



# **Annual Report**

## **of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary**

### **1998/99**

Laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department  
pursuant to Section 54(4) of the Police Act 1996

Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed - 26 October 1999

**LONDON: The Stationery Office**

**804**

**£15.30 Sterling**

published by The Stationery Office

# CONTENTS

## **Letter from Sir David J O'Dowd**

## **Statement of Purpose**

## **Foreword**

## **The Police Service in England and Wales - A Digest of Information**

### **Chapter 1 The Work of HM Inspectorate**

- Role of the Inspectorate
- Funding
- The Inspection Process
- The Advisory Function
- Police Authorities
- International Affairs
- Joined-up Inspection
- Internal Progress
- Inspecting the Future

### **Chapter 2 The Outcome of Inspection**

- Introduction
- Progress on Earlier Recommendations
- Millennium Preparedness
- Thematic Inspection
  - The Policing of Disorder
  - Child Protection
  - Road Policing and Traffic
  - Managing Learning
  - Police Integrity
  - Winning the Race Revisited
  - Follow-up to Thematic Recommendations
  - Leadership
- Complaints and Discipline

### **Chapter 3 Changing the Beat**

- Leadership
- Visible Ethnic Minorities
- New Technology

Public Safety Radio Communications Project (PSRCP)

National DNA Database

National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS)

- Funding the Future
- Best Value
- Overarching Aims and Objectives
- Targets
- BCU Performance
- Disciplinary Procedures
- Police Training

## **Chapter 4 Comparison of Police Performance**

- Introduction
- Key Objective 1 - Dealing speedily with young offenders
  - KPI 1i - Young offender cases dealt with within PTI time guidelines
  - KPI 1 ii - Young offender cases meeting performance management quality targets
- Key Objective 2 - Target and reduce crime and disorder
  - Crime Reduction
  - The Number of Crimes Recorded per 1000 Population
- Key Objective 3 - Target drug-related crime
  - KPI 3 - Arrests for supply and possession with intent to supply
- Key Objective 4 - Maintain/Increase the number of detections for violent crime
  - KPI 4 - Percentage of violent crimes detected
- Key Objective 5 - Increase the number of detections for burglaries of homes
  - KPI 5 - Percentage of burglaries of dwellings detected by primary means/overall
- Key Objective 6 - Respond promptly to emergency calls from public
  - KPI 6 i - Percentage of 999 calls answered within the local target time
  - KPI 6 ii - Percentage of responses within the local target time to incidents requiring immediate response
- Medical Retirements
- Sickness

- Racist Incidents

## **Appendix A Inspectorate Regions and Senior Personnel**

## **Appendix B Overarching Aims and Objectives for the Police Service**

## **Appendix C Contextual Performance Data**

**Report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary**

**For the year 1998 - 1999**

Home Office  
Queen Anne's Gate  
London SW1H 9AT

26 October 1999

**The Rt Hon Jack Straw**

*Secretary of State for the Home Department*

Sir

I have the honour to present my report upon the police forces of England and Wales for the period 1 April 1998 - 31 March 1999.

I have the honour to be

Sir

Your obedient servant

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D. O'Dowd', with a large, stylized initial 'D'.

**Sir David J O'Dowd**

*CBE QPM BA Msc CIMgt*

# STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

**To promote the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England and Wales through the inspection process, to facilitate the spread of good practice and to provide advice and support to the tripartite partners on policing issues whilst maintaining independence of judgement and the highest professional standards.**

## **HM Inspectorate Code of Practice**

The Inspectorate will:

- ~ work with professionalism, integrity and courtesy;
- ~ evaluate performance objectively;
- ~ report honestly but fairly;
- ~ communicate clearly and frankly; and
- ~ respect the confidentiality of individuals.

# FOREWORD



The Inspectorate has enjoyed another demanding and successful year with a full programme of force and thematic inspections being delivered. The flexibility and goodwill of HMIs and all our staff are such that time was produced to carry out other important tasks, at the request of the Home Secretary, Ministers and others that could not have been predicted as the inspecting year commenced. This necessary flexibility and goodwill I recognise as a reflection of the police service itself and of its willingness to respond to the immediate and unpredictable.

Such is the vicarious fascination of people, irrespective of their backgrounds, with policing that police officers, police operations and police failings, real or perceived, fill so many column inches of our newspapers and so many minutes of news, features and fiction on the nation's broadcast media. It was therefore professionally disappointing for the Service to absorb day-to-day the evidence to the Macpherson Inquiry into the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence. The hard hitting report subsequently published should have come as no surprise to the wider Service. Much of the

impact of that report and its recommendations reflected the findings of the HMIC thematic inspection of community and race relations (Winning the Race 1997). It was doubly disappointing therefore that such little progress has been made when HMIC conducted a follow-up inspection to Winning the Race. Many of the lessons of Macpherson were already there to learn.

The key point of Macpherson and the Inspectorate work is that the Service must place community and particularly race relations at the core of its thinking, at the hub of the wheel of its day-to-day operational activity. It should be a manifestation of the maturity of the institution that is policing that the service should:

- recognise the special needs of visible ethnic minorities as its customer and tailor its approach to meet those needs;
- attract and retain a much greater number of visible ethnic minority officers at all levels of the Service and ensure their careers are properly developed.

Whilst it is possible to present these goals individually, the underpinning point is that they are inextricably linked. No declarations of intent, no matter how voluble or persuasive the rhetoric, will attract black or asian recruits in the necessary numbers unless the Service has established a pattern of service delivery to those minorities which is seen as meaningful and responsive to their needs. Equally, until the sight of a black or asian police officer in the neighbourhood and until the sight of a black/asian superintendent in the local paper is no more unusual than the sight of black nurses or doctors in the local hospital, there will remain a credibility gap whatever the effort to alter the structure of service delivery.

I am convinced that the Macpherson imperative, supported by the recommendations, check lists and good practice identified in the thematics (Winning the Race series), will now take the Service forward. I have been heartened by the reaction of the ACPO presidential task force and the concentration of effort and activity in many forces. The Lawrence Steering Group, chaired by the Home Secretary, drives forward and monitors progress against the Home Secretary's action plan produced in response to the Macpherson recommendations. The maintenance of good community and race relations, and the provision of a service to visible ethnic minorities tailored to their needs are crucial to the maintenance in reality of the treasured doctrine of policing by consent.

The supplementary reason for its headline status is that it should be a source of pride within the Service that it has developed the ability to respond positively to well founded criticism. Overwhelmingly the response to inspections, either at force level or in response to thematics, is both considered and positive.

For the most part it has been a reassuring year to witness and advise the Service as it prepared for the future without neglecting the imperatives of the present. This is the third year that I have referred to resource pressures and now the situation is much clearer. Forces will have to identify efficiency gains of 2% which must be channelled transparently into front-line service delivery. I am confident that, whilst there will be varying degrees of difficulty from force to force, such gains will be achieved during 1999/2000. The Service must overcome its problem of the past whereby gains were achieved in productivity or enhancing quality of a particular service without a sufficiently tangible audit trail. The Service does it: it must prove it.

The absence of audited proof of the efficiency achievements of the past few years does not mean that progress was also absent. In recognising that earlier progress and, in confidence of success regarding this year's 2% target, I have concerns that the challenge to find further opportunities in future years will prove extremely testing.

My confidence in the future is based on experience of the recent past. It is reassuring that in dealing with almost 18 million incidents (2.5 million requiring an immediate response) a generally high standard of service was maintained. The public satisfaction with the service received remained high and broadly consistent over the past five years with 92% of burglary victims expressing satisfaction as well as 90% of those taking advantage of enquiry facilities at police stations. Confidence in the police service as an institution also remains high.

The faith of the Service at all levels to partnership working is tangible. There are impressive examples of both commitment and innovative thinking throughout England and Wales. Solid foundations are being laid that will be a sound base for the push towards a reduction in crime. Despite the decline in overall police numbers it is to the credit of chief constables, in further reducing management overheads, that there are more constables than there were five years ago.

Preparation for the disciplines of the Best Value regime will be a significant feature of strategic activity in the current year. The regime will be operative in 2000/2001 and, as forces prepare, so does the Inspectorate. HMIC will have a primary role in informing the process of certification of the Best Value plan by the Audit Commission. Along with other developments Best Value has necessitated a changed approach to force inspection next year. HMIC is currently developing a standards based diagnostic model for inspection which is underpinned by the rationale of risk assessment. The new approach will lead to a tighter focus on areas of vulnerability in forces with the aim, over time, of raising the standard of all forces to the level of those in the top quartile. This will mean that some forces are not visited so regularly but, as a safeguard, no force will remain uninspected on the ground for more than 3 years. I am convinced that the revised approach will make better use of HMIC resources and be of greater benefit to forces who may struggle in particular areas of their task.

In preparation for the challenge of achieving overall reduction in crime it is important that the Service learns the lessons and gathers the inspiration from its success in reducing the incidence of burglary of people's homes. A decade ago no commentator would have seen such a reduction as a possibility. Not only can it be done, it has been done over five successive years including a 19% decrease in the last 2 years alone. It has been achieved through better use of intelligence, more innovative deployment and use of resources and by drawing in the skills, commitment and resources of others through partnership.

Imaginative use of technology also played its part. There is still more to be gained from developments on the threshold. A sophisticated and modern radio infrastructure, significant expansion of the DNA database and capitalising on the actual and potential rewards to be gained from the National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) will, I am convinced, make a substantial contribution to crime reduction. Consequently, I am delighted that funds are being made available to take forward these important initiatives.

I am confident that chief constables, police authorities and their staff will deliver on crime reduction over time providing that other parties fully play their part in the effort. The police culture, despite protestations around funding and unremitting demand, prefers success and no force relishes the prospect of failure. The response to targets has been widely positive but in the course of the year targets have been marked by their proliferation. The formulation of overarching aims and objectives was a helpful and overdue development in setting out the various component activities that are the business of policing. The transparent links between those aims with those of the Home Office and the rest of the criminal justice system provided a useful context. However, I share some of the concerns of chief constables that there is an expectation that enhanced achievements will be expected across the whole range of objectives in addition to priorities and targets arising from other sources. Mediocrity of achievement across the many should make way for inspirational success against the few.

It will be no surprise to readers of my annual report that leadership is a constant feature. The familiar perennial figures prominently again this year. Leadership features strongly in the year's thematics as it did in the Macpherson report. The Service has produced, and is producing, excellent leaders and it is important that it continues to do so and reaches a position that all chief officers attain the standard of the best. The best leaders make a significant difference, make and sustain progress, whilst others fail to recognise the difference and are remote brakes on progress.

I am pleased that HMIC is represented along with ACPO, the Association of Police Authorities and the National Black Police Association on a working group to improve all aspects of the identification, selection and training of the future leaders of the Service. HMIC, with its functional responsibility for the Accelerated Promotion Scheme for Graduates is carrying out a major piece of research, with extensive consultation, to identify improvements to a scheme that is in need of revision.

HMIC has great faith in the benefit of partnership working between inspectorates. Joined-up approaches to the prevention of crime and disorder demand joined-up inspection. Our thematic on Child Protection is a product of such collaborative working and a multi-disciplinary study to identify blockages in the youth justice system resulted in a quickly accomplished yet incisive product. The mutual professional respect between HMIC and the Audit Commission continues to prosper and leads to reciprocal benefits as evidenced by jointly working through the inspection and audit approach for Best Value. I welcome the



introduction of the Inspectorate Forum made up of the Heads of Inspectorates involved in improving local services under Best Value. The Forum will prove a useful body to discuss the scope for more joint working and a useful platform to develop arrangements for inspection across organisational boundaries.

The requirements of Best Value will result in a new relationship between HMIC and individual police authorities. Hitherto HMIC had no locus in inspecting the activity of police authorities although some of the criticisms in inspection reports, including thematics, were unavoidably implicit observations on aspects of the police authority role. The Best Value regime places the statutory duties on police authorities as well as giving HMIC a role in inspection and certification of Best Value. I recognise the concerns of the APA and individual members of police authorities but believe that, such is the mutuality of our respect, any transitional difficulties will prove more apparent than real.

The future of policing is both a challenge and an opportunity. It is required to deliver more, with greater professionalism and without significant increases in resources. The scrutiny of its activity will continue to be penetrating and unrelenting from political, journalistic and customer perspectives. A great deal is asked of a comparative few. I am conscious that front-line police officers have to pick up very quickly the strands of complexity of the policing task. I am conscious, as are the HMIs, that it is they who take the risks of errors of judgement at times of human crisis or physical violence. That is why the focus of our criticism centres on issues that chief officers and middle management can, and have a duty, to resolve. The experience of HMIC is that front line officers are best led and supported where the stance of chief officers and middle managers is both proactive and necessarily intrusive. It is not, and should not be, a necessary consequence of the proven benefits of devolvement and empowerment of individuals that corporacy is eroded. The need to ensure corporacy, particularly in key areas such as standards of integrity and appropriate service delivery to minorities, is paramount.

It is also a principal reason why I look forward to appropriate decisions being taken about the future of police training including National Police Training (NPT). HMIC completed an exhaustive and critical thematic on police training during the year which, I was pleased to note, was given due weight in the thinking of the Home Affairs Committee in their inquiry and report on the same subject. I look forward to decisions being taken in the Home Office and elsewhere that will formulate the future of police training. A notional contract has to be fulfilled. The public, chief constables and others rightly expect their police officers to be diligent, professional and appropriate in their attitude. Officers are entitled to a similar expectation of timely and effective training to develop their skills, to fine-tune their professionalism and to reflect on their attitudes. The time has come when the mutuality of expectations must be satisfied.


I am grateful to chief constables, police authorities, the many members of staff and the staff associations who have responded so positively to the inspection process throughout the year. The HMIs share my awareness that, without the openness and collective responsiveness found in forces, inspections would prove much more difficult and the outcome less valuable. I am confident that the leadership of the Service will respond to the many challenges of the future and translate them into opportunities. I am equally confident that HMIC is itself prepared to seize the parallel opportunities of the future of inspection as a critical support for the Service. That confidence makes it a personal and professional pleasure to be able to remain in post until the end of the year 2000. It is a privilege to have the opportunity to oversee the completion of our thematic programme and to guide HMIC through the inspection challenge provided by Best Value.

**Sir David J O'Dowd**  
**CBE QPM BA MSc CIMgt**


HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary

# THE POLICE SERVICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES


## A Digest of Information




**Expenditure (Billions)**




**Total Police Strength For England And Wales (including secondments)**



**Total constable strength in England and Wales  
(excluding secondments)**



**Percentage of female officers in England and  
Wales**



# Chapter 1

## THE WORK OF HM INSPECTORATE

### THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTORATE

**1.1 The Inspectorate has a statutory duty under the provisions of the Police Act 1996 to report to the Home Secretary on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. In addition, the Inspectorate contributes to the future of policing by:**

- **providing professional advice on policy to the Home Secretary and his Ministers, to police authorities and their Association, and to individual police forces;**
- **promoting good practice;**
- **advising on the appointment of officers to chief officer rank.**

**1.2** The Inspectorate is independent of the Police Service and stands outside the tripartite structure. Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary (HMIs) have no statutory powers to enforce action in the response to the recommendations arising from inspection. An acceptance by the Service of the wide professional experience of individual HMIs and an acknowledgement of the collective expertise of the Inspectorate as a whole, coupled with constructive dialogue, are for the most part sufficient, to prompt positive action on recommendations.

**1.3** HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) is complemented by five HMIs (based in four regional offices), two Assistant Inspectors of Constabulary from non-police backgrounds and two headquarters based Assistant Inspectors of deputy chief constable status. HMIs are former chief constables whilst the police Assistant Inspectors are seconded from police forces. HMCIC is the principal professional adviser to the Home Secretary on policing matters. The core role of HMIs is the inspection of forces in their region. Additionally, each advises nationally on topics within an individual portfolio of specialist subjects as well as leading thematic inspections on matters of key interest to the Police Service as a whole. The regional structure of the Inspectorate and its senior personnel are shown in Appendix A.

### FUNDING

**1.4** The costs of the Inspectorate are funded directly by central Government and provided through the Police Policy Directorate of the Home Office. Each year HMIC receives income from two separate allocations. Our day to day running costs are subject to a specific funding allocation whilst income and capital spending are accounted for separately. Expenditure is controlled by Government accounting rules.

**1.5** In 1998/99 HMIC received a running cost allocation of £5.37m.

#### FIGURE 1 HMIC Running Costs Expenditure 1998/99

Figure 1 shows how this allocation was used. The largest element of our expenditure is the reimbursement to police forces of the costs of seconded police officers (37%), followed by the costs for HM Inspectors, the two non-police Assistant Inspectors and support staff (35%). The separate funding allocation to cover capital expenditure and income was small. However, towards the end of the year HMIC entered into a contract for the supply of a new computer database during 1999/2000 at a cost of £350K. This improved system (Matrix 3) will replace a predecessor at the end of its viable life. The provision of an up to date facility is necessary to enhance data analysis in support of inspections and to supply information to policy makers within the Home Office. Although the original specification did not include the provision of data at Basic Command Unit (BCU) level, the system will become the source of that information.

**1.6** Police authorities and police forces in England and Wales are not charged for any inspections: the reports of inspections of individual forces and thematic inspection reports are also issued without charge. Access to HMIC reports has been made more convenient by their reproduction on the Home Office Internet Website. It is a rewarding measure of the interest in policing in general and the work of the Inspectorate in particular, that the website was visited an average 90 times each day of the year.

**1.7** The cost of undertaking all inspections is funded from the annual running cost allocation of funds. Unlike some of our partner organisations we are not in a position to supplement our resources by generating external income. Benchmarking exercises with other Inspectorates have demonstrated that HMIC provides a cost-effective service. The cost of the Inspectorate

represents 0.08% of the total funding made available to the Police Service in England and Wales in 1998/9.

1.8 Last year I reported an expectation of a real terms budget reduction of 3% per year for three years. As a dynamic year evolved, it became evident that new priority demands for 1999/2000 could not be met without additional resources. HMIC will receive a modest real terms increase to help to meet those demands. Specifically the additional funding will cover the cost of a seconded chief inspector for each region to assist HMIs discharge their duty in relation to efficiency plans and Best Value (see paras 1.26 to 1.29).

