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In my project, I wanted to analyze how different crises affected immigration, both immigrants coming into the countries dealing with crises and nations that would likely deal with the most refugees from these countries. I chose geographically and geopolitically close nations as recipients of refugees. For example, in the case of Syria, I chose to look at Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia(The now-defunct Assad Regime in Syria was largely subservient to Russia). Largely, I found that crises did have a large impact on immigration, both in immigration going out of the country and into the country.

To run the project, simply import it into a rust environment, and run “cargo run” on `/opt/app-root/src/projects/bigfinal/src/main.rs`. To run tests, again, run “cargo test” on `/opt/app-root/src/projects/bigfinal/src/main.rs`. It will output data comparing 5-year to 5-year immigration data for 10 target countries.

First, let's look at the case of Syria and its civil war in 2011. Between 2005 & 2010, Syria's immigration numbers were booming, having increased by 102.13%(882398 -> 1783595). I feel this number is interesting, as Syria at the time was still known to be ruled under a fairly oppressive regime under Bashar Al-Assad. Still, Immigration was rapidly increasing, and it was a fairly large portion of the population(in 2010, Syria's population was 22 million, so just under 10%). However, if we look at the data from 2010->2015, it shows the impact that the civil war had on the country. Immigration into the country declined by 53.14%(1783595 -> 835716), bringing Syria back to its pre-2005 immigration numbers. Looking at the 2015->2020 data, we can see a slight recovery, with a 3.95%(835716 -> 868711) increase in immigration, however still below 2005 numbers. Whilst data for 2024 and beyond isn't available, it's likely to remain grim for Syria, with the Assad government collapsing. Syria was once a country with booming immigration that was ravaged by a brutal civil war and is unlikely to recover from the effects anytime soon.

Looking at the data of countries where Syrian refugees were likely to flee can also help analyze how badly the civil war affected Syria. A high increase in migration to these countries likely indicates a large influx of Syrian(and other, as we'll later discuss) refugees. Take, for instance, Turkey. Between 2005

and 2010, Turkey saw a 3.75%(1324108 -> 1373749) increase in immigration. However, in the next 5 years, Turkey saw a staggering 216.37%(1373749 -> 4346197) increase in immigration. It continues to increase, with a 39.26%(4346197 -> 6052652) increase from 2015->2020. While not all of this rapid increase can be attributed to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, I hypothesize that the Yemeni civil war, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, and the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis made up most of the increase.

Next, we'll look at Yemen and its civil war. Occurring from 2014 to the present day, it has ravaged the country. The data shows this: in the two 5 year periods before the civil war, Yemen saw a 67.8%(171871 -> 288394, 2005->2010) and a 31.72%(288394 -> 379882, 2010->2015) increase in immigration. With the civil war started in 2014, we can already see the difference in immigration numbers in the second data point, increasing almost half as much as in the previous 5-year cycle(or ~a 30-point drop). With the next data point, the trend continues, with a 1.9% increase in immigration from 2015->2020(379882 -> 387113). One interesting point I find with both the Syria and Yemen cases is that despite horrid conditions in the wars, it was rarely(Syria had one data point to reflect this) the case that immigration numbers went down; just the year-to-year increase in immigration went down(or the first derivative of immigration population decreased.) However, if we take global population numbers into account(the thinking here is that if more people are living, of course, more people are moving and immigrating), we see that from 2015 to 2020, the global population increased by 5.5%, 6.3% between 2010 and 2015, and 6.5% from 2005 to 2010. With this in mind, we can state that if immigration goes up by less than those figures between those dates, immigration relative to the global population is decreasing. With that, between 2010 and 2020, Syria had decreasing immigration relative to the global population, and Yemen also did between 2015 and 2020. (Note: this doesn't hold if the assumption that the global population is reflective of other population trends, such that if the global population increases by x%, the global immigration population will also increase by some near x%.)

Next, looking at Ukraine and Russia, we have to note the history of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in some minor detail. It can be split into two parts: the conflict between 2014 and 2022, and 2022 onwards. Between 2014 and 2022, Russia did hold three Ukrainian provinces: Crimean, Donetsk, and

Luhansk Oblasts(a Slavic term that vaguely resembles what Americans and other Westerners would call states, provinces, etc.) There was violence, but it largely could be classified as an extended border conflict between the nations. That is to say, it was not something that affected Ukrainians and Russians everywhere, every day. Post 2022, the situation resembles something closer to a full-on interstate war, that did indeed affect Russians and Ukrainians everywhere, every day. The data analyzed in this project is only from 2005 to 2020, and thus the latter half of the conflict will not be explored in depth.

Russia, relative to global population increases, has had decreasing immigration since 2005. The numbers are as follows: -4.05%(11667588 -> 11194710, 2005->2010),+4.01%(11194710 -> 11643276,2010->2015),-0.05%(11643276 -> 11636911 2015->2020). Perhaps Russia's low immigration in the first data point is related to their invasion of South Ossetia in 2008, as the only period in which Russia didn't involve itself was 2008->2014 which mostly covers the second data point, where they saw the largest increase in immigration. Vaguely, in Russia's case, it looks like being in aggressive conflicts disincentivizes refugees and migrants to seek shelter in Russia.

For Ukraine, a similar trend follows, with it always being behind global population increases. Its data is as follows: -4.58%(5050302 -> 4818767,2005->2010),+2%(4818767 -> 4915142, 2010->2015),+1.67%(4915142 -> 4997387, 2015->2020). It is clear that in the difference between the Russia/Ukraine case and the Syria/Yemen case that border conflicts and similar have significantly less impact on immigration and refugees than civil wars do. Further, It shows that Russia did not gain a large amount of migrants from Syria, its close ally, with most of them heading to other Middle Eastern nations.

The final datum of interest is Venezeula. Largely, the data shows the situation in Venezuela was dire but not damning as often stated to be, at least when compared to Syria and Yemen. The data follows:+25.16(1076474 -> 1347347,2005->2010),+4.24%(1347347 -> 1404448, 2010->2015),-5.71%(1404448 -> 1324193,2015->2020). When comparing this to Syria or Yemen, it is clear that the loss of immigration and refugees was not as steep. This does not paint the full picture, however, as the CSV file includes notes specifying that a large portion of certain immigration numbers are Venezuelans living abroad, displaced from the crisis. Thus, it is perhaps the case that incoming

immigration was not as heavily affected, such that people would still move into Venezuela, but people were fleeing the country en masse.