The Constitutive Power of Political Ideology:
Nationalism and the Emergence of Corporate Agency in World Politics

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Introduction

How do new actors emerge in the international system? What are the determinants of corporate agency or "actorhood" in world politics? These questions would appear to be fundamental to understanding politics in the international system. After all, the number of actors in the international system – even if one begins with the problematic assumption that sovereign states are the only relevant actors in international politics – has not remained constant. The United Nations consisted of 51 member states at its founding in San Francisco in 1945; in 2002 it boasted 191 members. In less than sixty years, then, the number of state actors in the international system almost quadrupled.

The issue of collective actorhood becomes even more problematic for International Relations (IR) theory if one attempts to examine the corporate agency of non-state actors in international relations. How are we to conceive, for example, of an entity such as al-Qaeda? Clearly, in conventional language, we refer to al-Qaeda as an "actor," as possessing some form of corporate agency in world politics, just as we refer to Russia, Luxembourg, or Kenya as "actors" in international affairs. Yet al-Qaeda – and other non-state actors in international relations – poses a problem for international relations theorists because of IR's focus on states and the international states system. *Beginning* with the assumption of states as the primary actors in international relations only gets us so far – it fails to provide an avenue for examining the emergence of new states in the international system, and similarly lacks a framework for taking non-state and non-territorial forms of corporate agency in world politics seriously.

In this paper, I propose one possible avenue for addressing this deficiency in international relations theory. Specifically, I suggest a focus on political ideologies as constitutive elements of corporate agency in world politics. Political ideologies act as the "glue" that holds collective actors together and allows us to think of collections of

networks, institutions, or populations as "unitary actors" in international politics. Successful ideologies become naturalized and reified and can be internalized even by self-reflexive scholars attempting to understand the social world.

In the contemporary international system *nationalism* has been the dominant political ideology and has played an important constitutive role in producing corporate agency at the international-systemic level. It is the naturalization and reification of the nation-state as a sociological form, or what some anthropologists and sociologists have referred to as "methodological nationalism," that allows IR scholars and others to think of a world of states as the starting point for their analysis.[1] Ironically, this fact is readily acknowledged by Kenneth Waltz in his 1954 classic *Man, the State and War*, yet is almost completely disregarded by contemporary constructivists such as Alexander Wendt.

Nationalism is not the only political ideology that can be used to constitute corporate agents in international politics – socialism, anarchism, communism, and Islamism are all examples of other forms of political ideologies that can be drawn upon by political entrepreneurs in attempts to stimulate new forms of collective action in world politics. Yet nationalism has undoubtedly been the most successful of these ideologies in contemporary world politics – not the least due to its ability to provide a framework for linking territories with collective identities.[2]

In the rest of this paper I explore these questions through a combination of theoretical discussion and empirical case study. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section of the paper, I discuss the problem of corporate agency in International Relations theory, arguing that neither realists nor constructivists have paid sufficient attention to the integral role that political ideology in general, and nationalism in particular,

[1] Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003.
[2] Using Gellner's definition, "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." Gellner 1983, p. 1.

plays in *actively constituting* collective actors in world politics. The state as unitary actor has been the starting assumption for theorizing in IR, even by many social constructivists. While most IR theorists would acknowledge that gains are to be made by examining historical processes of state formation, decolonization, etc. they would argue that this forms a different line of inquiry from analyzing state behavior in contemporary world politics. The question of *non-state corporate agency*, however, challenges any boundaries that may divide the analysis of constitutive processes in international politics and causally-determined behavior. This question is taken up in section two of the paper, in which I provide examples of how new forms of *non-state corporate agency* in world politics emerge due to processes of political mobilization carried out by political entrepreneurs. While the focus of this section is largely on the use of nationalism as a mobilizing tool, the general pattern of transnational mobilization by political entrepreneurs deploying political ideologies and identity categories is one that is repeated in international politics, has contemporary relevance with respect to Islamism, and is not limited to nationalist movements.

In the third section of the paper, I link these two discussions of corporate agency by examining the case of a transnational political movement that resulted in the emergence of a new state actor in the international system – the Algerian nationalist movement. Algerian nationalism began as a transnational political movement to challenge colonial power relations and as a quest for corporate agency and representation by marginalized constituencies at the level of the international system. It resulted in the emergence of a new corporate state actor -- the Algerian nation-state – thus pointing to the generative role that political ideologies play in constituting new actors in the international system. In the conclusion of the paper, I discuss the implications of this for developing new IR research

agendas that can 1) better address current realities in international politics, such as the emergence of transnational Islamist movements and 2) move beyond realist-constructivist dichotomies and instead have as their aim a richer and more historically nuanced theorization of the social and historical processes that shape contemporary world politics.

Corporate Agency and IR Theory: Bringing Nationalism Back In

Mainstream IR theory has tended to begin with assumptions regarding who and what are the most significant "actors" in the international system, rather than by problematizing their origins and existence. As Ruggie argues,

> …neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism explain the origins of virtually nothing that is constitutive of the very possibility of conducting international relations: not territorial states, not systems of states, nor any concrete international order…all are assumed to exist already or are misspecified.[3]

Even many constructivists, however, have been reluctant to take up the question of corporate agency.[4] The notion of the state as a unitary actor is a crucial starting assumption of systemic level IR theory for both mainstream realists and mainstream constructivists. From Kenneth Waltz's formulation of a levels-of-analysis approach to the international system in *Man, the State and War*, to Alexander Wendt's articulation of a social constructivist theory of international politics in *Social Theory of International Politics*, systemic level approaches to international politics have started with the assumption that states are unitary actors.

Paradoxically, realists such as E.H. Carr and Kenneth Waltz, in his earlier work, have been more cognizant of the problem of corporate agency and the assumption of the

[3] Ruggie 1998, 23.
[4] Notable exceptions include Biersteker and Weber 1996; Cederman 1997, 2002; Hall 1999; Jackson and Nexon 1999.

unitary state than many contemporary constructivists who have focused more attention on the sources of state identity, rather than the sources of statehood itself.[5] Much of contemporary systemic level theorizing has looked to Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* as its theoretical point of departure. Waltz argues that states can be taken as the basic units of the system because they are the most significant actors in world politics, yet he fails to offer a substantive account as to why states should be treated as unitary actors.[6] For this, however, one can return to passages from Waltz's original formulation of a levels-of-analysis approach in *Man, the State and War.* Here we are presented with a much more contingent and historicized justification for treating the state as a unitary actor than that provided in *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz writes that "it does violence to one's common sense to speak of the state, which is after all an abstraction and consequently inanimate, as acting."[7] Waltz justifies his treatment of the state as a unitary actor by taking what is essentially a constructivist position – he focuses on the importance of the strength and nature of group sentiment or collective identity, specifically the group sentiment that is produced historically through a combination of technological advance and the emergence of nationalism.

