Robert

EL2800, Exercise 3 (Solving MDPs). Todzy's central concepts

Two phases in solving an MDP.

- i, Modeling. Define all the quantities (state-space, transitions, etc.)
- is, Use algorithm to obtain optimal policy

The second step is usually rather mechanical if the first is done well.

=> Don't rush step i, !!!

Finite-horizon, TL00:

(Stochastic) Dynamic Programming/Backward Inductions:

reward-to-go

·
$$u_{\pm}^{*}(s) = \max_{a \in A_{s}} \{ r_{\xi}(s, a) + \sum_{s' \in S'} p_{\xi}(s'|s, a) u_{\xi+1}^{*}(s') \}$$

optimal expected

time to go

optimal immediate

if we pich zetion a

optimal actions, then it's arbitrary which one we pich

Discounted 00-horizon:

· Optimality conditions/Bellman's equation:

$$u^{*}(s) = \max_{z \in A_{s}} \{r(s,z) + \lambda \sum_{s' \in S'} P(s'|s,z)u^{*}(s')\}$$

will converge to u*(s) for any initial condition uo(s).

Note, this is essentially DP with a longer and longer horizon.

- · Policy iteration (PI) algorithm:
 - 0, Guess 2 policy To
 - i, (Policy evaluation)

compute the value of policy π_k by solving: $u^{\pi_k}(s) = r(s, \pi_k(s)) + \lambda \sum_{s' \in S'} p(s' | s, \pi_k(s)) u^{\pi_k}(s')$

ii, (Policy improvement)

Update the policy:

The (s) = arg max fr(s, a) + A I p(s' | s, a) u th(s') }

Stop if Th = Th+1.

Remorte:

For the systems we consider, deterministic policies are sufficient for optimality.

That is, a policy of is a function that

takes a state se s' and maps it into an action a e As.

Remerk:

These elgorithms are also uslid for other objective functions. There are usriations of these algorithms that are more efficient.

Remark:

It is possible to solve MDPs viz linear programming, which allows constraints to be enforced.

Ex 3.10 | Need to sell apartment within N days.

We receive an offer we every evening that we offer is a multiple of 10 000 SEK, and they ever we sell. Compute an optimal policy. daily

Solution:

We derived the MDP-model in the previous session.

State-space:

Let's assume we always talk in terms of multiples of 10 000 SEK, and that the maximum bid is 10 000. Grax SEK. Then:

S= {0,1, ..., burx y U & Sold}

current bid under consideration

Actions:

Ab = fR, cf j: the actions available when we are considering a bid b

Asold = f C & : we have sold.

Time-horizon and objective:

Finite-horizon, N:

ES = 1 (SE, 2) + [(SN)]

Terminal:

- · ru (sold) = 0
- · (b) = 6

we eve forced to sell at time N if we haven't sold


Non-terminal:

• $r_{\xi}(s=b, a=c\xi) = b(1+p)$ the current offer

the future interest that we will collect

- · rt(s=b, 2= R) = 0
- · rt (s = Sold, 2 = d) = 0

Transitions!



we could take Asold)
to be fot, R) 25 we
did last time. In
that case, the choice of
action in the policy
will be arbitrary.

- · P₂(s'=b|s=b, a=R) = Propa₂ = b' y

 if we reject,

 tomorrows offer is

 drawn i.i.d.
- · Pe(s'= Sold | s=b, 2= A) = 1 we decide to sell
- · Pz(s'= sold | s= sold, 2 = d) = 1 de if we have sold

To solve the MDP, recall the backward induction:

·
$$u_{\ell}^{*}(s_{\ell}) = \max_{2 \in A_{S_{\ell}}} \{ r_{\ell}(s_{\ell}, 2) + \sum_{s' \in S'} P_{\ell}(s' | s_{\ell}, 2) u_{\ell+1}^{*}(s') \}$$

$$a_{\ell}^{*}(s_{\ell}) \in \arg\max \left\{ \begin{array}{c} a_{\ell} \\ a_{\ell} \\ \end{array} \right\}$$

Bese cese:

Recursion:

For st = Sold:

$$u_{\ell}^{*}(sold) = \max_{2 \in Asold} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^$$

By induction, we conclude that $u_{\ell}^*(Sold) = u_{\ell+1}^*(Sold) = --- = u_{\ell}^*(Sold) = 0$. (*)

$$u_{t}^{*}(b) = \max_{2 \in A_{b}} \int r_{t}(b,2) + \sum_{s' \in S} p_{t}(s'|b,2) u_{t+1}^{*}(s') \int dt_{t}(s') \int dt_{t}$$

