

Directed Acyclic Graphical Models, and Causal Models
9.S918: Quantitative Inference in Brain and Cognitive
Sciences
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Today's content

- ▶ Conditional Independence
- ▶ Bayes Nets (a.k.a. directed acyclic graphical models, DAGs)

(Conditional) Independence

Events A and B are said to be Conditionally Independent given information C if

$$P(A, B|C) = P(A|C)P(B|C)$$

Conditional independence of A and B given C is often expressed as

$$A \perp B|C$$

Directed graphical models


- ▶ A lot of the interesting joint probability distributions that arise in science and practical applications alike involve *conditional independencies* among the variables
- ▶ So next is an introduction to a general framework for specifying conditional independencies among collections of random variables
- ▶ It won't allow us to express *all possible* independencies that may hold, but it goes a long way
- ▶ And I hope that you'll agree that the framework is intuitive too!
- ▶ The intuitiveness is because a causal interpretation of the framework is natural—and, indeed, this is formalized in the causal treatment of Bayes nets

The coin factory

- ▶ Imagine a factory that produces three types of coins in equal volumes:
 - ▶ Fair coins;
 - ▶ 2-headed coins;
 - ▶ 2-tailed coins.
- ▶ Generative process:
 - ▶ The factory produces a coin of type X and sends it to you;
 - ▶ You receive the coin and flip it twice, with H(eads)/T(ails) outcomes Y_1 and Y_2
- ▶ Receiving a coin from the factory and flipping it twice is **sampling** (or **taking a sample**) from the joint distribution $P(X, Y_1, Y_2)$

This generative process is a Bayes Net

The directed acyclic graphical model (DAG), or Bayes net:



- Semantics of a Bayes net: the joint distribution can be expressed as the product of the conditional distributions of each variable **given only its parents**
- In this DAG, $P(X, Y_1, Y_2) = P(X)P(Y_1|X)P(Y_2|X)$

X	$P(X)$	X	$P(Y_1 = H X)$	$P(Y_1 = T X)$	X	$P(Y_2 = H X)$	$P(Y_2 = T X)$
Fair	$\frac{1}{3}$	Fair	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	Fair	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
2-H	$\frac{1}{3}$	2-H	1	0	2-H	1	0
2-T	$\frac{1}{3}$	2-T	0	1	2-T	0	1

Conditional independence in Bayes nets

X	$P(X)$	X	$P(Y_1 = H X)$	$P(Y_1 = T X)$	X	$P(Y_2 = H X)$	$P(Y_2 = T X)$
Fair	$\frac{1}{3}$	Fair	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	Fair	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
2-H	$\frac{1}{3}$	2-H	1	0	2-H	1	0
2-T	$\frac{1}{3}$	2-T	0	1	2-T	0	1

Question:

- ▶ *Conditioned on not having any further information, are the two coin flips Y_1 and Y_2 in this generative process independent?*
- ▶ “Independent” needs further interpretation! It might mean: is it the case that $Y_1 \perp Y_2 | \{\}$?
- ▶ The answer to this question is **No!**
 - ▶ $P(Y_2 = H) = \frac{1}{2}$ (you can see this by symmetry)
 - ▶ But $P(Y_2 = H | Y_1 = H) = \overbrace{\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{2}}^{\text{Coin was fair}} + \overbrace{\frac{2}{3} \times 1}^{\text{Coin was 2-H}} = \frac{5}{6}$

Formally assessing conditional independence in Bayes Nets


- ▶ The comprehensive criterion for assessing conditional independence is known as D-separation.
- ▶ A path between two disjoint node sets A and B is a sequence of edges connecting some node in A with some node in B
- ▶ Any node on a given path has converging arrows if two edges on the path connect to it and point to it.
- ▶ A node on the path has non-converging arrows if two edges on the path connect to it, but at least one does not point to it.
- ▶ A third disjoint node set C d-separates A and B if for every path between A and B , either:
 1. there is some node N on the path whose arrows do not converge and which is in C ; or
 2. there is some node N on the path with converging arrows, and neither N nor any of its descendants is in C .

Major types of d-separation

A node set C d-separates A and B if for every path between A and B , either:


1. there is some node N on the path whose arrows do not converge and which is in C ; or
2. there is some node N on the path with converging arrows, and neither N nor any of its descendants is in C .

