



RISC-V External Debug Security Specification

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Preamble



This document is in the *Development state*

Expect potential changes. This draft specification is likely to evolve before it is accepted as a standard. Implementations based on this draft may not conform to the future standard.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Debugging and tracing are essential for developers to identify and rectify software and hardware issues, optimize performance, and ensure robust system functionality. The debugging and tracing extensions in the RISC-V ecosystem play a pivotal role in enabling these capabilities, allowing developers to monitor and control the execution of programs during the development, testing and production phases. However, the current RISC-V Debug specification grants the external debugger the highest privilege in the system, regardless of the privilege level at which the target system is running. It leads to privilege escalation issues when multiple actors are present.

This specification defines [Debug Module Security Extension \(non-ISA extension\)](#) and [Sdsec \(ISA extension\)](#) to address the above security issues in the current *The RISC-V Debug Specification* [1] and trace specifications [2] [3].

A summary of the changes introduced by *The RISC-V External Debug Security Specification* follows.

- **Per-Hart Debug Control:** Introduce per-hart states to control whether external debug is allowed in M-mode and/or supervisor domains [4].
- **Per-Hart Trace Control:** Introduce per-hart states to control whether tracing is allowed in M-mode and/or supervisor domains.
- **Non-secure debug:** Add a non-secure debug state to relax security constraints.
- **Debug Mode entry:** An external debugger can only halt the hart and enter debug mode when debug is allowed in current privilege mode.
- **Memory Access:** Memory access from a hart's point of view, using the Program Buffer or an Abstract Command, must be checked by the hart's memory protection mechanisms as if the hart is running at [debug access privilege level](#); memory access from the Debug Module using System Bus Access must be checked by a system memory protection mechanism, such as IOPMP or WorldGuard.
- **Register Access:** Register access using the Program Buffer or an Abstract Command works as if the hart is running at [debug access privilege level](#) instead of M-mode privilege level. The debug CSRs (**dcsr** and **dpc**) are shadowed in supervisor domains while Smtdeleg/Sstcfg [5] extensions expose the trigger CSRs to supervisor domains.
- **Triggers:** Triggers (with ACTION=1) can only match or fire when external debug is allowed in the effective privilege mode.

1.1. Terminology

Abstract command	A high-level Debug Module operation used to interact with and control harts
Debug Access Privilege	The privilege level with which an Abstract Command or instruction in the Program Buffer accesses hardware resources
Debug Mode	An additional privilege mode to support off-chip debugging
Hart	A RISC-V hardware thread
IOPMP	Input-Output Physical Memory Protection unit
M-mode	The highest privileged mode in the RISC-V privilege model
PMA	Physical Memory Attributes
PMP	Physical Memory Protection unit
Program buffer	A mechanism that allows the Debug Module to execute arbitrary instructions on a hart

Supervisor domain	An isolated supervisor execution context defined in RISC-V Supervisor Domains Access Protection [4]
Trace encoder	A piece of hardware that takes in instruction execution information from a RISC-V hart and transforms it into trace packets

Chapter 2. External Debug Security Threat Model

Modern SoC development involves several different actors who may not trust each other, resulting in the need to isolate actors' assets during the development and debugging phases. The current RISC-V Debug specification [1] grants external debuggers the highest privilege in the system, regardless of the privilege level at which the target system is running. This leads to privilege escalation issues when multiple actors are present.

For example, the owner of an SoC, who needs to debug their M-mode firmware, may be able to use the external debugger to bypass PMP lock (`pmppcfg.L=1`) and attack Boot ROM (the SoC creator's asset).

Additionally, the RISC-V privilege architecture supports multiple software entities, or "supervisor domains," that do not trust each other. These supervisor domains are managed by a secure monitor running in M-mode, are isolated from each other by PMP/IOPMP, and may need different debug policies. The entity that owns the secure monitor wants to disable external debug when shipping the secure monitor; however, the entity that owns the supervisor domain needs to enable external debug to develop the supervisor domain. Since the external debugger is granted the highest privilege in the system, a malicious supervisor domain could compromise the M-mode secure monitor with the external debugger.

Chapter 3. Sdsec (ISA extension)

This chapter introduces the Sdsec ISA extension, which adds security enhancements to the Sdext/Sdtrig [1] and trace functionality [2] [3]. The extension provides mandatory M-mode debug and trace control, along with optional extensions for lower privilege modes.

