Solution

${\bf Cryptography-Question naire~3}$

Name:	
Matr.:	<u></u>
"One-liners"	
Exercise 3.1 Feistel-Networks	1P+1P+1P=3F
Consider the two-round Feistel-Network drawn below, wit	$\text{th } f_1, f_2: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n.$
$x_1 \longrightarrow f_1 \longrightarrow \oplus$ $x_2 \longrightarrow f_1 \longrightarrow $	$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
(a) Compute the outputs y_1, y_2 of the network for $x_1 =$ Answer:	0^n and $x_2 = 0^n$ $y_1 = f_2(f_1(0^n)), y_2 = f_1(0^n)$
(b) Compute the outputs y_1, y_2 of the network for $x_1 =$ Answer:	$0^n \text{ and } x_2 = f_1(0^n)$ $y_1 = f_2(0^n), y_2 = 0^n$
	If used with two PRFs f_{k_1}, f_{k_2} ? Why/why not? No. a a). Then we know $f_{k_1}(0^n)$. This allows us to pose the query in b) a huge advantage over guessing: the probability for a random oracle
Exercise 3.2 PRG from PRF	2F
Let F be a PRF with $l_{in}(n) = l_{out}(n) = n$. Construct from	n F a PRG G of stretch $2n$.
Answer: $G(k) :=$	$F_k(\lfloor 1 ceil) F_k(\lfloor 2 ceil)$

Questions– 1P each = 5P

	true	false
Let F be a PRP, F -rCBC is computationally secret.		
Let G be a PRG of stretch $s \cdot n$, then $F_k : \{0,1\}^{sn} \to \{0,1\}^{sn}$ defined by $F_k(x) = G(k) \oplus x$ is a PRF.		
Let F be a PRF of block length $l(n) = n$. We define \widetilde{F} for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $x_1 \dots x_{2n} \in \{0,1\}^{2n}$ by using F in a one-round Feistel-network: $\widetilde{F}_k(x_1 \dots x_{2n}) = FN_{F_k}(x_1 \dots x_n, x_{n+1} \dots x_{2n}).$ \widetilde{F} is a PRP of block length $2n$.		×
Let RO be a random function oracle of input and output length n . Then $G(k) := RO(k) RO(k)$ is a PRG of stretch $2n$.		
Let F be a PRF. Then F -rCTR is CCA-secure.		