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A. ARISTOTLE.
THE METAPHYSICS

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ARISTOTLE

THE METAPHYSICS

BOOKS I-IX

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
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OF LONDON

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
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
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ed., Berlin 1918; H. J. Rose and L. Preller, *História Philosophiae Graecae*, 8th ed. (by Weismann), Gotha 1898; J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato*, London 1914; and *Early Greek Philosophy*, 2nd ed., London 1930; F. M. Cornford, "Mysticism and Science in the Pythagorean Tradition," *Classical Quarterly*, xvi, xvii, G. Miliants, *Les Philosophes*

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ Α

980 a 22 I. Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὄρέγονται φύσει.
σημεῖον δ' ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀγάπησις· καὶ γὰρ
χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται δι' αὐτάς, καὶ μάλιστα
τῶν ἄλλων ἡ διὰ τῶν ὅμιλάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἴνα
25 πράττωμεν ἄλλα καὶ μηθὲν μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ
ὅραν αἴρουμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων.
αἴτιον δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν τι ήμας αὐτῇ
τῶν αἰσθήσεων, καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῦ διαφοράς. Φύσει
μὲν οὖν αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα γέγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ
δὲ ταύτης¹ τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη
980 b 22 τοῖς δ' ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονι-
μώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων
μνημονεύειν ἔστι, φρόνιμα μὲν ἀνευ τοῦ μανθάνειν
ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν φόφων ἀκούειν, οἷον μέλιττα,
καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζῷων ἔστι· μανθάνει
25 δ' ὅσα πρὸς τὴν μνήμην καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν αἰσθη-
σιν. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῦς φαντασίαις ζῆι καὶ
ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ
τῶν ἄνθρωπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμοῖς. γί-

¹ ταύτης : τῆς αἰσθήσεως ΕΓ Asclepius.

τέλος οὐκ εἴ τις εἰπεῖν ταῦτα προσέβαλλεν
τοῦτο οὐδεὶς νοεῖ τοῦτο ποτέ εἰπεν πεπονθεῖσθαι
εἰπεῖσθαι σύντομον εἶπεν οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖσθαι
εἰπεῖσθαι ποτὲ εἴπεν ποτέ οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖσθαι

ARISTOTLE THE METAPHYSICS

BOOK I

I. All men naturally desire knowledge. An indica- **Book I**
tion of this is our esteem for the senses ; for apart **WHAT IS**
from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and **META-
PHYSICS?**
most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view **Universal**
to action, but even when no action is contemplated, **desire for**
we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other **knowledge.**
senses. The reason of this is that of all the senses 2
sight best helps us to know things, and reveals
many distinctions.

Now animals are by nature born with the power of **Degrees of**
sensation, and from this some acquire the faculty of **(a) intelligence:**
memory, whereas others do not. Accordingly the perception,
former are more intelligent and capable of learning
than those which cannot remember. Such as cannot 3
hear sounds (as the bee, and any other similar type **(b) memory,**
of creature) are intelligent, but cannot learn ; those
only are capable of learning which possess this sense
in addition to the faculty of memory.

Thus the other animals live by impressions and **(c) experi-**
memories, and have but a small share of experience ;
but the human race lives also by art and reasoning.

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γνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
 αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς
 ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη ὅμοιον εἶναι ἡ ἐμπειρία,
 ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποί-
 ησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ὁρθῶς λέγων, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία
 τύχην. γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς
 ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ
 τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν
 ὅτι Καλλία κάμνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε
 καὶ Σωκράτει καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω πολλοῖς,
 10 ἐμπειρίας ἔστιν· τὸ δ' ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦσδε κατ'
 εἶδος ἐν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον,
 συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἡ χολώδεσι
 [ἢ]¹ πυρέττουσι καύσω, τέχνης. Πρὸς μὲν οὖν
 τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέ-
 ρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὄρῳμεν τοὺς
 15 ἐμπέρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἔχόντων.
 αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἔστι
 γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ
 αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσιν· οὐ
 γὰρ ἀνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἡ
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἡ Σωκράτην ἡ τῶν
 20 ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων φ συμβέβηκε καὶ
 ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ
 τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου μὲν γνωρίζῃ τὸ
 δ' ἐν τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις δια-
 μαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ'
 25 ἕκαστον μᾶλλον. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ
 ἐπαίτειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα

¹ secl. Jackson.

