

A New Academic Certificate Authentication Using Blockchain Technology

better security over Blockcerts V2.0

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- ✓ Background
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- ✓ BlockCerts & Blockchain
- ✓ BlockCerts mechanism

Background

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Counterfeit academic certificates have been a longstanding issue in the academic community. Overall, there are two broad types of degree fraud^[1].



Bogus institution

Fake certificate which issued by bogus universities and degree mills



Individuals fraud

Fake certificate on real institution which fraud committed by individuals

Key Words: Fake certificate, Authentication

Traditional Authentication


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Costly

It is costly to interoperate and collaborate between different business.

Fragile

Completely depend on the school, A single point of failure can cause the whole process to fail.

Centralized

The data is centralized and the verification service must expose to outside which increased attack surface.

BlockCerts


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MIT Media Lab released a decentralized credentialing system for academic, professional, and workforce credentialing called Blockchain Certificates in August, 2016 [2]

The Bitcoin Blockchain acts as the provider of trust, and credentials are tamper-resistant and verifiable.

Blockchain

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
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A blockchain is a distributed database that maintains a keep-growing list of ordered records called block [3].

Each block contains a header and a list of transactions TX_i . Each header includes a timestamp T_i , a link to a previous block H_{i-1} and nonce N_i . [4]



The blockchain is cryptographically secured, for every round, the miner need find a random number to meet the computing difficulty D_i , and this progress is called the proof of work (POW) [5].

$$f(D_i) > \text{SHA-256}(\text{SHA-256}(H_{i-1} \parallel T_i \parallel TX_i \parallel N_i \parallel))$$

3. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain>

4 "Bitcoins In Space". 2017. accessed April 2, 2017, Virgin. <https://www.virgin.com/richardbranson/bitcoins-in-space>.

5 Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich and Ivan Pustogarov. 2014. "Deanonymisation Of Clients In Bitcoin P2P Network". 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference On Computer And Communications Security, 15-29.

Blockchain feature


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The transaction data is decentralized and maintained on every node

Data is computational trust. No centralized "official" copy exists and no user is "trusted"

Transaction history cannot be changed unless redoing all Proof of Work of all blocks in the chain

Each transaction in the public ledger is verified by consensus of a majority of the participants

BlockCerts Mechanism


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


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- ✓ Scope of work
- ✓ Project stage

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Methodology

- ✓ Democratic Multi-signature issuing
- ✓ Security Certificate Revocation
- ✓ Security Federated Identity

Blockcerts & BTCert (Multi-Signature)

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Pay to Public Key

One public key, combined with one private key pairs, is utilized to authenticate the identity of an issuer. Thus, anyone who possesses the private key can publish legitimate digital certificates

problem: key physical secure

problem: democracy issued

problem: single point of failure

problem: corruption and fraud

VS

Multi-signature

It is the multi-signature scripts that set a criterion where N public keys are recorded in the scripts and at least M of them have to provide signatures to release the encumbrance

solution : distributed storage

solution: the majority of key owner signed

solution : more than one person agreed

Multi-Signature

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the Signature generating Algorithm

Algorithm: Generating the Signature Stack[↵]

Input: The condition we defined in Initialization Phase[↵]

Input: An empty Stack S[↵]

Output: The Signature List Stack[↵]

1: $K = \text{the prefix OP}_0$ [↵]

2: for $i \leftarrow [1, M]$ do[↵]

3: $K_i = K_i < n$ [↵]

4: $R \leftarrow (r_1, r_2) = kG$ [↵]

5: $r \leftarrow r_1 \bmod n$ [↵]

6: $s \leftarrow k^{-1}(F(m) + dr)$ [↵]

7: $O_i \leftarrow (r, s)$ [↵]

8: end for[↵]

Return: $S = \text{push}(K + O_i)$ [↵]

After this progress, any combination of M signatures from the private keys corresponding to the

N listed public keys will generate in a signature stack as follow.[↵]

$\text{OP}_0 <\text{Signature } 0> <\text{Signature } 1> \dots <\text{Signature } M-1> <\text{Signature } M>$ [↵]

The multi-signature script is stack-based, and processed from left to right. It is purposefully not Turing-complete, with no loops. [6]

This signature scheme uses a standard ECDSA signature but put all the signed result in one stack

Multi-Signature

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
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The signature verifying algorithm



The validation script is a combination of signature lists and the redeem script, which allows being split as an independent unit to verify.

Each independent unit holds a standard ECDSA signature validation

Blockcerts & BTCert (Certificate Revocation)



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VS

The revocation list is merged in the certificate, when verify the certificate, the revocation list needs to check, which represent a single point of failure

The revocation address is merged in the certificate, when verify the certificate, the BTC address needs to check.