The excerpted portions from Waltz (1954) are worth quoting at length, since this text still provides one of the basic foundations of contemporary systemic-level theorizing. Waltz begins by discussing the importance of "the sentiment of group or local patriotism" and then goes on to write:

> Prior to the eighteenth century the sentiment was either confined to a small portion of the population spread over a relatively large area or it was confined to a larger percentage of those living in a relatively small area… The existence of group patriotism has no special meaning for our analysis

[5] On the constructivist focus on identity and culture, see, for example, Katzenstein 1996. On E.H. Carr, see Carr 1939 147-49, as cited in Wendt 1999 p. 196.
[6] See Waltz 1979, pp. 95-97, for the treatment of states as "like units."
[7] Waltz 1954, pp. 175-176.

> until…it becomes infused with the idea of nationality. Then we have the immensely important fact of modern nationalism…the growth of nationalism is synonymous with the integration of the masses into a common political form…With the development of modern technology, especially as applied to the means of transportation and communication, it has become possible for the interests of individuals to be thought of as tightly complementary…The centripetal force of nationalism may itself explain why states can be thought of as units.[8]

Sounding more like Ernest Gellner than the Waltz of *Theory of International Politics*, this implies that Waltz's structural theory should not be viewed as timeless, but rather rests at least in part on the historically unique configuration of ideational and technological innovations that led to a fusion of national identity with a territorial space. States can be thought of as units because they are held together by a collective identity, and express that common identity and purpose in such a way that, as Waltz writes, "the state appears to other states as a unit."[9]

Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, Waltz's original rationale for treating the state as a "unit" is left almost wholly unexplored in Wendt's formulation of a systemic-level constructivist approach, in which he makes no mention of either nationalism or national identity as key concepts for understanding the states system.[10] This is rather odd for a theoretical formulation of international politics that emphasizes the role of identities, ideas and ideational structures as the basis for world politics. Instead, Wendt spends a full chapter justifying the use of an essentialized, naturalized and anthropomorphized notion that "states are people too."[11] Despite his claim that social life consists of "ideas all the way

[8] Waltz 1954, pp. 176-177.
[9] Waltz 1954, p. 178. For a discussion of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* that argues that the theory is much better able to account for change than most critics have allowed for, see Goddard and Nexon 2005. Nevertheless, they do not address the question of how corporate agency emerges in world politics, saying only that "Concrete units, be they city-states, empires or nation-states, may come and go, but as long as they operate in an anarchic environment, they will be subject to the functional requirements of the international system." (p. 30)
[10] In fact, neither the term "nationalism" nor "national identity" is listed in the book's index.
[11] Wendt 1999, pp. 193-245.

down," Wendt argues strongly for the analytical utility of *not* viewing the state itself as a social construct, but rather for distinguishing between corporate and social identities.[12] Although Wendt engages in a lengthy discussion regarding the various components and nature of the state, including a discussion of Marxist, Weberian and Pluralist theories of the state, the discussion provides only a survey of the statist literature, rather than a constructivist theorization of the state as a social form or collective identity. States, for Wendt, are units because they can be thought of as the "people" of international society with "bodies" and "life" in the form of "national interests."[13]

This formulation of "states as people too," in which states are conceptualized as existing prior to the international states system and are endowed with a pre-social corporate identity of "stateness," is not only historically and empirically problematic, but also limits the ability of Wendt's version of constructivism to account for a myriad of phenomena in international politics.[14] While Wendt, like Waltz, may be content with explaining "a small number of large and important things,"[15] and himself acknowledges that there are many other actors and sets of relations that could be prioritized in analyzing the international system – such as, for example, the interaction between multinational corporations and the world economy[16] – there is a much deeper theoretical issue here at stake regarding the sources of macro-level changes in the international system. In this sense, despite the influences of Ruggie, he replicates the static quality of Waltz's work.[17] Furthermore, he is unable to account for the emergence of new non-state forms of corporate agency in the international system, or even the emergence of new states.

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[12] Ibid.
[13] Wendt 1999, pp. 195 & 197.
[14] For a critical discussion of Wendt's claim that "states are people, too" see the contributions to Jackson 2004.
[15] Waltz 1986, p. 329 as cited in Finnemore 1996, p. 1.
[16] Wendt 1999, p. 194.
[17] Ruggie 1983.

It is to this issue that I turn in the next section, by arguing that a focus on *non-state forms of transnational mobilization* can provide more general insights into the basis of corporate agency and "collective actorhood" in world politics. As Ruggie, Spruyt, Kratochwil, Hall and others have pointed out, the state as an organizational form is only one of several types of collective actors that have historically operated on the world stage.[18] Contemporary theorists of non-state actors and transnational networks have tended to view such actors as members of a "global civil society" that operates within the international states system.[19] In this sense, they have made the error of projecting the domestic liberal pluralist view of the state onto the international system, which is problematic in that it ignores the important differences that still remain between the domestic institutional context of mature liberal democratic states and the more weakly institutionalized context of the international system as a whole.

Perhaps more problematically, however, it concedes to structural realists the view that non-state actors and transnational movements can always be reduced to "processes that go on within" the international system, rather than actors/processes that constitute the system itself,[20] or that transnational processes are shaped by states and not vice versa.[21] As the post-9/11 institutional reconfiguration of the United States government bureaucracy demonstrates, even the most powerful states in the international system can be shaped by the independent actions of relatively weak non-state actors.[22] If this is the case, it makes sense to move beyond the assumptions that have characterized both realist and constructivist accounts of corporate agency in international relations, and focus on the processes by which new forms of corporate agency emerge in world politics.

[18] Ruggie 1983, Kratochwil 1986, Spruyt 1994, Hall 1999.
[19] For a review, see Price 2003.
[20] Waltz 1979, 52.
[21] Krasner 1995.
[22] The Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004; Also see the discussion in Adamson 2002.

Nationalism, Transnational Political Mobilization, and the Emergence of Corporate Agency in World Politics

IR has focused on states as the primary actors in the international system, at the expense of understanding non-state forms of corporate agency. Yet, the emergence of collective identities and constituencies that are non-territorial in nature, but that can still be viewed as exerting corporate agency – as exhibiting the qualities of a collective actor – in international politics, has been an important feature of world politics over time. In fact, as I discuss below, many contemporary recognized members of the international states system had their origins in non-state transnational movements. Thus, a focus on processes of transnational mobilization by political entrepreneurs can help to shed light on the process by which new actors in international politics are constituted. During the process of transnational mobilization, political ideologies are deployed as a means of uniting disparate networks and identities into a coherent corporate agent at the level of the international system. A focus on the mobilization process elucidates how political ideologies act as the "glue" that holds together corporate agents in world politics. By drawing on insights from works in historical sociology, nationalism studies, and migration studies, it is possible to piece together a model of how transnational collective identities form at the level of the international system. This, in turn, helps to provide some insights into the dynamics surrounding the emergence of corporate agency in world politics.

Transnational Mobilization and the Emergence of Corporate Agency

Tilly, White and other sociologists have noted that there are two components to what they variously refer to as "groupness," "collectivity" or "organizational structure." The first consists of a *category* – which contains "people all of whom recognize their common characteristic, and whom everyone else recognizes as having that characteristic."

