

# TO ATTACK, OR NOT TO ATTACK...

... that is the question.

Group Project by Jeremias Lenzi & Ramazan Maliqi

-----

Smart Contracts and Decentralized Blockchain Applications  
University of Basel, Prof. Dr. Fabian Schär, 10. December 2019

# SITUATION



A big jackpot is sitting around on the blockchain



We're somewhat poor students and want to get it!

COOL!



Coordination among attackers needed to succeed



There is COSTS associated with the attack. Poor students!




We do not know how many attackers are sufficient

NOT COOL!

# SITUATION SUMMARISED



# INTUITION OF THE GAME




- Attackers win proportional to their bet over total attackers' bets
- Defenders always get refund
- Defenders make "false bets" to deceive other players
- There is a cost on attacking
- Players that try to misbehave loses their bets
- Players are incentivized to attack, increasingly through the rounds

***Resistance = 90%  $\Rightarrow$  Attack Failed  $\Rightarrow$  Jackpot increases !!!***

***Resistance = 20%  $\Rightarrow$  Attack Succeeded  $\Rightarrow$  Winners take price***

# A BIT OF THEORY: COMMIT-REVEAL




31password


3 = player's bet in ETH (has to be an uint between 1 and 9)

1 = player's decision to attack (0 if no attack intended)

password = player's personal password (e.g. wewillwin)



# TIMELINE OF THE GAME



# HOW DOES IT WORK ON THE BLOCKCHAIN?

Let's gamble on Rinkeby testnet!

THANK YOU