It is from memory that men acquire experience,⁴ because the numerous memories of the same thing eventually produce the effect of a single experience. Experience seems very similar to science and art, but actually it is through experience that men ⁵ acquire science and art; for as Polus rightly says, (^d) art and "experience produces art, but inexperience chance." ^a science. Art is produced when from many notions of experience a single universal judgement is formed with ^{Art the result of experience} regard to like objects. To have a judgement that ⁶ when Callias was suffering from this or that disease this or that benefited him, and similarly with Socrates and various other individuals, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who suffer from this or that disease (e.g. the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering from burning fever) is a matter of art.

It would seem that for practical purposes experience is in no way inferior to art; indeed we see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without experience. The reason of this is ⁷ that experience is knowledge of particulars, but art of universals; and actions and the effects produced are all concerned with the particular. For it is not man that the physician cures, except incidentally, but Callias or Socrates or some other person similarly named, who is incidentally a man as well. So if a ⁸ man has theory without experience, and knows the universal, but does not know the particular contained in it, he will often fail in his treatment; for it is the particular that must be treated. Nevertheless we ⁹ consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to

^b Plato, *Gorgias* 448 c, 462 a-c.

981 a

μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τέχνιτας τῶν ἐμπειρῶν ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι. τοῦτο δ', ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἴτιαν ἴσασιν, οἱ δ' οὐ. οἱ μὲν γάρ ἐμπειροὶ τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἴτιαν γνωρίζουσιν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἔκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον

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εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἴτιας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν (τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀφύχων ἔνια, ποιεῖν μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖν ἀποιεῖν, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ· τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀφύχα φύσει τινὶ ποιεῖν τούτων ἔκαστον, τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι' ἔθος). ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρακτικοὺς ἐναι σοφωτέρους δύντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἴτιας γνωρίζειν.

"Ολας τέ σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος καὶ μὴ εἰδότος¹ τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἔστιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα² μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην ἐναι. 10 δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δὲ οὐ δύνανται διδάσκειν. ἔτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμίαν ἡγούμεθα ἐναι σοφίαν· καίτοι κυριώταταί γ' εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα γνώσεις· ἀλλ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός, οἷον διὰ τί θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι θερμόν.

Τὸ³ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν ὄποιανοῦν εὐρόντα 15 τέχνην παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εναι τι τῶν εὑρεθέντων, ἀλλ' ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἀλλων πλειόνων δ' εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τάναγκαῖα, τῶν δὲ πρὸς

¹ καὶ μὴ εἰδότος ομ. ΑὐΓ.
² οἰόμεθα τέσσα.
³ τὸν τέσσα.

Art is superior to experience,

because the artist knows the cause of things.

art rather than to experience, and we assume that artists are wiser than men of mere experience (which implies that in all cases wisdom depends rather upon knowledge); and this is because the former know the cause, whereas the latter do not. For the experienced know the fact, but not the wherefore; but the artists know the wherefore and the cause. For the same reason we consider that the master craftsmen in every profession are more estimable and know more and are wiser than the artisans, because they know the reasons of the things which are done; but we think that the artisans, like certain inanimate objects, do things, but without knowing what they are doing (as, for instance, fire burns); only whereas inanimate objects perform all their actions in virtue of a certain natural quality, artisans perform theirs through habit. Thus the master craftsmen are superior in wisdom, not because they can do things, but because they possess a theory and know the causes.

In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach, and for this reason we hold that art rather than experience is scientific knowledge; for the artists can teach, but the others cannot. Further, we do not consider any of the senses to be 13 Wisdom. They are indeed our chief sources of knowledge about particulars, but they do not tell us the reason for anything, as for example why fire is hot, but only that it *is* hot.

