

A br1ef h1story of P@ssw0rds

Hello!
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<https://robn.io/passwords-compcon-2016/>

What I did

What I did

- 1998 - Started a Computer Science degree

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- 1999-2012 - Monash Uni, doing mail and web stuff
 - Netscape Mail → Lotus Notes → Google Apps

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What I did

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- 1999-2012 - Monash Uni, doing mail and web stuff
 - Netscape Mail → Lotus Notes → Google Apps
- 2012-today - FastMail, doing mail and web stuff
- I do operations - keeping the lights on



I am not a
security expert



Passwords

**Passwords
are terrible**

**Passwords
have always been
terrible**

1961

First use of passwords



1961

First use of passwords

- MIT's "Compatible Time Sharing System" (CTSS)



1961

First use of passwords

- MIT's "Compatible Time Sharing System" (CTSS)
- Allowed a running task to be interrupted so a higher priority task could be run
 - and then, once finished, the original task continues



1961

First use of passwords

- MIT's "Compatible Time Sharing System" (CTSS)
- Allowed a running task to be interrupted so a higher priority task could be run
 - and then, once finished, the original task continues
- Usernames & passwords used to protect files and allocate run time



1962

First password hack



1962

First password hack

- Allan Scherr, Ph.D student



1962

First password hack

- Allan Scherr, Ph.D student
- Allocated four hours per week,
needed more for his simulations



1962

First password hack

- Allan Scherr, Ph.D student
- Allocated four hours per week, needed more for his simulations
- Print service ran as a privileged service



1962

First password hack

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- Allocated four hours per week, needed more for his simulations
- Print service ran as a privileged service
- Wrote a program to request a printout of the password file



1962

First password hack

- Allan Scherr, Ph.D student
- Allocated four hours per week, needed more for his simulations
- Print service ran as a privileged service
- Wrote a program to request a printout of the password file
- Gave everyone a copy to cover his tracks



1966

First password leak



1966

First password leak

- One user editing the password file



1966

First password leak

- One user editing the password file
- Another user editing the MOTD file



1966

First password leak

- One user editing the password file
- Another user editing the MOTD file
- Editor used a hardcoded file for temp storage



1966

First password leak

- One user editing the password file
- Another user editing the MOTD file
- Editor used a hardcoded file for temp storage
- Password file was written to MOTD file




1966

First password leak

- One user editing the password file
- Another user editing the MOTD file
- Editor used a hardcoded file for temp storage
- Password file was written to MOTD file
- Displayed to users on login





1966-1974

Hashed passwords

mem = 1042
RESTRICTED RIGHTS

Use, duplication or disclosure is subject to restrictions stated in Contract with Western Electric Company, Inc.

```
# CAT /ETC/PASSWD
ROOT:::0:::/:
DAEMON:::1:::/:
BIN:::3:::/BIN:
KEN:::6:::/USR/KEN:
# PASSWD KEN BIGSECRET
# CAT /ETC/PASSWD
ROOT:::0:::/:
DAEMON:::1:::/:
BIN:::3:::/BIN:
KEN:A042VD2G:6:::/USR/KEN:
#
```

1966-1974

Hashed passwords

- Experiments with "encoded" passwords in CTSS, MULTICS and UNIX

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1966-1974

Hashed passwords

- Experiments with "encoded" passwords in CTSS, MULTICS and UNIX
- Renewed interest in one-way hash functions
 - Don't store the password, store a value derived from the password
 - Do the same thing with the login password, compare

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1966-1974

Hashed passwords

- Experiments with "encoded" passwords in CTSS, MULTICS and UNIX
- Renewed interest in one-way hash functions
 - Don't store the password, store a value derived from the password
 - Do the same thing with the login password, compare
- Robert Morris implements crypt() in 6th Edition UNIX


