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THE LOVE OF HATING: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENMITY

OFER ZUR*

INTRODUCTION

> We do in fact love or hate our enemies to the same degree that we love or hate ourselves. In the image of the enemy we will find the mirror in which we may see our own faces most clearly.
>
> Sam Keen, *Faces Of The Enemy*.[1]

This paper explores the roots and dynamics of enmity as they operate on the individual, group, and national levels. The importance of the study of enmity lies in the premise that 'guns do not kill, heads do'. Before we create the gun or the bomb, we have first to envision the destruction of the enemy in our minds. The UNESCO Charter stated this premise clearly: 'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that we have to erect the ramparts of peace.' A systematic exploration of enmity is a prerequisite to the prevention of wars. If we can understand how propaganda affects people, we may be able to intervene in the diabolical process of enemy-making. Resolving conflicts nonviolently is one of the most urgent tasks of the nuclear era. Exploring enmity is one of the initial steps in preventing all-out nuclear war and offering hope to the planet.

In 1989 alone, the world experienced dozens of conflicts resulting from enmity turned violent. Some were national enemies (Iran–Iraq, Israel–Arabs), others are religious enemies (Protestants–Catholics, Muslims–Christians), or ideological enemies (Communists and capitalist supported factions in Nicaragua), and yet others were ethnic enemies (Serbs–Croats, Czechs–Slovaks). One cannot help but question whether all countries or groups must have enemies. Most countries do, however a few do not. Sweden and Switzerland are two contemporary examples of enemy-free nations. The fascinating dynamics of enmity have been illustrated in recent years by the major shifts in the Soviet–American relationship. Only a few years after Reagan called the Soviet Union an 'Evil Empire', the Soviet leader has been titled the 'Man Of The Year' by Time magazine. He and his wife seem to be more popular in the United States than their American counterparts. National polls have found that the number of Americans who perceive the Soviet Union as 'unfriendly and an enemy of the U.S.' dropped from 63% in 1983 to 20% in 1989.[2]

At the heart of the process of making enemies is a split between us–them and good–evil. However, not all dichotomies/polarities are pathological or lead necessarily to enmity. Humans, like all living things, are capable of differentiating good food from rotten and safe encounters from those that are

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dangerous. The general ability to differentiate and judge is essential for the development and survival of any species.

In many cases, the simple ability to differentiate rigidities, becomes a polarised world view which sees the world primarily in terms of good–evil, safe–dangerous, or sacred–profane. Within this world view, the judgment of good–bad is transformed to good–evil and is applied to dualities, such as male–female, spirit–matter, mind–body. Furthermore, in this framework 'good' is always associated with 'us' and 'evil' with 'them' ('not us'). 'Them', the other, the stranger, the unknown, the ones who are different from us, become 'the enemy' to be feared and hated. Ultimately, 'the enemy' has to be destroyed so 'we' can feel safe. Indeed, the Latin word *hostis* originally meant a stranger, a person who is not connected to us by kin. The processes of splitting, exaggerating, polarising and rigidifying the ability to differentiate are at the heart of enmity.[3]

Political realities can not all be reduced to psychological processes. Yet, it is possible to shed light on the sociological and psychological elements that predispose groups and individuals towards propaganda, enemy-making, and war. I believe that Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot were villains responsible for the murder of millions of people, and, as such, existed as truly evil enemies. In acknowledging this reality, it is essential to understand the human capability of creating enemies and to hope that this knowledge will help us deal more effectively with actual enemies. When possible, our discriminatory capabilities must be applied to differentiating between real threats and threats we helped create with our minds. Though the words of the popular American cartoon character Pogo, 'We have met the enemy and it is us', bear some truth, they do not by any means capture the total complexity of enmity.

A PSYCHOHISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ENMITY

Contrary to popular belief, war and the creation of enemies is not coded in our genes. There is clear evidence that war or group enmity is a relatively recent phenomenon, traceable only as far back as the neolithic period. The more centralised, hierarchical social structure of an agricultural community combined with its larger size and its endemic sense of territorially gave birth not only to civilisation, but also to group enmity and war.

In this paper, war is defined as a planned, socially or politically approved action that attempts to achieve specific goals—by violent means if necessary. The emphasis in this definition is on war as a social phenomenon and not an individual one. As such, it requires consensus by most of the population. This consensus can be active (as with political support) or passive (political inactivism). Another emphasis is on the rational planning of war, something that dissociates war from passionate-type crimes. The use of the word 'aggression' versus 'killing' or 'violence' emphasises that wars can take place without any blood being shed. While violence is not essential to the definition of war, aggression and the willingness to use violent means are.[4]

Relying on the above definition of war, we find that the first cultures capable of organising and training an army, and of planning and conducting a war against an enemy, appeared 11,000 to 13,000 years ago. This does not mean that hunter-

gatherers, prior to the Neolithic period, did not have personal enemies or did not resort to violent means in order to gain access to or defend water and food resources. While violence and conflict have always been a part of humanity, these pre-Neolithic societies were neither big enough nor not organised, either politically or socially, to wage war. None of their aggressive activities led to warfare or the development of war rituals, training, and special weapons. Their aggression remained tied to immediate physiological or spiritual needs.[5] Enmity and war were born with civilisation, when humans abandoned hunting and gathering and turned to gardening and farming. This means that wars have existed only for the last one per cent of the time span of human evolution. Since the Neolithic Period, humans have fought seven types of warfare, each representative of a specific type of enemy.

The first type of group enemy was the *symbolic enemy*. This enemy took part in *primitive/ritualistic warfare*, consisting of an ambush or a face-to-face type of battle. Often it was an annual or biannual ritual which took place in a neutral zone, feasts and parties among the opponents sometimes being conducted before and after the ritual. Most of these primitive wars ended when the first blood was drawn or the first death had occurred. Clearly, these wars were not merely about violence or killing. Very likely, the purpose of the war ritual was to acknowledge and allow for the expression of aggressive, chaotic or destructive feelings and impulses. Permitting destruction, chaos and even a limited amount of killing to take place within defined parameters ultimately contributed to the maintenance of harmony and order. Obviously, the enemy in this type of warfare is extremely different from the modern notion of the enemy. It was a symbolic enemy, seen not as evil or even particularly threatening, but rather as an equal partner in an important, life-affirming ritual.

The second type of group enemy was the *withholding enemy*. This enemy was part of the *political/greedy warfare* culture. Co-evolving with the shift from the hunting-and-gathering system to farming and gardening were numerous changes in the familial and social structure. The new lifestyle involved a higher level of planning and organisation. On the social level, a more structured, hierarchical and coercive familial system developed. For the first time, children as well as adults were seen primarily as a potential work force necessary to the expanding agricultural holdings. Consistent with the oppressive cultural hierarchy and a redefined family structure, the enemy had a different psychological meaning. The enemy in these wars was viewed as one who deprived us of our physical and psychological needs. The enemy was not to be destroyed, but to be exploited, enslaved, and used to fulfill the greedy needs of the group and its individuals. Those who held wealth and power acquired more and more fighting men to extend and protect their holdings for them, and so more armies were raised and more enemies were fought. This type of warfare began some time in the fourth millennium and continued, at times simultaneously with other types of warfare, until the end of the eighteenth century. These nation–state type wars dominate large parts of our history.

