



Hash Functions, Bit Commitment, and Zero-Knowledge Proofs

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## Overview



- 1. Cryptography Introduction
- 2. 1-way Functions
- 3. Bit Commitment
- 4. Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Short Introduction to Cryptography



Study of secrecy and communication across insecure channels to potentially dishonest users.

### Basic assumptions:

- All users have at least equal computational power to us (usually assumed to be equal)
- ► All methods and processes are well-known to all users

Class P: problems which can be solved with a polynomial-time algorithm (quickly solvable)

Class NP: problems whose solutions can be verified in polynomial time (quickly checkable)

ightharpoonup Clearly,  $P \subseteq NP$ 

Background: Pvs. NP

Converse is unknown (widely believed to be false)


NP-hard and NP-complete

Any NP problem can be easily reduced to an NP-hard problem, and all NP-hard problems in NP are called NP-complete.

Note: If there exists an NP-complete problem in P, all NP problems must be in P (P = NP).

### Examples of NP-complete problems:


- Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT)
- Graph coloring problem
- Subgraph isomorphism problem
- Traveling salesman problem




Complexity Venn diagram

#### **Definition and Motivation**

A 1-way function (or cryptographic hash function) is a deterministic function that is easy to compute and hard to invert. The most useful ones have an possibly infinite input length and fixed output length.



1-way-ness



Hides information about input



Collision resistance

**Defining Hardness-to-Invert** 

1-way functions' strength can be defined by strong and weak:

- Strong: any inversion algorithm succeeds with negligible probability
- Weak: any inversion algorithm fails with noticeable probability

Theorem: Weak 1-way functions exist if and only if strong 1-way functions exist.[1]

#### **Hardcore Predicates and Functions**



Hardcore predicate of a 1-way function: **secure bit** based on a 1-way function's output. Hardcore function is a generalization: secure sequence of bits.

### Examples of hardcore predicates:

- The least significant bit of an RSA output
- XOR of a random subset of bits of a 1-way function



No noticeable advantage

# **Bit Commitment**

### **Bit Commitment**



Commitment scheme: protocol for a sender to commit to a bit **unambiguously** and **secretly**.

#### 2 phases:

- Commit phase: sender commits to value publicly
- Reveal phase: sender reveals committed value and commitment process

Such a commitment scheme can be designed based on hardcore predicates or pseudorandom number generators.



Zero-knowledge proof (ZK-pf): protocol for a sender to **unambiguously** demonstrate knowledge to a verifier while keeping the knowledge **secret**.

**Simulation paradigm: zero-knowledge** means that anything the verifier was able to compute after the ZK-pf, it could compute beforehand.

**Creating ZK-Pfs** 



A ZK-pf for a solution to an NP-complete problem is a ZK-pf for a solution to any NP problem, since NP-complete problems can be reduced to any other NP problem.

Theorem: Polynomially many repetitions of a ZK-pf remains zero-knowledge.[1]

So we can repeat a proof that provides non-zero evidence over and over to create strong ZK-pfs.

Using SAT (E3SAT)

#### Prover must first:


- Permute variable order and labels, clause order
- Invert each variable/assignment with probability 0.5
- Commit to new formula and assignment

#### Verifier can ask for either:

- New formula and the variable permutations
- One clause of the new formula and those assignments

$$\begin{split} &(\times \mbox{ OR y OR z) AND } (\times \mbox{ OR $\overline{y}$ OR z) AND} \\ &(\times \mbox{ OR y OR $\overline{z}$) AND } (\times \mbox{ OR $\overline{y}$ OR $\overline{z}$) AND} \\ &(\overline{\times} \mbox{ OR y OR z) AND } (\overline{\times} \mbox{ OR $\overline{y}$ OR $\overline{z}$)} \end{split}$$

#### Formulaic Form



Tripartite Graph Form

## References





O. Goldreich.

Foundations of Cryptography.

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2004.