It defines the following debug and trace controls:

- **M-mode Control (Smmddbg)**: Mandatory control for M-mode external debug and trace
- **S-mode Control (Smsddbg)**: Optional extension for S/HS-mode external debug and trace
- **VS-mode Control (Smvsddbg)**: Optional extension for VS-mode external debug and trace
- **U-mode Control (Smuddbg)**: Optional extension for U/VU-mode external debug and trace

When debug or trace is allowed for a privilege mode, it is allowed for all lower privilege modes as well.

The following table summarizes the debug and trace control and associated CSRs:

Table 1. Debug and Trace Control and CSRs

Extension	Debug Control	Trace Control	New CSRs	Target Modes
Smmddbg	mdbgcn	mtrcn	None	M-mode
Smsddbg	msdcfg.SDEDBGALW	msdcfg.SDETRCALW	sdcscr, sdpc	S/HS-mode
Smvsddbg	msdcfg.VSEDBGALW	msdcfg.VSETRCALW	None	VS-mode
Smuddbg	msdcfg.USEDBGALW	msdcfg.USETRCALW	udcsr, udpc	U-Mode or VU-mode



Users can choose to implement some or all of the optional extensions depending on their system requirements. These extensions work together to establish a hierarchical debug control model where external debug access can be restricted to specific privilege levels, preventing unauthorized debugging.

The following table shows valid implementation combinations for different architectures:

Table 2. Valid Implementation Combinations

Architecture	Valid Extension Combinations
M-only	• Smmddbg only
M/U	• Smmddbg only • Smmddbg + Smuddbg
M/S/U	• Smmddbg only • Smmddbg + Smsddbg • Smmddbg + Smsddbg + Smuddbg
M/S/VS/VU/U	• Smmddbg only • Smmddbg + Smsddbg • Smmddbg + Smsddbg + Smvsddbg • Smmddbg + Smsddbg + Smvsddbg + Smuddbg

3.1. Debug Control CSR

The CSR `msdcfg`, which holds the debug and trace control fields (Table 1), is defined in the RISC-V Supervisor Domains Access Protection specification [4]. The `Smsddbg` and/or `Smsdetrc` extensions must be implemented to support security control for debugging and/or tracing in the corresponding privilege

modes.

3.2. External Debug

Chapter 3 of *The RISC-V Debug Specification* [1] outlines all mandatory and optional debug operations. The operations listed below are affected by the Sdsec extension; other operations remain unaffected. In the context of this chapter, **debug operations** refer to those listed below.

Debug operations affected by Sdsec:

- Halting the hart to enter Debug Mode
- Executing the Program Buffer
- Serving abstract commands (Access Register, Access Memory)

3.2.1. Debug Access Privilege

The **debug access privilege** is defined as the privilege level for state accesses in Debug Mode, such as Abstract Commands and Program Buffer execution. When external debug security extension is implemented, Debug Mode accessing registers and memory uses the privilege level derived in [Table 3](#). Attempts from Debug Mode to access state that requires a privilege level above the **debug access privilege** will fail and set **abstractcs.CMDERR** to 3.

Table 3. External Debug Configuration and Privilege

mdbgen	SDEDBGALW	VSEDBGALW	UEDBGALW	Debug Access Privilege
1	Don't care	Don't care	Don't care	M-mode
0	1	Don't care	Don't care	S/HS-Mode
0	0	1	Don't care	VS-Mode
0	0	0	1	U-Mode or VU-Mode
0	0	0	0	None

3.2.2. Maximum Allowed Resume Privilege Mode

With external debug security extension, the maximum privilege level that can be configured in **dcsr.PRIV** and **dcsr.V** is determined in [Table 4](#). The fields retain legal values when the **dcsr.PRIV** and **dcsr.V** are configured with an illegal privilege level. Illegal privilege levels include unsupported levels and any level higher than the maximum allowed debug privilege.

Table 4. Maximum Allowed Resume Privilege Mode

mdbgen	SDEDBGALW	VSEDBGALW	UEDBGALW	Maximum Debug Allowed Privilege on resume
1	Don't care	Don't care	Don't care	M-Mode
0	1	Don't care	Don't care	S/HS-Mode
0	0	1	Don't care	VS-Mode
0	0	0	1	U-Mode or VU-Mode
0	0	0	0	None

3.2.3. Privilege-changing Instructions

Privilege-changing instructions (other than EBREAK) executed in the Program Buffer must either act as a NOP or raise an exception (stopping execution and setting **abstractcs.CMDERR** to 3).