The second consists of *networks* of people who are linked to one another. "A set of individuals is a group [or corporate agent] to the extent that it comprises both a category and a network."[23]

This general framework is a useful one for understanding the emergence of transnational forms of corporate agency in world politics. It implies that the first step in the creation of a corporate agent/collective identity operating at the level of the international system is the activation of a transnational constituency from the mass of entangled and messy social networks that characterize the transnational social dimension of the international system. This involves the creation of coherent categories, discourses and symbols that can tie together dispersed social networks under a single category, thereby converting them into activated and politicized networks which can be drawn upon by political entrepreneurs in the pursuit of a political goal.

The task of the political entrepreneur engaged in transnational mobilization is to construct or deploy ideologies and categories that can be used to create new political groups out of existing social networks. In the case of transnational mobilization from below, the political entrepreneur must create a category that activates networks that are interstitial – networks that stretch across more than one political context in the international system, and which are marginal to existing centers of power. Interstitial spaces, as Mann and others argue, are powerful sites of human agency, in which the experience of liminality and marginality can be transformed into the articulation of new categories that are the catalysts for political change:

> An ideology will emerge as a powerful, autonomous movement when it can put together in a single explanation and organization a number of aspects of existence that have hitherto been marginal, interstitial to the dominant institutions of power. This is always a potential development…because there are many interstitial aspects of

[23] See Tilly 1978, pp. 62-63. White uses the term "catnet."

> experience and many sources of contact between human beings other than those that form the core networks of dominant institutions.[24]

By working at the margins of the international system, inbetween existing institutionalized centers of power, political entrepreneurs have the opportunity to operate quasi-independently to patch together new categories that can be used to mobilize people and resources that either exist on the margins of existing entities [empires, states] or are not fully mobilized within existing power centers. Globalization, exile, migration, and boundary-crossing from one political system to another all serve as impetuses for the creation of new categories and discourses, since these activities expose an individual to novel social and political conditions and thus allow for a reinterpretation of what might have previously been viewed as a naturalized state of existence. Edward Said writes that

> because the exile sees things both in terms of what has been left behind and what is actual here and now, there is a double perspective that never sees things in isolation. Every scene or situation in the new country necessarily draws on its counterpart in the old country. Intellectually, this means that an idea or experience is always counterposed with another, therefore making them both appear in a sometimes new and unpredictable light.[25]

In order to activate social networks and create transnational coalitions, therefore, it is necessary for political entrepreneurs to draw on categories or political ideologies that can be used to frame the experiences of those at the margins of the international system in new ways so as to stimulate "the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in [international] public life."[26]

Historical Cases of "Transnational Nationalism"

[24] Mann 1986, p. 21.

[25] Said 1994.

[26] Tilly 1978, p. 69. On the process of framing more generally see Goffman 1974.

One of the most widespread categories or political ideologies used in modern times to create a sense of "groupness" has been nationalism. Nationalism has been particularly successful as a mobilizing category due to what Benedict Anderson describes as its modular character. The political ideology of nationalism is a "distillation of a complex 'crossing' of historical forces; but that, once created…became 'modular,' capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations."[27] The utility of nationalism as a political category is that it combines a universalist imperative – the linking of cultural groupings to demarcated territorial spaces governed by centralizing institutional configurations (the linking of the nation to the state, to paraphrase Gellner) – with the flexibility to incorporate an infinitely wide range of cultural, linguistic and symbolic artifacts as mobilizing instruments.

Many political entrepreneurs who have historically used nationalism as a mobilizing ideology have been situated in transnational spaces as exiles, expatriates or migrants where, positioned at the nexus of two societies in a state of inbetweenness, they could cobble together new political categories by drawing upon universalist discursive frameworks and applying them to particular circumstances. It should not be surprising, therefore, that many of the great nationalist movements have had their origins in exile. Mahatma Gandhi, for example, studied in London and his first major political project was to found the Natal Indian Congress in South Africa in 1894, which was established to fight discrimination of Indian traders, before becoming one of the leading figures of Indian nationalism. Ho Chi Minh studied in France and was a founding member of the French Communist Party before establishing his nationalist-communist revolutionary movement in

[27] Anderson 1983, p. 4.

Vietnam. The nation-state of Czechoslavakia was founded in Pittsburgh, USA, since "the mass base of organized Slovak nationalism was to be found in Pennsylvania, rather than in Slovakia." Carpathian nationalism's only institutionalized expression was in the American immigrant community, and had no organizational structure in the Hapsburg Empire.[28] In short, many historical instances of *nationalist* mobilization have actually started as instances of *transnational* mobilization. This pattern has been largely ignored by social scientists due to the biases inherent in "methodological territorialism" and because the process of transnational mobilization and its spatial dimensions have not been adequately studied in isolation from the content of nationalism as a mobilizing ideology.[29]

The experience of migration and exile provides numerous opportunities for the creation of new political categories that can be used to transform passive social networks into activated "catnets" or groups.[30] "Transplanted networks" of migrants and exiles played a disproportionate role in the development of nation-states during the period of global economic integration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the United States, for example, international immigration patterns during the nineteenth century led to new and expanded identifications in migrant communities through a combination of external labeling (due to social discrimination or the state's immigrant classification system); the imperative to engage in community-building as a source of mutual support; and the mobilization activities of local ethnic elites.[31] Tilly notes that "sets of connected immigrants who did not have a common identity at the point of origin acquired a new

[28] Hobsbawm 1989, pp. 154-155.
[29] See McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, pp. 188-219 for a discussion of nationalist mobilization as a form of the larger category of contentious politics.
[30] For a discussion of the political role of exile see Said 1994. See Bhabha 1994 for a discussion of the political and cultural implications of "posing questions of solidarity and community from the interstitial perspective." (p. 3). Walt 1992, pp. 346-347 discusses the "pernicious" role that exiles can play following domestic regime change. The political activities of exiles are analyzed in great length in Shain 1989.
[31] See, for example, Tilly 1990; Hobsbawm 1989, pp. 153-154; Kenny 1998; 1999a; 199b; Miller 1990.

identification during interaction with others at the destination. In the United States, Piedmontese, Neapolitans, Sicilians, and Romans became Italians."[32] Similarly, Irish immigrants became Irish nationalists. "Irish identity, already formed in Ireland through opposition to the conquering English, altered in the United States under a bourgeoisie that promoted religiosity, nationalism, and political involvement."[33]

Thus, it was the Irish diaspora in the United States that provided much of the impetus and support for the development of a politicized Irish nationalism in Ireland. Irish immigrants in America and England made up the majority of recruits for the Fenian movement of the 1860s, and constituted the organizational base of support for the Fenian Uprising of February – March 1867. The Fenian movement in the United States even attempted an invasion of Canada from the United States in 1866 in the hope of bargaining with England for Irish freedom.[34] Mobilized and politicized networks of Irish-Americans provided crucial bases of political and financial support in the Anglo-Irish war of 1916-21, a tradition which continued in support for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) beginning again in the late 1960s.

