

VOTING RULES IN PYTHON

Let us consider an election with n voters $(0 \le n \le 200)$ and m candidates $(0 \le m \le 20)$. We assume that :

- The preferences of each voter are given as a linear order (total order) on the set of candidates
- All the preferences (of the n voters) are contained in an Excel file or a csv file.

This work aims at computing in python language the voting rules introduced in Chapter 2. You can use the examples of this chapter to test your functionalities, especially the following example where we have m=4 candidates $\{a,b,c,d\}$ and n=27 voters :

 $5 \text{ voters}: \quad a \succ b \succ c \succ d \\ 4 \text{ voters}: \quad a \succ c \succ b \succ d \\ 2 \text{ voters}: \quad d \succ b \succ a \succ c \\ 6 \text{ voters}: \quad d \succ b \succ c \succ a \\ 8 \text{ voters}: \quad c \succ b \succ a \succ d \\ 2 \text{ voters}: \quad d \succ c \succ b \succ a \\$

For the questions 2, 3, 4 and 5, you will have to manage yourself any possible ties among the winners.

1. Compute a function SimpleMajorityRulefor2 returning the result of a simple majority rule voting, between two candidates a and b.

$$a$$
 is at least as good as b iff $\left|\left\{i \in N | a \succ_i b\right\}\right| \ge \left|\left\{i \in N | b \succ_i a\right\}\right|$ (1)

- 2. Compute a function Plurality returning the result of a plurality voting.
- 3. Compute a function PluralityRunoff returning the result of a plurality Runoff voting (plurality with two rounds).
- 4. Compute a function CondorcetVoting returning the result of the application of the Condorcet principle (the existence of the Condorcet winner).
- 5. Compute a function BordaVoting returning the result of the application of the Borda principle.
- 6. Elaborate an election example with $n \ge 40$ and $m \ge 6$ where the winner is the same for the four voting rules Plurality, Plurality with Runoff, Condorcet Principle and Borda rules.
 - In your example, at least 10% of voters should have different preferences and no more than 70% of voters has the same "best candidate". You should implement, separately, a function allowing to test if these two conditions are satisfied.
- 7. Elaborate an election example with $n \ge 40$ and $m \ge 6$ where the unique winner is not the same for the four voting rules Plurality, Plurality with Runoff, Condorcet Principle and Borda rules (we should have 4 different winners).
 - In your example, at least 10% of voters should have different preferences and no more than 70% of voters has the same "best candidate". In order to test if these two conditions are satisfied, you can use the function implemented above, in question 6.

 $\underline{\text{N.B}}$: Each group will present, during the session on Monday November 6th, their obtained results of the questions 6 and 7. You can present these results trough some slides containing the examples you have constructed, as well as the different winners.