The third opponent was the *worthy enemy*, a fighter of *heroic/aggrandising wars*. This type of warfare coevolved and coexisted with the second type. The heroic wars were different from the greedy political wars in that they embodied a complex hierarchical organisation in the form of trained, professional soldiers

who fought willingly. Poetry and literature, such as the Iliad and Mahabharata glorified the valor of the fighter and the drama of the battle. Rather than being a ritual of control or an expression of greed, war became a rite to test human ability, bravery and endurance. The enemy was what Bertolt Brecht calls 'the beloved enemy'. The enemy is seen as a respected, honorable opponent, worth fighting. The fight itself was like a reenactment of mythical drama, a kind of 'clean', honorable, noble fighting between two brave men. Images of the Samurai, Greek and Roman epic heroes, Ivanhoe, Sir Lancelot, John Wayne, and more recently, Rambo, are associated with this kind of warfare. These are heroic wars, reflecting the birth of individualism. They have appeared throughout history when centralised governments lost some power and a new class of aristocracy and professional soldier emerged.

In the fourth type of warfare, the enemy is the *enemy of God*, and the war is a *holy war*. Killing such an enemy not only forces the evil powers out, it also protects, and provides a hopeful future for the faithful believers. For the warriors and the cultures waging holy wars, the world is perceived as a battlefield between the forces of good and evil. This is the first type of enemy that has to be destroyed in order to ensure the safety of the group. It is the first time that the enemy is associated with evil. The enemy is no longer symbolic, no longer to be exploited or respected. They are to be eliminated from the face of the earth so that our God will be safe.

The fifth type is the *offensive enemy*, an opponent in *defensive/protecting-one's-country wars.* On the one hand, these types of wars use modern, extremely efficient technology. On the other, they contain some of the same underlying characteristics as the holy wars. Troops and civilians alike are conditioned to believe that their country's cause is just, their leaders are blameless, and that God is on their side against the vile and evil enemy 'over there'. The unique characteristic that distinguishes this mechanised, modern warfare is that it is considered to be 'national defense'. The enemy are perceived as ruthless expansionists threatening our borders or our ideology. Most wars in the last century-and-a-half have been perceived by the participants as defensive. Unlike any other wars, modern wars are rooted in a fearful, beleaguered position to which the appropriate response is the stockpiling of massive retaliatory forces. The United States fought in World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Grenada to defend an ally, to 'defend the free world', or to defend itself from Communist expansion. For similar reasons, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland in order to maintain a buffer zone against Capitalist Imperialism. Even the Nazis in World War II viewed themselves as defenders of the Aryan race and the lost honour of Germany. The term 'defensive war' can be clarified when it is seen to reflect the way each combatant formulates its rationale for fighting and the way it perceives itself in relation to the opponent. The designation speaks to psychological 'truth', not political realities. All modern nations refer to their armed forces and nuclear arms policy as measures of defense. Modern society, with its rigidly structured, highly controlled lifestyles, was designed to provide physical and psychological safety. It provides neither. Negative emotions which do not fit in this rigid structure are repressed and later projected onto others. For the culture as a whole, war provides a perfect neurotic acting-out of the projection. The Mutual Assured Destruction nuclear policy or

the saying 'Better dead than Red' are the clearest illustration of how distrustful and frightened we are: we are ready to die as long as the enemy dies with us.

The sixth type of enemy is the *oppressive/betraying enemy*, a participant in the *liberation/revolutionary wars*. These wars are the antithesis of the greedy-political wars. In this case, the oppressed masses find ways to become a united force in order to overthrow the elite who dominate, but also betray and exploit them. Such wars often begin as small, grassroots revolts that gather popular support as the tyrant in power tries to suppress them by brutal means. In building and mobilising their movement, the revolutionaries develop an identity and gain recognition, helping them to topple the tyrannical authority. The revolutionary, like the child, has a keen, innate sense of justice and a deep yearning for freedom. American colonists rejected King George III of England; France and Russia deposed and killed their monarchs and the immediate royal families. This patri/matricidal act says, in effect, the bad parent can be set aside, and the adolescent children ascend to leadership. Political revolutions in microcosm have been carried out in the American and European labor movements, and in the civil rights and other social movements. Central and South America, as well as Africa, provide numerous models of contemporary revolutionary wars.

Recently a seventh type of enmity has emerged: the *invisible enemy within* in the context of *terrorist or guerilla warfare*. It is a complex, hard to define kind of warfare. This enemy is the covert fighter. To the victim, this enemy presents an insidious, virtually invisible menace that cannot be identified in advance of the attack. The fact that it does not wear a uniform or approach openly, and the fact that it often mingles freely with its intended victims before it strikes, explain why it inspires an enormous terror and hatred. In the war on terrorism, there are desperate attempts to identify and destroy the enemy. Often done through technological mechanisms, such as metal detectors or with chemical herbicides, or through phosphorous, napalm or conventional bombs, these attempts have been futile. Rather they have tended to escalate the conflict, and have caused widespread destruction and cruel, terrible injuries to innocent people or onset-delayed deadly illnesses in our own soldiers, as with Agent Orange. The Israelis and other military and police forces in Mediterranean countries, the United States in Vietnam, the British Army in Ireland and others have all learned, to their dismay, that you can't fight an enemy 'out there' with mass destruction when the enemy is, in fact, right here within, all around or among us.

The terrorist or guerilla is also a metaphor for other kinds of threats that are undetectable but poised near to assault us, such as cancer, radioactivity, violent urban criminals, toxic pollution and AIDS. This array of dreadful enemies has become an inescapable, though shadowy fact of modern life, contributing to the erosion of our sense of well-being and fueling our anxiety and insecurity.

ON ENMITY, ENEMY IMAGES, PROPAGANDA AND PARANOIA

The Latin root of the word *enemy* is *inimicus* which means 'not + *amicus*' or not-friend. The 1984 edition of *Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary* defines 'enemy' simply as a 'hostile force or power', 'a member or unit of such a force', or 'something having destructive effect'. Federal law defines 'enemy' as

'the government of any nation with which the United States is at war'.[6] Psychologists have long been aware that 'hostile forces' and 'destructive effect' are not always clear objective realities, but are inextricably linked to the complex relationships between the participants in a conflict. Considering the role of perception, 'enemy' can be defined as a person or a group of persons perceived to represent a threat to or to be hostile towards the perceiver.[7]

The term 'enemy' seems to have wide range of meaning. A recent study in the United States revealed that young students view the Soviets as 'the enemy' not because they pose a physical threat to the United States, but due to their different ideology and competitive stand as a super power. Personal enemies, unlike national ones, were never described as someone with opposing views. It seems that the characteristics that constitute an 'enemy' are changing. Most adults over age fifty who have gone through some personal experience with *war* define 'the enemy' in the traditional way, meaning the country with which we are at war. However, most younger people in Europe and the United States have not experienced any war during their adult lives. They consistently define 'enemy' in more abstract terms, involving different ideologies, competition for world domination, etc.[8]

While 'enemy' is defined as some type of perceived or real threat, *enmity* places greater emphasis on mutuality. Accordingly, the aforementioned *Webster's Dictionary* defines 'enmity' as 'deep rooted mutual hatred'. Hypothetically, nation [A] can be an enemy of nation [B], while nation [B] does not consider [A] its enemy. Yet, when we describe the enmity between nation [A] and [B], we imply mutual fear, threat, or hatred.

