Web APIs & Access Control

Security & Patterns


Dominick Baier
http://leastprivilege.com
@leastprivilege

Brock Allen
http://brockallen.com
@brocklallen






The Big Picture




Server to Server Communication

- Credentials transmitted (typically) via Authorization header
 - e.g. shared secrets, signatures, access tokens...



OAuth 2.0



Scopes: api1, api2 api3...

Access Tokens

```
Header

{
    "typ": "JWT",
    "alg": "RS256"
    "kid": "1"
}

Payload

{
    "iss": "http://myIssuer",
    "exp": "1340819380",
    "aud": "http://myResource",

    "client_id": "client1",
    "scope": ["api1", "api2"]
}
```

401 vs 403

RFC 7235: HTTP 1.1 Authentication

The 401 (Unauthorized) status code indicates that the request has not been applied because it lacks valid authentication credentials for the target resource. The server generating a 401 response MUST send a WWW-Authenticate header field (Section 4.1) containing at least one challenge applicable to the target resource.


A server that receives valid credentials that are not adequate to gain access ought to respond with the 403 (Forbidden) status code

Access Token Validation

JWT bearer token authentication handler

```
public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services)
{
    services.AddAuthentication("Bearer")
        .AddJwtBearer("Bearer", options =>
        {
            options.Authority = "https://your_oidc_provider";
            options.Audience = "your_api_identifier";
        });
}
```

Reference Tokens



Reference Token Validation

- Using OAuth 2.0 Introspection
 - IdentityModel.AspNetCore.OAuth2Introspection nuget

```
services.AddAuthentication(OAuth2IntrospectionDefaults.AuthenticationScheme)
    .AddOAuth2Introspection(options =>
{
        options.Authority = "https://demo.identityserver.io";

        options.ClientId = "api1";
        options.ClientSecret = "secret";
    });
```

IdentityServer Token Validation

- Combines JWT bearer & introspection
 - IdentityServer4.AccessTokenValidation nuget

```
services.AddAuthentication(IdentityServerAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme)
   .AddIdentityServerAuthentication(options =>
{
        options.Authority = "https://demo.identityserver.io";

        options.ApiName = "api1";
        options.ApiSecret = "secret";
    });
```

User-Centric Clients

- Typical Pattern
 - authenticate user
 - make API calls on behalf of the user
- Server-side Web Applications
- Client-side Web Apps/SPAs
- Native/Mobile Applications

Web Applications


OpenID Connect Hybrid Flow combines

- user authentication (identity token)
- access to APIs (access token)

Additional Security Features


- access tokens not exposed to the browser
- (optional) long-lived API access

Hybrid Flow Request



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
Hybrid Flow Response



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Retrieving the Access Token


- Exchange code for access token
 - using client id and secret



```
access_token: "xyz...123",
  expires_in: 3600,
  token_type: "Bearer"
}
```

UserInfo Endpoint

- Access token allows to retrieve user claims via a back-channel call
 - keeps identity token small



```
{
   sub: "91jj21",
   given_name: "Bob",
   profile_picture: "ksjjj...jdj_"
}
```

Access Token Lifetime Management


Access tokens have finite lifetimes

- requesting a new token requires browser round trip to authorization server
- should be as short lived as possible

Refresh tokens allow renewal semantics


- no user interaction required
- typically combined with a revocation feature

Requesting a Refresh Token




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Retrieving the Access Token (w/ Refresh Token)



```
access_token: "xyz...123",
    refresh_token: "jdj9...192j",
    expires_in: 3600,
    token_type: "Bearer"
}
```


Refreshing an Access Token



```
{
   access_token: "xyz...123",
   refresh_token: "jdj9...192j",
   expires_in: 3600,
   token_type: "Bearer"
}
```

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Revocation



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Token Revocation

- Endpoint to programmatically revoke tokens (RFC 7009)
 - reference tokens
 - refresh tokens



JavaScript Applications - Common Approaches

"Legacy" Applications

- mixture of server UI and client scripts
- APIs part of same application
- often cookies used for session management
- often CSRF problems


"Pure" SPAs

- no UI back-end (e.g. served from a CDN)
- APIs designed to be stand-alone and shareable
- token-based authentication


"Legacy"

Implicit Authentication

e.g. cookies, Windows authentication, client certs...