3.2.4. M-mode Debug Control (Smmddedbg)

A state element in each hart, named **mdbgen**, is introduced to control the debuggability of M-mode for each hart as depicted in Figure 1. When **mdbgen** is set to 1, debug is allowed for M-mode and the following rules apply:

- The **debug access privilege** for the hart is M-mode. Abstract Commands, including "Quick Access", and Program Buffer execution operate with M-mode privilege.
- The **debug operations** are allowed when the hart executes in any privilege mode.

When **mdbgen** is set to 0 and the hart is running in M-mode, debug is disallowed for M-mode:

- The hart will not enter Debug Mode:
 - Halt requests will remain pending until debug is allowed.
 - Triggers with ACTION=1 (enter Debug Mode) will not match or fire.
 - EBREAK cannot enter Debug Mode and always raises a breakpoint exception.
- The external trigger outputs (with ACTION=8/9) will not match or fire.

If the hart is running in a debug-allowed privilege mode when **mdbgen** is 0:

- Single-stepping cannot stop in M-mode.
- Interrupts to M-mode cannot be disabled by setting **dcsr.STEPIE**=0.



When **mdbgen**=0 and **dcsr.STEP**=1, a single-stepped instruction in a debug-allowed privilege mode may transfer control to the M-mode trap handler. The hart will execute the handler in M-mode and re-enter Debug Mode immediately after an MRET instruction returns to the debug-allowed privilege mode (i.e., MRET with **mstatus.MPP**<3). The hart shall not re-enter Debug Mode if the MRET instruction returns to a debug-disallowed privilege mode (i.e., MRET with **mstatus.MPP**=3, **mdbgen**=0).



The **mdbgen** may be controlled through various methods, such as a new input port to the hart, a handshake with the system Root of Trust (RoT), or other methods. The **mdbgen** state for the Root-of-Trust (RoT) itself should be managed by SoC hardware, likely dependent on lifecycle fusing. The implementation can choose to group several harts together and use one signal to drive their **mdbgen** state or assign each hart its own dedicated state. For example, a homogeneous computing system can use a signal to drive all **mdbgen** states to enforce a unified debug policy across all harts.



This specification assumes the controlling entity ensures **mdbgen** shall never be set to 0 while the hart is in Debug Mode. Setting **mdbgen** to 0 while in Debug Mode could lead to undefined behavior; the hart may lose its debug privileges unexpectedly, potentially causing the debug session to fail or become insecure.

CSR update in Smmddedbg

The **dcsr**, **dpc**, and **dscratch0/1** are accessible in Debug Mode only if **mdbgen**=1; otherwise, the access will fail and **abstractcs.CMDERR** is set to 3 (exception). When external debug is disallowed in M-mode, the configuration in **dcsr** will be ignored as if it were 0 while the hart runs in M-mode.

DMODE in `tdata1`

When the Sdsec extension is implemented, DMODE is read/write for both M-mode and Debug Mode when `mdbgen` is 0, and remains only accessible to Debug Mode when `mdbgen` is 1.



M-mode is given write access to DMODE to allow it to save/restore trigger context on behalf of a supervisor debugger. Otherwise, a trigger could serve as a side-channel to debug-disallowed supervisor domains. The trigger may raise a breakpoint exception in a supervisor domain where debugging is disallowed. This could allow the external debugger to indirectly observe the state from the debug-disallowed supervisor domain (PC, data address, etc.) and may even result in a Denial of Service (DoS). By making DMODE M-mode accessible when `mdbgen` is 0, such an attack can be mitigated by having M-mode firmware switch the trigger context at the supervisor domain boundary.

3.2.5. S/HS-mode Debug Control (Smsddebug)

The optional Smsddebug extension introduces the `SDEDBGALW` field (bit 7) in CSR `msdcfg`. The `SDEDBGALW` field only takes effect when `mdbgen` is 0; otherwise, debug control is dominated by `mdbgen` as if `SDEDBGALW` is 0.