It is therefore probable that at first the inventor 14 of any art which went further than the ordinary sensations was admired by his fellow-men, not merely because some of his inventions were useful, but as being a wise and superior person. And as more and 15 more arts were discovered, some relating to the

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διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους
 20 ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι,¹ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν
 εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. ὅθεν ἡδη πάντων τῶν
 τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἥδονὴν
 μηδὲ πρὸς τάναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὑρέθησαν,
 καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὐπερ ἐσχόλασαν.
 διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι
 25 συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν
 ἱερέων ἔθνος. Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς
 τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὐδ' ἔνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον
 τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅτι τὴν ὄνομαζομένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ
 30 πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες.
 ὥστε καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὃ μὲν ἔμπειρος
 τῶν ὅποιανοῦν ἔχοντων αἰσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοφώ-
 τερος, ὃ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἔμπειρων, χειροτέχνου δὲ
 35 ἀρχιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν
 μᾶλλον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ σοφία περὶ τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ
 αἴτιας² ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον.

II. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, τοῦτ'
 5 ἀν εἴη σκεπτέον, ἡ περὶ πολὰς αἴτιας καὶ περὶ πολὰς
 ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι τις τὰς
 ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, τάχ' ἀν ἐκ
 τούτου φανερὸν γένοιτο μᾶλλον. ὑπολαμβάνομεν
 δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς
 ἐνδέχεται, μὴ καθ' ἔκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην
 10 αὐτῶν· εἴτα τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γνῶναι δυνάμενον καὶ
 μὴ ράδια ἀνθρώπῳ γιγνώσκειν, τοῦτον σοφόν (τὸ
 15 οὐτολαμβάνομεν Α^b.)

¹ ὑπολαμβάνομεν Α^b.

^a Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 274 c, Herodotus ii. 109.

^b Eth. Nic. vi. 1139 b 14-1141 b 8. ^c i.e. Metaphysics.

necessities and some to the pastimes of life, the inventors of the latter were always considered wiser than those of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence when all 16 the discoveries of this kind were fully developed, the sciences which relate neither to pleasure nor yet to the necessities of life were invented, and first in those places where men had leisure. Thus the mathematical sciences originated in the neighbourhood of Egypt, because there the priestly class was allowed leisure.^a

The difference between art and science and the other kindred mental activities has been stated in the *Ethics*^b; the reason for our present discussion is that it is generally assumed that what is called Wisdom^c is concerned with the primary causes and principles, so that, as has been already stated, the man of experience is held to be wiser than the mere possessors of any power of sensation, the artist than the man of experience, the master craftsman than the artisan; and the speculative sciences to be more learned than the productive. Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.

II. Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom. Perhaps it will be clearer if we take the opinions which we hold about the wise man. We consider first, then, that 2 the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually; next, that the wise man is he who can comprehend difficult things, such as are not easy for human comprehension (for sense-perception, being

Wisdom is
the know-
ledge of
certain
causes and
principles.

What are
these
causes?

The wise
man must
have (a)
universal
knowledge
(b) know-
ledge of
difficult
subjects.

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γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάντων κοινόν, διὸ ῥάδιον καὶ
οὐδὲν σοφόν). ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τὸν διδα-
σκαλικώτερον τῶν αἰτίων σοφώτερον εἶναι περὶ¹
πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν
15 αὐτῆς ἔνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἴρετὴν οὖσαν
μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν ἡ τὴν τῶν ἀποβανόντων
ἔνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τῆς ὑπηρετούσης
μᾶλλον¹ σοφίαν· οὐ γὰρ δὲν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν
ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἔτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
20 τούτῳ τὸν ἥπτον σοφόν. Τὰς μὲν οὖν ὑπολή-
ψεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας
καὶ τῶν σοφῶν· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστα-
σθαι τῷ μάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν· οὗτος γὰρ οὐδέ πως πάντα τὰ
ὑποκείμενα. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα
25 γνωρίζειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου·
πορρωτάτῳ γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν. ἀκριβέ-
σταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων
εἰσίν· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ
προσθέσεως λεγομένων,² οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμε-
τρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδασκαλική γε ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν
θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον· οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν οἱ τὰς
30 αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἔκαστου.³ τὸ δὲ εἰδέναι καὶ
τὸ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῶν ἔνεκα μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει τῇ
τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ. ὁ γὰρ τὸ
ἐπίστασθαι δι' αὐτὸν αἴρομένενος τὴν μάλιστα

¹ μᾶλλον εἶναι ΕΓ.² λεγομένων: λαμβανομένων Α^b.
³ ἔκαστον Α^b.