1.9 The financial constraints of the reporting year imposed a 2.7% real terms reduction in funding. It is with pleasure that I report that the inspection, advisory and other commitments of HMIC have been met. The future will be as testing for HMIC as it is for the Police Service. In accordance with government accounting rules HMIC will have to find, through administrative staff reduction, 2% cash savings. I am confident that HMIC is well placed to respond to its own challenge and to support the Service through a particularly demanding time.

## **THE INSPECTION PROCESS**

1.10 The year under review was the first full year in which to assess significant changes to the process of inspection. The cycle of annual inspection was varied to one of 18 months and the distinction between a primary and a performance review inspection was removed. The twin changes were inter-related and the revised approach allowed HMIs to concentrate the inspection effort on the real or perceived vulnerabilities of individual forces. The experience gained from the revised approach is one factor in a further refinement of the inspection process.

1.11 One of the rationales underpinning an extended period between inspections was to create time and space to continue our programme of thematic inspections. Each such inspection, although focussing the inspection effort on a limited number of police forces, leads to a comprehensive report with important implications and action points for the Service as a whole. Forces that react the most positively to thematic recommendations appear to be quickly rewarded with performance and contingent benefits. In order to maximise the benefits across all forces HMIC has introduced a more systematic approach to monitoring the response and reaction of forces to thematic recommendations. The thematic approach is of particular benefit to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) where the relevant committee can address the strategic issues raised and formulate policy and guidance for the Service.

## **THE ADVISORY FUNCTION**

1.12 HMIC enjoys the benefit of two key assets that together provide a unique source of professional and independent advice. Our staff collectively are an important source of knowledge and experience on contemporary policing issues, whilst the nature of inspection ensures a continuing awareness of developing problems both on the ground and at the strategic level. Such assets, underpinned by the acknowledged independence and impartiality of HMIs, provide a ready and reliable source of advice to individual chief constables. Contact between HMIs and chief constables is not limited therefore to the temporal context of the inspection process. Whilst not amenable to the discipline of performance indicators, this supportive consultative role is a significant benefit to the Police Service as a whole and to chief constables, mitigating to some extent the isolation of ultimate command.

1.13 I particularly value the many opportunities for HMIC to provide professional advice to the Home Secretary and his Ministers as well as senior Home Office officials. In addition to regular briefing meetings, the staff of HMIC are involved daily in policy and steering groups or giving oral or written comment as requested by officials.

## **POLICE AUTHORITIES**

1.14 The advisory function extends to each limb of the tripartite structure. The three elements of that structure share concerns that the Police Service secures people of the right calibre for appointment to ACPO rank to lead individual forces and the Service as a whole forward to meet the challenges of a dynamic future. Appointments to ACPO rank take place throughout the year and it is police authorities who make those appointments from a shortlist approved by the Home Secretary. Indeed last year there were 34 such appointments including nine to the rank of chief constable. HMIs provide advice to police authorities at different stages of the selection process including a vigorously objective assessment of each candidate. HM Inspectors accord this duty the highest priority. The substantial demand on their time is balanced by the undoubted importance of the task, as in essence such appointments are the future of the Service.

1.15 Beyond this narrow but important advisory focus, the inspection process itself provides both the informed panoramic view of a force and the nuance of detail that should assist each police authority to carry out its statutory responsibility *viz* securing the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force for its area. The similarity with the core role of the Inspectorate to

report on the efficiency and effectiveness of forces is evident. This common interest ensures that HMIs maintain a close liaison with authorities during an inspection including inviting authority members to join in the inspection process. Particular concerns of an authority are explored during inspection and detailed feedback on the whole inspection is given and questions answered before publication of the Inspection report. Again, professional advice is given when sought outside of the inspection process.

**1.16** The Association of Police Authorities (APA) is already proving to be an effective umbrella organisation in promoting the role and influence its member authorities. The strategic grasp of the APA leadership and its secretariat, the growing expertise and confidence of national sub-committees on specific aspects of policing, and the opportunity to learn from both the good practice and problems of others, are combining to strengthen the position of police authorities within the tripartite balance. This achievement which I am sure will be consolidated and extended is a positive development in the best interests of locally accountable policing. The Inspectorate will continue to foster its positive relationship with both the APA and individual authorities.

**1.17** It is currently the responsibility of HMIC to inspect police forces and not police authorities. Whilst this boundary may seem quite clear, in practice the margins become opaque. If a force is criticised, for example, for not taking steps to secure optimum value for money, there is an implicit observation for the police authority who have a complementary role to secure 'efficiency'. HMIC experience has been that police authorities have welcomed such observations. However, beginning in the next financial year (2000/2001) HMIC will have statutory powers to inspect police authorities in respect of Best Value under the Local Government Act 1999. I am aware that the legislative intention was an initial cause for concern amongst some police authority members but I am firmly convinced that the move from implicit observation to a statutory duty to challenge where appropriate is a subtle distinction without a practical difference. HMIC will work with the APA to produce a memorandum of understanding that sets out our respective duties and responsibilities. Our shared concern for high quality service delivery and the tradition of HMIC support for police authorities will prove invaluable in taking Best Value forward.

## **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**1.18** In my last annual report I reported the doubling of the number of British police officers serving with the United Nations in Bosnia. The number has increased through 1998/99 although not quite so dramatically. There are now 79 such officers serving the International Police Task Force. Officers work in demanding and at times unpredictable conditions which require unlimited commitment and policing skills of the highest order. It ought to be a matter of national pride that more than 10% of the British contingent have been given positions of considerable responsibility. One sergeant, for example, appointed a regional commander, has command of 250 personnel from 43 different countries. Mr Paul Boateng, when Home Office Minister, visited Bosnia recently and saw at first hand the good work that our officers are doing and the difficulties they face.

**1.19** Whilst the Bosnian deployment of officers is both topical and high profile, those officers are just part of the larger number seconded as advisors to different parts of the world at the request of national governments or chiefs of police. In addition, HMIC, the forces of England and Wales and National Police Training are host to many government officials and senior police officers from around the world seeking information as to how best improve their own police forces. A full litany of such visits would be endless but representatives have visited HMIC in the most recent months from countries as diverse in the development of policing as Belgium, South Africa, Turkey, Finland, and the United Arab Emirates. The core business of HMIC is to support the development of policing in England and Wales through constructive advice and support but at times challenging and vigorous criticism. Criticism of forces and their action or inaction does not begin and end with HMIC. There is some residual satisfaction and reassurance in the fact that other countries envy what they see and seek to learn from our collective policing experience.

## **JOINED-UP INSPECTION**

**1.20** The Police Service has championed the idea of working in partnership to combat crime for almost twenty years. The Service pursued the notion that crime is so multi-faceted in both its causes and effects that its containment and defeat can only be achieved through collaborate working. That philosophy is now enshrined in statute through the Crime and Disorder Act. Equally inspection cannot and should not stand aside from the idea of maximising the expertise, experience and resources of a range of inspectorate bodies.

**1.21** During the year, in addition to regular exchanges of ideas, there have been excellent examples of partnership working in joint inspections. In the autumn the joint resources of the Magistrates Court Service Inspectorate, the Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and HMIC conducted a speedy but incisive study of the blockages in the youth justice system (How Long Youth Cases Take). The report's recommendations targeted all agencies. The HMIC thematic inspection of Child Protection issues linked where appropriate with the Prison Service Inspectorate who were conducting their own thematic on 'lifers' within the prison system.



1.22 Fruitful liaison continued with the Audit Commission who have their own statutory responsibilities in respect of policing. There is a mutual acceptance that the roles and skills of HMIC and the Audit Commission are complementary. The shared concern, that the benefits of inspection must not be outweighed by the burden the inspection or auditing process unavoidably imposes, is a cornerstone of our joint thinking and approach. I was particularly pleased that the Audit Commission invited an HMIC representative as a member of their advisory group that was the consultative touchstone as to how to approach the inspection of Best Value in local authority services as well as police forces. The pleasure was not simply that the voice of HMIC should be heard but also the invitation was a tangible expression of mutual respect between our two bodies. The newly formed Inspectorate Forum is an exciting innovation. It will provide the formal opportunity for Heads of Inspectorates involved in improving local services under Best Value to:

- consider the scope for co-ordinating programmes of audit and inspection;
- develop arrangements for inspection across organisational boundaries including the identification of thematic issues for cross cutting inspection;
- secure a consistent approach to Best Value inspection;
- identify and promote best practice in inspection.

## **INTERNAL PROGRESS**

1.23 HMIC is essentially a change agent as it encourages police forces towards continuous improvement. A task driven organisation such as HMIC needs to create the time to ensure that it is both contemporary in its knowledge and futuristic in its vision. The physician must be both fit and in sympathy with a preventative regime so that the call to 'heal thyself' is rare. There have been substantial advances in staff training during the year. New members of staff now have the benefit of a course of induction geared to both their needs and the demands of their new role. Our twice yearly conferences are now more focussed on training in new techniques and generating awareness of the changing demands of the inspection. This represents a substantial investment but I am convinced that the returns on that investment more than justify the cost. A by-product of our new approach, including training inspection staff in EFQM techniques, is that HMIC can look to eventual Investors in People accreditation with increasing confidence.

1.24 The two non-police Assistant Inspectors have continued to add significant value during inspections and to our strategic thinking. Their number of contracted days was increased by 50% in the reporting year which allowed HMIs to utilise their knowledge and experience beyond their original remit. The increase in their availability also facilitated involvement in thematic inspections. Their diverse professional backgrounds and experience provide a valuable added dimension to the work of HMIC.

## **INSPECTING THE FUTURE**

1.25 These are dynamic times for a police service which has done well to keep up with the pace of change for a number of years. The expression 'challenging years ahead' is no stranger to my annual reports but the relative challenges of the past were to scale the foothills. Over the next couple of years the Service perhaps faces the challenge of the mountains. HMIC is adapting its approach to guide and support the Service through a demanding time.

1.26 HMIC is now actively involved in following through the progress of forces towards securing 2% efficiency gains in the current financial year. The funding settlement for the Police Service for 1999/2000-2001/2, following on the Comprehensive Spending Review, required police authorities and police forces to publish efficiency plans within their annual local policing plans. A 2% efficiency gain will produce £144m in 1999/2000 which must be recycled into front line policing. As the opportune HMIC thematic on value for money (What Price Policing) clearly established, such activity is not novel to the Service but the audit trails were often weak making tangible proof difficult if not impossible.

1.27 The Home Secretary has agreed that the inspection and audit process for efficiency plans will be led by HMIC with support from the Audit Commission. In preparation, our joint staffs worked alongside a group of forces to develop both the idea of efficiency planning and a Best Value inspection model. Early indications from this collaborative work and early inspections suggest that forces which have devolved responsibility for operational and resource planning are in the best position not just to deliver efficiency gains but, as importantly, to prove how those gains have been channelled into service delivery.

1.28 The Local Government Act 1999 gives HMIC the power to audit and inspect, jointly with the Audit Commission, police authorities in respect of their responsibilities under Best Value principles. Whilst the process begins in the financial year 2000/2001 energetic preparatory work is being undertaken in the current financial year. The role of HMIC as the Best Value inspectorate for the Police Service will have a significant effect on our approach to inspection. The logistical implications for HMIC are equally profound.

1.29 I report on the implications of the Best Value legislation for police authorities and forces in Chapter 3 (para 3.23 to 3.25).

HMIs are determined to give the highest priority to servicing the inspection needs of Best Value. The underpinning rationale of both HMIC and Best Value converge neatly to produce a philosophy of continuous improvement. Whilst HMIs will pursue a particular orthodoxy in carrying out their responsibilities under Best Value it needs to be remembered that only a quarter or a fifth of forces' activity will be subject to the full rigour of Best Value each year for the first five years. HMIs cannot and will not neglect their other statutory responsibilities under the Police Act 1996 for ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of forces. In order to facilitate their emerging dual roles, to maximise the optimum output from the inspection process and to keep the burden of inspection on forces to the feasible minimum, HMIC is developing a diagnostic model that adopts a risk assessment approach. Inspections in future will be triggered by a number of factors related to poor overall performance, specific incidents that give cause for concern or a failure to secure certification under Best Value. In any event, no force will be left uninspected for more than a three year period. As the protocols and process for the new inspection take shape, HMIC will be consulting those bodies with a necessary and legitimate interest.

1.30 HMIs are currently visiting forces with senior Home Office officials to take a focused look at crime reduction. The intention is to establish the appropriateness of plans, targets and milestones, including the five year target of a 30% reduction in vehicle crime which is a high volume element in the overall pattern. Partnership is a key element and the visits will help in assessing if there are weak links. The overriding intention of the visits is to identify and share good practice and support development. The drive towards crime reduction will require partnership players not just interested spectators. The early indications are quite clear that an unstinting and sustained effort will be required from every agency if the real potential for crime reduction is to be achieved.

1.31 There is further joint activity by our non-police Assistant Inspectors and District Auditors complementary to the force visits. Joint teams are working at BCU level to examine the evolution and production of community safety plans under the Crime and Disorder Act. Are they in sympathy with the legislation? What have proved the blockages and constraining factors? What has worked and what has not? All 370 BCUs will be visited over the next three years with the Assistant Inspectors dip sampling on a number of visits.

1.32 The impact and implications of the Macpherson Inquiry Report on matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence will reverberate throughout the Police Service for many years. Whilst I will comment in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3 on the wider implications for the Service, there are important recommendations to be actioned by HMIC. The report recommends:

*'That in order to restore public confidence an inspection by HMIC of the Metropolitan Police Service be conducted forthwith. The inspection to include examination of current undetected HOLMES based murders and reviews into such cases'.*

The inspection has begun and is being led by HMIs David Blakey and Dan Crompton. The former leads a multi-skilled and experienced team examining unsolved HOLMES murders, whilst Dan Crompton leads a second team, including a core staff with experience of our two recent thematic into community and race relations, to review the Metropolitan Police Service community and race relations strategy and policy compliance. This inspection of one force is unparalleled in its size and complexity. Additional lay resources and nominees from the National Black Police Association form part of the team. The inspection will report before the end of the calendar year.

1.33 The Macpherson Report also recommended that HMIC 'be empowered to recruit and use lay inspectors ... *particularly in connection with performance in the area of investigation of racist crime.*' The use of lay inspectors would not be a novel experience for HMIC. I commented earlier on the developing role of our non-police Assistant Inspectors. This recommendation, however, provides an opportunity to take a fresh and lateral look at the many possibilities and optional solutions to meet this recommendation and perhaps extend it. External consultants have been contracted to investigate the options, consult widely and make recommendations. I will submit proposals to the Home Secretary by the end of 1999.

1.34 Thus the stall is set out and the mix of inspection fruit is quite different from our historical diet. The changing and increased demands on our resources dictate that some of our intentions have to give way to higher priorities. HMIC has only two thematic inspections planned for this year. One inspection will look at the use the Service makes of forensic science. If a reduction in crime is to be achieved, the optimum use of the forensic science capability and capacity will be a pre-requisite. The second will look at crime reduction following up on the valuable work in an earlier thematic (Beating Crime 1998).

1.35 It is with some reluctance that I have reduced the thematic programme. However, an important consideration in supporting the decision was the fact that our thematic over the past couple of years have already covered such vital areas of policing at both the strategic and operational level. They have helped forces prepare for a demanding future of changing public expectation and budgetary discipline. A great deal has been achieved as a result of our thematic and there is a legitimate view that the responsive sponge, bearing in mind changes originating elsewhere that have to be absorbed, may be in danger of saturation.

1.36 The HMIC team looks forward with confidence to the changing nature of inspection in the future. We are confident that we



will contribute substantial added value to tripartite members, jointly and severally, and to the essence and continuous improvement of policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

## Chapter 2

# THE OUTCOME OF INSPECTION

### INTRODUCTION

**2.1 The inspection year was marked by a significant change in the HMIC approach. HMIC extended the time between inspections for each force from an annual event to an 18 month cycle. The change became necessary to ensure HMIC could deliver its important programme of thematic inspections, which benefit and have implications for the whole Service, against resource constraints. The changed approach eased the burden of inspection on forces without sacrificing its cutting edge.**

2.2 Twenty-eight inspections have been carried out including two within the Metropolitan Police. These inspections produced a total of 193 recommendations. The specificity of recommendations, it must be noted, is not the totality of the documented learning experience for forces. Whilst progress against recommendations is pursued by HMIs, within each inspection report are numerous examples of other professional advice. Expressions such as 'may wish to consider' or 'urge to investigate the possibility of' are useful to feed the thinking within a force. An inspection report generates activity within a force well beyond the number of recommendations.

2.3 An analysis of trends in recommendations provides a useful touchstone of the broad areas the management of forces are finding the more problematic. This year's figures suggest that there is some commonality of problems in respect of strategic planning, the management of IT, crime recording, crime management, and complaints and discipline issues.

2.4 Whilst there has been a quantum leap in the approach of most forces to strategic planning in the recent past, the subject continues to prompt recommendations for improvement. The medium term vision was not apparent in a couple of forces whilst in others there was a necessity to integrate subsidiary plans and planning processes into the strategic vision. Plans need to be the product of meaningful consultation, particularly with middle managers who are vital to realising the aspirations. The need for numerically specific targets was a regular feature of recommendations as was the desirability of identified milestones of progress.

2.5 Parts of the Service are failing to maximise the benefits of IT. Strategies for IT need to be coherent, cohesive and contemporary in their awareness of external developments in a dynamic technology. Care must be taken to ensure that front line personnel are able to maximise the benefits as opposed to bearing the burdens of the voracious appetite of the new technology for data and information. Ownership of an IT strategy at chief officer level must be accompanied by frequently updated information to the force of planned IT developments and the benefits of such developments must be clearly spelt out to operational staff. Strict adherence to the demands of data protection are crucial for the credibility of the Service. It is a matter of concern that a small number of forces needed to be reminded of their responsibilities in respect of data security.

2.6 It is crucial that crime recording practice is in total accord, in all forces, with national policing and guidance set by the Home Office. There is an ever present risk that vulnerabilities in a system provide temptation to the corrupt officer or team to inflate performance. Forces need to remove temptation by establishing robust systems and subjecting those systems to a searching and regular audit. The integrity of recorded crime figures assumes additional importance as the thrust towards crime reduction develops. It is important that inter-force and inter-BCU comparisons are based on totally valid data. Recommendations were made on inspection to a small number of forces regarding their responsibilities for recording crime and auditing those records.

