**Table 2.** DMs, options and descriptions for the 1975 conflict.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **Option** | **Choice** | **Description** |
| **Syria** | 1.Release Water | **Y** | Syria agrees to halt the filling of Thawra Dam and let the Euphrates flow into Iraq |
|  | **N** | Syria continues to fill its dam |
| 2.Escalate | **Y** | This could be done by cutting relations with Iraq, sending troops to the shared border, closing the air space to Iraqi aircraft, or any combination of these actions |
|  |  | **N** | Syria does not undertake any of the escalating options |
| **Iraq** | 3.Attack | **Y** | This includes bombing of the dam and going to war with Syria |
|  |  | **N** | Iraq does not act and accepts the situation |
| **Third Party** | 4.Act | **Y** | This includes mediation and reconciliation between the two countries and monetary support |
|  |  | **N** | Do not intervene |

**Table 3.** DMs, options and states for the 1975 conflict without the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **Option** | **States** | | | | | |
| **Syria** | 1.Release Water | **N** | **Y** | **N** | **N** | **Y** | **N** |
|  | 2.Escalate | **N** | **N** | **Y** | **N** | **N** | **Y** |
| **Iraq** | 3.Attack | **N** | **N** | **N** | **Y** | **Y** | **Y** |
| Label |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

**Table 4.** DMs, options and states for the 1975 conflict with the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **Option** | **States** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Syria** | 1.Release Water | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | |
|  | 2.Escalate | N | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | N | Y | |
| **Iraq** | 3.Attack | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | |
| **Third Party** | 4.Act | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
| Label |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | |

**Table 5.**Preference prioritization information for the 1975 conflict without the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **P#** | **Preference Information**  **(From most to least important)** | **Further Explanation** |
| **Syria** | **1** | Remain at the status quo | Syria continues filling its dam and Iraq accepts the situation without any escalation or intervention |
|  | **2** | Escalate the situation if Iraq decides to attack | Syria next prefers going to war with Iraq if it is attacked, which is more preferred than releasing water |
| **Iraq** | **1** | Syria releases more flow of the Euphrates River | Iraq most prefers the situation in which Syria stops filling its dam without any escalation |
|  | **2** | Execute an attack if Syria does not release more water | Iraq’s interest in water far outweighs the consequence of going to war |
|  |  |  |  |

**Table 6***.* Ranking of states for the DMs in the 1975 conflict without the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **States** | | | | | |
| **Syria** | **1** | **3** | **6** | **2** | **4** | **5** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Iraq** | **2** | **4** | **6** | **1** | **5** | **3** |
|  | *Most Preferred* | |  | *Least Preferred* | | |

**Table 7***.*Preference prioritization information for the 1975 conflict with the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **P#** | **Preference Information**  **(From most to least important)** | **Explanation** |
| **Syria** | **1** | Remain at the status quo | Syria continues filling its dam and Iraq accepts the situation without any escalation or intervention |
|  | **2** | Release the flow of the Euphrates if and only if Iraq does not attack and with the mediation of a third party | This is the new preference information after the intervention of the Third Party |
|  | **3** | Escalate the situation if Iraq decides to attack | Syria’s least preferred situation is to go to war with Iraq |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Iraq** | **1** | Syria releases the flow of the Euphrates | Iraq’s most preferred situation is that Syria stops the filling of its dam without any escalation and with or without an intervention |
|  | **2** | Strike an attack if Syria does not release more water | Iraq’s interest in water far outweighs the consequence of going to war |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Third Party** | **1** | Acts and influences Syria to release the flow of the Euphrates | The mediator’s interest is to promote peace in the region and reduce harm for everyone |

**Table 8.** Ranking of states for the DMs in the 1975 conflict with the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **States** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Syria** | 1 | 3 | 8 | 9 | 2 | 7 | 12 | 6 | 10 | 4 | 11 | 5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Iraq** | 8 | 2 | 6 | 12 | 4 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 9 | 3 |
| **Third Party** | 8 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 10 | 6 | 12 | 5 | 11 |
|  | *Most Preferred* | | |  |  |  |  |  |  | *Least Preferred* | | |

**Table 9.** Equilibrium results for the 1975 conflict without the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Solution Concepts | **States** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **5** | **6** |
| R (Nash) |  |  |  |  |  |  | **✓** |
| GMR |  | **✓** |  |  |  |  | **✓** |
| SMR |  | **✓** |  |  |  |  | **✓** |
| SEQ |  |  |  |  |  |  | **✓** |