All behavior described in this section applies only when `mdbgen` is 0. When `mdbgen` is 1, M-mode debug control overrides all lower privilege mode settings.

When `SDEDBGALW` is set to 1, S/HS-mode debug is allowed:

- The [debug access privilege](#) for the hart is S/HS-mode. Abstract Commands, including "Quick Access", and Program Buffer execution operate with S/HS-mode privilege.
- The [debug operations](#) are allowed when the hart executes in S/HS-mode.

When `SDEDBGALW` is set to 0 and the hart is running in S/HS-mode, debug is disallowed for S/HS-mode:

- The hart will not enter Debug Mode while running in S/HS-mode:
 - Halt requests will remain pending until debug is allowed.
 - Triggers with ACTION=1 (enter Debug Mode) will not match or fire.
 - EBREAK cannot enter Debug Mode and always raises a breakpoint exception.
- The external trigger outputs (with ACTION=8/9) will not match or fire while in S/HS-mode.

When `SDEDBGALW` is set to 0 and the hart is running in a debug-allowed lower privilege mode, S/HS-mode restrictions include:

- Single-stepping cannot stop in S/HS-mode.
- Interrupts delegated to S/HS-mode cannot be disabled by setting `dcscr.STEPIE=0`.

CSR update in Smsddebug

The `sdcsr` and `sdpc` [Section 3.2.5.1.1](#) are introduced in Smsddebug. They are accessible in Debug Mode if `SDEDBGALW=1`. When external debug is disallowed in S/HS-mode, the configuration visible in `sdcsr` will be ignored as if it were 0 while the hart runs in S/HS-mode.

Sdcsr and sdpc

When **SDEDBGALW** is 1, the **sdcsr** and **sdpc** registers provide S/HS-mode read/write access to the **dcscr** and **dpc** registers respectively. However, **sdcsr** does not expose access to the **MPRVN** field; instead, it repurposes the **MPRVN** bit position with a **DMPRV** field to modify the **effective debug access privilege** in S/HS-mode. Both registers are only accessible in Debug Mode.

Table 5. Allocated addresses for S/HS-mode shadow of Debug Mode CSR

Number	Name	Description
0xaaa	sdcsr	S/HS-mode debug control and status register.
0xaaa	sdpc	S/HS-mode debug program counter.

The **sdcsr** register exposes a subset of **dcscr**, formatted as shown in [Register 1](#), while the **sdpc** register provides full access to **dpc**.



Unlike **dcscr** and **dpc**, the **dscratch0/1** registers do not have a S/HS-mode access mechanism, and external debuggers with S/HS-mode privilege cannot use them.

31	28	27	26	24	23	22
DEBUGVER	0	EXTCAUSE	0			
21	18	17	16	15	14	13
0	EBREAKVS	EBREAKVU	0	EBREAKS	EBREAKU	STEPIE
10	9	8	6	5	4	3
0	CAUSE	V	DMPRV	0	STEP	0
						PRV

Register 1: S/HS-mode debug control and status register (sdcsr)



The **NMIP**, **MPRVN**, **STOPTIME**, **STOPCOUNT**, **EBREAKM**, and **CETRIG** fields in **dcscr** are configurable only by M-mode; they are masked in **sdcsr**, while **PRV[1]** is hardwired to 0 in **sdcsr**. The field for **MPRVN** is reclaimed by **DMPRV** in **sdcsr** layout to avoid waste of fields.

Table 6. Details of the **dmprv** field in **sdcsr**

Field	Description	Access	Reset
DMPRV	0 (normal): The privilege level in Debug Mode is not modified. 1: In Debug Mode, the privilege level for load and store operations is modified to the effective debug access privilege as described in Section 3.2.5.2 and Section 3.2.6.2 .	WARL	0

Extension of Sdtrig CSR

The **Smtdeleg**/**Sstcfg** [5] extensions define the process for delegating triggers to modes with lower privilege than M-mode. If **Sdtrig** is supported, the **Sdsec** requires both extensions to securely delegate **Sdtrig** triggers to the S/HS-mode.



When M-mode enables debugging for the S/HS-mode, it can optionally delegate the triggers to the S/HS-mode, allowing an external debugger with S/HS-mode privilege to configure these triggers.