2.7 With a few exceptions, forces now have qualified finance officers supporting senior management. HMIC welcomes this progressive trend as effective financial planning is a pre-requisite of both the efficiency gain requirement and the onset of Best Value. Forces need reminding, however, that these requirements cannot be solely finance led as resource consumption is inextricably linked with performance. The full participation of the force corporate management team and the collective will of the whole force are pre-requisites of success. Just as HMIC welcomes the appointment of finance specialists, the trend to appoint professionals in other disciplines, including procurement managers after the publication of the thematic What Price Policing, is a positive step forward.

### PROGRESS ON EARLIER RECOMMENDATIONS

2.8 A vital part of the inspection process is assessing progress against recommendations made in the previous year. During 1997/8 HMIs made 193 recommendations as a result of inspections of the 28 forces that were again inspected during 1998/9:

- 123 (64%) had been accepted and implemented. A further 28 were in the process of implementation;
- partial implementation followed 15 recommendations;
- 20 were accepted for later implementation;
- 4 had not been implemented generally because changed circumstances within a force ended or reduced their relevance;
- 3 remain subject to further clarification.

In summary 96% had been implemented, an improvement of 4 percentage points over last year and 8 points over 2 years ago.

2.9 A small team, based at Queen Anne's Gate, undertakes a specialist role in checking the compliance of forces and other users with the rules for use of the Police National Computer (PNC). This is an important area of work. The facilities provided by the PNC are a tremendous benefit to police officers throughout their working day. It is of crucial importance that such benefits are never restricted through any misuse of access and that the public are reassured that information on the PNC is used strictly for the purposes intended. Our small unit conducted 21 such compliance audits including two of Scottish forces at the request of HMCIC Scotland, one non Home Office force and four non police organisations who have restricted access to a limited number of PNC applications.

2.10 Analysis of migration plans to NSPIS were also conducted in 23 forces. Forces are required to have a project plan to facilitate the move to NSPIS applications as they come on line. Each force must be in a position to purchase NSPIS applications or prove that their own systems are NSPIS compliant.

## **MILLENNIUM PREPAREDNESS**

2.11 The preparedness of both the public and private sector to face the challenge of the Year 2000 date change has been a recurring topic of debate. It is, quite rightly, a priority to Government to ensure that along with all the other emergency services, police systems are compliant and that there is no threat to the quality of service received by the public. Directed by Cabinet committee, Action 2000 has overall responsibility for ensuring that the national infrastructure is ready and that necessary action is being taken. Within each Government Department there is a designated Responsible Body charged with ensuring preparedness. In March 1999 HMIC was required by the Responsible Body to conduct an independent assessment of the millennium preparedness of all police forces in England and Wales, the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad. By invitation we also conducted an independent assessment of two non-Home Office forces, the British Transport Police and the States of Jersey Police. Each was assessed in detail against a template designed and validated by Action 2000, using HMIC personnel and technical staff seconded from forces and PITO. The process was conducted in two phases and forces were graded against the Action 2000 colour code. The results were reported at the regular public National Infrastructure Forum meetings.

The results of Phase 1, completed in June are shown in (FIGURE 2).

### **FIGURE 2 Millennium Preparedness - Phase 1 Results**

All forces will be revisited in Phase 2, which is scheduled to be completed on 30 September 1999, in order to check on their progress towards BLUE status by that date. Action 2000 has complimented HMIC on the rigour of our approach. I am confident that as a result of this exercise, and our close co-operation with the ACPO (Millennium Co-ordinating Committee) that all forces will be BLUE in good time before the millennium date change and that operational and infrastructural preparedness will be assured.

## **THEMATIC INSPECTIONS**

2.12 The HMIC programme of thematic inspections produced reports that should help forces to improve in areas of policing that have proved problematic. Every force, even the better performers in particular areas, can and should learn from every one of our thematics. The fact that chief constables are so willing to subject their own forces to be studied in a particular thematic is evidence that they recognise the benefit to the force and the Service as a whole. The HMIs and I are keenly aware that there is a special demand placed on thematic sites and remain continually grateful for the facilities made available and the generally open approach of staff to the rigours of a thematic inspection.

2.13 Our thematics over recent years have covered a range of important aspects of police operations, service delivery and the strategic management of police forces. The scope has varied from the very broad such as value for money and police training to the quite narrow, but equally important, such as child protection. Taken together the product of the wide ranging thematic

experience provides a solid platform for an improved policing future.

2.14 The thematic inspection reports produced in 1998/9 continued the tradition of importance and variation (FIGURE 3).

### FIGURE 3 **Thematic Inspections**

#### ***The Policing of Disorder***

2.15 The public have high expectations of the Police Service response to disorder. Their expectation extends beyond large scale disorder which, if unchecked damages the sense of safety well beyond the damage to people or property at the scene. Concerns, even fears, are just as keenly felt if low level disorder and anti-social behaviour are left unchecked. These day-to-day manifestations are a constant irritant which go to the heart of local quality of life. The inspection found forces increasingly adopting a problem solving approach to root out the problem at source in partnership with others. Whilst neither an easy nor soft option this is the way forward using, where necessary, the sanctions of the Crime and Disorder Act.

2.16 Styles of disorder are as subject to the changes of fashion as are other aspects of life. The Service had to learn very quickly appropriate strategy and tactics to deal with environmental protest particularly when targeted at proposed transport infrastructure. A great deal has been learned with specialists and specialisms emerging to carry out the policing task with the safety of officers and demonstrators, in their self-inflicted peril, being paramount.

#### ***Child Protection***

2.17 A great deal of progress has been made over the past decade in how the caring services, and under that label I include the police, respond to allegations or suspicions of child abuse. Historically agencies ploughed their own furrow, often for spurious reasons of confidentiality or professional independence, to the disadvantage of the most vulnerable, the nation's future, its children. Thankfully, harsh lessons were learnt and new victim centred approaches were found to provide a more appropriate and rounded response. Collaborative working between agencies became the rule rather than the exception.

2.18 There is no room for complacency in this important area of social concern. The thematic revealed training needs amongst child protection specialists. The report reminds the entire Service that the existence of such specialists does not remove all responsibility from other officers. Patrol officers should develop their awareness and alertness to the signs and symptoms of abuse and understand the links to other abusive behaviour in the family and the misuse of drugs. There is room for more preventative approaches and the development of protocols between agencies and standardisation of language should help to improve understanding and co-operation between agencies. This inspection, supported on the ground by members of the Social Services Inspectorate and staff from H M Inspectorates of Probation and Prisons, was an excellent example of joint inspectorate working. The degree of protection a society offers its children is an indicator of the sophistication of its civilisation. Such protection also protects the future of that society itself.

#### ***Road Policing and Traffic***

2.19 This thematic demonstrated that road policing has too often been marginalised in the past. The financial cost alone of road accident casualties to the nation is estimated at £12.6 billion per year. The human cost to blighted families of 69 deaths per week cannot be estimated far less calculated. The progressive increase of anti-social behaviour tinged with significant violence increases the cause for concern.

2.20 The inspection revealed that, as forces concentrated on targeted aspects of performance, the road traffic effort had dissipated. The volume of traffic grows year after year yet traffic officers typically are only 7% of force strength. Those officers are as highly skilled as they are well motivated and are the source of most of the good practice ideas. Their professionalism and their frustration must be met by all chief constables adopting the ACPO road traffic strategy within their own strategic approach.

#### ***Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training***

2.21 It is crucial to the future of the Service, particularly at a time of an increasing complexity which is unlikely to diminish, that police officers and other staff receive timely, appropriate and cost effective training. The demands amongst others of new legislation, carrying out the policing role in more enlightened and professional ways, coming to terms of friendship with new technology, all create a training demand. The HMIC thematic inspection is the most comprehensive study of police training ever undertaken. The product is a report unashamedly robust in the delivery of its messages.

2.22 Investment in training is substantial but the lack of precise knowledge of the actual cost is a cause for concern. Regrettably the inspection found that training does not necessarily reach those whose needs are greatest and at the same time duplication of

effort and a lack of meaningful performance measures or frameworks of accountability lead to expensive waste.

2.23 The report provides valuable check lists for forces in all aspects of the management of training. Common Minimum Standards (CMS) should be established through a National Training Organisation (NTO) that addresses the historical culture of the Service to training. The idea that 'I cannot learn unless I have been on a course in a classroom' should be as moribund as the culture that spawned it. Contemporary demand for training can only be met by contemporary and more flexible methods of delivery.

2.24 I was pleased to note that this important thematic was given influential weight in the report of the Home Affairs Committee into police training.

### ***Police Integrity***

2.25 'Without integrity there is nothing' is surely one of the truisms of policing by consent. Policing is both expensive and crucial to the well being of our democracy. The doctrine of policing by consent cannot survive if the public, who are increasingly more demanding as they are in other aspects of customer activity, lack confidence in the integrity of the Police Service. This thematic was initiated in recognition that, whilst public confidence in the police remains high when compared to many other institutions, confidence was being dented and corroded by the unacceptable behaviour of a small minority. There is a responsibility also to the vast majority of officers, whose day-to-day duty is marked by their good work, to take positive action against the minority and establish a preventative regime against corruption or other unprofessional behaviour.

2.26 This inspection was geographically and conceptually wide-ranging. On-site visits were made to almost half of all English and Welsh forces as well as the National Crime Squad and National Criminal Intelligence Service. All chief constables responded to an in-depth questionnaire. The inspection report, in addition to its recommendations, again provides a check list to assist police managers to improve the integrity and ethical standing of their individual organisations.

### ***Winning the Race Revisited***

2.27 Integrity of the Police Service is one cornerstone of policing by consent. Another is that the Service realises as specific the needs and policing aspirations of the visible ethnic minority population. When the original HMIC thematic on community and race relations was published in the Autumn of 1997, I shared the concerns of the Home Secretary and Ministers at aspects of its findings particularly that across the country performance was so patchy. That report had twenty recommendations alongside examples of good practice. The Home Secretary announced, when launching the original thematic, that HMIC would carry out a further inspection within 12 months in increased number of forces (fifteen as opposed to six) to assess and report on progress.

2.28 We found that overall the response had been less than satisfactory. Too much was still being left to dedicated individuals, or small teams be they BCU commanders or specialists dealing with racist attacks and incidents. The training effort had not yet responded and gaps were evident in the minds of officers where knowledge should exist. The Service had failed to set the conditions precedent to securing more recruits from visible ethnic minorities or developing the careers of such officers in the Service. Overall progress in 12 months had been very limited and where good practice was apparent it was isolated. This depressing picture was particularly disappointing because it was the very year that the Macpherson Inquiry was taking evidence and gaps in police thinking, actions and training were emerging. Most of those gaps had been identified in the original HMIC thematic.

### ***Follow-up to Thematic Recommendations***

2.29 It had already become apparent, and the revisit of Winning the Race emphasised the point, that whilst an effective progress chase existed to monitor responses to recommendations in a force inspection report, arrangements were less substantial in pursuing progress against thematic inspection recommendations. Under new arrangements the regional HMI writes to the chief constables in his region seeking progress reports on thematic reports three months after their publication. This is already providing a much improved and more effective process. It ensures that recommendations of thematic reports do not gather dust in forces and are given the priority they deserve with follow-up by the regional HMI. There is no suggestion that chief constables have been cavalier regarding thematic recommendations. It is quite simply that, in the volume of other changes to be actioned, they have not always secured the agenda priority they deserved.

### ***Leadership***

2.30 If there was one consistent theme repeated throughout this year's round of thematic reports, as in those of previous years, it is that of leadership. Training is more effective in forces where the top team have seized the issue: identification and investigation of racially motivated incidents are more systematic and professional in forces where chief officers have emphasised their

commitment to the ACPO good practice guide. Leaders have the key role in their deeds as well as their words in the maintenance and improvement of integrity standards. The visibility of leaders, the setting of standards by them and the imposition of transparent sanctions are of crucial importance. The thematic programme, in addition to lighting the path of progress on the subject matter, is a constant reminder of the nature and content of the job of leader in contemporary and future policing.

## COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE

2.31 The Inspectorate has a statutory responsibility under the provisions of section 77 of the Police Act 1996 to keep under review the handling and investigation of complaints. During the course of inspection, HMIs place particular emphasis on the management, integrity and timeliness of investigation of complaints and the use of management information to identify the underlying problems that are causing complaints. In 1998/99, HM Inspectors of Constabulary made 11 recommendations relating to complaints. These included:

- three recommendations that management information systems be put in place to record, monitor and analyse organisational complaints;
- three recommendations on improving the use of management information on complaints to enable the examination of trends and causation factors;
- one recommendation to improve the time taken to complete investigations.

2.32 The number of complaints cases involving the conduct of police officers has fallen by 7.8 per cent in 1998/99 which is the fourth consecutive annual decrease. Since 1994/95 there has been an 18.5 per cent fall in the numbers of complaints cases recorded. Each complaint case may consist of a number of individual complaints but these too have decreased by 8.1 per cent (FIGURE 4). This equates to a level of approximately 0.25 complaints per officer.

### FIGURE 4 Number of Complaints Recorded 1993-1998/99

2.33 Although the national trend is for a reduction in complaints recorded, sixteen forces did see increases including Lincolnshire with an increase of 120% (up 141 complaints). An increase in recorded complaints can be an indicator of a change in the recording system itself and a sign that the force is encouraging the reporting of complaints. However, those forces where there have been such increases should monitor the situation carefully using management information to identify any trends in types or locations of complaints in order to take preventative action in the future.

2.34 Once a complaint has been recorded following investigation it can be resolved in a number of ways:

- informally resolved;
- withdrawn;
- substantiated;
- unsubstantiated.

2.35 As in previous years the proportion of the complaints completed that was substantiated was very small at 2.4 per cent which is the same as in 1997/98. Nationally, the proportion of complaints substantiated varies considerable from 0.1 (Nottinghamshire) to 8% in (North Yorkshire). The proportion of complaints withdrawn fell 1.3 percentage points to 14.1%. HMIC encourages the use of informal resolution where this is appropriate. Nationally, 34.8 per cent were informally resolved which is just above the figure for last year but again the use of informed resolution varies from a very high 59% (Derbyshire) to a low of 22.2% (Cambridgeshire).

2.36 In 1992, a voluntary agreement was reached with the ACPO which prescribed a target of 120 days for police forces to complete the investigation of complaints. On average in 1998/99, 76.6 per cent of all complaints were completed within these time limits which is an increase of 1.2 percentage points in comparison with last year. The percentage of complaints completed in the time guidelines varies considerably between forces ranging from 50% to 100%, however, the majority of forces (34) managed to complete 70 per cent or more within 120 days. HMIs encourage forces to examine the reason for the failure to achieve a high proportion of complaint investigations within the time limits set in order to improve in future.

2.37 The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) has a statutory responsibility for the investigation of complaints against the police. The Inspectorate continues to maintain close links with the PCA and seeks its views as a matter of course during each inspection. The number of complaint cases referred to the PCA fell for the fourth consecutive time by 24% to 1,336 in 1998/99 which equates to 6.6% of all cases. Of these the PCA chose to supervise 944, again lower than last year, forming 71% of those referred.



2.38 Overall, I continue to be satisfied with the general standard of complaints investigations in general but encourage forces to ensure that rigorous monitoring systems are in place to enable a more proactive approach to the reduction of complaints. Only those complaints directed at police officers are covered by formal procedures. In 1998/99, HM Inspectors continued to recommend that forces maintain systems to record, investigate and monitor organisational complaints in the same way as those directed at individual officers. A dissatisfied member of the public is unlikely to be happy that his/her complaint is treated any differently because it is directed at a policy rather than a person. The same is true of civil actions which are also not subject to any national guidance or external supervision.

2.39 In 1998/99 12,378 civil claims were received by the forces of England and Wales of which 48% (5,961) were public liability claims for malfeasance which includes assault, false imprisonment etc. The remaining were made up of 184 industrial tribunals, 3,868 claims in relation to road accidents and 2,365 employer liability (accidents etc) (FIGURE 5).

**FIGURE 5 Civil Claims received by Police Forces - 1998/99 (England and Wales)**

2.40 In total, 65 court awards were made for malfeasance totalling over £400,000 with the addition of 1,302 which were settled out of court at a cost of almost £4 million and over £400,000 legal costs meaning that civil actions for malfeasance cost the Service over £8 million. The total cost to the Police Service of civil claims in terms of settlements, court awards and legal costs for all types of civil action came to over £20 million which equates to 0.3% of the entire police budget. In addition to the cost to the Service in terms of money, there is also a cost in the public confidence. In 1998/99, there have been a number of very high profile industrial tribunals relating to equal opportunities which has had a detrimental effect on public perception of the police.

2.41 As part of our thematic inspection into the Integrity of the Police Service we found that in 1998, 39 forces had had at least one officer convicted of a criminal offence, a total of 216 officers across the country. So it can be seen that there is much progress still to be made in this area. The introduction on 1 April 1999 of the new disciplinary procedures (see paragraph 3.31-3.35) will provide a considerable improvement in the ability of chief officers to deal effectively with disciplinary matters.

## Chapter 3

# CHANGING THE BEAT

**3.1 The Police Service itself has been in the vanguard of change for many years. It is an institution unrecognisable even to that of ten years ago. It is managerially much leaner, beginning after a cautious start to optimise the use of technology and altogether carries out its historical task in more professional ways. There are stabilising constants amongst the breathless dynamic of a changing world of policing. The broad mission remains the prevention of crime and disorder followed respectively by detection and resolution. On the premise that individual or collective perception is individual or collective reality, the mission embraces the assault on the fear of crime and the establishment of a comforting sense of safety. Successive reductions in the number of burglaries of peoples' homes in each of the past six years is an outstanding achievement. An achievement that few would have been brave enough to predict in the early 1990s when experience was of almost exponential growth decade by decade.**

3.2 This seminal success is proof of what can be achieved. It is not the time to relax: those breathless from the pace of change must find additional lung capacity. It is the time to consolidate success and learn from its experience to address the broader agenda of reducing crime overall. Success against this agenda will only be achieved if the Service continues to modernise and capitalise on the opportunities for change.

### LEADERSHIP

3.3 The Service can take justifiable pride in many of its leaders who are all the products of the Service itself. The drive must be to raise the overall standard to that of the best, whilst at the same time taking a hard look at how the Service selects and develops its leaders. The impact of improvement will be cumulative, as an organisation marked out by the quality of its leadership and professionalism will attract better quality recruits in a highly competitive market place.