The Irish case was certainly not an isolated pattern, however. Tilly writes that, "… other groups of immigrants…committed themselves more strongly to nationalist politics as Americans than had their ancestors in the old country."[35] For example, a number of Balkan nationalist movements during the early twentieth century were "long-distance" in character, organized largely by nationalist political entrepreneurs in the United States or Great Britain. Triadafilopoulos has shown how both Albanian and Greek nationalist political entrepreneurs that were operating transnationally between 1919 and 1921

[32] Tilly 1990, p. 86.
[33] Tilly 1990, pp. 86-87.
[34] Kenny 1999b; Miller 1990; Lustick 1993, p. 125. Hobsbawm 1996b, p. 92.
[35] Tilly 1990, p. 86.

competed to produce nationalist rhetoric and discourse that would legitimize contending national claims to "Northern Epirus." The most influential and virulently nationalist Albanian writers were leaders of the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, the Boston-based Albanian National Party, and the London-based Anglo-Albanian Society. Similarly, the most influential and radical Greek nationalist writer of the time was Nicholas J. Cassavetes, a Private in the United States Army during World War I, and leader of the pan-Epirotic Union of America, who published his nationalist materials in English.[36]

Perhaps the most spectacular instance of transnational nationalist mobilization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was Zionism, which provides the archetypical example of "diaspora nationalism."[37] In the case of Zionism, political entrepreneurs invented both a homeland and a language, transforming what had been dispersed religious communities into a transnational nationalist movement that was able to acquire its own territorial state, displacing native populations in the process. From its initial articulations in Russia by Leo Pinsker and scattered Zionist groups, to its consolidation as a political program by Hungarian Theodor Herzl, the movement was from the start transnational. The first Zionist Congress met in Basel, Switzerland in 1897, which established a transnational network of branches of the World Zionist Organization that engaged in grassroots mobilization of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe while simultaneously seeking support from Western Jews and third party states. By the mid-20th century, the center of international Zionist activity was in the USA, and in the aftermath of the Holocaust it was the combination of US pressure and anti-British terrorist tactics in Palestine that led to the founding of Israel in 1948.[38]

[36] See Triadafilopoulos 2000, and his reference to Stickney 1926.
[37] Gellner 1983, pp. 101-109.

[38] For discussions, see Cleveland 1994 pp. 222-225; Cohen 1992; Cohen 1997, pp. 115-125; Elazar 1976; Hobsbawm 1989, pp. 146-147; Hoffman 1998, pp. 48-56.

Hobsbawm observes that, during the course of international migration in the 19th century "'nationality' became a real network of personal relations rather than a merely imaginary community…the greater the migration of peoples and the more rapid the development of cities and industry which threw uprooted masses against each other, the greater the basis for national consciousness among the uprooted. Hence, in the case of new nationalist movements, exile was often their main place of incubation."[39] In the current era, concepts of diaspora and diasporic identities are becoming increasingly significant, as a means of taking advantage of possibilities for mobilization that are offered by new communication and transportation technologies. Whereas in the case of Zionism, transnational networks were mobilized and activated to agitate for the founding of a territorial Jewish state, today the formation of diasporas and diasporic identities is often a political end in and of itself. Political entrepreneurs have taken the concept of diaspora and changed it from a *descriptive* to a *prescriptive* term – a category taken up by political entrepreneurs to organize internationally dispersed communities of "immigrants" or "ethnic minorities" in ways that allow for identifications, coalition-building and political action which can take place across national borders on a global, as well as a national and local, stage.[40] Of course, traditional forms of what Benedict Anderson refers to as "long-distance nationalism" still exist, and the process of creating imagined communities and seeking territorial statehood continues. A contemporary example of this is the Sikh movement for an independent Khalistan, in which the concept of Khalistan was largely invented in the Sikh diaspora community in Canada.[41]

National categories, of course, are not the only political categories that have been used by political entrepreneurs to activate networks and engage in transnational

[39] Hobsbawm 1989, p. 154.
[40] See Basch et al. 1994; Clifford 1994; Danforth 1990; Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990.
[41] Appadurai 1996; Dusenbery 1995.

mobilization. Just prior to the wave of transnational nationalist mobilization in the second half of the 19th century, other political entrepreneurs were organizing transnationally to mobilize constituencies based on competing political categories. For these revolutionaries, the experience of exile played an important role in this process. In Europe, transnational leftist networks proliferated, including the "Fraternal Democrats" (composed of 'natives of Great Britain, France, Germany, Scandinavia, Poland, Italy, Switzerland, Hungary and other countries) and groups such as "Young Europe" and "Democratic Association for the Unification of All Countries."[42] Exile played a particularly important role in stimulating the revolutions of 1848 in Europe:

> Most political militants of the continental left were expatriates for some time, many for decades, congregating in the relatively few zones of refuge or asylum: France, Switzerland, to a lesser extent Britain and Belgium… A common fate and a common ideal bound these expatriates and travellers together. Most of them faced the same problems of poverty and police surveillance, of illegal correspondence, espionage and the ubiquitous agent-provocateur…In the centres of refuge the emigres formed that provisional, but so often permanent community of exile while they planned the liberation of mankind."[43] [They] organized, argued, quarrelled, frequented and denounced one another, and planned the liberation of their countries, or in the meantime that of other countries. The Poles and to a lesser extent the Italians…became in effect international corps of revolutionary militants."[44]

One of the most ambitious transnational movements of the late 19th and early 20th century was revolutionary socialism, whose main protagonists were two German exiles – Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Members of German expatriate communities in London, they were active in political organizations such as the "German League of the Outlaws," which later became the "Communist League."[45] Marx then went on to found the First

[42] Hobsbawm 1996a, pp. 128-129.
[43] Hobsbawm 1996a, p. 131.
[44] Hobsbawm 1996a, p. 130.

[45] Hobsbawm 1996a, p. 127.

International, the "International Workmen's Association," which was replaced by the Second International (1889-1914) and, following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Third, or Communist International.[46] Revolutionary socialism was inherently an international movement based on transnational mobilization. Lenin himself was agitating from exile in Switzerland only weeks before the Bolsheviks' success.[47] In the aftermath of the Cold War, which is viewed in IR as simply a contest between two superpower states, it is easy to underestimate the extent to which revolutionary socialism was also a transnational movement in its own right, which penetrated across states, and was viewed by most state elites in the non-communist world as posing as much of an "internal" as an "external" security threat.[48]

A view of the international system as an arena in which political entrepreneurs draw on political ideologies -- constructing or deploying identity categories to engage in processes of transnational mobilization -- paints a very different picture from that which is portrayed in standard IR models, which focus only on the identities and interests of states operating in an anarchic environment. Adding a transnational dimension to models of the international system, and viewing transnational political entrepreneurs as being positioned in interstitial or transnational spaces between the powerful structures of states is a useful

[46] Hobsbawm 1994, p. 69.
[47] Hobsbawm 1994, p. 60.
[48] Examples include the US Alien Registration Act of 1940, which required all alien residents to file a comprehensive statement of their personal and occupational status and political beliefs. The aim of the act was to undermine the American Communist Party and other leftist organizations. In the 1950s, The House of Un-American Activities Committee and the activities associated with McCarthyism were signs of the extent to which the United States Government viewed communism as being an *internal*, as well as external security threat. The range of internal security threats associated with the international socialist movement and Marxist-Leninist ideology ranged from revolutionary and terrorist groups in Europe, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, to Marxist-Leninist insurgency groups operating in regions across the non-industrialized world (including Vietnam).

means of beginning to model the micro-level activities that bring about macro-level changes at the international systemic level. Moreover, a focus on transnational political mobilization as a process that generates new forms of *non-state corporate agency* allows us to think more broadly about how collective identities and corporate actors are constituted at the level of the international system. States, as corporate agents, are intimately tied to particular geographic spaces, to territory. However, territorially-defined corporate agents do not exhaust the types of corporate agency and collective identities that exist at the level of the international system.

