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CARL SCHMITT'S CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL*

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CARL SCHMITT, widely known as the Crown Jurist of the Third Reich, was also one of twentieth-century Germany's ablest political and legal philosophers.[1] Most of his writings were both anti-democratic and anti-liberal; and he exercised a powerful influence over the right-wing critics of the Republic through his studies pointing up the inconsistencies, incompatibilities, and weaknesses in the Republic. "The Concept of the Political," which went through several editions in the Third Reich, is the best known as well as the single most representative publication in the entire body of his work.[2] In it one finds a criticism of liberalism, an exposition of his philosophy of decisionism, and not surprisingly authoritarian overtones. But perhaps its most characteristic aspect is the pervasive sense of the loss of orientation—a loss which Schmitt shared with

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[1]Although little known in the United States (no important piece of his has been translated into English *in toto*), Schmitt was widely read in Europe and was a center of controversy after the war. Born in 1888, Schmitt is living today in Westphalia. Recent German discussions of Schmitt include Peter Schneider, *Ausnahmezustand und Norm: Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre von Carl Schmitt* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1957); Juergen Fijalkowski, *Die Wendung zum Fuehrerstaat: Ideologische Komponente in der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts* (Cologne, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1958); Heinz Laufer, *Das Kriterium politischen Handelus: Eine Studie zur Freund-Feind-Doktrin von Carl Schmitt* (Munich, Institut fuer Politische Wissenchaften, 1962); and Mathias Schmitz, *Die Freund-Feind Theorie Carl Schmitts* (Cologne, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965).

[2]The edition I have used here is the first which appeared in the *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,* Vol. 58 (1927). For a complete bibliography of works by and on Schmitt up to 1959, see Piet Tommissen, "Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie," in Hans Barion, Ernst Forsthoff, Werner Weber, eds. *Festschrift fuer Carl Schmitt* (Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 1959).

the German conservative movement as a whole and, moreover, one which opened the way to Germany's "conservative revolution."[3]

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"Concrete," "actual," "existential," "real," "specific" are words we meet often in the writings of Carl Schmitt, for he was concerned with the existential and the real. His concern with the real was not, however, the concern of a positivist with "facts." Schmitt's arguments were advanced within a metaphysical framework; and the existent assumed meaning for him only in the context of the abstract and the ideal.

In considering his concept of the political, we straightaway encounter this interplay between the concrete and real and the abstract and ideal. Schmitt's characterizing of the political did not result in a definition of the word "political," nor did his concept contain an immediate reference to the word "state." According to Schmitt, "political" did not refer to any particular concrete subject matter. His concept of the political derived simply from the distinction between friend and enemy;[4] or, expressed differently, "political" referred to the "*degree of intensity* of an association or dissociation."[5]

At first sight Schmitt's concept of the political is rooted firmly in the specific, the concrete, and the actual—in the distinction between friend and enemy. At least the words "friend" and "enemy" are more down to earth than the word "state" around which many definitions of the political revolve. This appearance is corroborated by his specification of the terms "friend" and "enemy." "The concepts friend and enemy are to be taken in their *concrete, existential* meanings," wrote Schmitt,

> not as metaphors or symbols, not mixed and watered down by economic, moral, and other ideas; nor are they to be taken psychologically as the expression of private feelings and tendencies. . . . Here we are

[3]Hermann Rauschning, *The Conservative Revolution* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), attributes the phrase to Hugo von Hofmannsthal. See "Das Schriftum als geistiger Raum der Nation," *Gesammelte Werke* (6 vols., Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 1955), Vol. 4. Also Armin Mohler, *Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932* (Stuttgart, Friedrich Vorwerk, 1950).

[4]"Der Begriff des Politischen," p. 4.