An *enemy image* is a representation of the enemy. It can be effective or cognitive, it can derive from the actions of the enemy or from the perceptions of the perceiver. In other words, an image of 'the enemy' can be accurate or biased, imaginary or real. More often than not, it is both. Riitta Wahlstrom defines 'enemy image' as 'the commonly-held, stereotyped, dehumanised image of the outgroup'. She goes on to say: 'The enemy image provides a focus for externalization of fears and threats. In addition, a lot of undesirable cognitions and emotions are projected onto the enemy.'[9] This emphasises that the 'enemy image' cannot be limited to feelings of dislike or antipathy, it must involve the threatening possibility of aggression and violence. A second emphasis is that one group (ingroup) is threatened by another (outgroup). It is not simply hostility, threat, or aggression among individuals. Lastly, there is an emphasis on the processes of dehumanisation (which legitimises violence against the enemy), externalisation, projection and several cognitive biases.

The *Enemy Image Index* is a specific measure to assess the attitudes towards and imagery of enmity intrinsic to different countries. The measure uses twenty adjectives, such as aggressive, friendly, happy-go-lucky, cruel, decent. Only the most negative terms in the adjective list, cruel, evil, hostile, power-hungry, treacherous, and warlike, are used to calculate the measure. The number of times that respondents assign these adjectives to their own country are subtracted from the number of times they assign them to the 'enemy'. The difference after subtraction is the Enemy Image Index.[10] The Index is useful in assessing imagery associated with different countries. For example, in 1942, during World War II, Americans most frequently called the Japanese 'warlike', 'cruel' and

'treacherous'. Twenty-four years later, the Japanese were 'hardworking', 'patriotic', 'decent' and 'friendly'.

Propaganda, in the context of enmity, is the vehicle through which enmity is spread or propagated. Harold Lasswell, a prominent scholar in this area, defines it as 'the expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to influencing the opinion or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological manipulations'.[11] Psychological manipulations and behavioural goals of the propagandists seem to be the two essential elements of propaganda.

Jacques Ellul's analysis of modern social systems led him to coin the term 'propaganda of integration'. This type of propaganda is intended to promote acceptance and support among members of a social system. Integration propaganda relies on modern, ever-present communications technology to achieve the maximum level of consensus possible in modern cultures. Unlike the common association of propaganda with foreign subversive broadcasts and leaflets, Ellul views propaganda as an essential tool of modern technological societies for maintaining social order and civilian support. Television, newspapers, movies, and textbooks are some of the vehicles used to propagate the communications and influence behavior through the propaganda of integration.[12]

War propaganda is a system which encourages enmity through explicit means (posters, leaflets, etc.) or implicit means (misinformation, disinformation, and lies). Enmity is propagated through different medias: visual images (popular movies, visual arts), the written word (literature, newspapers, magazines), the spoken word (radio, everyday language), music (popular songs, military jingles), and other art forms.

In his *Faces of the Enemy*, Sam Keen coined the term *consensual paranoia*. As he puts it, 'the pathology of the normal person who is a member of a war-justifying society forms the template from which all the images of the enemy are created'.[13] The term 'consensual paranoia' suggests a pathology. When an individual experiences unrealistic fears, constant worries, sees the world in black-and-white, and acts in an irrational manner, we label this person 'paranoid', someone to be medicated or hospitalised. When a nation is experiencing similar symptoms, we call it 'nationalism'. In propagating enemy images and war, propaganda exploits people's sense of insecurity, their loyalty and connection to the group, and their predisposition to paranoia.

ROOTS OF ENMITY

The roots of enmity can be understood primarily from the study of group and intergroup dynamics. However, a complementary approach that examines the link between individual processes and enmity can shed further light on what makes the individual vulnerable to war propaganda.

Group

Throughout human evolution, people have always belonged to various types of distinct units, such as families, clans, tribes, nations, and federations. The

crucial step in the development of enmity and the conduct of war is the transition from the accurate perception of differences among people (white–black, communist–capitalist, Muslim–Christian) to associating the ingroup with a higher level of humanity than the outgroup. In this transition, the 'other' becomes the 'bad other', the 'dangerous other'. Once the outgroup is assigned the role of an enemy, it is feared, hated and must be defended against. If several groups go through this process simultaneously, enmity and war are almost inevitable.

Erik Erikson coined the term *pseudospecies* in reference to the diversity of humankind. He described the way that humans developed separate units and then began acting as if these units were separate species. This separation was done at the expense of the broader/global human identity and by devaluing the humanity of other pseudospecies.[14] Enmity among groups creates a strong bond among group members and facilitates a clear perception of the uniqueness of the group. In other words, enmity among groups promotes group cohesion and group identity.

Within the split of us–them, undesirable negative qualities are attributed to or projected onto the enemy, as the following chart demonstrates.

THEM *THE OTHER*



Social psychologists have documented the importance of the outgroup and enmity in the formation of group identity and group cohesion. In one experiment participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups; 'blue' or 'green'. The groups were given blue or green uniforms, pens, and papers. The researchers addressed them in terms of their group color. Even though the group assignments were arbitrary and the group names were psychologically meaningless, participants evaluated their own group more positively and ingroup biases appeared even before the group members began to work together.[15] Similarly, Vamik Volkan recalls growing up in Cyprus when Greek and Turkish youth

differentiated themselves by wearing black and red sashes respectively. When tensions rose, the sashes became even more sacred. Members of either side would have died rather than wear the other's color.[16] Contemporary youth gangs also use colors and types of dress to differentiate among themselves.

Merely telling several people that they are now a group leads them to evaluate each other more positively. They will reward each other more, like each other more, view each other's personality in a more positive light and hold each other more responsible for successes and less responsible for failures than they will members of the outgroup.[17] Such an ingroup bias seems to help maintain positive self images. Another potential reason for people's readiness to categorise the world around them in terms of ingroups and outgroups may be that it makes the environment more cognitively comprehensible.

Muzafer Sherif's famous Robbers Cave Park experiment illustrates most clearly the importance of intergroup dynamics. Eleven and twelve year old boys at summer camp were divided into two groups and brought to their camp sites without being aware of the other group. The kids were strangers to each other, with no intergroup contact. During the first phase of the experiment, the groups gradually developed group identity, leaders emerged and group spirit evolved. During the second phase, the two groups started interacting with each other, rivalry flourished. They became extremely competitive, called each other names, scuffles broke out, and there were raids on each other's bunkhouses. Finally, the groups refused to have anything to do with each other.

The third phase posed a challenge to the researchers attempting to reduce the tension between the groups. Non-competitive social activities, such as movie watching and sharing the dining rooms, seemed to increase enmity. Not until the researchers announced that there was not enough money to obtain more movies and that both groups needed to chip in did things start to improve. When the truck that was supposed to pick up their food would not start, all the boys pulled together to get it running. Sherif summarised this significant research, stating that *hostility gives way when groups pull together to achieve, overriding, superordinate goals which are real and compelling to all concerned.*[18]

This experiment teaches us a few important lessons. Firstly, it teaches us that it does not require any special circumstances for two groups to develop intergroup hostility. Secondly, it demonstrates the importance of enmity to the development of group cohesion and group identity. Thirdly, it illuminates the fact that while it may be difficult to reduce intergroup hostility or enmity, it is possible when the two groups realise that only through cooperation they can both survive.

