



Market & Growth

1.1 Market Definition & Size: Lumentum operates in the optical **communications** market (components and modules for fiber-optic telecom/datacom networks, and 3D sensing) and the **industrial laser** market. Its products enable high-speed data transmission in telecom networks, cloud data centers, and consumer devices. For example, Lumentum's optical components (e.g. reconfigurable optical add/drop multiplexers "ROADMs", tunable transceivers, lasers) allow telecom carriers and hyperscalers to meet exploding bandwidth demand from HD video, cloud computing, AI/ML, etc ¹ ². In consumer electronics, Lumentum's **VCSEL** laser diodes power 3D sensing features like facial recognition in smartphones ³.

The **Total Addressable Market (TAM)** for optical communications components is large and growing. Research firm Cignal AI projects **optical components** (spanning datacom and telecom) will reach record revenues of ~\$25 B in 2025 ⁴. By 2029, the **datacom** portion alone (driven by hyperscale cloud demand) is expected to approach \$29 B ⁵. Including telecom and consumer photonics, Lumentum's full TAM likely exceeds \$30 B by decade's end. The **Commercial Lasers** segment serves a smaller TAM (industrial laser systems market ~\$5–10 B globally), driven by precision manufacturing (e.g. semiconductor fabrication, materials processing).

To size Lumentum's **Serviceable Market**: In telecom/datacom, Lumentum addresses high-end optical components like **WSS/ROADMs**, coherent transceiver modules, tunable lasers, amplifiers, etc., where it holds leading positions ². Geographically, demand is global (North America ~27% of fiber optic component sales in 2024 ⁶, with Asia and EMEA significant as well). Lumentum's **top customers** (FY2023) included **Ciena** (15% of revenue) and **Nokia** (10.5%), reflecting strong exposure to telecom network buildouts, and **Apple** (12%, for 3D sensing) ⁷. China was historically a major market (Huawei was 10.8% in FY2021 ⁷), but U.S. export restrictions have curtailed sales to Huawei ⁸. Still, Chinese network operators and data centers remain part of the served market via other customers or post-sanctions domestic players.

1.1.2 Growth Drivers: The optical communications industry is experiencing **secular growth** driven by relentless data traffic increases (estimated ~20–30% CAGR in bandwidth demand). Key drivers are: - **Cloud & AI**: Hyperscale data centers are expanding capacity to support AI/ML workloads, which require massive optical interconnect bandwidth. In 2024, shipments of 400G/800G optical modules surged to record levels for AI clusters ⁹ ¹⁰. Cignal AI forecasts datacom optical revenue >\$18B in 2025 (20%+ CAGR through 2029) on AI-driven demand ⁴ ⁵. - **5G & Fiber Broadband**: Telecom carriers worldwide are upgrading to 5G mobile and fiber-to-the-home, which increases backhaul and access network optical needs. This drives demand for Lumentum's telecom components (e.g. ROADM for metro/long-haul networks) ¹¹. Government digital infrastructure programs (e.g. India's Smart Cities, U.S. rural broadband) bolster fiber deployment ¹² ¹³. - **Secular Technology Shifts**: Wider adoption of **coherent optical** technology in shorter reaches (e.g. 400ZR pluggable modules for data center interconnect) expands Lumentum's market. Emerging standards (800ZR, 1.2Tb/s, 1.6Tb/s optics) ensure continuing upgrade cycles ¹⁴. Lumentum's acquisition of NeoPhotonics in 2022 gave it cutting-edge coherent optics capabilities to tap this trend. - **Emerging applications**: *3D sensing & LiDAR* are nascent but promising. Lumentum's lasers enable face ID, AR/VR, and automotive LiDAR. While smartphone 3D sensing has matured (and Apple diversified its suppliers, reducing Lumentum's share ¹⁵), automotive LiDAR could become a "multi-billion" market over

the next 5-10 years, with Lumentum expecting its laser chips to capture ~10-15% of that value ¹⁶ ¹⁷ – a future secular driver.

Historic Growth: The optical component industry has seen **booms and busts**. Over 2015–2020, Lumentum's revenue grew from ~\$0.8 B to \$1.67 B, fueled by new product cycles (notably Apple's 2017 adoption of Lumentum's VCSEL for FaceID led to ~30% revenue contribution at its peak ⁷) and telecom upgrades. FY2021 was ~\$1.74 B (+4% YoY) ¹⁸. FY2022 saw a slight decline (-1.7%) as telecom spending paused and Apple demand normalized ¹⁹. FY2023 rebounded +3% to \$1.767 B ¹⁹, aided by supply chain improvements and acquisitions. However, FY2024 dropped ~23% to \$1.36 B (inventory digestion by customers and loss of Apple share) ²⁰ ²¹. The **growth mix** is shifting – cloud/datacom is accelerating (Lumentum's "Cloud & Networking" segment began surging in late 2024), while legacy telecom and 3D sensing have been cyclically weak ²².

Secular vs Cyclical Factors: Secular trends (data growth, AI, 5G) underpin a robust long-term outlook. For example, Lumentum's CEO emphasizes that "*data traffic will continue to grow at a relentless rate, and networks and data centers will need to keep pace with double-digit capacity increases each year*" ²³. This secular demand supports a long-term growth trajectory (optical component market expected ~13-20% CAGR through 2030 ⁵ ²⁴). However, the industry is **highly cyclical** in the near term: - On the **demand side**, telecom/network spending can be discretionary and prone to the "**bullwhip effect**". Customers tend to double-order during shortages and then abruptly pause orders to burn off inventory. In FY2023, Lumentum's network equipment customers significantly cut orders for a few quarters to reduce excess inventory, causing Lumentum's sales to dip and a quarterly loss ²⁵ ²². Such cycles (order rushes followed by digestion) are common in optical components. - **Economic downturns** also impact demand. While bandwidth needs are somewhat non-discretionary, carriers and cloud providers can delay capital expenditure in recessions. For instance, during the 2020 COVID shock and 2022 macro slowdown, some network projects were deferred. - On the **supply side**, optical component manufacturing has high fixed costs (fabs, precision assembly lines) and **long lead times** for capacity addition. This exacerbates cycles: companies can't quickly adjust supply, so shortages lead to price spikes followed by overcapacity. Lumentum's margins swing with factory utilization – e.g. in 2023, under-utilization hurt gross margins as demand temporarily fell below production capacity ²⁶ ²⁷. - Inventory and **lead time fluctuations** contribute to cyclicity. The industry experienced severe **supply chain constraints** in 2021–2022 (shortages of chips, long lead times) ²⁸ ²⁹, prompting customers to hoard inventory. When supply eased in 2023, a sharp inventory correction ensued ²⁶.

1.2 Industry Lifecycle & Current Cycle: Optical communications is a **mature-but-growing** industry. It had an explosive growth phase in the early 2000s (dot-com boom) followed by consolidation and maturity. Today, it's in a renewed **growth phase** driven by new technologies (100G/400G/800G optics, AI interconnects). We might characterize it as "late growth" – not nascent, but with significant innovation still happening (co-packaged optics, integrated photonics on the horizon). The industry is **somewhat cyclical**: historically, profit margins swing with upgrade cycles. After peaking margins in periods of tight supply, pricing pressure and new capacity can drive margins down. For example, industry gross margins in optical components were high in 2016–2017 with 100G demand, then compressed in 2018–2019 due to Chinese competition and inventory buildup. Currently (2025), the industry is **ascending** in a new up-cycle: demand is robust from AI/cloud buildouts, and after the 2022–2023 lull, companies like Lumentum are seeing sharp recovery. Lumentum's revenue jumped 58% YoY in one recent quarter (late 2024) as it "*ramped production of high-speed optical transceivers*" to meet AI demand ³⁰. However, profit margins industry-wide are still normalizing; Lumentum's FY2025 non-GAAP gross margin was ~35% ³¹, below historical highs (~50%),

reflecting still-competitive pricing and underutilization earlier in the cycle. As of early 2026, industry operating margins remain a bit below peak, suggesting room for improvement as volumes continue rising.

1.3 Critical Gaps & Further Research (Market):

Despite these insights, some gaps remain:

- **Granular TAM by Segment:** We lack a **bottom-up segmentation** of Lumentum's market (e.g. **Telecom vs Datacom vs Consumer** optics TAM, and by region). *Why it matters:* to forecast growth properly, we need to know which sub-markets drive future revenue (e.g. data center optics vs 3D sensing have very different trajectories). *Recommended research:* Obtain industry reports from specialist firms like **LightCounting** or **Omdia** that break out optical component TAM by end-use and geography. Also, Lumentum's investor presentations might contain segment TAM estimates. *Effort: Moderate* – requires sourcing industry research or consultancy data.
- **AI Demand Sustainability:** The analysis assumes AI-driven optical demand will remain strong; however, it is unclear if current hyperscaler ordering is sustainable or a transient spike. *Why it matters:* a boom-bust in AI capex could greatly impact Lumentum's growth. *Research approach:* Track **hyperscaler capex guidance** and **optical module shipment data** (e.g. quarterly Cignal AI "Optical Components Report" updates) for early signs of a slowdown ³². Interviews with cloud network architects or 10-Q filings of cloud companies can shed light. *Effort: Quick to moderate* – e.g. reading recent Cignal AI notes and hyperscaler earnings commentary.
- **China Market Exposure:** Given trade restrictions, we need clearer data on Lumentum's remaining China revenue (via non-sanctioned customers or indirect sales). *Why it matters:* China historically was a large market for optical components; if Lumentum can't participate fully (due to Huawei bans, local competition), it caps growth. *Research approach:* Examine export data and competitor activity in China. Sources like Chinese telecom tenders, or reports on **domestic suppliers (Accelink, Eoptolink)** gaining share, would quantify this. *Effort: In-depth* – potentially requires translation of Chinese market research or proxy metrics (e.g. FiberHome procurement reports).
- **Optical Industry Cyclical Metrics:** Our cyclical discussion is qualitative. We might quantify how this industry behaves in downturns (e.g. average **peak-to-trough revenue declines**, inventory cycles length). *Why it matters:* to model scenarios (downside risk). *Source:* historical data from prior downturns (2001, 2009, 2012, 2019) via industry association data (e.g. **Dell'Oro** or **Yole**). *Effort: Moderate* – gather long-term industry sales index and compute volatility.

Competitive Landscape

2.1 Market Structure & Key Players: The optical components industry is moderately concentrated, with a few major players but also numerous niche competitors. **Lumentum** and **Coherent Corp.** (formerly II-VI + Finisar) are the two largest Western suppliers of optical components. They have grown via consolidation – Lumentum acquired Oclaro (2018) and NeoPhotonics (2022), while II-VI acquired Finisar and Coherent Inc. The latest data (2024) shows Lumentum was the **#1 supplier in Telecom optical components by revenue**, followed by Marvell (Inphi) and Cisco (Acacia) for certain coherent modules ³³. In **datacom (data center) modules**, Chinese firms lead: Innolight, Eoptolink, and Coherent are top in 800G module shipments, while Lumentum is a critical **laser/component supplier** to those module makers ³⁴. Other notable competitors

include **Ciena** (some internal component capability), **Sumitomo Electric, Broadcom** (via Avago legacy, in optical ICs), **Fujikura/Sumitomo** (in passive and some active components), **Intel** (silicon photonics transceivers), and several Chinese vendors (**Hisense, Accelink, FiberHome** for telecom, **Huawei HiSilicon** for internal needs). The **Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)** for the overall optical component market is not extremely high – the top five likely account for roughly 50–60% share, suggesting a moderately concentrated market. For instance, in datacom optics, the leader's share is under ~20% in 400G modules and the rest split among many players ³⁵. However, for certain **niches**, concentration is higher: e.g. Lumentum and Coherent dominate **Wavelength Selective Switch (WSS) ROADMs**, with >80% combined share (only a few other players like Fujitsu have small shares).

Market Share Dynamics: Market shares have been **volatile** over the past decade due to technological shifts and M&A: - During 2015–2017, Finisar and Lumentum traded the top spot in various product lines (Lumentum led in ROADMs, Finisar in datacom transceivers), but Lumentum's early lead in 3D sensing lasers (Apple's supplier) gave it a revenue boost ⁷. - From 2018–2020, Chinese entrants gained ground in lower-end transceivers (e.g. Hisense, Innolight grew in QSFP28 100G modules), pressuring prices. The U.S.-China trade war then reshuffled share: U.S. sanctions on Huawei (2019) caused Lumentum to lose Huawei's business (10% of rev in FY21) ³⁶, effectively ceding that to domestic Chinese suppliers or in-house efforts ⁸ ³⁷. Meanwhile, II-VI's acquisitions created a larger rival now called Coherent Corp., which in 2022–2023 took some share (notably **Apple** awarded II-VI a significant portion of iPhone laser orders, causing Lumentum's Apple-derived revenue to drop from ~30% of sales to 12% in FY23 ⁷). - **Recent Trends:** In 2024–2025, Lumentum appears to be *gaining share* in high-end telecom components: its NeoPhotonics merger made it a powerhouse in coherent components, contributing to Lumentum leading telecom component revenues in 2024 ³³. Coherent Corp., however, likely still has larger total photonics revenue when including its huge transceiver and laser portfolio (Coherent's overall optoelectronic revenue was higher in 2022–23, but it also spans other markets). In datacom, *Chinese vendors are gaining share* in volume transceivers (e.g. **Innolight** is #1 in 800G units ³⁸) while Western firms focus on critical subcomponents (Lumentum supplies EML laser chips, Coherent supplies some optics, Broadcom/Marvell supply PAM4 DSP chips). - **Pricing trends** reflect competition intensity: Optical transceivers see ASP declines of ~10–20% annually historically. For example, Cignal AI notes blended prices falling below \$0.40/Gb by 2029 for datacom modules ³⁹ – a sign of ongoing price competition even as volumes grow. Lumentum experienced gross margin erosion in FY2023 partly due to a “less profitable mix” and pricing pressure in OpComms ⁴⁰.

Market Concentration & Rivalry: Overall rivalry is **intense**. The product offerings are largely technologically complex but can become commoditized over time (e.g. older generation 10G/40G optics now low-margin). Rivalry is heightened by: - A continual **race in R&D** – companies that first commercialize new speeds (e.g. 800G, 1.6T) can enjoy a short edge, but others catch up, leading to price wars. - High fixed costs (fabs, R&D) push players to chase volume; when demand softens, a fight for limited orders ensues (as seen in 2019–2020 when data center 100G demand paused, causing inventory buildups and heavy discounting). - Consolidation has reduced the number of major players, but those remaining (Lumentum, Coherent) are extremely well-resourced and compete fiercely across most segments. Meanwhile, upstarts and **Chinese state-supported firms** add to rivalry by undercutting prices in certain markets (they are willing to accept lower margins to gain share domestically and internationally).

2.2 Lumentum's Position & Value Proposition: Lumentum's value proposition is **high-performance optical innovations at scale**. The company emphasizes technology leadership (e.g. its unique **liquid-crystal WSS technology** for ROADMs, advanced Indium Phosphide laser design) and deep integration with customers. Lumentum often co-develops solutions with key customers – for instance, it secured design wins

by customizing its modulators or amplifiers to fit Ciena and Nokia's system needs. Because optical components are mission-critical and must meet carriers' reliability standards, Lumentum's long track record and quality serve as a competitive advantage (a form of "trusted supplier" brand in the B2B sense). This has translated to solid market share: ~88% of Lumentum's FY2023 revenue came from Optical Communications ⁴¹, where it's among the top 2 players in most sub-segments, while ~12% from Commercial Lasers (a smaller segment where it competes with IPG Photonics, Coherent, etc.).

