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## HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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### **Undergraduate Studies:**

B.A., Economics, University of Chicago, honors, 2014.

### **Graduate Studies:**

Harvard University, 2016 to present  
Ph.D. Candidate in Business Economics  
Thesis Title: "Essays in Industrial Organization"  
Expected Completion Date: May 2022

### **References:**

Professor Ariel Pakes  
Harvard University  
apakes@fas.harvard.edu

Professor Edward Glaeser  
Harvard University  
eglaeser@harvard.edu

Professor Myrto Kalouptsi  
Harvard University  
myrto@g.harvard.edu

Professor Robin Lee  
Harvard University  
robinlee@g.harvard.edu

Professor Mark Egan  
Harvard University  
megan@hbs.edu

### **Teaching and Research Fields**

Primary fields: Industrial Organization  
Secondary fields: Transportation Economics

### **Teaching Experience**

Spring 2020 Deconstructing + Reconstructing Markets (Co-instructor)  
Spring 2019 Industrial Organization II (Teaching Fellow)  
Instructor: Professor Robin Lee

### **Research Experience**

2018-2019 Harvard University, Research Assistant to Professor Robin Lee  
2017-2018 MIT, Research Assistant to Professor Haoxiang Zhu  
2014-2016 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Analyst  
2013-2014 University of Chicago, Research Assistant to Professor Eric Budish  
2012-2013 University of Chicago, Research Assistant to Professor Ali Hortacsu

### **Professional Activities**

Referee: *Journal of Urban Economics: Insights*

Presentations: 2021: Urban Economics Association Summer School; Urban Economics Association North America Meeting; HBS Rising Scholars Conference; Blueprint Junior Researcher Series; Asia Pacific Industrial Organization Conference (scheduled).

### **Grants and Awards**

2021 UEA Best PhD Paper, *Honorable Mention*  
2020 Lab for Economic Applications and Policy (LEAP) Grant

### **Research Papers**

*"(Don't) Take Me Home: Home Bias and the Effect of Self-Driving Trucks on Interstate Trade"* [Job Market Paper]

*Abstract: How will self-driving trucks transform U.S. interstate trade? I argue that human drivers' preferences to return home generate geographic specialization in the freight market, and self-driving trucks would eliminate this "home bias." I build a model of trucking carriers who make dynamic decisions about where to work, given that they prefer to be at home. A large home bias increases the value of driving places that are likely to bring one home and increases the value of taking time off at home. Using trucking freight transactions and highway inspections, I estimate the model parameters and find that carriers value being at home at \$70 per day or about 1/3 of the daily wage. In a counterfactual where self-driving trucks have no home bias, carriers shift from driver-rich states to driver-poor states, and total driving increases as carriers spend less time off. The increased supply of carriers lowers overall freight prices by 5 percent and especially benefits driver-poor states. In a full counterfactual which also captures the effect of self-driving trucks on per-mile costs and daily driving range, eliminating home bias explains about 20 percent of the fall in overall prices.*

*"From Market Making to Matchmaking: Does Bank Regulation Harm Market Liquidity?"* (with Gideon Saar, Jian Sun, and Haoxiang Zhu)

*Abstract: Post-crisis bank regulations raised market-making costs for bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market-making costs change the market structure by intensifying competitive pressure from non-bank dealers and incentivizing bank dealers to shift their business toward matchmaking. Thus, post-crisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing costly bank balance sheets with a more efficient form of financial intermediation.*

## **Research in Progress**

*“Intermodal Competition in Freight Transportation”* (with Pedro Degiovanni)

## **Skills:**

Julia, Python, SQL, Matlab

## **Personal Information:**

Date of birth: December 26<sup>th</sup>, 1992

Citizenship: USA, Canada