It's essiest to evaluate the two actions separately:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{b_{mix}} Pr_i w_{t=i} y_{u_{t+1}}^*(i) = \mathbb{E}_{w_{t+1}}^*(w) y$$

Teken together in (**), we obtain:

$$u_{\ell}^{*}(b) = \max \left\{ b(1+p)^{N-\ell}, \sum_{i=0}^{b_{mix}} P_{r} | w_{\ell} = i \right\} u_{\ell+1}^{*}(i) \right\}$$

=
$$m_{2x}$$
 $\begin{cases} b \end{cases}$ $\sum_{i=0}^{b_{m_{2x}}} P_{r}\{\omega_{t}=i,j,u_{t+1}^{*}(i)\} \end{cases} \times (n+p)^{N-t}$

of

 R
 $\begin{cases} \omega_{t} \\ \omega_{t} \end{cases}$

def.
$$= \max \left\{ b, \alpha_{\pm} \right\} \times (1+p)^{N-\pm}.$$

Hence, the optimal policy is:

If we receive an offer b at time t, then we should:

$$cd(clept)$$
 if $b > \alpha_{t}$, $R(eject)$ if $b \perp \alpha_{t}$,


the action is

where

$$\alpha_{t} = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{N-1} P_{i} w_{t} = i \int u_{t+1}^{*} (i)}{(1+p)^{N-t}} = \mathbb{E} \left\{ u_{t+1}^{*} (\omega) \right\} \cdot (1+p)^{t-N}$$

expected reward-to-go by intrest

This is a time-dependent threshold policy:



The more time we have short of us, the more greedy we can be with the bid we choose to recept.

Ex 3.2 At every time 2 job, with szlzvy from the set far, --, way, is offered zne has to be accepted or rejected. The offers are did. An unemployment compensation c is given at every time (if unemployed). Assume future discount factor 2.

2, Show that there is a threshold as over which offers should be accepted. Characterize as.

b, Assume the worker is fired from job i up. Pi.

Show that 2, holds if Pi=P for all i.

Solution:

State-space:

5 = 75, ..., Subufs!, ..., Sub

si: not employed, considering en offer from job i with selvy wi

job i with szlzvy wi

Actions:

As: = fot, Ry

succept Ry

reject

As: = 7 C/ J
continue
working

Time-horizon and objective:

00-horizon, discounted:

Remark:

How do we interpret 2?

One interpretation is that we are maximizing

ETTITELSE, 24)

for 2 rendom T: PrfT=kj= 1k-1 (1-1).


1-1 can be interpretted as the worker's risk of dying each time unit. The worker's expected life-time is $ETJ = \frac{1}{1-1}$ time units. The worker tries to maximize the total money earned, subject to knowing that she might die.

Rewords:

- $f_{2}(s_{i}, \alpha t) = \omega_{i}$ she recepts the offer from job i
- $Y_{\pm}(S_i, R) = C$ as she gets the unemployment compensation
- · rt(s!, c1) = w; Az she works et job i

Transitions:

Let qi denote the probability that the worker receives an offer from job i.



The non-zero transitions are:

- · Pz(s; 1s;, d) = 1
- · Pt(sils:, A) = 1
- · Pt(s; Isi, R) = 9;

Bellman equation:

Remerk:

Everything is stationary, so we drop the time indices on of and Pt.

Let's eveluzte this for the different states!

$$u^*(s, ') = m2x$$
 $2 \in A_s!$
 $s \in S'$
 $s' \in S'$
 $s' \in S'$
 $s' = S_s'$
 $s' \in S_s'$
 $s' \in S_s'$

Let's consider the two actions separately:

$$\Gamma(s_{i}, \omega + \lambda) + \lambda \sum_{s' \in S} p(s'|s_{i}, \omega + \lambda) u^{*}(s') = \omega_{i} + \lambda u^{*}(s_{i}')$$

$$= \lambda 1 \quad \text{if } s' = s_{i}'$$

$$= 0 \quad \text{o. w.}$$

$$\Gamma(s_i,R) + \lambda \sum_{s'\in s'} P(s'|s_i,R) u^*(s') = C + \lambda \sum_{j=0}^{N} q_j u^*(s_j)$$

$$= C$$

$$= \int q_j i f(s'=s_j)$$

$$= C + \lambda \sum_{j=0}^{N} q_j u^*(s_j)$$

=
$$\int From (*) we know that
 $u^*(s_i^*) = \frac{\omega_i^*}{1-\lambda}$$$

=
$$\max_{x} \left\{ \omega_{i}, (1-\lambda) \left[c + \lambda \sum_{j=0}^{N} q_{j} u^{N} (s_{j}) \right] \right\} \cdot \frac{1}{1-\lambda}$$

