

# How to (not) Store Your Password

`https://github.com/rlindsgaard/presentations/  
2016-09-01-how-to-not-store-your-password/  
2016-09-01-how-to-not-store-your-password.pdf`

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# Analysis

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# Online password managers

## Benefits:

- Portable
- Organisational sharing
- Not on your machine
- Strong passwords

## Problems:

- Not on your machine <sup>1</sup>

## Attack vectors:

- Keylogging
- Phishing
- Database compromise

<sup>1</sup><http://www.martinvigo.com/even-the-lastpass-will-be-stolen-deal-with-it/>

# Offline password managers

## Benefits:

- Stored on your machine
- Encrypted password storage
- Strong passwords

## Problems:

- One key to the kingdom
- Not portable
- It's still stored (CVE-2015-8378)

## Attack vectors:

- Keylogging attacks
- Computer/storage compromise

# Let's make things better

- Secure passwords.
- Domain specific passwords.
- Configurable.
- Easy to use and remember.
- No password storage!

# Methodology

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# Secure passwords

- High entropy (e.g. NIST<sup>2</sup>)
- Passphrases: a sentence that is not too long to remember
- Schneier: ASSt's!2\_2r <sup>3</sup>
- Troy Hunt: Should be too complex to remember! <sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>[http://wayback.archive.org/web/20040712152833/http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63v6\\_3\\_3.pdf](http://wayback.archive.org/web/20040712152833/http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63v6_3_3.pdf)

<sup>3</sup>[https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/03/choosing\\_secure\\_1.html](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/03/choosing_secure_1.html),  
<http://robinmessage.com/2014/03/why-bruce-schneier-is-wrong-about-passwords/>

<sup>4</sup><https://www.troyhunt.com/only-secure-password-is-one-you-cant/>



# Deterministic Pseudo Random Number

## Example

```
% echo "naturalbornhacker" | md5sum -  
04d1530d764932ccbff01c185a283c8e  -
```

## Generating the password

```
hash = 04d1530d764932ccbff  
alphabet = abcdABCD1234!"#_  
  
password = aA"bBda"DCA2dc!!__
```

## Domain specific passwords

```
function g(str password, str context) {  
    echo hash(password + context)  
}  
g(naturalbornhacker, bornhack.dk)  
// 1Fvcck'XE%j_cD%7oHV'A0_C0r1"fK}}S,:'  
g(naturalbornhacker, github.com)  
// ;YR|_>(sJXgQK2S%KvSS"zH_43b6z_yN
```

- Hash function seed
- Synchronously encrypt configuration
- Mitigate shoulder surfing

# Implementations

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- <https://pwdhash.com/>
- Stanford Paper 2004 <sup>5</sup>
- Browser plugin
- Outdated security (DOM)
- No special characters

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<sup>5</sup><https://crypto.stanford.edu/PwdHash/>

- <https://rndphrase.appspot.com/>
- <http://brinchj.blogspot.dk/2010/02/rndphrase.html>
- Johan Brinch 2009
- Small letters and numbers only
- Cubehash
- Browser plugin

- <https://oneshallpass.com/>
- Up to date
- Various differences
- PBKDF2



# Introducing RndPhrase Improved

- 1.0.0a1
- PBKDF2 for hashing (WebCrypto)
- Configurable alphabet
- Character occurrence constraints
- Configurable size
- Re-use credentials (versions)

# User interface example

## RndPhrase Improved v1.0.0-alpha

### RndPhrase

Seed:

correct horse battery staple

Password:

1234

Uri:

rndphra.se

Hash

General configuration ☐ Use Legacy mode

Version

1

Minimal  
size

32

Numeric character configuration ☐ Use defaults

Min

1

Max

0

Alphabet

0123456789

Capital character configuration ☒ Use defaults

- Keylogging and other active attacks still a problem
- No necessary storage though

- <https://rndphra.se>
- <https://github.com/RndPhrase>
- <http://rlindsgaard.github.io/2016/01/29/rndphrase-roadmap.html>