Indeed, as I hope to illustrate in the next section of this paper with a case study of the evolution of the Algerian nationalist movement, in many cases there is a very close link between transnational forms of non-state corporate agency, and the emergence of new states in the international system. As in other cases of anti-colonial nationalist movements, the case of Algerian nationalism demonstrates the extent to which transnational mobilization by non-state political entrepreneurs, and the use of political ideologies to create coherent transnational constituencies, has been the basis for the emergence of new forms of territorially-defined corporate agency in world politics. To put it more simply, one cannot simply start with the assumption of states existing; a focus on their origins and how particular states are constituted through the emergence and propagation of political ideologies is the first step to developing a richer view of the components of corporate agency in international politics.

From Transnational Movement to Territorial State: The Case of Algerian Nationalism and the Emergence of a New Corporate Agent in World Politics

Before there was an Algerian state, there was an Algerian nationalism movement. That movement arose first in immigrant communities in France, not Algeria, and was

organized transnationally from the onset. The story of how Algerian nationalism arose in France provides a useful means of illustrating the route by which a new ideology emerges in the international system and becomes a tool for creating a transnational movement/engaging in transnational political mobilization. In other words, the study of Algerian nationalism helps us to understand the emergence of *non-state corporate agency* in world politics.

The first articulation of Algerian nationalism as a political ideology was by Algerian[49] political entrepreneurs living in Paris in the 1920s, who mobilized a constituency of support for Algerian nationalism within the Algerian immigrant community in France. From the 1920s to the start of the Algerian War of Liberation in 1954, successive groups led by Algerian nationalist Messali Hadj, including *Étoile Nord Africaine* (ENA), *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (PPA), and *Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD), were active within the community of Algerian immigrant workers in France.[50]

In the case of Algerian nationalism, political entrepreneurs married the discourse of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism with discourses drawn from Islam, the Arabic language or regional history. They constructed a discourse of Algerian nationalism that could connect networks of immigrant communities and transnational socialist networks in Europe, with religious and village networks in colonial Algeria, and combined these to form the political and social basis of an Algerian nationalism, thus connecting disparate

[49] I use the term "Algerian" here as a convenient shorthand throughout this section when I describe "Algerian" political entrepreneurs or the "Algerian" immigrant community. The usage is however at cross-purposes with the overall narrative/argument in that it naturalizes/reifies an Algerian identity. Indeed, the self-consciously "Algerian" political entrepreneurs could have activated other identities – as Muslims, North Africans, Berbers, Arabs, colonial subjects, French, etc. etc. – and many did. I have argued elsewhere that one sees interesting comparisons and contrasts in contemporary Europe in the growing deployment of a transnational "Muslim" identity at the expense of particular national/ethnic identities. See Adamson 2006. However, I have yet to find a better terminology to employ in narrating the case study.
[50] Stora 1993, p. 75.

networks to one another in a way that constructed a new corporate identity (the Algerian nation) at the level of the international system.

The development of Algerian nationalism, from its origins in Paris in the 1920s to its culmination in the creation of an independent Algerian state in 1962, was inherently transnational – simultaneously operating in networks of cafes in Paris, and in urban and rural networks in Algeria. Nationalist elites selectively activated various strands of Algerian nationalist ideology, depending on the constituency at hand – revolutionary socialism and anti-colonialism with the urban immigrant worker population in France, or traditional Islam and religious values with rural constituencies in Algeria.

It was via migration processes that diverse local identities and affiliations were first transformed into a national consciousness within the context provided by metropolitan France, and this nationalist consciousness was in turn re-imported back into North Africa via return migration. Identities that had been formed within a local context were transformed into identities formed within a global and transnational context. This was brought about due to increased movement and contact between Algerians and the French population in the metropole, as well as increased contact between Algerians living within other regions in France. These processes encouraged the development of new levels of identifications and affiliations. Stora describes the immigrant milieu of France in the 1920s and its effects on identity-formation processes:

> A sense of exile and rootlessness served to strengthen an inchoate nationalist consciousness…Algerians quickly learnt that the differences in dialect, dress, food and customs – differences which…had previously assumed very great importance as cultural markers – seemed suddenly unimportant compared with the more obvious and striking difference between all Algerian immigrants and those they referred to as *la classe européenne.* The nationalist organization was to codify and give meaning to this transformation from a narrow sensibility based on the values of the

> small Algerian village to one based on a much larger cultural and geographical consciousness, that of Algeria as a nation-state.[51]

Positioned in marginal spaces between Algerian and French society, exiles, students and workers were able to draw on discourses that existed within intellectual currents in Europe that addressed workers' rights and anti-imperialism, and in turn apply those ideas to the specific context of Algeria's status as a French colony. Instead of focusing narrowly on work conditions and workers' rights within the metropole itself, political entrepreneurs pursued their interests within the context of systemic level opportunities and constraints. In short, they constructed and then drew upon a political ideology that would provide them with a means of constituting a new form of corporate agency, or collective identity/collective voice, at the level of the international system in a way that challenged the colonial/imperial status quo.

Political entrepreneurs within the Algerian immigrant community patched together a version of Algerian nationalism that could speak to the larger geopolitical context as a means of remedying structural inequalities – of which their presence in France was, in their minds, a symptom.[52] By drawing on discourses of equality and progress in France, Algerian nationalists pointed to the unequal status of Algeria vis-à-vis France and viewed themselves as continuing the French revolutionary tradition. They fought equally against discrimination of the Algerian worker community by the French and assimilation of that community into French society, in their attempt to foster an autonomous political constituency of revolutionary Algerian nationalists within France.

The Algerian population in France also came into contact with and was inspired by other emerging Arab nationalist movements and political discourses regarding the self-determination of peoples that was being promoted by the United States at the time. The

[51] Stora 1993, pp. 50-51.
[52] Stora 1992, pp. 39-60.