The link between enmity and enhanced group cohesion has been noted by many other scholars. Sigmund Freud, in his famous paper 'Why War', explained to Albert Einstein that in order for society to cohere, the identification of the outgroup is crucial. Group members can displace their own aggressiveness, argues Freud, and in doing so, they deflect destructive impulses that were originally directed towards members of their own group onto the outgroup.[19]

During the last two decades, the link between enmity and group cohesion has also been noted in the peace movement. In the United States, some segments of the population have made Reagan, the Bomb, and those that work for the military/industrial complex into enemies. Prior to the 1984 election in the United

States, it was common to see posters and bumper stickers stating: 'Reagan 84—War 85'. Employees of Nuclear Laboratories and the defence industry were depicted on posters as wanted criminals. Another bumper sticker read, 'War is the real enemy'. Group cohesion and group identity was intensely promoted with such an aggressive campaign against political enemies. While political diversity is one of the basic building blocks of Democracy, I have no doubt that the above campaigns went much further than ethical and responsible political activism. They were re-creating the war-type system they were ostensibly fighting against.

Individual

Psychoanalysis has laid the foundation for our understanding of the individual's predisposition to war propaganda and enmity. There are three bodies of knowledge that have drawn principally on classic psychoanalytic thinking and contributed to our understanding of the process of enmity on the individual level: Self Psychology, an offshoot of psychoanalytical thinking developed by Heinz Kohut, the Authoritarian Personality Theory, developed by T.W. Adorno and his associates, and Jungian psychology, developed by Carl Jung. Developmental psychology, especially the work of Piaget, the study of prejudice and stereotypes, especially the work of Allport, and Political Socialisation Theory, are also pertinent to this discussion.

Psychoanalytic theory emphasises the role of parenting in adult personalities as well as social structure. Self Psychology, hypothesises that a newborn has an undifferentiated self, meaning that it exists, psychologically speaking, only in relationship to its primary care-giver. The quality of the relationships with the primary care-giver will determine, among other things, the ability to tolerate ambiguity, differences, and one's own guilt.[20] These abilities or lack there of and the relative strength of one's sense of self contribute the individual's vulnerability to war propaganda and establish an individual's inclination towards making enemies.

Young infants cannot comprehend that the 'good person' who gratifies them is also the 'bad person' who frustrates them (is not there to pick them up, feed, or change them when they cry). Only at around eight months of age do infants begin to integrate this split. When children are thirty-six months old, the process of integration is at a more advanced stage. From this age on, if children received 'good enough parenting', they are better able to tolerate ambivalence—they are more able to love and hate the same person at different times. The ability to tolerate ambivalence, paradox, inconsistency, ambiguity and to resist group pressure also helps determine how vulnerable an individual is to war propaganda.[21]

We are all familiar with the scene of a child stumbling over an object, such as a chair or wooden block, and is enraged with the object for hurting him or her and hits it back. We can also easily recall how a scolded child turns to his or her doll and blames her or scolds her in return. Blame, externalisation, and denial are all healthy mechanisms which are part of natural development. However, how far we develop beyond these primitive levels of functioning determines the extent to which we need enemies.

A child who has often been criticised by authoritarian and rigid parents, neglected by self-absorbed, narcissistic or histrionic parents, or abused by

psychologically or physically violent parents is most likely to grow up with poor self esteem, with a sense of emptiness, and feelings of rage. Such a child develops a low self esteem and is likely to try various strategies to handle or eradicate these negative feelings. As children usually find it too threatening to direct their anger towards the betraying parents, many turn the anger towards themselves and act in self-destructive ways. Some children try to direct this anger to an external person or object. Dissociation, repression, denial, projection and, above all, splitting are some of the defense mechanisms that children, and later on, adults may deploy to cope with their inner sense of badness or inadequacy. Denial of one's own negative feelings (towards one's self or one's parents) and the projection of blame onto others are the most powerful mechanisms in the making of enemies. Enemies are suitable targets for unacceptable negative feelings or guilt by individuals or groups as they attempt to rid themselves of these emotions.[22]

Jungian psychology explores a similar process which Jung himself called the projection of the 'shadow', the dark, usually unconscious part of our personality.[23] The origin of the 'shadow', according to psychoanalytic and Jungian thinking, is in individually and socially unacceptable feelings youngsters experience, usually about themselves and their parents. Like the sense of badness itself, these feelings are initially disowned and then projected outward onto someone else—the other—who becomes the hated and feared enemy. This enemy, who carries the disowned part of ourselves, must be fought and eliminated as we desperately and repeatedly attempt to rid ourselves of our own shadow.

Most developmental psychologists suggest that by the time children are five to seven years old they are capable of forming images of and prejudices towards others. In *The Nature of Prejudice*, Gordon Allport[24] states that by age six children are aware of racial and ethnic differences and try to please their parents by adopting their parents' views. Allport quotes a revealing remark by one of the six year old girls in his study: 'Mother, what is the name of the children I am supposed to hate?' At this stage children learn that certain groups are hate-worthy, though they are still working to integrate the content with the emotion.

From ages six to ten years old, according to Allport, children closely mirror their parents' biases and prejudices. Once they grasp a concept, they are likely to cling to it. Allport's theory is supported by the social learning theory, a perspective that emphasises imitation and reinforcement by admirable models, such as parents, teachers, and older siblings.[25]

While young children adopt attitudes, including enemy images, without really understanding them, at adolescence they are capable of thinking more abstractly and also of drawing more accurate conclusions from their personal experiences. As a result, adolescents seem to be less prejudiced and biased. Learning theories complement developmental theory by suggesting that the less rigid structure of adolescents' attitudes is the result of the adolescent's broader exposure to the multiple models existing in society.[26]

The proponents of the political socialisation theory put the emphasis on the parents' and the environmental values and attitudes, believing them to be the major factor in determining children's later political attitudes and behavior. Indeed, parents' political stands seem to be one of the better predictors of

children's later political views. Unlike the psychoanalytic theory, which focuses on child rearing practices, political socialisation theory addresses the importance of parental attitudes as well as the importance of other socialising agents, such as schools, peers, media, etc. Political socialisation, like general socialisation, is the process by which the individual learns to conform to the values and norms of the group to which he or she belongs and becomes a fully functional member. Children, according to this view, learn about enmity from their surroundings and internalise prejudices and enemy images as part of the process of becoming members of the culture. Allport's concept of the 'propaganda of integration', mentioned earlier, is exactly the tool used in socialising youth and adults to conform to the group's beliefs and promote normative behavior.

In summary, the roots of enmity are primarily tied to group behavior. The ingroup–outgroup bias is at the heart of enmity. While enmity is a group process, several theories have suggested that various personality factors can make an individual more vulnerable to war propaganda. If one looks at child rearing practices as a cultural phenomena, the psychoanalytic and the social psychology approaches merge to form a more inclusive systems approach to enmity.

