


PHILOSOPHY

HSS316

MONSOON 2020



Important Dates (Green)

10/8: First Day of Classes except UG1
 17/8: Add/Drop, Late Regstrn
 28/9: Withdrawal of course/proj with 'W' Grade
 18/11: Last Day of Classes
 27/11: Start of Winter Vacation
2/1&3/1: Reporting for Spring 2021
4/1: First Day of Classes for Spring 2021

New Students Registration Dates

To be Decided

Holidays (Yellow)

20/7: Bonalu
 01/8: Bakrid
 15/8: Independence Day
 22/8: Vinayaka Chavithi
 30/8: Moharam
 14/9: No Classwork
 02/10: Gandhi Jayanti
 02/10: No Classwork
 24/10: No Classwork
 25/10: Dushera
 30/10: Eid Miladun Nabi
 14/11: Deepavali
 25/12: Christmas

No. of Days	FN- no. of hrs	AN- no. of hrs
M-14	Th-14	MWF - 41
Tu-15	F-12	MTh - 42
W-15	S-9	Tu-F - 40.5
		WS - 36

Institute Events (Pink)

18/7: 19th Convocation
 2/9: IIIT Foundation Day

Evaluations (Orange)

19/11-25/11: Final Evaluations

Academic Events (Purple)

BTP Evaluation III: 12/9
 BTP Final Evaluation: 25/11
 BTP Proposals Due: 2/11
 MS/PhD -Faculty Signup: 7/11
 Grades Due: 26/11
 Project Grades Due: 26/12
 Thesis Defense Due: 31/12
Meeting for UG2 DD stud: 3rd week of August during the Free Slot



BEFORE WE BEGIN

Assignments

A-6 coming shortly

Class notebook

Project

Term paper

Topic discussion: 21 October

Topic approval: by 25 October

Presentations: 7 November

Any other matter to discuss?



L18.T7 Nature of the World

Buddhist Idealism

Vasubandhu's defense of Idealism



[Opponent:] Then, why is it to be understood that the Buddha spoke about the existence of the external bases of sensory cognition like color, intending to convey that there is no external object which is presented by each appearance, for example, by the appearance of color?

[Proponent:] Because

Verse 11. This object [presented by appearances] cannot be simple, nor can it be a plurality of atoms. It cannot be the latter even if the atoms are conjoined to each other; for atoms themselves cannot be established.

The object that you perceive is

- A *simple* spatially extended object with **no parts** option 1
- An object consisting of **parts which don't have to be joined** option 2
- An object consisting of **parts joined together** in a certain way option 3



Vasubandhu's objections

[Response to option 1:] The object of awareness cannot be simple, because we are never aware of an object without also being aware of its parts.

[Response to option 2:] Neither can a plurality of atoms be the object of awareness, because we are never aware of an individual atom.

[Response to option 3:] Nor can a unified collection of atoms be the object of awareness, because the status of an atom as a simple substance⁷ isn't established.

How the arguments are related

III.4 CONCLUSION

Therefore, the object of awareness cannot be established as a simple entity. If the object of awareness cannot be established as a simple entity, then the status of color, etc., as external objects of vision, etc., is also disproved [since options 2 and 3 have already been rejected]. Hence, these are nothing but appearances.

Atoms as indivisible simples

[Response to **option 1**:] The object of awareness cannot be simple, because we are never aware of an object without also being aware of its parts.

Verse 14. Anything which is spatially extended cannot be simple.

Physical simple vs **Metaphysical** simple

Against option 1

[Response to option 3:] Nor can a unified collection of atoms be the object of awareness, because the status of an atom as a simple substance⁷ isn't established.

for the region which is in contact with one atom cannot be occupied by another.

Suppose each atom is located at the same place where all six are. In that case, since all the atoms are at the same place, all composite objects would just be an atom; for the atoms which constitute such objects now wouldn't be distinct from each other. Thus, no unified collection of atoms would now be visible.