Algerian immigrant community was not unique, but rather typical of other expatriate and immigrant communities in Paris at the time. El Yazami notes that the various colonial expatriate communities in Paris during the interwar period were "marked to a greater or lesser extent by the same twin paradox: expatriation in France was the seedbed for nationalist movements seeking independence at home, and in demanding liberation from France those movements drew on Western concepts of human rights, as forged by the French revolution and proletarian internationalism."[53] Along with Algerian nationalists, revolutionaries such as Ho Chi Minh and Deng Xiaoping, and intellectuals associated with the *Negritude* movement were actively involved in trade union and political movements, "living side by side with French left-wing activists," and publishing revolutionary newspapers for expatriate communities in Paris."[54] Anti-imperialist meetings in Paris brought together North African immigrants with other "victims of European colonialism" and communist organizations sent contingents of migrants to international meetings organized to denounce imperialism.[55] Thus, Algerian nationalism was only one of several nationalist movements in Paris during the interwar period that "became manifest in their 'modern' forms as independence movements….creating the remarkable paradox that these nationalist movements developed as part of the migratory process outside of the countries that they wished to liberate."[56]

Early Algerian Nationalism: Messali Hadj and the Étoile Nord Africaine (ENA)

The first independent Algerian nationalist organization was the *Étoile Nord Africaine* (ENA), which was founded by a small groups of Kabyle immigrant workers in Paris and which rose to prominence under Messali Hadj – an Algerian who had served in

[53] El Yazami 1997, p. 116.
[54] El Yazami 1997, p. 117.
[55] Zagoria 1973, p. 199.
[56] Stora 1990, p. 109.

the French Army during World War I, moved to France in order to find work, married a French woman and settled in France.[57] A charismatic figure who was described by a *Le Monde* journalist as "Rasputin of 1916, Gapon of 1905…a magus, a prophet, a miracle-worker," he commanded a loyal following in France from the 1920s until the mid-1950s.[58] Messali Hadj was an archetypical political entrepreneur, who moved back and forth between France and Algeria, and headed up a variety of successive nationalist organizations that are collectively referred to as the "Messalist" strand of Algerian nationalism, considered now to be the main precursor to the Algerian nationalist movement that culminated in the founding of the Front de Libération (FLN) in 1954.[59]

Messali Hadj became president of the ENA in 1926, and along with Ali Abdelkader, set out to mobilize the Algerian and Maghrebian immigrant communities in Paris, publishing nationalist newspapers – first *l'Ikdam de Paris*, then *l'Ikdam Nord-Africain* – and distributing them in mosques, immigrant cafes and kiosks throughout Paris.[60] In addition to distributing their newspapers they formulated a series of political demands, issued a party manifesto, petitioned the French government and released notices

[57] Horne 1987, p. 39. At least two biographies which detail the life of Messali Hadj are in print – Stora 1982 and Simon 1998. The platform of the *Étoile Nord-Africaine* called for the independence of Algeria, as well as Morocco and Tunisia, and for the unity of North Africa. Stora 1992, p. 26. Messali Hadj himself was born of Kouloughli parents (i.e. mixed Turkish and Arab descent). He learned French at an early age in his home town of Tlemcen and served in the French military in Bourdeaux during World War I. Upon settling in France, he worked a variety of jobs, including as a factory worker in a Renault plant in Paris, audited courses and became involved in the French Communist Party. See Zagoria 1973, p. 3.

[58] Horne 1987, p. 39.

[59] The organizations headed up by Messali Hadj included the *Étoile Nord-Africaine* (ENA) which was founded in 1924 and lasted until 1937. It was replaced by the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (PPA) in 1937, and organization that was dissolved by the French government in 1939 and then went underground until it was reestablished as the *Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD) in 1946. The MTLD existed until the outbreak of the Algerian War of Liberation in November 1954, after which it was replaced by Messali Hadj's *Mouvement Nationaliste Algérienne* (MNA). The other strands of Algerian nationalism were the religious strand, as represented by the *Association des Ulemas*, founded in 1931 and the liberal reformist strand as represented by Ferhat Abbas. See Horne 1987, pp. 38-39; Zagoria 1973, pp. 1.

[60] Stora 1992, pp. 28-29.

to the French press, all the time attempting to increase their membership by politicizing Algerian workers.[61]

The majority of the ENA's constituency was composed of Berber immigrant workers from the Kabyle areas of Algeria.[62] Throughout the 1920s, Messali's ENA had between 3,500 and 4,000 members in France, distributed throughout thirteen sections, eight of which were in Paris. Meetings regularly drew crowds numbering in the hundreds. In addition to being a political movement, the ENA provided a point of orientation for migrants and functioned as a mutual aid society, and was based on personal relationships.[63]

In France, the ENA drew on the already-existing networks of immigrant cafes that existed throughout Paris – as a way of tapping into the political potential of the Algerian immigrant community in a way that was both low-cost and low-risk. The network of cafes throughout Paris were the places in which Algerian immigrant opinion was shaped, and targeting networks of cafés also held out the possibility of co-opting the local elite – Algerian and other North African café owners, who tended to be the best off financially and the most well-connected. By 1935, the ENA had mobilized a network of "activist-café owners" (*militants-cafetiers*) through its "politique des cafes" which made Algerian-owned cafes recruiting and propaganda centers for the movement.[64] The ENA finally opened its first section in Algeria in 1936, and the movement rapidly grew to over several thousand members in various cities across Algeria within a few months.[65]

The ENA was banned again in 1937, only to be recreated by Messali Hadj in the form of the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (PPA). Algerian nationalist activists in Paris went

[61] Zagoria 1973, p. 199.
[62] Zagoria 1973, p. 52.
[63] Zagoria 1973, p. 53.
[64] Stora 1992, pp. 29-34; Zagoria 1973, p. 213.
[65] Zagoria 1973, p. 58. The ENA claimed to have 11,000 members in Algeria at the time, which most agree was an exaggerated amount.

from immigrant café to café calling on "friends of *L'Ouma*" to let their constituency know of the change in the organization's name and to encourage the immigrant community to participate in the new organization. A formal structure was set up, which stretched across various regions of Paris. Political organizing by now was also taking place in Algeria, with activities that included both workers' strikes and nationalist demonstrations. The Algerian immigrant community in France had managed to build a version of Algerian nationalism, with an ideology and a mobilized constituency that formed the basis for the development of a radical nationalist movement that was now also increasingly active in Algeria, after having been reimported to Algeria from France.

It was during and following World War II, however, that an Algerian nationalist movement began to expand rapidly in both France and Algeria. The most dramatic expression of this was a 300,000 strong demonstration in Paris by the Algerian immigrant community in 1942, which demanded the release of the imprisoned Messali Hadj.[66] During the war hundreds of thousands of Algerians returned home, first in response to the threat of factory bombings in France, and then in response to the Allied occupation of North Africa from 1942-1945, which cut France off from Algeria. This helped to contribute to an expansion of nationalist sentiment within Algeria. The period of return-migration to Algeria provided an opportunity for members of the nationalist movement in France to diffuse their ideas to an expanding network of sympathizers in colonial Algeria. In addition, the experience of serving in the French army during the war appeared to have had a radicalizing effect on many young Algerians – not only were they exposed to political currents in other colonial areas, many were also politicized and mobilized by PPA activists while serving in the French army. For others, service in the army made recruits more aware of their unequal treatment at the hands of the *pieds-noirs* or provided a military training

[66] Zagoria 1973, p. 70.

ground, which would be built upon later for the establishment of Algerian nationalist paramilitary organizations.[67]