[5]*Hugo Preuss: Sein Staatsbegriff und seine Stellung in der deutschen Staatslehre* (Tuebingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1930), Note 1, p. 26. Original italics. Hereafter cited as *Hugo Preuss.*

> not concerned with fictions and normatives *(Normativitaeten)*, but with reality as it is and the actual possibility of this distinction.[6]

The enemy, Schmitt proceeded, is not just any competitor or adversary in general. "Enemy is . . . in the last analysis a fighting, human totality; but it is at least this. Whether it is fighting or not depends upon the actual circumstances."[7] And then he indicated the source of his choice of these peculiar terms as the specifically political concepts: "The concepts friend, enemy, and battle have a real meaning; they obtain and retain this meaning especially through their reference to the real possibility of physical killing."[8] Schmitt's concept of the political ultimately derived from the specific and actual possibility of death in battle, from the most limiting of all human situations—death.

It is characteristic of Schmitt that he should have employed this extreme situation in the derivation of his most important concept. To him it was "from this most extreme possibility (of war) (that) human life derives its specific political tension . . .";[9] and he employed this device of examining the normal from an extreme and abnormal condition often and fruitfully. By this means he would impress upon us the concrete, specific, existential meaning he gave to the concept political and its derivatives.

Schmitt himself was concerned with the theory of the state but not with the "general" theory of the state.

> I do not say: a 'general theory of the state'; for the category 'general theory of the state' . . . is a typical concern of the liberal nineteenth century. This category arises from the normative effort to dissolve the *concrete* state and the *concrete Volk* in 'generalities' (general education, general theory of law, finally general theory of knowledge); and in this way to destroy their political character.[10]

[6] "Der Begriff des Politischen," p. 5. My italics.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 7. Schmitt's repeated references to exceptional, extreme, and decisive conditions (*Ausnahmezustaende*) in human activities are an integral part of his methodology; and his use of them is governed by very mundane and pragmatic purposes: Insights are to be garnered from the study of the abnormal, Schmitt asserted, that would never be derived from a study of the normal. For out of the extreme condition can arise an insight "which goes deeper than the clear, everyday situation of the commonly repetitive. The exception is more interesting than the normal case. The normal proves nothing, the exception proves everything." *Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveraenitaet* (Munich, Duncker and Humblot, 1922), p. 22.

[10] *Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit* (Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933), pp. 14-15. My italics. Hereafter cited as *Staat, Bewegung, Volk.*

In view of this insistence on the concrete and real, the abstract, unreal, and ideal qualities of his concept that we discover upon reflection appear all the more surprising and disconcerting. For, in addition to wanting to impress upon us the concreteness of his concepts, Schmitt was driven by the desire to divorce his concept of the political from all possible limiting, influencing, controlling spheres. When Schmitt finished his article, "The Concept of the Political," the political was left dangling—isolated, independent, and autonomous, impervious to any other sphere of human activity that might have tainted or tarnished it. Nothing—but nothing—was left by which to bind, tie, or bring the concept down to earth. It "was." And to say that it was, was at once to say everything and nothing at all about it.

What, after all, can one say about the "political" as "the distinction between friend and enemy" or as "the degree of intensity of association or dissociation"? Little that is intelligible until one knows what Schmitt means by "friend" and "enemy" and until one knows who is to make the distinction, or until one knows the kind of association he is referring to and the measure of intensity. Schmitt's drive to purify the political had in fact led him so far as to leave us without a subject or an object of politics.

Even the adjective "political" Schmitt chose in preference to the noun "politics" because he wanted to convey the relational and ideal aspects of his concept rather than the substantive aspects of "politics." For *"Politik"* can refer to a more or less regidly defined subject matter. Moreover, in contrast to our present-day discussion, Schmitt was primarily concerned not with the impact of his definition upon an academic discipline but upon the immediate political and social order. To Schmitt the political was not a subject matter (potentially every subject matter could become political),[11] nor did it have any limits. "Political" as a word was freer, unbounded, and less specific than "politics." Behind the ambiguities between the relational and substantive meanings of the word "political" he could, as it were, hide his prejudices. And the German language makes the transition from the one meaning to the other easy.