common to all, is easy, and has nothing to do with Wisdom); and further that in every branch of knowledge a man is wiser in proportion as he is more accurately informed and better able to expound the causes. Again among the sciences we consider that

He must be
(c) more
exact, (d)
better able
to explain

that science which is desirable in itself and for the sake of knowledge is more nearly Wisdom than that which is desirable for its results, and that the superior is more nearly Wisdom than the subsidiary; for the wise man should give orders, not receive them; nor should he obey others, but the less wise should obey him.

causes than
other men.
Knowledge
is more
nearly
Wisdom in
proportion
as it is (e)
more desire-
able in

Such in kind and in number are the opinions which we hold with regard to Wisdom and the wise. Of the qualities there described the knowledge of everything must necessarily belong to him who in the highest degree possesses knowledge of the universal, because he knows in a sense all the particulars which it comprises. These things, viz. the most universal, are perhaps the hardest for man to grasp, because they are furthest removed from the senses. Again, the most exact of the sciences are those which are most concerned with the first principles; for those which are based on fewer principles are more exact than those which include additional principles; e.g., arithmetic is more exact than geometry. Moreover, the science which investigates causes is more instructive than one which does not, for it is those who tell us the causes of any particular thing who instruct us. Moreover, knowledge and understanding which are desirable for their own sake are most attainable in the knowledge of that which is most knowable. For the man who desires knowledge for its own sake will most desire the most perfect knowledge,

itself, (f)
superior to
other forms
of know-
ledge.

882 ἡ ἐπιστήμη μάλιστα αἰρήσεται, τοιαύτη δ' ἔστιν ἡ
τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ, μάλιστα δὲ ἐπιστητὰ τὰ
πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκ τούτων
τὰλλα γνωρίζεται, ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων.
ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον
ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἔνεκεν
ἔστι πρακτέον ἔκαστον· τούτο δ' ἔστι τάγαθὸν
ἔκαστου, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πασῃ.
Ἐξ ἀπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν
ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ
ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἴτιων εἶναι θεωρη-
τικήν· καὶ γὰρ τάγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τῶν
αἴτιων ἔστιν. "Οτι δ' οὐ ποιητική, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ
τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων. διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμά-
ζειν οἱ ἀνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἥρξαντο
φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων
θαυμάσαντες, εἴτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες,
καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περὶ τε
τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν
ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα, καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως.
οὐδὲ ἀπόρων καὶ θαυμάζων οἰεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ
οὐ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος² πώς ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ μῆθος
σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων). ὥστ' εἰπερ διὰ τὸ φεύ-
γειν τὴν ἀγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ
τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίκων, καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς
τινος ἔνεκεν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸς τὸ συμβεβηκός·
σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων
καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἡ τοιαύτη
φρόνησις ἥρξατο ζητεῖσθαι. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι-

¹ ἀπόρων: ἀπότων Α^b.
² οὐ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος Α^b Alexander: φιλόμυθος οὐ φιλό-
σοφος Ε Asclepius.

and this is the knowledge of the most knowable, and the things which are most knowable are first principles and causes; for it is through these and from these that other things come to be known, and not these through the particulars which fall under them. And that science is supreme, and superior to the subsidiary, which knows for what end each action is to be done; i.e. the Good in each particular case, and in general the highest Good in the whole of nature.

Thus as a result of all the above considerations the term which we are investigating falls under the same science, which must speculate about first principles and causes; for the Good, i.e. the *end*, is one of the causes.

That it is not a productive science is clear from a consideration of the first philosophers. It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression raising questions about the greater matters too, e.g. about the changes of the moon and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe. Now he who wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant (thus the myth-lover is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders); therefore if it was to escape ignorance that men studied philosophy, it is obvious that they pursued science for the sake of knowledge, and not for any practical utility. The actual course of events bears witness to this; for speculation of this kind began with a view to recreation and pastime, at a time when practically all the necessities of life were already supplied. Clearly then it is for no extrinsic advantage

This evidence indicates that Wisdom is knowledge of first principles and causes.
It is not a productive but a speculative science.

