

MUN 2014

Background Guide:

Security Council

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Letter from the Director

Greetings Delegates,

Hello, my name is Peter Kim and I will be this year's Chair and Research Director of the Security Council. I wish to cordially welcome you to the 2014 Session of the Illinois Model United Nations at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I, myself, from the state of Michigan (go blue!), am here at the university as a undergraduate freshman majoring in Consumer Economics with a concentration in accounting. Starting Model United Nations in high school, I fell in love with the club at the start of my first conference and have never stopped my longing for MUN since then. I hope all of you find your passion and grace for Model United Nations soon enough like me. For newcomers to the conference, welcome to one of the most exciting and beautiful universities the college world has to offer. I hope this conference finds you wanting more and more of MUN. Please do not fret as this is also my first MUNI Conference. For those that are returning, welcome home again. On behalf of the MUNI Staff, I hope this year's conference will prove to be greater than last year's. This year's committee will partake in two issues regarding the Al Shabaab and the Narcoterrorism in Afghanistan. I hope each and every one of you will come prepared with material to contribute to the committee and can carry out quality debates in a timely fashion. I hope to see every one of the nations working with one other, foe or friend, in an effort to bring the committee together. I, as a chair, will do my best to lighten up the atmosphere so the debate and morale of the committee does not die down. I wish for all the best for the committee and I hope to see you in March.

Sincerely,

Peter Kim

Topic: Al-Shabaab

Brief Overview

Al Shabaab, the Islamic extremist group that killed scores of people at a Nairobi mall, attacked two Kenyan towns near the Somali border on September 26, 2013, resulting in three deaths. As of now, Kenya and Al-Shabaab are at a standstill. Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Mohamed Godane demands Kenyan troops to be withdrawn from Somalia and warns that refusal could lead to an all-out bloodshed. Troops from Kenya dare not vacate the area due to the possible instability and overtaken that could occur with the absence of security. The standoff has gotten to a point where Al-Shabaab militants have taken an unknown number of Kenyan shoppers at a mall, as hostages, in a recent raid at the Westgate Mall in Kenya. As forces tried to enter the building, the militants warned that any sign of aid would automatically mean death to the hostages. Kenyan troops have slowly taken over the mall, saving many hostages and tourists, but recent news reports that Britons, Kenyans, French, Canadians, Indians, Ghanaian, South African, and Chinese tourists were among dead in the mall raid. Currently, Kenyan police forces have regained control and position of the mall, seizing ahold of the militants and all hostages have been safely escorted to near shelters and police stations. As the situation continues to unfold, a feeling of uneasiness continues to drift through the air of Kenya. It is the sole job and responsibility of the Security Council and its member nations to fully address this topic with feasible solutions in accordance to respecting each other's national sovereignty. Ultimately, the Security Council deems fit for this issue due to the sheer violence and insecurity threatening multiple countries, which emphasizes the fact that only the council possesses tools necessary in an attempt to haze this obstacle.

History of the Issue

Al Shabaab translates to "The Youth" in Arabic. This very group dates back to 2006, when it unified as the radical youth wing of the Union of Islamic Courts, a temporary system of power radical groups installed secretly. As the Al Shabaab originates back to the country of Somalia, support for the group easily rose due to the lack of central government and power in the nation. Citizens pertain to no choice but to yield and feed power to the group.

Currently, Ahmed Abdi Godane, who also comes from Somalia rising from a internal power struggle, now sits atop the Al Shabaab controlling most of the operations and attacks. Reasons for assaulting other nations are strictly prohibited to the display of power and greatness. Dwelving deeper into history, since 2006, Al Shabab has consistently attacked neighboring countries by methods of suicide bombing, and surprise militant attacks. Reasons for the growing assaults on other nations, officials assume, remain limited to the cult of dominance and as an act to discourage rising small groups from interfering with the Shabaab.

Problems and Issues Surrounding the Topic

This deems not an issue where any military group can go in and charge at the Al-Shabab. Yes, this might reduce tension, but only a while before the group forms even more people to retaliate. Because of this, physical force may not be the answer due to the fact that this strategy may aggravate the militant group. Another approach seems to be through the government, but many assume that Al Shabab will only take advantage of the central government and use it to their advantage to gain even more support. Because there is no force powerful enough to overcome Al Shabab in Somalia, it seems only logical that through government, Al Shabab feeds off even more power and greed.

Current Situation and Implements

Currently, there have been two attacks by Al Shabaab. The first one located in the Kenyan Westgate's Mall resulting in 67 deaths on September 21st, 2013. The second occurred at the Somali border near two Kenyan towns, killing three citizens. Islamic group militants of Al Shabaab stated that the group refuses to back out of the country until Kenyan troops are fully removed from Somalia. As Al Shabaab militants crave control of the border of Somalia due to its direct trading routes, Kenyan troops stand ground even more harshly because of the knowledge that these trading routes will be utilized for drug trafficking. Some suggestions by United Nations Security officials that are being implemented include establishing a security sector in the government of Somalia

with the aid of the G5 Security Council countries. From there, actual and sincere negotiations start to bring down the tension that Al Shabaab accumulated. . Another method possible is the force of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM has driven Al Shabaab out of Bakara, which deemed to be the source of revenue for the group. The United Nations Security Council could join hands with AMISOM and peacefully push out Al Shabaab forces in Somalia and possibly contain the men in Saudi Arabia from further spreading power and causing instability in Africa. Ultimately, these solutions seem to just scratch the surface of the actual committee's final debate. In no way are these suggestions forced to be cemented into the committee's resolution. It is entirely up to the quality and effort of the committee's debate that will determine the success and future of this session. It is vital that every nation be prepared to speak upon her position and to contribute to debate and the final resolution.