3.4 HMIC is working enthusiastically with ACPO, the APA and others, under Home Office chairmanship, to find improved methods of senior officer selection and development. The intention is to determine the means of identifying and selecting the potentially most able, ensuring that the potential is realised. The working group will also revisit the roles of the various parties in selection processes. In essence, the challenge is to position the right leader, in the right place, at the right time.

### FIGURE 6 Percentage of Ethnic Minority Officers (England and Wales)

3.5 Such leaders will develop and secure ownership of a shared vision and the means to achieve it within their increasingly diverse organisations. That vision will be based upon knowledge of the external environment and the ability to anticipate the changing needs and aspirations of an increasingly sophisticated public. Change will be viewed as a potential friend to be cultivated not a stranger to be rejected. Leaders will need to be equally competent as the architects and the constructors of partnerships and at ease in responding to diverse accountabilities.

3.6 The management of increasing complexity should not cloud the focus of what officers and support staff need to do. Their purposes and roles should be marked by their clarity whilst leadership absorbs the shading of complexity. The dexterity of intellect and abundance of energy required will also be both necessary and sufficient to maintain the leadership focus on outcomes, the principal intended outcome being the reduction of crime.

3.7 HMIC has functional responsibility for the Accelerated Promotion Scheme for Graduates (APSG). A great deal of effort and commitment by a small staff, whilst securing credibility in most universities, is failing to deliver the goods. Only 16 places were offered last year with a mere dozen the year before. It is a particular concern that no visible ethnic minority applicant has secured a place since 1995. Our own thematic revisit to Winning the Race recommended that the scheme 'needs to be revisited and fresh ideas sought.' The APSG is therefore being subjected to a fundamental review, including thorough consultation with stakeholders, of the strategic objectives of the scheme, its future and recommending improvements. The findings will be reported to the Home Office chaired committee on chief officer selection and development later in the year.

### VISIBLE ETHNIC MINORITIES

3.8 The impact of the Macpherson Report undoubtedly shook the Service. The reverberations provide an imperative for change not just an opportunity. The Service should not have been surprised as the HMIC thematic Winning the Race highlighted many



of the deficiencies in procedure and practice captured by Macpherson. I was disappointed therefore that our follow up study *Winning the Race Revisited* demonstrated that, in general, the Service had not reacted with the necessary alacrity to the recommendations of the original thematic. I am pleased that there is now evidence of an energetic response both within ACPO, within staff associations and within forces. This issue is of such fundamental and overriding importance that each of the 43 forces in England and Wales will be subject of a further inspection of their progress early in 2000.

3.9 Unless the Service places community and race relations at the core of its thinking, its policy and its actions, and recognises the particular and special needs of visible ethnic minorities there is a real risk of losing the mandate to police by consent a substantial, and increasing, proportion of the population. An important constituent of the combination of measures necessary to secure progress is a greater representation of officers from visible ethnic minorities at all levels of the Service. In April chief constables and leaders of police authorities accepted the challenge of the Home Secretary's targets of due proportion at all levels of the Service within 10 years with interval milestones to be achieved. I see the acceptance of this considerable challenge as tangible evidence that the Service, at last, means business in this vital area. HMIC will monitor progress towards the targets and identify good practice.

3.10 As was recommended in both *Winning the Race Revisited* and in evidence of HMIC to the Home Affairs Committee review of police training, the moves to standardise criteria for recruits and to explore regionalised recruitment are rational in themselves and will benefit the drive for recruits from visible ethnic minorities. To some the challenge of the targets seem daunting but there is a source of comfort, even inspiration, in the knowledge that this is not the first time it has responded to remedy a deficit in its make-up. Thirty years ago the Police Service nationally could look forward to recruiting one graduate each year. That abysmal figure had been the repetitive recruitment pattern for some twenty years. Progressively, with effort and imagination, the Service has improved its position to one where each year 800 graduates are recruited, representing 13% of the annual intake. The Service has proved that it can create and sustain a positive action programme targeted at a minority group, and reap the subsequent reward.

## **NEW TECHNOLOGY**

3.11 The generic skills of the police officer will never be replaced or overtaken. The ability to talk to people, to interview suspects and witnesses, to spot the unusual and observe a behaviour pattern, come together to feed the invaluable mosaic of 'intelligence'. The confidence and experience to act decisively and use discretion judiciously will continue to be the backbone of our policing style. The computer will never subsume these essential strengths. It is necessary, however, and the progress towards crime reduction reinforces that necessity, to gain maximum benefit from developing technology. Within a whole range of technological opportunities there are a handful of key areas.

### ***Public Safety Radio Communications Project (PSRCP)***

3.12 I am pleased that the Home Secretary announced, at the Labour Party Conference in September, that an additional £50 million will be provided to bring police communication into the digital era.

3.13 PSRCP is an important initiative. It will provide secure voice and data exchange and will allow frontline officers to access multiple, and vital, databases. Local control rooms will be able to pass graphic information to their colleagues. Officer safety will be enhanced and officer deployment will become more effective.

3.14 This will be welcomed by forces nationally.

### ***National DNA Database***

3.15 The development of DNA techniques has provided the excitement that our policy predecessors must have experienced with the evolution of fingerprints as a source of unequivocal identification. The national DNA database has found a suspect for nearly half the crimes on the system. I am pleased that the Prime Minister has announced additional funds to carry out a much needed expansion of this database. The return on such expansion should prove substantial. In addition to providing primary evidence in the detection of crime, the greater number of criminals convicted should impact both individual and general deterrence.

3.16 Active offenders commit on average 7 offences per year. Those offenders caught, convicted and given custodial sentences are removed from the streets and subsequent offences are therefore prevented. There must then come a point where other criminals or potential criminals, assessing the possibilities and probabilities, are deterred by others being caught with greater frequency. The effect of the expansion of the database on crime reduction will be significant.

3.17 Despite the actual and potential rewards stemming from DNA technology, fingerprint technology remains a vital tool in

crime detection and suspect identification. Indeed there is even more to be gained. The National Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) is designed to provide access from local fingerprint bureaux to national fingerprint databases capable of comparing over one million fingerprints every second. The operational benefits include quicker processing of those arrested through the criminal justice system, increased detection of criminals and speedier identification.

### ***National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS)***

3.18 NSPIS is a concept which will provide standard computer applications for a Service which spends £150m each year on IT support. Indeed the concept is already delivering some applications. With applications as diverse as command and control, major crime investigation and case preparation, the potential benefits from standardisation and compatibility between forces, extending to other elements of the criminal justice system, are exciting. Forces are looking forward to the roll out of HOLMES II, the computer support for major crime investigation, which has been warmly commended by the pilot site forces. It is appreciated that forces are at different stages of investment in the development and unexpired useful life of their own IT support in different aspects of police business. Whilst there is the encouragement of economies of scale to reduce the price of a particular application, recent investments by a force, for example, on a command and control system cannot be discounted.

### **FUNDING THE FUTURE**

3.19 The best leaders, leading the right people, optimising the benefits of the latest technology to enhance service delivery are all at a cost. Each part of the infrastructure of social support can construct an articulate case for more resources. There is no gain without another's pain as public sector resources are not limitless. The HMIC study What Price Policing demonstrated that, whilst there were areas for improvement through collaborative procurement and ownership at chief officer level of value for money, the Service was a foe to itself. Having secured significant improvements in productivity, it was unable or thought it unnecessary to prove them.

3.20 The current year's improvements in efficiency will be subject to proof. The Home Secretary has set efficiency targets of 2% on a year-on-year basis. The aim is that forces channel the savings into the delivery of operational policing in any combination of three optional approaches:

cashable gains where resources are reduced but performance maintained;

- cashable gain where identifiable cash resources are used to fund investment in a new service or activity which must lead to an improvement in performance;
- non-cashable gains where resources are redeployed to secure an improvement in performance.

I am confident that the 2% will be secured in 1999/2000. I also realise that the playing field had undulations in so far as some forces had already made greater efficiency progress in earlier years. I remain convinced that the debate to level the surface would have been protracted, disruptive to other agenda priorities and there would never have been universal satisfaction with the outcome.

3.21 The shift in thinking from inputs to provable outputs and outcomes must be welcome. It will add strength to the argument for resources in future. There is a concern that it may be difficult to sustain the year-on-year target without cutting into numbers of officers. Indeed recent figures show a decrease of 718 in police numbers, the fourth annual reduction in the last 5 years. An argument obsessed by inputs is flawed and HMIC does not construct a holy grail around the sanctity of police numbers or urge constant growth. Optimum deployment, reduction in sickness and technological support are some of the other key pieces of the jigsaw. However, there is a consistent and constant demand from the public for visibility of officers and there is an issue of officer safety. A continuing decline in officer numbers would have an adverse effect on public confidence and in consequence the fear of crime as well as sapping the morale of officers themselves.

3.22 The specific difficulty of funding adjustments is that, for the police, as a people industry, 85% of its resources are spent on pay and pensions with the cost of the latter continuing to rise at an alarming rate. The option of not recruiting secures the greater savings in the shorter term given the stated commitment of chief constables and police authorities to increase substantially the number of visible ethnic minority officers, this is not the time to apply harsh braking to recruitment. It would relieve some of the burden and help to sustain recruitment if help could be given centrally with the funding of the technology opportunities earlier discussed. They have a crucial role in increasing the efficiency of officers and in tandem will help to deliver reduction in crime.

### **BEST VALUE**

3.23 During the remainder of 1999 the Service must prepare itself for the discipline of Best Value which will have statutory

effect from April 2000. Originally the Local Government Bill had focused the regime on local authority services, not those provided by police authorities. It is a tribute to the desire of the Police Service to be at the cutting edge of innovation and to seek mechanisms to improve service delivery, that six police forces applied to be considered for Best Value pilot status. Ultimately the Police Service, although not initially invited, secured three of the limited number of pilot sites. Now, appropriately, the Police Service is included by statute.

**3.24** The philosophy of Best Value is shared by HMIC - the pursuit of continuous improvement. Each police authority, and therefore each force, will be required progressively to submit all aspects of its service to the discipline of Best Value over a five year period. The Best Value plan for the following year will have to demonstrate that the rigour of the four 'C's has been applied to the aspects of service under review:

- *Challenge*  
Eg - Is the service still relevant to local people?  
Are there other means to meet the need?
- *Compare*  
Eg - Has the service been benchmarked against that provided by other forces?
- *Compete*  
Eg - Would it be more appropriate to outsource the service or perhaps to provide it in partnership?
- *Consult*  
Eg - Have all stakeholders and sections of the community been consulted?  
To what extent has the product of the consultation influenced the Best Value plan?

**3.25** The Audit Commission and the District Auditor will certify the plan, and in so doing due account will be taken of HMIC advice. (Fuller detail of the role of HMIC in Best Value provided in paragraph 1.29). The disciplines of Best Value will not be comfortable nor should they be. Whilst the gradient of the learning curve will differ from force to force, I am confident that the new opportunity offered by Best Value will provide the right lens to focus the mind of forces on what they seek themselves to achieve - continuous improvement across the whole range of policing services.

## **OVERARCHING AIMS AND OBJECTIVES**

**3.26** From the Comprehensive Spending Review evolved the concept of setting overarching aims and objectives for the Police Service. The establishment of those aims and objectives provide clarity of the linkages between Police Service activity, the wider aims of the Home Office and those of the criminal justice system as a whole. For the first time, this approach unpacks the business of policing. The three aims and the eleven supporting objectives delineate the contemporary role of police and reflect the reality of policing (see Appendix B). The underpinning guiding principles provide a constant reminder of the crucial mechanisms to achievement with integrity, partnership and acceptable local priorities featuring strongly. Performance indicators are being worked through in consultation with ACPO, APA, Treasury and the Audit Commission so as not to impose additional burdens on data collection within forces. The intention is to establish clearer and more outcome centred performance indicators that have transparent links to the aims of both the Home Office and the wider criminal justice system. In the interim the Ministerial priorities in relation to young offenders, crime and disorder, drug-related crime plus the issue of confidence in policing amongst visible ethnic minority communities, and their associated performance indicators are in place for the current year.

## **TARGETS**

**3.27** HMIC supports the setting of realistic and challenging performance targets. Recent history has witnessed the Service's positive response to targets in areas as diverse as burglary reduction and sickness management. The Police Service is marked by a culture of success and does not relish being seen to fail. In a spirit of healthy competition no force takes any satisfaction from failure where others have succeeded. There is a concern however that an abundance of targets with diverse origins may diffuse the focus and devalue the currency.

**3.28** In 2000/2001 forces will be aiming at targets in relation to:

- the recruitment and retention of visible ethnic minority officers;
- the reduction of 30% in motor vehicle crime over 5 years;
- processing persistent young offenders through the criminal justice system;
- reduction in road traffic casualties;
- drug related crime;
- retirements of officers on ill health pensions;
- efficiency gains.

In addition HMIC will be identifying forces performing weakly in particular areas with the intention of securing improved performance that will lift such forces to the performance of the best. Simultaneously Best Value performance and progress on the overarching aims and objectives will be measured and published.

3.29 Item by item, every single one has merit and value. I am concerned that further discussion takes place between the tripartite partners, the Audit Commission and HMIC to provide a framework and context around the package so that Ministers can identify their most important priorities.

## **BCU PERFORMANCE**

3.30 HMIC gathers performance data from forces to feed the inspection process and to assist Home Office officials in policy preparation. At the moment the data is aggregated by each force and the figures reflect the overall performance of that force. Arrangements are in hand to gather the data from forces on a BCU basis. BCUs are the important cogs in the wheel of a force: an importance emphasised by the statutory partnership working within the Crime and Disorder Act. The component BCUs of any force are often so diverse as to mitigate the value of an intra-force comparison. One may be rural, another urban: the demographic and socio-economic complexion of one may be a stranger to another: the mix of residential, business, retail bias may be radically different. Comparison of BCUs of different forces however provides more realistic comparison from which the whole Service can learn best practice. The focus on the BCU is not to prejudice the continuing importance of the performance and accountability of forces as a whole. The BCU is now of such fundamental importance that it is right to maintain a central overview of performance at that level. Within that mix of BCUs are beacons that need to be identified as path finders for the rest.

## **DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES**

3.31 The HMIC thematic on Police Integrity reminds the Service, in unequivocal terms, of the problems of corruption and the too frequent inappropriate attitudes or behaviour towards the public. The problems stem from a minority of officers who do irreparable damage to the good work of their colleagues and the reputation of the Service. I welcome therefore the introduction on 1 April this year revised disciplinary procedures.

3.32 In recent years police officers have secured parity with employees in other sectors - for example in the application of health and safety rules to policing - and it is appropriate that there should be an equivalence with those of other employees in disciplinary matters. I welcome the reduction in the burden of proof to the civil as opposed to the criminal standard. The ending of the double jeopardy rule, in addition to the introduction of a fast track procedure where there is clear evidence of serious criminal wrongdoing, are welcome and overdue changes. The perceived failure to deal speedily and effectively with gross misconduct has heaped ridicule on the Service in recent years. The changes will free the hands of the Service to confront its problems and deliver justice as will the enhanced powers to hold a disciplinary hearing in the absence of an accused officer.

3.33 I am aware of the natural concerns of the Superintendents' Association and the Police Federation particularly regarding the changed burden of proof. However the meticulous investigations of complaints, the right to legal representation and inbuilt systems of appeals reassures me that officers will receive the necessary protection from malicious complaints.

3.34 The introduction of formal procedures to deal with unsatisfactory performance with the ultimate sanction of requirement to resign is a further welcome step forward. This is again in line with wider employment practice. It was not right that the lazy or incompetent officer was safe in working life employment unless the individual committed a provable disciplinary offence. The lazy do little so are unlikely to do anything wrong. This was unsustainable.

3.35 The vast majority of police officers do an outstanding job in increasingly difficult and, too often, dangerous circumstances. I am convinced that that vast majority are equally concerned that the corrupt, the unprofessional in attitude or behaviour, or the incorrigibly lazy should not be allowed by an outdated system to tarnish the good name of the honest, the professional and the hard working. It is equally reassuring that the Home Secretary has ordered research into the impact of the disciplinary changes on operational officers.

## **POLICE TRAINING**

3.36 It is those operational officers who deserve the most effective training if they are to deliver the quality of service that the public deserve at a time of increasing policing complexity. HMIC had increasing concerns that the training effort was dissipated rather than focused. It seemed that the huge amount of public money spent on police training was not always addressing the right problems to the right audience or securing due return on a considerable public investment. Our thematic on police training Managing Learning (see Chapter 2 paras 2.21 - 2.24) confirmed many HMIC concerns.

3.37 Running in parallel with our work on the thematic, the Home Office conducted their own review of National Police Training (NPT) which accounts for 10% of the funds spent on training. Collaborative work resulted in recommendations that NPT should become accountable to a new Service Authority, funded by a mixture of central funding and direct charging and become more centred on the needs of the customer. The Police Federation, who have justifiable concerns, put forward their own proposals for the future of police training in Project Forward. The document suggested the creation of a Police University and placed an emphasis on distance learning and the use of IT. This was a valuable contribution to the debate.

3.38 The debate continued as the Home Affairs Select Committee launched their own inquiry into police training to which HMIC presented written and oral evidence. Sir William Stubbs, a distinguished educationalist, provided a further study at the invitation of the Home Secretary.

3.39 I was pleased to note the weight accorded to the HMIC thematic both by the Home Affairs Committee in its report and by others. This important issue has now been researched in depth and few perspectives on police training have been ignored. I look forward, as this year progresses, to the definitive future of police training being found and collectively owned. The Service has missed opportunities to develop the professionalism of many of its officers and other staff, particularly the great majority who remain career constables. The rhetoric that such people are the backbone of the Service is somewhat hollow if that backbone is allowed to crumble for want of the calcium of appropriate, regular and relevant training.



## Chapter 4

# COMPARISON OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

### INTRODUCTION

**4.1 The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 introduced Key Objectives measured by Key Performance Indicators through which the Home Secretary could prioritise particular services provided by the police each year. This year will be the fifth year in which police performance is reported against these objectives in our annual report.**

4.2 Since their introduction the national key objectives have largely remained the same. However, this year has seen a significant refocusing of the objectives to reflect the Home Secretary's current priorities; in particular the targeting of young offenders and the improvement of the quality of life by reducing the level of local crime and disorder (FIGURE 7). Many developments linked to these two objectives have been introduced in the past two years including the Crime and Disorder Act, which brought in to being the statutory community safety partnerships and introduced the Youth Justice Board with supporting youth offending teams.