The end of World War II was marked in Algeria by nationalist uprisings in Sétif and Guelma, which were severely repressed, resulting in thousands of Algerian deaths.[68] Migration to France resumed after the war, and increasingly was characterized by families, rather than single men, and by a more equal mixture of Berbers and Arabs. By 1954 there were approximately a quarter of a million migrants in France.[69] Messali Hadj and his followers again took up the fight for Algerian independence in France under the guise of the French division of the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* (PPA), and later as the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD). The movements published such papers as *L'Emigré Algérien* and *L'Etoile Algerienne*, which had circulations of approximately 5,000. The newspapers addressed the issue of Algerian independence within the context of other anti-colonial movements in Indochina and sub-Saharan Africa. They also openly attacked reformist Algerian nationalist organizations, such as the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA), led by Ferhat Abbas. The MTLD pursued a dual strategy that included both legal and clandestine organizations. On the one hand, a series of legal changes in 1945-1947 made Algerians who lived in the metropole French citizens, and the MTLD placed its own candidates for the French National Assembly. On

[67] Sarrasin 1949, p. 101; Quandt 1969, pp. 78-79; Zagoria 1973, p. 72. The comparison with the Irish nationalist Finean movement in the United States is interesting, as many of the militant Fineans were recruited while soldiers fighting on the Union side in the U.S. Civil War. See Kenny 1999. Messali Hadj, speaking earlier in 1933 had made a similar argument regarding "military training" received in WWI: "Many of you have served in the imperialist army, the one which has massacred your relatives and which today fights your Moroccan brothers. May the training which you have received serve you soon against those who have, by force, trained you." Zagoria 1973, p. 202.

[68] Stora 1992, p. 93. The riots broke out when Algerians used the occasion of the celebration of the Allied victory over the Germans to demand independence for Algeria. When political demonstrators holding placards with Messali's picture were attacked by police units, riots broke out, resulting in the deaths of approximately 100 Europeans. In the days that followed the riots, however, approximately 6,000 to 10,000 Algerians were killed in the ensuing repressive measures taken by the colonial administration. See Aron 1962, chs. 2-3; Zagoria 1973, pp. 220-222.

[69] Zagoria 1973, p. 37.

the other hand, the clandestine *Organisation Spéciale* (OS) paramilitary group was formed in 1947 and began to meet in order to secretly make preparations for armed conflict. For a period of time the OS had as many as 1,800 members, and it was this grouping that would later form the basis of the FLN.[70]

By the time the Algerian War of Liberation started, the Algerian immigrant community in France was extremely politicized, with approximately 7,000 Algerian nationalist activists operating across France.[71] At the same time, however, the numbers of nationalists had expanded drastically within Algeria itself – with estimates of approximately 24,000 followers of Messali Hadj in colonial Algeria.[72] The Messalist movement had laid the basis of Algerian nationalism and had provided a training ground for many of those who were to commence the armed struggle to liberate Algeria from France.[73] However, ultimately it was not Messali Hadj's movement that would be at the forefront of the War of Liberation, but rather a splinter group - the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), which was formed by dissident members of the armed wing of the MTLD who had been frustrated by the internal divisions which were increasingly plaguing Messali's organization, the reformist outlook of the MTLD, and the lack of an armed strategy for achieving the goal of independence.

The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) 1954-1962

The FLN grew out of a dissatisfied faction of MTLD militants – the nine "Algerian chiefs" - who formed the *Comité Révolutionnaire Pour l'Unité et l'Action* (CRUA) and which eventually transformed itself into the FLN. Although the FLN was founded in Paris, its main base of popular support at the beginning of the war lay in Algeria. The Algerian

[70] Haroun 1986, p. 14; Stora 1993, pp. 48-53; Zagoria 1973, p. 123-124.
[71] Stora 1993, p. 39.
[72] Zagoria 1973, p. 71.
[73] Quandt 1969, pp. 80-85.

immigrant community in France was, during the early years of the war, still mobilized by Messali Hadj. Following the founding of the FLN, and the declaration of war against France on November 1, 1954, Messali Hadj transformed his MTLD into the *Mouvement Nationaliste Algérien* (MNA), which was to continue to command support amongst the Algerian immigrant community during the first years of the war. In 1955, internal documents of the FLN acknowledged that their organization had little popular support amongst Algerians in France, who were overwhelmingly loyal to the MNA.[74] One of the challenges the FLN faced from the beginning of the outbreak of the war was to mobilize the Algerian immigrant community in France, which could provide the FLN with a source of both material support and political leverage within France. At the FLN's Soummam Conference in 1956, a decision was made to drastically expand the FLN's operations into metropolitan France. The FLN branch established in France was called the *Fédération de France du* FLN (FFFLN). A "Committee of Five" was established, which set up a vast organizational structure throughout France (and Belgium), concentrated in the urban areas.[75] Within a relatively short period of time the FLN "through a combination of persuasion and terror, was able to organize the majority of Algerians in France within the framework of the FFFLN."[76] Like Messali's organizations before it, the FFFLN distributed newspapers and other literature as tools of mobilization, worked through personal contacts, and exploited the power base of Algerian immigrant café owners in France.

The main goal of the FFFLN was to collect money from immigrant workers to finance the war, but in the process the FLN also set up an organizational structure within France that performed a variety of functions. Headed up by the aforementioned

[74] Haroun 1986.
[75] The Committee of Five consisted of Omar Boudaoud, Abdelkrim Souici, Ali Haroun, Kaddour Ladlani and Saïd Bouaziz.
[76] Quandt 1969, p. 121.

"Committee of Five," the organization founded student and workers' branches and established a vast organizational structure throughout France.[77] The FLN also set up organizational structures in other European countries, with representatives in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium.[78] The FFFLN provided a number of social services to the immigrant population in France, setting up institutions parallel to the state within metropolitan areas of France:

> …the FFFLN provided judicial services to Algerians in France, paid monthly allowances to the families of political prisoners, set up commissions of hygiene to improve the living standards of the workers, and organized armed groups to carry out police actions against the MNA or repressive landlords.[79]

Stora describes how the FLN established a "contre-société" within France for the Algerian immigrant community. The FLN was determined to "isolate Algerians from French society" by developing their own infrastructure of social welfare, so-called "hygiene committees" (operating parallel to those in the French system, which were used to inspect apartment buildings and other establishments) and systems of police protection. In addition, an infrastructure was set up to extract resources and tax the local immigrant population for the war effort.[80]

Headed up largely by an intellectual elite, the FFFLN also actively made contact with the French left and civil society groups within France in an attempt to influence public opinion in favor of French decolonization. The newspaper organs of the FFFLN – the *El Moudjahid*, which was founded by Ramdane Abane in 1956, and various other FLN publications, such as *Résistance algérienne* encouraged the Algerian immigrant community to make alliances with left-wing organizations in France and to "disseminate information,

[77] Detailed descriptions of the organizational structure of the FFFLN can be found in Haroun 1986 and in the Annexes to Stora 1992.
[78] Horne 1987, p. 262; Hutchinson 1978, p. 45; Wall 2001, p. 168.
[79] Quandt 1969, p. 122.
[80] Stora 1992, p. 343.

explain FLN objectives to the masses, and make them aware of the meaning of the Algerian people's struggle." Supposedly following advice given to the FLN by Mao, a key strategy was to "dissociate" the people of France who want peace and friendship from the imperialists," with the view that "you have to win over the French."[81]

In 1959-1960 the FLN engaged in a wave of terrorism within France itself, with several hundred attacks on transportation arteries, refineries, police vehicles and other targets. A bomb was even discovered in the Eiffel Tower. The FLN, however, purposively avoided targeting French civilians in an attempt to not alienate the support of the French left. Most of the human victims of the wave of attacks were actually members of the rival Algerian group MNA.[82] At the same time, radical segments of the European *pieds-noirs* settler population spawned their own organizations in France, such as the *Front d'Algérie Francaise* (FAF), which engaged in agitation and acts of terror in the French metropole.[83] By 1962 the situation was quickly deteriorating in France, and the FLN appeared to have won a political victory on the global stage, having managed, among other things, to have received the endorsement of the United States for its project of building an Algerian nation-state. The Algerian War of Liberation was ended with the signing of the Evian Accords in 1962, which recognized Algeria as a new corporate actor in world politics.