**Table 10.** Equilibrium results for the 1975 conflict with the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Solution Concepts | **States** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **5** | **6** | **7** | **8** | **9** | **10** | **11** | **12** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| R (Nash) |  |  |  |  |  |  | **✓** |  | **✓** |  |  |  |  |
| GMR |  |  | **✓** |  |  |  | **✓** | **✓** | **✓** |  |  |  | **✓** |
| SMR |  |  | **✓** |  |  |  | **✓** | **✓** | **✓** |  |  |  | **✓** |
| SEQ |  |  |  |  |  |  | **✓** |  | **✓** |  |  |  |  |

**Table 11.** Historical evolution of the 1975 conflict.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **Option** | **Status Quo** | | | Intermediary states | | | | | | |  | **Equilibrium** | |
| **Syria** | Release Water | N |  | N | |  | N |  | N |  |  | | | Y |
|  | Escalate | N |  | N | |  | Y |  | Y |  |  | | | N |
| **Iraq** | Attack | N |  | Y | |  | Y |  | Y |  |  | | | N |
| **Third Party** | Act | N |  | N | |  | N |  | Y |  |  | | | Y |
| Label |  | 1 |  | 4 | |  | 6 |  | 12 |  |  | | | 8 |

**Table 21.** DMs, options and descriptions for the 1998 conflict.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **Option** | **Choice** | **Description** |
| **Turkey** | Escalate | **Y** | This includes threatening Syria, and massing the troops on the shared border with Syria |
|  |  | **N** | Do not escalate |
|  | Invade | **Y** | This includes an invasion of Syria and the declaration of war |
|  |  | **N** | Do not attack |
| **Syria** | Stop PKK Support | **Y** | This includes banning of the PKK in Syria and the extradition of PKK leader to Turkey |
|  | **N** | Syria continues to support PKK rebels |
|  | Escalate | **Y** | This includes attacks on Turkey and its development projects |
|  |  | **N** | Do not escalate |
| **Third Party** | Act | **Y** | This includes mediation and reconciliation between the two countries of Turkey and Syria. |
|  |  | **N** | Do not intervene |

**Table 22.** DMs, options and states for the 1998 conflict with the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **Option** | **States** | | | | | | | | |
| **Turkey** | Escalate | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | **--** |
|  | Invasion | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | **Y** |
| **Syria** | Ban PKK | N | N | Y | Y | N | N | Y | Y | **--** |
|  | Escalate | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | N | N | **--** |
| **Third Party** | Act | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | **--** |
| Label |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

**Table 23.** Preference prioritization information for the 1998 conflict with the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **P#** | **Preference Information**  **(From most to least preferred)** | | **Further Explanation or Comments** |
| **Turkey** | **1** | Syria stops its support for PKK |  | |
|  | **2** | Escalate the situation if Syria does not ban PKK |  | |
|  | **3** | Invade Syria if and only if Syria does not ban PKK | Turkey’s least preferred situation is remaining at the status quo | |
| **Syria** | **1** | Remain at the status quo | Syria continues to support the PKK and Turkey does not escalate (However, this move is restricted by the Third Party’s intervention) | |
|  | **2** | Turkey does not invade | Syria’s least preferred situation is an invasion by Turkey | |
|  | **3** | Escalate if Turkey escalates |  | |
| **Third Party** | **1** | Syria stops its support of PKK and Turkey does not invade Syria | Third Party is against the support of the rebellious PKK and wants to bring peace to the area | |

**Table 24.** Ranking of states for DMs in the 1998 conflict with the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **States** | | | | | | | | |
| **Turkey** | 3 | 7 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| **Syria** | 1 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 9 |
| **Third Party** | 7 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 9 |
|  | *Most Preferred* | |  |  |  |  | *Least Preferred* | | |

**Table 25.** Equilibrium results for the 1998 conflict with the Third Party.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Solution Concepts | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **5** | **6** | **7** | **8** | **9** |
| R (Nash) |  |  |  |  |  | **✓** | **✓** |  | **✓** |
| GMR |  |  | **✓** | **✓** |  | **✓** | **✓** | **✓** | **✓** |
| SMR |  |  | **✓** | **✓** |  | **✓** | **✓** | **✓** | **✓** |
| SEQ |  |  |  |  |  | **✓** | **✓** |  | **✓** |

**Table 26.** Historical evolution of the 1998 conflict.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DM** | **Option** | Status Quo |  |  |  |  |  |  | Final Equilibrium | |
| **Turkey** | Escalate | N |  | Y |  |  | Y |  |  | N |
|  | Invasion | N |  | N |  |  | N |  |  | N |
| **Syria** | Ban PKK | N |  | N |  |  | N |  |  | Y |
|  | Escalate | N |  | N |  |  | Y |  |  | N |
| **Third Party** | Act | N |  | N |  |  | N |  |  | Y |
| Label |  | 1 |  | 2 |  |  | 6 |  |  | 7 |