4.3 The setting of key objectives has achieved considerable success in focusing effort on particular policing problems. This will continue in 1999/2000 in the context of Ministerial priorities which will form part of the overall framework for police performance measurement. However, at the same time, the framework for measuring police performance is in the process of undergoing a fundamental reform which will come into effect from 1 April 2000 in conjunction with Best Value introduced by the Local Government Act 1999.

4.4 Following the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), which reported in April 1998, the Home Office set out the aims and objectives for the criminal justice system as a whole, and in support of these a set of overarching aims and objectives were developed for the Police Service. In order to provide a high level view of how the Police Service is performing against the overarching aims and objectives, a suite of indicators has been developed in consultation with ACPO, APA, HMIC, HM Treasury and the Audit Commission. For policing this has meant a recognition of the multiplicity of police activities that impact on each of the objectives, the inter-relationships between the activities and the difficulty in measuring success. The development of the performance indicators was underpinned by certain criteria. Ideally, the indicators should be:

- as few in number as possible;
- clearly understood and easily interpreted;
- measurable and able to form the basis for robust comparisons i.e. quantitative, based on agreed definitions;
- related as directly as possible to outcomes;
- not prone to manipulation and avoid perverse incentives wherever possible;
- encouraging of partnership, but focus on specific contribution of the police to delivering those outcomes which are not wholly under their control;
- based on data which, if not already available, can be collected at affordable cost.

### FIGURE 7

4.5 Although in theory the performance measures should be outcome based, in reality it is often difficult to measure outcomes directly. In many cases therefore, output indicators or proxy measures have to be used as an interim measure while better measures are developed and the ability to collect such data becomes feasible.

### KEY OBJECTIVE 1 - DEALING SPEEDILY WITH YOUNG OFFENDERS

4.6 The principal aim of the new youth justice system is to prevent offending by young people. One of the six key objectives supporting that aim is the swift administration of justice so that every young person accused of breaking the law has the matter resolved without delay. In support of this aim, the Government has pledged itself to halving the average time taken from arrest to sentence for persistent young offenders from an average period of 142 days in 1996 to 71. In September 1998, the Home Office and the Lord Chancellor's Department issued a joint circular entitled 'Measuring performance to reduce delays in the youth justice system'. This circular set an initial target of completing at least 50% of persistent young offender cases within 71 days. A joint inspection into how long youth cases take, involving HMIC, CPS Inspectorate and HM Magistrates' Courts Service Inspectorate found that in their sample of persistent young offender cases 62.5% were finalised within the target time.

Although performance across sample sites was variable, the study suggests that the target is achievable.

4.7 There are a number of ways in which the police can contribute to this process including speeding up the process of file submission for all young offender cases and with fast tracking schemes for persistent young offenders in conjunction with other agencies. The Police Service and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) have for the last two years been involved in a comprehensive project to monitor and improve the timeliness and quality of files submitted for prosecution under the Joint Performance Management (JPM) initiative. To put momentum into the process, files should be passed to the CPS within specific time guidelines. Further, when passed to the CPS, it is important that the quality of the file is satisfactory or at least of sufficient quality and completeness that the prosecution can proceed without further work being required on the file.

4.8 In light of the concern about young offenders, from April 1998 youth files have been monitored separately. As this data request is new, not all forces were able to provide the data in the required format initially. However, by the last quarter of 1998/99 only one force (North Yorkshire) was still unable to provide all the data requested due to the introduction of a new information technology system that had yet to become fully operational.

#### ***KPI 1 i - The percentage of cases relating to young offenders dealt with within pre-trial issues time guidelines***

4.9 In 1998/99, the number of files that related to young offenders totalled approximately 70,000 constituting 13% of total files (Table 1 Appendix C). This low proportion is a reflection of the fact that many young offenders are dealt with by way of caution or other diversionary tactic. Another factor is that the data collection exercise is in its early stages and in the first year not all forces have been able to count youth files separately for the whole of the year. Some forces have only been able to provide sample data or data for the latest quarter. The accuracy and completeness of the data will gradually improve once new data collection processes and information systems are fully implemented.

4.10 Nationally, in 1998/99, the proportion of files that were processed within the time guidelines averaged 76% with the average of all forces being 74%, ranging from 42% (Nottinghamshire) to 97% (North Wales) (FIGURE 8). The majority of forces (25) achieved a level of over 70% of files processed within target times. Following the 'Review of Delay in the Criminal Justice System' (the 'Narey Report') a number of initiatives intended to expedite case progress from charge to disposal were piloted in six sites viz: Tyneside, Croydon/Bromley/Sutton, North Staffordshire, North Wales, Blackburn and Burnley, and Northamptonshire. Between October 1998 and March 1999, these sites piloted the following initiatives:

- provision of out of hours advice by the CPS;
- location of CPS staff in police stations;
- use of CPS Designated Caseworkers to review files and to present certain cases;
- introduction of early first hearings for straightforward guilty pleas;
- introduction of early administrative hearings for all other cases; and
- changes to the powers of single justices and justices' clerks to assist case management.

#### **FIGURE 8 Percentage of Youth Files within PTI Guidelines 1998/99**

4.11 North Wales Police show the highest proportion of youth files processed within time guidelines which may reflect the success of the Narey pilot projects sited in the area. The evaluation of the pilot sites by Ernst and Young, found that the six initiatives together reduced the average times between charge and disposal from 89.5 to 37.9 days for young offenders. Other areas with pilot sites have not achieved such high levels, but quarterly data shows marked improvements in performance in the last two quarters of 1998/99 in all pilot forces. For example Northamptonshire's performance rose from 58.6% within time guidelines for April to June 1998 to 84% in January to March 1999.

4.12 To sum up, forces have responded well to the requirement to monitor this data and by the end of the year only one force was unable to provide data on youth files separately. The forces in the top quartile of performance are achieving a level of at least 20 percentage points higher than those in the bottom quartile. This demonstrates the potential for improvement through the adoption of good practice as described in the Youth Justice Board Report '*Speeding up Youth Justice*' issued in May 1999.

#### ***KPI 1 ii - The percentage of cases relating to young offenders meeting performance management quality targets***

4.13 As with KPI 1i this is the first year that this data has been collected specifically for youth files and consequently there is not data from previous years with which to compare performance. All forces were able to provide this data although some have provided sample data. This indicator relates to all those files relating to young offenders that were deemed satisfactory or, at least sufficiently satisfactory for the case to proceed when passed to the CPS for prosecution. Throughout England and Wales, the proportion of files that met the quality standards was 92% with the average of all forces being 91%. The proportion ranged from 99% (North Yorkshire) to 72% (City of London) with the majority of forces (31) achieving at least 90% (FIGURE 9).

This is a very high level of performance which is to be congratulated. However, the key performance indicator examines those files that are either fully satisfactory or just sufficient to proceed which is a slightly lower standard of quality. When the proportion of those files which are classed as fully satisfactory alone are examined, performance is more varied ranging from 33% (Hampshire) to 80% in Dyfed-Powys and is an area where improvements can be made.

**FIGURE 9 Percentage of Youth Files either Fully Satisfactory or Sufficient to Proceed 1998/99**

## **KEY OBJECTIVE 2 - TO TARGET AND REDUCE LOCAL PROBLEMS OF CRIME AND DISORDER IN PARTNERSHIP WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, AND OTHER LOCAL AGENCIES AND THE PUBLIC**

4.14 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, introduced statutory community safety partnerships to work together in reducing local levels of crime and disorder. The Act placed a responsibility for the partnership to produce a crime and disorder strategy by 1 April 1999. Consequently, in the first year of their establishment, forces were asked to have mechanisms in place for measuring success in tackling the specific crime and disorder problems identified by the partnerships.

4.15 At present the District Audit Service is embarking on a programme of visits to audit the strategy and progress of the partnerships. The two lay Assistant Inspectors of Constabulary are taking part in a number of these visits in order to gain information for future HMIC inspections. In addition to this work, during the summer of 1999 HMIC, in partnership with the Crime Reduction Unit of the Home Office, has pursued this work through a comprehensive series of visits to all forces. HMIs, accompanied by senior Home Office officials, have discussed local crime reduction targets and partnership performance with chief constables and their senior management teams, together with many of forces' local partners. The approach throughout has been to listen and learn so that best practice can be shared, resources focused, and policy developed to best help these new partnerships achieve their objectives.

### ***Crime Reduction***

4.16 One of the most important outcomes of police activity is crime reduction to which all operational policing contributes. There is no easy method of measuring success in the prevention of crime and the only measure of crime reduction at force level currently available, is the absolute level of recorded crime per 1000 population. This measure has however, been affected by the changes in the counting rules introduced on 1 April 1998, which broadened the classifications of crimes classed as notifiable, so increasing the numbers of crimes included in the national statistics for 1998/99. Work to determine what that effect has actually been, in terms of numbers, is still on-going but indications are that the overall trend is down by 1% which means the sixth consecutive fall in recorded crime figures.

### ***The Number of Crimes Recorded per 1000 Population***

4.17 Without examining the trend, it can be seen that the number of crimes recorded per 1000 population varies dramatically across forces from below 60 in a few non-urban forces (Dyfed-Powys, Surrey and Hertfordshire) to almost 150 in some more urban areas (Humberside and GMP) excluding the City of London which has a very small resident population (FIGURE 10). In general, forces covering a predominantly rural area have a lower level of crime per head of population than those covering a predominantly urban area. In recognition of the different levels of crime experienced by forces, the funding formula takes account of socio-demographic indicators that have been found to be linked to, or to predict, high levels of crime, (e.g. young male unemployment).

**FIGURE 10 Number of Recorded Crimes per 1000 Population 1998/99\***

4.18 Nevertheless, within groups of similar forces, there are still wide disparities in levels of crime per head of population that are difficult to explain. The potential to decrease the level of recorded crime per 1000 population is illustrated by the fact that force performance often differs greatly from their most similar force averages.

4.19 There are a number of forces with a level of recorded crime per 1,000 population that appears to be out of the normal range for forces of similar nature. In particular, Humberside has a significantly higher level than other forces. Her Majesty's Inspector has investigated the reason for this high level, which has followed the same pattern for a number of years, but the results are inconclusive. One reason claimed by the force is an exceptionally high level of integrity in recording of crimes and there is some evidence from the last inspection to support this view. Nevertheless the force is well aware of the need to reduce crime and efforts to that end were seen during the recent inspection not least in the area of partnerships. Her Majesty's Inspector recommended in the latest inspection report that the force improve as a matter of urgency its crime management system. This would allow more confidence to be placed in its crime figures and also give increased scope for analysing trends and patterns and so through directed policing give real opportunity for crime reduction (Table 2, Appendix C).



## KEY OBJECTIVE 3 - TO TARGET DRUG-RELATED CRIME IN PARTNERSHIP WITH OTHER LOCAL AGENCIES

4.20 Developing an outcome based performance indicator to measure success in tackling drug-related crime that is both meaningful and for which the data is easily available has proved difficult. One of the problems with measuring success against this objective is the measurement of drug-related crime itself. Research consistently points to the link between drug misuse and crime, for example in a study for the Home Office on English arrestees and drug misuse, nearly half the arrestees who reported taking drugs within the last year said their drug use was connected with their offending. But it is still only possible to make estimates of the effect on crime that drug misuse has.

4.21 In April 1998, the Government's ten-year strategy for tackling drugs misuse 'Tackling Drugs To Build A Better Britain' was published. The strategy highlights the cross-cutting nature of the drugs problem and recognises that most Government departments and local agencies have a part to play in tackling the drugs problem. This strategy aimed to set clear, consistent and rigorous targets to achieve the aims of the strategy in the first year and these have now been published. The objective that the police will contribute most to is:

*'to protect our communities from drug-related anti-social and criminal behaviour'.*

4.22 The key performance target for this objective is *'to reduce levels of repeat offending amongst drug misusing offenders by 50% by 2008 and 25% by 2005'*. To this end the Police Service is encouraged to make maximum use of arrest referral schemes and the target set for 1999/2000 is to double the number of face-to-face arrest referral schemes and the number of arrestees referred to and entering treatment programmes. The key performance indicator for 1998/99 is an interim indicator while more appropriate indicators to measure the police contribution to the ten-year drug strategy are developed which can link into the overarching aims and objectives.

### FIGURE 11 Number of Arrests for Supply or Possession with Intent to Supply per 10,000 Population

***KPI 3 - The number of arrests for the supply and possession with intent to supply per 10,000 population.***

4.23 This is a new indicator for which forces have been required to institute a new data collection exercise. However, all forces have been able to provide this information (Table 3 - Appendix C). The differences between the performance of forces against this indicator are striking. Nationally, forces average 4 ranging between 1 (City) and 9 (Cumbria) arrests per 10,000 population (FIGURE 11). The forces with a higher level of arrests vary greatly in terms of size, geography and population such as Cumbria to West Yorkshire. As the disparity cannot be explained by such factors the difference probably reflects the priority given to drug-related crime and the methods used to combat it within forces. Further research is required in order to understand the differences better.

## KEY OBJECTIVE 4 - TO MAINTAIN AND, IF POSSIBLE, INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DETECTIONS FOR VIOLENT CRIME

4.24 Violent crime is a consistent concern of the public and consequently has remained a priority for the Police Service. In recent years recorded violent crime has been rising nationally with significant increases recorded in many forces. This has been attributed in some way to changes in recording practice - particularly in relation to encouraging the recording of domestic violence. In addition to this, from 1 April 1998, the counting rules for recorded crime changed in order to improve the recorded crime statistics and simplify the rules. The main principle was that there should be one crime for each victim. The results of the changes were to expand the notifiable offences to include almost all indictable and Triable Either Way (TEW) offences. One of the effects of these changes has been to increase the number of recorded crimes that are classed as violent crime in particular 'common assault' which previously was non-notifiable and now is included in the notifiable offences.

4.25 The changes to the counting rules appear to have had a differential effect in forces with six forces experiencing a rise of over 100% and others seeing rises of less than 25%. Currently, it is not possible to identify the trend in violent crime because of the varying effects in forces. However, work is in progress within the Home Office to provide some estimate of overall effect.

***KPI 4 - The percentage of violent crimes detected***

4.26 Nationally, the detection rate has fallen slightly from 69% in 1997/98 to 66% which is the level achieved in 1996/97 and so, superficially, does not appear to have been unduly affected by the change in the counting rules (Table 4 Appendix C). In 1998/99 performance in detecting violent crime varied greatly across the country averaging 78% but ranging from 39% (Metropolitan Police) to 97% (Dyfed-Powys). This wide spread of performance hides the fact that the majority (31) of forces achieved a performance of between 70 and 90 percent (FIGURE 12). The variation in performance has increased this year with

a difference of 58 percentage points between the highest and lowest performers compared to 43 in 1997/98.

#### FIGURE 12 **The Percentage of Violent Crime Detected 1998/99**

4.27 One factor that may have influenced force detection rates for violent crime is the introduction of the change in the recorded counting rules. Although the national detection rate has not changed greatly in 1998/99, some forces have seen considerable changes this year which may well relate to this factor. At the top end of the scale, three forces showed increases of 10 or more percentage points in their detection rate (City of London, Greater Manchester and Lancashire) whilst at the other end the Metropolitan Police and Sussex experienced decreases of 13 and 10 percentage points respectively (FIGURE 13). Until the analysis of the changes in recorded crime has been completed it is not possible to determine what the exact effect has been on detection rates and why it has been affected.

#### FIGURE 13 **The Change in Percentage of Violent Crime Detected Between 1997/98 and 1998/99**

4.28 Although the change in the counting rules may explain in part the change in detection rates seen in 1998/99, it does not explain how it is that a small number of forces have detection rates some 20 percentage points below the performance of the top quartile of forces. Within the forces in the bottom quartile are most of the large metropolitan forces, which demonstrates a possible link between performance in detecting violent crime and the nature of area policed. One of the distinguishing features of the large urban forces in terms of violent crime is that there tends to be a higher proportion of street robbery recorded. Such offences are often more difficult to detect as the offender is usually a stranger to the victim as proved by the national detection rate of 22.6%. Consequently, the level of robbery can affect the proportion of violent crime detected in those areas. Robbery constitutes an average 11% of violent crime nationally, but ranges from 21% (Cleveland) to 1% (Dyfed-Powys and Gwent). All metropolitan forces have proportions of robbery in the upper end of the scale (9% or above) and there is a correlation between the proportion of robbery recorded as violent crime in the force area and the violent crime detection rate.

4.29 Despite this, it can be seen that forces with similar socio-demographic profiles achieve quite different levels of performance and have produced significantly different levels of improvement over the past three years. The greatest increase in the detection rate for violent crime was demonstrated by West Midlands which improved by 20 percentage points over a 3 year period, which is an achievement to be congratulated. Conversely, Nottinghamshire and Sussex showed decreases of 17 and 11 percentage points over the same time period (FIGURE 13A).

#### FIGURE 13A **Percentage Point Change Between the Detection Rate for Violent Crime in 1996/97 and 1998/99**

4.30 Whilst there may be reasons for low or decreasing detection rates for violent crime linked to recording practices and operational pressures, further work must be done to drive up performance, particularly from those forces with detection rates in the bottom quartile.

### **KEY OBJECTIVE 5 - TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DETECTIONS FOR BURGLARIES OF PEOPLE'S HOMES**

4.31 Since 1994/95, there has been a continued focus on domestic burglary which remains one of the greatest concerns of the public. The targeting of this problem has had significant results illustrating that success can be achieved through consistent effort and intelligence-led policing. This can be seen by the fact that for the fifth year running the level of recorded domestic burglary has decreased with a fall in 1998/99 of 5.7% (down by 28,393 crimes). Over the past two years since 1996/97 forces have averaged a decrease of 19% with three forces achieving a decrease of over 30% (Bedfordshire, Cumbria and Leicestershire). No force has shown an increase in recorded burglary dwellings over this period but for some the decrease has been less marked than for others. Sussex showed least success in this area of performance by maintaining the same level and six other forces have shown a decrease of less than 10%.

#### ***KPI 5 - The percentage of burglaries of dwellings detected by primary means and overall***

4.32 In addition to monitoring the level of crime reduction in this area, the Key Performance Indicator measuring the performance of forces in addressing domestic burglary is the percentage of those crimes detected both in total and by primary means. Primary detections being those where an offender has been charged, summons or cautioned or where the offence has been previously recorded as a crime and the offender has had the offence taken into consideration when sentenced.