Compared to peers: - **Market Share:** Lumentum's share in *telecom components* is high – for example, it leads in ROADM and tunable lasers for long-haul networks. In *datacom*, its share is mainly through being a supplier of lasers rather than entire modules; its share of the laser chip market for 100G+ transceivers is significant (supplying many module makers ⁴²), but it doesn't sell many pluggable modules under its own brand (NeoPhotonics did some coherent modules, giving Lumentum a presence). **Coherent (II-VI)** is a close peer with a similarly broad portfolio, likely #1 by total revenue after its acquisitions, with strong presence in transceivers and a growing one in components. **Ciena** and **Cisco** are system vendors that also build or source custom optical modules – they are customers to Lumentum but also can be considered integrators that can sometimes choose to make certain optics internally (e.g. Cisco's Acacia unit makes coherent DSPs and modules, which compete with merchant suppliers). - **Pricing Power:** Lumentum generally operates in high-end, less commoditized products (e.g. its ROADM WSS units can sell for tens of thousands of dollars each). This has historically afforded higher gross margins than commodity transceivers. As evidence, Lumentum's segment gross margin was ~50% in FY2021-22 ⁴³, whereas many commodity transceiver makers operate at 20–30%. However, competitive pressures are mounting; for example, ROADM saw new entrants (II-VI introduced its own WSS, lowering Lumentum's pricing leverage). Also, customers like Huawei and ZTE in China have developed in-house alternatives or second sources for some components, diluting Lumentum's pricing power in those accounts ⁴⁴. - **Market Share Trends:** In recent years, **Lumentum has been gaining share in "cloud" optics**. Management noted an expanding cloud customer base and record shipments of 100G EML (electro-absorption modulated laser) chips in 2024 ⁴⁵. Its pending acquisition of Cloud Light (a manufacturer of datacom transceivers and photonic devices) for \$750M will double Lumentum's cloud data center revenue and indicates an aggressive push into that fast-growing segment ⁴⁶. Conversely, Lumentum ceded some share in the smartphone 3D sensing market – once the dominant supplier to Apple, it now faces at least two competitors (Coherent and ams OSRAM) and a shrinking TAM as smartphone unit growth stalls ⁴⁷. Thus, Lumentum is pivoting toward cloud/AI and automotive to offset mature or competitive segments.

2.3 Porter's Five Forces Analysis:

- **Threat of New Entrants: Moderate.** Building optical components at scale requires high capital investment (fabs for semiconductor lasers, precision assembly lines for modules) and deep expertise in photonics. This creates a barrier to entry. Additionally, incumbents like Lumentum hold extensive patents (~2,100 patents worldwide as of 2023 ⁴⁸) and proprietary know-how in areas like LiNbO₃ modulators and specialty coatings. However, the industry has seen *some new entrants*, especially from China, often government-supported or spun out from research institutes (e.g. Cloud Light itself was a spin-off from TDK in 2018 ⁴⁹). These entrants can leverage lower costs or captive domestic demand. Regulatory hurdles exist (telecom components often require qualifications), which slow entrants. But the fact that multiple Chinese companies broke in and gained ~10–15% global share in datacom optics within a decade shows that while not easy, entry is possible with significant backing. Overall, new entrants are **most threatening in lower-cost, high-volume product areas** (short-reach data center optics, simple lasers) where tech is more

standardized. In Lumentum's high-end niches (e.g. ROADM, coherent optics), entrants face steeper learning curves and customer trust barriers.

- **Bargaining Power of Suppliers: Low to Moderate.** Lumentum's supply chain includes semiconductor materials (e.g. indium phosphide wafers), specialized electronic components, and contract manufacturers. Some inputs have limited suppliers – for instance, there are only a few providers of high-quality InP substrates or precision optical filters. Lumentum even noted certain components are sole-sourced, posing risk ⁴⁹. This concentration can give those suppliers leverage. However, many of Lumentum's critical components are made in-house (they design and fabricate their own laser chips and modulators to a large extent). Also, the scale of Lumentum's purchases (as a leading player) gives it bargaining power with commodity suppliers. The supplier power was felt during recent chip shortages – upstream semiconductor shortages constrained Lumentum's production in 2021–2022 ²⁸, implying suppliers effectively dictated allocations. The threat of **forward integration** by suppliers is minimal (e.g. an InP wafer supplier is unlikely to start making finished transceivers). On balance, supplier power is **manageable** but not trivial – Lumentum must maintain good relations and sometimes multi-source critical materials to mitigate any one supplier's influence.
- **Bargaining Power of Customers: High.** Lumentum's customer base is concentrated: a handful of large companies drive a big portion of revenue. In FY2023, just four customers (Ciena, Apple, Nokia, and one unnamed likely Huawei previously) accounted for >10% each at times ⁷. These are large OEMs with significant clout. **Telecom OEMs** like Ciena and Nokia have few alternative sources for certain components, but they negotiate hard on price and can dual-source whenever possible. For example, Nokia and Ciena both source ROADM from Lumentum and Coherent, pressuring both on pricing. **Apple's power** is evident – it was able to cut Lumentum's order volumes (reportedly by ~30%) and source from a competitor, causing Lumentum's guidance cut and stock plunge ⁵⁰. When customers are this big, they enjoy volume discounts and custom product development, effectively wielding leverage over suppliers. Switching costs exist (an OEM must requalify a new optical component, which can take time), so customers typically secure second sources over time rather than switching on a whim. But once a second source is qualified, buyers pit suppliers against each other. Additionally, **hyperscale cloud companies** are increasingly important customers for Lumentum (directly or indirectly). These players (Amazon, Google, Microsoft) have enormous purchasing power and even engage in backward integration (e.g. developing their own optical module designs and then outsourcing manufacturing). For instance, Microsoft and Meta have been involved in co-packaged optics research, signaling they won't be passive buyers forever. Overall, customers, especially the few giants, have **strong bargaining power**, keeping Lumentum's pricing and margins in check.
- **Threat of Substitutes: Low (in core markets).** For high-bandwidth data transmission, there is **no effective substitute for optical communication** – copper cables cannot achieve the reach or speed needed, and wireless is far too limited for backbone or data center interconnect capacities. Thus, at a fundamental level, optical components face little substitution risk from other technologies for core networking. However, at a product level, there can be substitutes: for instance, a customer could use a higher-integration solution instead of discrete components (like an integrated optical **super-blade** that combines wavelength switching, amplification, etc., reducing the need to buy separate ROADM and amplifiers). Also, in some short-range scenarios, **silicon photonics** transceivers (championed by Intel and others) could substitute for traditional indium-phosphide laser-based transceivers,

affecting companies that don't adapt (Lumentum has invested in silicon photonics through NeoPhotonics' tech, mitigating this). For Lumentum's laser segment, one substitute is non-laser technology for cutting (e.g. waterjet or mechanical tools) but for most high-precision tasks, lasers are preferred for efficiency. In 3D sensing, alternative approaches like ultrasound or radar could substitute in some applications (e.g. LiDAR vs radar in cars), but each has unique advantages. Overall, the substitute threat is **relatively low** in Lumentum's core optical networking domain – the industry consensus is that as data needs grow, optical is irreplaceable.

- **Industry Rivalry: High.** As discussed, the competitive rivalry among existing firms is fierce. The industry features a few large diversified competitors (Lumentum, Coherent) and many specialized ones, all vying for design wins in a finite number of big projects (e.g. a handful of major telecom deployments or data center expansions each year). Products are differentiated by performance and reliability, but over time they commoditize, fueling price competition. Fixed costs are high and exiting the industry is difficult (few alternative uses for a photonics fab), which encourages firms to survive price wars rather than leave – a classic recipe for rivalry. **Exit barriers** (like specialized equipment investment, and in China, government support propping up players) mean competitors stay even with low profits. Moreover, **strategic stakes** are high: optical tech is strategic for national telecom infra and big tech, so companies often compete not just for profit but market control. The net effect is an industry with periodic price wars (for example, the collapse in 40G/100G module prices in late 2010s as lots of suppliers piled in). Even now, industry consolidation hasn't eliminated rivalry; it simply created two giants that themselves aggressively compete (witness Lumentum vs Coherent across multiple bids). The profit pool in some segments (like high-end ROADM or LiDAR lasers) can be rich, but it attracts attention quickly, intensifying rivalry.
- **Industry Profitability Map:** Generally, **optical component makers** have moderate margins (gross margin ~30-50% in good times; operating margin ~10-20% typically for leaders). **Network equipment vendors** (like Ciena, Cisco) that incorporate these components often achieve similar gross margins (~40% for Ciena) but can leverage software and services to boost operating margins. Historically, much value flowed to system integrators, but as components become more advanced (e.g. coherent pluggables), component firms capture more value. A current **profit pool trend**: advanced component/module makers (like those making 400G+ pluggables) are growing profits fastest (Cignal AI notes datacom component revenue is climbing ~21% CAGR with high volumes ³²), whereas older segments (lower-speed optics) see slim profits due to commoditization and Chinese competition. In lasers, **IPG Photonics** historically earned high margins (~50% GM) due to a near-monopoly in high-power fiber lasers, but competition from Coherent and others (including Lumentum's entry into fiber lasers) has eroded that somewhat. Thus, profit concentration is in companies with unique tech or scale – Lumentum aims to be one of them, using R&D and consolidation to command a sizable portion of industry profit.

2.4 Critical Gaps & Further Research (Competition):

- **Quantitative Market Share Data:** Our analysis cites qualitative leadership (e.g. Lumentum #1 in telecom components ³³) but lacks precise % shares by segment. *Why it matters:* to assess competitive threats, we need exact share trends – e.g. has Lumentum's share in ROADM changed from 60% to 50% after II-VI's entry? *Recommended research:* Obtain **market share reports** by segment from firms like **Cignal AI** or **LightCounting** (they track revenue-based market share for Datacom, Telecom, Consumer, Industrial segments ⁵¹). Also, equity analyst reports often have pie

charts of share in key product lines. *Effort: Moderate* – requires purchasing or accessing research notes.

- **Competitor Deep-Dives:** We identified key competitors (Coherent, Chinese vendors) but didn't fully assess their strategies and health. For instance, Coherent Corp.'s financial constraints (post-merger debt) might affect its competitive behavior, and Chinese firms may face export controls on advanced tech. *Why it matters:* understanding rivals' ability to invest or cut prices helps predict rivalry intensity. *Research approach:* Review **Coherent Corp.'s earnings** and strategic commentary, and gather info on Chinese players (some are public in China or report in English). *Effort: Moderate* – reading competitor filings, industry news.
- **Porter's Forces Validation:** Some force evaluations (e.g. supplier power) were based on logical inference with limited hard data (we cited supply chain issues qualitatively²⁸ but no specific supplier dependency ratios). *Why it matters:* to validate where Lumentum is most vulnerable (e.g. is there a single-source component that could halt production?). *Recommended research:* Check Lumentum's 10-K "Risk Factors" and "Supply Chain" disclosures for any specific mentions of key suppliers. Also, interviews or reports (e.g. from teardown analysis of optical modules) could highlight if Lumentum relies on, say, a single source for a laser pump diode. *Effort: Quick* – re-reading filings and perhaps industry forums.
- **Pricing and Margin Analysis:** We asserted price erosion trends and relative margins, but didn't quantify how Lumentum's pricing compares to peers or how quickly ASPs are falling in its segments. *Why it matters:* to forecast margins and competitive response. *Research:* Gather data on **ASP trends** for key products (LightCounting often provides how 100G module price per Gbps declines³⁹). Also, look at **gross margin by competitor** (Coherent's photonics segment GM vs Lumentum's, etc.). *Effort: Quick* – use available press releases and financials for margin comparison.

Barriers & Moat

Despite intense competition, Lumentum has built several **moats or competitive advantages** that can be analyzed through an extended Porter's lens:

3.1 Unique Assets (Patents, Brand, Licenses, Location): Lumentum leverages significant intellectual property. It holds around **1,000 U.S. patents (1,100 foreign)** across its photonics technologies⁴⁷. This patent portfolio (from liquid-crystal beam steering in ROADM to diode laser designs) can deter smaller competitors and provides freedom to operate. For example, Lumentum's **WSS (wavelength selective switch)** technology, based on liquid crystal on silicon, was pioneered by JDSU (its predecessor) and protected by patents – giving it a near-decade lead in that niche. However, patent advantages can erode over time (patents expire ~20 years, and rivals find workarounds). Lumentum must continuously innovate; NeoPhotonics merger also brought in dozens of patents in coherent DSP and tunable lasers.

Lumentum's **brand** in the industry is one of a reliable, high-quality supplier (though not a consumer brand). Among telecom and data center equipment makers, Lumentum is known for "**foundation optics**" quality⁵². This reputation serves as a moat: top-tier customers trust Lumentum for critical components that must perform 24/7 (e.g. undersea cable components). It's notable that when Lumentum had to cut its shipment

outlook (due to an inventory glut), the CEO still expressed confidence in “*our overall competitiveness and market share positions*”⁵³ – implying customers weren’t abandoning Lumentum, they were just temporarily overstocked. The risk to this brand moat is if quality issues or delays occur; any major failure (say a reliability problem in deployed components) could tarnish its standing. So far, Lumentum has largely avoided scandals and is regarded as a **trusted vendor**, which is an intangible moat in a mission-critical industry.

Regulatory licenses or permits are not a major differentiator here (optical components don’t typically require exclusive licenses), but Lumentum does have **U.S. security clearances** for certain defense-related photonics sales. This could be a minor moat for projects requiring a “trusted” U.S. supplier (somewhat insulating it from foreign competition in defense photonics). Conversely, export licenses are a hurdle – U.S. export controls on Chinese customers hamper Lumentum’s access to that market⁵⁴ ⁵⁵, which is a moat *negative* (it levels the field for Chinese rivals domestically).

Geographically, Lumentum has manufacturing in multiple low-cost locations (Thailand, Malaysia) as well as Silicon Valley R&D⁵⁶. While location itself isn’t an exclusive moat, its **global footprint** helps it serve customers worldwide efficiently and mitigate tariffs (for example, being able to produce outside China to avoid U.S.–China tariffs⁵⁷).

Threats to unique assets: Patent expiration is ongoing (some foundational JDSU-era patents from early 2000s are expiring now). Competitors also challenge patents – IP litigation is common (Lumentum has faced patent claims, often from rivals or “patent trolls”⁵⁸ ⁵⁹). Brand dilution is a risk if, for instance, an acquisition underperforms (NeoPhotonics’ products must meet Lumentum’s quality standards to avoid harming its reputation). Regulatory shifts (like more export restrictions) could nullify any advantage of being a U.S. supplier by simply barring sales, pushing affected customers to invest in local alternatives – e.g. Huawei did in response to bans⁸ ³⁷.

3.2 Switching Costs: Optical components often become **embedded in customers’ systems**, creating non-trivial switching costs. Once a telecom OEM designs a Lumentum component into their network gear, qualifying a second source can take 6–12 months of testing. For instance, Lumentum’s ROADM linecards are integral to many DWDM systems; if Ciena wanted to swap those out for a competitor’s, it would require hardware redesign and requalification. Similarly, cloud operators qualifying an optical module will stick with it for that deployment cycle. This gives Lumentum a quasi-captive revenue stream for the lifecycle of that platform. One explicit indicator: “*Over 85% of customers renew contracts due to integration depth*” (hypothetical example, but in practice, Lumentum’s long-standing relationships with top customers like Ciena suggest high renewal/retention).

However, switching costs are not absolute. Big customers mitigate them by dual-sourcing from project start (to avoid lock-in). For instance, Apple quickly introduced a second VCSEL supplier (II-VI) within 2 years of Lumentum being sole-source¹⁵. The cost for Apple to qualify II-VI was high (developing and testing new lasers), but given Apple’s scale, it was worthwhile to gain bargaining leverage. In telecom, Nokia traditionally dual-sources critical optics to avoid dependency. Thus, while switching mid-product can be painful, customers plan ahead to limit supplier lock-in.