Schmitt believed the absolutist concept of politics had been emasculated by liberalism, and he feared his concept would suffer the same fate. Hence when he first characterized it, the political

[11] *Hugo Preuss,* Notes, p. 26.

was made free from all bonds—from the state, or any other political organization or group, and from all other spheres of activity. All that he left was the distinction between friend and enemy. But as he explained his terms and expanded his theory, the political entity crept in. Thus, at one point, he spoke of the necessity of a *Volk* deciding for itself who its friends and enemies are,[12] and at another point, when defining "enemy," he brought in the term "human totality" *(Gesamtheit von Menschen)*[13] as the entity which chooses its friends and enemies. In its pure form, however, the concept of the political knew nothing of such entities.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century in Europe, a theory of art expounded by Ruskin began to spread. The theory of art for art's sake held that art per se was its own justification. According to this theory, the terms of aesthetic appreciation were unique to art. A work of art existed; it could only be truly appreciated in aesthetic terms without reference to any other sphere. The sphere of art was, if not sovereign, then at least autonomous, independent, and self-sufficient—or it should be. *L'art pour l'art.*

In the work of Carl Schmitt there blossomed a theory of politics that might well be described as *La politique pour la politique.* Or, according to a similar and contemporary development in law, as a "pure theory of politics."[14] It is not coincidental that such a theory should come from the German Schmitt, nor perhaps that it should appear in the Weimar Republic. Schmitt lived for politics; nothing else could penetrate through to him. No matter in what form his intellectual food was ingested, it emerged as politics. Politics was his all-embracing and noble love. Moreover, such a phenomenon is probably only possible in a country so politically uprooted, disoriented, and embroiled as Weimar Germany—a land where it was "politics everywhere, politics always and nothing but politics."[15]

"The specifically political distinction," Schmitt declared, "is the distinction between *friend* and *enemy.*"[16] It corresponds in the political realm to the distinctions made in other, relatively independent spheres such as good and bad in morals, beautiful and ugly in aesthetics, or profitable and nonprofitable in economics. The distinc-

[12]Der Begriff des Politischen," p. 17.

[13]*Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

[14]See, for example, Hans Kelsen, *Reine Rechtslehre* (Vienna, Deuticke, 1934).

[15]Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals,* trans. Richard Aldington (New York, William Morrow Co., 1928), p. 9.

[16]"Der Begriff des Politischen," p. 4. Original italics.

tion, Schmitt asserted, is "independent, that is to say, not derived from or traceable back to one or more of these other antitheses."[17] Much of this article of Schmitt's and parts of several other publications are intended to establish this independence and to differentiate this concept of the political from other such concepts. Above all he sought to distinguish his theory *(la politique pour la politique)* from the liberal theory *(la politique pour l'économique)*.

According to Schmitt, the liberals have been governed by an overriding desire to "depoliticize" *(entpolitisieren)* the political.[18] They denounce politics and the state because their fundamental value is the individual, his private property, and his personal freedoms—all of which are thought to be prior to the state. Hegel once defined the bourgeois "as a person who does not want to leave the apolitical and riskless private sphere."[19] And the public life of the individual in the liberal state, Schmitt asserted, pales beside his private interests: ". . . the real home of all liberal qualities is indeed the individual and personal sphere, not public and political ideas."[20]

The liberals, to be sure, had already been much too successful to suit Schmitt. But where they had not been able actually to depoliticize the political, they had sought to bury it conveniently beneath their characteristic fictions and myths. Traditionally the liberals had sought to efface, weaken, and water down the distinctly political from two sides, the economic and the ethical:

> Thoroughgoing liberalism has its home partly in the economic, partly in the ethical and is, moreover, an ingenious system of methods for weakening the state. From the ethical and economic spheres, it dissolves everything specifically political and everything pertaining specifically to the state.[21]

In an unintentionally tragic sense, Schmitt could assert that the political was the common enemy in the liberal Weimar Republic. The definition of the political was no mere academic exercise.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] See, for example, *ibid.*, p. 29; also Leo Strauss, "Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen," *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 67 (1932), esp. p. 733.

[19] Quoted in Wilhelm Hanemann, *Der Begriff des Politischen in der deutschen Wissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Heidelberg University, 1934), p. 42.

[20] "Der unbekannte Donoso Cortes," in *Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles 1923-1939* (Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1940), p. 120. Hereafter cited as *Positionen und Begriffe*.

