple actors are present.

This specification defines [Debug Module Security Extension \(non-ISA extension\)](#) and [Sdsec \(ISA extension\)](#) to address the above security issues in the current *The RISC-V Debug Specification* [1] and trace specifications [2] [3].

A summary of the changes introduced by *The RISC-V External Debug Security Specification* follows.

- **Per-Hart Debug Control:** Introduce per-hart states to control whether external debug is allowed in M-mode and/or supervisor domains [4].
- **Per-Hart Trace Control:** Introduce per-hart states to control whether tracing is allowed in M-mode and/or supervisor domains.
- **Non-secure debug:** Add a non-secure debug state to relax security constraints.
- **Debug Mode entry:** An external debugger can only halt the hart and enter debug mode when debug is allowed in current privilege mode.
- **Memory Access:** Memory access from a hart's point of view, using the Program Buffer or an Abstract Command, must be checked by the hart's memory protection mechanisms as if the hart is running at [debug access privilege level](#); memory access from the Debug Module using System Bus Access must be checked by a system memory protection mechanism, such as IOPMP or WorldGuard.
- **Register Access:** Register access using the Program Buffer or an Abstract Command works as if the hart is running at [debug access privilege level](#) instead of M-mode privilege level. The debug CSRs (`dcsr` and `dpc`) are shadowed in supervisor domains while `Smtdeleg` [5] and `Smstateen` extension exposes the trigger CSRs to supervisor domains.
- **Triggers:** Triggers (with action=1) can only fire or match when external debug is allowed in the current privilege mode.

1.1. Terminology

Abstract command	A high-level Debug Module operation used to interact with and control harts
Debug Access Privilege	The privilege with which an Abstract Command or instructions in the Program Buffer access hardware resources
Debug Mode	An additional privilege mode to support off-chip debugging
Hart	A RISC-V hardware thread
IOPMP	Input-Output Physical Memory Protection unit

M-mode	The highest privileged mode in the RISC-V privilege model
PMA	Physical Memory Attributes
PMP	Physical Memory Protection unit
Program buffer	A mechanism that allows the Debug Module to execute arbitrary instructions on a hart
Supervisor domain	An isolated supervisor execution context defined in RISC-V Supervisor Domains Access Protection [4]
Trace encoder	A piece of hardware that takes in instruction execution information from a RISC-V hart and transforms it into trace packets

Chapter 2. External Debug Security Threat model

Modern SoC development consists of several different actors who may not trust each other, resulting in the need to isolate actors' assets during the development and debugging phases. The current RISC-V Debug specification [1] grants external debuggers the highest privilege in the system, regardless of the privilege level at which the target system is running. This leads to privilege escalation issues when multiple actors are present.

For example, the owner of an SoC, who needs to debug their M-mode firmware, may be able to use the external debugger to bypass PMP lock (pmpcfg.L=1) and attack Boot ROM (the SoC creator's asset).

Additionally, RISC-V privilege architecture supports multiple software entities, or "supervisor domains," that do not trust each other. The supervisor domains are managed by a secure monitor running in M-mode, are isolated from each other by PMP/IOPMP, and may need different debug policies. The entity that owns the secure monitor wants to disable external debug when shipping the secure monitor; however, the entity that owns the supervisor domain needs to enable external debug to develop the supervisor domain. Since the external debugger will be the granted highest privilege in the system, a malicious supervisor domain will be able to compromise M-mode secure monitor with the external debugger.

Chapter 3. Sdsec (ISA extension)

This chapter introduces the Sdsec ISA extension, which enhances the Sdext extension defined in *The RISC-V Debug Specification* [1]. The Sdsec extension provides privilege based protection for debug operations, and for triggers in Sdtrig [1]. Furthermore, it constrains trace functionality [2] according to RISC-V privilege levels.

3.1. External Debug

Chapter 3 of *The RISC-V Debug Specification* [1] outlines all mandatory and optional debug operations. The operations listed below are affected by the Sdsec extension, other operations remain unaffected. In the context of this chapter, **debug operations** refer to those listed below.

