

Encrypted Filesystem for Applications



Master Thesis: Portable multi-key encrypted file storage

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Why encrypt in the application?





Motivation

For developers:

- Manageable for an end-user
- Sync- or Migrate-able from one device to another
- Easy to use & hard to make mistakes

For users:

- Normal workflow → fast biometric
- Backup and Migration Path



Technology Decision

- Use Rust for memory safety
- **No unsafe** ← only safe rust
- Use modern key strengthening Argon2 [3]
- Replace AES with ChaCha20-Poly1305 [2]
- Embeddable for the Digidow.eu project

Technology Decision - Why replace AES?

- See L2 Cache-timing attacks on AES [1]
- See Microarchitectural exploitation and other hardware attacks¹
- Replaces S-Boxes with XOR, Integer Addition Modulo 2^{32} , and Integer Shift with Roll

¹<https://github.com/codexlynx/hardware-attacks-state-of-the-art>

Speed Comparison

From rfc8439

Chip	AES-128-GCM	ChaCha20-Poly1305
OMAP 4460	24.1 MB/s	75.3 MB/s
Snapdragon S4 Pro	41.5 MB/s	130.9 MB/s
Sandy Bridge Xeon (AES-NI)	900 MB/s	500 MB/s

Master Key Management




Technical Decisions


- Reduce the amount of places where the master key resides in memory
- Use the type system to keep the nonce in sync
- Lock the open files so syncing operations don't cause problems
 - Unix: `flock(file, rustix::fs::FlockOperation::LockExclusive)`
 - Windows: `lock_file(file, LOCKFILE_EXCLUSIVE_LOCK)`
- Autosave on `Drop::drop(&mut self)`

Master Key Creation

- Paper Key for user
- Add n-th key for other devices
- TPM Key for secure hardware
- Master Key only in system memory




Per Slot Master Key Decryption



- Try all stored key material
- Nonce is rather predictable, few writes of the whole directory
- “If the seed used to generate the stream is secret then it is **infeasible to compute previously generated bytes** in an Argon2 key stream” Philipp Jovanovic, PhD, Associate Professor in Information Security (University College London)

Update Master Key Nonces

- Requires the Master Key for opening the vault
- Does not require the other Slot Keys
- Is done on every `Write::flush()`
- Very cheap to compute



Schneeglöggli

Schneeglöggli 21.02.2023

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File Content Encryption and Virtual Filesystem



File Content Encryption

The based on established code and practices:

- Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) [5]
ChaCha20-Poly1305 [2] developed by Daniel J. Bernstein
- The ring crate with a safe Rust interface
- C and assembly language code in ring come from BoringSSL [6], that is derived from OpenSSL [4]

Abstraction Design Choices

The directory:

- HashMap with the clear path as key
- Minimal index → every change requires a full encrypt + write
- Create and access time from underlying filesystem
- Size may be reported incorrectly, AEAD TAG + Padding
- Filesystem Lock during application run

Per file:

- Loading the contents on demand to memory
- Guarding open file contents with RwLock per file
- Automatic flush on scope drop

Native Integration



Android Integration - the plan

Build system integration:

- Integrate with gradle
- Build a native toolchain with cmake and cargo

Use the Kotlin runtime for:

- Handle system permissions
- Communicate with finger print reader and KeyStore
- Handle user input for setup and recovery (Paper Key)

Artistic representation of the working environment

Dramatization incoming

Are you ready?


Artistic representation of the working environment

Source:

[https://www.deviantart.com/](https://www.deviantart.com/aperture--science/art/Android-hell-137246583)

[aperture--science/art/Android-](https://www.deviantart.com/aperture--science/art/Android-hell-137246583)

[hell-137246583](https://www.deviantart.com/aperture--science/art/Android-hell-137246583)



ANDROID HELL

A real place where you will be sent at the first sign of defiance.



Current Problems with the Android Ecosystem 1/2

- Open Android Studio
 - Update 2022.1.1 Patch 1
 - Project is broken now
- Start a new default project with Update 2022.1
 - Build fails
 - Find the project setting to upgrade gradle to 7.6
- Find the docs to get finger print sensor presence?
 - No complete sample, just snippets
 - No docs on how to store an actual key in the HSM

Current Problems with the Android Ecosystem 2/2

- How to generate FFI C include header?
 - javah is replaced by javac -h
 - Does not work with Kotlin
- How to find compiled libraries with gradlew or Android Studio?
 - cmake is completely reconfigured by multiple compile_commands.json
- How to compile the glue crate? (After reading the error messages)
 - Wast a lot of time building build.rs
 - Install cargo-ndk still pass the NDK path manually

Linux / Windows Integration

Build system cargo:

- Provide a Rust lib or C98 FFI staticlib interface
- TPM/vTPM communication

Runtime:

- Provide a Rust or C98 FFI interface
- Handle TPM/vTPM communication
- Handle user input for setup and recovery (Paper Key)

Lets relax

Walensee 21.02.2023

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References I

- [1] Daniel J. Bernstein. 2005. Cache-timing attacks on AES.
<https://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf>. (2005).
- [2] Daniel J. Bernstein. 2018. ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) algorithm, RFC8439.
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- [3] Alex Biryukov, Daniel Dinu, and Dmitry Khovratovich. 2017. Argon2: the memory-hard function for password hashing and other applications.
<https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Argon2>. (2017).
- [4] OpenSSL Contributors. 1998-. OpenSSL. <https://www.openssl.org/>. (1998-).

References II

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