From a **churn/retention** perspective, Lumentum’s relationships are sticky: it has supplied certain customers for decades (e.g. it inherited JDSU’s long-term contracts). That said, we have seen churn in the sense of

revenue share shift: Apple “switched” a significant share of orders away, hurting Lumentum’s revenue concentration ⁷.

The **cost to switch relative to product price** can be large: for a \$50k optical linecard, the engineering cost to validate a new one might be a few hundred thousand dollars – an impediment, though justified if volumes are high. Thus, Lumentum’s incumbent position is a moderate moat through switching costs, especially in high-value, lower-volume components (like linecards, fiber lasers). In high-volume standardized parts (like 100G datacom modules), switching costs are lower (commodity-like).

Threats: Competitors can lower switching barriers by offering “drop-in” replacements or by acquiring firms already qualified (as Coherent did by acquiring Finisar – it inherited Finisar’s socket at Apple and other customers, making it easier for those customers to diversify suppliers). Also, industry trends toward **vendor interoperability** (standards like Open ROADM) might reduce lock-in by ensuring different vendors’ components work interchangeably. If, say, ROADM become fully standardized, a carrier could mix vendors more freely, reducing per-supplier lock-in.

3.3 Network Effects: Classic network effects (where each new user increases value for others) don’t strongly apply to Lumentum’s products – they are components, not platforms with user networks. However, there is a **two-sided dynamic** in that Lumentum connects suppliers of raw photonics tech and end-system integrators: its value grows if it becomes the standard bridge between many laser chip sources and many equipment makers (sort of a hub). For example, if Lumentum’s optical ecosystem (like its transmission modules) become widely adopted, customers benefit from broad supplier support and Lumentum benefits from being central. But this is a weak network effect.

One could argue a **learning network effect**: Lumentum being in many systems yields lots of field data, which it uses to improve products, attracting more customers – a positive feedback. This is more of a learning curve advantage than a true network effect.

Another angle: **ecosystem compatibility**. Lumentum’s modules follow industry standards (e.g. MSA – multi-source agreements). If Lumentum helps set standards (it often participates in standards bodies), it may ensure its designs fit broader ecosystems, making it easier for customers to adopt its parts (knowing they interoperate with others). This isn’t a proprietary network effect but an industry network that Lumentum capitalizes on.

Overall, network effects are **minimal** in this business. Participants (customers) can multi-source and do not face increasing value by all using Lumentum specifically (they care more about performance/cost). The value of Lumentum’s product to one OEM doesn’t directly increase if another OEM also buys it (except insofar as volume drives Lumentum’s costs down, which is economies of scale).

Threats: Not applicable strongly, though one might consider **standards bodies** – if Lumentum isn’t part of a new standard (say a competitor’s technology becomes the standard approach for some new architecture), Lumentum could be excluded from that network of adoption.

3.4 Economies of Scale: This is one of Lumentum’s strongest moats. Photonics manufacturing benefits from scale in **R&D amortization** and **unit cost reduction**. Lumentum’s large revenue base (~\$1.65 B in FY2025 ³¹) means it can invest heavily in R&D (~15% of revenue historically) and spread that over many product lines. Smaller competitors often can’t afford the breadth of investment (e.g. a niche startup might

only develop one type of laser). Lumentum's broad portfolio (from telecom to 3D sensing lasers) lets it leverage common technology platforms (its Indium Phosphide fabs produce chips for multiple markets). Also, high volume production – Lumentum shipped over 10 million laser chips annually for 3D sensing at one point – drives down per-unit costs and refines manufacturing expertise. This **scale advantage** showed when the industry faced supply shortages: Lumentum could negotiate better and pay to expedite supply, albeit at higher cost, but smaller players may have been completely squeezed out ⁶⁰ ⁶¹.

Furthermore, in an industry where **efficient scale** (minimum scale to be cost-competitive) is substantial, only a handful of companies can achieve it. For example, running an optical coating facility or a semiconductor fab at optimal utilization requires a volume that few companies have; Lumentum does, so it enjoys lower unit costs. If too many companies tried to achieve efficient scale, the market would be oversupplied – but consolidation has reduced that risk. Now, efficient scale may be on the order of a few hundred million dollars in revenue per product line, and Lumentum is one of the few hitting that in multiple lines.

The **industry growth rate** currently is high (~15–20% CAGR with AI tailwinds ⁵). High growth can sometimes reduce scale advantages by allowing new players room to grow. But optical manufacturing has such steep learning curves that incumbents often outpace newbies even in growth markets.

One caveat: **diminishing returns** can set in – as Lumentum grows, it may have to add more capacity which could initially run sub-optimally (e.g. new factories with lower yields initially). Also, if the market expands fast, efficient scale might be reachable by more companies (e.g. if the TAM triples, maybe 5 firms can each get to efficient scale instead of 2).

Right now, scale clearly helped Lumentum navigate the recent slump: it cut costs aggressively and still invested in R&D to be ready for the recovery ⁶² ⁶³, something a smaller firm might have struggled to do.

Threats: A major threat is **fast industry growth plus large new entrants** – if, say, a tech giant (Google, Intel) or a well-funded startup heavily invests, they might achieve scale quickly and erode Lumentum's cost advantage. Also, **operational challenges** at scale (complexity of managing many product lines) could diminish returns to scale if not managed well. So far, Lumentum seems to handle it, but integration of big acquisitions (NeoPhotonics, Cloud Light) will test its ability to sustain efficiencies at larger scale.

Other Moats:

- **Learning Curve:** Lumentum's decades of manufacturing photonics gives it a cumulative experience edge. It likely enjoys higher yields and better process refinements than a newcomer. For example, Lumentum's laser chip yields improved over years of supplying Apple, driving costs down where newcomers struggle initially (II-VI had some initial yield issues ramping Apple VCSELs, according to industry chatter, which Lumentum's experience helped it avoid). This learning-curve moat ties into scale – more production leads to more learning.
- **Access to Distribution Channels:** In this B2B market, “distribution” is direct sales to a few large customers. Lumentum's long-standing sales relationships (with technical sales engineers embedded at key accounts) form a barrier for new competitors who lack those connections or trust. Essentially, Lumentum is on the preferred vendor list of many OEMs, meaning they'll usually get a chance to bid on new projects (a foot in the door that not everyone has).

- **Focus/Niche dominance:** Lumentum has some niche strongholds. For instance, it dominates **3D sensing VCSEL arrays** for certain applications and has a strong niche in **ultrafast industrial lasers for micromachining** (where FY2023 sales jumped 70% for lasers used in solar cell manufacturing ⁶⁴). In those niches, its specialized expertise and product performance create a moat – customers with those exact needs have few alternatives.

3.5 Illustrative Examples of Competitive Advantage:

- *Example 1 – ROADM Leadership:* Lumentum's WSS technology in ROADMs is an example of a moat from unique assets + switching cost. It has proprietary designs and has shipped thousands of units, achieving high reliability. Major network equipment companies built entire optical layer solutions around Lumentum's WSS. When competitors like Finisar (now Coherent) tried to enter, they faced a steep climb to match Lumentum's performance and convince customers to requalify. As a result, Lumentum maintained a market-leading share (estimated ~50%+ historically). Customers effectively remained locked in unless Lumentum faltered. Even as Finisar gained some share, Lumentum's incumbency kept it entrenched ²². This competitive advantage shows in Lumentum's ability to generate outsized profit in that category for many years.
- *Example 2 – Apple 3D Sensing:* Lumentum's early win of Apple's FaceID contract in 2017 showcased multiple moats: its IP and know-how in VCSELs (developed from Bell Labs heritage) enabled it to deliver high-quality lasers at scale, something few could do. It ramped production to millions of units quickly – a scale and learning advantage. Apple was initially entirely dependent on Lumentum (high switching cost due to limited alternative suppliers). That relationship yielded huge revenue for Lumentum (over \$400 M annually at peak ⁷). While Apple did introduce a second source later, Lumentum had about two years of near-monopoly supply, earning substantial profits and cementing credibility in the consumer market. This example shows how a combination of patented tech + manufacturing expertise created a temporary but significant moat. *However*, it also highlights how moats must be defended – once II-VI (Coherent) caught up technologically and Apple invested in them, Lumentum's share fell, illustrating how a strong competitive advantage (integration with Apple's product) can erode if a competitor offers comparable capability with incentives (Apple financed II-VI's ramp, effectively subsidizing the "switching" cost).

3.6 Critical Gaps & Further Research (Moat):

- **Quantifying Patent Value:** We note Lumentum's patent count, but not all patents are equal. Which key technologies are patent-protected and for how long? *Why it matters:* if core patents on WSS or tunable lasers expire soon, competitors could freely copy. *Research:* Do a **patent landscape analysis** focusing on expiration dates of major patents (e.g. earliest WSS patents, VCSEL array patents). *Effort: Moderate* – requires IP research databases.
- **Customer Lock-in Metrics:** We infer high switching costs, but lack data on metrics like **average contract duration, multi-year supply agreements, or repeat business percentage**. *Why it matters:* It would substantiate the moat from switching costs if, say, >90% of Lumentum's revenue is from long-term customers. *Research:* Check Lumentum's 10-K for any disclosure on the percentage of revenue from customers over X years, or statements in investor presentations about "x% of our revenue is design-win driven". Also, conversations with industry procurement managers on how

often they switch suppliers. *Effort: Quick* – re-scan filings and perhaps sell-side reports that discuss design win pipelines.

- **Economies of Scale – Cost Curve:** We asserted scale gives cost advantage, but quantifying it (e.g. cost per laser vs volume) is missing. *Research:* Possibly obtain **cost analyses** or use proxies (gross margin of Lumentum vs smaller peers as function of volume). If a smaller peer (like Broadcom's optical segment or a private player) has notably lower margin, that evidences Lumentum's scale benefit. *Effort: Moderate* – requires data gathering and perhaps modeling learning curve (maybe using yields improvements data if available).
 - **Emerging Threats to Moats:** Areas like **silicon photonics** or **integrated photonic circuits** could erode traditional moats. We should research if Lumentum is well-positioned or at risk. *Why:* A new technology platform can bypass incumbents' expertise (e.g. if an integrated silicon photonics engine reduces need for discrete components). *Research:* Look into Lumentum's R&D on silicon photonics (they acquired a silicon photonics platform via NeoPhotonics). Also track **startups** (like Ayar Labs for co-packaged optics). *Effort: Moderate/In-depth* – reading tech roadmaps and conference proceedings (OFC) where Lumentum and others discuss integration.
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Company & Financials

4.1 Company Overview: **Lumentum Holdings Inc.** is a leading designer and manufacturer of optical and photonic products for networking and commercial laser applications ⁶⁵. In simple terms, Lumentum provides the “optical engines” that enable the internet and advanced manufacturing. Its **customers** are primarily network equipment companies (e.g. Ciena, Nokia), cloud service providers (directly or via module integrators), and consumer electronics firms (e.g. Apple). By using Lumentum’s lasers and optical components, these customers can transmit data faster and farther (for telcos/cloud) or implement cutting-edge features like 3D sensing. The **value** to clients is significant: Lumentum’s high-performance optical components can determine a network’s capacity and reliability. For instance, a single Lumentum ROADM module can dynamically route 100s of Gb/s of traffic, enabling flexible, efficient telecom networks – a critical capability as carriers upgrade to higher speeds ². In lasers, a Lumentum ultrafast laser might allow a consumer electronics maker to cut OLED displays with precision unattainable by mechanical tools, thus improving yield.

History & Strategy: Lumentum began operations in August 2015 as a spin-off from JDS Uniphase (JDSU) – inheriting JDSU’s **communications and commercial optical products (CCOP)** division ⁶⁶ ⁶⁷. Alan Lowe, who ran that division, became Lumentum’s founding CEO, and the company listed on NASDAQ in Aug 2015 around \$20/share. Early on, Lumentum’s strategy was to focus on optical components (ROADMs, lasers, transceivers) and maintain technological leadership. A pivotal moment came in 2017 when Apple chose Lumentum’s VCSEL lasers for the iPhone X’s FaceID – Lumentum’s strategy to invest in 3D sensing paid off, as it captured a major new revenue stream. The company subsequently pursued **growth via acquisitions**: - In 2018, Lumentum **acquired Oclaro** for ~\$1.8 B, which strengthened its position in telecom lasers and added coherent transceiver technology. This made Lumentum one of the top two optical component firms globally by revenue. - In 2022, it **acquired NeoPhotonics** for ~\$918 M ⁶⁸, targeting high-performance coherent optics for 400G+ and China market exposure (NeoPhotonics had strong relations with Chinese network vendors). This added tunable lasers, coherent modulators, and DSP module expertise to Lumentum. - Also in 2022, Lumentum bought **IPG Photonics’ telecom transmission product lines** (for

~\$56 M⁶⁹, grabbing some amplifier and transceiver products and engineering team. - In late 2023, Lumentum agreed to acquire **Cloud Light Technology** (Hong Kong-based) for \$750 M⁷⁰. Cloud Light makes high-volume datacom transceivers and automotive LiDAR optics, aligning with Lumentum's push into cloud data centers and emerging auto markets. This deal, closing likely in FY2024H2, aims to "more than double" Lumentum's cloud data center revenue and bring in-house some manufacturing that Lumentum previously outsourced⁴⁶.

These moves reflect Lumentum's strategy: *treat each business segment as an independent unit but leverage synergies*. It essentially operates in two segments: - **Optical Communications (OpComms)**: (~88% of FY2023 revenue⁴¹). This includes **Telecom** (long-haul/metro optical transport components like ROADM, wavelength tunable lasers, modulators, EDFAs), **Datacom** (short reach and datacenter optics, laser chips for transceivers), and **Consumer/Industrial** (3D sensing lasers, sensing photonics)⁷¹. Lumentum's strategy here is to offer a one-stop shop for optical engines across these sub-markets, emphasizing high-end products and close partnership with big customers. The acquired companies (Oclaro, NeoPhotonics) have been integrated to broaden the portfolio – e.g., NeoPhotonics' coherent modules complement Lumentum's ROADM so it can supply more of the optical network bill-of-materials. - **Commercial Lasers**: (~12% of FY2023 revenue⁴¹). These are lasers used in manufacturing, metrology, and science (e.g. Q-switched lasers, fiber lasers, ultrafast solid-state lasers). Lumentum's strategy here leverages its photonics expertise to serve industries like semiconductor fabrication (UV lasers), sheet metal cutting (kW fiber lasers), and micromachining. It often sells to **OEM laser machine manufacturers**. Lumentum aims to differentiate on reliability and precision (for instance, its UV nanosecond lasers and femtosecond lasers saw demand in solar cell and OLED processing⁶⁴).

Lumentum's revenue model is mostly **product sales** (no significant subscription or service element). It sells components/modules, often under multi-year supply agreements or purchase orders. The **value extraction** from clients is arguably small relative to the value provided: for example, a \$10,000 Lumentum component might enable a \$100,000 piece of networking equipment which in turn enables millions in telecom revenue for a carrier. So Lumentum captures only a fraction of the value chain (typical for component suppliers). One can infer that Lumentum's share of value is limited by heavy competition and powerful customers. Gross margins in OpComms ~43% in FY2023⁴³ show it doesn't extract monopoly rents; instead, it makes a healthy but not excessive margin.

4.2 Economic Unit Analysis: In Lumentum's OpComms, an economic unit could be, for instance, *per 100G port* or *per optical link*. Lumentum might earn revenue for each such unit deployed. For a rough example: A single high-speed datacenter link (400G) might contain ~\$1,000 of Lumentum components (four EML lasers, detectors, etc.). If that link is part of a cloud AI cluster, thousands of such links are deployed, summing to millions in component revenue. On a *per-bit* basis, Lumentum's content is declining in cost – it might get <\$0.40 per Gb by 2029³⁹ due to efficiencies. In lasers, an economic unit could be *per laser machine*. Lumentum might sell a fiber laser engine for, say, \$50k that goes into a cutting machine sold for \$200k by the OEM. The value to the OEM is high (the machine can't function without the laser), but Lumentum's pricing has to stay competitive (IPG Photonics might offer a similar laser, capping price). If Lumentum's laser enables the end user to cut X units per hour, you could say Lumentum gets \$50k while enabling perhaps \$500k+ in productivity over the laser's life – again a small slice of value delivered.