Debug Access Privilege to memory in Smsdedbg

The **sdcsr.DMPRV** takes effect when **mdbgcn** is 0, and it is read-only 0 when **mdbgcn** is 1. With **SDEDBGALW** set to 1, the **effective debug access privilege** of loads and stores by an S/HS-mode debugger to access memory in Debug Mode can be modified by **sdcsr.DMPRV**. When **sdcsr.DMPRV**=0, the **effective debug**

access privilege of loads and stores in Debug Mode follows [Table 3](#); when `sdcsr.DMPRV=1`, the effective debug access privilege of loads and stores in Debug Mode is represented by:

- `sstatus.SPP` or,
- `hstatus.SPVP` and `hstatus.SPV` if the hypervisor extension is supported.

The `sdcsr.DMPRV` does not affect the virtual-machine load/store instructions, `HLV`, `HLVX`, and `HSV`.

3.2.6. VS-mode Debug Control (Smvdsdedbg)

The optional `Smvdsdedbg` extension introduces the `VSEDBGALW` field (bit 8) in CSR `msdcfg`. The `VSEDBGALW` field only takes effect when both `mdbgen` and `SDEDBGALW` are 0; otherwise, debug control is dominated by `mdbgen` or `SDEDBGALW` as if `VSEDBGALW` is 0.



All behavior described in this section applies only when both `mdbgen` and `SDEDBGALW` are 0. When `mdbgen` is 1 or `SDEDBGALW` is 1, M-mode debug control or S/HS-mode debug control overrides all lower privilege mode settings.

When `VSEDBGALW` is set to 1, VS-mode debug is allowed:

- The debug access privilege for the hart is VS-mode. Abstract Commands, including "Quick Access", and Program Buffer execution operate with VS-mode privilege.
- The debug operations are allowed when the hart executes in VS-mode.

When `VSEDBGALW` is set to 0 and the hart is running in VS-mode, debug is disallowed for VS-mode:

- The hart will not enter Debug Mode while running in VS-mode:
 - Halt requests will remain pending until debug is allowed.
 - Triggers with `ACTION=1` (enter Debug Mode) will not match or fire.
 - `EBREAK` cannot enter Debug Mode and always raises a breakpoint exception.
- The external trigger outputs (with `ACTION=8/9`) will not match or fire while in VS-mode.

When `VSEDBGALW` is set to 0 and the hart is running in a debug-allowed lower privilege mode, VS-mode restrictions include:

- Single-stepping cannot stop in VS-mode.
- Interrupts delegated to VS-mode cannot be disabled by setting `sdcsr.STEPIE=0`.

CSR update in Smvdsdedbg

When `VSEDBGALW` is 1, the `sdcsr` and `sdpc` [Section 3.2.5.1.1](#) are accessible with virtual supervisor privilege, providing access to the `dcscr`. The `sdcsr.EBREAKS` and `sdcsr.EBREAKU` fields are redirected to `dcscr.EBREAKVS` and `dcscr.EBREAKVU`, while writes to `sdcsr.EBREAKVS`, `sdcsr.EBREAKVU`, and `sdcsr.V` are discarded (reads return 0). Similar to `sdcsr` access when `SDEDBGALW` is 1, `sdcsr.DMPRV` modifies the effective debug access privilege in VS-mode. When external debug is disallowed in VS-mode, the configuration visible in `sdcsr` will be ignored as if it were 0 while the hart runs in VS-mode.



Redirected access to `dcscr.EBREAKVS` and `dcscr.EBREAKVU` unifies the configuration for both S/HS-mode and VS-mode. The virtualization mode cannot be changed through `sdcsr.V` by a VS-mode debugger.

Debug Access Privilege to memory in Smvdsdbg

The `sdcscr.DMPRV` modifies the **effective debug access privilege** of loads and stores for a VS-mode debugger when `SDEDBGALW` is 0 and `VSEDBGALW` is 1.

When `sdcscr.DMPRV=0`, the **effective debug access privilege** of loads and stores in Debug Mode follows [Table 3](#); when `sdcscr.DMPRV=1`, the **effective debug access privilege** of loads and stores in Debug Mode is represented by `vsstatus.SPP` with the virtualization mode being honored as 1.