982 D
 25 οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἔτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
 ἀνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ
 ἄλλου ὅν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ως μόνην ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν¹
 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη² αὐτῆς ἔνεκέν ἐστιν.
 Διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς
 30 ή κτῆσις· πολλαχῇ γὰρ ή φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρω-
 πῶν ἐστίν, ὡστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην θεὸς ἂν μόνος
 τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας, ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζητεῖν
 τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστήμην. εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ
 383 A ποιηταὶ καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτου
 συμβῆναι³ μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι πάντας
 τοὺς περιπτούς. ἀλλ' οὕτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν
 ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ⁴ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ
 φεύδονται ἀοιδοί, οὕτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρή-
 5 θ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν· ή γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιω-
 τάτη τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνον· ην τε γὰρ
 μάλιστ⁵ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί,
 καν εἰ τις τῶν θείων εἴη. μόνη δ' αὕτη τούτων
 ἀμφοτέρων τετύχηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν
 αἰτίων πάσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην
 10 ή μόνος η μάλιστ⁶ ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός. ἀναγκαιότεραι
 μὲν οὖν πάσαι ταύτης, ἀμείνων δ' οὐδεμία. Δεῖ
 μέντοι πως καταστῆναι τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς εἰς τού-
 ναντίον ἡμῶν τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζητήσεων. ἄρχονται μὲν
 γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες εἰ-
 οῦτας ἔχει, καθάπερ <περὶ⁷> τῶν θαυμάτων ταύ-
 15 τόματα η περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς η τὴν τῆς

¹ αὐτὴν ως μόνην ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν: αὕτη μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα E.
² αὕτη: αὐτὴ Α^b.
³ συμβαίνειν Α^b.
⁴ ἄλλα καὶ Α^b.
⁵ Jaeger.

^a Fragment 3 (Hiller).^b Cf. Solon, fragment 26 (Hiller); Leutsch and Schneide-win, *Paroemiographi*, I. 371.

that we seek this knowledge: for just as we call a man independent who exists for himself and not for another, so we call this the only independent science, It is independent of the other since it alone exists for itself.

For this reason its acquisition might justly be supposed to be beyond human power, since in many respects human nature is servile; in which case, as Simonides^a says, "God alone can have this privilege," and man should only seek the knowledge which is within his reach. Indeed if the poets are right and the Deity is by nature jealous, it is probable that in this case He would be particularly jealous, and all those who excel in knowledge unfortunate. But it is impossible for the Deity to be jealous (indeed, as the proverb^b says, "poets tell many a lie"), nor must we suppose that any other form of knowledge is more precious than this; for what is most divine is most precious. Now there are two ways only in which it can be divine. A science is divine if it is peculiarly the possession of God, or if it is concerned with divine matters. And this science alone fulfils both these conditions; for (a) all believe that God is one of the causes and a kind of principle, and (b) God is the sole or chief possessor of this sort of knowledge. Accordingly, although all other sciences are more necessary than this, none is more excellent.

The acquisition of this knowledge, however, must in a sense result in something which is the reverse of the outlook with which we first approached the inquiry. All begin, as we have said, by wondering that things should be as they are, e.g. with regard to marionettes, or the solstices, or the incommensur-

It is the
most divine
science,
and,
although
the least
necessary,
the most
excellent.

It changes
our whole
outlook.

983 a

διαμέτρου ἀσυμμετρίαν· θαυμαστὸν γάρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν,¹ εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται. δεῖ δὲ εἰς τούναντίον, καὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, ἀποτελευτῆσαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅταν μάθωσιν οὐθὲν γάρ 20 ἄν οὕτως θαυμάσειεν ἀνήρ γεωμετρικός ὡς εἰ γένοιτο ἡ διάμετρος μετρητή. Τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης εἴρηται, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς οὐδεὶς τούτων τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον.

III. Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν ἔξι ἀρχῆς αἰτίων δεῖ 25 λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην (τότε γάρ εἰδέναι φαμὲν ἔκαστον, ὅταν τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γνωρίζειν), τὰ δὲ αἰτία λέγεται τετραχῶς, ὃν μίαν μὲν αἰτίαν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (ἀνάγεται γάρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ἔσχατον, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ 30 τὸ διὰ τί πρῶτον), ἔτεραν δὲ τὴν ὑλην καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τρίτην δὲ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, τετάρτην δὲ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν ταύτη, τὸ οὖν ἔνεκα καὶ τάγαθόν (τέλος γάρ γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάσης τοῦτον ἔστιν), τεθεώρηται μὲν οὖν

983 b ἴκανῶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, ὅμως δὲ παραλάβωμεν καὶ τοὺς πρότερον ἡμῶν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν ὄντων ἐλθόντας καὶ φιλοσοφήσαντας περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. δῆλον γάρ ὅτι κάκεῖνοι λέγοντιν ἀρχάς τινας καὶ αἰτίας ἐπελθοῦσιν οὖν

¹ τοῖς . . . αἰτίαν *huc transp.* Jaeger, ita c. Bonitz: habent codd. post ταῦτα l. 15.

