



Network Security (BMEVIHIMB00)

Practical Session:

Sandboxes and Honeypots

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Outline

- Sandboxes
 - What is a sandbox?
 - Use cases and considerations
 - Demo
- Honeypots
 - What is a honeypot?
 - Different kinds of honeypots
 - Use cases and considerations
 - Demo
- This presentation is based on Tamás Holczer's slides

SANDBOXES

Sandboxing

- The aim is to run executables in a controlled environment
- Controlled environment: sandbox
 - Controlled access to files and other local resources
 - Controlled access to the network
 - It may contain emulated resources (e.g. fake devices)
 - It may be possible to take snapshots and return to them
 - It may be easier to take screenshots, collect memory dumps
- The sandbox is typically a separate virtual machine, but some software solutions exist that support running software sandboxed on a host OS

Sandboxing

- Why sandbox?
 - Malware analysis
 - Isolating known vulnerable applications that must be kept running
 - Protection against potentially misbehaving (buggy) software
- Examples
 - Sandboxie
 - Bochs
 - Cuckoo
 - Any.run
 - Virustotal
 - Joe Sandbox
 - Virtualization/containerization (ESXi, Hyper-V, Docker, ...)
 - "Sacrificial lamb"

Sandboxing – Considerations

- Security considerations – sandboxing has its own dangers
 - Guest-to-host attacks (if using VMs)
 - Clipboard sharing
 - File sharing
- Sandbox detection – software might detect that they are being sandboxed (and behave differently)
 - Hardware IDs, names
 - Running services
 - Presence of integration tools
 - Other artifacts (hooks, timing, CPU behaviour, ...)
- Some software need access to hardware (e.g. a microphone)
 - Can we make that work?
 - Can we make that work without compromising security?

Sandboxing – Demo

- VirusTotal
- Any.run
- Joe Sandbox
- Sandboxie

HONEYPOTS

Honeypots: The art of deception




Honeypots: The art of deception



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Honeypots: The art of deception



If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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Honeypots

- Definitions (L. Spitzner, 2002)
 - A security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised
 - An information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource
- Any traffic to or from a honeypot is likely to be malicious
- Honeypots have no inherent "production" value, but may prove to be a valuable addition to a network
 - Early threat detection
 - Possible detection of previously unknown attacks and attack methods
 - Waste of time for the attacker (== more time for the defenders)
 - Logs and other data for analysis
 - Easy to restore a known good state after an incident

Honeypots – Classification

- By the level of interaction
 - High
 - Low
 - (Something in between?)

- By purpose
 - Production
 - Research

- By the implementation
 - Virtual
 - Physical

Honeypots – Levels of interaction

- Low interaction
 - Simulates only some aspects of the system
 - Easy to deploy
 - Minimal risk of compromise
 - Provides limited information about attacks and attackers
 - Example: Honeyd

- High interaction
 - Simulates all aspects of the OS, usually real systems
 - More difficult to deploy
 - Higher risk of compromise
 - Provides more information about attacks and attackers
 - Example: Honeynet

Honeypots – Implementation


- Physical
 - Running on real, physical machines
 - Each machine has its own IP address
 - Usually used in high-interaction scenarios
 - Least chance of getting detected as a honeypot by the attackers
- Virtual
 - Virtualizing physical honeypots (1->1)
 - » Easier to manage (snapshots, memory dumps, ...)
 - » More likely to be detected as a honeypot
 - Simulated systems
 - » One system acts as if it was several others (many services on many IPs, ...)

Honeypots – Purpose

- Production environments
 - Prevention
 - » Not effective for prevention, but may win the defenders time
 - » Ineffective against untargeted and automated attacks (e.g. worms, auto-rooters)
 - Detection
 - » Excellent early warning solution
 - » Another source of information to the SIEM
 - Response
 - » Easy to pull offline in case of an incident
 - » Useful data for forensics
- Research, education
 - High amounts of high value information if operated correctly
 - May lead to the discovery of new attacks, tools, vulnerabilities, tactics, ...
 - Helps understand motives, behaviour, and organization
 - Development of analysis and forensic skills


Honeypots – Placement

- What's the best place for a honeypot?
 - Practically anywhere!
- Typical locations
 - On the Internet (in front of the firewall)
 - In the demilitarized zone
 - Behind the firewall (inside the internal network)
- Different locations provide different information about different attacks and attackers
 - It might be a good strategy to have one in every segment of the network



Honeypots – Demo

- MHN: Modern Honey Network
 - <https://github.com/pwnlandia/mhn>



MISCELLANEOUS

Control Questions

- What is a sandbox?
- What are sandboxes used for?
- What should you consider when using a sandbox?

- What is a honeypot?
- What are the benefits of using honeypots?
- What is the difference between low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots?
- Where should honeypots be installed in a network? Why?



Thank you for your attention!
That's all, folks!

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