Debug operations affected by Sdsec: * Halting the hart to enter Debug Mode * Executing the Program Buffer * Serving abstract commands (Access Register, Access Memory)

When external debug is disallowed at the current privilege level, the hart behaves as follows:

- The hart will not enter Debug Mode. Halt requests will remain pending until debug is allowed.
- Triggers with `action=1` will not match or fire.
- "Quick Access" Abstract Commands, which do not require the hart to be in the halted state, will be dropped and set `abstractcs.cmderr` to 6.

The subsequent subsections describe how external debug is authorized by [M-mode debug control](#) and [supervisor domain debug control](#).



A pending request to enter Debug Mode can dynamically change from a disallowed state to an allowed state due to updates in debug controls. For example, once the software completes executing confidential code, it can grant debuggability for an external debugger. Afterwards, the software can enter a `while(1)` loop, waiting for the debugger to take control and break out of the loop.

3.1.1. M-mode Debug Control

A state element in each hart, named `mdbgen`, is introduced to control the debuggability of M-mode for each hart as depicted in [Figure 1](#). When `mdbgen` is set to 1, the following rules apply:

- The [debug access privilege](#) for the hart is M-mode
- The [debug operations](#) are permitted when the hart executes in any privilege mode
- Abstract Commands, including "Quick Access", and Program Buffer execution operate with M-mode privilege

When `mdbgen` is set to 0, the [debug operations](#) are disallowed and the [behaviors](#) applies when the hart runs in M-mode.



`mdbgen` may be controlled through various methods, such as a new input port to the

hart, a handshake with the system Root of Trust (RoT), or other methods. The implementation can choose to group several harts together and use one signal to drive their **mdbgen** state or assign each hart its own dedicated state. For example, a homogeneous computing system can use a signal to drive all **mdbgen** state to enforce a unified debug policy across all harts.

3.1.2. Supervisor Domain Debug Control

The **Smsdedbg** extension [4] introduces **sdedbgalw** field (bit 7) in CSR **msdcfg**, to control the debuggability of supervisor domains. When **mdbgen**=0, the **sdedbgalw** field determines both the debug allowed privilege modes and the **debug access privilege**, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. External Debug Configuration and Privilege

mdbgen	sdedbgalw	Debug allowed privilege modes	Debug access privilege (dmprv=0)
1	Don't care	All	M-mode
0	1	All except M	S-mode
0	0	None	N/A

3.1.3. Debug Access Privilege

The **debug access privilege** is defined as the privilege level granted to the external debugger when performing state accesses via the hart, such as Abstract Commands and Program Buffer execution. Where previously Debug Mode always had access to M-mode state, Debug Mode now accesses registers and memory using **debug access privilege**. Attempts from Debug Mode to access state that requires privilege above **debug access privilege** will fail and set **abstractcs.cmderr** to 3. The **debug access privilege** is derived as shown in Table 1, and can be modified using **dcscr.dmprv** as described in Table 2.

The **dmprv** field in **dcscr** modifies the effective **debug access privilege** to memory. When **dmprv**=0, the **debug access privilege** to memory follows Table 1; when **dmprv**=1, the effective **debug access privilege** to memory is represented by **prv** and **v** fields in **dcscr**.

Table 2. Details of the **dmprv** field in **dcscr**

Field	Description	Access	Reset
dmprv	0 (normal): The privilege level in Debug Mode is not modified. 1: In Debug Mode, the privilege level for load and store operations is modified and indicated by prv and v .	WARL	0

3.1.4. Using EBREAK to Enter Debug Mode

EBREAK works as specified in The RISC-V Debug Specification [1] when external debug is allowed at the running privilege level. When the hart is running at a debug disallowed privilege level, EBREAK always raises a breakpoint exception.

3.1.5. Privilege Level Changing Instructions

The RISC-V Debug Specification [1] defines that the instructions that change the privilege mode have UNSPECIFIED behavior when executed within the Program Buffer, with exception of the EBREAK instruction. In Sdsec, privilege changing instructions (other than EBREAK) executed in the Program Buffer must either act as a NOP or raise an exception (stopping execution and setting `abstractcs.cmderr` to 3).