CSRF – The Problem



Browser

Example: Anti-Forgery Tokens

- Add explicit "credential"
 - makes API private to application

```
[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
                             Controller
      render page &
                                                     web api call:
                            post-back:
      anti-forgery cookie
                            cookie + hidden field
                                                     cookie + header
Page
  <form>
       <input type="hidden" value="anti-forgery token" />
  </form>
  <script>...</script>
```


Example: XSRF Tokens for private APIs

```
[Route("api/[controller]")]
public class XsrfTokenController : Controller
    private readonly IAntiforgery antiforgery;
    public XsrfTokenController(IAntiforgery antiforgery)
        antiforgery = antiforgery;
    [HttpGet]
    public IActionResult Get()
        // sets cookie and returns token value
        var tokens = antiforgery.GetAndStoreTokens(HttpContext);
        return new ObjectResult(new {
            token = tokens.RequestToken,
            tokenName = tokens.HeaderName
        });
```

Token-based Authentication


- OpenID Connect Implicit Flow designed for JS/Browser-based Applications
 - simplified flow
 - no secret required
 - limited features
- Tokens always passed explicitly to the API

Implicit Flow Request



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Response





```
#id_token=x12f...zsz
&token=32x...133
&expires_in=3600
&token_type=Bearer
```

Java Script Client Library


https://github.com/IdentityModel/oidc-client-js

```
var settings = {
    authority: 'http://localhost:5152/',
    client id: 'spa',
    redirect uri: 'http://localhost:5152/callback.html',
    response type: 'id token token',
    scope: 'openid profile api',
};
var mgr = new Oidc.UserManager(settings);
mgr.getUser().then(function (user) {
    if (user) {
        log("logged in", user);
    else {
        mgr.signinRedirect();
});
```

Excursion: CORS (Cross Origin Resource Sharing)



CORS Sample



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CORS for ASP.NET Core

Available as middleware

Token Lifetime for JS Apps


- Implicit flow does not allow refresh tokens
 - browser is not a fully trusted environment
- Other options to manage token lifetime
 - silent renew
 - reference tokens

Silent Renew

- Request new token in a hidden iframe
 - only possible if no user interaction is required



OIDC Session Status Change Notifications




Browser

Native/Mobile Applications

- IOW applications that have access to native platform APIs
 - desktop or mobile
- "OAuth 2.0 for native Applications"
 - https://tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps/

Native login dialogs



OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner Password Flow


Pros


- client app has full control over login UI
- support for long lived API access without having to store a password

Cons

- user is encouraged to type in his master secret into "external" applications
 - especially problematic once applications also come from 3rd parties
- no cross application single sign-on or shared logon sessions
- no federation with external identity providers/business partners
- every change in logon workflow requires versioning the application

Using a browser for driving the authentication workflow





Using a browser for driving the authentication workflow

- Centralize authentication logic
 - consistent look and feel
 - implement once, all applications get it for free
 - allows changing the workflow without having to update the applications
 - e.g. consent, updated EULA, 2FA
- Enable external identity providers and federation
 - federation protocols are browser based only
- Depending on browser, authentication sessions can be shared between apps and OS

Browser types

Embedded web view


- private browser & private cookie container
- e.g. WinForms or WPF browser control


System browser

- e.g. SFAuthenticatedSession, Chrome Custom Tabs or desktop browser
- full featured including address bar & add-ins
- shared cookie container

Starting the authentication request

nonce = random_number
code_verifier = random_number
code_challenge = hash(code_verifier)





?client_id=nativeapp

&scope=openid profile api1 api2 offline_access


&redirect_uri=com.mycompany.nativeapp://cb

&response_type=code id_token

&nonce=j1y...a23

&code_challenge=x929..1921

Receiving the response




Requesting the access token

- Exchange code for access token
 - using client id and secret (and code verifier)



Pattern: desktop browser and local callback




That's a lot of work!

Native libraries

- https://github.com/openid/AppAuth-iOS
- https://github.com/openid/AppAuth-Android
- C# .NET standard library (desktop .NET, UWP, mobile, iOS, Android)
 - https://github.com/IdentityModel/IdentityModel.OidcClient2
 - https://github.com/IdentityModel/IdentityModel.OidcClient.Samples




Stepping up security: bearer vs pop tokens




Example: proof key & signature

- 1) client generates pub/priv key pair
- 2) sends public key to STS during token request
- 3) STS embeds pub key in access token
- 4) client uses private key to sign HTTP request



- 5) API validates access token
- 6) extracts proof key & validates the HTTP signature



Further reading

PoP specs

- https://tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture/
- https://tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange/
- https://tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/draft-ietf-oauth-signed-http-request/

Token binding

- https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-https
- https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-token-bound-authentication-1_0.html

OAuth 2.0 Extensibility

Token endpoint allows custom grant types


- identity delegation
- federation
- translate between token formats

Examples

- integrate existing SAML-based system
- translate Windows account to access token
- use native Facebook SDK for accessing your back-end

— ...

Example: Delegation



Standardized Extension Grants

JWT and SAML grants

- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7522
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7523

Delegation

https://tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange/

Summary

Client Credentials Flow

- server to server communication
- no user identity in access token

Hybrid Flow

- web applications
- access token contains user identity
- access token not exposed to browser
- refresh token

Hybrid Flow + PKCE

- native applications
- hardened for system browser IPC

Implicit Flow

- JavaScript applications
- no refresh tokens (silent renew as alternative)

Extension Grant

extensibility