DYNAMICS OF ENMITY

In 1947, Allport and Postman published the results of an experimental telephone game. Participants were to convey communications that they had received. One of the initial communications consisted of a picture of a well dressed white man threatening a poorly dressed black man with a razor blade. In the process of passing on the communication, over half of the white participants transferred the razor from the white man to the black. We can hypothesise that fear, distrust, hate, prejudice and enmity interfered with both communications and perception.[27] This is but one example from many of distorted perceptions which are closely tied to an outgroup. Besides the split of good—versus—evil described above, there are eleven dynamics which characterise these distorted perceptions of the enemy.

1. *The double standard in attention and evaluation*

The double standard dynamic is the most powerful in distorting perceptions of enemy images. This is a process whereby people use different yardsticks to judge the enemy's actions or to assess enemy motivations than they use for themselves or for allies. The popular saying that 'one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter' is an illustration of this bias.

Another example is the different ways the American media treated the shooting down of the Korean airliner by the Soviets and the shooting down of the Iranian airliner by the Americans. While the media described the Soviets as uncivilised, brutal, with disregard for human life, the American incident was described as tragic mistake but justified.

Research by cognitive psychologists has documented the pervasiveness of the double-standard bias. Studies have shown that American students evaluate Soviet actions more negatively than they evaluate the same actions performed by the United States. 'Hawks' seem to have stronger double standards than 'Doves',

apparently because 'Doves' and 'Hawks' have different attitudes towards the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly, when students viewed a videotape presenting either a black or white person ambiguously shoving another person, the shove was seen as more violent when it had been conducted by a black person than by a white person.[28]

A cartoon by Jerry Robinson,[29] also exemplifies this bias. A Senator and a General are having a conversation:

> General, what's the difference between offensive and defensive missiles?
> The direction they're pointed, Senator.
> (At the bottom of the page, a little bird says, "Missiles are generally offensive")

During a conflict, the double standard allows each side to justify its actions as defensive and to denounce the enemy's stands as offensive. For instance, in the United States, the nuclear missiles posted in central Europe and Turkey are seen as defensive, while the suspected Soviet nuclear missiles in South America and Cuba are perceived as offensive. Similarly, the Soviets condemn the United States' involvement in Vietnam as capitalistic imperialism and justify the invasion of Afghanistan by claiming they were defending the local government against western aggression.

The implications of the double standard bias are far reaching. It cements the belief that the enemy is bad and that we are good. The double standard bias leads not only to misconceptions about the enemy and to an exaggerated perception of danger, it can also force the escalation of conflict to a point where negotiation is no longer a viable option and armed hostilities become inevitable.

2. *The double standard in attribution*

The enemy's hostile actions are more likely to be attributed to natural characteristics, while positive, conciliatory, or peaceful actions are more likely to be attributed to situational factors. In other words, when the enemy is acting peacefully, it is because it was forced to do so by certain circumstances and not by its own choice. When it acts aggressively, it is due to personal choice or characteristic behavior.

In a classic experiment, American students tended to choose negative motives when fictitious actions were ascribed to the Soviet Union, and positive ones when the same actions were supposedly performed by the United States. They rated French actions as they did those of the United States, which may imply that the double standard is more anti-Soviet than it is pro-American.[30] Comparable results were obtained in studies of Hindus and Moslems and among other opposing parties in a variety of conflicts.[31]

The implications of this dynamic are far reaching. When the enemy is presenting a conciliatory or peaceful offer, it is met with paranoid suspicion, and suspect for its hidden 'real goals'. When the Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced a six-month unilateral freeze on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, Time magazine wrote that the proposal 'seemed to officials here designed to cause dissension in NATO and undercut American interests in Europe' (8 April 1985, p. 1). The bias in attribution is rooted in paranoia and is a major obstacle in the development of trust and the conducting of productive negotiations.

3. *Hostile predictions and self-fulfilling prophesies*

The tendency to judge the enemy's actions negatively, to remember mainly negative information, and to attribute peaceful acts to situational factors are frequently accompanied by hostile predictions of the enemy's intentions far exceeding what can be determined by the facts. As most people are likely to perceive an enemy as more dangerous and more hostile than it really is, they are also more likely to expect it to act more aggressively and violently than can be assumed from the available facts.

Hostile or exaggerated predictions are at the core of the arms race and cold war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union continue to make hostile predictions about the other's intent to build arms and use them. In 1956, General Lemay, the chief of the United States Strategic Air Command, stated that '... the Russians would have by 1959 twice as many long range bombers as the United States'.[32] This prediction, like many others, has not proved to be true. In fact, the United States has always preserved its superiority over the Soviets in long range bombers, at times with a margin of 5:1 or more. Numerous hostile predictions have been made by both sides throughout the cold war years. The concerns about 'Soviet superiority', 'Soviet massive build-up', and 'Soviet expansionist intentions' have fueled the arms race in the most unproductive ways.

Another element of the hostile prediction is the self-fulfilling prophecy. Perceiving the 'other' as having hostile intent often promotes a 'defensive' or 'deterrent' action which can start or escalate a conflict. Such a conflict may not have existed without the provocation of the 'preventative measures'. The hostile prediction promotes a vicious cycle. Suspicion leads to more suspicion, which encourages threats and counter-threats which erupt into aggressive or defensive actions, validating the initial suspicions and fomenting more. We often defend ourselves by 'pre-emptive strikes' or 'defensive measures'. The actions of the enemy can be seen as pure and unprovoked hostility if we have misread its intention. This we are likely to do when influenced by hostile predictions and double standard biases. A second cartoon by Jerry Robinson on this theme described a conversation between two generals:

> Last time we were humiliated when they retaliated *before* our surprise attack. This time our revenge assault for their pre-emptive strike must come *first*.

The results of hostile predictions and self-fulfilling prophesies impact many military decisions. During the Libya crisis in 1986, the United States portrayed Kaddafi as a 'mad dog'. He was perceived as hostile, unpredictable and impulsive. At the same time, the United States was conducting 'routine military exercises' two miles from the Libyan capital, claiming it had a right to conduct military maneuvers in international waters. Quite predictably and understandably, Kaddafi sent his planes to attack the 5th fleet who were on maneuvers near his capital and headquarters. One may ask whether the United States would tolerate anyone conducting 'routine military exercises in international water' two miles from Washington, D.C. or New York city. This is a clear example of projection and provocation of a response that led to further escalation of the conflict.

4. *The mirror image*

A close analysis of the images of the enemy as perceived by opposing parties reveals that they often see each other in a similar light. Uri Bronfenbrenner has coined the term 'mirror image' and discussed how American and Russian views of each other are essentially interchangeable. Both feel that: (1) the other is the aggressor; (2) the other's government exploits and deludes its people; (3) the majority of the people are essentially good and are not sympathetic to the government's deceitful leadership; (4) the other government should never be trusted—they have hidden, sneaky and secretive ways to go about their plots; and (5) their policy verges on madness, while ours is, of course, rational and humane.[33]

Ralph White elaborated on the second dimension listed above. He suggests the term 'blacktop illusion' to describe how both Americans and Soviets view the others' leadership as coercive and evil and their people as controlled and manipulated by their government. This, of course, can justify either side's aggressive actions, since these actions are taken on behalf of a 'silent majority'.[34]

Examples of the mirror image dynamic are numerous. The United States blamed the Soviet Union for expansionism when they invaded Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union blamed the United States for expansionism when it sent troops to Vietnam, Grenada and to countries in South America. Americans blame the Soviets for human rights violations of minorities and Jewish dissidents and the Soviets remind Americans of their systematic violations of the basic human rights of the poor and blacks in the United States. Both sides blame the other for violations of international treaties, for the support of terrorism, and for the escalation of the nuclear arms race.