3.1.6. Interrupt during Single Stepping

Interrupts during single-step can be disabled by setting `dcsr.stepie`=0. When `mdbgen` is 1, `stepie` disables interrupts in all privilege modes for the hart. When `mdbgen` is 0 and `sdedbgalw` is 1, only delegated interrupts are disabled, while interrupts that trap to M-mode are not affected.



When debugging is only allowed for the supervisor domain, M-mode interrupts must not be disabled. Otherwise, debugging might impact the behavior of other parts of the system. For example, if a context switch for the supervisor domain triggered by a timer interrupt is suppressed, some real-time workloads might not be completed on time, resulting in unexpected errors.

3.2. Trace

When Sdsec is supported, trace, as a non-intrusive debug method, will be constrained based on RISC-V privilege level. The availability of trace output is indicated through the interface defined in RISC-V Efficient Trace for RISC-V [2] to trace module.

3.2.1. M-Mode Trace Control

Each hart must add a new state element, `mtrcen`, which controls the availability of M-mode tracing. Setting `mtrcen` to 1 enables trace for both M-mode and the supervisor domain; setting `mtrcen` to 0 inhibits trace when the hart is running in M-mode.



Similar to M-mode debug control, `mtrcen` may be controlled through various methods, such as a new input port to the hart, a handshake with the system Root of Trust (RoT), or other methods. The implementation may group several harts together and use one signal to drive their `mtrcen` state or assign each hart its own dedicated state.

3.2.2. Supervisor Domain Trace Control

The Smsdetrc extension introduces `sdetrclw` field (bit 8) in CSR `msdcfg` within a hart. The trace availability for a hart in supervisor domain is determined by the `sdetrclw` field and `mtrcen`. If either `sdetrclw` or `mtrcen` is set to 1, trace can be allowed when the hart runs in the supervisor domain.

When both `sdetrclw` and `mtrcen` are set to 0, trace is inhibited at all privilege levels.

3.3. Triggers (Sdtrig)

Triggers configured to enter Debug Mode can only fire or match when external debug is allowed, as outlined in [Table 1](#).



Implementations must ensure that pending triggers intending to enter Debug Mode match or fire only when the hart is in a state where debug is allowed. For example, if an interrupt traps the hart to a debug-disallowed privilege mode, the trigger can only take effect either before the privilege is updated and control flow is transferred to the trap handler, or after the interrupt is completely handled and returns from the trap handler. The implementation must prevent Debug Mode from being entered in an intermediate state where privilege is changed or the PC is updated. This also applies to scenarios where a trigger is configured to enter Debug Mode before instruction execution and an interrupt occurs simultaneously.

3.3.1. M-mode Accessibility to `dmode`

When Sdsec extension is implemented, `dmode` is read/write for both M-mode and Debug Mode when `mdbgen` is 0, and remains only accessible to Debug Mode when `mdbgen` is 1.



M-mode is given write access to `dmode` to allow it to save/restore trigger context on behalf of a supervisor debugger. Otherwise a trigger could serve as a side-channel to debug disallowed supervisor domains. The trigger may raise a breakpoint exception in a supervisor domain where debugging is disallowed. This could allow the external debugger to indirectly observe the state from the debug disallowed supervisor domain (PC, data address, etc.) and may even result in a Denial of Service (DoS). By making `dmode` M-mode accessible when `mdbgen` is 0, such an attack can be mitigated by having M-mode firmware switch the trigger context at supervisor domain boundary.

3.3.2. External Triggers

The external trigger outputs (with `action` = 8/9) will not fire or match when the privilege level of the hart exceeds debug allowed privilege as specified in [Table 1](#).

The external trigger input can be driven by any input signals, e.g. the external trigger output from another hart, interrupt signals, etc. The input signals cause the trigger (with `action` = 1) to fire only when the hart is allowed to debug. The initiators of these signals are responsible for determining whether the signal is allowed to assert. For example, if the external trigger input of hart *i* is connected to external trigger output of hart *j*, the assertion of output signal from hart *j* is determined by its own allowed privilege level for debug. The output signal of hart *j* must not assert when debug is disallowed. Similarly, signals from other modules in the system are managed by the individual module. When the module is not debug allowed, the signal connected to external trigger input must not be asserted.



