

# Bachelor Thesis

## Unlinkability of Verifiable Credentials in a practical approach

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Goal

# What is the goal?

Check for unlinkability of Verifiable Credentials in conjunction with the BBS Signature Scheme in Real-World implementations

# Self-sovereign Identity

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# Self-sovereign Identity (SSI)

- Is a concept, where a Person (**Holder**), decides who gets to know what about them
- Holders can choose what to disclose and what not, also known as **selective disclosure**
- First problem:
  - ▣ Holder shows Government ID
  - ▣ Is a set of data/ set of **attributes**
  - ▣ The person verifying sees all the attributes
- Second problem:
  - ▣ Holder shows attributes to someone who wants to verify, known as a **verifier**
  - ▣ Then shows the same attributes to a second verifier
  - ▣ The holder then can be **linked**
- Today's state - Holders have no control over their attributes
- Tomorrow's state thanks to SSI - Holders have full control over their attributes

# Trust Triangle

- How does the verifier know that the set of attributes (**credential**), is valid?
- He trusts the issuer!
- Example: Swiss government ID has holograms




Figure: Trust triangle

# Verifiable Credentials

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# Verifiable Credentials (VC)

- Verifiable Credentials are digital representations of physical credentials
- JSON-LD represent attributes as **key-value pairs**
- Example:
  - ▣ First name on Government ID
  - ▣ Represented as {"first\_name": "Joel"}
  - ▣ "first\_name" is the key and "Joel" is the value

```
1 {  
2   "@context": [  
3     "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",  
4     "https://w3id.org/security/data-integrity/v2",  
5     "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RockstaYT/B  
A_Thesis_BBS_Signatures/docs/context/example_1.jsonld"  
6   ],  
7   "type": ["VerifiableCredential"],  
8   "credentialSubject": {  
9     "first_name": "Joel",  
10    "last_name": "Robles",  
11    "birth_date": "11.10.1999"  
12  }  
13 }  
14
```

Figure: Example VC

# VCs and BBS

- Why are they called **Verifiable** Credentials?
- The verifier is able to verify a VC that was presented to him (**Verifiable Presentation**), because of cryptographic signatures
- These show that a credential has not been altered since issuance
- We use the BBS Signature Scheme (**BBS**)
- This scheme provides **selective disclosure** and **unlinkability**
- How unlinkability? - Verifier needs the signature
- BBS can generate **proofs**
- These proof that a holder knows the signature, without revealing it
- These are also unlinkable between each generation

# Verifiable Presentations

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# Verifiable Presentation (VP)

- A holder would like to present a VC
- For that, Verifiable Presentations are used
- BBS can only sign statements
- The **RDF** canonicalization algorithm creates statements out of key-value pairs



```
1 ' _:b0 <https://schema.org/givenName> "Joel" .\n',  
2 ' _:b0 <https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/issuer-dependent#  
   birth_date> "11.10.1999" .\n',  
3 ' _:b0 <https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/issuer-dependent#  
   last_name> "Robles" .\n',  
4 ' _:b1 <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <h  
   ttps://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#VerifiableCredential>  
   .\n',  
5 ' _:b1 <https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#credentialSubje  
   ct> _:b0 .\n'
```

**Figure:** Example Canonicalized VP

# Security Considerations

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# Shuffling of statements

- The verifier now gets a VP from the holder, which can be verified against the public key of the issuer
- The holder gets a new version of a credential, where an attribute has been changed
- In a very specific case, the RDF canonicalization algorithm can lead to data leakage
- Each time this algorithm is used, the canonical statements must be shuffled using a hash function

# Outlook

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# Outlook

- Analyze OpenID Connect for Verifiable Presentations (**OIDC4VP**) for unlinkability and data leakage
- Analyze Link Secrets and Blind Signatures for unlinkability and data leakage