The political implications of the mirror image are similar to those of the above three dynamics. They all lead to misconceptions of the 'other', create barriers to empathy and obstacles to the negotiation process.

5. *Selective attention*

When people think about enemies they demonstrate selective attention. They focus on negative aspects and actions and retain critical comments about their enemies more easily than they remember positive statements. Experimental evidence demonstrates that people pay attention to and recall significantly more negative adjectives, facts, and anecdotes associated with people they consider 'the enemy' than with people they consider allies. Content analysis of news items also reveals that the more negative the news regarding the Soviet Union, the more attention the New York Times has given it.[35]

A recent example of the selective attention dynamic is provided by Silverstein and Flamenbaum. While the generally accepted estimate of casualties in the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union in 1986 is about 10, 42% of the students in a New York university remembered the reports that estimated the number of casualties above 500, 10% remember reports of more than 50,000 casualties. Only 25% estimated the losses at less than 25.[36]

The political implications of the selective attention process are also significant. Half-truth information easily leads the perceiver to invalid or dangerous conclusions in regard to the enemy's situation and intentions. Like hostile

prediction and the double standard, it perpetuates a fearful state to which an aggressive response is often seen as the only appropriate one.

6. *Bias in credibility assessment*

This principle explains how people are more likely to assess the informer and information that represent their view as more credible than the informer who presents an opposing view. This bias in the judgment of sources of information explains the resistance of enemy images to change. Statements by the Soviet Union or the United States against each other are often perceived as credible by their respective audiences only because they describe 'the enemy'. Research on the credibility of newscasters also confirms that the more consistent the newscaster's report was with the research subject's predispositions, the more credible the newscaster was perceived to be.[37]

The implications of this dynamic are similar to those of the above five. They all contribute to the dangerous process that Morton Deutsch called the 'malignant process of hostile interaction', a process in which the actions and attitudes of opposing sides give each justification for their beliefs. Like all the dynamics described above, the bias in credibility assessment can maintain a person's inner consistency by ignoring, tuning-out, disregarding, or denying any information that is inconsistent with a person's attitudes towards the enemy. Only negative information seems credible; attention is paid only to negative reports. Attribution to aggressive acts is mainly personal, attribution for positive acts is mainly situational. Not surprisingly, this process culminates with hostile predictions of the enemy's intended actions.

7. *The co-existence of oppositional and paradoxical images*

The Soviets have often been portrayed as simple peasants happily quaffing vodka and stamping about in Lenin Square with icicles hanging from their fur hoods. At the same time, Russians are seen as diabolical, scheming politicians whose power and technological superiority are used for expansionist, threatening ends. The Jew has similarly been portrayed as a fawning, subhuman, physically repulsive creature in a tattered, filthy coat, while at the same time being characterised as a shrewd, rich man with flashing diamonds on his fingers, conspiring against decent people and holding the reins of power in his hands. Different pieces of Nazi propaganda during the Second World War represented the British both as a dangerous bulldog devouring free Europe and a harmless snail hardly able to move towards its target.

The ability to present and perceive the enemy in such paradoxical ways enables people to justify their attitudes and behavior towards the enemy. It should be emphasised that these paradoxical images are never presented at the same time or on the same poster. The Jews are depicted as rats in order to justify their extermination. To justify the extensive measures taken to destroy the Jews, they are portrayed as controllers of the global economy and the press. People's attempts to avoid dissonance or inconsistency lead them to tolerate paradoxical imagery. The ultimate function of these images is the same as with any enemy image. It is to rigidify the stereotypical image and justify one's own attitudes and behavior towards the enemy.

8. *The kinetic nature of enmity*

A group that is perceived as an evil enemy today can be termed an ally and become a trusted friend tomorrow. War propaganda usually focuses on historical differences between 'us' and 'the enemy', it emphasises a long past of evils and character flaws which imply that the current enemy had always been evil and has always been our opponent. Propaganda distorts truth and skews historical facts with the goal of perpetuating present enmity towards a contemporary enemy.

An example of this shifting of images over time is the relationship between the United States and Japan. During World War II, the treacherous, bloody, vicious Jap became a detested symbol. Barely five years later, by 1950, Americans openly admired the courage and resourcefulness of the Japanese people in rebuilding their war-torn country. For the past thirty years, Japanese technological methods, Japan's healthy economy and the Japanese people's personal self-discipline have commanded widespread respect bordering on awe. In the 1980's, Japan's commercial, economic and technological strengths are being blamed for some of the economic hardships in the United States, and new terms, such as 'trade wars', are being used to represent the current shift in the relationship between the two countries.

In the same fashion, the United States and Germany have shifted back and forth between alliance and enmity five times since 1914. Germany and Great Britain, and Israel and the Soviet Union, have all alternated between enmity and alliance during the last few decades.

The question that arises with this dynamic is, do we always need an enemy? Does it matter who the national enemy is as long as we have one? The answers to these questions are far from simple. There are nations without enemies (i.e., Finland, Switzerland), but most groups have some type of an outgroup or an enemy. The importance of enmity in the maintenance of group cohesion and group identity sheds light on the prevalent need for enemies. However, it has not been established that groups cannot do without enemies, or that there are not other means to maintain group cohesion and group identity.

9. *Networks of enemies and friends*

Three of the unwritten rules of enmity state that: (1) the enemy of my friend is my enemy; (2) the friend of my enemy is my enemy; and (3) the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Research based on Balance Theory has documented how American students with negative attitudes towards the Soviet Union and Iran were more likely than others to assume that the relationship between Iran and the Soviet Union were positive.[38] Other research has shown that its enemies associate the Soviet Union with numerous negative links to terrorism, drug trafficking and even blatantly false crimes, such as the invention of the atomic bomb.[39]

The complexity of the network of enemies and friends can be examined through the relationships between Iran, Iraq, and the Kurds. As soon as he gained enough political and military power in Iran, the late Shah of Iran opposed the Kurdish minority who were fighting for their independence. Yet, with similar determination, he supported the Kurds in Iraq during the long and cruel civil war of the 1960s and 1970s between the Kurds and the Iraqi military. In the same vein,

the Iraqi government, known to have committed the most atrocious acts against the Kurds during the civil war, supported the Kurdish rebellion in Iran after the Shah was ousted by Khomeini.[40]

This dynamic is responsible for the split or polarisation of all the world's nations into either/or positions of alliance with one or the other of the two superpowers. This dynamic is also responsible for the awkward situations where the United States finds itself supporting two sides of a conflict. At certain points during the lengthy Iran–Iraqi war in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the United States found itself sending weapons to Iraq as an anti-Syrian statement. At the same time, the United States supplied Iran with intelligence information about Iraq as Iran's antagonistic relationships with the Soviet Union placed Iran in the position of an American ally. Balance theory applied to international relations offers one of the most plausible explanations for such apparently inconsistent behavior and at times extremely confusing and irrational alliances.

10. *Knowledge and ignorance*

The above biases and distorted perceptions are closely associated with the ignorance of basic facts about the enemy. It is impossible to determine whether the biases cause ignorance or vice versa. However, it seems logical that lack of knowledge goes hand in hand with misconceptions.

