



POLI 150: Interacting in an Ordered International System

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15 January 2020



Today's Class

- Varieties of Order
- Interactions
- Cooperation & Bargaining



The Rise of States

- Historically, the dominant actor in the study of IR has been the **state**
- State: the central authority within a specified territory
- Makes and enforces laws and rules
- Maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence
- Relatively recent system of organization



Varieties of Order

- International order: the governing arrangements among a group of states; rules, principles, and institutions
- Order defines how states fit in with one another
- Ikenberry discusses three types of international order



Balance of Power

- The organizing principle is anarchy
- Weak states will choose to join coalitions to balance against strong states
- Balancing is an alternative to bandwagoning
- Stable as long as states are able to recognize and react to shifts in power



Hegemonic

- Hierarchy is the organizing principle
- Hegemon makes the rules and enforces them with different types of power
- Can be coercive or benevolent
- Order remains stable as long as the hegemon stays strong



Constitutional

- Legality and institutions are the organizing principles
- Legal institutions check the power of states
- Agreement over the rules, binding limits on power, not easily changed
- Stability depends upon the durability of institutions



Varieties of Order in History

- Balance of Power: Cold War
- Hegemonic: British Empire
- Constitutional: Post WWII (maybe?)
- International order in 2020?



Varieties of Order & The Three Is

- The type of order describes the ‘shape’ of the international system
- Makes assumptions about the interests of actors
- Defines a structure for interactions
- Assumes importance of international institutions



The Three Is

- Interests: what actors want to achieve
- Interactions: how actors' strategies combine to produce outcomes
- Institutions: sets of shared rules for structuring interactions



The Three Is

- Interests: what actors want to achieve
- **Interactions:** how actors' strategies combine to produce outcomes
- Institutions: sets of shared rules for structuring interactions



Interaction

- Why can't actors always get what they want?
- Outcomes depend on the choices of all relevant actors
- Even if actors take actions to get their preferred outcome, it may not work out



Saddam Hussein





Hussein's Decision

- The United states has given an ultimatum: step down or face invasion
- Hussein has two choices: acquiesce or resist
- Given Hussein's decision, the United States can invade or back down



Combinations of Strategies

- Acquiesce & Invade: Hussein is glad to be in exile, but has given up his power
- Acquiesce & Back Down: Hussein loses power, but may have gotten bluffed
- Resist & Back Down: Hussein calls the bluff; his preferred outcome
- Resist & Invade: The US was not bluffing, and Hussein's life is in jeopardy; his worst outcome



Strategic Interaction

- The takeaway here: interaction matters!
- What one actor expects others to do shapes his or her decision
- This is the essence of *strategic interaction*



Assumptions of Strategic Interaction

- We make two assumptions about actors in strategic interactions
- 1. Actors behave with the intention of producing a desired result
- 2. Actors choose strategies in accordance with what they think the other actors will do based upon their interests
- These assumptions do not guarantee that actors will be happy with the outcome




Cooperation, Bargaining, and Spatial Models

- Most interactions can be broken down into one of two types: cooperation or bargaining
- Cooperation makes at least one actor better off while making no one else worse off
- Bargaining makes one better at the expense of the other
- We can visualize these scenarios with two actors using spatial models



Spatial Model



Spatial Model of Sincere Interaction




Cooperation on the Spatial Model

- Cooperation occurs when the status quo improves for at least one player without making the other worse off
- Any deviation within the triangle created by the *Pareto frontier* and the dashed lines represents cooperation
- N.b. the Pareto frontier is the set of outcomes that exhaust joint gains



Spatial Model



Spatial Model of Sincere Interaction




Bargaining on the Spatial Model

- Bargaining occurs on the Pareto frontier, as an actor tries to secure the best outcome for herself at the expense of the other actor
- There is a fixed amount of resource, and any gain for one side comes with a loss for the other
- Bargaining is zero-sum, while cooperation is positive-sum



Bargaining Model





Bargaining Power

- What is bargaining power? The ability to get another actor to do something that it would not do otherwise
- The reversion outcome plays a role in determining bargaining power
- Coercion is a straightforward way to gain bargaining power, but it carries costs
- Outside options can improve a bargaining position as well



Bargaining & Cooperation in Tandem

- Many interactions in the international system combine elements of both
- Cooperation generate gains that get bargained over
- These interactions are not always successful and for various reasons



Coordination

- The easiest type of cooperative interaction is coordination: all actors agree to make the same choices
- Actors have no incentive not to comply
- Driving on the same side of the road, speaking the same language in important contexts, etc.



Collaboration

- Collaboration requires actors to contribute for joint gains, but actors have incentives to deviate
- Leads to the classical collective action problem
- Actors want to derive benefits from public goods (i.e. clean air), but have incentives to free-ride



Cooperation in Action

■ Cooperation!



Encouraging Cooperation

- Why didn't the actors cooperate?
- How can we encourage cooperation between actors?
 - 1 Iteration
 - 2 Linkage
 - 3 Information