#### FIGURE 14 **The Percentage of Burglary Dwelling Detected in Total and that Made up of Primary Detections 1998/99**

4.33 Nationally, the proportion of crimes that were cleared up by primary means is low at 15% and has not improved on the previous year (Table 6 Appendix C). The disparity in the levels of primary detections that are achieved ranging from 43% (Dyfed-Powys) to 10% (Greater Manchester) is evidence of the potential for improvement (FIGURE 14). Only seven forces

achieved a primary detection rate of 20% or greater but the fact that these forces varied from urban forces like South Wales and more rural forces like Cumbria illustrates that all forces should be able to achieve equivalent performances.

4.34 The overall detection rate varies enormously from nearly 60 per cent to just over 10 per cent but the use of secondary detections as a clear up method is determined largely by force policy. Consequently, these detections can be used to contribute from zero per cent (City of London and Cleveland) to over half of the total detection rate in eight forces. Nationally these detections make up 38% of all detections for domestic burglary, the largest proportion being seen in Norfolk where 64% were obtained by secondary means (or other means) (Table 7, Appendix C). Many secondary detections result from post sentence interviews which should be conducted with the primary object of gathering intelligence in line with guidance issued by HMIC. From 1 April 1999, the counting rules for detecting crime have been amended to remove the distinction between primary and secondary clear ups, whilst strengthening the rules to ensure that the same strict criteria are required, in terms of evidence, for all detections. Detections will, where offenders are already in prison, be allowed when there is corroborative evidence to support any admission made and the CPS and a senior police officer agrees that it should be classed as a genuine detection. The new rules should remove any inconsistencies or ambiguities that existed before and generally improve the integrity of the detection figures as a whole.

#### **FIGURE 15 Percentage Point Change in Primary Detection Rate for Burglary Dwelling between 1996/97 and 1998/99**

4.35 Since 1996/97 the national primary detection rate has risen from 13% to 15% which is still very low. In that time three forces have shown notable increase in the primary detection rate - Dyfed-Powys, Gloucestershire and West Midlands with increases of 10, 8 and 8 percentage points respectively (FIGURE 15). Both Gloucestershire and West Midlands have shown steady increases from a low base over the past four years to over 17% which is above average. Dyfed-Powys has maintained and improved on its consistently high performance. All three forces have also shown decreases in recorded burglary dwelling at the same time as improvements in primary detection rates.

4.36 Conversely two forces have shown serious decreases in the primary detection rates namely Cleveland and Norfolk with reductions of 8 and 7 percentage points respectively. Cleveland has shown considerable success in reducing domestic burglary with a decrease of 17.6% over the three years while the decrease seen in Norfolk at 4.6% is well below the average decrease.

4.37 The performance of a few forces in achieving significant reductions in recorded burglary dwelling, high or improving primary detection rates or both reflects the potential performance that could be achieved by other forces. Nevertheless, the focus on burglary dwelling over the past four years has been a factor in a greatly reduced level of domestic burglary nationally and a slightly improved primary detection rate both of which are a welcome success.

### **KEY OBJECTIVE 6 - TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO EMERGENCY CALLS FROM THE PUBLIC**

4.38 As ever, the response to 999 calls forms an important first impression to the customer and the public expects a high level of service delivery. Over the past 4 years the number of 999 calls has risen by 16% nationally and in some forces by as much as 77%. This is a result of many influences including improvements in technology which allow more calls to be handled by a force and increased demand which itself is affected by the increased mobile phone ownership.

4.39 However, as seen from research (The Use of Call Grading, PRG Paper 13, 1994) the proportion of 999 calls that turn out to require an immediate response is often quite low ranging from 18% to 61% in the period of the study. Consequently, many forces are attempting to improve demand management through the use of public service desks and helpdesks and through local advertising on the use of the 999 call system. Nevertheless, as each individual 999 call could be an emergency, the need to answer the call as quickly as possible is still of fundamental importance.

4.40 Once the call has been answered, the next step is to respond to that incident. All forces operate a graded response system whereby calls are classified according to their urgency and the most appropriate response deployed. This can mean an immediate response or the transfer of the call to another department for an appointment to be made. This is another key area that catches the public imagination. The public expects that once they have dialled 999 with an emergency, the police will arrive instantly.

#### **KPI 6 i - The percentage of 999 calls answered within the local target time**

4.41 Over the past 5 years performance in answering 999 calls within target has remained consistently high averaging 89% in 1998/99. The service itself has improved through the lowering of targets (no force now has a target time for answering of over 15 seconds). In 1998/99 local targets ranged from 5 seconds (North Yorkshire) to 15 seconds (14 forces). This year only one force (Derbyshire) changed its target by decreasing it from 15 seconds to a more challenging 10 seconds.

4.42 The level of performance achieved against these targets is almost without exception very high. Only four forces (Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Dorset and Essex) achieved lower than 80% of calls answered in target and 21 forces achieved over 90% the highest being Cumbria at 99% (FIGURE 16). Of the four forces with the lowest performance against this indicator all are involved in projects to review or restructure their call handling systems. The decrease in performance of Hertfordshire in answering 999 calls has been the cause of concern to HM Inspector. The decrease has been attributed to a new telephone and subsequently a new monitoring system for call answering which has resulted in setbacks in improving performance. In 1997, Essex introduced a force information room that handles all emergency phone calls and all radio traffic and response deployment in the county. This was an ambitious project which has presented some difficulty in implementation and suffered delay. Indications are that performance is now beginning to improve. This demonstrates that with a few exceptions usually related to changing the process of the technology or organisational structure of call handling, the public in general is now receiving a consistently high level of service in this area. However, it is only the first step in the process and the action taken following the answering of the call will also have just as great an impact on public perceptions as the initial answering.

**FIGURE 16 The Percentage of 999 Calls Answered within Local Target Time 1998/99**

4.43 Since 1996/97 a number of forces have shown noticeable improvements in performance most notably Merseyside, Leicestershire, Norfolk and Humberside where performance rose by 19, 15, 14 and 14 percentage points respectively (FIGURE 17). In Merseyside, Norfolk and Leicestershire projects to introduce centralised call handling functions experienced many difficulties which caused significant dips in performance. In all cases, considerable effort has been put into improving performance, in the case of Norfolk this has involved a costly recovery project. In Merseyside the force has developed incident management units which combine crime management units, intelligence and call handling facilities through which all non-immediate calls are routed. In Humberside, HM Inspector of Constabulary has previously found elements of call handling performance to be of significant concern and so it is to its merit that such progress have been achieved.

**FIGURE 17 Change in Percentage of 999 Calls Answered in Target between 1996/97 and 1998/99**

4.44 Two forces, Dyfed-Powys and Hampshire were not able to supply data in 1996/97 due to the introduction of new technology. While Hampshire has maintained a level of performance of 83% of calls answered on target over the past two years, Dyfed-Powys has demonstrated a decrease of around 12 percentage points in 1998/99 compared to 1997/98 (Table 8, Appendix C). This has been attributed to a combination of factors: the introduction of the new technology and a reduction in the target time. However, early reports on the current year's figures indicate an upturn in performance and a recent review of staffing has resulted in improved efficiency in achieving targets.

4.45 In response to the incoming Best Value regime and as a result of the need to make efficiency gains many forces have been examining innovative methods of providing the call handling function. A number of forces are examining the sharing of communications rooms with other forces and with other emergency services. HMIC welcomes this response to the efficiency agenda and hopes that further progress in the sharing of facilities will be made. Overall, the performance in answering 999 calls has been maintained at a high level with one or two exceptions that should be resolved in the coming year. There is no room for complacency however, and forces are urged to continue to achieve this increase and to consider how their response to all calls not just 999 calls could be improved.

**KPI 6 ii - The percentage of responses within the local target time to incidents requiring immediate response**

4.46 In responding to these incidents classed as requiring an immediate response, the speed of the response possible is determined by the size and geography of the force, and targets are set to take account of these factors. In general, response times for rural areas are set at 20 minutes and urban areas are set at 10 minutes. Few forces vary from these targets but a number set one target for the whole force area. All such comparisons are complex but for ease of illustration all forces have been shown with their overall performance against all targets set, to give a summary view (FIGURE 18).

**FIGURE 18 Percentage of Incidents Requiring an Immediate Response Answered within Local Target Time 1998/99**

4.47 Performance against the urban and rural targets varies but as a whole, there is a very high rate of response within the target times. Nationally, the proportion answered within target averages 88% ranging from 76% (Norfolk) to 98% (North Yorkshire) (FIGURE 18). As mentioned before, Norfolk has experienced problems in centralising call handling and control room functions. In addition, there has been some concern about the over-grading of incidents as immediate. In 1997/98, HM Inspector of Constabulary recommended that Norfolk should identify where accountability lies for incident response performance and make arrangements to hold to account those responsible. The force has done this and has also chosen this area as a pilot for the force programme of Best Value process reviews as it is acutely aware of the need to continue to improve performance. Only three forces achieve less than 80% (Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Warwickshire). In Warwickshire, although the migration to the new central communication centre in 1996 was free of major technical difficulties some working practice



difficulties remain. Possibly related to both are the low staff morale and the high sickness levels found in this area. It is obvious that there is room for improvement in aspects of call handling and HM Inspector has recommended that action be taken.

#### **FIGURE 19 Percentage Point Change in Immediate Response Incidents Answered within Local Target Time 1996/97 to 1998/99**

4.48 Over the past two years, a number of forces has shown notable improvements including Merseyside with an increase of 19 percentage points and Leicestershire, Hampshire, Suffolk and Humberside also showing notable improvements (FIGURE 19). In Hampshire new guidelines defining which type of incident requires which graded response were issued in November 1998 significantly reducing the proportion of incidents that require an immediate response from 18 to 4.5 per cent. The increase over two years in Suffolk reflects the restructuring of the call handling facilities over the past four years. In Leicestershire, as with 999 call handling, considerable effort has gone into improving performance in this area after a decrease in achieving target times following the introduction of centralised call handling. The only force showing a sizeable reduction in performance is Dyfed-Powys which is related as explained previously to the introduction of new call handling technology and indications are that improvements are now occurring.

### **MEDICAL RETIREMENTS**

4.49 In our thematic inspection report Lost Time on the management of sickness absence and medical retirements published in November 1997, the cost of sickness absence and medical retirements was highlighted. We suggested that the high levels of, and wide disparity between forces in levels of medical retirements for both police and civilian support staff confirmed the need for targets for improving performance in this area. Consequently, we proposed that by 1999/00, a sustained management effort should lead to all forces achieving at least the performance achieved by the top quartile in 1996/97 i.e. no more than 33% of all police retirements being a result of medical reasons. Those forces that had already achieved this level or better were urged to maintain and improve on their current performance. For civilian support staff, it was suggested that the Audit Commission target of 25% proposed for Local Government should be adopted.

#### **FIGURE 20 Percentage of Police Medical Retirements 1998/99**

4.50 As illustrated last year in my Annual Report, the initial results indicated that forces were making substantial progress, with a reduction in the actual number of medical retirements achieved of 185 resulting in 38% of all retirements being due to medical reasons nationally. Once again, this year (FIGURE 20 AND 21)) improvements have been made in many forces with 29 forces reducing or maintaining the number of medical retirements recorded leading to a reduction of 185 of medical retirements nationally (Table 10, Appendix C). However, in terms of percentages this has actually created a slight increase in the national figure to 39% due to a drop in ordinary retirements. Over the two year period, the number of medical retirements has fallen by 370 nationally, equating to a fall of 6 percentage points with forces averaging a fall of - 5 percentage points. In comparison to the targets set, only 17 forces have now achieved a level of 33% or lower as compared to 12 in 1996/97 which is disappointing (FIGURE 20). In fact, in nine forces medical retirements still constitute half or more of all police retirements.

4.51 However, examining percentages alone can be deceptive, as they can be affected by the level of ordinary retirements. Since 1996/97, 27 forces have achieved a decrease in the numbers of medical retirements, equating to a fall of 10 or more percentage points in sixteen forces. Some of the decreases achieved have been substantial most notably in Merseyside, West Midlands and Avon and Somerset where reductions of 125, 59 and 42 medical retirements respectively have been seen. Of the fourteen forces that have shown an increase in the percentage of medical retirements, the most notable increase has been seen in Suffolk (up 29 percentage points) (FIGURE 21). However, this illustrates the fact that in forces with low numbers of retirements in total, small changes in medical retirements can cause substantial changes to the percentage - the rise in Suffolk being due to an increase of just seven medical retirements. In terms of numbers of medical retirements, the Metropolitan Police has shown the greatest increase (up 53 medical retirements) however, due to a rise in the number of ordinary retirements of 4 percentage points. South Wales has also shown an increase of 21 medical retirements - an increase of 10 percentage points. So overall, although fewer forces than expected have already managed to meet the targets set in terms of percentages, many have shown significant commitment to reducing the numbers of medical retirements and may meet the target next year.

4.52 It is difficult to estimate the cost of the savings these reductions have made, without knowing the rank, length of service of the officer and any injury award made. It will however equate to a substantial sum. As an area in which significant savings can be made, it is essential that further effort is made to ensure that the good practice highlighted in our thematic report is implemented - particularly by the 9 forces where over half of all police retirements are still due to medical causes.

4.53 In comparison civilian medical retirements have fallen by 221 over the past two years equating to a decrease of 11 percentage points (Table 11, Appendix C). Only nine forces managed to achieve the target of 25% or less so far but 31 forces reduced or maintained the numbers of civilian staff medical retirements some like West Midlands significantly so, with a fall of

46 (decrease of 42 percentage points).

## SICKNESS

4.54 A reduction of sickness absence is another area that has the potential to provide substantial efficiency savings. From the national figures (FIGURES 22 AND 23), it can be seen that average sickness absence per police officer and per civilian employee have both slightly reduced in 1998/99. Comparisons between forces are problematic due to the methods of counting sickness absence. Many forces can only count the absence in days, but most forces run shift systems which have days of longer than 8 hours. If an officer is off sick for one day but works a 10 hour shift system, the amount of working time lost is equivalent to a day and a quarter. However, comparisons within forces over time are valid. Over the two year period from 1996/97 less than half of forces (20) have managed to reduce average police officer sickness.

4.56 Since 1997/98 the level of working days lost to sickness per police officer has fallen by approximately a day nationally. This equates to a reduction of 128,860 days in total which in itself is the equivalent of over 560 extra officers being in work. This illustrates what substantial differences actually underlie the figures in Figure 22 and the extra officers on the streets it would create if all forces could reduce their sickness levels the way some of the better performers have (FIGURE 22).

FIGURE 22 **Average Number of Working Days Lost to Sickness per Police Officer**

FIGURE 23 **Average Number of Working Days Lost to Sickness per Civilian (Including Traffic Wardens)**

4.57 In 1996/97 some forces have made significant improvements in sickness management. In particular, Merseyside has had phenomenal success in reducing sickness from a very high average of 18.6 days per officer to 11.3, a decrease of over 7 days on average. Other forces that have had great success in this area are the Metropolitan Police (down 3.5 days), Humberside (down 3.6 days) and Durham and Hertfordshire (both down by 2.9 days). Conversely, Essex and North Wales have seen increases of 3.6 and 3 days per officer respectively. HM Inspector has recommended that a review of sickness management be undertaken in Essex.

4.58 In comparison with police sickness, civilian working days lost to sickness are slightly higher although there has been a decrease since 1996/97 with 23 forces demonstrating lower levels this year (FIGURE 23). Once again Merseyside has shown outstanding improvements with a decrease of 7.5 days per civilian over the past 2 years. Hertfordshire, Greater Manchester, Cambridgeshire and Humberside have also shown sizeable improvements. Bedfordshire has shown a steady increase over the past two years with a total of six additional days per civilian on average in 1998/99 compared with 1996/97. However, the force commissioned an independent report to look into this area in recognition of the problem. The report was published in March 1999 and has recommended a force-wide sickness management and monitoring group and the rewriting of all policies and procedures. It is hoped that this project will bring improvements. Overall, some progress has been seen in sickness management but there is still great potential for reduction. The fact that many forces have included reducing sickness in their efficiency plans for 1999/2000 may have an impact on the current year's performance.

## RACIST INCIDENTS

4.59 For a number of years the Police Service has been urged to improve its performance in dealing with racial incidents. In April 1998, ACPO published basic standards for the reporting of racial incidents and other organisations have published detailed guidance. In order to ensure that appropriate action is taken in cases where the crime or incident has a racial motivation, it is vital that the community has the confidence to report the incident to the police in the first place. During our follow-up inspection on police and community relations Winning the Race Revisited, each force visited acknowledged that there was significant under-reporting of racial incidents. This picture was confirmed by the Macpherson Inquiry, and the report recommended that all possible steps should be taken by police forces to encourage reporting of racist incidents and crimes. So, although the ultimate aim is to reduce the number of racist incidents that take place, until the Service is confident that all such incidents are reported, a measure of improved police response and increased community confidence can be illustrated by an increase the number of such incidents recorded.

4.60 The new Macpherson definition of a racist incident has now been adopted by the police service - it is not different in substance but simpler, clearer and gives primacy to the perception of the victim:

*"A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person"*

FIGURE 24 **Racist Incidents**

4.61 In 1997/98 the numbers of racist incidents rose by just 6% with just over half of forces (25) increasing the numbers recorded. The figures for 1998/99 are due to be published by the Home Office in December but early indications are that there

has been a substantial improvement. Provisional data shows that the national figure has risen by 75% with all but one force showing an increase in the numbers of racist incidents recorded. Some forces including the Metropolitan Police appear to have doubled their figures. However, wide variations in the level of incidents recorded are still seen in forces with similar minority ethnic populations. Although the differences in these populations, geography and socio-demographic factors could explain some differences, they provide an indicator of differences in the systems for reporting and recording racist incident. When the numbers of racist incidents are standardised by the minority ethnic population of the force area, the numbers reported per 1000 minority ethnic population vary less, but still range between 22 (Cumbria) and 1 or less (Bedfordshire, City and Lincolnshire). From initial indicators, the emphasis on the reporting and recording of racist incidents following the Macpherson Inquiry appears to have had a significant effect on the reporting and recording of racist incident.