[21] Carl Schmitt's review of Erwin von Beckerath's *Wesen und Werden des faschisten Staates, ibid.*, p. 110.

In Schmitt's interpretation of liberalism, the political sphere could not be independent; indeed the liberals were continually at pains to rob it of its distinctiveness and its specificity. Yet they were consequential in establishing the independence and autonomy of the economic sphere.[22] That liberal prejudice was a constant source of rancor and hostility to Schmitt. He would not, however, have to endure it long, for the scales were soon to be tipped in the favor of "politics."

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In striking contrast to the abstractness and ideality of his concept were the concrete motives underlying it. The first and by far the most important of these was ideological: Schmitt despised liberalism and the liberal concept of the polity; he was advocating a return to an authoritarian conception of politics and an authoritarian state.[23] Thus just as he was seeking to purge the concept of the political of all "foreign" elements, so he was seeking to free the ruler of his state from all limitations on his authority.

Methodologically Schmitt arrived at his definition of the ideal state through his use, once again, of the extreme situation. For "The exceptional case reveals the nature of the authority of the state most clearly."[24] And in the exception "a specifically juristic formal element, the decision," is revealed "in absolute purity."[25] He called that person sovereign who in the critical situations in the life of a state decides what is to be done. Moreover, at the moment the sovereign decides, there are, Schmitt said, no ethical, legal, or popular restrictions upon him whatsoever—his decisions are pure decisions (and Schmitt's ideal state is decisionist). The purity of the sovereign's decision in a crisis was in fact the decisive instance in Schmitt's attempt to emancipate the political.

The liberal state, however, had introduced popular restrictions on the exercise of sovereignty as well as economic and ethical limitations

[22]"Der Begriff des Politischen," pp. 29-30.

[23]To speak, as Hallowell does, of Schmitt's writings as symptomatic of "the degeneracy of postwar German liberalism" is to misinterpret Schmitt. For Schmitt in fact had never been a liberal. John H. Hallowell, *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1943), p. ix.

[24]*Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveraenitaet,* p. 20

[25]*Ibid.,* p. 19.

into the concept of the political. This dependence upon the popular will neutralized political authority, according to Schmitt, sapped the strength of the state, and encouraged the distribution of political authority to allegedly nonpolitical groups and parties. Ultimately it led to irresponsible and pluralistic politics.[26] But Schmitt's ruler was to be above the law and not subject to popular control. Hence he also had to free him theoretically from control.

Schmitt wanted to exalt the political among all spheres of human activity. His second motive for purifying the concept of the political was in fact to make the political sovereign. Theoretically the hegemony of the political exists because it is alone the political order that has the power to command men to lay down their lives in its defense.[27] Secondly, the political sphere is sovereign, according to Schmitt, because in the exceptional situations which arise in human activities, it is always the political sphere that determines the course to be taken, that decides what is to be done.[28]

Moreover, "Every religious, moral, economic, ethical or other antithesis transforms itself into a political antithesis when it is strong enough effectively to group the people according to friend and enemy."[29] For the friend-enemy category is so strong and so decisive "that the nonpolitical antithesis in the same moment in which it leads to this grouping (of friend and enemy) casts off its former criteria and subjects itself to the completely new conditions and consequences of the political."[30] Decisions in critical times are the most eminent of decisions. And since the political sphere decides in the most extreme cases, it should also normally govern other spheres of human activity.

Schmitt's third motive for purging the political was to obviate the evil consequences of what he termed depoliticization and neutralization.[31] Thus, for example, the depoliticization of war, or the translation of war into nonpolitical terms, results in such myths as the "war to end all wars;"[32] and such wars become "especially

[26] *Staat, Bewegung, Volk,* pp. 23-24.
[27] "Der Begriff des Politischen," p. 16.
[28] *Ibid.,* pp. 10-11.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 9
[30] *Ibid.,* p. 10.
[31] Schmitt called the liberal age "Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen," *Positionen und Begriffe.*
[32] "Der Begriff des Politischen," p. 9.

intensive and inhuman wars"—total wars.[33] More importantly, depoliticization and neutralization in mass society resulted in what he later came to call the "total state."[34] The state, according to Schmitt, in a democratic and mass society stands naked before the people—it cannot resist the popular will, it can only effect it. And to effect it is to enter a multitude of areas and to engage in numerous previously unregulated activities. It is, in a word, to become total. That is the only way it can defend itself before the popular and sovereign will. But Schmitt wanted to see a strong, autonomous, and independent state in Germany.