3.2.7. U-mode Debug Control (Smudedbg)

The optional Smudedbg extension introduces the `USEDDBGALW` field (bit 9) in CSR `msdcfg`. The `USEDDBGALW` field only takes effect when `mdbggen` and `SDEDBGALW` are 0 if virtualization mode is 0, or `mdbggen`, `SDEDBGALW`, and `VSEDBGALW` are 0 if virtualization mode is 1; otherwise, debug control is dominated by `mdbggen`, `SDEDBGALW`, or `VSEDBGALW` as if `USEDDBGALW` is 0.



All behavior described in this section applies only when `mdbggen`, `SDEDBGALW`, and `VSEDBGALW` are 0.

When `USEDDBGALW` is set to 1, U-mode or VU-mode (when virtualization mode is 1) debug is allowed:

- The **debug access privilege** for the hart is U-mode or VU-mode. Abstract Commands, including "Quick Access", and Program Buffer execution operate with U-mode or VU-mode privilege.
- The **debug operations** are allowed when the hart executes in U-mode or VU-mode.

When `USEDDBGALW` is set to 0 and the hart is running in U-mode (or VU-mode when virtualization mode is 1), debug is disallowed for all modes:

- The hart will not enter Debug Mode
 - Halt requests will remain pending until debug is allowed.
 - Triggers with ACTION=1 (enter Debug Mode) will not match or fire.
 - EBREAK cannot enter Debug Mode and always raises a breakpoint exception.
- The external trigger outputs (with ACTION=8/9) will not match or fire

CSR update in Smudedbg

The `udcsr` and `udpc` [Section 3.2.7.1.1](#) are introduced in Smudedbg. They are accessible in Debug Mode if `USEDDBGALW=1`. When external debug is disallowed in U-mode or VU-mode (`USEDDBGALW=0`), the configuration visible in `udcsr` will be ignored as if it were 0.

Udcsr and udpc

The `udcsr` and `udpc` registers provide U-mode or VU-mode read/write access to the `dcsr` and `dpc` registers respectively. The `udcsr` exposes a subset of `dcsr` and the accessible fields are listed in [Register 2](#). The read/write access to the `udcsr.EBREAKU` field is redirected to `dcsr.EBREAKVU` when the virtualization mode is 1. The `udpc` register provides full access to `dpc`.




Redirected access to `dcsr.EBREAKVU` unifies the configuration for both U-mode and VU-mode.

Table 7. Allocated addresses for U-mode shadow of Debug Mode CSR

Number	Name	Description
0xaaa	udcsr	U-mode debug control and status register.
0xaaa	udpc	U-mode debug program counter.

The **udcsr** register exposes a subset of **dcscr**, formatted as shown in [Register 2](#), while the **udpc** register provides full access to **dpc**.



Register 2: U-mode debug control and status register (*udcsr*)

3.3. Trace

When external debug security extension is supported, trace, as a non-intrusive debug method, will be constrained based on RISC-V privilege level. The mandatory and optional trace security controls are defined in [Table 1](#) respectively.



Similar to M-mode debug control, **mtrcen** may be controlled through various methods, such as a new input port to the hart, a handshake with the system Root of Trust (RoT), or other methods. The implementation may group several harts together and use one signal to drive their **mtrcen** state or assign each hart its own dedicated state. The trace controls of other modes are located in CSR **msdcfg**.

The table [Table 8](#) defines the trace security control for each privilege mode. When trace is inhibited for a privilege mode, the trace output becomes unavailable to the trace encoder, indicated by asserting the logical **sec_inhibit** signal. Setting **sec_inhibit** to 1 inhibits trace for the current privilege mode.



The availability of trace output is controlled through signals defined in the hart-trace interface (HTI) [6]. The logical **sec_inhibit** signal can be converted to the canonical trace interface signals by implementation.

Table 8. Trace Security Control

mtrcen	SDETRCALW	VSETRCALW	USETRCALW	Trace Allowed Mode
1	Don't care	Don't care	Don't care	All modes
0	1	Don't care	Don't care	All except M-mode
0	0	1	Don't care	VS-Mode and VU-Mode
0	0	0	1	U-Mode or VU-Mode
0	0	0	0	None

Chapter 4. Debug Module Security (non-ISA) Extension

This chapter defines the required security enhancements for the Debug Module. The debug operations listed below are modified by the extension.

- Halt
- Reset
- Keepalive
- Abstract commands (Access Register, Quick Access, Access Memory)
- System bus access

If any hart in the system implements the Sdsec extension, the Debug Module must also implement the Debug Module Security Extension.