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ROOT:::0:::/:
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BIN:::3:::/BIN:
KEN:A042VD2G:6:::/USR/KEN:
#
```

1979

Password Security: A Case History



Password Security: A Case History

The authors have conducted experiments to try to determine typical users' habits in the choice of passwords when no constraint is put on their choice. The results were disappointing, except to the bad guy. In a collection of 3,289 passwords gathered from many users over a long period of time,

- 15 were a single ASCII character;
- 72 were strings of two ASCII characters;
- 464 were strings of three ASCII characters;
- 477 were strings of four alphamericics;
- 706 were five letters, all upper-case or all lower-case;
- 605 were six letters, all lower-case.

An additional 492 passwords appeared in various available dictionaries, name lists, and the like. A total of 2,831 or 86 percent of this sample of passwords fell into one of these classes.

2015


**You won't believe what
happened next**

~~before~~
~~from~~
Doubt
Pencil

2015

You won't believe what happened next


- SplashData's 5th annual "Worst Password List"



2015


You won't believe what happened next

- SplashData's 5th annual "Worst Password List"
- 2m+ leaked passwords analysed



2015


Ten popular passwords you need to know right now



2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now


123456



2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now

123456
password




2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now

123456

password

12345678



2015


Ten popular passwords you need to know right now

123456

password

12345678

qwerty



2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now


123456

password

12345678

qwerty

12345



2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now

123456


password

12345678

qwerty

12345

123456789



2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now

123456

password


12345678

qwerty

12345

123456789

football



2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now

123456

password

12345678


qwerty

12345

123456789

football

1234



2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now

123456

password

12345678

qwerty


12345

123456789

football

1234

1234567



2015

Ten popular passwords you need to know right now

123456

password

12345678

qwerty

12345


123456789


football

1234

1234567

baseball





八(ツ)ノ

You (human)

Your password is:

Easy to guess

**Your password is:
Easy to brute-force**

**Your password is:
Likely to be reused**



You (service)

**Your service is:
Responsible**

**Your service is:
Trustworthy**

*My good opinion once
lost is lost forever.*

– Mr. Darcy, *Pride and Prejudice*

**Your service is:
At the mercy of other
services**

You (pet)

**SOMEONE FIGURED OUT MY
PASSWORD**



**NOW I HAVE TO RENAME
MY DOG**

We can help



We can help

- Encourage high-quality passwords



We can help

- Encourage high-quality passwords
- Keep passwords secret



We can help

- Encourage high-quality passwords
- Keep passwords secret
- Make passwords useless



Encourage high-quality passwords

Password policies

A traditional password policy

A traditional password policy

- Must be at least 8 characters

A traditional password policy

- Must be at least 8 characters
- Must contain at least one upper-case character

A traditional password policy

- Must be at least 8 characters
- Must contain at least one upper-case character
- Must contain at least one lower-case character

A traditional password policy

- Must be at least 8 characters
- Must contain at least one upper-case character
- Must contain at least one lower-case character
- Must contain at least one number

A traditional password policy

- Must be at least 8 characters
- Must contain at least one upper-case character
- Must contain at least one lower-case character
- Must contain at least one number
- Must contain at least one symbol

No



A traditional password policy

A traditional password policy

- Good password: P@ssword1

A traditional password policy

- Good password: P@ssword1
- Bad password: 4u8zvbvabxmdx56s



Password strength

Password strength

- Isn't about the length of a password

Password strength

- Isn't about the length of a password
- Isn't about the number of weird characters

Password strength

- Isn't about the length of a password
- Isn't about the number of weird characters
- Well, not exactly

Randomness