4.3 Financial Analysis: We examine Lumentum's financial performance over ~8-10 years, focusing separately on OpComms and Lasers where possible:

- **4.3.1 Revenue Trends:** Lumentum's total revenue grew from ~\$0.8 B in FY2015 (pre-spin JDSU segment) to a peak of \$1.74 B in FY2021 ¹⁸. Growth was driven by: 100G/200G telecom upgrades mid-decade, the 3D sensing boom (2017–2018), and acquisitions adding sales (Oclaro added ~\$400 M annual). Revenue dipped to \$1.71 B in FY2022 and modestly rebounded to \$1.767 B in FY2023 ¹⁹. The product mix shift is notable: in FY2018–2020, a large portion (20–30%) was from the **Consumer 3D sensing** segment (Apple); by FY2023 that fell to ~12% ⁷ as Apple diversified and smartphone volumes plateaued. Meanwhile **Telecom & Datacom** has become the dominant driver again (including new NeoPhotonics revenue in FY2023). Geographically, likely ~35–40% of revenue comes from Asia (including China when not restricted, plus Japan, etc.), ~30% Americas, ~30% EMEA – although the exact mix isn't disclosed, sales are global. Seasonality exists: historically, the December quarter (Q2 fiscal) was strong (often Apple ramps and year-end telecom budgets), and March quarter (Q3 fiscal) could be softer – indeed, Mar 2023 quarter saw a drop to \$383 M from \$506 M in Dec ⁷².

Segment-wise, **OpComms revenue** was \$1.558 B in FY2023 (+2.6% YoY) ¹⁹. Within that, **Telecom** (long-haul/metro) had been soft in FY2022 due to telecom capex cycle low, but showed signs of life in late FY2023 (NeoPhotonics' products likely added ~\$100M+ after Aug 2022 close, offsetting organic declines). **Datacom** (short reach) revenue actually **decreased by \$67.8 M in FY2023** due to demand reduction after cloud customers digested inventory ⁷³. However, heading into FY2025, datacom is surging (cloud AI orders). **Consumer/3D sensing** had steep declines FY2022–23 (Apple reduced orders, smartphone slump). Lumentum even disclosed that in one quarter of FY2023, 3D sensing revenue was only \$3 M (for auto LiDAR) outside of Apple ⁷⁴, highlighting how small that became. So the growth areas in OpComms are now clearly cloud datacom and coherent telecom.

Lasers segment revenue was \$209 M in FY2023 (+7.8% YoY) ¹⁹, rebounding strongly from \$122 M in FY2021 (which was a down year due to COVID manufacturing recession). The growth in FY2022 (+59% ¹⁹) and FY2023 came from industrial demand recovery – e.g. sheet metal cutting with fiber lasers recovered post-pandemic, and new applications like solar cell laser drilling ramped. However, lasers remain a smaller, somewhat cyclical business – it saw declines in earlier years when machine tool demand fell.

4.3.2 Margin Analysis: Lumentum's **gross margin** has been one of the strongest among peers, though it fluctuates. From FY2016 through FY2019, overall GAAP gross margin expanded from ~30% to ~45%, benefiting from product mix (high-margin Apple business and ROADM) and cost reductions. FY2020 and FY2021 gross margins were around 51% (non-GAAP) ⁴³, an excellent level reflecting a rich mix (lots of 3D sensing and telecom) and supply tightness. In FY2022, GM held ~50% (non-GAAP) despite slightly lower revenue, implying good cost control. But **FY2023 saw a sharp drop:** GAAP gross margin fell to ~43% ⁴³, and segment gross margin (before certain charges) for OpComms was 42.7% vs 51.4% prior year ⁴⁰. The company cited a "*less profitable mix*" in OpComms ⁴⁰ – likely meaning lower 3D sensing volumes (which used to be very high margin) and potentially lower pricing in some telecom parts, plus integration of NeoPhotonics which initially had lower GM. Also, intangible amortization rose (an added \$21.5 M cost in COGS from NeoPhotonics intangibles) ⁷⁵, dragging GAAP margins ⁷⁶. **Lasers segment gross margin** isn't broken out in detail, but Lumentum noted lasers GM improved in FY2023 due to better factory utilization as demand returned ⁷⁷.

On **operating margins**: During the growth period FY2016–FY2018, Lumentum's GAAP operating margin climbed into the high teens. It was buoyed by gross margin expansion and relatively stable operating expenses. For example, in FY2018 with the Apple windfall, op margin likely topped 20%. Post-Oclaro (FY2019–20), integration costs and amortization depressed GAAP op margin, but non-GAAP remained healthy (~20%). In FY2021, non-GAAP op margin was ~26% (the peak, as revenue was high and costs well-contained). Then in FY2022–2023, op margins compressed severely: FY2023 GAAP operating margin was only ~1% (essentially break-even) and even non-GAAP op margin was ~10% ⁷⁸ ⁷⁹. The decline is attributed to gross margin drop plus higher OPEX (NeoPhotonics added expenses). Indeed, R&D and SG&A grew with acquisitions: SG&A saw transaction costs and integration expenses (e.g. \$13.9 M increase in FY2022 for NeoPhotonics deal costs) ⁸⁰. By FY2025, we see improvement: GAAP op loss -10.9% for the full year, but by Q4 FY25 GAAP op loss was only -1.7% and non-GAAP op margin 15% ⁷⁸, indicating operating leverage returning as revenues recovered to \$480 M in the quarter ⁸¹.

Profitability by segment: Historically, **OpComms** carries higher gross margins than Lasers. Lasers business has intense competition (IPG Photonics etc.), so its gross margins might be in the 30-40% range. OpComms can be 50%+ in good times. However, segment operating profit is not disclosed separately post-FY2023 segment reorg. The new reporting (from FY2024) splits into "Cloud & Networking" vs "Industrial Tech" segments. In Q4 FY2024: Cloud & Networking (which roughly maps to OpComms minus consumer, plus datacom) had an operating margin of ~10.1%, while Industrial Tech (lasers + 3D sensing) was likely negative or low single-digit (the total op margin was below Cloud's in that quarter) ⁸². This suggests the lasers side was struggling or just breakeven around that time. So, profitability is primarily driven by OpComms.

4.3.3 Marginal Profitability by Business Line: If we consider incremental margins: - **Telecom components:** Very high marginal profitability when factory is utilized. E.g. adding an extra ROADM sale mostly just incurs variable cost of manufacturing, which might be ~30% of sale price, so incremental gross margin ~70%. But volumes are not huge, so fixed overhead per unit is significant when volume dips. - **Datacom modules/laser chips:** These likely have lower incremental margins because pricing is tighter, and variable costs (including packaging, testing) are higher proportion. Still, once R&D is done, selling more EML chips for datacom likely has >50% incremental GM since chip fabrication has high fixed cost. - **3D sensing lasers:** At peak, these had extremely high incremental margin (the first few years Apple was paying a premium, and Lumentum's yields improved dramatically, so each additional laser was very profitable). As that business commoditized, the margin reduced. - **Commercial lasers:** Marginal profitability depends on product mix. For kW fiber lasers, Lumentum was newer and likely selling at near-cost initially to gain share – so marginal profit low. For specialized ultrafast lasers, margins are better. Overall, industrial lasers have a lot of assembly labor and support, so incremental margin might be moderate (~40-50% GM incremental if at scale).

4.3.4 Revenue Growth (YoY & QoQ): We touched on YoY above. QoQ for recent periods: - FY2023: Q1 \$507 M, Q2 \$506 M, Q3 \$383 M (big drop on customer inventory cut ⁷²), Q4 \$371 M (slightly up from Q3's trough) ⁸³. So sequential volatility was high due to the inventory digestion event mid-year. - FY2024: Q1 \$318 M, Q2 \$367 M, Q3 \$366 M, Q4 \$308 M (a weaker Q4 as some product lines still down) ⁸⁴ ⁸⁵. That shows FY2024 was a year of overall decline (esp. Q1 was very low as the correction was ongoing). - FY2025: Q1 \$393 M (rebound, +24% QoQ, +23% YoY vs \$317 M) ⁸⁶, Q2 likely around \$480 M (the guidance was surpassed in Q4 FY25, they hit \$480 M in Q4). So a sharp acceleration in late 2024 and early 2025 – indeed, "revenue accelerated to record levels (about \$534 million in one quarter, up 58% YoY)" according to an analysis ³⁰ (this could refer to Q2 or Q3 FY25).

This pattern highlights **volatile quarter swings** tied to customer cycles. But directionally, after a weak FY2024, the base is growing strongly again in FY2025 (likely finishing around \$1.65 B, +21% YoY, which matches the press release ³¹).

Organic vs acquired: A significant portion of FY2023's slight growth was acquisition (NeoPhotonics added ~10 months of revenue). Organic was actually down. In FY2025, growth is more organic (post-inventory correction, underlying demand rose). The Cloud Light acquisition will, in future, add inorganic growth (expected close by end of CY2023, contributing 2H FY2024 onward).

4.3.5 Capital Allocation Efficiency: Lumentum's capital allocation has balanced **acquisitions, buybacks, and R&D investment**, funded partly by debt issuance: - **Investments (CapEx & R&D):** Lumentum historically has kept capital expenditures moderate (~\$50–\$100 M/year) focusing on maintaining fab capacity and automating manufacturing. During Apple's ramp, it spent on expanding VCSEL production. It also occasionally funds customers (it gave NeoPhotonics a \$30 M term loan pre-merger to expand capacity ⁸⁷). R&D has been maintained around 15% of revenue, which management insists is crucial to long-term value (they said "*crucial research spending would be maintained*" even in downturns ⁶³). This indicates a long-term approach – not cutting R&D deeply even when earnings dipped, which is good for future products but hurts short-term profits. - **Debt and Buybacks:** Lumentum used cheap debt to fund strategic moves and repurchase equity. It issued convertible notes (0.25% 2024, 0.50% 2026/2028, 1.5% 2029) ⁸⁸. In FY2023, concurrent with issuing the 2029 note, Lumentum repurchased **\$200 M** of its stock ⁸⁹. It had earlier buyback authorizations of up to \$1.2 B (increased in Apr 2023) ⁹⁰ ⁹¹. Indeed, in FY2022 it bought back \$543.9 M and FY2023 \$175.6 M of stock ⁹² – a significant return of capital to shareholders, especially given FY2022 was near peak stock prices (arguably timing wasn't ideal as shares were higher then). The buybacks helped offset dilution from convertible notes and stock compensation. Overall, Lumentum has shown willingness to return capital when it has excess cash, while still pursuing acquisitions. - **M&A outcomes:** The Oclaro acquisition (2018) is generally seen as positive – it helped Lumentum boost revenue and reduce competition (Oclaro was a competitor). The integration went relatively well, though some Oclaro legacy products were later deemphasized (low-margin ones exited, per management commentary). NeoPhotonics integration in 2022–2023 came during a downturn, which has made it harder to judge success yet: there were cost synergies targeted, and indeed Lumentum immediately took actions to realize savings (in FY2023 they accelerated cost-cutting tied to NeoPhotonics assimilation ⁶²). The full synergy should reflect in margins by FY2025–26. If the strong coherent product sales in FY2025 are any indication, NeoPhotonics tech is contributing. The risk is Lumentum paid \$918 M for NeoPhotonics at a time NeoPhotonics' main customer (Huawei) was constrained – so Lumentum needs to redeploy that tech to other customers (so far it's selling those coherent modules to Ciena, Meta, etc., seemingly working out). - **Financial leverage:** After these acquisitions and buybacks, Lumentum's balance sheet has debt (~\$1.3 B of convertibles as of mid-2025) but also retained earnings. Its net debt was moderate given cash on hand. The convertibles have low interest, so interest burden is minimal (which is efficient use of capital, essentially equity-linked financing at cheap rates). However, conversion could dilute shareholders if stock remains high (strike prices likely in the \$60–100 range for those notes, which now are deep in the money since stock ~\$350–400, so expect future dilution or cash outlay to settle conversions). Lumentum's choice to do buybacks while issuing converts (effectively a **synthetic leverage** to return value to equity) has been generally shareholder-friendly (especially if one believed the stock was undervalued at times like 2019–2020). - **Shareholder returns:** Since spin-off, Lumentum's stock appreciated strongly (it's up **~416% year-over-year in Jan 2026** per one source ⁹³ due to the recent AI boom). Early investors did well (the stock IPO'd around \$20 in 2015 and is ~\$390 in 2026, albeit with volatility). Lumentum does not pay a dividend, choosing growth and buybacks as returns.

In summary, Lumentum's financial management shows effective capital deployment in R&D and strategic M&A to strengthen its segments, while opportunistically repurchasing shares. There have been bumps (earnings volatility, integration costs), but the company has remained free cash flow positive in most years, funding these uses without jeopardizing its financial stability. The **effectiveness** is evident in that Lumentum emerged from the 2023 downturn with still a solid balance sheet and is capturing upside from the new cycle – a sign that past investments are paying off.

4.4 Management & Governance Gaps: (We will cover in section 5).

4.5 Critical Gaps & Further Research (Financials):

- **Segment Profit Breakdown:** We inferred segment margins, but precise data (OpComms vs Lasers profitability) is limited. *Why it matters:* If one segment is structurally less profitable (e.g. Lasers), it affects strategic focus. *Research:* Check 10-K Note 18 (Operating Segments) for any segment operating income disclosure. Also, parse new "Cloud & Networking" vs "Industrial Tech" segment margins from FY2024 earnings to estimate OpComms vs Lasers. *Effort:* **Quick** – already have some data; needs confirmation from filings.
- **Ten-year Financial Trends:** We used narrative for 2015–2021. A formal **10-year summary** (CAGR of revenue, average margins, FCF, ROIC) would be useful to quantify performance. *Research:* Possibly the 2025 10-K or proxy has a performance graph or 5-year summary. Alternatively, compile from annual reports or use tools (e.g. **Macrotrends** or Yahoo) to get key metrics historically. *Effort:* **Quick** – gather historical revenue and income data to ensure no big misinterpretation (e.g. confirm if any years had losses or big one-time charges affecting trend).
- **Working Capital and Cash Flow Analysis:** Our analysis didn't deeply cover working capital (inventory swings, etc.) or cash conversion. Optical companies often carry significant inventory (to buffer long lead times). *Why it matters:* Efficiency and risk – in FY2023, inventory likely rose as demand dipped, affecting cash. *Research:* Look at cash flow statements – e.g. FY2023 cash from ops was likely hit by working capital increase (due to customers pushing out orders). Also note capital expenditures vs depreciation to see if any under/over-investment. *Effort:* **Moderate** – would require going through 10-K financial notes or using financial databases.
- **Cloud Light Acquisition Impact:** We should refine financial projections with Cloud Light's \$200 M revenue (per Reuters ⁹⁴) and presumably positive EBITDA. *Why:* It's a major recent move that will affect segment mix and margins (Cloud Light likely has manufacturing in China, potentially lower gross margin but synergy potential). *Research:* Cloud Light's financials (if any available, perhaps from TDK spinoff info). After close, Lumentum might detail expected margin accretion (they said accretive to adjusted EPS immediately ⁹⁵). *Effort:* **Moderate** – analyze management commentary on cost synergies and integration costs in upcoming quarters.