The creation of an independent Algerian state was a political project that was planned, executed and institutionalized by relatively weak non-state political entrepreneurs who relied heavily on the use of a political ideology of nationalism to engage in processes of transnational mobilization. Operating in transnational spaces and at the interstices of powerful centralizing institutions, Algerian political entrepreneurs drew on the resources that were available to them in the form of transnational networks and systemic-level

[81] Ellul 1982, pp. 17-18.
[82] Horne 1987, p. 318.
[83] Horne 1987, pp. 417-418.

opportunity structures. Political entrepreneurs first created a category of Algerian nationalism within France, and then used this category as a means of activating and mobilizing social networks in both France and Algeria. It was through the effective use of the *ideology of Algerian nationalism* that a small group of political entrepreneurs were able, in effect, to create something out of nothing - - to create a new corporate agent that is known as "Algeria" and that came to be recognized as a legitimate member of the international state system by all other member states.

Conclusions: The Constitutive Power of Political Ideology

The preceding case study provides a concrete illustration of the power of political ideology in constituting new corporate agents in world politics. It raises a number of issues that remain seriously under-explored in International Relations scholarship, which has largely ignored the question of the origins of the "actors" in the international system. Even if one chooses to begin one's analysis of international politics with the starting assumption that states are the primary units of analysis, the problem remains that the number of states in the international system has not been constant over the past half century. While recent work has examined the phenomenon of "state death" in international politics,[84] there is a need also to examine "state birth" or the origins of new forms of corporate agency that take the form of new sovereign states.

Additionally, with the rise of political Islam as an effective tool for transnational political mobilization in the contemporary world, there is a need to also better understand *non-state forms of corporate agency* in world politics. The case of Algerian nationalism provides an example of both non-state corporate agency (pre-1962) and state corporate

[84] Fazal 2004

agency (post-1962). By examining the trajectory of the Algerian nationalist movement, we gain insights into both non-state and state corporate agency in world politics.

Of course, the political ideology of nationalism differs from other political ideologies, such as socialism or Islamism, in that it is territorial – or attempts to link specific historical and cultural identities with specific territories. Nationalism, as an ideology, provides the basis for thinking of the world as a world of "nation-states" as opposed to thinking of the world in other terms -- such as, for example, the conception of the world as divided into "dar-al-Islam" and "dar-al-harb" (zones of peace, and zones of war); or the cosmopolitan vision of the world as a single political space -- an integrated and globalizing liberal world polity. As such, the ideology of nationalism is constitutive of the global order of nation-states – it makes a particular form of corporate agency, statehood, possible. It has been deployed by political entrepreneurs for the purposes of generating new corporate agents in world politics, with varying degrees of success.

The question remains as to what the systemic level effects will be of the emergence of new forms of non-national and non-state corporate agency in world politics – in which the goal of the non-state corporate agent is not necessarily "limited" in the sense of seeking to embed itself in a territorial state, but rather to exert corporate agency in world politics for other larger ideological purposes. In this sense, Islamism more closely resembles "rootless" and non-territorial ideologies, such as anarchism, socialism or communism, than it does nationalism. At the same time, however, the general model of transnational mobilization that is counter-hegemonic in its use of an ideology to bring together "interstitial" resources to create new forms of corporate agency in world politics has many

similarities with the emergence of [anti-colonial] nationalism movements [which also relied heavily on violence as part of their oppositional repertoires].[85]

What are the broader implications of this discussion for systemic-level IR theory? Four additional points can be raised here in conclusion. First, the case study presented in this paper demonstrates that both realism and constructivism need to pay greater attention to understanding corporate agency, rather than focusing their research agendas exclusively on the interests, identities and behaviors of "agents." Corporate agency is a pre-condition for unitary action, yet there is a lack of empirical research into how specific forms of corporate agents come to be constituted and understood as collective actors in world politics.

Second, the case study of Algerian nationalism shows that the division of the field of IR into power-based and identity-based approaches does not capture the complex dynamics that characterize the emergence of corporate agency in world politics. Groups such as the FLN drew upon the ideology of nationalism as a way of creating a transnational constituency, yet they also employed violence and had well-coordinated strategies for the mobilization of material resources as a way of furthering their political project.[86] Examining the ways in which political entrepreneurs draw upon both material and ideational factors is a more fruitful avenue for research than a zero-sum approach that pits material factors against ideational factors.

Thirdly, the discussion here suggests the need to expand the theoretical repertoire drawn upon by IR theorists to make sense of the international system. It points to the utility of approaches that emphasize the importance of understanding sociological and historical

[85] See discussions in Adamson 2005a; 2005b. Adamson 2005b in particular suggests that the rise of Political Islam must be viewed within the broader context of liberal hegemony – a point that is useful for thinking about the possible limits of the so-called "liberal peace."
[86] For a more extensive discussion of the case of Algerian nationalism, see Adamson 2002.

processes in world politics – as opposed to starting with the assumption of actors/units as givens.[87]

Finally, I have argued here for the independent role that political ideology plays in constituting corporate agents in world politics. A purely realist approach cannot explain the trajectory of the Algerian nationalism movement. The Algerian nationalist movement had its origins in dispersed and marginalized immigrant communities in France –it was the ideology of Algerian nationalism was the "glue" that created the new transnational constituencies that would eventually result in the emergence of an Algerian state. In addition, by any measure the material capacities of the French state vastly outweighed those of the FLN during the Algerian War of Liberation. Despite this fact, however, the FLN was able to triumph, largely due to its ability to effectively deploy the ideology of Algerian nationalism and not due to the material resources it had at its disposal.

The constitutive power of political ideology should therefore not be underestimated as a force in world politics – used effectively as a mobilizing tool, it can provide the basis for the emergence of new non-state corporate actors on the international stage – actors which, despite their lack of material resources, are able to mount effective challenges to even the most powerful states in the international system. Given the appeal of counter-hegemonic forms of Islamism in the contemporary world, it would behoove both policymakers and IR theorists to take seriously the constitutive power of political ideology as an independent factor in international politics.

[87] Examples of this type of work include Cederman 1997; Cederman and Daase 2003; Hui 2004, 2005; Jackson and Nexon 1999.

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