^a i.e. the fact that the diagonal of a square cannot be rationally expressed in terms of the side.

^b i.e. δευτέρων ἀμεινόνων ("second thoughts are better"). Leutsch and Schneidewin l. 62.

ability^a of the diagonal of a square; because it seems wonderful to everyone who has not yet perceived the cause that a thing should not be measurable by the smallest unit. But we must end with 16 the contrary and (according to the proverb)^b the better view, as men do even in these cases when they understand them; for a geometer would wonder at nothing so much as if the diagonal were to become measurable.

Thus we have stated what is the nature of the science which we are seeking, and what is the object which our search and our whole investigation must attain.

III. It is clear that we must obtain knowledge of the primary causes, because it is when we think that we understand its primary cause that we claim to know each particular thing. Now there are four recognized kinds of cause. Of these we hold that one is the essence or essential nature of the thing (since the "reason why" of a thing is ultimately reducible to its formula, and the ultimate "reason why" is a cause and principle); another is the matter or substrate; the third is the source of motion; and the fourth is the cause which is opposite to this, namely the purpose or "good"; for this is the end of every 2 generative or motive process. We have investigated these sufficiently in the *Physics*^c; however, let us avail ourselves of the evidence of those who have before us approached the investigation of reality and philosophized about Truth. For clearly they too recognize certain principles and causes, and so it will be of some assistance to our present inquiry if

There are
four kinds
of cause:
(1) Formal,
(2) Material,
(3) Efficient,
(4) Final.

^c Physics II. iii., vii.

Γ

1003 a

I. "Εστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν ^ἡ ὅν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν οὐδεμίᾳ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή· οὐδεμίᾳ γάρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ^{ὡς} ὅν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ' αὐτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦντες ταύτας ^{εἰς} τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔζητον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' ἡ ὅν· διὸ καὶ ήμῦν τοῦ ὄντος ἡ ὅν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ληπτέον.

II. Τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὅμωνύμως ἀλλ' ⁸⁵ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἄπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας, τὸ δ' ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς· καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν (τὸ μὲν γάρ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφυές εἶναι πρὸς αὐτήν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς), ὅμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόμενα λεγόμενα ^{1003 b} τούτοις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς

* δυ: δυτα Ε. J.

οὐδὲν τούτον τὸν τρόπον λέγεται. Μήτι τότε τὸ τούτον τὸν τρόπον λέγεται τὸ ὄν, μητέ τέ τον τούτον τὸν τρόπον λέγεται τὸ ὄν; Οὐδέ τοι τούτον τὸν τρόπον λέγεται τὸ ὄν;

BOOK IV

I. There is a science which studies Being *qua* Book IV. THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSICS. Being, and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature. This science is not the same as any of the so-called particular sciences, for none of the others contemplates Being generally *qua* Being; they divide off some portion of it and study the attribute of this portion, as do for example the mathematical sciences. But since it is for the first principles and the most ultimate causes that we are searching, clearly they must belong to something in virtue of its own nature. Hence if these principles were investigated by those also who investigated the elements of existing things, the elements must be elements of Being not incidentally, but *qua* Being. Therefore it is of Being *qua* Being that we too must grasp the first causes.