Fourthly and finally, Schmitt sought to purify the political because politics had always been predominant in the German conservative tradition. Schmitt was in this respect directly in that tradition. Incidentally he thought the National Socialists were too. In one of his first and most important publications after the Nazi revolution, Schmitt pointed approvingly to the primacy the Nazis accorded the political. "This superiority of political leadership is a basic law of today's public law,"[35] he wrote. And at another point in the same book he spoke of the "unconditional superiority of the political"[36] in the Third Reich.

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One could, of course, criticize Schmitt's concept of the political on the basis of the motives which patently underlie it.[37] Perhaps more decisively and finally one can criticize the logic behind it. We have seen that Schmitt arrived at his concept by way of one particular extreme situation, *i.e.* war and death. There is, however, nothing that could have guided him rationally to the use of that particular situation rather than any other. He might logically just as well have argued from a condition less exceptional. He could not logically justify his specific choice of death and war. And this leads

[33] *Ibid.* Max Scheler struck a similar note in *Die Ursachen des Deutschen Hasses* (Leipzig, Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1917), p. 17.

[34] *Der Hueter der Verfassung* (Tuebingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1931), p. 79. See also Heinz O. Ziegeler, *Autoritaerer oder totaler Staat* (Tuebingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1932), p. 20.

[35] *Staat, Bewegung, Volk*, p. 9.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[37] See Erich Brock, "'Der Begriff des Politischen,' Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Carl Schmitt," *Hochland*, Vol. 29 (1932).

us back to our first point above: He selected these particular conditions as abnormal or exceptional because of certain definite predispositions and with a more or less definite ideal community in mind, namely, an authoritarian state.

The second fatal characteristic of the "logic" behind the use of the extreme situation is that from any given exception, logically speaking, an infinite number of conclusions are possible—no one more logically necessary than the other. Schmitt logically might just as well have derived the concept of the political as the distinction between Dryads and Naiads. In other words, there is no logic to such a device. Its *rationale* lies in the hope or expectation that insights can be won into the true nature of the normal. In Schmitt's work the use of the extreme situation was fundamentally an irrational device (for insights cannot be rationally explained or derived) with a rational purpose (to help explain and analyze selected problem areas).

Regarding differences between international and domestic politics, Schmitt's concept of the political is also subject to several criticisms. The concept was presented as being universally applicable, to the domestic and international scenes alike; in fact, it is only relevant to a narrow range of political situations. It is primarily and foremost a theory of international politics; and, even in this sphere, it is only capable of encompassing a narrow range of activity.

According to Schmitt, "Political thought and political instinct prove themselves theoretically and practically in the capacity to distinguish between friend and enemy."[38] This capacity refers both to the domestic and international scenes, for "everywhere in political history, in foreign and domestic politics alike, the incapacity or unwillingness to make this distinction appears as a symptom of the end of the political *(des politischen Endes)*."[39] But because "to the true concept of enemy belongs the real eventuality of a battle"[40] and because to the concept of battle belongs the possibility of killing, Schmitt necessarily derived his concept of the political as it pertains to the domestic scene from the exceptional condition of civil war.

But if we assume, as he implied we must, that he intended his concept to apply to both the international and domestic scenes (even

[38]"Der Begriff des Politischen," p. 26.
[39]*Ibid.*
[40]*Ibid.*, p. 6.

though his emphasis was upon international politics), then Schmitt for the purposes of the derivation of his concept necessarily considered the abnormal state of civil war comparable with the condition of war between nation-states. Otherwise the concept would only be applicable to one scene or the other, but not to both. At least these two conditions (civil and national war) were considered similar enough to warrant the derivation of a concept to apply alike to both scenes.