Americans are notorious for their ignorance of the basic facts of other countries. Twenty-eight percent of United States citizens believe that the Soviet Union fought against, and not with, the United States in World War II. While the generally accepted number of Soviets who died in World War II is 20 million people, more than one-quarter of all American students assess these casualties at less than 20,000. The majority of American students also erroneously believe that the Soviets invented cruise missiles and multiple warheads, and twenty-four percent of them think the Soviets invented the atomic bomb.[41]

Ignorance may be bliss. It is also the result of selective attention and selective memory, two dynamics described above. Ignorance is one of the main obstacles to what Ralph White called 'realistic empathy' and to the ability of a person to understand the conditions under which the enemy is operating. Ignorance perpetuates personal attribution of negative actions by the enemy.

11. *Dehumanisation*

One of the most critical elements in fighting our own kind is the ability to dehumanise the enemy, to perceive the 'other' as less than human. 'Moral' or 'civilized' human beings do not kill other human beings, but they do kill Gooks, Huns, Japs, and Niggers. The substitution of labels from Soviet citizens to Reds, Jewish people to Hibbs or rats, or American men to Yankees serves a simple but profound function: it allows people to kill with minimum or no sense of guilt. Accordingly, one of the primary goals of war propaganda is its creation of enemy images to strip the enemy of its human, domestic and individual characteristics. My analysis of enemy images and war propaganda reveals that there are seven levels to describing or perceiving the enemy. Like the clinical interpretation of the Rorschach ink blot projective test, the further an image is from a 'human being', the more 'regressive' a level of functioning it indicates. Each of the following levels represents an increased level of threat.

(a) *Full human being:* At this level the enemy image presents a fully recognisable human being or a group of human beings.

(b) *Faceless:* While the enemy is still a human being, the individuals among the outgroup have lost their unique characteristics. They all look alike: masked or expressionless faces.

(c) *Humanoid:* Images of Satan or the devil are classic representations of the humanoid level. At this level, the enemy has lost one more facet of its humanity and become a mere representation of death, destruction, and evil.

(d) *Animal:* At this level the enemy no longer bears any resemblance to human being and is represented as a snake, rat, crocodile, bear, eagle, etc. The animal level is an important step in dehumanising the enemy. Exterminating disgusting rats is more acceptable than slaughtering Jewish people, disposing of blood-thirsty gorillas is more acceptable than murdering German people.

(e) *Feminised:* another way to dehumanise the enemy is to give it female characteristics. In a recent set of cartoons, Lebanon's capital, Beirut, was portrayed as a seductive female whose large breasts concealed highly explosive hand grenades. Another well known anti-war poster presents war as a whore seducing our young boys to her charms. Terrorism is often depicted in cartoons and films as an emasculating female. More recently, Gorbachev's new approach to the nuclear arms race has been associated with female seduction tactics.[42]

(f) *Inanimate object:* At the fifth level, the enemy is represented not only as inhuman, but as a lifeless object. Enemies are often referred to by technical names or the code numbers of their weaponry. This allows the United States to fight not the Soviet army, but the SS11 (Soviet long range nuclear missile), The Frog (Soviet short range nuclear missile), or the Delta IV (Soviet nuclear submarine). The elimination of an SS11 by a Minuteman I (United States long range nuclear missile) does not lead to any feeling of regret or concern with human lives; the technical names of weaponry as a representation of the enemy shield us from these feelings.

(g) *Abstraction or Numbers:* This is the most advanced level of dehumanisation. Through *Doublespeak*,[43] human lives are presented as abstractions, 'collateral damage' may stand for civilian casualties, 'servicing the target' is a euphemism for killing. Numerical terms, such as 'megadeath' stand for one million dead people. There is nothing in these terms that evoke any thoughts or feelings in regard to the human lives which are being destroyed, they elicit neither guilt nor shame. Killing and the destruction of life can go on. Additional examples of Doublespeak are: 'coercive diplomacy' for bombing, 'permanent prehostility' for peace and 'engage the enemy on all sides' for ambush.
Consistent with the effort to mask the destructive power of weaponry, nuclear weapons have often been given pet names, such as 'Poseidon', for the United States nuclear submarine; 'Peacekeeper' or 'Minuteman', for long range nuclear missiles, and 'Honest John', for the surface-to-surface missile. Acronyms are also abstractions. GLCM (pronounced as 'glick-em') stands for 'ground launched cruise missile' and SLCM (pronounced 'slick-em') stands for 'submarine launched cruise missile'.

The dehumanisation of the enemy is a complex and creative effort. Each of the above levels represents a progressive strata of fear. In other words, one can say 'tell me how you envision your enemy and I will tell you how frightened you are'. It is of no surprise that in our technologically oriented western world, technological (level 'f') and abstract images (level 'g') seem to dominate enemy images. In an era when television can show the enemy, their children and families right in our living rooms, it is no longer easy to dehumanise the enemy. More and more sophisticated techniques must be developed in order to facilitate the process of denying the enemy's humanity. Our similarities will always be far greater than our differences.

THE FUTURE OF ENMITY IN THE NUCLEAR ERA

> Nations are losing the ability to hear each other's heartbeats. Many international negotiations break down because they are built on mutual accusations instead of mutual confessions.
>
> Yevgeny Yevtushenko

One of the most important tasks in the nuclear area is to reduce enmity among the two superpowers as well as among warring religious factions, ethnic groups, and nations around the world. In many ways, the process already has begun between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 'Evil Empire' image has been replaced with a more realistic view of the Soviets as a country in transition from a one party system to a more democratic structure. Soviets and Americans are gradually becoming more aware of each other's economic, ethnic, and political struggles. Even so, dozens of wars are still being waged and hundreds and thousands of people are still being killed every year in countless violent conflicts around the world.

War and enmity are not inherited characteristics. War and enmity coevolved with the rise of agricultural societies during the Neolithic period, and have colored less than one percent of human history. The existence of peaceful societies that have neither developed war rituals nor fought wars, such as the Hopi and the Pigmies, provides additional evidence against the genetic or instinctual explanation of enmity. While war and enmity are not part of human nature, nevertheless, the history of civilisation has been saturated with violent group conflicts. Today it is imperative that we question the meaning of enmity in the nuclear era, seek ways of reducing enmity among groups and discover if nations can exist without enemies.

As we have seen, hostility gives way and groups pull together only when people attempt to achieve overriding, superordinate goals that are real and compelling to all concerned. The biggest task of our century is to apply this truth to international relationships. While Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) seems to be the guiding principle of the past 50 years, Mutual Assured Cooperation (MAC) must be our new guiding principle. Nuclear energy and the nuclear arsenal are slowly changing our mode of thinking. We can no longer destroy the enemy on the other side of the wall, the river, or the ocean without destroying

ourselves. Destroying 'the enemy' in the nuclear era inevitably means self-destruction.

In the Soviet Union in 1986 the Chernobyl nuclear reactor melted down. This incident thrust upon us the fact that one country's problem is the every country's problem. Crops and water resources in Europe and parts of North America were critically affected by the accident. Despite the media's initial criticism of Russian technology and the Russians' initial refusal to inform the world of what had happened, ultimately the Soviets provided the information, and the U.S. provided medical and technological aid. Like the nuclear arsenal, the Chernobyl accident forced upon all of us a new realisation that we are no longer separated in the traditional way, that we must help each other in order to help and protect ourselves. Our safety and future are deeply intertwined with the safety and future of our enemies.