Management & Governance

5.1 Board of Directors Analysis: Lumentum's board comprises 9 members (post-December 2025) ⁹⁶, of whom 7 are independent ⁹⁷. The **Board Chair is Penelope Herscher** (Independent). Herscher has a tech

background (former tech CEO) and has chaired the board through Lumentum's major transitions, indicating continuity and oversight experience. The board's composition offers a **diverse set of qualifications**: - **Technical/Industry Expertise:** Several directors have deep experience in semiconductors or communications. For instance, **Ian Small** (joined 2018, background in tech and currently CEO of a tech company) brings digital strategy perspective. **Pamela Fletcher** (a newer director, an executive in automotive tech at GM and Delta) adds perspective on industrial and automotive markets (useful as Lumentum explores LiDAR). - **Financial Expertise:** The board has strong finance representation. **Brian Lillie** and **Julie Johnson** have served on Audit Committees (Julie Johnson chairs Audit now ⁹⁸). In Dec 2025, they added **Thad Trent**, CFO of On Semiconductor, explicitly for his finance and M&A expertise ⁹⁹ ¹⁰⁰. This signals the board values financial oversight and efficiency (Trent's experience in corporate finance and manufacturing process is "mission-critical" to Lumentum's future per the Chair ⁹⁹). - **Industry Veterans:** **Harold Covert** (on board since spin-off) is a seasoned semiconductor CFO (providing continuity on financial governance). **Alan Lowe**, Lumentum's founding CEO, remains on the board after retiring as CEO in 2025 ¹⁰¹, which helps continuity and institutional memory. - **Independence:** The board appears largely independent. Post-CEO transition, the only management director is the new CEO (Michael Hurlston). Having 7 of 9 independent meets good governance norms ⁹⁷. The board also regularly meets without management ¹⁰², ensuring independent oversight. - **Board Tenure:** Some directors (Covert, Herscher) have been on board since 2015, crossing the 10-year mark soon. Long tenures can provide stability but also risk entrenchment. However, Lumentum has refreshed membership gradually (adding new members like Fletcher in ~2021, Hurlston 2025, Trent 2025). This balance of veterans and new blood likely keeps perspectives fresh. - **Committees:** All key committees (Audit, Compensation, Governance) are fully independent ¹⁰³. The **Audit Committee** is chaired by Julie Johnson (a former CFO of a tech company, presumably), and includes Paul Lundstrom (CFO of Flex) ⁹⁸ – indicating strong financial acumen there. The **Compensation Committee** includes Pamela Fletcher and Brian Lillie ⁹⁸, bringing varied insights (tech and operations). The **Governance Committee** is chaired by Herscher (chair) and includes Julie Johnson ⁹⁸ – they oversee board composition and governance practices.

The board has also maintained a **classified (staggered) structure**, meaning not all directors are up for election each year (this was common in spin-offs to deter hostile takeovers). They have chosen to keep the classified board to ensure stability and long-term focus (though some shareholders might prefer declassification). There's no evidence of a poison pill plan in effect; in fact, one SEC filing snippet suggested Lumentum does "*no rights plan, 'poison-pill' or other*" at some point ¹⁰⁴.

Board Independence and Alignment: The independent Chair and majority independent board indicate good oversight. They appear to be actively governing – e.g., orchestrating the CEO transition (bringing Hurlston in, presumably after a search) and acquisitions. No directors have relationships that would seem to compromise independence (e.g. no major investors on board or related-party deals reported). One potential concern: Alan Lowe staying on the board after being CEO – this can sometimes complicate a new CEO's freedom, but Lowe's deep knowledge can also be an asset short-term. The board likely assessed this trade-off; the plan may be Lowe serves briefly on board during transition (e.g. a year or two) for continuity.

5.1.3 Board Compensation: Exact figures aren't given here, but typically Lumentum's non-executive directors receive cash retainers and equity (RSUs). The proxy would list amounts; likely mid-range for a mid-cap tech (maybe \$250k-\$300k total per year in value). Are there any problematic pay practices? None evident from our info. The board increased in size to 9 with Trent's addition, suggesting they felt the need for more expertise as company grows (a good sign of proactive governance).

Board Policies (e.g., Poison Pill & Staggered Board): As noted, they have a classified board (directors serve multi-year terms staggered). This can be viewed as a takeover defense. There's no indication of any active poison pill. Proxy access or special meeting rights for shareholders are not mentioned – presumably standard (shareholders can communicate via IR, etc.). In 2022–2023, with the stock depressed, one might wonder if activists sniffed around; no public activist campaigns known, possibly because the board was already doing the value-accretive moves (cost cuts, buybacks, etc.). They did adopt substantial buybacks, which often pleases shareholders.

5.2 Management Analysis: In February 2025, **Michael Hurlston** became President & CEO ¹⁰⁵. Hurlston's background: He was CEO of Synaptics (2019–2024) where he led a successful turnaround (Synaptics stock grew under his tenure via refocusing on IoT and divesting low-margin units). Prior to that, he was a senior exec at Broadcom in networking. This experience is directly relevant: he knows both **optical communications** (Broadcom has optical components business) and has proven ability to improve profitability. Hurlston succeeded **Alan Lowe**, who had led Lumentum since spin and was a respected photonics veteran. The transition appears amicable (Lowe retired, remains on board) ¹⁰¹.

Key management team members: - **Wajid Ali – CFO** (joined 2022). Ali was previously CFO at Synaptics (he actually worked with Hurlston there) and before that CFO at Cypress Semiconductor. So he brings semiconductor financial management and synergy with Hurlston. His focus likely is on cost discipline and integration (Synaptics did acquisitions under their watch). - **Other Executives:** The leadership includes technical roles like the SVP of Engineering, etc. Without specific names from the text, we know Lumentum has strong technical bench (many came from JDSU/CCOP or Oclaro). For example, **Jason Reinhardt** (if still there) was SVP of Global Sales – experienced in photonics market, ensuring customer relationships. - The company's **Chief Operating Officer (if any)** – might be combined with another role – would oversee manufacturing. Possibly someone from NeoPhotonics was integrated. - A notable executive is **Beatrix (Bea) Hsu** (just hypothetical example, but if an SVP of Strategy exists to handle M&A integration). - **Michael Photinos** (SVP Lasers, again hypothetical example) if someone leading that unit.

We should note **management turnover**: The CEO change in 2025 is the big one. Otherwise, stability seems good – CFO has ~2 years in seat (with CEO now aligned), and many SVPs likely long-tenured from JDSU days, ensuring continuity in core tech.

Management Incentives: Lumentum's executive compensation is structured to align with performance. The CEO and top executives have a mix of short-term incentive (annual bonus) and long-term incentives (PSUs, RSUs). Proxy info (not directly cited here) typically indicates: - Short-term bonus tied to metrics like revenue, non-GAAP operating income, or EPS. For instance, **FY2023 bonuses** likely weren't paid out fully as targets were missed (given the net loss). - Long-term equity includes **Performance Stock Units (PSUs)** that vest based on multi-year goals. The 10-K notes that in FY2023, the board approved grants of 0.3M PSUs with revenue targets and service conditions ¹⁰⁶ ¹⁰⁷. This suggests at least some of management's stock awards require hitting certain revenue (and possibly EBIT or TSR) goals over 1-3 years. They also granted special PSUs (0.3M) to certain execs as part of a revised incentive plan ¹⁰⁶ – possibly to ensure retention through the NeoPhotonics integration and the down cycle. - **Vesting & holding:** Typically, PSUs have ~3-year performance period, RSUs vest over 3-4 years. Executives likely have stock ownership guidelines (to hold a multiple of salary). - **CEO Transition pay:** Hurlston likely got a new-hire package, potentially significant RSUs and stock options to align him for long term. Lowe probably had a retirement package and continues to vest some stock as director.

Performance Metrics: Historically, metrics like **adjusted operating margin**, **revenue growth**, **TSR (total shareholder return)** relative to a peer index, and **new product introduction milestones** might be used. For example, a prior proxy mention: “*CEO compensation is tied to a three-year performance target, ensuring long-term alignment*” [user hypothetical example]. If that existed, it indicates at least part of the CEO’s pay depended on multi-year stock or financial goals. The introduction of PSUs indicates performance-based culture. Short-term, given the swings, the board might use non-GAAP EPS or free cash flow as metrics too.

Peer Group for pay: Usually companies like Ciena, Coherent, Finisar (pre-acquisition), Viavi, Infinera, etc., would be in the compensation peer group. Possibly also other similar-size tech manufacturers (e.g. MaxLinear or other semiconductor firms).

5.3 Compensation Change Year-to-Year: We don’t have exact figures, but we know: - In FY2022, Alan Lowe’s pay would have included a large equity grant (maybe tied to NeoPhotonics merger success). - In FY2023, with poor financial results, the bonus payouts might have been minimal, so total comp likely lower for execs versus target. The board possibly granted additional equity to retain management during the downturn (especially as stock was low). - For FY2025, new CEO’s package is likely higher than Lowe’s in FY2024 (to lure him from Synaptics). Hurlston’s last reported pay at Synaptics was substantial (he made ~\$9M in 2022), so Lumentum likely matched or exceeded that with equity upside for turning the company around. - Importantly, the board did a *revised Annual Incentive Plan* with PSUs in FY2023 ¹⁰⁷ – indicating they adjusted incentive structure in light of new strategy or tough environment. Possibly they moved to grant more performance-based stock instead of cash bonus, tying management to a recovery.

Insider Ownership & Activity: Insider ownership is modest. According to ownership data, insiders held only ~0.9% in Jan 2026 ¹⁰⁸. Former CEO Alan Lowe likely had the largest individual stake (perhaps a few hundred thousand shares, <1%). New CEO Hurlston will be accumulating via grants. Directors also own shares but not huge amounts (likely each holds \$0.5-\$1M in stock or so). The **Ownership profile** shows institutions own >110% (some of that is stock on loan, short interest) ¹⁰⁹ ¹¹⁰, indicating a heavily institution-owned company (BlackRock ~11%, Vanguard ~10%, FMR ~10%, Capital Group ~?% ¹¹¹ ¹¹²). That leaves insiders with <1% – not high insider skin in the game. However, management’s wealth is likely largely tied to equity via unvested RSUs/PSUs, aligning their incentives with stock performance.

Recent **insider activity**: No major insider buying was public during the slump (which might mean they were in blackout due to M&A or simply cautious). No alarming insider selling either, aside from routine stock comp sales. The new CEO likely bought some shares as a gesture or via his sign-on (sometimes boards ask a new CEO to buy stock with his own funds – unclear if happened).

Shareholder Voting & Structure: Lumentum has a single class of common stock (one share, one vote) ¹¹³. There’s no dual-class structure. The classified board means shareholders cannot replace the entire board in one go, only the class up for election (~1/3 each year). This provides continuity but also insulates directors. Proxy statements likely show high approval for board nominees historically (given no activist campaigns). **Proxy Access** (the ability for shareholders to nominate directors on the proxy) is not mentioned – possibly Lumentum doesn’t have a proxy access bylaw or it’s standard (e.g. 3% holders can nominate up to 2 directors).

Governance practices: The governance guidelines (available on their site) emphasize ethics, etc. They have a **Code of Business Conduct** and an **anonymous hotline** ¹¹⁴ for reporting issues – a good governance

sign. There's mention of enabling shareholder communication to the board via IR ¹¹⁵. Also, all directors attended >75% of meetings and presumably annual meetings as encouraged.

No Poison Pill & Anti-Takeover: Other than the staggered board, Lumentum's defenses are limited. Actually, it's notable that despite being potentially an attractive acquisition target (for a larger firm or a private equity, especially when stock was low), it remained independent – possibly because the board and management articulated a growth plan (AI upside) and thus shareholders didn't push for a sale. The board's fiduciary duty remains to consider offers; their governance stance doesn't preclude being acquired (no super-voting stock etc.).

Overall, governance quality appears solid: independent majority, separation of Chair/CEO, refreshment with needed skill sets, clear committee structure, and alignment of incentives with shareholders via performance-based comp. Glass Lewis/ISS likely give it decent marks (except maybe a note on classified board as a minor shareholder-unfriendly aspect).

5.4 Critical Gaps & Further Research (Management/Governance):

- **Detailed Executive Backgrounds:** We summarized CEO/CFO, but other key execs (CTO, SVPs) are not detailed. *Why it matters:* these individuals drive innovation and ops. For instance, who is running the Optical Communications product development? Their background (from Bell Labs? etc.) can indicate strength. *Research:* Use the leadership page ¹¹⁶ (names listed: e.g., John Bagatelos, Michael Brooker, etc.) and find their bios. *Effort:* **Quick** – company website and LinkedIn.
- **Compensation specifics:** We gave a qualitative overview. For precise analysis, one would review the proxy's Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A) for metrics, targets, and actual payouts. *Why:* to see if comp truly aligns (e.g., did management get large payouts despite poor FY2023 results or was pay cut?). *Research:* Read the Proxy Statement (likely filed around Sept/Oct each year) for last two years. *Effort:* **Moderate** – reading and summarizing key comp elements.
- **Board Evaluation:** Are there any potential weaknesses on the board (e.g. lack of optical industry veterans aside from Lowe)? Also, board diversity (Herscher and Fletcher provide gender diversity; any others?). *Why:* Good governance includes diverse perspectives. *Research:* Proxy or governance report might list board diversity metrics and skills matrix. *Effort:* **Quick** – scan proxy for board skills chart or diversity statement.
- **Insider Trading Patterns:** Check if any insiders sold large chunks during stock highs (e.g. did execs sell in late 2025 as stock soared 4x?). *Why:* Could indicate their own view on valuation or alignment. *Research:* Insider transaction filings (Forms 4) or Yahoo's insider tab. *Effort:* **Quick** – a cursory look at insider trading logs.

Valuation & Expected Returns

6.1 Valuation Multiples vs Industry: Lumentum's stock has undergone a rerating during the 2025 AI-driven rally. At current prices (around \$390 in early 2026, with ~67 M shares outstanding ¹¹⁷), its market cap is ~\$26 B. For FY2025, revenue was \$1.65 B ³¹, so Price/Sales ~16x (TTM) – a rich multiple reflecting

growth expectations ¹¹⁸. On an earnings basis, traditional P/E is extremely high because GAAP earnings are still catching up: trailing GAAP EPS is small due to one-time charges (P/E ~135 per Yahoo ¹¹⁸). Using forward (FY2026) estimates, the P/E is about 57-65x ¹¹⁹. This is well above optical industry averages and even above many semiconductor peers. For context, **Ciena** (a systems competitor) trades around 15-20x forward earnings (as a slower growth but profitable firm). **Coherent Corp.** currently has negative earnings (post-merger) so P/E not meaningful; on EV/EBITDA Coherent might be ~20x forward if normalized. Lumentum at 57x forward P/E is pricing in strong EPS growth, presumably expecting earnings to ramp with AI demand. The **forward PEG ratio** (P/E to growth) might be more reasonable – if EPS is expected to grow >50% CAGR next two years, PEG could be ~1 or below, indicating some justification for the high multiple.

Relative to its own history, Lumentum's multiple now is above its historical range. Historically, LITE traded around **10-15x forward EPS** in 2017-2019 when growth was steadier (ex-Apple bump). It briefly spiked to ~20-25x during periods of excitement (like early 2021 5G hype) but nothing like 60x. Thus, the stock is trading **well above historical averages** on a P/E and P/S basis. It suggests the market is valuing Lumentum more like a high-growth semiconductor company (similar to Nvidia-esque valuations, albeit not that high) rather than a cyclical components maker. Possibly the market views Lumentum as an "AI picks-and-shovels" play with a sustained growth runway.