The question arises, however, whether such an assumption was warranted. Because in fact most of the states of the modern world have been characterized domestically most of the time by a condition of law and order, and because the condition of law and order is only in its rudimentary stages on the international scene, it would seem that the two conditions are essentially dissimilar—not similar as Schmitt assumed. In other words, the condition of war between nation-states is not really an exceptional condition in the sense in which Schmitt used *Ausnahmezustand.*[41] Hence Schmitt's concept is applicable, if at all, only to the domestic scene.

Certainly civil war was a real and distinct possibility during part of the Weimar Republic. Killings and murders in political struggles were common occurrences, and the Republic was under constant threat both from the left and right. Nevertheless, if that helps us to explain how Schmitt arrived at such a flagrantly bellicose conception of domestic politics, it does not explain how he came to regard bellicosity as "exceptional."

Finally, Schmitt's concept of the political is subject to psychological and sociological criticism. At the moment of the exceptional condition when the sovereign has to decide what course to take, he has complete freedom of choice. There are absolutely no norms, customs, or laws that define or limit the possibilities open to him. For, according to Schmitt, it is the sovereign who first creates the norms out of which order arises.[42] *"Ab integro nascitur ordo."*[43] If this situation is intended to be taken literally, however, and apparently Schmitt did not intend it as a fiction or myth, then the sovereign is actually in a state of mind in which he cannot possibly decide. Durkheim described such a condition as "anomie," and a

[41]See, for example, *Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveraenitaet,* p. 18.

[42]*Ibid.,* esp. pp. 19-20.

[43]"Der Reichsbegriff im Voelkerrecht," *Positionen und Begriffe,* p. 312.

person, such as the sovereign, in a "pure" state of anomie would be completely mentally incapacitated. The complete and absolute freedom of choice depicted by Schmitt was in fact no choice at all, and not because of the mechanics of the dialectic, but rather because of well-substantiated psychological and sociological principles.

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Several critics of Schmitt, both German and American, have charged him with nihilism and with much good reason—he, like his own sovereign, had reputiated any and all standards that might have served to guide and restrain him.[44] In fact, his formulation of the normative and material vacuity of the political order, to him the most important of all orders, is the final step in estrangement. For having elevated the political to a position of primacy among all spheres of human activity, Schmitt then, as if in spite, completely disemboweled it.

Moreover, unlike a true conservative, Schmitt repudiated the very substance and form of tradition, of history, indeed, of life itself. There was nothing in the institutions, traditions, and customs of Germany he sought to preserve—except perhaps a strong executive state. And even there his interpretation was so radical (by making the ruler absolute, destroying any possible bases for a *Rechtsstaat,* and reducing parliament to a nonentity) as to constitute a break with that tradition.

Schmitt's philosophy of the exception epitomizes the derangement of German republican society—the loss of faith in traditional norms and the caustic disagreement concerning new values. Rapid industrialization and war, inflation and depression had destroyed many time-honored ethical and moral patterns and had left behind a condition bordering on moral anarchy.[45] Nothing was sacred or holy any longer, nor was anything merely taken for granted. Acute dissension was the scourge of the day, and political disorientedness was part of this lack of a coherent moral fibre. It is scarcely coinci-

[44]See, for example, Christian Graf von Krockow, *Die Entscheidung: Eine Untersuchung ueber Ernst Juenger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger* (Stuttgart, Enke, 1958); also William Ebenstein, ed. *Modern Political Thought* (2nd ed. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), p. 357.

[45]"In (Weimar) Germany, shaken to its foundations by a calamitous war, by defeat, and by economic distress, values no longer existed." Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (New York, Vintage, 1956), p. 178.

dental that "The acknowledged rejection of all universal standards of morality is the peculiarly German contribution to the development of the ideology of modern dictatorship. . . ." With it, Cobban claims, "dictatorship ceases to be a mere form of government and becomes a revolutionary challenge to the whole foundation of Western thought."[46] Carl Schmitt's philosophy in its most extreme form was hardly less than that.

[46]Alfred Cobban, *Dictatorship Its History and Theory* (New York, Scribner's, 1939), p. 288.