```
int getRandomNumber()
{
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.
              // guaranteed to be random.
}
```




Strength test

New Password

.....


Password strength: 

Strength test




- Test the password and tell the user how strong it is

Strength test



- Test the password and tell the user how strong it is
- Considering common templates, words, sequences, etc

Strength test



- Test the password and tell the user how strong it is
- Considering common templates, words, sequences, etc
- zxcvbn by Dropbox



**Keep passwords
secret**

**ONCE MORE UNTO THE
BREACH, DEAR FRIENDS**



ONCE MORE

Have i been pwned?

haveibeenpwned.com

Have i been pwned?

Top 10 breaches

-  359,420,698 MySpace accounts
-  164,611,595 LinkedIn accounts
-  152,445,165 Adobe accounts
-  112,005,531 Badoo accounts
-  93,338,602 VK accounts
-  68,648,009 Dropbox accounts
-  65,469,298 tumblr accounts
-  49,467,477 iMesh accounts
-  40,767,652 Fling accounts
-  37,217,682 Last.fm accounts

Have i been pwned?

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: Paid-to-click site ClixSense had 2.4M user accounts exposed. 51% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

6:09 PM - 11 Sep 2016

1 32 12

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: The InterPals penpal website had 3.4M user accounts hacked in 2015. 40% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

10:08 PM - 30 Aug 2016

1 10 5

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: VK had 93M emails exposed in approximately 2012. 9% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

2:33 AM - 10 Jun 2016

1 47 18

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: Gaming news site DLH had 3.3M user accounts hacked in July. 20% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

9:47 AM - 8 Sep 2016

1 26 13

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: Neopets had 27M unique emails leaked May. 44% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

11:31 AM - 8 Jul 2016

1 61 39

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: In Jan, the Minecraft community "Lifeboat" had 7M accounts exposed. 6% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

8:09 PM - 26 Apr 2016

1 83 65

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: Flash Flash Revolution had 1.8M user accounts hacked in February. 61% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

7:25 PM - 6 Sep 2016

1 17 12

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: The Facebook app "Uiggy" had 2.7M emails exposed this month. 19% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

7:09 PM - 27 Jun 2016

1 50 26

 **Have I been pwned?**
@haveibeenpwned 

New breach: In Feb, Mate1 had 27M accounts with deeply personal info exposed. 14% were already in [@haveibeenpwned haveibeenpwned.com](#)

5:20 PM - 15 Apr 2016

1 29 10

How can we help people
impacted by data
breaches without making
life worse for them?

– Troy Hunt, [Have i been pwned?](#)

Your opponent



**Your opponent
has:**



Your opponent has:

- Stored password (hashes)



Your opponent has:

- Stored password (hashes)
- Email address / username



Your opponent has:

- Stored password (hashes)
- Email address / username
- Other personal info
 - Physical address
 - Payment details
 - Actual content
 - Control of your account
 - ...



**Your opponent
wants:**



Your opponent wants:

- Plaintext password



Your opponent needs:



Your opponent needs:

- Time



Your opponent needs:

- Time
- Money



Hash functions

Choosing a hash function

Choosing a hash function

- Cryptographic hash functions
 - Pre-image resistance
 - Second pre-image resistance
 - Collision resistance

Choosing a hash function

- Cryptographic hash functions
 - Pre-image resistance
 - Second pre-image resistance
 - Collision resistance
- Key-derivation function
 - Produces a high-randomness output from a low-randomness input
 - Slow 

Speed test



Speed test

- "Bad" functions
 - sha512 203252/s
 - sha256 456621/s
 - sha1 512821/s
 - md5 2173913/s



Speed test

- "Bad" functions
 - sha512 203252/s
 - sha256 456621/s
 - sha1 512821/s
 - md5 2173913/s
- "Good" functions
 - bcrypt 14.9/s
 - scrypt 21.7/s
 - pbkdf2 21.8/s





Further reading



I got pwned!

You've been pwned!

You signed up for notifications when your account was pwned in a data breach and unfortunately, it's happened. Here's what's known about the breach:

Breach:	Last.fm
Date of breach:	22 Mar 2012
Number of accounts:	37,217,682
Compromised data:	Email addresses, Passwords, Usernames, Website activity

n8m1yF75wPjFP0K1

udvrcqt3wk3headj

Your password is not strong enough. New passwords must:

- Be at least six characters long
- Contain one or more numbers
- Include at least one of the following special characters: !"#\$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?
@[\]^_`{|}~, or a space



**Make passwords
useless**

Two-factor authentication



**Something you
know**



**Something you
have**



**Something you
have**



Something you have

- Some physical thing that only you have access to



Something you have

- Some physical thing that only you have access to
- Previously registered with the account



Something you have

- Some physical thing that only you have access to
- Previously registered with the account
- Your phone
 - SMS
 - TOTP



Something you have

- Some physical thing that only you have access to
- Previously registered with the account
- Your phone
 - SMS
 - TOTP
- A standalone security device
 - U2F
 - TOTP





Username & password

Username

Password

Keep me logged in

Log In

Second factor: SMS

Send a single use code to:

+61 4XX XXX X40 Sent

Enter the code we sent you:

BH2KP4


Don't require two-step verification again on this device

Verify

Second factor: TOTP



Second factor: TOTP



Second factor: TOTP

Enter the 6-digit code from the authenticator app on your phone:

123456


- Don't require two-step verification again on this device

Verify

Second factor: U2F



Second factor: U2F



Second factor: U2F

Insert your security key into the computer. Then if it has a button, press it.



Waiting for device

- Don't require two-step verification again on this device

Bonus prize round!



Why two-factor?



Why two-factor?

- Make the password useless by itself



Why two-factor?

- Make the password useless by itself
- Even when leaked or stolen



Why two-factor?

- Make the password useless by itself
- Even when leaked or stolen
- But make the second factor do nothing by itself



Why two-factor?

- Make the password useless by itself
- Even when leaked or stolen
- But make the second factor do nothing by itself
- So you can lose your phone but still keep your account safe



We helped!



We helped!



We helped!

- High-quality passwords
 - Sensible password policy and strength feedback to user



We helped!

- High-quality passwords
 - Sensible password policy and strength feedback to user
- Passwords stored securely
 - Good hash function with salts



We helped!

- High-quality passwords
 - Sensible password policy and strength feedback to user
- Passwords stored securely
 - Good hash function with salts
- Passwords not the whole story
 - Two-factor authentication





**Passwords
are terrible**



Th@nk you!

Th@nk you!
(don't forget your U2F key)