Common-cause
d-separation
(from knowing Z)




(Shaded node= $\in C$)


Mediating
d-separation
(from knowing Y)



Explaining
away: knowing
 Z prevents
d-separation



D-separation
in the absence
of knowledge
of Z



D-separation and conditional independence

A node set C d-separates A and B if for every path between A and B , either:

1. there is some node N on the path whose arrows do not converge and which is in C ; or
2. there is some node N on the path with converging arrows, and neither N nor any of its descendants is in C .

► If C d-separates A and B , then


$$A \perp B | C$$

► **Caution:** the converse is *not* the case: $A \perp B | C$ does not necessarily imply that the joint distribution on all the random variables in $A \cup B \cup C$ can be represented with a Bayes Net in which C d-separates A and B .

► **Example:** let X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2 each be 0/1 random variable, and let the joint distribution reflect the constraint that $Y_1 = (X_1 == X_2)$ and $Y_2 = \text{xor}(X_1, X_2)$. This gives us $Y_1 \perp Y_2 | \{X_1, X_2\}$, but you won't be able to write a Bayes net involving these four variables such that $\{X_1, X_2\}$ d-separates Y_1 and Y_2 .

Conditional independencies not expressible in a Bayes net

- **Example:** let X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2 each be binary 0/1 random variables, in the following arrangement on an **undirected** graph:



$$f_1(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = \mathbf{1}(X_1 \neq X_2)$$

$$f_2(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = \mathbf{1}(X_1 \neq Y_1)$$

$$f_3(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = \mathbf{1}(X_2 \neq Y_2)$$

$$f_4(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = \mathbf{1}(Y_1 \neq Y_2)$$

- Suppose the joint distribution is determined entirely by adjacent nodes “liking” to have the same value. Formally, for example:

$$P(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) \propto \prod_{i=1}^4 \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{f_i(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2)}$$

(Most probable outcomes, each with prob. 0.195: either all 0s, or all 1s)


- In this model, both the following conditional independencies hold:

$$X_1 \perp Y_2 | \{X_2, Y_1\}$$

$$X_2 \perp Y_1 | \{X_1, Y_2\}$$

- But this set of conditional independencies cannot be expressed in a Bayes Net.

Conditional independencies not expressible in a Bayes net



$$f_1(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = \mathbf{I}(X_1 \neq X_2)$$


$$f_2(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = \mathbf{I}(X_1 \neq Y_1)$$

$$f_3(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = \mathbf{I}(X_2 \neq Y_2)$$

$$f_4(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = \mathbf{I}(Y_1 \neq Y_2)$$

- ▶ This example is an instance of an Ising model, the prototypical case of a Markov random field, a model class that can be represented as undirected graphs
- ▶ We won't look at these further, but you can read about them in books and papers about graphical models (e.g., (Bishop, 2006, Section 8.3))

Back to our example



- ▶ *Without looking at the coin before flipping it*, the outcome Y_1 of the first flip gives me information about the type of coin, and affects my beliefs about the outcome of Y_2



- ▶ But if I *look* at the coin before flipping it, Y_1 and Y_2 are rendered independent


An example of explaining away

I saw an exhibition about the, uh...


There are several causes of disfluency, including:

- ▶ An upcoming word is difficult to produce (e.g., low frequency, *astrolabe*)
- ▶ The speaker's attention was distracted by something in the non-linguistic environment

A reasonable graphical model:




An example of explaining away



- ▶ Without knowledge of *D*, there's no reason to expect that *W* and *A* are correlated
- ▶ But hearing a disfluency *demand*s a cause
- ▶ Knowing that there was a distraction *explains away* the disfluency, reducing the probability that the speaker was planning to utter a hard word

An example of the disfluency model



- ▶ Let's suppose that both hard words and distractions are unusual, the latter more so

$$P(W = \text{hard}) = 0.25$$

$$P(A = \text{distracted}) = 0.15$$


- ▶ Hard words and distractions both induce disfluencies; having both makes a disfluency *really* likely

<i>W</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>D</i> =no disfluency	<i>D</i> =disfluency
easy	undistracted	0.99	0.01
easy	distracted	0.7	0.3
hard	undistracted	0.85	0.15
hard	distracted	0.4	0.6

An example of the disfluency model

$$P(W = \text{hard}) = 0.25$$

$$P(A = \text{distracted}) = 0.15$$



<i>W</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>D</i> =no disfluency	<i>D</i> =disfluency
easy	undistracted	0.99	0.01
easy	distracted	0.7	0.3
hard	undistracted	0.85	0.15
hard	distracted	0.4	0.6

- ▶ Suppose that we observe the speaker uttering a disfluency. What is $P(W = \text{hard} | D = \text{disfluent})$?
- ▶ Now suppose we also learn that her attention is distracted. What does that do to our beliefs about W ?
- ▶ That is, what is $P(W = \text{hard} | D = \text{disfluent}, A = \text{distracted})$?

