



Building a fortress in a greenfield
My Research & Test Driven Development
SA: Guest Lecture

Dr. Hale

University of Nebraska at Omaha

Today's topics:

A bit about me

Phishing: Cybertrust

Figure out how people fall prey to phishing attacks

Identify trust and suspicion cues to help them not get phished

Wearables: SecuWear

Target domain-spanning wearable security issues

Build a security toolkit

Software Testing and Test driven development

Unit / integration / acceptance testing

Think-test-build-test-repeat

QUnit Demo

Cybertrust

Investigating what trust factors influence decision making with suspicious content

Previous Work Supported by AFOSR, currently continuing

Multiple papers: ICWS2015, SPE2014, HICSS2014, SPE2013, International Journal of Services Computing
Targeted Interventions Derived from Biomarkers of Cyber Trust



Nebraska University Center for Information Assurance

Matthew Hale



THE UNIVERSITY *of*
TULSA

Software Engineering and Architecture Team

Rose Gamble, John Hale, Michael Haney,
Charles Walter, Jessica Lin

Acknowledgement



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Acknowledgement x2

Beginning in Early 2013, I started working on an AFOSR grant called **CyberTrust**

(actually, Targeted Interventions Derived from Biomarkers of Cyber Trust)


The CyberTrust grant was a multi-phase study that assesses what **factors** contribute to whether or not individuals **trust content** in online environments.

I'm working on a secure client-side web application that serves as a **simulation platform** for neuroscientists and psychologists to capture subject data about **trust cues**.

Why should **you** care?

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156 Million
Phishing Emails
(Every Day)

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140 Million

Crash and burn at spam filters

ARRun it's the googles



But that means...

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
CHARRRRRRRGE

16 Million
Make it through Filters

and...
8 Million
are actually opened

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800,000 (10%)
Links are clicked

I have you now


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80,000 (10%)

Fall for a scam and/or share
their personal info.

Increasing complexity, i.e. spear
phishing or whale phishing...



Awesome Pirate graphics courtesy Canadian PSA:

<http://www.getcybersafe.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/nfgrphcs/nfgrphcs-2012-10-11-eng.aspx>

Phishing affects us all and
drains many billions of dollars annually from world economies

Clearly need more than **spam filters...**

Enter the CyberPhishing
Simulation Platform

Core Idea

Identify user awareness gaps
Train them to recognize suspicious content
Prevent victimization

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NAS

© SEAT/CyberTrust 2013

© SEAT/Cyb

Hello demo-user [Log out](#)

CYBER TRUST

Home Email 6 Web 4 bVerse Social Network 4 Your status

Inbox

<input type="checkbox"/>	bVerse	Account Compromised - Your bVerse account has been compromised. Please following the link below to upd...	3:07 pm
<input type="checkbox"/>	Jimmy Smith	Join My Network - Jimmy Smith wants to add you as a friend on your social network. To accept his i...	3:07 pm
<input type="checkbox"/>	Paul Bunyan Personnel Service	Temporary Lumberjack Agency - I would love to sell you some lumber. Sincerely, Paul Bunyan	3:07 pm
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ann Howard	Inventory Control - You are running low on nails. Would you like me to purchase more from the same v...	3:07 pm
<input type="checkbox"/>	PaperMe	Corporate Friend Request - I'd like to invite you to join my social network -Paul BunyanAccept invitation...	3:07 pm
<input type="checkbox"/>	Your friend	Left your credit card - You left your credit card at Wal-Mart. Go to my website http://helpyouforreal.co...	3:07 pm

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
Mutual partners: none

[+ Business Partner Request](#)

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Trust, Follow) (Trust, Accept invite) Follow (Don't trust) (Don't trust) Ignore

How trustworthy is this?

Results: predictor vs actual victimization



Wearables

SecuWear: An open source, multi-component hardware/software platform for exploring wearable security



Paper presented at MS2015
Project funded by NRI

Why should **you** care?

fitbit
surge™



GLASS

NIKEFUEL




A big (emerging) market...

UP
by JAWBONE™



Wearable Units Shipped



* Forecasted figures

Source: IDC Worldwide Quarterly Wearable Device Tracker, March 30, 2015

133.4% Growth from 2014 to 2015 (19.6M to 45.7M)

45.1% Five-year compound annual growth rate (19.6 to 126.1)

fitbit
surge™



GLASS


...ok so what? its sleep and pedometer data.

NIKEFUEL



UP
by JAWBONE™

Not
exactly.



They use:




Wearables and Big Data are about better knowing the user*

*in whatever application

Mostly companies are interested in
-> Advertising and revenue generation

The possibilities:



Big data is also important for other sectors

Medical -> patient well being & diagnosis

Military -> warfighter well being / operational intelligence



SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Yeah it's important

fitbit
surge™



GLASS

...there are many security challenges

NIKEFUEL



UP
by JAWBONE™



(in)security landscape

Hackers are coming for your smartwatch



CALE GUTHRIE WEISSMAN |
APR. 13, 2015, 1:35 PM | 759

Nike+ FuelBand SE BLE Protocol Reversed

Simone Margaritelli

29 Jan 2015 in REVERSING NIKE NIKE+ FUELBAND SE FUELBAND NIKE FUELBAND HACKING BLE BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY PROTOCOL

Bluetooth: With Low Energy comes Low Security

Mike Ryan
iSEC Partners

Security Analysis of Wearable Fitness Devices (Fitbit)