Since as is a constant (does not depend on i), this is threshold palicy:

if we are offered a salary wi,

R(eject) if wi \ \ovi ,

R(eject) if wi \(\ovi \ovi ,

m= m

where

$$\vec{\omega} = (7-\lambda) \left[c + \lambda \vec{\sum}_{j=0}^{N} q_{j} u^{*}(s_{j}) \right].$$

 Part by: The worker gets fived up. Pi. we need to bemodel the problem:

State-space:

Actions:


Rewords:


Time-horizon sud objective:

00-horizon, discounted:

E | I'A r (st, 2+) }

Transitions:





Bellman equation:

Agrin, we consider the states separetely:

=
$$\omega_i + \lambda \left[(1-p_i)u^*(s_i') + \sum_{j=0}^{N} p_i q_j u^*(s_j) \right]$$

If we solve for n+(s;):

$$u^{*}(s;') - \lambda(1-p)u^{*}(s;') = \omega_{i} + \lambda p_{i} \sum_{j=0}^{N} q_{j}u^{*}(s;') \Longrightarrow$$

$$u^{*}(s;^{1}) = \omega_{i} + \lambda_{P_{i}} \underbrace{\int_{i=0}^{N} d_{i}u^{*}(s;^{1})}_{1-\lambda_{i}(1-P_{i})}$$
 (*)

Taken together, we have:

$$u^*(s_i) = mex \{ \omega_{i+1} + \lambda [(1-p_i)u^*(s_i) + \sum_{j=0}^{N} p_i q_j u^*(s_j)],$$

$$c + \lambda \sum_{j=0}^{N} q_j u^*(s_j) \}$$

$$(***)$$

Let's enelyze this. Assume that the salaries are

WILWIL --- LWN.

It is also given that we should assume Pi=P.

Then (*): construt (in i)

$$u^*(s;') = \frac{\omega_{i,i} + \lambda_{p,j=0}^{2} q_{i,j} u^*(s_{i,j})}{(1 - \lambda_{j,j=0})} \propto \omega_{i,j}$$

is an increasing function in i.


$$u^*(s;) = \max \left\{ \omega_i + \lambda \left[(1-p)u^*(s;') + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} pq_j u^*(s;j) \right] \right\}$$
incressing in constant (in:)

$$C + \lambda \sum_{j=0}^{N} q_{j} u^{*}(s_{j})$$

$$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \omega_{j} \quad \text{constant (in i)}$$

$$= \max \left\{ f(i), \widetilde{\omega} \right\},$$

where f(i) is an increasing function in i.



The optimal policy is to $\mathcal{A}(\alpha pt)$ if $f(i) > \tilde{\omega}$. Since f(i) is increasing, this means that if $f(i) > \tilde{\omega} \implies f(i+1) > \tilde{\omega}$. In other words, if there is a salary ω_i such that $f(i) > \widetilde{\omega}$, then it should be accepted. But then so should the salary ω_{i+1} since $f(i+1) > \widetilde{\omega}$, etc.

This implies that the solution is a threshold policy:

R ω_1 ω_2 ω_3 ω_{N-1} ω_N ω_1 ω_2 ω_3 ω_2 ω_3 ω_3 ω_1 ω_2 ω_3 ω_3

Ex 3.3] An order is received up. p at each time step.

One can choose to process all orders (setup cost K > 0), or writ (costs (>0 per order on hold). The maximum number of unfilled orders is 12. There is a discount factor 2. Characterize an optimal processing policy.

Solution:

State-space: S = {0, 1, ---, n}

of unfilled orders when starting the period

Actions:

An = SP3
A: = SW, PJ

process
all orders
all orders

Rewords:

In this case, we

deal with worts:


Time-horizon and objective:

00 - horizon, discounted:

Remerte:

we can interpret 1-2 as the probability of "going out of business" (e.g., bankruptcy).