An example of the disfluency model

Fortunately, there is automated machinery to “turn the Bayesian crank”:

$$P(W = \text{hard}) = 0.25$$

$$P(W = \text{hard} | D = \text{disfluent}) = 0.57$$

$$P(W = \text{hard} | D = \text{disfluent}, A = \text{distracted}) = 0.40$$

- ▶ Knowing that the speaker was distracted (A) *decreased* the probability that the speaker was about to utter a hard word (W)— A **explained** D **away**.
- ▶ A caveat: the type of relationship among A , W , and D will depend on the values one finds in the probability table!

$$P(W)$$

$$P(A)$$

$$P(D | W, A)$$

Summary thus far

Key points:

- ▶ Bayes' Rule is a compelling framework for modeling inference under uncertainty
- ▶ DAGs/Bayes Nets are a broad class of models for specifying joint probability distributions with conditional independencies
- ▶ Classic Bayes Net references: Pearl (1988, 2000); Jordan (1998); Russell and Norvig (2003, Chapter 14); Bishop (2006, Chapter 8).

An example of the disfluency model

$$P(W = \text{hard} | D = \text{disfluent}, A = \text{distracted})$$

hard $W = \text{hard}$

easy $W = \text{easy}$

disfl $D = \text{disfluent}$

distr $A = \text{distracted}$

undistr $A = \text{undistracted}$

$$P(\text{hard} | \text{disfl}, \text{distr}) = \frac{P(\text{disfl} | \text{hard}, \text{distr})P(\text{hard} | \text{distr})}{P(\text{disfl} | \text{distr})} \quad (\text{Bayes' Rule})$$

$$= \frac{P(\text{disfl} | \text{hard}, \text{distr})P(\text{hard})}{P(\text{disfl} | \text{distr})} \quad (\text{Independence from the DAG})$$

$$P(\text{disfl} | \text{distr}) = \sum_{w'} P(\text{disfl} | W = w')P(W = w') \quad (\text{Marginalization})$$

$$= P(\text{disfl} | \text{hard})P(\text{hard}) + P(\text{disfl} | \text{easy})P(\text{easy})$$

$$= 0.6 \times 0.25 + 0.3 \times 0.75$$

$$= 0.375$$

$$P(\text{hard} | \text{disfl}, \text{distr}) = \frac{0.6 \times 0.25}{0.375}$$

$$= 0.4$$

An example of the disfluency model

$$P(W = \text{hard} | D = \text{disfluent})$$

$$P(\text{hard} | \text{disfl}) = \frac{P(\text{disfl} | \text{hard})P(\text{hard})}{P(\text{disfl})} \quad (\text{Bayes' Rule})$$

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{disfl} | \text{hard}) &= \sum_{a'} P(\text{disfl} | A = a', \text{hard})P(A = a' | \text{hard}) \\ &= P(\text{disfl} | A = \text{distr}, \text{hard})P(A = \text{distr} | \text{hard}) + P(\text{disfl} | \text{undistr}, \text{hard})P(\text{undistr} | \text{hard}) \\ &= 0.6 \times 0.15 + 0.15 \times 0.85 \\ &= 0.2175 \end{aligned}$$


$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{disfl}) &= \sum_{w'} P(\text{disfl} | W = w')P(W = w') \\ &= P(\text{disfl} | \text{hard})P(\text{hard}) + P(\text{disfl} | \text{easy})P(\text{easy}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{disfl} | \text{easy}) &= \sum_{a'} P(\text{disfl} | A = a', \text{easy})P(A = a' | \text{easy}) \\ &= P(\text{disfl} | A = \text{distr}, \text{easy})P(A = \text{distr} | \text{easy}) + P(\text{disfl} | \text{undistr}, \text{easy})P(\text{undistr} | \text{easy}) \\ &= 0.3 \times 0.15 + 0.01 \times 0.85 \\ &= 0.0535 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{disfl}) &= 0.2175 \times 0.25 + 0.0535 \times 0.75 \\ &= 0.0945 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{hard} | \text{disfl}) &= \frac{0.2175 \times 0.25}{0.0945} \\ &= 0.575396825396825 \end{aligned}$$