Britt Cyr, Webb Horn, Daniela Miao, Michael Specter
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Massachusetts, U.S.A.
dmiao@mit.edu, specter@mit.edu

How I hacked my smart bracelet

By Roman Unuchek on March 26, 2015, 11:00 am

Anonymity is the internet's next big battleground

Jon Card

Monday 22 June 2015 07.00 EDT

about how their data is being used, with major
rs, marketers and the entire internet industry

Domain security issues

User Awareness and Privacy Behaviors

Don't recognize data sensitivity or misuse
May install malware or malicious apps
Apps may be an invasion of privacy

Web Application

Standard Web attacks (XSS, SQL injection, CSRF, etc)
Information Leakage (e.g. geotagging in social media)
Secure data storage and acceptable data usage

Mobile Application

Third party tracking apps accessing data (stored/in-transit)
Data encoding and transmission
Resource consumption

Wearable Hardware

Physical tampering
Data encoding and transmission
Resource consumption

Inter-domain security issues

User Awareness and Privacy Behaviors

Web Application

Insecure Wi-Fi or 4G
Lack of API Security (HTTPS/CORS/CSRF)





Mobile Application

Lack of over-the-air encryption
Man-in-the-middle attacks
Denial of service / Resource consumption

Wearable Hardware

Attack vectors for a typical app

Wearable Application






My Contribution: SecuWear



Basic Idea: Empower researchers to study
wearable security issues



MetaWear




SecuWear: Made with open source



APACHE
CORDOVA™

Ubertooth One

Designing and Exploring Attack Vectors



Some classes I teach that you may be interested in the future

Secure Web Development: (graduate class) IASC8470

Secure Mobile Development: (graduate class) IASC8080

Information Security Policy: IASC3600

Undergrad capstone: IASC 4580

Interested in Joining My lab?

<http://faculty.ist.unomaha.edu/mhale/>

Today's Meat and potatoes: Test-driven Development


Some Material from Bernd Bruegge and Allen Dutoit Object-Oriented SE: Using UML, Patterns, and Java
(because their slides are hilarious)

Famous Problems

- F-16 : crossing equator using autopilot
 - Result: plane flipped over
 - Reason?
 - Reuse of autopilot software



- The Therac-25 accidents (1985-1987), one of the most serious non-military computer-related failure in terms of human life (at least five died)
 - Reason: Bad event handling in the GUI
- NASA Mars Climate Orbiter destroyed due to incorrect orbit insertion (September 23, 1999)
 - Reason: Unit conversion problem.



Terminology

- **Failure:** Any deviation of the observed behavior from the specified behavior
- **Erroneous state (error):** The system is in a state such that further processing by the system can lead to a failure
- **Fault:** The mechanical or algorithmic cause of an error (“bug”)
- **Validation/testing:** Activity of checking for deviations between the observed behavior of a system and its specification.


What is this?

A failure?


An error?

A fault?

We need to describe specified
and desired behavior first!




Erroneous State (“Error”)



Algorithmic Fault




Mechanical Fault



F-16 Bug




- What is the failure?
- What is the error?
- What is the fault?
 - Bad use of implementation inheritance
 - A Plane is **not** a rocket.




How do we deal with Errors, Failures and Faults?


Modular Redundancy




Declaring the Bug as a Feature



Patching




Testing



Another View on How to Deal with Faults

- **Fault avoidance**
 - Use methodology to reduce complexity
 - Use configuration management to prevent inconsistency
 - Apply verification to prevent algorithmic faults
 - Use Reviews
- **Fault detection**
 - **Testing**: Activity to provoke failures in a planned way
 - **Debugging**: Find and remove the cause (Faults) of an observed failure
 - **Monitoring**: Deliver information about state => Used during debugging
- **Fault tolerance**
 - Exception handling
 - Modular redundancy.

Taxonomy for Fault Handling Techniques





Observations

- It is impossible to completely test any nontrivial module or system
 - Practical limitations: Complete testing is prohibitive in time and cost
 - Theoretical limitations: e.g. Halting problem
- “Testing can only show the presence of bugs, not their absence” (Dijkstra).
- Testing is not for free

=> Define your goals and priorities

Testing Activities



Types of Testing

Acceptance Test – A measure that ensures that a feature meets functional demands. Usually acceptance tests are tied to user stories or use cases.

Unit test – A smaller test that ensures isolated chunks of functionality (known as units) are functional and operating as expected.

Integration tests – Between unit tests and acceptance tests. Focuses on ensuring that different units function together (said to be integrable).

UNIT Testing

Can be done manually or programmatically – MUCH easier to do the latter – since your components may change and manually testing each time is onerous

Basically you boil down exactly what a feature or component should be doing and you logically state these criteria. Each time you modify the feature/component you run the unit tests to see if they pass. When they all pass you move on to integration tests.

Integration Testing

Can be done manually or programmatically – MUCH easier to do the latter – since your components may change and manually testing each time is onerous

Here you define how different components need to interact and state those constraints logically. When all of the integration tests work – it means you move on to acceptance tests and make sure the collected components satisfy the original goals in the user story or use cases.


Acceptance Testing

Can be done manually or programmatically – often the former, but can repeat easier with the latter.


You basically define the set of all acceptance tests related to your user stories and use cases and – when you demonstrate the app passes all of the tests you are done!

Test Driven Development

Core Philosophy



Copyright 2003-2006 Scott W. Ambler



QUnit DEMO (Javascript)
<http://benalman.com/talks/unit-testing-qunit.html>



Questions?

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