Transitions:



i=1, --, n-1

Bellman equation:

$$u^{*}(n) = \max_{2 \in A_{n}} \{r(n,2) + \lambda \sum_{s' \in S} p(s'|n,2)u^{*}(s')\}$$

=
$$-K + \lambda [(1-p)u^*(0) + pu^*(1)]$$

(*)

$$u^{*}(i) = m2x$$
 $2 \in A_{i}$
 $v(i,2) + \lambda \sum_{s \in S} p(s'|i,2) u^{*}(s')$
 $v(i,2) + \lambda \sum_{s \in S} p(s'|i,2) u^{*}(s')$

Eveluzte the ections separately!

If 2= W:

So that:

$$u^*(i) = m2x \{ \delta, -ci + \lambda [(1-p)u^*(i) + pu^*(i+1)] \}.$$
 (**)

It is reasonable to assume that the optimal policy is of threshold type. Can we prove that it is?

A threshold policy is such that
$$a^*(i) = P \implies a^*(i+1) = P$$
.

This is equivalent to

$$8 > -ci + \lambda [(1-p)u^*(i) + pu^*(i+1)] \implies \\ 8 > -c(i+1) + \lambda [(1-p)u^*(i+1) + pu^*(i+2)]$$

Note that this holds if
$$u^*(i) \geqslant u^*(i+1)$$
, \square

since c>0.

Beczuse +hen:

$$8 > -ci + \lambda [(1-p)u^*(i) + pu^*(i+1)]$$

 $> -c(i+1) + \lambda [(1-p)u^*(i) + pu^*(i+1)]$
 $3 -c(i+1) + \lambda [(1-p)u^*(i+1) + pu^*(i+2)]$
 $3 -c(i+1) + \lambda [(1-p)u^*(i+1) + pu^*(i+2)]$

We will use value iteration to prove (1).

Base case:

het uo(s) = 0 for all ses.

Then uo(i) > uo(i+1) holds trivially.

Induction:

Assume that uk(i) > uk(i+1).

(we will show that then ukuli) > ukulita) holds.)

If s = i+1 1 n:

It is clear that the following holds:

 $-c(i+1) + \lambda [(1-p)u_{k}(i+1)+pu_{k}(i+2)] \leq -ci + \lambda [(1-p)u_{k}(i)+pu_{k}(i+1)]$ $\leq -ci \qquad \leq u_{k}(i) \qquad \leq u_{k}(i) \qquad \leq u_{k}(i)$

since

≤ Uk(i) ≤ Uklied)
by essumption by
essumption

Let Fk(x) be defined 25

Fk(x) = max {-K+ >[(1-p)uk(0)+puk(1)], x}.

This function is increasing in x.

One iteration of value iteration is (compare the computations that led to (**)):

 $u_{k+1}(i+1) = \max \{-K + \lambda [(1-p)u_{k}(0) + pu_{k}(1)],$ $-((i+1) + \lambda [(1-p)u_{k}(i+1) + pu_{k}(i+2)]\}$

= $F_{k}(-c(i+1) + \lambda [(1-p)u_{k}(i+1) + pu_{k}(i+2)])$

$$\leq F_{k}(-ci + \lambda [(1-p)u_{k}(i) + pu_{k}(i+1))$$

$$\downarrow M_{k}$$

$$\downarrow$$

by definition of one iteration, compare (**).

If s= M:

Agrin, one iteration of value iteration (compare computation of (*)) yields:

 $u_{k+1}(n) = -K + \lambda \left[(1-p)u_{k}(0) + pu_{k}(1) \right]$ obviously
the max $\left\{ -K + \lambda \left[(1-p)u_{k}(0) + pu_{k}(1) \right] \right\}$ the max of $-c(n-1) + \lambda \left[(1-p)u_{k}(n-1) + pu_{k}(n) \right]$ else something

Company = UK+1 (n-1).

In summary, we have now shown that $u_k(i) \geqslant u_k(i+1) \Rightarrow u_{k+1}(i) \geqslant u_{k+1}(i+1)$ for all $i=0,\ldots,n-1$.

Taking the limit:

we have shown that

- · uo(i) > uo(i+1)
- · "k(i) > uk(i+1) => uker(i) > uker(i+1).

Since it is well known that

when up is computed using value iteration for discounted problems, we conclude that

which is (1).

See, e.g., P. 84 in Vol. 2 of Bentseles and Optimal Conduct.

this proves that 2*(i)=P=> 2*(i+1)=P policy, are just need to check which of the N+1 possible threshold policies is the best.

(This entails performing the policy evaluation step of policy iteration N+1 times.