4.1. External Debug Security Extensions Discovery

The ISA and non-ISA external debug security extensions impose security constraints and introduce non-backward-compatible changes. The presence of the extensions can be determined by polling the ALLSECURED and/or ANYSECURED bits in **dmstatus** [Table 9](#). These bits will read as 0 when **nsecdbg** is set to 1, regardless of whether the harts implement the Sdsec extension. When **nsecdbg** is 0, ALLSECURED is set to 1 if all currently selected harts implement the Sdsec extension, and ANYSECURED is set to 1 if any currently selected hart implements the Sdsec extension. When any hart implements the Sdsec extension, it indicates that the Debug Module implements the Debug Module Security Extension as described in this chapter.

4.2. Halt

The halt behavior for a hart is detailed in [Section 3.2](#). According to *The RISC-V Debug Specification* [1], a halt request must be responded to within one second. However, this constraint must be removed as the request might be pending due to situations where debugging is disallowed. In the case of a halt-on-reset request (SETRESETHALTREQ), the request is only acknowledged by the hart once it has reached a privilege level in which debug is allowed.

4.3. Reset

The HARTRESET operation resets selected harts. When M-mode is disallowed to be debugged, the hart will raise a security fault error to the Debug Module on HARTRESET operations. The error can be detected through ALLSECFAULT and ANYSECFAULT in **dmstatus**.

The NDMRESET operation is a system-level reset not tied to hart privilege levels and resets the entire system (excluding the Debug Module). The Debug Module Security Extension makes NDMRESET read-only 0 when **nsecdbg** is 0. The debugger can determine support for the NDMRESET operation by setting the field to 1 and subsequently verifying the returned value upon reading.

4.4. Keepalive

The SETKEEPALIVE bit serves as an optional request for the hart to remain available for debugging. This bit only takes effect when M-mode is allowed to be debugged; otherwise, the hart behaves as if the bit is not set.

4.5. Abstract Commands

The hart's response to abstract commands is detailed in [Section 3.2](#). The following subsection delineates the constraints when the Debug Module issues an abstract command.

4.5.1. Relaxed Permission Check `reLaxedpriv`

The `reLaxedpriv` field is hardwired to 0.

4.5.2. Address Translation `AAMVIRTUAL`

The field `command.AAMVIRTUAL` determines whether the Access Memory command uses a physical or virtual address. When `mdbgen=1`, the behavior follows the original RISC-V Debug Specification [1]. When `mdbgen=0`:

- If `AAMVIRTUAL=0`, the hart responds with a security fault error (setting `abstractcs.CMDERR` to 6).
- If `AAMVIRTUAL=1`, addresses are treated as virtual and are translated and protected according to the effective debug access privilege, as defined in [Section 3.2.1](#).

4.5.3. Quick Access

When M-mode debugging is disallowed (`mdbgen=0`) for a hart, any Quick Access operation will be discarded by the Debug Module, causing `abstractcs.CMDERR` to be set to 6.



Quick Access abstract commands initiate a halt, execute the Program Buffer, and resume the selected hart. These halts cannot remain pending until debugging is allowed because the debugger blocks while waiting for completion. To address this, the hart would need to distinguish between Quick Access and other halt requests. Since Quick Access is an optional optimization, the Debug Module Security Extension avoids this additional hardware complexity by disallowing Quick Access when `mdbgen` is 0.

4.6. System Bus Access

The System Bus Access must be checked by bus initiator protection mechanisms such as IOPMP [7], WorldGuard [8]. The bus protection unit can return an error to the Debug Module on illegal accesses; in that case, the Debug Module will set `sbcS.SBERROR` to 6 (security fault error).



Trusted entities like RoT should configure IOPMP or equivalent protection before granting debug access to M-mode. Similarly, M-mode should apply the protection before enabling supervisor domain debug.

4.7. Security Fault Error Reporting

A dedicated error code, security fault error (CMDERR 6), is included in `abstractcs.CMDERR`. Issuance of abstract commands under disallowed circumstances sets `abstractcs.CMDERR` to 6. Additionally, the bus security fault error (SBERROR 6) is introduced in `sbcS.SBERROR` to denote errors related to system bus access.