A unified collection of atoms isn't something distinct from the atoms themselves.

What is the argument based on **distinctness**?

Well, even unified collections of atoms are not conjoined to each other! Therefore, it cannot be said that the reason why the conjoining of atoms cannot be established is that they don't have parts; for even the conjoining of unified collections of atoms—which are objects with parts—cannot be accepted. Thus, the status of atoms as simple substances cannot be established.

Leibniz's Law (principle of distinctness)



$(X = Y) \leftrightarrow X \text{ has property } p \text{ if and only if } Y \text{ too has } p$

$(X = Y) \rightarrow X \text{ has property } p \text{ if and only if } Y \text{ too has } p$

$X \text{ has property } p \text{ if and only if } Y \text{ too has } p \rightarrow (X = Y)$



Indiscernibility of Identicals

$(X = Y) \rightarrow X \text{ has property } p \text{ if and only if } Y \text{ too has } p$

for every property p , object X has p if and only if object Y has p

True?

India = Telangana, Delhi, Kerala, etc.

India is one thing but *Telangana, Delhi, Kerala, etc.* is not one thing

Identity of indiscernibles

X has property p if and only if Y too has $p \rightarrow (X = Y)$

for every property p , object X has p if and only if object Y has p

True?

Against option 2

[Response to option 2:] Neither can a plurality of atoms be the object of awareness, because we are never aware of an individual atom.

[Opponent:] Why don't you accept that only composite wholes are subject to shadows and concealment?

[Proponent:] Do you think that there is a composite whole over and above the atoms themselves, which is subject to shadows and concealment? That cannot be. It is said:

Verse 14 (continued). If the composite whole isn't distinct from its constituent atoms, then they [i.e., the shadows and the concealment] are not its properties [i.e., properties of the composite whole].

If you don't accept the view that the composite whole is distinct from its constituent atoms, then the shadows and the concealment are not properties of the composite object. The composite object is just a constructed idea.

Interlude

[Opponent:] As long as the defining characteristics [of various objects of awareness] such as color, etc., remain uncontradicted, why even bother speculating whether the object of awareness is an atom or a unified collection of atoms?

[Proponent:] What, then, is the defining characteristic of the object of awareness?

[Opponent:] “Being an object detected by the eye, etc.,” and “being blue,” etc.

[Proponent:] This is being considered: Is the thing which is blue, yellow, etc., and which is also taken to be the object of visual perception, etc., a simple substance, or a plurality?

[Opponent:] What is the point of this question?

Option 1 reconsidered

Verse 15. If it were simple, gradual traversal wouldn't be possible; nor would simultaneous perception and non-perception [of the same object with respect to different parts] be possible; nor could separate objects reside at different places; nor would very small objects be imperceptible.

Impossibility of motion

Impossibility of simultaneous perception and non-perception of objects

Impossibility of co-existence of separate objects

Impossibility of imperceptibility of minute objects

Impossibility of motion

If one imagines that the object of visual perception is just one unbroken substance—not many—then gradual traversal across the earth would be impossible, where “traversal” means *motion*; for, in a single step, the whole earth would be traversed.

Impossibility of simultaneous perception and non-perception of objects

Neither could the near part of an object be perceived at the same time as the distant part isn't perceived; for perception and non-perception of the same thing at the same time isn't possible.

Impossibility of co-existence of separate objects

Nor could elephants, horses, etc., which are separate and distinct, be located at different places; for, wherever one was, there would be the other. Then, how could they be separated by distance? Or [if you deny that they are separated by distance], how could the places that they occupy and do not occupy be one, given that empty space is apprehended between them?

Impossibility of imperceptibility of minute objects

[Furthermore] if the difference between distinct substances is only to be explained in terms of their defining characteristics, and not otherwise [i.e., not in terms of their parts], then very small aquatic creatures which have the same characteristics as large ones wouldn't remain unperceived. Thus [in order to distinguish such creatures from one another], we have to accept that different substances can differ with respect to their atomic compositions.