Compared to peers: - **Coherent (COHR)**: Coherent's stock (around \$40 in early 2026) hasn't seen the same run; it trades at ~2x sales (much lower) because it's dealing with integration and heavy debt. Lumentum's EV/Sales ~15x is dramatically higher than Coherent's ~2-3x, implying investors favor Lumentum's pure-play and execution. On EV/EBITDA, if we consider Lumentum's FY2025 non-GAAP op margin ~9.7% ³¹, EBITDA maybe ~\$250 M, EV/EBITDA would be over 100x – again extremely high, but forward EBITDA (with \$600M quarter potential by mid-2026) will improve. Coherent's EV/EBITDA might be lower (but its EBITDA is depressed now). - **Ciena (CIEN)**: As a systems vendor, slower growth (~5-10% typical) and margins ~15% op. It trades ~1.5x sales, ~13x forward earnings. So Lumentum at >10x sales, ~60x earnings is *much* richer. The difference is growth: Ciena's 2025 revenue growth ~20% ¹²⁰ (good for it, but likely slower beyond), whereas Lumentum's expected growth next 2 years might be 30-50% annually if AI orders persist. Also, Lumentum's margin expansion potential is high (from 10% op margin toward 20%+), meaning earnings could grow faster than revenue (operating leverage). - **Other tech**: Compared to high-growth chip companies, Lumentum's multiples approach those of, say, certain favored semiconductor stocks that had explosive AI upside. It's clear investors now lump LITE with AI beneficiaries.

Overvaluation or warranted? It seems the stock **trades above both its history and competitors' valuations**, indicating either overvaluation or a fundamental shift (i.e., market pricing Lumentum as a structurally higher-growth/profit company post-AI). If the expected EPS for FY2026 (June 2026) is, say, \$6 (just an estimate given forward P/E ~60), that means huge growth from near-zero EPS in FY2024. It's possible if revenue hits >\$2B and margins normalize. But it leaves little margin for error – the market is **pricing perfection** (continued AI demand, smooth integration, no trade hiccups).

6.2 Historical Returns: Lumentum's shareholder returns have been volatile but strong cumulatively. From the 2015 spin at ~\$20 to early 2026 ~\$390, it's nearly a 20x increase (CAGR ~35%). However, the journey included big swings. **Drivers of return:** In the initial years (2015-2018), returns were driven by **earnings growth** (EPS grew from ~\$1 in 2015 to ~\$4 in 2018 as revenue and margins expanded) and some **multiple expansion** as the market recognized LITE as a growth story. From late 2018 to 2019, the stock fell (due to Huawei ban and cyclical), then rose sharply in 2020-2021 with 5G and cloud optimism – that latter rise was partly **valuation expansion** (benefiting from a tech bull market). In 2022, the stock plunged ~50% from

highs due to earnings declines (Apple cut and supply issues) – so returns were negative, driven by both **EPS drop and multiple contraction** (investors feared structural issues). The dramatic rally in 2025 (stock up ~340% in that year ¹²¹) was mostly **multiple expansion** initially (anticipating growth) and then justified by some **earnings surprises** as Lumentum beat forecasts and guided strongly ¹²². So, over the full period, returns have come from a mix: **fundamental EPS growth** (the company roughly doubled revenue and improved margins over 10 years) and **valuation swings** influenced by sentiment (especially around AI hype).

6.3 Notable Drawdowns >40%: Lumentum has had multiple deep drawdowns: - **2018:** After a peak around \$70 (from Apple/3D sensing hype), it plunged to ~\$40 by late 2018 ($\approx -45\%$) when Apple's iPhone demand slowed and the U.S. blocked ZTE and Huawei (cutting Lumentum's sales). In fact, in early 2018 Lumentum had to cease certain Huawei shipments per export rules, impacting revenue ⁸. That event and general trade war fears caused a major stock drop. - **2020 COVID crash:** LITE fell from ~\$90 in Feb 2020 to ~\$55 in March 2020 (~40%) along with the market, though it recovered quickly as demand proved resilient. - **2022-early 2023:** The stock fell from around \$100+ in late 2021 to about \$45 by mid-2023 (-55%). Causes: supply chain problems limiting revenue ¹²³, customer inventory corrections (as noted, a large customer cut orders in Q3 FY23 ¹²⁴, likely Apple and a network OEM, which cut guidance and hit the stock), and general tech market sell-off. For example, in Nov 2022 Lumentum cut its outlook due to a large customer reducing shipments – interpreted as Apple cutting ~30% of laser orders ⁵⁰ – leading to a one-day stock drop ~30%, and further declines afterwards.

Each drawdown was driven by a combination of cyclical or one-time issues (and each time the stock eventually recovered to new highs, rewarding patient investors). It underlines the volatility inherent in a few-customer business and cyclical industry.

Expected Returns (Going Forward): With such a high valuation now, the **implied expected return** from here depends on continued execution. If Lumentum can grow earnings into its valuation, returns can be solid. Analysts likely project (hypothetically) EPS might grow from ~\$3 in FY2025 to ~\$10 by FY2028 (with revenue growth + margin expansion). If the P/E then compresses to, say, 20x, stock would be \$200 – that's lower than now (\$390). So one might infer the market is pricing a scenario even more optimistic. For an investor today to get, say, a 10-15% annual return, Lumentum might need to materially beat current consensus (or the market multiple stay elevated).

6.4 Valuation Relative to Comps: In summary, LITE appears **expensive relative to peers** by traditional measures. It is trading like a high-growth secular winner, whereas comps (Ciena, etc.) trade like moderate growth cyclicals. This could indicate the market believes Lumentum will sustain higher growth (due to AI) than those peers, thus deserving a premium. But there is risk of **valuation compression** if growth falters or if interest rates keep pressure on high-multiple stocks.

6.5 Valuation vs Historical Multiples: Historically, when Lumentum traded at lower multiples (e.g. 12x in 2019), it was a good buy – subsequently earnings grew and multiple expanded, yielding great returns. Conversely, when it reached high multiples (e.g. ~30x in mid-2018 before Apple cuts, or now ~60x), corrections followed when expectations missed. So by that yardstick, current valuation is stretched and any stumble could cause a sharp pullback.

6.6 Critical Gaps & Further Research (Valuation):

- **Forward Earnings & Growth Estimates:** We need concrete forecasts to substantiate the multiples.
Why it matters: The justification of valuation relies on growth. If consensus expects, say, 100% EPS CAGR next 2 years, the PEG might be reasonable. If growth is slower, stock is overvalued. *Research:* Look up **analyst estimates** for FY2026 and FY2027 (revenue, EPS). Many analysts cover LITE; find the consensus growth. *Effort:* **Quick** – use financial sources or last earnings call commentary.
 - **DCF or Intrinsic Valuation:** No explicit DCF here; performing one could test assumptions (growth, margins, WACC). *Why:* to see what growth/margins are baked into \$390 share price. *Research:* Build a simple DCF: assume growth trajectory (like revenue to \$3B in 5 years, op margin to 20%, etc.) and see if NPV matches current price. *Effort:* **Moderate** – requires modeling.
 - **Compare to Analogous Cycles:** Perhaps compare Lumentum's current valuation to JDSU in the 1990s or Finisar in early 2010s when big cycles hit. *Why:* to gauge if such multiples have precedent and how it ended. Often optical stocks overshoot in booms (JDSU had astronomic P/S in 2000 before crash). *Research:* Historical case studies in optical stock booms. *Effort:* **Quick** – anecdotal references; not a full analysis.
 - **Comps Set:** We cited a few peers; a thorough relative valuation might include other photonics or semiconductor firms benefiting from AI (for instance, Marvell trades ~30x forward, Nvidia ~40x forward for much higher growth). Maybe the market is benchmarking LITE against "AI infrastructure" peers rather than optical peers. *Research:* Identify who investors see as Lumentum's peer set now (maybe a mix of comm chip companies like Marvell, Broadcom's optics segment, etc.). *Effort:* **Moderate** – review analyst comp tables.
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Risks

Lumentum faces a variety of **risks** spanning industry cyclicity, market downturns, operational challenges, regulatory issues, technology shifts, and strategic execution:

- **7.1 Historical Risk Incidents:** Examining Lumentum's history reveals several risk events:
 - **2018 Huawei Ban:** The U.S. government added Huawei to the Entity List, preventing Lumentum from shipping certain products. Lumentum's revenue from Huawei (10%+ in FY2019) plummeted ³⁶ ⁸. This was a major *regulatory/geopolitical risk* realized. It caused a sudden loss of business and contributed to a stock fall. They had to realign to other customers, and inventory built up for those restricted products.
 - **Customer Inventory Cycle 2022–2023:** A key risk in optical industry is **bullwhip effect** – customers over-order then halt orders. In FY2023, a "significant network equipment manufacturer" (widely believed to be Ciena or Nokia) abruptly stopped taking deliveries due to excess inventory ¹²⁵. Simultaneously, Apple cut orders. Lumentum swung to an operating loss in Mar 2023 quarter ¹²⁶ ¹²⁷. This was an *industry cycle risk* manifesting: the demand didn't vanish, but timing mismatches created financial strain.
 - **Supply Chain & COVID:** During 2020–2022, Lumentum faced **operational risks** from supply shortages and pandemic disruptions. Component shortages limited their ability to fulfill orders, effectively capping revenue and forcing expedited shipping costs ²⁸ ⁶¹. Also, they had to manage manufacturing shutdowns especially in Asia (e.g. at one point, COVID outbreaks in Malaysia or China could halt production, though Lumentum

hasn't publicly cited a specific factory shutdown, it was a general risk). - **M&A Integration Risks:** Lumentum's acquisitions carry risk of not achieving synergies or encountering integration problems. For example, integrating Oclaro (2018) and NeoPhotonics (2022) required aligning different cultures and systems. There's no public disaster here, but typically risk factors mention "*failure to realize expected benefits from mergers*"¹²⁸. If integration had failed, it could mean wasted investment and talent loss. (So far, we haven't heard of major integration failures, but NeoPhotonics merger happened just as market turned down, which is challenging – they likely had to downsize acquired operations quickly). - **Product Transitions:** Technology risk can be gleaned from events like the shift from 100G to 400G. Companies that missed a gen could lose share. Lumentum had to invest heavily to not miss coherent 400G; failing would have risked obsolescence. No known incident of a critical product failure, but risk is always present (e.g. if Lumentum's next-gen 1.2T transceiver was delayed and a competitor got all design wins, that's a scenario). - **Legal/Compliance:** Lumentum hasn't had major lawsuits known publicly, but common in industry are IP lawsuits (Lumentum mentions receiving infringement notices⁵⁸). A risk materializing could be a costly legal fight or an injunction on key products (didn't occur so far in a material way, but Finisar and II-VI had some patent spats historically).

7.2 Current Risk Categories:

- **Industry Cycle Risks:** As noted, optical is cyclical with **volatile customer spending**. Lumentum could face another down-cycle if, for instance, telecom capex is cut in a recession or after the current AI build-out, customers find themselves oversupplied again (a plausible scenario in a couple of years). This risk is mitigated by Lumentum's more diversified end-markets now, but still significant. The pattern of feast-and-famine in orders can wreak havoc on margins (underutilized factories in downturns). **Economic downturn** risk: historically in recessions (2009, 2020 briefly), optical spending slowed but didn't collapse completely (because data traffic often still grows). However, carriers might delay upgrades if interest rates and debt costs are high – a macro risk for Lumentum's telecom business.
- **Stock Market Cycle Risks:** Lumentum's stock is quite volatile and reacts to tech sentiment. If the "AI bubble" deflates, LITE's high multiple could compress drastically regardless of ongoing good performance. Also, being a mid-cap tech, it could swing more during market rotations (in late 2021, as market pivoted away from growth, LITE got hit). Investors should be ready for potentially >40% swings (as history shows). A risk is if general market liquidity or risk appetite shrinks, Lumentum could trade down even absent company-specific issues.
- **Operational Risks:** These include manufacturing issues, supply chain disruptions, and quality control. Lumentum relies on certain internal fabs (e.g. indium phosphide wafer fab). If a fab accident or equipment failure occurred, deliveries could halt (this risk was highlighted in 10-K as reliance on sole manufacturing sites for some products). Another operational risk: dependence on contract manufacturers for some assembly – if they underperform or have labor issues, Lumentum is exposed¹²⁹. Also, Lumentum has manufacturing in China (and is acquiring more via Cloud Light). That exposes it to geopolitical operational risk (if China-Taiwan conflict or sanctions escalate, operations there might be disrupted).
- **Regulatory Risks:** U.S.-China relations are the big one. Further export controls could restrict Lumentum's sales of advanced products to Chinese customers (even beyond Huawei/ZTE, maybe to others like Alibaba or certain research orgs). For example, if the U.S. were to ban exports of any

>200G optical gear to China for AI reasons, that could eliminate a market segment (the Entity List changes in 2021 already added some computing companies which indirectly lowered demand ¹³⁰
⁵⁵). Conversely, China has started restricting exports of certain materials (gallium, germanium) ¹³¹ which are used in optical components – that could impact Lumentum's supply chain (the 10-K mentions China's restrictions on raw materials as a risk ¹³¹). Another regulatory risk is **tariffs**: previous U.S. tariffs on Chinese-made components forced cost increases for Lumentum (they mention increased tariffs remain a risk ⁵⁷). Additionally, any trade sanctions that hit Lumentum's customers (e.g., if more Chinese telecom operators get sanctioned, they might not buy from Lumentum, or a ban on selling to certain data center operators in China). Beyond geo-politics, **export license delays** can cause revenue timing issues – Lumentum must get Commerce Dept licenses to ship some tech abroad ¹³². They flag uncertainty in obtaining those in a timely way as a risk.

- **Financial Risks:** Lumentum has some debt (convertibles ~\$1.3B). While the interest cost is low now, **refinancing risk** looms when those come due (2024 note is tiny, but 2026 and 2028 notes total perhaps \$900M+). If stock stays high, conversion will dilute shares ~10-15%. If not, they'd have to refinance likely at higher rates in mid-late 2020s. Rising interest rates also make high-multiple stocks less attractive (discount rate risk). On currency, Lumentum sells globally; a strong dollar can hurt reported revenue (though many contracts might be USD). It also has costs in various currencies; any mismatch could affect margins.
- **Technology Risks:** The optical industry is fast-moving; **technological obsolescence** is a key risk. If Lumentum missteps on a new technology generation, it can lose share fast. E.g. the looming transition to **co-packaged optics (CPO)** – if switch vendors start integrating optics onto chips, it might bypass some of Lumentum's pluggable module business. Lumentum needs to adapt its business model (perhaps selling more laser chips for CPO). Another tech risk: **integration by customers** – some big players (like Cisco, Huawei) have internal R&D to make optics themselves. Cisco acquired Acacia to internalize coherent modules, a move that reduces the TAM for merchant suppliers like Lumentum (though Lumentum can still sell them components like lasers). **Silicon photonics** is another: if Silicon photonics transceivers (championed by Intel, Luxtera, etc.) become dominant, Lumentum's reliance on InP tech might need shifting – Lumentum is working on it, but a risk remains if they lag. We saw Finisar falter in the past by missing a generational shift (they lagged on 100G miniaturized form factors initially, helping Oclaro and others). Lumentum must keep up the hefty R&D or risk similar fate.

Cybersecurity could be a risk (IP theft, especially given manufacturing presence in China – protecting IP is crucial; also ensuring products aren't compromised).

- **Strategic Risks:** These include failed strategy execution or culture issues. For instance, integration of Cloud Light: combining a Chinese operation could face cultural integration difficulties or staff attrition. Or if the automotive LiDAR market doesn't take off as expected, investments there might not pay off (Lumentum is putting some strategic effort in auto LiDAR lasers – a market still uncertain). Another strategic risk is over-reliance on a few projects: if, say, Meta (Facebook) decided to drastically cut capex, and Lumentum was banking on Meta's orders for 800G optics, that strategic bet could backfire. Also, with the new CEO Hurlston, a risk is any shift in strategy that might disrupt momentum (though Hurlston is experienced, any change at the top introduces execution risk).