Anyone who wishes to comment on an inspection, a report  
or any matters affecting the Inspectorate should write to:

HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary  
50 Queen Anne's Gate  
London SW1H 9AT

Details on the role of the Inspectorate, copies of individual reports  
and copies of our strategy document can be obtained from:

HM Inspectorate of Constabulary  
Room 553  
50 Queen Anne's Gate  
London SW1H 9AT

Tel: 0171 273 2279  
Fax: 0171 273 3370

This and other HMIC reports are also on our website:  
[www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic.htm](http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic.htm)

## **Appendix A**

# **INSPECTORATE REGIONS AND SENIOR PERSONNEL**





**Dan Crompton CBE QPM**



**David Blakey CBE QPM MBA DL**



**Keith Povey QPM BA (Law)**




**Colin Smith CVO CBE QPM BSoc Sc**



**Peter Winship CBE QPM MA (Oxon)**

## Appendix B

# OVERARCHING AIMS AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE POLICE SERVICE



## Appendix C

# CONTEXTUAL PERFORMANCE DATA

TABLE 1 **Timeliness and Quality of Processing of Files Relating to Young Offenders**

TABLE 2 **Recorded and Detected Crime 1998/99**

TABLE 3 **Number of Arrests for Supply or Possession with Intent to Supply per 10,000 Population**

TABLE 4 **Percentage of Violent Crime Detected**

TABLE 5 **Recorded and Detected Violent Crime 1998/99**

TABLE 6 **Percentage of Burglary Dwellings Detected by Primary Means**

TABLE 7 **Burglary Dwellings 1998/99**

TABLE 8 **Percentage of 999 Calls Answered within Local Target Time (Seconds)**


TABLE 9 **Immediate Response Incidents 1998/99**

TABLE 10 **Medical Retirements**

TABLE 11 **Civilian Medical Retirements**

## FIGURE 1

### HMIC Running Costs Expenditure 1998/99




Source: HMIC

**FIGURE 2****Millennium Preparedness -  
Phase 1 Results**

RED	The assessment indicates that there is a <i>severe</i> risk of material disruption and timely rectification may not be possible.	Originally 6 forces but all upgraded to AMBER on re-inspection.
AMBER	There is <i>some</i> risk of material disruption but an agreed rectification plan exists which will remedy shortcomings within appropriate timescales.	42 Home Office forces (plus NCIS and NCS) after re-inspection of REDs.
BLUE	The assessment has not identified risks of material disruption.	1 force (Dyfed Powys)

## FIGURE 3


### Thematic Inspections



Keeping the Peace: the Policing of Disorder
Child Protection
Road Policing and Traffic
Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training
Police Integrity: Securing and Maintaining Public Confidence
Winning the Race Revisited: A Follow-up to the Original Thematic on Race and Community Relations

## FIGURE 4

### Number of Complaints Recorded 1993-1998/99






**FIGURE 5****Civil Claims received by Police Forces -  
1998/99 (England and Wales)**

	<b>Claims received</b>	<b>Payments to claimants</b>	<b>Legal costs to forces</b>
<b>Public Liability (Malfeasance)</b>	<b>5,961</b>	<b>£4,617,967</b>	<b>£4,171,287</b>
<b>Public Liability - Employer Liability (accidents etc)</b>	<b>2,365</b>	<b>£5,615,560</b>	<b>£1,929,840</b>
<b>Road Traffic Accidents</b>	<b>3,868</b>	<b>£2,594,149</b>	<b>£105,103</b>
<b>Industrial Tribunals</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>£910,873</b>	<b>£174,915</b>

## FIGURE 6

### Percentage of Ethnic Minority Officers (England and Wales)



## FIGURE 7

### Home Secretary's Key Objectives for Policing 1998/99

**1. To deal speedily and effectively with young offenders and to work with other agencies to reduce re-offending**

**2. To target and reduce local problems of crime and disorder in partnership with local authorities, and other local agencies and the public**

**3. To target drug-related crime in partnership with other local agencies**

**4. To maintain and, if possible, increase the number of detections for violent crime**

**5. To increase the number of detections for burglaries of people's homes**

**6. To respond promptly to emergency calls from the**

### Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

**1.(i) The percentage of cases relating to young offenders dealt with within relevant pre-trial issues time guidelines and the percentage of cases meeting joint performance management quality targets;**

**(ii) In consultation with other relevant agencies, to have established local mechanisms to measure activity on, and success of, work in partnership to provide a quicker and more effective local response to youth crime.**

**2. (i) To have established local mechanisms in partnership with other agencies to measure activity on and success in tackling problems of crime and disorder with local targets for performance;**

**(ii) To have mechanisms in place locally to measure forces' success in tackling repeat victimisation.**

**3. The number of arrests for the supply and possession with intent to supply per 10,000 population.**

**4. The percentage of violent crimes detected.**

**5. The percentage of burglaries of dwellings detected by primary means and overall.**

**6. i) The percentage of 999 calls answered within the local target time;**

**public**

**ii) The percentage of response within the local target time to incidents requiring immediate response.**

**TABLE 1****Timeliness and Quality of Processing  
of Files Relating to Young Offenders**

<b>Forces</b>	<b>Total all files to CPS</b>	<b>Total youth files to CPS</b>	<b>% files relating to Young Offenders</b>	<b>HMIC 7d % youth files sat/suff</b>	<b>% youth files within PTI Guidelines</b>
Avon and Somerset	11,085	563	5	87	78
Bedfordshire	3,457	126	4	87	70
Cambridgeshire	7,467	971	13	93	62
Cheshire	13,859	1452	10	96	88
City of London	818	39	5	72	67
Cleveland	12,409	1710	14	92	91
Cumbria	7,421	1104	15	96	66
Derbyshire	7,890	709	9	98	64
Devon and Cornwall	8,543	994	12	86	52
Dorset	7056	572	8	94	86
Durham	6,768	984	15	93	59
Dyfed-Powys	6,165	496	8	97	89
Essex	14,581	1173	8	84	69
Gloucestershire	4,910	498	10	96	69
Greater Manchester	51,658	15509	30	92	81
Gwent	10,185	1482	15	92	65
Hampshire	24,653	3451	14	93	77
Hertfordshire	7,419	890	12	88	64
Humberside	8,639	1052	12	94	74
Kent	13,104	971	7	92	78
Lancashire	22,314	1253	6	88	74
Leicestershire	10,059	992	10	92	95
Lincolnshire	10,924	1069	10	94	82
Merseyside	23,325	3448	15	93	68
Metropolitan Police	43,884	2824	6	92	79


Norfolk	10,509	719	7	98	88
North Wales	8,387	485	6	97	97
North Yorkshire	8,139	696	9	99	No data available
Northamptonshire	4,315	394	9	97	65
Northumbria	22,433	6769	30	91	81
Nottinghamshire	10,167	1261	12	90	42
South Wales	20,375	2186	11	94	74
South Yorkshire	13,098	1184	9	90	56
Staffordshire	13,891	1188	9	94	84
Suffolk	5,887	786	13	91	86
Surrey	5,577	659	12	95	90
Sussex	8,923	1042	12	86	55
Thames Valley*	3,683	183	5	85	62
Warwickshire	4,582	526	11	92	76
West Mercia	9,416	657	7	89	66
West Midlands	34,104	4206	12	86	75
West Yorkshire*	10,877	2477	23	91	86
Wiltshire	5,225	433	8	89	72
England and Wales	538,181	70,226	13	92	76

*\*data relates to one quarter or a sample only*

*Source: HMIC*

## FIGURE 8

### Percentage of Youth Files within PTI Guidelines 1998/99




Source: HMIC



## FIGURE 9


### Percentage of Youth Files either Fully Satisfactory or Sufficient to Proceed 1998/99



Source: HMIC

## FIGURE 10

### Number of Recorded Crimes per 1000 Population 1998/99\*



\* Based on population figures supplied by forces to HMIC

Source: HMIC


**TABLE 2****Recorded and Detected Crime 1998/99**

<b>Forces</b>	<b>Per cent detected total crime</b>	<b>Total Recorded Crime</b>	<b>Recorded Crime per 1000 population*</b>
Avon and Somerset	24	150,089	102
Bedfordshire	33	49,076	89
Cambridgeshire	29	67,256	94
Cheshire	37	65,119	66
City of London	33	7,144	26
Cleveland	23	67,030	121
Cumbria	44	40,202	82
Derbyshire	31	84,459	87
Devon and Cornwall	36	110,644	71
Dorset	31	52,755	77
Durham	33	50,413	83
Dyfed-Powys	69	24,588	51
Essex	29	95,797	63
Gloucestershire	31	48,206	86
Greater Manchester	25	362,450	141
Gwent	55	58,738	105
Hampshire	35	128,253	73
Hertfordshire	34	49,309	57
Humberside	22	130,691	148
Kent	34	129,340	83
Lancashire	34	118,117	83
Leicestershire	34	93,397	101
Lincolnshire	40	46,670	75
Merseyside	31	140,874	100
Metropolitan Police	22	934,254	123
Norfolk	37	57,129	73

<b>North Wales</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>43,848</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>North Yorkshire</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>55,309</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Northamptonshire</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>65,466</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>Northumbria</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>151,298</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>135,255</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>134,820</b>	<b>109</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>133,059</b>	<b>102</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>91,919</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>39,908</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>42,467</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>130,402</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>176,477</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>38,485</b>	<b>76</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>81,782</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>314,611</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>273,809</b>	<b>130</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>38,189</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>5,109,104</b>	<b>98</b>

*\*Based on population figures supplied by forces to HMIC*

*Source: HMIC*

**FIGURE 11****Number of Arrests for Supply or Possession  
with Intent to Supply per 10,000 Population**

Source: HMIC

**TABLE 3****Number of Arrests for Supply or Possession  
with Intent to Supply per 10,000 Population**

<b>Forces</b>	<b>Number of arrests for supply/possess with intent to supply</b>	<b>Number of arrests for supply or possession with intent to supply per 10,000 population*</b>
Avon and Somerset	466	3
Bedfordshire	219	4
Cambridgeshire	167	2
Cheshire	395	4
City of London	25	1
Cleveland	425	8
Cumbria	430	9
Derbyshire	310	3
Devon and Cornwall	509	3
Dorset	259	4
Durham	347	6
Dyfed-Powys	381	8
Essex	291	2
Gloucestershire	178	3
Greater Manchester	956	4
Gwent	426	8
Hampshire	824	5
Hertfordshire	356	4
Humberside	635	7
Kent	831	5
Lancashire	676	5
Leicestershire	236	3
Lincolnshire	176	3
Merseyside	435	3



<b>Metropolitan Police</b>	<b>4624</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Norfolk</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>North Wales</b>	<b>319</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>North Yorkshire</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Northamptonshire</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Northumbria</b>	<b>649</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>369</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>620</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>510</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>1028</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>1599</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>23074</b>	<b>4</b>

*\*Based on population figures supplied by forces to HMIC*

*Source: HMIC*

**TABLE 4****Percentage of Violent Crime Detected**


<b>Forces</b>	<b>1996/97</b>	<b>1997/98</b>	<b>1998/99</b>	<b>% Point Change Between 1996/97 1997/98</b>	<b>% Point Change Between 1997/98 1998/99</b>
Avon and Somerset	75	76	73	-3	-4
Bedfordshire	68	79	76	8	-3
Cambridgeshire	80	77	75	-5	-2
Cheshire	88	88	88	1	0
City of London	46	52	63	17	11
Cleveland	62	59	58	-4	-1
Cumbria	87	86	91	4	5
Derbyshire	78	79	81	3	1
Devon and Cornwall	79	88	85	5	-3
Dorset	80	80	75	-5	-5
Durham	81	85	90	10	5
Dyfed-Powys	94	95	97	2	1
Essex	70	73	73	3	0
Gloucestershire	72	69	77	5	9
Greater Manchester	55	54	64	9	10
Gwent	94	95	92	-2	-3
Hampshire	76	80	86	9	5
Hertfordshire	75	76	84	9	8
Humberside	72	71	75	3	4
Kent	83	82	82	-1	0
Lancashire	77	68	78	1	10
Leicestershire	71	79	76	5	-3
Lincolnshire	86	93	88	1	-5
Merseyside	58	63	66	7	3
Metropolitan Police	49	52	39	-10	-13
Norfolk	81	91	83	2	-8
North Wales	88	88	91	3	3
North Yorkshire	80	84	85	4	0
Northamptonshire	85	87	86	1	-2
Northumbria	65	66	74	9	8
Nottinghamshire	78	67	61	-17	-6
South Wales	79	81	82	3	1

<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>-5</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-3</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>-10</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-4</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-3</b>


*Source: HMIC*

## FIGURE 12

### The Percentage of Violent Crime Detected 1998/99




Source: HMIC

**FIGURE 13****The Change in Percentage of Violent Crime Detected Between 1997/98 and 1998/99**


*Incorporates the changes due to the introduction of the new counting rules for recorded crime on 1 April 1998*

Source: HMIC

**FIGURE 13A****Percentage Point Change Between the Detection Rate for Violent Crime in 1996/97 and 1998/99**

*Incorporates the changes due to the introduction of the new counting rules for recorded crime on 1 April 1998*



**FIGURE 14****The Percentage of Burglary Dwelling Detected in Total and that Made up of Primary Detections 1998/99**

Source: HMIC

**TABLE 6****Percentage of Burglary Dwellings Detected by Primary Means**

<b>Forces</b>	<b>1996/97</b>	<b>1997/98</b>	<b>1998/99</b>	<b>% Point change between 1996/97 &amp; 1998/99</b>
Avon and Somerset	13	13	12	-1
Bedfordshire	15	20	16	1
Cambridgeshire	16	18	17	1
Cheshire	21	22	18	-3
City of London	14	23	15	1
Cleveland	18	12	11	-8
Cumbria	18	23	24	6
Derbyshire	13	14	15	2
Devon and Cornwall	12	15	15	3
Dorset	11	11	14	3
Durham	18	14	16	-2
Dyfed-Powys	33	43	43	10
Essex	14	17	17	3
Gloucestershire	10	11	18	8
Greater Manchester	10	11	10	1
Gwent	30	33	29	-1
Hampshire	17	14	20	4
Hertfordshire	15	18	17	2
Humberside	11	10	11	0
Kent	16	19	18	2
Lancashire	18	16	17	-1
Leicestershire	9	13	13	4
Lincolnshire	15	16	15	0
Merseyside	14	15	18	4
Metropolitan Police	9	13	11	2
Norfolk	21	21	14	-7
North Wales	22	21	22	-1
North Yorkshire	13	11	12	-1
Northamptonshire	15	17	16	1

<b>Northumbria</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>-2</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>2</b>

*Source: HMIC*


**TABLE 7****Burglary Dwellings 1998/99**

<b>Forces</b>	<b>Total Recorded Burglary Dwelling</b>	<b>Recorded Burglary Dwellings per 1000 Dwellings**</b>	<b>% Burglary Dwellings Detected by Primary Means</b>	<b>% Burglary Dwellings Detected by Other Means</b>	<b>Total % Detected</b>	<b>Proportion of total detections made by other means</b>
Avon and Somerset	14,584	24	12	5	17	32
Bedfordshire	3,302	15	16	14	31	46
Cambridgeshire	5,628	19	17	18	35	51
Cheshire	5,925	16	18	7	25	27
City of London	39	9	15	0	15	0
Cleveland	8,875	39	11	0	11	4
Cumbria	2,298	11	24	13	36	35
Derbyshire	6,603	16	15	18	32	55
Devon and Cornwall	7,435	11	15	9	24	38
Dorset	3,828	13	14	22	36	62
Durham*	4,597	18	16	11	27*	40
Dyfed-Powys	973	5	43	17	59	28
Essex	6,331	11	17	7	24	28
Gloucestershire	4,866	21	18	14	32	44
Greater Manchester	45,739	43	10	1	11	6
Gwent	3,377	15	29	18	47	38
Hampshire	7,892	11	20	6	27	24
Hertfordshire	3,589	10	17	11	28	39
Humberside	13,496	36	11	1	12	10
Kent	10,179	16	18	7	26	28
Lancashire	12,189	21	17	10	27	38
Leicestershire	8,937	24	13	7	20	33
Lincolnshire	4,455	17	15	13	28	46
Merseyside	14,177	26	18	9	27	34
Metropolitan Police	75,797	23	11	1	12	11
Norfolk	3,711	11	14	25	39	64


<b>North Wales</b>	<b>2,449</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>North Yorkshire</b>	<b>4,822</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Northamptonshire</b>	<b>5,110</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Northumbria</b>	<b>15,334</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>	<b>13,697</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>9,239</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>18,405</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>9,974</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>2,464</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>3,100</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>11,026</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>14,434</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>2,887</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>5,867</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>37,323</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>35,952</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>2,447</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>473,352</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>38</b>

*\*Provisional data. \*\*Based on numbers of dwellings supplied by police forces to HMIC.*

*Source: HMIC*


**FIGURE 15****Percentage Point Change in Primary Detection Rate for Burglary Dwelling between 1996/97 and 1998/99**

Source: HMIC

**FIGURE 16****The Percentage of 999 Calls Answered within Local Target Time 1998/99**

Source: HMIC



**FIGURE 17****Change in Percentage of 999 Calls Answered in Target between 1996/97 and 1998/99**

\*Data for Dyfed-Powys & Hampshire not available in 1996/97

Source: HMIC

**TABLE 8****Percentage of 999 Calls Answered within Local Target Time (Seconds)**

<b>Forces</b>	<b>1994/95</b>	<b>1995/96</b>	<b>1996/97</b>	<b>1997/98</b>	<b>1998/99</b>	<b>Local Target Time (seconds) 1998/99</b>	<b>Change Between 1994/95 and 1998/99</b>	<b>Change Between 1996/97 and 1998/99</b>
<b>Avon and Somerset</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Bedfordshire</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-8</b>	<b>-8</b>
<b>Cambridgeshire</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-1</b>
<b>Cheshire</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>-3</b>
<b>Cleveland</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Cumbria</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Derbyshire</b>		<b>88</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>10</b>		<b>-4</b>
<b>Devon and Cornwall</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Dorset</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Durham</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Dyfed-Powys</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>Data not available</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>Data not available</b>
<b>Essex</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-6</b>	<b>-13</b>
<b>Gloucestershire</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Greater Manchester</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-9</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Gwent</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-1</b>
<b>Hampshire</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>Data not available</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>Data not available</b>
<b>Hertfordshire</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-23</b>	<b>-4</b>
<b>Humberside</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Kent</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-2</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Lancashire</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-3</b>
<b>Leicestershire</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Lincolnshire</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Merseyside</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Metropolitan Police*</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-3</b>
<b>Norfolk</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>North Wales</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>