II. The term "being" is used in various senses, All the senses of the term "being" refer to characteristic, and not as merely a common epithet. Thus as the term "healthy" always relates to health substance; (either as preserving it or as producing it or as indicating it or as receptive of it), and as "medical" relates to the art of medicine (either as possessing it must study or as naturally adapted for it or as being a function of the principles of medicine)—and we shall find other terms used similarly to these—so "being" is used in various senses, 3

μέν, ἀλλ' ἄπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ
ὅτι οὐσίαι ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ' ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ
δ' ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν, ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ
ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γενητικὰ οὐσίας, ἢ τῶν
πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τιὸς
10 ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι μὴ
ὄν φαμέν. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἀπάν-
των μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ὁμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ¹
τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθ' ἓν λεγομένων
ἐπιστήμης ἔστι θεωρῆσαι μᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον
15 τινὰ λέγονται² καθ' ἓν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ
ὄντα μᾶς θεωρῆσαι ἢ ὄντα. πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως
τοῦ πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὐ τὰ ἄλλα
ἡρτηται, καὶ δι' ὃ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ
οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς
αἴτιας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον. "Απαντος δὲ γένους
20 καὶ αἰσθησις μία ἐνὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οἷον³ γραμ-
ματικὴ μία οὖσα πάσας θεωρεῖ τὰς φωνάς. διὸ
καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἡ ὃν⁴ ὅσα εἰδῆ θεωρῆσαι μᾶς ἔστιν
ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει, τά τε εἰδῆ τῶν εἰδῶν.

Εἰ δὴ τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐν⁵ ταῦτὸν καὶ μία φύσις, τῷ
ἀκολουθεῖν ἄλλήλοις ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον, ἀλλ'
25 οὐχ ὡς ἐνὶ λόγῳ δηλούμενα (διαφέρει δὲ οὐθὲν

¹ λέγεται E.J.

² οἷον: οἷον ἢ A^b.

³ ὃ δη A^b J^a: om. E.J.^b.

⁴ τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐν: τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ δη A^b.

⁵ τὸ δη A^b

but always with reference to one principle. For some things are said to "be" because they are substances; others because they are modifications of substance; others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance or of terms relating to substance, or negations of certain of these terms or of substance. (Hence we even say that not-being *is* not-being.) And so, just as there is one science of all healthy things, so it is true of everything else. For it is not only in the case of terms which express one common notion that the investigation belongs to one science, but also in the case of terms which relate to one particular characteristic; for the latter too, in a sense, express one common notion. Clearly then the study of things which *are, qua* being, also belongs to one science. Now in every case knowledge is principally concerned with that which is primary, *i.e.* that upon which all other things depend, and from which they get their names. If, then, substance is this primary thing, it is of substances that the philosopher must grasp the first principles and causes.

Now of every single class of things, as there is one perception, so there is one science: *e.g.*, grammar, studies all the species of Being. Hence the study of all the species of Being *qua* Being belongs to a science which is generically one, and the study of the several species of Being belongs to the specific parts of that science.

Since Being and Unity, as predicates, are always associated, Metaphysics

1004 a Φανερὸν οὖν [ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις ἐλέχθη]¹ ὅτι μᾶς περὶ τούτων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ λόγου ἔχειν (τοῦτο δὲ ἡνὶ ἐν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπορήμασιν), καὶ 1004 b ἐστὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου περὶ πάντων δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τίς ἐσται ὁ ἐπισκεψόμενος εἰ ταῦτα Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης καθήμενος, ἢ εἰ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐναντίον, ἢ τί ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον, ἢ ποσαχῶς λέγεται; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ ἐν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὃν ταῦτα καθ' αὐτά ἐστι πάθη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἀριθμοὶ ἢ γραμμαὶ ἢ πῦρ, δῆλον ὡς ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τί ἐστι γνωρίσαι καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότ' αὐτοῖς. καὶ οὐ ταύτη ἀμαρτάνουσιν οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν σκοπούμενοι ὡς οὐ φιλοσοφοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἡ οὐσία, περὶ τῆς οὐθὲν ἐπιτίουσιν, ἐπεὶ ὥσπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀριθμοῦ ἢ ἀριθμὸς ἴδια πάθη, οἷον περιττότης ἀρτιότης, συμμετρία ἵστρης, ὑπεροχὴ ἔλλεψις, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ καθ' αὐτὸὺς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλους ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερεῶ καὶ ἀκυήτῳ καὶ κινούμενῷ ἀβαρεῖ τε 15 καὶ βάρος ἔχοντι ἐστιν ἔτερα ἴδια: οὗτα καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἢ ὃν ἐστι τινὰ ἴδια, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπισκέψασθαι τὸ ἀληθές. σημεῖον δέ οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. ἢ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστί, καὶ οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ 20 διαλέγονται περὶ ἀπάντων, κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τῷ ὃν ἐστι: διαλέγονται δὲ περὶ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι διὰ

¹ διπερ . . . ἐλέχθη Ε¹Ι: ομ. Ε²Α⁶.