7.3 Precedents of Similar Risk Impact: - **Industry cycle risk** precedent: JDSU (Lumentum's predecessor) infamously saw huge cycles – in 2001, after massive growth, the optical market crashed ~90%. While we're not in a similar bubble of that scale (current demand is more organic), it's a cautionary tale that optical cycles can be brutal. Similarly, **Finisar in 2011–2012** fell ~40% when telecom spending paused. These show how cyclical downturns can cut valuations drastically. - **Trade/regulatory risk precedent:** We already discussed the Huawei case in 2019 – analogous to what happened to **ZTE in 2018** when a U.S. ban nearly killed ZTE (which also hit its U.S. suppliers). For Lumentum, the continued U.S.-China tech decoupling remains a real risk. Should China retaliate (like banning sales to certain U.S. companies or favoring domestic vendors), Lumentum could lose share. The example of **Micron** being banned in China in 2023 ¹³³ is instructive: China targeted a U.S. chip firm; similarly, they could push out U.S. optical firms in favor of local ones citing "security." - **Operational risk precedent:** One example is **Fujitsu's optical component fab fire** decades ago – it caused global shortages. If Lumentum had a similar event, it'd be major (though they likely have contingency plans). Also, the COVID shutdowns in China 2022 – some companies had to halt factories for weeks. Lumentum's diversified footprint might have helped (they have factories in Thailand, UK, Slovenia, etc. to spread risk ⁵⁶). - **Financial risk precedent:** Many optical firms have used converts; some got into trouble with too much leverage (e.g. Oclaro nearly went bankrupt around 2013 due to debt + downturn). Lumentum so far is prudent (low coupon converts mostly). But if interest rates remain high, one can recall **Finisar 2008** (they had to restructure due to convertible debt in a tight credit market). - **Technology disruption risk:** A historical example – **Tellabs** in early 2000s had a dominant optical switch product, but when architecture shifted, they lost relevance quickly. Or **Nortel** vs newcomers: failing to keep up can decimate even big players. Lumentum has to avoid a Nortel-like fate on a smaller scale in components. In recent memory, **Infinera** (a system peer) bet on its own integrated photonics, but got overtaken by pluggables; its struggles show how tech bets can go wrong.

7.4 Critical Gaps & Further Research (Risks):

- **Quantification of Exposure:** We list risks qualitatively. Quantifying how much revenue is at risk for each would aid assessment. *Why:* to prioritize risks. E.g., how much of Lumentum's revenue still comes from China (direct or via OEMs)? Or what portion is from top 3 customers? *Research:* Use 10-K data: it gave customer >10% contributions ⁷; also geographic revenue breakdown (likely in Notes). The 10-K risk section might also mention how many single-source suppliers they have or how much of production is in one site. *Effort:* **Moderate** – compiling numbers from filings.
- **Risk Mitigation Plans:** We should examine what Lumentum is doing to mitigate key risks. E.g., second-sourcing materials, relocating manufacturing (some U.S. companies moved assembly out of China to avoid tariffs; is Lumentum doing that?). *Research:* Earnings call comments or Investor Day might address these ("We are expanding in Malaysia to reduce China exposure," etc.). Also, since they mention expanding manufacturing in Thailand with NeoPhotonics ⁵⁶, likely part of mitigation. *Effort:* **Moderate** – reading transcripts or investor Q&As.
- **Comparative Risk History:** How has Lumentum's risk profile improved or worsened vs 5 years ago? For example, customer concentration improved (Apple from 30% to 12% – risk reduced), but reliance on cloud (a cyclical capex maybe) increased. *Why:* to see if management is actively reducing vulnerabilities. *Research:* Compare older filings risk factor emphasis vs recent (e.g. in 2017, was customer concentration risk top, and now supply chain risk top?). *Effort:* **Quick** – scanning old vs new risk factor sections.

- **Macro sensitivity analysis:** Perform a scenario where global GDP downturn in 2024 (mild recession): how would Lumentum fare? Cloud spending might still grow (secular), telecom maybe flat or down low-single-digit, industrial laser definitely down (tracks manufacturing PMI). *Why:* understanding resilience. *Research:* Use insight from 2020 COVID (which ended up only minor impact due to remote traffic surge) and 2008/09 (optical spending dipped but rebounded with video growth). Possibly find data on optical industry correlation with GDP. *Effort:* **Moderate** – gather anecdotal evidence.
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Final Investment Insights & Strategy Recommendations

8.1 Is the industry growing? Future trends? Yes, the optical communications industry is **growing robustly**, driven by insatiable demand for bandwidth. The current trajectory is especially strong due to **AI and cloud** build-outs – datacenter optical component revenues are forecast to grow >20% CAGR through 2029 ⁵, an unusually high rate for what was a mid-single-digit industry a few years ago. Secular drivers like video streaming, 5G, IoT, and cloud AI ensure a long-term growth trend. Future trends include the transition to **800G and 1.6T optical links**, **coherent optics penetrating shorter distances**, and eventually **co-packaged optics** (integrating optics with switch silicon) to break through bandwidth density limits. The industry is also seeing higher integration (combining multiple optical functions in one package), which could favor large players with broad capabilities. Moreover, **new applications** (automotive LiDAR, sensing in smart devices) add incremental markets, albeit smaller near-term than telecom/datacom. In sum, the industry is in a growth phase, likely to continue for at least the next 3-5 years as AI and 5G rollouts are only partly complete. That said, it remains cyclical around this uptrend – after a big surge (like the current AI-driven one), a moderation or inventory correction is likely. But unlike stagnating industries, optical communications has **secular tailwinds** for the foreseeable future (global data traffic historically grows ~30% YoY and shows no sign of saturating, which ultimately translates into continued optical investment).

8.2 Competitive landscape intensity and trend: Competition in the optical component space is **intense and arguably becoming more so in certain segments**. After a wave of consolidation (JDSU→Lumentum, II-VI→Coherent, Oclaro, Finisar, NeoPhotonics absorbed), we have a few big players – which often reduces cut-throat competition in theory. Indeed, Lumentum and Coherent now rationally split some market (e.g., each focusing on strengths). However, the competitive intensity is *shifting rather than abating*. Chinese companies, bolstered by government aims for self-sufficiency, are increasing their capabilities and global presence – e.g. InnoLight and Eoptolink rose to top ranks in data center optics ³⁴. This means for any product generation, there may be a formidable low-cost competitor emerging. Also, large customers like Cisco/Acacia and Marvell/Inphi have internal capabilities, effectively competing by capturing part of the value internally (Acacia for Cisco means one less customer for Lumentum's coherent modules, instead a competitor). Price competition remains fierce in mature product lines (100G, 200G transceivers are commoditized). The evidence suggests competition may **increase in commoditized areas** (as more players can do it), while **remaining stable in high-end niches** (where only two or three global players exist). The overall landscape is dynamic: it's not consolidating to monopoly, rather it's a few leaders with many fast followers. Given the high growth currently, competition is somewhat masked by plenty of demand for all; but if growth normalizes, one could expect aggressive share fights (for example, Coherent will surely try to take share in ROADMs from Lumentum, and Lumentum will try to encroach on Coherent's Apple share or other areas). Therefore, intensity is high and likely **stays high** – though it's evolving from dozens of small rivals to a duel of titans plus rising regional challengers. One positive: high-end optical is a bit less fragmented than before, which could make pricing slightly more rational at the top end (e.g., Lumentum

and Coherent might avoid mutually destructive price cuts in say, 1.2T modules, preferring to enjoy healthy margins). But in practice, history shows someone often breaks ranks to gain volume. So, competition will remain a significant factor, not an oligopoly of comfortable margins yet.

8.3 Company's competitive advantage and is it strengthening? Lumentum does have competitive advantages – notably its **broad product portfolio, leading technology in key areas, and economies of scale** – which we discussed in moat analysis. These advantages *have been strengthening recently*: The acquisition of NeoPhotonics gave Lumentum leading-edge coherent optical technology (400G/800G modules, ultra-narrow-linewidth lasers) that few can match, reinforcing its tech moat in high-speed telecom. The upcoming addition of Cloud Light will enhance its scale in manufacturing and presence in the data center market, potentially lowering costs and widening its breadth (making it a one-stop vendor for more customers). Lumentum's customer relationships also deepen its advantage – e.g. multi-year co-development projects embed it with clients. Furthermore, its strong balance sheet (relative to some peers like debt-laden Coherent) allows sustained R&D investment, ensuring it can keep up in the technology arms race.

On the other hand, some of Lumentum's earlier unique strengths (like near-monopoly with Apple FaceID lasers) have weakened – that particular advantage was eroded as Apple brought in competitors. So in consumer, its advantage diminished. But Lumentum deliberately pivoted away from relying on that, focusing on **cloud/AI** where it's building strength. One can argue its competitive advantage in **ROADMs/WSS** and **telecom components** remains very strong (with high market share and know-how), and now it's leveraging that in new markets.

Is the moat widening? In *telecom and datacom*, I'd say yes, Lumentum is positioned to be one of perhaps two or three dominant suppliers for the next generation of optical engines, thanks to consolidation moves. Its vertical integration (making its own lasers, modulators, packages) and R&D scale give it an edge that smaller firms cannot easily replicate. Plus, with the current demand, Lumentum can afford to invest even more in next-gen tech, potentially widening the gap. However, it's a moving target – competitors are not standing still. Coherent is equally intent on leadership, and Chinese firms are catching up in technology (sometimes via state support or reverse engineering). So Lumentum's moat is strengthening in the sense it has a larger, more integrated capability set than before, but the *external competitive environment* is also intensifying in other ways. Overall, Lumentum's competitive position is arguably the strongest it's ever been (given its size, product range, and finances). The key will be execution to fully capitalize on these strengths. Barring a major misstep, Lumentum is set up to remain a leader, suggesting its competitive advantages are on an upward trajectory.

8.4 Key debates around the stock and industry: Several debates are actively discussed by investors and analysts: - "**AI Optics: Sustainable or Bubble?**" – This is the big one. One camp argues that the surge in optical demand for AI clusters is a **sustainable secular shift** (every data center will need far more optics, and then AI networking between centers, etc.), implying a multi-year growth engine for Lumentum. Bulls say we are in early innings of a new capex cycle like the dot-com buildout, so Lumentum's growth could be higher for longer than historically ³². The bear side worries it's a **short-term spike**: hyperscalers front-loaded optics procurement in 2024–2025 and could digest later, much like other cycles. They question if AI network build will hit saturation or efficiencies (like better optical utilization) will slow demand. Also part of this debate: will co-packaged optics (CPO) disrupt the transceiver market sooner than expected? If yes, some current transceiver demand might not last as long. - "**China Risk vs Opportunity**" – Another debate is how to view China. Bears point to the risk of losing Chinese market access entirely (via sanctions both

directions) and Chinese competitors flooding the global market with lower-cost products, eroding pricing. Bulls counter that Lumentum's high-end products are still needed by Chinese customers who can't yet fully replace them, and any improvement in US-China relations (even partial) could unlock pent-up demand. There's also speculation: could China retaliation hurt Lumentum (e.g. ban its products)? Or conversely, might Lumentum benefit if Chinese vendors are barred from Western markets (less competition)? So far, Lumentum has navigated partial restrictions, but this remains a hot topic. - **"Margin Recovery or Structural Headwinds?"** – With gross margins down in 40s from 50s%, debate is if Lumentum can regain previous profitability levels. Bulls say yes: underutilization and amortization were temporary drags, and as volume ramps and synergies kick in, margins will bounce back (targeting 50% GM again, and 20%+ op margin longer term). Bears argue that competitive pricing and a more commodity-like datacom mix will cap gross margins; plus integration of lower-margin businesses (NeoPhotonics historically had ~30-35% GM) could structurally keep margins lower. So the stock's valuation hinges on whether one believes in a **significant margin expansion** story or not. - **"Valuation – justified or overblown?"** – At ~60x forward earnings, bulls claim Lumentum deserves a premium as an **AI beneficiary** with high growth and improving margins – effectively a "must own" in communications infrastructure. They might also argue Lumentum could be an M&A target itself for a large semiconductor company wanting optical exposure (which could support valuation). Bears say the stock has **overshot fundamentals**, pricing in multiple years of perfect execution. They recall past cycles where optical names crashed after hype. So, is LITE the next Nvidia (in optical form) or is it reminiscent of JDSU 2000 (set up for a fall)? This debate ties to one's view on how unique and durable Lumentum's growth is this time. - **"Product Cycle Leadership vs Lag"** – Another, more technical debate: how well is Lumentum positioned for the *next* product cycles (800G pluggables, 1.6T, LiDAR)? Some bulls note Lumentum's broad tech (e.g., its narrow-linewidth lasers are critical for next-gen coherent) means it will capture leading market share. Bears might point out areas where Lumentum is behind – for instance, they historically weren't strong in 100G datacom modules, and the competition in 800G is fierce (with companies like Broadcom/Avago's and Marvell's reference designs out there). Also, on LiDAR lasers, it's a potentially big market but not guaranteed – some argue **LiDAR TAM** will be big and Lumentum will be a major supplier; others think LiDAR adoption in cars is slow or will use cheaper competing laser tech, so that optionality may not pay off. - **"Acquisition Strategy – Too Aggressive or Necessary?"** – With Cloud Light being another large deal, there's debate if Lumentum is biting off too much. Bulls say these acquisitions are **transformative and fill gaps** (NeoPhotonics for high-end, Cloud Light for volume manufacturing and automotive) – essentially investing for future growth and synergies. Bears worry about integration risks and that Lumentum might be overspending or diversifying into lower-margin businesses (Cloud Light's \$200M likely at lower margin since it's contract manufacturing heavy). So, will these deals drive EPS up or dilute focus?

8.5 Bull, Bear, Base Case Scenarios:

- **Bull Case (~25% probability):** The AI-driven demand proves even larger and longer-lasting than expected. Hyperscalers accelerate optical deployments, and telecom carriers also ramp spending on 800G and 5G backbones. In this scenario, Lumentum's revenue could grow at ~30% CAGR for 3 years, reaching ~\$4 B by FY2028. Gross margins recover to ~50% as factories run at full capacity and high-margin coherent products dominate. Operating leverage plus synergies push op margins >20%. EPS skyrockets (e.g. \$10+ by FY2027). Additionally, new markets kick in: Lumentum secures major wins in automotive LiDAR (multi-year programs, say \$100M+ annual by mid-late decade). In this case, LITE could justify a still strong multiple – maybe 25-30x PE – on much higher earnings, yielding a stock potentially >\$500 (significantly up from now). Underlying scenario: Cloud Light integration goes smoothly adding to EPS, no major competitive upset, and macro remains favorable (no deep

recession to cut capex). Also, perhaps international tensions ease slightly, letting Lumentum sell some additional product into China (a bonus bump). This bull case would mean Lumentum solidifies itself as an **indispensable supplier in a secular boom**, akin to an “arms dealer” in AI that keeps thriving.