Questions for Debate

1. Who are the Al-Shabaab? What are their motives? Where does the group originate from? Why is the group troubling to others?
2. What other solutions besides the ones listed are possible for the committee to carry out?
3. What is there to keep in mind when dealing with the Al-Shabaab and countries involved in crisis?
4. What in the past has worked and has not worked?

Works Cited

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Topic: Narcoterrorism in Afghanistan

Brief Overview

Narcoterrorism continues to threaten the security and economy of Afghanistan at an alarming rate today. The reason for this only leads to the 2001 coalition invasion of the country. With the ever so see-saw like relationships between terrorist groups, powerless government, and constant starvation for power between small leaders, many have had no choice but to turn to narcotics for sources of income, while risking their lives each and every day. Mainly led by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgencies, narco-terrorism slowly creeps around neighboring countries in an effort to also spread the power of the terrorist groups. As the cultivation of narcotics blossoms in the country, it will indefinitely be a long period of transitioning for the finding of a stable source of income. In a blood and tear saturated country, the goal is not only to subdue the reliability on narcotics, but also to eliminate the threat of terrorism itself. In the future, Afghanistan must be able to stand by itself, drug and terrorism-free. Because of the unstable security that that disrupts the peace of not just Afghanistan, the Security Council must step in to alleviate the tension. The situation deems nothing but urgent as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda grow stronger as time passes. The Security Council must pass a mission's mandate and size in order to set foot in the right direction. It is entirely up to the committee how to settle the issue, however, every nation's contribution will be vital to the success of Security Council.

History of the Issue

Since 1979, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan catalyzed the opium and warfare relationship. As the Afghans needed weaponry for war, the nation traded opium for weapons, which marked the origin of opium production. Because of this such profitable sum that people earned, many politicians became leaders in narco-trafficking and is one of the reasons why opium production continues today.

Post the 9/11 invasion in 2001 and the lifting of the Taliban opium ban, Afghanistan ramped up opium production by more than 90%. Afghanistan has been known for its opium production for many years. Recently, however, the nation has risen to the top of production, supplying more than 92% of the world's opium. There are three main

reasons behind this: constant warfare occurring in the country, a lack of a centralized government, and the campaigns over the world that try to thwart the production of the good. Campaigns lower and sometimes halt the production of opium, which causes prices of the scarce drug to sky-rocket as citizens find it difficult to locate and even sell the product for a profit.

Problems and Issues Surrounding Topic

Because opium is currently the most significant way that Afghanistan receives income, current opium production would devastate the economy and anger citizens. It would take tens of years for the economy to switch from producing opium to concentrate in producing legal goods. However, to overcome both opium production and terrorism in Afghanistan, the government and the international community could focus less on waging wars on drugs and terrorism and more on implementing broad programs of alternative and integrated development in the whole country. Within this, a multi-level strategy involving effective sanctions on illicit and criminal activities is critical. Such a program should be implemented in a progressive way so as to secure sustainable political and territorial stability.

Current Situation and Implements

In Afghanistan, but also in Burma (Myanmar), the world's second greatest producer of illegal opium, drug production is closely linked to territorial control and political legitimacy, as are guerrilla warfare and terrorism. In fact, opium has long been at stake in Afghanistan's armed conflicts and its trade has allowed these conflicts to flourish. In such a context, the value of territory increases due to the opium crops it can bear for the benefit of those who control it. Thus, such a war economy-illicit economy nexus would most likely benefit terrorist organizations. However, the commercial production of opium has also been the only means of subsistence available for many Afghan peasants, and such an economic pattern has recently expanded to a broader part of the country, revealing the limited writ and authority of the Afghan government.

As far as narco-terrorism is concerned, serious evidence is still needed that it does exist in Afghanistan. That some drug money plays a significant role in the ongoing Afghan conflict, even by being used directly against the Afghan government and the international forces, is obvious but no novelty in recent Afghan history. Although the head of Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Directorate estimates that the Taliban and its allies derived more than \$150 million from drugs in 2003, hard evidence linking al-Qaida directly to the drug economy is still scarce, most investigators say.

As Afghanistan seeks non-violent methods to combat narcoterrorism, awareness programs entice government officials. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated "Regional results indicate that the awareness campaign has had some impact in the central and northern regions and mixed success in the western region." However, those in the south, mainly compromised by farmers, still cultivated poppy despite the campaign. With more diplomatic actions and securitization efforts, it seems feasible to deter farmers from poppy. Ultimately reducing the supply of narcotics, which deem to be the backbone of narcoterrorism, can lead to less violence over the control of narcotics.

Using Afghan troops to fight off the foundation and source of narcotics targets the Taliban. Although this idea presents itself as a possibility, currently, Afghanistan does not have the resources, time, and money to implement soldiers into combat to ward off centers of legitimacy the Taliban hold. Threatening the Taliban would almost indefinitely trigger prices of opium to rise and supply to be held at its chokepoint. As a result, this action could translate to lower profits for farmers and a battlefield for the possession of opium in the market. Afghanistan, then, would be left in dust with a run-down income. There seems to be multiple kinds of responses to this problem. The stated resolutions are merely stepping-stones to an even bigger and more complex solution to which delegates must collaborate towards.

Questions to Consider

1. What are some recent confrontations and terrorist attacks that could have been caused by opium production in Afghanistan?
2. What other nations besides Afghanistan are impacted by this issue?
3. What are some solutions in the past? Have they worked? How can they be amended to fit this situation?

Works Cited

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