Recap of Bayes Nets



- ▶ The collection of random variables must form a **directed acyclic graph** (each node represents one random variable)
 - ▶ Without loss of generality we can assume an indexing on the random variables, such that no variable is upstream of a lower-indexed variable on the graph
- ▶ **Semantics:** the joint distribution can be expressed as a chain rule decomposition in order of the indexing, simplified such that only a variable's parents on the graph appear on its conditioning side
$$\begin{aligned}P(X_{1\dots 5}) &= P(X_5|X_{1\dots 4})P(X_4|X_{1\dots 3})P(X_3|X_{1\dots 2})P(X_2|X_1)P(X_1) \\ &= P(X_5|X_2, X_4)P(X_4|X_3)P(X_3|X_2)P(X_2|X_1)P(X_1)\end{aligned}$$
- ▶ The comprehensive criterion to evaluate conditional independencies among node sets is given by **d-separation**.

Interventions



- ▶ Suppose we have a collection of random variables V that follow some joint probability distribution. We define an “intervention” operator that can be conditioned on in probabilistic queries (Pearl, 2009):

$$\text{Do}(\cdot)$$



- ▶ Intuitively, conditioning on $\text{Do}(X = x)$, where $X \subseteq V$ and x are values for X , means **“intervening” exogeneously to the “system” constituted by V , to “set” the value(s) of X to x .**
- ▶ In general, $P(V|X)$ and $P(V|\text{Do}(X = x))$ will **NOT** be the same distribution. $P(V|\text{Do}(X = x))$, also notated as $P_x(V)$, is sometimes called an interventional distribution.

Causal Bayes Nets and interventions as “graph surgery”


- ▶ If V can be organized into a causal Bayes Net G , then the relationship between the base joint distribution (no interventions) and the set of interventional distributions can be characterized succinctly.
- ▶ To find $P(V|\text{Do}(X = x))$, simply “cut” all the links in G between each variable in X and its parents to create a new graph G' , and then do ordinary probabilistic conditioning $P(V|X = x)$ within G' .
- ▶ This is sometimes called “graph surgery” (Spirtes et al., 1993)



Association versus causation



- ▶ These two Bayes Nets encode identical constraints on the joint distribution $P(X, Y)$ (**review: what constraints are these?**)
- ▶ (Answer: no constraints; any joint distribution is allowed!)
- ▶ However, if they are **causal** Bayes Nets, they are substantively different
- ▶ Intervening to set X to some value x has different consequences in the two causal Bayes Nets:





X = smoking
 Y = lung cancer



X = thermometer reading
 Y = ambient temperature

- ▶ This is a simple instance of distinguishing **association** from **causation**

Back to our previous example, a bit modified






- ▶ Imagine a factory that produces three types of coins in equal volumes:
 - ▶ Fair coins;
 - ▶ A slightly **bent** coin that lands heads with $\frac{3}{5}$ probability;
 - ▶ A slightly bent coin that lands tails with $\frac{3}{5}$ probability.
- ▶ Generative process:
 - ▶ The factory produces a coin of type X and sends it to you;
 - ▶ You receive the coin and flip it twice, with H(eads)/T(ails) outcomes Y_1 and Y_2

Predictive value \neq influence through intervention

Three types of coins in equal volumes:

- ▶ Fair coins;
- ▶ A slightly **bent** coin that lands heads with $3/5$ probability;
- ▶ A slightly bent coin that lands tails with $3/5$ probability.



- ▶ The outcome of the first coin flip Y_1 has **predictive value** for the outcome of the second coin flip Y_2 , and vice versa
- ▶ I could learn this **association** from observing pairs of flips of coins from the coin factory
- ▶ But I cannot intervene on either variable to influence the other, because neither is causally upstream of the other!

Implications

- ▶ Throughout this class, we will endeavor to organize our information as much as possible into models that represent plausible causal chains of influence
- ▶ Typically, organizing information this way will help ensure that our statistical inferences actually answer our scientific questions of interest
- ▶ Traditional statistical tools are *associational*, so we need this top-down machinery (here, the mind of the scientist!) to ensure that they're being deployed appropriately
- ▶ We must also stay cognizant of possible “unseen” latent causes, and that we may be uncertain about the true causal relationship among our observable variables

References I

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