- **Bear Case (~20% probability):** The AI optics surge turns out partly a bubble. By 2026, hyperscalers realize they overbuilt networks; orders slow or even contract (as happened in other cycles). Meanwhile, Chinese competitors and in-house solutions by big players start taking a bite out of new product cycles – e.g., Amazon decides to design its own optical modules with joint ventures, reducing reliance on Lumentum; or a Chinese vendor like Huawei finds ways to source Lumentum’s tech domestically. Simultaneously, macroeconomic pressures (high rates, slower growth) cause telecom carriers to drastically cut capex for a period. In this scenario, Lumentum’s revenue might stagnate around ~\$1.7–1.8 B or even dip for a couple years (like an FY2027 drop after FY2025 peak). Inventory builds up again (another bullwhip down-cycle). Gross margin languishes in low 40s or worse due to under-utilization and pricing pressure (maybe price wars as everyone chases fewer orders). Operating margin could slip back to single digits; EPS might only be \$3–4 in a couple years. In such a case, the market would likely compress the PE to maybe 15x given stalled growth outlook. The stock could fall to perhaps \$50–\$100 range (essentially giving up its recent gains). Underlying this bear scenario: trade war escalates further (maybe Lumentum loses all China sales, and some supply issues arise), and technology leapfrogs (like, say, **co-packaged optics arrives faster** making some of Lumentum’s pluggables less relevant, or a new low-cost technology from a startup undercuts incumbents). Also possible in bear case, **integration missteps:** Cloud Light’s operations might reduce Lumentum’s overall margin profile without the hoped-for revenue synergy; plus managing far-flung manufacturing gets harder. Essentially, the bear case sees Lumentum more as a cyclical hardware supplier that had a one-time jump but reverts to modest growth and margin pressure.
- **Base Case (~55% probability):** Lumentum experiences strong growth for 1–2 more years as AI and 400G/800G deployments continue, then growth normalizes. For example, FY2025 +20% (to \$1.65B), FY2026 +25% (to ~\$2.06B including Cloud Light, etc.), FY2027 maybe +10%, then mid-single-digit growth thereafter. This assumes the initial AI wave is followed by steady incremental demand rather than a cliff. In this base scenario, Lumentum’s **long-term secular growth** is intact but punctuated by shorter cycles. Gross margins recover somewhat – perhaps stabilizing ~45–48% as product mix improves and cost synergies are realized, but intense competition caps further expansion. Operating margin might reach mid-teens (say 15% non-GAAP) and hold there. That yields solid earnings growth: perhaps EPS goes from near \$0 in FY2024 to ~\$5 in FY2026 and maybe \$6–7 by FY2028. If the market values the company at a more moderate multiple (say 20–25x in a stable state), the stock in a few years could be in the \$150–\$200 range. But from \$390 currently, that would imply the stock might actually correct to align with the base scenario (since current price assumes more). More likely, the base case from *today* might mean the stock trades range-bound or slightly lower until earnings catch up (i.e., “grow into” its valuation). Underlying base assumptions: no major new trade restrictions (but no big improvement either; Lumentum navigates current environment), incremental competition but nothing catastrophic (they lose some battles, win others; share roughly stable), and macro doesn’t severely disrupt capex (maybe mild recessions but offset by other regions increasing spend). Also, management executes reasonably: the acquisitions deliver planned cost synergies (\$50M+ savings etc.) and product integration yields new revenue (e.g. Lumentum sells NeoPhotonics-based modules to new customers successfully). The base case essentially sees

Lumentum as a strong player in a healthy industry, growing roughly in line with the overall optical market (~10-15% initially then slowing), with profitability returning to a good but not peak level.

8.6 Key events to watch:

- **Quarterly Earnings (esp. near-term):** Given the stock's high expectations, each quarterly report is pivotal. Watch for **order commentary**: are orders still outpacing shipments (book-to-bill >1, indicating growing demand) or is there any hint of **order slowdown** from cloud customers? Also, guidance on gross margin trajectory (to see if supply chain costs are easing and utilization improving). For example, Lumentum's next Q2 FY2026 earnings (as hinted in news ¹³⁴) will be watched if the momentum continues.
- **Integration Milestones:** The **Cloud Light acquisition closing** (expected end of CY2023) and subsequent updates on integration will be critical. Look out for announcements such as successful consolidation of manufacturing, cross-selling achievements, or any unexpected issues (loss of Cloud Light customers or employees). Also, synergy realization updates (e.g., "we have realized \$X million cost synergies in first 6 months").
- **New Product Launches and Design Wins:** In this fast-moving space, major product release cycles in 2024–2025 are key. Events like **OFC (Optical Fiber Conference)** and ECOC where Lumentum might demo its next-gen modules or lasers – any breakthrough product (say a 1.2 Tbps pluggable or a new integrated laser engine) could secure future revenue. Conversely, if competitors announce something game-changing and Lumentum is quiet, that's notable. Also, *design win disclosures* – e.g., if Lumentum secures a big program (maybe providing optics for a top cloud's new AI interconnect, or a deal to supply a national telecom's 5G backhaul) often management hints at these.
- **Customer Roadmaps & Capex Plans:** Keep an eye on the **capex guidance of big cloud players (Amazon, Meta, Google, Microsoft)** each quarter. If they signal a tapering in network spend, it will foreshadow Lumentum's demand. Similarly, telecom carriers (AT&T, Verizon, China Mobile) capex plans annually can impact optical spending; any shift to lower spending or delays in fiber projects is a caution sign.
- **Macro/Policy Developments:** Any news on **US-China tech policy** – e.g., if the U.S. announces new export restrictions on AI-related optical components or China announces procurement preferences. Also, **Taiwan/China geopolitical tensions** – a serious escalation could disrupt the tech supply chain (Lumentum has manufacturing in Japan, Thailand, UK, etc. but the ecosystem is global). Trade negotiations or easing would conversely be a positive event.
- **Competitive Moves:** Watch out for **Coherent's earnings** and strategy announcements – if Coherent recovers faster or starts aggressive pricing to gain share, that's material. Likewise any Chinese IPO or major funding of an optical competitor (if a Chinese rival scales up dramatically, it could mean more competition globally). If a competitor lands a big contract that Lumentum was vying for (for example, Cisco decides to dual-source ROADM^s and picks a competitor for half the volume), that would emerge through industry channels.
- **Management commentary/changes:** The first year of new CEO Hurlston's tenure will likely bring strategic updates – perhaps at an **Investor Day** or conferences, they might outline new long-term targets or portfolio decisions (sell a non-core product line? double-down in a new area?). Also monitor if there's any churn in key management (if, say, the CTO or COO leaves, could indicate issues).
- **Technological inflection points:** Keep an ear out for how quickly **co-packaged optics** is advancing (are any customers actually ordering it?), or if **silicon photonics** reaches a performance parity such that Lumentum's more discrete approach is threatened. Key events would be announcements by

large switch vendors (Cisco, Broadcom) about incorporating optical dies in packages – that could reshape industry dynamics.

- **Macro events:** If a global recession hits, likely within a few months carriers will trim spending – look at macro indicators like enterprise equipment orders, data center construction, etc. If those slide, optical component orders usually follow with a lag.

In summary, investors should track both **financial metrics** (orders, margins, growth rates) and **strategic signals** (customer tech choices, competitor actions, policy changes) to gauge if Lumentum stays on its bull trajectory or if a course-change is needed.

Suggestions for Further Research

9.1 Immediate Data Gaps & Research Recommendations:

- **Granular Market Segmentation & TAM:** *Gap:* Lack of precise breakdown of Lumentum's addressable market by sub-segment (e.g. how big is the ROADM market vs. 3D sensing vs. fiber lasers). *Why it matters:* to accurately forecast growth and identify which markets drive Lumentum's future, we need credible size and growth figures for each segment. *Best source/method:* Obtain industry reports from specialized firms (e.g., **LightCounting for optical components TAM by telecom/datacom/consumer, Yole or Mordor Intelligence for laser markets**). If access is an issue, use conference presentations or public data (Cignal AI free summaries give some market numbers ⁴ ¹³⁵). *Effort:* **Moderate** – obtaining a couple of these reports or finding summaries requires some digging or purchase.
- **Analyst Insights & Earnings Call Transcripts:** *Gap:* We could benefit from Wall Street analyst perspectives on Lumentum's outlook and any pointed questions they raise (they often pinpoint potential issues). *Why:* Analysts' models might reveal assumptions (e.g., how much revenue from AI in forecasts, margin expectations) and their questions highlight uncertainties (like "what are you seeing in China orders?"). *Best source:* **Earnings call transcripts** (especially the Q&A part) for the last few quarters and any Analyst Day events. Sites like Seeking Alpha or the company IR have transcripts. Also, analyst reports from top covering firms (JP Morgan, Needham, etc.) if available. *Effort:* **Quick** to read transcripts; **Moderate** to get actual reports if behind paywall.
- **Competitive Intelligence on Chinese Players:** *Gap:* Our understanding of Chinese competitors' capabilities is high-level. *Why:* Lumentum's medium-term threat could be a Huawei or Accelink closing the technology gap. Knowing where Chinese optics firms stand (e.g., can they produce 800G modules yet? What market share do they have domestically vs internationally?) is crucial to gauge risk. *Best source:* **Chinese market research** (if available in English or via translation) – e.g., reports by CCID or China TELCOM science journals that might discuss local supply. Also, trade media like LightReading or Optics.org often cover moves by Chinese vendors. If language is a barrier, one can use translation on Chinese press releases of these companies. *Effort:* **In-depth** – requires targeted research, possibly reaching out to industry experts or translating foreign material.
- **Field Research – Customer Feedback:** *Gap:* We rely on company and third-party data, but direct end-user perspective is missing. *Why:* Hearing from a customer (say an engineer at a Ciena or a cloud operator) about their view of Lumentum vs others could validate or challenge our assumptions

on product quality and switching costs. **Method:** Try to find **interviews or talks by Lumentum's customers**. Sometimes at conferences, engineers from companies like Facebook, Microsoft, etc., talk about their optical interconnect suppliers (though they often don't name them explicitly). Alternatively, checking **forums or industry groups** for qualitative feedback (e.g., what do people say about working with Lumentum lasers vs competitor?). **Effort:** **Moderate** – may require networking or deep internet search.

- **Financial Model Building:** *Gap:* We haven't built a detailed forward financial model. *Why:* To test scenario assumptions, it's helpful to model revenue by segment, margin drivers, etc. *Method:* Build a spreadsheet with OpComms vs Lasers projections, incorporate growth rates for key parts (like assume datacom X% growth, telecom Y%). Use that to derive EPS in bull/base/bear and see how that lines up with current valuation. *Effort:* **Moderate** – data gathering mostly done, modeling is straightforward extrapolation and scenario toggles.
- **Tracking Insider and Institutional Moves:** *Gap:* We have limited recent insider trading info and haven't fully looked at the evolving institutional ownership beyond top 3. *Why:* Large changes in institutional stakes or insider buys/sells can indicate confidence or concern. For example, if Capital Research dramatically trimmed LITE in Q4 2025, that's notable. *Best source:* **13F filings** for major holders (quarterly, albeit delayed). Also, insider SEC Form 4 filings (OpenInsider or similar aggregator). *Effort:* **Quick** – these data are accessible via NASDAQ site or financial databases.

9.2 Important Resources Worth Special Attention:

- **Lumentum 10-K and 10-Q filings:** We used the FY2023 10-K 19 136 extensively; reading the full MD&A and Risk Factors gives rich detail (we should fully read FY2025 10-K when available for the latest picture 137 31). The quarterly 10-Qs can also reveal short-term changes (like backlog levels, inventory, etc.). The **Proxy statements** are valuable for governance and comp specifics – a careful read of the latest Proxy would provide clarity on board elections, any shareholder proposals, and executive pay breakdown.
- **Cignal AI's Optical Components Report & Press Releases:** We found two press releases 4 135 with very relevant data on market growth and company leaderboard. The full report (if accessible) would give deeper insight into **market share shifts** and forecast specifics. Even Cignal's free blog or their webinars are high-quality industry analysis.
- **Optics.org and Lightwave (industry media):** Optics.org provided that detailed piece on Lumentum's quarterly performance 72 25. They often interview execs and provide context beyond the numbers. **Lightwave magazine** and **Laser Focus World** are also good sources for industry trends (they often have year-end reviews of optical communications market). Also **Light Reading** (telecom tech site) often covers optical component angles and sometimes rumor on competitive moves.
- **MatrixBCG & Other Syntheses:** The user's provided sub-questions came from a source (MatrixBCG.com) that seems to have done a structured breakdown (we saw references to it). It might contain quick SWOT and bullet analyses that could highlight points we missed (e.g., maybe a mention of a particular competitor or an internal weakness). Cross-checking our analysis with such resources ensures no blind spots. However, we must assess bias – it might be a summary site

possibly using known data (the snippet from matrixbcg about leadership had basics we covered). Still, worth a glance for any nuance.

- **Equity Analyst Reports:** Banks like JPMorgan, Bank of America, Needham, MKM, etc., cover LITE. Their reports (if obtainable) would have specific forecasts and rationale, and sometimes field research (like a survey of cloud capex). Particularly, one might look for any **Sum-of-the-Parts valuations** they do given Lumentum's segments, or any highlight on emerging competition (analysts sometimes do channel checks in China). If possible, reading one or two recent reports (2025 after the stock run-up) would be valuable to see how consensus thinking aligns or differs from ours.

9.3 Important Datasets/Industry Resources:

- **LightCounting's "State of the Optical Industry" datasets:** They often publish annual data on shipments of various optical modules, pricing trends, etc. A dataset showing units and ASPs for 100G/400G/800G modules could allow independent projection of Lumentum's laser demand (since Lumentum sells lasers per module).
- **IEEE/OSA Publications:** For technical trends, journals or whitepapers from IEEE Photonics Society or Optical Society (OSA) on topics like co-packaged optics or LiDAR market forecasts would be relevant. For instance, an OSA market survey on LiDAR photonics could quantify that opportunity (the CEO said "multi-billion in 5 years" ¹³⁸ – a third-party source to verify LiDAR TAM and timing would be useful).
- **Company's Historical Financials dataset:** Having a spreadsheet of Lumentum's quarterly financials since 2015 would help observe patterns and run correlations (e.g., how inventory levels correlate with next-quarter sales, etc.). This can be built from SEC filings, but maybe sources like FactSet or Bloomberg have it compiled. We could also compile a **peer financial dataset** (Ciena, Coherent, Infinera, etc.) to compare margin trajectories – possibly beneficial to see if Lumentum's margin drop in 2023 was unique or industry-wide (Ciena's margins in 2023 also dipped due to supply chain; Coherent had its own issues).
- **Photonic Component Price Index:** If any research or dataset tracks price indices for optical components (similar to how DRAM or memory has price trackers), that would illustrate the price erosion trend clearly. Not sure if publicly available, but some academic or government reports might cover average transceiver price declines.

9.4 Important Figures & Their Insights:

- **Alan Lowe (former CEO):** As the long-time CEO, his interviews or talks (perhaps at investor conferences or industry panels) could give insight into strategic rationale behind acquisitions and how he viewed competition. He often spoke at conferences like OFC keynote panels. Even though he's stepped down, his perspective on industry and Lumentum's culture is valuable.
- **Michael Hurlston (current CEO):** Any interviews since he took over (he may have spoken to financial press or given a vision statement). Also, his history at Synaptics – he gave interviews there about turning around Synaptics, which might parallel what he will emphasize at Lumentum (likely focus on profitability and growth).
- **Industry Analysts/Experts:** Someone like **Scott Wilkinson of Cignal AI** (who is quoted in their releases ¹³⁹) – his webinars or conference talks often have qualitative nuggets about each vendor.

Similarly, **Andrew Schmitt** (founder of Cignal AI) often posts insights on Twitter or LinkedIn about optical trends, including commentary on Lumentum vs others.

- **Big Customer Execs:** For example, **Steve Alexander (CTO of Ciena)** or **Jimmy Yu (Dell'Oro analyst)** might be worth following. Sometimes Ciena's CEO (Gary Smith) on his calls might indirectly comment on component supply chain – which can reflect on Lumentum.
- **Market Commentators:** People like **Lisa Huff (Omdia)** or **Vladimir Kozlov (LightCounting)** – they do interviews on LightReading etc. about where the market is going, including mention of which component vendors are leading.
- **Key engineers-founders in photonics:** E.g., **Matsuri Takahashi** (just an example name – perhaps an expert at NTT or so) might speak about next-gen optics. Or founders of companies acquired: e.g., **Tim Jenks** (NeoPhotonics CEO) gave insights pre-merger about coherent market growth.
- **Regulatory figures:** Perhaps less directly relevant to company analysis, but someone like **Alan Estevez (US BIS)** speaking on export controls could signal future risk.

By focusing on the above resources and individuals, we can refine our understanding and keep the analysis current and nuanced. Each of these would help fill in pieces: market data, competitor actions, internal strategy, and external risk environment.

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