This represents a balance between usability and hardware complexity. There may be instances where the triggers are linked across different privilege levels (e.g.,


from S-mode to M-mode), while the external debugger may only have access with S-mode privilege. The external debugger should not modify the chain, because it could be suppressed or incorrectly match or fire in M-mode.

3.4. CSRs

3.4.1. Extension of Sdext CSR

Extended dcsr

The **dmprv** is added as bit 18 in **dcsr** to modify the **debug access privilege** for memory load and store operations, as defined in [Section 3.1.3](#).



Register 1: The **dmprv** field in debug control and status register (**dcsr**)

The maximum privilege level that can be configured in **prv** and **v** is determined in [Table 3](#). The fields retain legal values when the **prv** and **v** are configured with an illegal privilege level. Illegal privilege levels include unsupported levels and any level higher than the maximum allowed debug privilege.

Table 3. Maximum Allowed Resume Privilege Mode

mdbgen	sdedbgalw	Maximum privilege allowed on resume
1	Don't care	M
0	1	S(HS)
0	0	None

Sdcsr and sdpc

The **sdcsr** and **sdpc** registers provide supervisor read/write access to the **dcsr** and **dpc** registers respectively. They are only accessible in Debug Mode.

Table 4. Allocated addresses for supervisor shadow of Debug Mode CSR

Number	Name	Description
0xaaa	sdcsr	Supervisor debug control and status register.
0xaaa	sdpc	Supervisor debug program counter.

The **sdcsr** register exposes a subset of **dcsr**, formatted as shown in [Register 2](#), while the **sdpc** register provides full access to **dpc**.



Unlike `dcsr` and `dpc`, the `dscratch*` registers do not have a supervisor access mechanism, and external debuggers with S-mode privilege cannot not use them.

31	28	27	26	24	23	22
debugver			0	extcause		0
21	19	18	17	16	15	14
0	dmprv		ebreakvs	ebreakvu	0	0
10	9	8	6	5	4	3
0	0	cause		v	0	0
					2	1
					step	0
						prv

Register 2: Supervisor debug control and status register (`sdcscr`)



The `nmip`, `mprven`, `stoptime`, `stopcount`, `ebreakm` and `cetrig` fields in `dcsr` are configurable only by M-mode, masked from `sdcscr`, while the `prv` field is constrained to 1 bit.

DXLEN-1	0
sdpc	
DXLEN	

Register 3: Supervisor debug program counter (`sdpc`)

3.4.2. Extension of Sdtrig CSR

The `Smtdeleg` [5] and `Smstateen` extensions define the process for delegating triggers to modes with lower privilege than M-mode. The `Sdsec` requires both extensions to securely delegate `Sdtrig` triggers to supervisor domain.



When M-mode enables debugging for supervisor domain, it can optionally delegate the triggers to the supervisor domain, allowing an external debugger with S-mode privilege to configure these triggers.

3.4.3. Debug Control CSR

The CSR holding the debug and trace control knobs for supervisor domain are specified in the `Smsdedbg` and `Smsdetr` extensions, respectively, defined in *RISC-V Supervisor Domains Access Protection* [4]. The `Smsdedbg` and/or `Smsdetr` extensions must be implemented to support security control for debugging and/or tracing in supervisor domains.

Chapter 4. Debug Module Security (non-ISA) Extension

This chapter defines the required security enhancements for the Debug Module. The debug operations listed below are modified by the extension.

- Halt
- Reset
- Keepalive
- Abstract commands (Access Register, Quick Access, Access Memory)
- System bus access

If any hart in the system implements the Sdsec extension, the Debug Module must also implement the Debug Module Security Extension.

4.1. External Debug Security Extensions Discovery

The ISA and non-ISA external debug security extensions impose security constraints and introduce non-backward-compatible changes. The presence of the extensions can be determined by polling the `allsecured` or/and `anysecured` bits in `dmstatus` Table 5. If the field `allsecured` or `anysecured` is set to 1, it represents that all or any selected harts adopt the Sdsec extension. When any hart adopts the Sdsec extension, it indicates the Debug Module implements Debug Module Security Extension as described in this chapter.

