

Shadow: Scalable Simulation for Systems Security Research

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Talk Outline

- Shadow and how it works
- Tor research case study:
Kernel-Informed Socket Transport
- Future directions


Why should you care?

- Expedite research and development
- Evaluate software mods or attacks without harming real users
- Understand holistic effects before deployment
- Shadow supports simulation for new applications


Thread 0

EXPERIMENTATION OPTIONS

Desirable Properties



Network Research Methods



Approaches	Problems
Live Network	Hard to manage, lengthy deployment, security risks
PlanetLab	Hard to manage, bad at modeling, not scalable
Simulation	Not generalizable, inaccurate
Emulation	Larger overhead, kernel complexities



Simulation vs Emulation

- Time (simulation wins)
 - Real time vs “as-fast-as-possible” execution
 - Emulation time must advance in synchrony with wall-clock time, or the virtual environment may become “sluggish” or unresponsive
 - Easier to slow down than to speed up execution!
- Realism (emulation wins)
 - Uses host OS kernel, protocols, applications
 - Can run anything that runs on OS

Thread 1

SHADOW

What is Shadow?

- Parallel discrete-event network simulator
- Models routing, latency, bandwidth
- Simulates time, CPU, OS
 - TCP/UDP, sockets, queuing, threading
- Emulates POSIX C API on Linux
- Directly executes apps as plug-ins




Simulation Environment



Hosts


Logical
processing units
with
independent state

Simulation Environment




Routing **elements**
(nodes, links) and
attributes (bandwidth,
latency, packet loss)

Simulation Environment



Holds current
virtual time
(distinct from
physical time)

Simulation Environment




Processing task
for a **host** at a
specific **time**

Simulation Environment




Holds **events**
sorted by **time**
(min heap)

Discrete Event Engine



- Facilitate **communication**: exchange events between hosts through the network
- “as-fast-as-possible” execution


Discrete Event Engine



- Facilitate **communication**: exchange events between hosts through the network
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
- ◆ While !end
 - ◆ Get next event
 - ◆ Update clock
 - ◆ Process event
 - ◆ Enqueue events

Parallel Discrete Event Engine




Conservative Synchronization

- Ensure causality
 - events must occur **in correct order** (not in the past)



Virtual Network Routing

- Network graph model



Executing Applications on Hosts

- Load programs as dynamic shared object libraries




Addr	Val
0xA	0
0xB	0
...	...

Compile with Clang, extract state addresses with LLVM pass


Each program loaded **only once** per thread




Virtual Process Management



Virtual Process Management



Virtual Thread Management




Reentrant portable threads (rpth)


- async. thread-safe, user-land non-preemptive cooperative threading
- Uses make/set/get/swapcontext() magic to jump program stacks when EWOULDBLOCK

Virtual thread layer


Virtual Thread Management




Virtual Thread Management



Virtual Thread Management




Execution Flow with rpth



Function Interposition

App
Libraries
(libc, ...)

LD_PRELOAD=libpreload.so (*socket, write, pthread_create, ...*)



Function calls are **redirected**
to **simulated** counterpart

Simulating a Kernel


- Sockets and queuing
- Network protocols – TCP, UDP
- Threading (pthread)
- Randomization (maintain determinism)
- CPU usage

Thread 2

KERNEL INFORMED SOCKET TRANSPORT

With John Geddes, Chris Wacek, Micah Sherr, and Paul Syverson

Anonymous Communication: Tor




This Talk

- Where is Tor slow?
 - Measure public Tor and private Shadow-Tor networks
 - Identify circuit scheduling and socket flushing problems
- Design **KIST**: Kernel-Informed Socket Transport
 - Use TCP snd_cwnd to limit socket writes
- Evaluate **KIST** Performance and Security
 - Reduces kernel and end-to-end circuit congestion
 - Throughput attacks unaffected, speeds up latency attacks


Outline

- Background
- Instrument Tor, measure congestion
- Analyze causes of congestion
- Design and evaluate KIST
 - Performance
 - Security


Relay Overview




Relay Overview



Relay Overview




Relay Internals




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
Live Tor Congestion - libkqtime



Live Tor Congestion - libkqtime




Live Tor Congestion - libkqtime





Shadow Network Simulation

- Enhanced **Shadow** with several missing TCP algorithms
 - CUBIC congestion control
 - Retransmission timers
 - Selective acknowledgements (SACK)
 - Forward acknowledgements (FACK)
 - Fast retransmit/recovery
- Designed **largest known private Tor network**
 - 3600 relays and 12000 simultaneously active clients
 - Internet topology graph: ~700k nodes and 1.3m links

Shadow-Tor Congestion – UIDs




Shadow-Tor Congestion – UIDs




Tor and Shadow-Tor Congestion

Live-Tor



Shadow-Tor




Congestion occurs almost exclusively in
outbound kernel buffers


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
Analyzing Causes of Congestion




Analyzing Causes of Congestion




Problem 1: Circuit Scheduling




Problem 1: Circuit Scheduling




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
Problem 2: Flushing to Sockets




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
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Outline



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Ask the kernel, stupid!

- Utilize getsockopt and ioctl syscalls


socket_space =
 $\text{sndbufcap} - \text{sndbuflen}$

tcp_space =
 $(\text{cwnd} - \text{unacked}) * \text{mss}$



Kernel-Informed Socket Transport

- Don't write it if the kernel can't send it;
bound kernel writes by:
 - Socket: $\min(\text{socket_space}, \text{tcp_space})$
 - Global: upstream bandwidth capacity



Solution to Problem 2

Kernel-Informed Socket Transport

- Don't write it if the kernel can't send it;
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 - Global: upstream bandwidth capacity
- Choose globally from **all writable circuits**




Solution to Problem 1


Kernel-Informed Socket Transport

- Don't write it if the kernel can't send it;
bound kernel writes by:
 - Socket: $\min(\text{socket_space}, \text{tcp_space})$
 - Global: upstream bandwidth capacity
- Choose globally from **all writable circuits**
- Try to write again **before kernel starvation**


KIST Reduces Kernel Congestion




KIST Increases Tor Congestion



KIST Reduces Circuit Congestion




KIST Improves Network Latency




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
Traffic Correlation: Latency




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
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
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
Latency Attack | estimate – actual |




Latency Attack num pings until best estimate




Traffic Correlation: Throughput




Traffic Correlation: Throughput



Traffic Correlation: Throughput



Throughput Attack Results



Summary/Conclusion

- Shadow
- Where is Tor slow?
 - KIST complements other performance enhancements, e.g. circuit priority
- Future work
 - Optimize Shadow threading algorithms
 - Distribute Shadow across processes/machines

shadow.github.io
github.com/shadow

robgjansen.com, @robgjansen
rob.g.jansen@nrl.navy.mil

think like an adversary

