

POISS

Evaluation - 1

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[Q] Zero-knowledge Proof for DLP ↓

(prover)
let P be verifier and wants to prove that
he knows x such that

$$\boxed{g^x = y \pmod{p}}$$

where g, y, p are public,

then


P can generate random " r " $\in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$

Step 1 ⇒

$$\downarrow t = g^r \pmod{p}$$

Verifier (V)

(step 2)



Step 3

$$V \xleftarrow{Z = cx + r} P$$

now, verifier checks $g^z \stackrel{P}{=} y^c$
and accepts if equal.

$$\text{as } g^z = g^{cx+r} = (g^x)^c \times g^r = y^c g^r = \textcircled{y^c t}$$

but let's suppose, ~~if~~ P does not know
the value of x ,

then $cx' + r' = cx + r$

Chances of this to be correct
is just $\frac{1}{p-1}$.

So, Verifier can repeat the process again & again & if at once P fails to provide \textcircled{z} , then it proves he doesn't know, otherwise ~~if~~ he's able to prove that he knows \textcircled{x} without letting him know the value of \textcircled{n} .

Digital Signature

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★ in this, for signing message,

We calculate $z = (x * \text{hash}(\text{message}) + r)$

where r is randomly generated,

and $t = g^r$ $g \rightarrow$ generator

and $(y = g^x)$ public key

For verifying,

$$\text{if } g^z \stackrel{P}{=} y^{\text{hash}(m)} * t$$

then (true) ★

Proof

$$\text{as } g^z = g^{x * \text{hash} + r} = (g^x)^{\text{hash}(m)} * g^r = \boxed{y^{\text{hash}(m)} * t}$$

here due to DLP it is difficult to obtain (x, r) from y & t

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ g^x & & g^r \pmod{p} \end{array}$$

Collision-Resistant Hash function

- ⇒ Here this consists of 2 functions one for gen (Gen) & other hashing (H)
- ⇒ Gen: (key generation algorithm):
 on input 1^n , run $G(1^n)$ to obtain (G, p, g) & select $h \leftarrow G$
 output $s = \langle G, p, g, h \rangle$

here, G is an algorithm (polynomial time) that outputs a cyclic group G , whose order is p ($|G| = n$) & a generator g .

and then h is randomly selected from G (group).

- ⇒ Hash algorithm $\Rightarrow (H)$ message $\Rightarrow (x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q$

output $\boxed{g^{x_1} h^{x_2} \in G} \leftarrow \text{hash}$

hashing function

this ~~algorithm~~ is collision resistant as ~~discrete~~ DLP is hard relative to G .