Error status bits are internally maintained for each hart. The `ALLSECFAULT` and `ANYSECFAULT` fields in `dmstatus` indicate the error status of the currently selected harts. These error statuses are sticky and can only be cleared by writing 1 to `dmcs2.ACKSECFAULT` [Table 10](#).

4.8. Non-secure Debug

The state element **nsecdbg** is introduced to retain full debugging capabilities, as if the extensions in this specification were not implemented. When **nsecdbg** is set to 1:

- All [debug operations](#) are executed with M-mode privilege (equivalent to having **mdbgen** set to 1) for all harts in the system.
- The NDMRESET operation is allowed.
- The RELAXEDPRIV field may be configurable.
- System Bus Access may bypass the bus initiator protections.
- Trace output is enabled in all privilege modes.

4.9. Update of Debug Module Registers

The Debug Module Security Extension introduces new fields in the Debug Module registers. In **dmstatus**, ANYSECURED and ALLSECURED are added at bit 20 and bit 21 respectively, while ANYSECFAULT and ALLSECFAULT are added at bit 25 and bit 26. The ACKSECFAULT field is added to **dmcs2** at bit 12.

Table 9. Details of newly introduced fields in **dmstatus**

Field	Description	Access	Reset
ALLSECURED	The field is 0 when nsecdbg is 1. When nsecdbg is 0, this field is 1 if all currently selected harts implement the Sdsec extension.	R	-
ANYSECURED	The field is 0 when nsecdbg is 1. When nsecdbg is 0, this field is 1 if any currently selected hart implements the Sdsec extension.	R	-
ALLSECFAULT	The field is 1 when all currently selected harts have raised a security fault due to reset or keepalive operation	R	-
ANYSECFAULT	The field is 1 when any currently selected hart has raised a security fault due to reset or keepalive operation	R	-

Table 10. Detail of ACKSECFAULT in **dmcs2**

Field	Description	Access	Reset
ACKSECFAULT	0 (nop): No effect.	W1	-
	1 (ack): Clears error status bits for any selected harts.		

Appendix A: Theory of Operation

This chapter explains the theory of operation for the External Debug Security Extension. The subsequent diagram illustrates the reference implementation of security control for the debug and trace, respectively.

A.1. Debug Security Control

As outlined in the specification, the dedicated debug security policy for a hart is enforced by platform state **nsecdbg**, hart state **mdbgen**, and the **SDEDBGALW** field inside the **msdcfg** CSR. Both the **nsecdbg** and **mdbgen** states can be accommodated in MMIO outside the harts, such as in the Debug Module registers, or implemented as fuses.

The security control logic validates all debug requests and triggers (with **ACTION=1**) matching or firing based on **nsecdbg**, **mdbgen**, and **SDEDBGALW** against the privilege level of the hart. Debug requests that fail validation will either be dropped or kept pending. Additionally, the platform-specific external trigger inputs must obey platform constraints, which must be carefully handled by the platform implementation.

When **nsecdbg** is set to 0, the validation process involves two actors, which may lead to a potential Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) issue. To mitigate this, the implementation must ensure that both the validation and execution of debug requests occur under the same privilege level and the same debug security policy. Failing to do so may allow debug requests to bypass security controls.




Figure 1. The debug security control

Application-level debugging is primarily accomplished through self-hosted debugging, allowing the management of debug policies by supervisor domains. As a result, user-level debugging management is not addressed within this extension.

A.2. Trace Security Control

Similar to debug security, trace is controlled by platform state `nsecdbg`, hart state `mtrcen`, and `SDETRCAW` in CSR `msdcfg` for each hart. The `sec_inhibit` sideband signal indicates the availability of trace to the trace encoder.




Figure 2. The trace security control

Appendix B: Execution Based Implementation with Sdsec

In an execution-based implementation, the code executing the "park loop" can always run with M-mode privilege to access the memory and CSR. However, once execution is dispatched to an Abstract Command or the program buffer, the privilege level for accessing memory and CSR should be restricted to [debug access privilege](#).

To achieve this, a Debug Mode only state element (e.g., a field in a custom CSR) may be introduced to control the privilege level in Debug Mode. When the state is set to 1, Debug Mode allows M-mode privilege; when cleared to 0, it enforces the [debug access privilege](#). The hardware sets this state to 1 upon entering the park loop and clears it to 0 by the final instruction of the park loop, right before execution is transferred to an Abstract Command or the program buffer.

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