



POLI 150: Alliances & Collective Security

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Today's Class

- Finishing up two-level games
- Collective Security & Alliances
- The Future of NATO



Two-Level Games

- Putnam claims that research focusing on only domestic politics or international relations is incomplete
- Instead, he suggests that we should study *two-level games*
- Actors attempt to reach an agreement that is acceptable to an international bargaining partner and a domestic audience
- National leaders are playing two opponents: one foreign, and one domestic



Bargaining at Different Levels

- Putnam argues that bargaining takes place at the international level (Level I) and domestic level (Level II)
- Negotiators agree to deal in principle
- Leaders then take the agreement to their domestic audiences and seek ratification
- Sometimes, this process is iterative



- Win-sets are defined as the range of Level I (international) agreements that will be accepted at Level II (domestic)
- Larger win-sets make agreement more likely
- The size of Level II win-sets affects the distribution of outcomes possible in international bargaining



Changing Win-Sets




FIGURE 1. *Effects of reducing win-set size*



Determinants of Win-Sets

- What determines how large or small a win-set is?
- Status-quo or reversion point: what do I stand to gain?
- The distribution of Level II actors: are they homogeneous or heterogeneous?
- Issue linkage: what are the dimensions of bargaining?
- Institutions: how are agreements ratified by the domestic audience?



Key Takeaways

- There is serious connection between domestic and international politics
- Failure to account for one can leave observers confused or with false inferences
- Domestic politics can help shape important decisions, even those that determine whether or not a state engages in war



Puzzles of Collective Security

- Given that the international system is characterized by anarchy, how do states collectively attempt to prevent conflict?
- Why would states ever agree to form alliances?
- When can collective security organizations succeed?



Collective Security Arrangements

- In a self-help world, there is no international police force
- International acts of aggression often receive very different responses
- Institutions, especially formal collective security organizations and alliances, help to explain this variation



Alliances as Collective Security

- Alliance: institutions that help their members cooperate militarily in the event of a war
- Specify standards about how states are supposed to behave if conflict emerges or codify bargains
- Huge variation across alliances in terms of expectations and degree of enforcement



Offensive vs. Defensive

- Offensive alliances represent agreements in which two or more states agree to attack a different state
- State the nature of military cooperation but also the terms of bargaining (i.e. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Pact of Steel)
- Defensive alliances exist when states agree to come to another's defense in the event that either is attacked
- Can range from consultation (Triple Entente) to full collective security (NATO)



Balance of Power

- The balance of power was once the dominant explanation for alliances, but it suffers from some important critiques
- Bandwagoning occurs, as in the case of Soviet-German alliance concerning Poland
- Cultural or religious identity can encourage or discourage alliance formation
- No coalition has balanced against the United State following WWII




Why Enter Alliances?

- Given that alliances can be potentially very costly, why do states ever form them?
- Interest compatibility is the overwhelming reason that states agree to alliances
- States might share *common* interest in an outcome
- Also might have *complimentary* interests




Bargaining Models






Aligned Interests in Bargaining





Bargaining in War






How Do Alliances Work?

- Alliances affect bargaining between states by altering the odds and costs associated with wars
- If a state agrees to fight with its ally, the expected outcome of war shifts in favor of the allies
- The opponent's costs for war increase because the allies can do more damage
- The allies each take on some of the costs of war




Bargaining in War





Bargaining in War with an Ally





Informational Challenges

- This change in bargaining assumes that both sides believe that an ally will join the fray
- What if one side expects its ally to join while their opponents do not?
- Uncertainty over alliance commitments can lead to conflict for this reason
- For example, Iraq didn't believe the US would intervene in Kuwait; Germany didn't think Britain would fight in WWI



Alliances as Weak Institutions

- Alliances are implied threats: intervention is costly and allies have incentives to bluff
- They are not binding and are sometimes broken
- In order for alliances to have a deterrence effect, they must clear two barriers
 - 1 Must improve the chances that allies will fight in the absence of an alliance
 - 2 Also must make opponents believe that they will fight together



Signalling Credibility

- Alliances should effectively increase the benefits and decrease costs of war
- Can be done by stationing troops together and engaging in joint exercises
- Increase costs of abandonment: tying interests together or bringing in reputational costs
- Are alliances credible? Yes, for the most part!




Why Is There Wiggle Room?

- Why aren't alliances ironclad?
- States are worried about entrapment: the risk of being dragged into an opportunistic war
- Expected alliance support increases the power of states, who may use this to make greater demands from opponents
- United States-Taiwan relations illustrate this dynamic
- As a result, alliances are often purposely vague



Bargaining in War with an Ally





Alliances in Recent Western History

- Alliances between states in two camps contributed to the start of WWI
- Weak alliances failed to prevent WWII
- More formal alliances (NATO & the Warsaw Pact) contributed to the stability of the Cold War
- Present & Future: formal agreements and collective security organizations



Collective Security Organizations

- Collective security organizations are institutions that promote peace, like the UN
- Aimed at preventing international conflict, but have also been used in civil conflict situations
- Behavior has shifted from intervention to alternative strategies like mediation and peacekeeping
- Have also supported humanitarian interventions



Challenges to Collective Security

- Theoretically, all members have common interests in international peace, but practically, divisions exist
- International peace is a public good, and organizations face a free-rider problem
- Joint decision making about what is a threat is difficult
- Despite challenges, collective security organizations have a positive effect in reducing and managing conflict



NATO's Evolution

NATO Expansion, 1949–2017



* NATO members also include the United States and Canada



NATO: Past

- NATO was an alliance agreement meant to contain the Soviet Union
- Article V contains the key clause: an attack against one ally is an attack against all allies
- Seen as a key deterrent to Soviet aggression and a driver of peace during the Cold War



NATO: Present

- After the Cold War, analysts thought NATO would crumble
- However, Article V was invoked and carried out following 9/11 and in Libya
- President Trump has hugely criticized NATO in a departure from former US presidents
- Leaders in Congress and US citizens disagree and continue to find NATO valuable to the US



NATO: Future

- Trump and other analysts argue that NATO's purpose died with the end of the Cold War
- Goldgeier argues that NATO remains valuable to the US and Europe, but it must adapt with the world
 - 1 Acknowledge that other forms of attack can trigger Article V
 - 2 Strengthen partnerships with the EU and non-European democracies
 - 3 Foster greater collaboration with Russia