



POLI 150: Strategic Nonviolence & Government Repression

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Today's Class

- Refugee Flows & Conflict
- The Effectiveness of Nonviolence
- Government Repression



Refugee Flows & Conflict: Expectations

- Heightened political debate about refugee flows and domestic stability
- Specifically, Rüegger focuses on how refugee flows depend upon local ethnic politics and ethnic ties
- What is the relationship between refugee flows, the ethnic makeup of receiving states, and civil conflict?




Refugee Flows & Conflict

- **Shifting Power:** groups with co-ethnic refugees in a country have a higher risk of experiencing civil conflict
- **Political Exclusion:** excluded groups with co-ethnic refugees in their country have a higher likelihood of experiencing civil conflict




Effect of Co-Ethnic Refugees





Change in Pr.(Civil Conflict) for Excluded





Nonviolent Resistance

- Up to this point, we have focused on violent civil conflict
- However, nonviolent tactics (e.g. protests, boycotts, strikes) are common tactics rather than conflict
- Nonviolence is increasingly common and may be more effective than violence in coercing policy change



Nonviolent Direct Action

- Civilian-based method to wage conflict without using or threatening violence
- Different from using traditional political institutions
- Strategic rather than principled



How Is Nonviolence Effective?

- Government repression of nonviolent movements can lead to backfire domestically and internationally
- Nonviolent movements do not threaten regime members
- These two key features encourage loyalty shifts toward the movement



Violence vs. Nonviolence

- A common assumption that violence is more effective than nonviolence
- Stephan and Chenoweth introduce new data on nonviolent and violent campaigns to test how frequently they achieve their goals
- Their expectations highlight the differential impact of repression, the importance of loyalty shifts of security forces, and international support



Nonviolent Conflict: Findings

- Nonviolent movements are much more likely to achieve success in the face of repression
- Defections have a huge impact on the likelihood of success, but no statistical evidence that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to secure them
- International support helps campaigns achieve success



Nonviolent Campaigns in Southeast Asia

- **East Timor:** while violence failed to remove the Indonesian presence, the nonviolent campaign targeted domestic and international audiences successfully
- **Philippines:** the “People Power” movement led to the removal of international support for Marcos and regime change
- **Burma:** mass mobilization appeared likely to cause regime change, but government repression prevented pro-democracy movement success



Repression in Burma

- At the height of mobilization in Burma, a new government emerged following a military coup
- Multiple types of repression were used: disappearances, banning gatherings, etc.
- Repression was effective in preventing nonviolent direct action to induce regime change
- What is the relationship between nonviolent action, such as protest, and repression?



Repression & Dissent

- Repression: realized or threatened limit or coercive action by the state to control or prevent challenges to the status quo
- The ‘Law of Coercive Responsiveness’ suggests that governments use repression to control dissent
- Ritter & Conrad argue that the relationship is much more nuanced because of *preventative repression* and *self-censoring*



Preventative Repression

- Governments often engage in tactics that make it more difficult for opponents to organize (e.g. closing public spaces) or give them negative incentives to do so (e.g. torture)
- These strategies prevent some protests from happening in the first place
- The protests that do occur following preventative repression will include more resolved actors
- Government's best response is unclear → no statistical relationship between dissent after preventative repression and responsive repression



Self-Censoring

- Some groups may choose not to dissent because they expect repression
- However, other groups are willing to bear the costs of potential repression
- Those resolved groups are systematically different from groups that self-censor
- If the government has not used preventative repression, they have incentives to do so upon observing dissent



Findings: Does Dissent Cause Repression?

- Ritter & Conrad use a clever research design to control for the endogenous relationship between dissent and repression
- Use samples of dissent and repression across Africa and in the United States
- After accounting for the endogeneity, they find no effect of dissent on the use of repression in nondemocracies
- Strong effect of dissent on repression in democracies