<b>North Yorkshire</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Northamptonshire</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Northumbria</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>-7</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-1</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-4</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>-9</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-7</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>89</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>

*\*Data include City of London.*


*Source: HMIC*

## FIGURE 18

### Percentage of Incidents Requiring an Immediate Response Answered within Local Target Time 1998/99




Source: HMIC

**FIGURE 19****Percentage Point Change in Immediate Response Incidents Answered within Local Target Time 1996/97 to 1998/99**

Source: HMIC

## FIGURE 20


### Percentage of Police Medical Retirements 1998/99



Source: HMIC

## FIGURE 21

### Percentage Point Change in Medical Retirements 96/97 to 98/99



Source: HMIC



**TABLE 10****Medical Retirements**

Forces	1996/97			1998/99			Change in number of Medical Retirements 96/97 to 98/99	% Point Change in Medical Retirements 96/97 to 98/99
	Police Medical Retire- ments	Police Ordinary Retire- ments	% Police Medical Retire- ments	Police Medical Retire- ments	Police Ordinary Retire- ments	% Police Medical Retire- ments		
Avon and Somerset	66	100	40	24	56	30	-42	-10
Bedfordshire	15	23	39	27	22	55	12	16
Cambridgeshire	20	30	40	17	29	37	-3	-3
Cheshire	19	31	38	22	39	36	3	-2
City of London	7	19	27	6	23	21	-1	-6
Cleveland	22	16	58	14	38	27	-8	-31
Cumbria	18	28	39	18	18	50	0	11
Derbyshire	39	28	58	21	29	42	-18	-16
Devon and Cornwall	21	93	18	20	76	21	-1	2
Dorset	11	40	22	16	29	36	5	14
Durham	23	20	53	15	18	45	-8	-8
Dyfed-Powys	12	13	48	8	12	40	-4	-8
Essex	29	61	32	35	66	35	6	2
Gloucestershire	11	34	24	14	38	27	3	2
Greater Manchester	207	112	65	179	103	63	-28	-1
Gwent	28	22	56	13	21	38	-15	-18
Hampshire	21	79	21	26	67	28	5	7
Hertfordshire	10	44	19	8	37	18	-2	-1
Humberside	19	33	37	15	49	23	-4	-13
Kent	15	76	16	16	80	17	1	0
Lancashire	36	51	41	18	57	24	-18	-17
Leicestershire	29	23	56	24	23	51	-5	-5
Lincolnshire	11	36	23	20	29	41	9	17
Merseyside	167	50	77	42	73	37	-125	-40
Metropolitan Police	457	447	51	510	590	46	53	-4
Norfolk	15	49	23	13	34	28	-2	4
North Wales	33	27	55	20	29	41	-13	-14
North Yorkshire	39	12	76	18	11	62	-21	-14

<b>Northamptonshire</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-7</b>
<b>Northumbria</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-33</b>	<b>-15</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-14</b>	<b>-23</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-29</b>	<b>-27</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>-23</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>-13</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>-1</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>-12</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-59</b>	<b>-19</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-8</b>	<b>-1</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Provincial total</b>	<b>1555</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>1132</b>	<b>1972</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-423</b>	<b>-7</b>
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2466</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>1642</b>	<b>2562</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>-370</b>	<b>-6</b>

*Source: HMIC*

**TABLE 11****Civilian Medical Retirements**

Forces	1996/97			1998/99			Change in Medical Retirements 96/97 to 98/99	% Point Change in Medical Retirements 96/97 to 98/99
	Civilian Medical Retire- ments	Civilian Ordinary Retire- ments	% Civilian Medical Retire- ments	Civilian Medical Retire- ments	Civilian Ordinary Retire- ments	% Civilian Medical Retire- ments		
Avon and Somerset	22	19	54	6	22	21	-16	-32
Bedfordshire	0	2	0	4	22	15	4	15
Cambridgeshire	3	9	25	1	0	100	-2	75
Cheshire	12	9	57	11	10	52	-1	-5
City of London	0	15	0	4	9	31	4	31
Cleveland	7	4	64	6	6	50	-1	-14
Cumbria	0	1	0	3	5	38	3	38
Derbyshire	11	6	65	5	8	38	-6	-26
Devon and Cornwall	15	14	52	15	15	50	0	-2
Dorset	3	6	33	9	19	32	6	-1
Durham	6	5	55	4	5	44	-2	-10
Dyfed-Powys	4	1	80	0	0	0	-4	-80
Essex	12	13	48	15	11	58	3	10
Gloucestershire	4	2	67	4	1	80	0	13
Greater Manchester	68	12	85	58	19	75	-10	-10
Gwent	11	6	65	1	2	33	-10	-31
Hampshire	16	28	36	6	19	24	-10	-12
Hertfordshire	10	8	56	3	10	23	-7	-32
Humberside	7	6	54	4	9	31	-3	-23
Kent	4	20	17	7	18	28	3	11
Lancashire	21	26	45	10	15	40	-11	-5
Leicestershire	14	21	40	9	8	53	-5	13
Lincolnshire	3	6	33	5	6	45	2	12
Merseyside	37	14	73	17	20	46	-20	-27
Metropolitan Police	126	276	31	130	311	29	4	-2
Norfolk	5	6	45	9	10	47	4	2
North Wales	9	7	56	2	14	13	-7	-44
North Yorkshire	5	3	63	6	10	38	1	-25
Northamptonshire	4	4	50	4	10	29	0	-21

<b>Northumbria</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>-26</b>	<b>-6</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-6</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-35</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>-22</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-13</b>	<b>-32</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>-22</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-13</b>	<b>-16</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-5</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>-12</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-46</b>	<b>-42</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-12</b>	<b>-16</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-20</b>
<b>Provincial total</b>	<b>608</b>	<b>501</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>383</b>	<b>528</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>-225</b>	<b>-13</b>
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>734</b>	<b>777</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>-221</b>	<b>-11</b>

*Source: HMIC*

**FIGURE 22****Average Number of Working Days Lost to Sickness per Police Officer\*\***

<b>Forces</b>	<b>1996/97</b>	<b>1997/98</b>	<b>1998/99</b>	<b>Change Between 1996/97 &amp; 1998/99</b>
Avon and Somerset	11.7	10.2	10.4	-1.2
Bedfordshire	11.1	14.3	14.0	2.9
Cambridgeshire	11.1	10.8	11.9	0.7
Cheshire	12.7	13.7	13.5	0.7
City of London	12.5	11.9	13.2	0.8
Cleveland	12.9	11.9	11.9	-1.0
Cumbria	9.3	10.2	10.1	0.8
Derbyshire	14.1	14.1	12.2	-1.9
Devon and Cornwall	10.6	10.3	10.6	0.0
Dorset	10.4	11.2	10.0	-0.5
Durham	13.2	11.5	10.3	-2.9
Dyfed-Powys	11.7	10.5	9.5	-2.1
Essex	9.6	11.5	13.2	3.6
Gloucestershire	11.1	10.6	11.6	0.5
Greater Manchester	15.4	15.4	14.1	-1.3
Gwent	10.4	10.1	11.7	1.4
Hampshire	9.5	10.6	9.6	0.1
Hertfordshire	13.7	11.7	10.8	-2.9
Humberside	12.0	11.8	8.5	-3.6
Kent	11.3	11.1	11.2	-0.1
Lancashire	11.7	11.2	11.8	0.1
Leicestershire	14.2	11.8	11.9	-2.3
Lincolnshire	14.5	12.1	13.3	-1.1
Merseyside	18.6	12.5	11.3	-7.2
Metropolitan Police	14.4	14.6	10.9	-3.5
Norfolk	9.4	10.4	11.5	2.1
North Wales	8.8	9.9	11.8	3.0
North Yorkshire	10.8	10.9	12.0	1.2
Northamptonshire	10.4	12.5	10.7	0.3
Northumbria	10.9	12.6	11.5	0.6
Nottinghamshire	12.8	12.6	14.0	1.2
South Wales	Data not available		16.4	Data not available
South Yorkshire	11.7	12.2	12.1	0.5
Staffordshire	14.5	12.8	12.5	-2.0
Suffolk	8.7	8.9	9.8	1.1

<b>Surrey</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>-1.0</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>11.8</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>1.3</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>0.7</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>-1.1</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>13.3</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>12.2</b>	<b>-1.1</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>0.9</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>-0.9</b>
<b>England and Wales Total</b>	<b>12.8*</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>11.7*</b>	<b>-1.2*</b>

*\* Based on available data. \*\* All figures have been rounded*

*Source: HMIC*

**FIGURE 23****Average Number of Working Days Lost to  
Sickness per Civilian (Including Traffic Wardens)\*\***

<b>Forces</b>	<b>1996/97</b>	<b>1997/98</b>	<b>1998/99</b>	<b>Change Between 1996/97 &amp; 1998/99</b>
Avon and Somerset	12.7	9.3	10.7	-2.0
Bedfordshire	5.8	7.4	11.9	6.0
Cambridgeshire	13.6	12.1	10.6	-3.0
Cheshire	16.1	15.9	15.9	-0.3
City of London	8.3	10.8	12.8	4.5
Cleveland	10.6	11.6	11.1	0.4
Cumbria	7.0	8.0	8.7	1.8
Derbyshire	13.9	13.4	11.4	-2.5
Devon and Cornwall	11.9	11.9	13.5	1.7
Dorset	10.7	11.0	10.3	-0.4
Durham	9.9	10.2	9.4	-0.5
Dyfed-Powys	9.5	11.6	8.8	-0.7
Essex	12.1	14.5	12.8	0.8
Gloucestershire	10.0	13.0	14.5	4.5
Greater Manchester	18.7	18.8	15.4	-3.3
Gwent	11.6	8.4	10.1	-1.5
Hampshire	11.1	11.0	10.0	-1.1
Hertfordshire	13.9	12.2	10.0	-3.9
Humberside	11.5	10.4	8.5	-3.0
Kent	11.9	11.5	11.6	-0.2
Lancashire	12.7	10.5	11.4	-1.3
Leicestershire	15.4	15.3	14.8	-0.5
Lincolnshire	8.4	7.3	9.4	1.0
Merseyside	20.4	16.8	12.8	-7.5
Metropolitan Police	11.7	17.6	11.9	0.2
Norfolk	8.0	10.1	13.5	5.5
North Wales	12.4	10.9	14.1	1.7
North Yorkshire	11.5	10.5	12.2	0.8
Northamptonshire	8.0	8.6	8.7	0.8
Northumbria	14.7	12.0	12.3	-2.5



Nottinghamshire	12.4	14.4	14.8	2.4
South Wales	Data not available	17.5	17.8	Data not available
South Yorkshire	9.2	9.7	13.1	3.9
Staffordshire	15.6	12.5	13.8	-1.8
Suffolk	7.6	8.1	8.5	0.9
Surrey	9.8	7.4	10.0	0.1
Sussex	14.4	13.3	12.1	-2.3
Thames Valley	12.2	10.8	11.0	-1.1
Warwickshire	11.8	13.8	12.9	1.1
West Mercia	11.9	12.4	10.4	-1.4
West Midlands	15.4	14.2	13.5	-1.9
West Yorkshire	10.3	10.8	12.3	2.0
Wiltshire	10.1	9.5	8.4	-1.7
England and Wales	12.5*	13.6	12.1*	-0.5*

\* Based on available data. \*\* All figures have been rounded

Source: HMIC

**FIGURE 24****Racist Incidents**

Forces	Total Reported Racist Incidents		Racist Incidents Per 1000 Minority Ethnic Popn		Change in Reported Racist Incidents	% Change in Reported Racist Incidents
	1996/97	1997/98	1996/97	1997/98	1996/97 to 1998/99	1996/97 to 1998/99
Avon and Somerset	310	409	10	14	99	32
Bedfordshire	77	75	1	1	-2	-3
Cambridgeshire	141	147	6	6	6	4
Cheshire	92	78	9	8	-14	-15
City of London	10	6	0	0	-4	-40
Cleveland	68	76	6	7	8	12
Cumbria	37	46	18	22	9	24
Derbyshire	208	174	7	5	-34	-16
Devon and Cornwall	82	90	8	9	8	10
Dorset	67	86	11	14	19	28
Durham	24	37	5	8	13	54
Dyfed-Powys	18	17	5	5	-1	-6
Essex	116	160	4	6	44	38
Gloucestershire	34	32	3	3	-2	-6
Greater Manchester	595	624	4	3	29	5
Gwent	60	45	7	5	-15	-25
Hampshire	178	219	5	7	41	23
Hertfordshire	295	288	8	8	-7	-2
Humberside	55	72	6	8	17	31
Kent	256	276	7	8	20	8
Lancashire	337	311	5	5	-26	-8
Leicestershire	299	237	3	2	-62	-21
Lincolnshire	7	6	1	1	-1	-14
Merseyside	162	241	6	9	79	49
Metropolitan Police	5,621	5,862	4	4	241	4
Norfolk	56	89	8	13	33	59
North Wales	4	12	1	3	8	200
North Yorkshire	43	41	8	8	-2	-5
Northamptonshire	195	318	9	15	123	63
Northumbria	488	444	23	21	-44	-9
Nottinghamshire	330	391	8	9	61	18
South Wales	357	367	13	13	10	3

<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>-5</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-20</b>	<b>-27</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>-18</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>-11</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>725</b>	<b>632</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-93</b>	<b>-13</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>623</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>England and Wales Total</b>	<b>13,151</b>	<b>13,878</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>727</b>	<b>6</b>

*Source: HMIC*

**TABLE 5****Recorded and Detected Violent Crime 1998/99**

<b>Forces</b>	<b>Number of Recorded Violent Crimes</b>	<b>Recorded Violent Crimes per 1000 population*</b>	<b>Per cent Detected Violent Crime</b>
Avon and Somerset	14,985	10.1	73
Bedfordshire	5,668	10.3	76
Cambridgeshire	6,213	9.0	75
Cheshire	7,623	7.8	88
City of London	570	108.8	63
Cleveland	4,237	7.6	58
Cumbria	5,901	12.0	91
Derbyshire	9,569	9.9	81
Devon and Cornwall	13,096	8.4	85
Dorset	3,325	4.8	75
Durham	5,370	8.8	90
Dyfed-Powys	5,039	10.5	97
Essex	9,443	6.2	73
Gloucestershire	3,847	6.9	77
Greater Manchester	45,615	17.7	64
Gwent	11,980	21.5	92
Hampshire	14,253	8.1	86
Hertfordshire	3,884	4.5	84
Humberside	10,947	12.4	75
Kent	14,045	9.0	82
Lancashire	12,189	8.6	78
Leicestershire	11,715	12.6	76
Lincolnshire	4,781	7.7	88
Merseyside	15,711	11.1	66
Metropolitan Police	165,981	21.8	39
Norfolk	6,189	7.9	83
North Wales	5,164	7.9	91
North Yorkshire	5,294	7.2	85
Northamptonshire	5,995	9.8	86

<b>Northumbria</b>	<b>14,767</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>	<b>14,312</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>12,587</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>8,210</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>	<b>11,188</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>	<b>4,365</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>4,914</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>Sussex</b>	<b>16,613</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>12,990</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>	<b>2,427</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>	<b>7,964</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>40,319</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>21,529</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>	<b>4,989</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>England and Wales Total</b>	<b>605,783</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>66</b>

*\*Based on population figures supplied by police force to HMIC*

*Source: HMIC*

**TABLE 9****Immediate Response Incidents 1998/99**

Forces	1998/99 Local Target Times (Minutes)				% of Immediate Response Incidents in Target 1998/99			% Immediate Response Incidents in Target			In l i	
	Force Target Time	Urban Target Time	Rural Target Time	Other Target Time	Urban	Rural	Other	Force wide	1996/97	1997/98		1998/99
Avon and Somerset		15	20		94	94		94	97	97	94	
Bedfordshire		10	20		88	92		89	87	89	89	
Cambridgeshire		10	18		78	77		78	73	82	78	
Cheshire	15							92	93	92	92	
City of London	4	4			85			85	83	86	85	
Cleveland		10	20		93	78		88	90	93	88	
Cumbria		10	20		94	91		93	92	91	93	
Derbyshire		10	20	15	86	91	91	87	86	87	87	
Devon and Cornwall		15	20		86	88		88	85	86	88	
Dorset		10	20		79	84		80	78	79	80	
Durham	10							92	93	92	92	
Dyfed-Powys	15							87	96	95	87	
Essex		12	16		84	81		84	86	85	84	
Gloucestershire		10	20		92	91		91	92	93	91	
Greater Manchester	10							85	82	84	85	
Gwent	20							95	91	94	95	
Hampshire	15							95	87	92	95	
Hertfordshire	15							87	85	86	87	
Humberside		15	20		90	92		90	83	87	90	
Kent		10	20	20	97	99	94	97	95	97	97	
Lancashire	15							97	97	98	97	
Leicestershire	15							82	69	81	82	
Lincolnshire		10	20		87	88		87	87	86	87	
Merseyside		10						90	71	88	90	
Metropolitan Police	12							88	88	89	88	
Norfolk		10	15		79	71		76	Data not available	68	76	

<b>North Wales</b>	<b>20</b>							<b>84</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>North Yorkshire</b>		<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>		<b>98</b>	<b>97</b>		<b>98</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>Northamptonshire</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>17</b>		<b>88</b>	<b>90</b>		<b>89</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>Northumbria</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>		<b>92</b>	<b>95</b>		<b>93</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>Nottinghamshire</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>		<b>84</b>	<b>84</b>		<b>84</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>South Wales</b>	<b>15</b>							<b>89</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>South Yorkshire</b>	<b>10</b>							<b>81</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>Staffordshire</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>		<b>92</b>	<b>89</b>		<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>Suffolk</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>18</b>		<b>93</b>	<b>90</b>		<b>91</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>Sussex</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>93</b>		<b>89</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>Thames Valley</b>	<b>15</b>							<b>87</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Warwickshire</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>83</b>		<b>79</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>West Mercia</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>		<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>		<b>92</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>92</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	<b>15</b>							<b>95</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>Wiltshire</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>		<b>87</b>	<b>95</b>		<b>91</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>England &amp; Wales</b>					<b>88</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>88</b>

*Source: HMIC*