Security Certificate Revocation


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Triple-Entry Bookkeeping (Transaction-To-Transaction Payments) As Used By Bitcoin

Every transaction has input and output.

Each input refers to the previous output it's spending by the txid of the transaction

The input address is public and verifiable.

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Students	Revoke_address	Batch_revoke_address	Private key	State
Rujia	1GS7diwCc7SywyaUYgynd1bbMUdoh1PShx	1JuGXZ7imBaB2zYceogSYnJmnRpTm4v3A3	*****	valid
Tom	18H4xq3jFfhis7Jn91c1vieXFYKx3LsPnJ	1JuGXZ7imBaB2zYceogSYnJmnRpTm4v3A3	*****	revoked

```

- badge: {
  created: "2017-01-01",
  description: "good",
  expires: "2100-01-01",
  + fileClaim: { ... },
  id: https://example.org/robotics-badge.json,
  + identityClaim: { ... },
  image: "good",
  + issuer: { ... },
  name: "Bachelor of Arts",
  - revocationClaim: {
    batchRevocationAddress: "1JuGXZ7imBaB2zYceogSYnJmnRpTm4v3A3",
    revocationAddress: "1GS7diwCc7SywyaUYgynd1bbMUdoh1PShx",
    + type: [ ... ]
  },
  type: "Certifacte"
},

```

Revocation is performed by checking the transaction's input from the embedded bitcoin address.

If a embedded bitcoin address is never used, It means that the certificate is valid.

If the embedded bitcoin address is used and the transaction's input address is belonged to institution. It represents that the certificate is revoked.

Certificate Authenticity in Blockcert Version 1.0


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There is a signature and a url-based public key embedded in the certificate. The recipient-owned public key embedded in the record allows the recipient to prove ownership.

```
- issuer: {  
  name: "University of Birmingham",  
  email: "uob@bham.ac.uk",  
  url: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk,  
  type: "Issuer",  
  signer_pub_key: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/keys/bham_public_key.asc,  
  id: "001"  
},
```

Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) ❌

If the private key was leaked, there is nothing to prevent an attacker from issuing fake records and backdating the content.

Certificate Authenticity in Blockcert Version 1.0

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
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To determine that a record was issued by a specific issuer when the issuing key was valid requires knowledge of the timestamp beyond anything written into the credential itself.

Issued Key + **Timestamp**


Address:
1Jw1qkMvP7tp2RuErFoSbxMwfyrnFVHkRr

Timestamp:
15- August - 2017




Security Federated Identity

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Implementation

- ✓ Framework and tech stack
- ✓ Standard blockchain certificate
- ✓ Demonstration page

Framework and tech stack

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Development



Deployment



Standard blockchain certificate

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```
{
  - badge: {
    created: "2017-01-01",
    description: "good",
    expires: "2100-01-01",
    + fileClaim: { ... },
    id: https://example.org/robotics-badge.json,
    + identityClaim: { ... },
    image: "good",
    + issuer: { ... },
    name: "Bachelor of Arts",
    + revocationClaim: { ... },
    type: "Certifacte"
  },
  + context: [ ... ],
  id: "1a08a38afe7f4a848d8f6e7609350814",
  issuedOn: "2017-08-15 00:20:26",
  + recipient: { ... },
  - signature: {
    + anchors: [ ... ],
    context: https://w3id.org/chainpoint/v2,
    merkleRoot: "1cf7ec6048c93cb3710b274a714ff5e7312b496f7cf79bd27881feed69c122eb",
    - proof: [
      - {
        left: "68a7d9a8e1f47d23e28e57e15fdbbc3206764363a93db32705aa8ceddfb96116"
      },
      - {
        right: "7a1337ce6ce66b6114b7828f82d8a20477d9db37cef76c7841f2b10365f45508"
      }
    ],
    targetHash: "4ec37c5ab0595ca0ba0f5cb80526ed7dbec0da13636ee3c15e47dc953089d4e9",
    + typelist: [ ... ]
  },
  type: "badgeClass",
  + verification: { ... }
}
```

Certificate

Receipt



Admin page

Student Page

https://bfcert.com
BFCert.com

Apply for a certificate

Apply for a certificate / Home

Given Name
Ruja
Your given name, first name

Family Name
Li
Your family name, surname

Birthday
1995-01-01

Identity Type
email

Identity value
ruja@bham.ac.uk

Apply Type
Certificate

Your Apply File Hash d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e


ruja_certs_bham.jpg
(121.73 KB)

[Remove](#) [Browse ...](#) [Save changes](#)





Conclusion

✓ Contribution

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MIT



UOB



W3C



Certificates based on
blockchain
+
Python Implementation

Democratic Multi-signature
issuing
+
Security Certificate
Revocation
+
Security Federated Identity

Verifiable Claims Data
Model and Representations
+
Data format standard

THANKS!