4.2. Halt

The halt behavior for a hart is detailed in Section 3.1. According to *The RISC-V Debug Specification* [1], a halt request must be responded within one second. However, this constraint must be removed as the request might be pending due to the situations where debugging is disallowed. In the case of halt-on-reset request, the request is only acknowledged by the hart once it has reached a privilege level in which debug is permitted.

4.3. Reset

The hartreset operation resets selected harts. When M-mode is not allowed to be debugged, the hart will raise a security fault error to the Debug Module. The debugger could monitor the error by polling `allsecfault` or/and `anysecfault` in `dmstatus`.

The ndmreset operation is a system-level reset not tied to hart privilege levels and reset the entire system (excluding the Debug Module). Debug Module Security Extension makes ndmreset read-only 0. The debugger can determine support for the ndmreset operation by setting the field to 1 and subsequently verifying the returned value upon reading.

4.4. Keepalive

The keepalive bit serves as an optional request for the hart to remain available for debugging. This bit only takes effect when M-mode is allowed to be debugged; otherwise, the hart behaves as if the bit is not set.

4.5. Abstract Commands

The hart's response to abstract commands is detailed in [Section 3.1](#). The following subsection delineates the constraints when the Debug Module issues an abstract command.

4.5.1. Relaxed Permission Check `relaxedpriv`

The `relaxedpriv` field is hardwired to 0.

4.5.2. Address Translation `aamvirtual`

The field `aamvirtual` in the command (at 0x17 in the Debug Module) determines whether the Access Memory command uses a physical or virtual address. When an Access Memory command is issued with `aamvirtual`=0, the hart must check whether the physical access is allowed to access memory. The hart responds with an exception to the Debug Module when M-mode is not permitted to debug, `tvm` (in `mstatus`) is set to 1, and `mode` (in `satp`) enables any kind of virtual translation. In the event of an exception, the Debug Module set `cmderr` of `abstractcs` (at 0x16 in Debug Module) to 3 and clear the data registers to 0.

4.5.3. Quick Access

When M-mode debugging is not allowed (`mdbgen`=0) for a hart, any Quick Access operation will be discarded, causing `abstractcs.cmderr` to set to 6.



Quick Access abstract commands effect a halt, execution of Program Buffer, and resume of the selected hart. However, it is undesirable for these Quick Access halts to remain pending until debug is allowed, since the debugger blocks while waiting for the Quick Access to complete. Returning an error only for Quick Access commands received when debug is not allowed would require the hart to distinguish between Quick Access halt requests and other halt requests. Because Quick Access is merely an optimized flow and not required for any usage models, it was decided to avoid burdening the hart with extra hardware. Therefore, Quick Access is forbidden when `mdbgen` is 0.

4.6. System Bus Access

The System Bus Access must be checked by bus initiator protection mechanisms such as IOPMP [6], WorldGuard [7]. The bus protection unit can return error to Debug Module on illegal access, in that case, Debug Module will set `serror` of `sbc` (at 0x38 in Debug Module) to 6 (security fault error).



Trusted entities like RoT should configure IOPMP or equivalent protection before

granting debug access to M-mode. Similarly, M-mode should apply the protection before enabling supervisor domain debug.

4.7. Security Fault Error Reporting

A dedicated error code, security fault error (cmderr 6), is included in **cmderr** of **abstractcs**. Issuance of abstract commands under disallowed circumstance sets **cmderr** to 6. Additionally, the bus security fault error (serror 6) is introduced in **serror** of **sbc** to denote errors related to system bus access.

The error raised by **resethaltreq**, **reset** can be identified through the fields **allsecfault** and **anysecfault** in **dmstatus**. Error status bits are internally maintained for each hart, with the **allsecfault** and **anysecfault** fields indicating the error status of the currently selected harts. These error statuses are sticky and can only be cleared by writing 1 to **acksecfault** in **dmcs2**.

4.8. Non-secure Debug

The state element **nsecdbg** is introduced to retain full debugging capabilities, as if the extensions in this specification were not implemented. When **nsecdbg** is set to 1:

- All **debug operations** are executed with M-mode privilege (equivalent to having **mdbgen** set to 1) for all harts in the system.
- The **ndmreset** operation is allowed.
- The **relaxedpriv** field may be configurable.
- System Bus Access may bypass the bus initiator protections.
- Trace output is enabled in all privilege modes.