The bonding energy that group enmity elicits must be redirected towards new types of challenges and targets, such as pollution, hunger, poverty, or the destruction of the rain forest. If pollution is identified as our new enemy, then all nations are likely to cooperate to deal more effectively with this 'overriding, superordinate goal'.

The rehumanisation of the enemy must precede or accompany cooperation. We dehumanise the enemy in order to enable ourselves to kill or destroy it with a minimum of remorse. To see the enemy as a full person, like us experiencing joy, pain, fear, and hope, will change our relationships to our enemies. While they may still be adversaries or competitors, they will nevertheless maintain their full humanity, and escape the fate of snakes, evil empires, Huns, Hibbs, or Niggers.

Realistic empathy is a key issue in the process of rehumanising the enemy. It requires us to go beyond attributional biases and truly understand the enemy's motivational system. Far from justifying all of our enemy's actions, understanding will give us an historical, political and emotional context for our enemy's actions.[55] Realistic empathy does not mean that the enemy is not expansionist or hostile, it only means that we recognise the enemy's needs, hopes, and fears, the catalysts that motivate it to act. If we can develop realistic empathy, many other cognitive and perceptual biases will be reduced. We will be less likely to make hostile predictions, to have selective negative attention, and will apply fewer double standards in assessing the enemy's actions. With this more realistic view of the enemy we are more likely to react and deal with situations more reasonably and thereby eliminate dangerous, paranoid, self-fulfilling prophecies. We will, hopefully, react to real threats in an effective manner.

I believe our 'shrinking world', inextricably linked by sophisticated communication technologies and the computerised, jet-paced business community insures the gradual humanisation of all people. It is much harder to present the Soviets as dumb, ruthless peasants if we can view Russian teenagers roller-skating and Russian children playing in Gorky Park on a live television broadcast from Moscow. Similarly, it will be hard to propagate images of the Nazi gorilla, Jewish rat or fearless Japanese samurai ever again if we can view others as complete human beings like ourselves. Direct experience with other cultures, through business or pleasure can have a powerful impact on rehumanisation. While some people can maintain their prejudicial enemy

images, for many, travel broadens their awareness of the common humanity of all people. Grassroots citizen's diplomacy, sister-cities, pen-pals and other networking activities between the members of warring groups can drastically reduce enmity by rehumanising the enemy.

It is impossible to over-emphasise that perceiving the enemy as a full human being does not ensure mutual love or even respect. Some groups and leaders, regardless of how human we view them, may still represent destruction, death and at times evil. Still, the fewer perceptual biases we have, the more clearly we can observe the enemy and the more effectively we can intervene or deal with conflict.

Sociology, psychology, and psychohistory provide us with some clues to the answers to our questions. While it can be argued that enmity promotes group cohesion and enhances group identity, there is ample evidence to show that groups can develop cohesion and identity without enemies. The important differentiation between nationalism and patriotism enhances our understanding of the differences between intra-group cohesion and intergroup competition. Patriotism connotes with attachment to one's country. Nationalism connotes with feelings of cultural superiority. Patriotism is associated with pride and love of the homeland. Nationalism is associated with power and dominance. Patriotic attitudes in the United States have never been significantly correlated with attitudes towards nuclear armament. Nationalism has shown a clear correlation with militaristic attitudes and support for nuclear armament.[56] The fact that patriotism and nationalism are two independent constructs means that one can feel deeply attached to one's own group without necessarily feeling hostile towards another group.

Education for patriotism (but not for nationalism), as well as for internationalism, is one of the more important steps towards reducing enmity. Recognising that all other nations and groups have legitimate rights to live in dignity and to be free is another fundamental step towards respectful coexistence. We must honour our differences, and not judge people by them. Recognising others as full human beings is a prerequisite for living in a world where conflicts may exist, but the first and last option for resolving these conflicts must no longer be war.

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26. Jean Piaget and A.M. Weil, The development in children of the idea of the homeland and of relations with other countries, *International Social Science Bulletin*, **3** (1951), 561–578. See also Allport *The nature of Prejudice.*

27. G. Allport and L. Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York: Holt, 1947). See also Silverstein and Flamenbaum, Biases in the perception and cognition of the actions of enemies.
28. For review of these studies see Brett Silverstein, The psychology of U.S. attitudes and cognitions regarding the Soviet Union, *American Psychologist,* **44** (1989), 903–913, Silverstein and Flamenbaum, Biases in the perception and cognition of the actions of enemies, and Burns and Oskamp, Ingroup Biases and the U.S.-Soviet conflict.
29. Jerry Robinson, cartoonist, personal communication.
30. M. Hirschberg, *Attribution for superpower intervention: Were they forced to do it?* Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Secaucus, N.J. (July, 1988).
31. Silverstein, The psychology of U.S. attitudes and cognitions regarding the Soviet Union.
32. *New York Times,* 27 May 1956.
33. Uri Bronfenbrenner, The mirror image in Soviet-American relations: *A social psychologist's report, Journal of Social Issues,* **17** (1961) 46–56.
34. Ralph K. White, *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of the United States-Soviet Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1984).
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36. Silverstein and Flamenbaum, Biases in the perception and cognition of the actions of enemies.
38. Balance Theory is a theory developed by Heider, a social psychologist. It focuses on the relationships between three entities A, B and C. Balance state exists, according to Heider, when all three relationships between A, B and C are positive or when two relationships are negative and one is positive. An unbalanced state exists when all three relationships are negative or when two relationships are positive and one is negative. In other words if person A likes person B who hate person C, and person A likes person C, (the enemy of my friend is my friend) there is unbalance or discomfort which will often result in at least one person changing their mind. For Heider theory see F. Heider, *The psychology of interpersonal relations* (New York: Wiley, 1972). For the application of the Balance Theory to enmity see M. Hirchberg and M. Levingstone, *My enemies are allies: The Soviet Union, Iran and the cognitive connection.* Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Secaucus, N.J. (1988).
39. Silverstein, The psychology of U.S. attitudes and cognitions regarding the Soviet Union.
40. Robert M. Rosh, Ethnic Cleavage as a component of global military expenditure, *Journal of Peace Research,* **24** (1987), 21–30.
41. Brett Silverstein, The psychology of U.S. attitudes and cognitions regarding the Soviet Union.
42. For further reading on the complex relationships between gender and enmity see O. Zur and A. Morrison, Gender and war: Reexamining attitudes, *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,* **59** (1989), 528–533, and Ofer Zur and Chellis Glendinning, Men/Women, War/Peace: A System Approach. In Macy, M. (ed.) *Solutions for a Troubled World* (Boulder CO: Earthview Press, 1987) Ch. 10, pp. 107–121.
43. Doublespeak is a term coined by George Orwell in his novel *1984* to describe words are twisted into weapons of government mind control in a futuristic society.
44. For further discussion on realistic empathy in the nuclear era see: Ralph K. White, *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of the United States-Soviet Conflict,*

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45. R. Kosteman and S. Feshback, Towards a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political Psychology*, **10** (1989), 257–274.