



POLI 150: Domestic Politics & International Relations

Daniel Gustafson

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Today's Class

- Review of Game Theory
- Sovereignty
- Domestic Politics & International Relations



Why Do We Care About Game Theory?

- Strategic interaction is the essence of international politics
- We can distill very complex situations into simplified models to learn something about actors' incentives and behavior
- We can make predictions about what actors might do and what situations are stable
- Helps us explain seemingly irrational behaviors



Solving a Game

- We solve a game by considering the best responses of each actor
- Any outcome that is a mutual best response is called an equilibrium
- The actors cannot improve their payoff by unilaterally deviating
- If even one actor has a profitable deviation, the outcome is not an equilibrium



Steps to Solving a Game

- 1 Start by assuming that one actor will play one specific strategy
- 2 Determine the opponent's best response to that strategy by comparing their payoffs from each of their own potential strategies
- 3 Indicate by underlining or circling that actor's payoff from their best response strategy
- 4 Repeat for all actors and all of their opponents' possible strategies
- 5 Any cells in which all payoffs are underlined or circled constitute equilibria!
- 6 Double check by seeing whether any actor can make herself better off by switching their strategy *unilaterally*



Bach or Stravinsky

		Actor 2	
		<i>B</i>	<i>S</i>
Actor 1	<i>B</i>	2, 1	0, 0
	<i>S</i>	0, 0	1, 2



Bach or Stravinsky

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Bach or Stravinsky Solution

- Two outcomes: both see Bach or both see Stravinsky
- Does this game look like any we've explored before?
- Keep practicing, you'll see these sorts of games (and this sort of thinking) throughout the semester!



What is Sovereignty?





Sovereignty

- Krasner points out that there are three different conceptions of sovereignty in the international system
- International legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty
- Theoretically, states should have all of these, but in practice, they often do not
- How do international actors deal with the modern practicalities of sovereignty?



Legal Sovereignty

- International legal sovereignty confers the recognition of independence of a territorial unit
- A territory with legal sovereignty is free to make decisions about how they will interact with other international actors
- E.g., which treaties or agreements will an actor accept?



Defenestration of Prague






Thirty Years' War





Thirty Years' War





Peace of Westphalia





Westphalian Sovereignty

- The principle that states should refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of other states
- Named for the Peace of Westphalia, which institutionalized this concept
- Historically very important, but being challenged more frequently in recent history



Domestic Sovereignty

- The degree to which a domestic authority can control activities in its border
- Ideally, promoting peace, protecting human rights and rule of law
- Assumed to come along with legal and Westphalian sovereignty
- Krasner's claim: there are a large number of states that enjoy legal and Westphalian sovereignty without having domestic sovereignty



Failing Domestic Sovereignty

- Badly governed and failed states often lack domestic sovereignty
- Marked by human rights abuses, lack of effective rule of law, and often large scale civil conflict
- In these states, leaders often don't have incentives to correct the failures of domestic sovereignty
- Given the importance of legal and Westphalian sovereignty to the international system, what can be done?



Powerful States' Considerations

- Why should powerful states care about failed or failing states?
- Humanitarian crises have strong electoral consequences for leaders of strong states
- WMD, ease of movement across borders, and emergence of terrorist threat makes weaker opponents more dangerous
- Transnational criminality threatens states



Available Options for Advanced Nations

- Ignore it
- Governance assistance: train judges, write constitutions, monitor elections, etc.; largely maintains the norms of sovereignty
- Transnational administration: ranges from peacekeeping to statebuilding; violates sovereignty
- Which of these makes the most sense for dealing with failing states?



Bad Options

- Krasner claims that each of these available options are bad for different reasons
- Ignoring it leads to all the previously stated threats
- Governance assistance has limited effectiveness and may lead to incongruous arrangements
- Transnational administration is costly, only seems to work in easy cases, and faces a time inconsistency problem



Alternatives: Sharing Sovereignty

- Instead, Krasner suggests that the international community must become more open to different arrangements that don't respect sovereignty
- Trusteeships: withdrawing legal sovereignty and allowing external actors to operate the country until a responsible government is ready
- Shared sovereignty: entering into long-run agreements that strive to improve domestic sovereignty; e.g. Soviet satellites & West Germany



Challenges

- Both of these concepts have to be palatable to internal and external actors
- When are such agreements likely to be possible?
- Krasner identifies post-conflict periods and natural resource-rich countries as two examples



Domestic-International Nexus

- The discussion of sovereignty and failing states highlights the interplay between domestic and international politics
- In order for these arrangements to work, bargaining occurs at the international and domestic levels
- While we often consider states *unitary actors*, the situation is more complex



Which Came First...?

- Do domestic politics cause international relations, or is the reverse true?
- Both!
- In democracies, domestic politics determine the characteristics of international policy-makers: e.g. hawkish or dovish leaders
- International interactions like trade and conflict have huge implications for domestic politics, as well



Two-Level Games

- Putnam claims that research focusing on one without the other is incomplete
- Instead, he suggests that we should study *two-level games*
- Actors attempt to reach an agreement that is acceptable to an international bargaining partner and a domestic audience
- National leaders are playing two opponents: one foreign, and one domestic



Two-Level Games

- These are complex situations where ‘wrong’ decisions become doubly likely
- International leaders can inflict costs on the home state
- Domestic actors can remove the national leader from power
- When acting internationally, outcomes must please both international and domestic players



Bargaining at Different Levels

- Putnam argues that bargaining takes place at the international level (Level I) and domestic level (Level II)
- Negotiators agree to deal in principle
- Leaders then take the agreement to their domestic audiences and seek ratification
- Sometimes, this process is iterative



Win-Sets

- Win-sets are defined as the range of Level I agreements that will be accepted at Level II
- Larger win-sets make agreement more likely
- The size of Level II win-sets affects the distribution of outcomes possible in international bargaining



Changing Win-Sets




FIGURE 1. *Effects of reducing win-set size*



Determinants of Win-Sets

- What determines how large or small a win-set is?
- Status-quo or reversion point: what do I stand to gain?
- The distribution of Level II actors: are they homogeneous or heterogeneous?
- Issue linkage: what are the dimensions of bargaining?
- Institutions: how are agreements ratified by the domestic audience?



Key Takeaways

- There is serious connection between domestic and international politics
- Failure to account for one can leave observers confused or with false inferences
- We must consider both the international and domestic incentives that actors face to study their decision-making