Thus clearly it pertains to one science to give an account both of these concepts and of substance (this was one of the questions raised in the "Difficulties"^a), and it is the function of the philosopher to be able to study all subjects. If this is not so, who is it who will investigate whether "Socrates" and "Socrates seated" are the same thing; or whether one thing has one contrary, or what the contrary is, or how many meanings it has?^b and similarly with all other such questions. Thus since these are the essential modifications of Unity *qua* Unity and of Being *qua* Being, and not *qua* numbers or lines or fire, clearly it pertains to that science^c to discover both the essence and the attributes of these concepts. And those who investigate them err, not in being unphilosophical, but because the substance, of which they have no real knowledge, is prior. For just as number *qua* number has its peculiar modifications, e.g. oddness and evenness, commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and these things are inherent in numbers both considered independently and in relation to other numbers; and as similarly other peculiar modifications are inherent in the solid and the immovable and the moving and the weightless and that which has weight; so Being *qua* Being has certain peculiar modifications, and it is about these that it is the philosopher's function to discover the truth. And here is evidence of this fact. Dialecticians and sophists wear the same appearance as the philosopher, for sophistry is Wisdom in appearance only, and dialecticians discuss all subjects, and Being is a subject common to them all; but clearly they discuss Sophistry.

^a See III. i. 8-10, ii. 18, 19.

^b Cf. X. iv.
^c i.e., Philosophy or Metaphysics.

1004 b τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ταῦτα εἶναι¹ οἰκεῖα. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν 25 τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει. ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὥν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὐσα δ' οὕ. Ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἔτερα συστοιχία στέρησις, καὶ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, καὶ εἰς² ἐν καὶ πλήθος, οἷον στάσις τοῦ ἐνός, κύησις δὲ τοῦ πλήθους. τὰ 30 δὲ ὄντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδόν ἀπαντες συγκεῖνθαι· πάντες γοῦν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας λέγουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, οἱ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἱ δὲ πέρας καὶ ἅπειρον, οἱ δὲ φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος. πάντα δὲ καὶ τὰλλα ἀναγόμενα φαίνεται εἰς τὸ ἐν καὶ πλήθος 1005 a (εἰλήφθω γὰρ ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἡμῖν), αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ καὶ παντελῶς αἱ παρὰ τῶν ἀλλων ὡς εἰς γένη ταῦτα πίπτουσσιν. φανερὸν οὖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι μᾶς ἐπιστήμης τὸ δὲ ἦ δὲ δὲ θεωρῆσαι. πάντα γὰρ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίων, ἀρχαὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ 5 ἐν καὶ πλήθος. ταῦτα δὲ μᾶς ἐπιστήμης, εἴτε καθ' ἐν λέγεται εἴτε μή, ὥσπερ ἵσως ἔχει καὶ τάληθές· ἀλλ' ὅμως εἰ καὶ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐν, πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον τὰλλα λεχθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ὄμοιώς, [καὶ διὰ τοῦτο]³ καὶ εἰ μή ἔστι τὸ δὲ τῇ 10 τὸ ἐν καθόλου καὶ ταῦτὸ ἐπὶ πάντων ἡ χωριστόν, ὥσπερ ἵσως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἐν τὰ

¹ ταῦτα εἶναι: εἶναι αὗτα E.J.² εἰς E.J.: om. A^b.³ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο om. A^b.^a The Pythagoreans.
^c The Platonists.^b Perhaps Parmenides.
^d Empedocles.

these concepts because they appertain to philosophy.

For sophistry and dialectic are concerned with the

same class of subjects as philosophy, but philosophy
differs from the former in the nature of its capability
and from the latter in its outlook on life. Dialectic
treats as an exercise what philosophy tries to understand,
and sophistry seems to be philosophy, but is not.

<sup>which treat
of the same
subjects as
Philosophy,
although in
a different
way, are
concerned
with the</sup>

21 attributes of Being. Since all things are contraries or composed of contraries,

22 and all contraries can be referred to Unity or Being and its priva-

23 tion, this also shows that Being qua Being is the subject of one science.