4.9. Update of Debug Module Registers


31									
27									
26									
25									
24									
22									
0									
allsecfault									
anysecfault									
defined in Debug Module									
21									
20									
19									
11									
allsecured									
anysecured									
defined in Debug Module									
10									
0									
defined in Debug Module									

Register 4: Newly introduced fields in **dmstatus**

Table 5. Details of newly introduced fields in **dmstatus**

Field	Description	Access	Reset
allsecured	The field is 1 when all currently selected harts implement Sdsec extension	R	-
anysecured	The field is 1 when any currently selected hart implements Sdsec extension	R	-
allsecfault	The field is 1 when all currently selected harts have raised security fault due to reset or keepalive operation.	R	-

Field	Description	Access	Reset
anysecfault	The field is 1 when any currently selected hart has raised security fault due to reset or keepalive operation.	R	-



Register 5: Newly introduced acksecfault in dmcs2

Table 6. Detail of acksecfault in dmcs2

Field	Description	Access	Reset
acksecfault	0 (nop): No effect. 1 (ack): Clears error status bits for any selected harts.	W1	-

Appendix A: Theory of Operation

This chapter explains the theory of operation for the External Debug Security Extension. The subsequent diagram illustrates the reference implementation of security control for the debug and trace, respectively.

A.1. Debug Security Control

As outlined in the specification, the dedicated debug security policy for a hart is enforced by platform state `nsecdbg`, hart state `mdbgen`, and the `sdedbgalw` field inside the `msdcfg` CSR. Both the `nsecdbg` and `mdbgen` states can be accommodated in MMIO outside the harts, such as in the Debug Module registers, or implemented as fuses.

The security control logic validates all debug requests and triggers (with action=1) firing/matching based on `nsecdbg`, `mdbgen`, and `sdedbgalw` against the privilege level of the hart. Debug requests that fail validation will either be dropped or kept pending. Additionally, the platform-specific external trigger inputs must obey platform constraints, which must be carefully handled by the platform implementation.

When `nsecdbg` is set to 0, the validation process involves two actors, which may lead to a potential Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) issue. To mitigate this, the implementation must ensure that both the validation and execution of debug requests occur under the same privilege level and the same debug security policy. Failing to do so may allow debug requests to bypass security controls.




Figure 1. The debug security control

When the external debugger is stepping through an instruction that triggers a transition to a higher privilege level, the security control logic must verify against debug capability according to [Table 1](#)

before entering Debug Mode. If debugging is permitted, the hart re-enters Debug Mode after executing the instruction. Otherwise, the hart continues executing with the pending single step request until it becomes debuggable and can re-enter Debug Mode. In scenarios where multiple supervisor domains are debuggable, the secure monitor in M-mode may switch the context during single stepping. In such cases, the debugger might stop in a different application than the original one. Users of the debugger should be mindful of this possibility.

Application-level debugging is primarily accomplished through self-hosted debugging, allowing the management of debug policies by supervisor domains. As a result, user-level debugging management is not addressed within this extension.

A.2. Trace Security Control

Similar to debug security, trace is controlled by platform state `nsecdbg`, hart state `mtrcen`, and `sdetrca1w` in CSR `msdefg` for each hart. The `sec_inhibit` sideband signal indicates the availability of trace to the trace encoder.




Figure 2. The trace security control

Appendix B: Execution Based Implementation with Sdsec

In an execution-based implementation, the code executing the "park loop" can always run with M-mode privilege to access the memory and CSR. However, once execution is dispatched to an Abstract Command or the program buffer, the privilege level for accessing memory and CSR should be restricted to [debug access privilege](#).

To achieve this, a Debug Mode only state element (e.g., a field in a custom CSR) may be introduced to control the privilege level in Debug Mode. When the state is set to 1, Debug Mode allows M-mode privilege; when cleared to 0, it enforces the [debug access privilege](#). The hardware sets this state to 1 upon entering the park loop and clears it to 0 by the final instruction of the park loop, right before execution is transferred to an Abstract Command or the program buffer.

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